Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Azizullah Khan vs Government of Pakistan and 4 others1989 SCMR 1623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-13
  locus standiwrit jurisdictionadministrative lawconstitutional petitionexhaustion of remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition challenging the installation of a petrol/diesel pump. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioner possessed the requisite locus standi to invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction to challenge the administrative decision regarding the installation of the pump. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the petitioner lacked the necessary locus standi to maintain the challenge in the writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the petitioner's remedy lay in agitating the grievance before the relevant administrative authorities or government agencies. The ratio established is that a party lacking locus standi cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge administrative actions such as the installation of a petrol pump, and must instead exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention, provided that any subsequent adverse order may then be challenged in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to challenge the installation of a petrol pump in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is it necessary to approach administrative authorities before invoking writ jurisdiction against the installation of a petrol pump?
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• Azizullah and 2 others vs Muhammad Ali and 2 others1989 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  criminal appealacquittaleye-witness credibilitySection 164 CrPCbenefit of doubtmurderballistic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in discarding the testimony of eye-witnesses and acquitting the respondents based on minor discrepancies and omissions in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasons for disbelieving the prosecution witnesses were inadequate. The Court found the eye-witness to be natural and disinterested, and the ocular evidence consistent with the medical evidence and the prompt F.I.R. The Court established the principle that minor discrepancies or omissions in statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 do not necessarily invalidate the substantial part of a witness's testimony, especially when the prosecution's case is otherwise corroborated by ballistic evidence and a proven motive. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court, granting the respondents the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy or omission in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically invalidate the testimony of an eye-witness?
  • Can an appellate court set aside an acquittal if the trial court's assessment of evidence was sound and the High Court's reasons for disbelieving witnesses were inadequate?
  • Is the prompt lodging of an F.I.R. a relevant factor in assessing the credibility of ocular evidence in a murder case?
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• Aziz Ullah and 11 others vs Rasool Bakhsh and 29 others1989 SCMR 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-29
  civil appealAdhlapi agreementconcurrent findingstitle to landmutationleave to appealadverse possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from concurrent judgments of three lower courts regarding the title to disputed land claimed by the defendants/petitioners under an Adhlapi agreement. The core legal questions involved whether the defendants established the existence and fulfillment of the Adhlapi agreement, including the sinking of a well and making the land cultivable, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the Adhlapi agreement or the fulfillment of its conditions, and could not demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court ruled that no case was made out for interference with the concurrent findings of fact. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding title and possession, supported by evidence and free from material irregularity, will not be interfered with in leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding title and possession can be interfered with without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is the attestation of a mutation based on an Adhlapi agreement sustainable when the conditions of sinking a well and cultivating the land are not fulfilled?
  • When does limitation start in a suit challenging mutation entries where the defendants threaten interference with ownership and possession?
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• Aziz Ahmad vs Muhammad Tufail and another1989 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-15
  pre-emptionestoppel by conductvendeewrit petitionBoard of Revenuerevisional jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner vendee's constitutional writ petition by the High Court in a pre-emption dispute. Although the petitioner's right of pre-emption was admittedly weaker than that of the respondent pre-emptor, the primary controversy concerned whether the pre-emptor was estopped by conduct from exercising his pre-emption right. Specifically, upon gaining knowledge of the transaction, the pre-emptor allegedly sought time from the vendor on the ground of lacking funds instead of concluding the bargain immediately. The Supreme Court observed that the Additional Commissioner's finding on the bar of estoppel prima facie appeared correct. Consequently, it required determination whether the Member, Board of Revenue, was justified in overturning that decision in revision, and whether the High Court ought to have intervened under its constitutional jurisdiction. Finding that substantial legal questions required consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is estopped by conduct from claiming a right of pre-emption if, upon gaining knowledge of the sale, he seeks time from the vendor due to lack of funds instead of concluding the transaction immediately?
  • Whether the Member, Board of Revenue, properly exercised revisional jurisdiction in reversing a finding of estoppel against a pre-emptor?
  • Whether the High Court ought to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an order of the Member, Board of Revenue that improperly reversed a finding on estoppel?
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• Azam Riaz Farooqi vs Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 4 others1989 SCMR 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-31
  colonization of government landsleave to appealallotment of landlegal heirsboard of revenue directives
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute adjudicated by the Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court is whether section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act is subject to the control of section 10 of the said Act, along with the terms and conditions laid down in relevant schemes and directives issued by the Board of Revenue. Granting leave to appeal, the Court held that the appeal may proceed subject to the condition that the petitioner implead the Muslim Law heirs of the original allottee as appellants and that any potential benefit from the success of the appeal shall accrue to those heirs. The key principle laid down relates to the interplay between statutory provisions governing government land colonization and the necessity of joining all legal heirs in appellate proceedings concerning allotted estates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act is subject to the control of section 10 thereof and the relevant schemes and directives issued by the Board of Revenue?
  • Can leave to appeal be made conditional upon the impleadment of the Muslim Law heirs of the original allottee?
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• Ayyas Mahmood vs Additional District Judge and others1989 SCMR 1743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  writ petitionconstitutional jurisdictionfrauddiscretionary reliefsale of landdecreeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition, which stemmed from the dismissal of his application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging a land sale decree on the ground of fraud. The core legal question concerns whether discretionary constitutional relief can be granted to a party attempting to use technicalities to defraud another despite concurrent findings that no fraud was committed against him and that he received the sale consideration. The Supreme Court held that a writ shall not issue in aid of injustice under constitutional jurisdiction and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction will be withheld from a litigant whose conduct shows an attempt to perpetuate injustice or defraud an opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ issue in aid of injustice under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Is a party who has received sale consideration and attempted to retain it without justification entitled to discretionary relief on the ground of fraud?
  • Whether an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging a decree on the ground of fraud can succeed when findings establish no fraud was committed against the applicant?
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• Ayub Hassan vs Government of the Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1255(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-19
  service tribunalcompulsory retirementqualifying servicecivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, formerly an Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged his retirement from service after completion of 25 years of qualifying service, arguing that his prior service under the Central Government should not have been combined with his Provincial Government service of 15 years for computing the retirement threshold, relying on precedent. The core legal question is whether Central Government service can be included by the Provincial Government when computing the 25 years of qualifying service for premature retirement under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention raised regarding the computation of qualifying service requires detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that the amalgamation of Central and Provincial government service for calculating qualifying service for retirement requires judicial scrutiny when challenged under the governing service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prior service under the Central Government can be counted towards qualifying service for retirement under the Provincial Government?
  • Does the computation of twenty-five years of service for retirement permit the amalgamation of federal and provincial tenures?
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• Attaur Rehman and another vs Mst. Azra Bibi and another1989 SCMR 1426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  minor custodyguardian and wardwelfare of the minormuslim personal lawconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the custody of a minor, Nazimur Rehman. The Guardian Judge initially awarded custody of the minor to the mother after recording evidence, which decision was subsequently upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge and confirmed by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question pertained to the proper custody of the minor and the welfare of the child. The Supreme Court held that none of the courts below committed any illegality in awarding the custody of the minor to the mother, noting that the High Court rightly kept in view the welfare of the minor as a paramount consideration alongside Muslim Personal Law. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in determining child custody matters?
  • Can the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction be invoked against concurrent findings of lower courts in custody matters?
  • Is the mother entitled to the custody of a minor under Muslim Personal Law and surrounding circumstances?
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• Atta Muhammad Khan Niazi vs The Deputy Inspectorgeneral of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha and another1989 SCMR 1566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-13
  Service Tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsreversion in rankunauthorized absencepolice serviceleave to appealquestion of law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Head Constable, challenged his reversion to the rank of Constable following an order by the Superintendent of Police due to unauthorized absence from duty. After exhausting departmental remedies, he appealed to the Service Tribunal, alleging that the daily diary register at the police station had been forged to falsely record his absence. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the absence was willful and that there was no evidence of tampering with the register. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, contending that an inquiry report supported his defense. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings, noting that the inquiry report relied upon by the petitioner was inconclusive and contradictory. Finding that the Service Tribunal's factual determination regarding the willful absence was sound and that no substantial question of law was presented, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does an inconclusive and contradictory inquiry report provide sufficient grounds to challenge a disciplinary finding of willful absence?
  • Is the factual determination of a Service Tribunal regarding the integrity of official police records subject to interference by the Supreme Court when no question of law is involved?
  • Can a disciplinary order of reversion be set aside on the basis of alleged forgery of departmental records if the evidence does not substantiate the claim?
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• Atta Muhammad and 2 others vs Hakim Ali and 3 others1989 SCMR 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-12
  specific performancediscretionary reliefleave to appealmonetary compensationcivil revisionsecond vendees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendants against a High Court judgment that dismissed their Civil Revision in a suit for specific performance. The petitioners, who were second vendees, contended that the discretionary relief of specific performance should not have been granted because the respondents could be adequately compensated through monetary damages, as suggested by the pleadings and the agreement in question. The Supreme Court, having previously settled other issues regarding the parties' rights in earlier litigation, examined this sole remaining contention. The Court held that the discretion to grant specific performance was exercised correctly by the lower courts. It further observed that the High Court had addressed the argument regarding monetary compensation with adequate reasoning, which did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the lower court's decision to grant specific performance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the discretionary relief of specific performance be denied solely on the ground that the plaintiff could be adequately compensated by money?
  • Does a High Court's reasoned dismissal of an argument regarding monetary compensation in a specific performance suit warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Ataurrehman vs Capt. Shahid Saleem Lone and others1989 SCMR 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  specific performanceamendment of plaintimpleadment of legal heirsleave to appealwrit jurisdictioncorrection of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside orders allowing the amendment of a plaint in a suit for specific performance. The core legal dispute arose when the trial court permitted the plaintiff to amend the plaint to implead the legal heirs of a deceased defendant, a decision initially upheld by the District Judge in revision. However, the High Court subsequently declared the trial and revisional courts' orders to be of no legal effect, effectively barring the impleadment of the deceased's widow and daughters. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the petition, granted leave to appeal to examine whether the trial court possessed the authority to correct the record or allow the amendment of the plaint under the circumstances. The Court held that the matter warranted a deeper examination of the procedural propriety of the lower courts' decisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court admitted the appeal for hearing, directed the parties to file necessary documents, and imposed an injunction restraining the alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court allow the amendment of a plaint to implead the legal heirs of a deceased defendant?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to set aside an order allowing the correction of a plaint in a revisionary capacity?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court correct the record regarding the parties in a suit for specific performance?
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• Assistant Controller of Customs and 3 others vs Messrs Link1989 SCMR 1698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  customs valuationimport dutyremandopen market pricewrit jurisdictioncustoms assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a customs valuation assessment imposed by the Assistant Collector of Customs. The respondent-company had imported copper wire from Taiwan, but customs authorities assessed the value based on the price of similar goods originating from Japan and Poland, effectively doubling the valuation. The High Court accepted the respondent's writ petition, holding that the respondent's original valuation should be accepted. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that under Sections 25 and 30 of the Customs Act, the valuation should be based on the price fetched in an open market sale between independent buyers and sellers in the country of export. The petitioners contended that if the valuation methodology was flawed, the High Court should have remanded the matter to the customs authorities for reassessment rather than setting aside the order entirely. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether, in the circumstances, the High Court should have remanded the case to the customs authority for proper valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should remand a case to the customs authority when the valuation methodology is found to be legally flawed?
  • Does the Customs Act require the normal price of imported goods to be determined based on the price of goods from the country of export rather than goods of other origins?
  • Is the valuation of imported goods under the Customs Act to be assessed based on a sale in the open market between a buyer and seller independent of each other?
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• Aslam Pervaiz and another vs The State and others1989 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-09
  criminal appealenhancement of sentencemurder convictionattempted murdercommon intentionappellate interferencecompensation to heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions: a jail petition filed by Aslam Pervaiz challenging his conviction and sentence for murder and attempted murder, and a criminal petition filed by the complainant, Muhammad Akram, seeking enhancement of the sentences awarded to Aslam Pervaiz and Nazir Ahmad. The core legal questions concerned whether the evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the accused under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the sentences of life imprisonment imposed by the High Court were inadequate and required enhancement. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the convictions were well-founded, noting that the incident arose from an exchange of hot words followed by firing, which resulted in one death and two injuries. The Court concluded that the sentences awarded were neither capricious nor outrageous. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions, maintaining the convictions and the sentences imposed by the High Court. The key principle affirmed is that appellate courts will not interfere with sentences that are proportionate to the circumstances of the offence and are neither capricious nor outrageous.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exchange of hot words preceding a shooting incident justify the enhancement of a life sentence to death?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a sentence imposed by the High Court?
  • Is a conviction under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable where the evidence shows a sudden escalation from a verbal altercation to firing?
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• Asian Associated Agencies vs Pakistan through Secretary,Ministry of Industries, Government of Pakistan1989 SCMR 2029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-23
  review applicationexecution proceedingsleave to appealscope of appealforeign exchange regulationconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the High Court dismissing a review application, which sought to challenge an earlier order regarding execution proceedings and the interpretation of a stay application. The appellant sought to contest the High Court's findings on whether a previous order constituted a consent order and whether it could be subsequently recalled. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant's counsel abandoned the initial contentions regarding the nature of the orders and the procedural propriety of the High Court's review. Instead, the appellant attempted to raise new arguments concerning the relevant date for determining exchange rates for remitting decretal amounts under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The Supreme Court held that these new questions did not arise from the High Court's order under review, nor were the findings in that order being challenged. Consequently, the Court determined that leave to appeal had been granted under a misapprehension of the scope of the appeal. The Court recalled the order granting leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal, affirming that appellate review is limited to the specific order under challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant raise new questions of law in an appeal that were not the subject of the order under review?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to recall an order granting leave to appeal if it determines the leave was granted under a misapprehension?
  • Is a review application under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record?
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• Ashiq Hussain and 3 others vs The State1989 SCMR 1580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  statutory baildelay in trialSection 497 CrPCpost-arrest bailspeedy trialcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a bail application filed by the petitioners, who sought release under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, on the grounds that their trial had not concluded within the statutory period of two years. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory bail when delays in the trial proceedings were partially attributable to their own acts or omissions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to bail, affirming that the statutory concession is unavailable where the delay in concluding the trial is occasioned by the accused's own conduct. The Court established the principle that the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, does not require a precise mathematical calculation of delay caused by the defence; rather, it requires determining whether the finalization of the trial has been delayed, in any manner, by an act or omission on the part of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a precise calculation of the time constituting delay caused by the defence required to deny bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the statutory right to bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, apply if the delay in the trial is occasioned by an act or omission of the accused?
  • Can an accused claim the benefit of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, if the trial has been delayed due to the accused's own transfer applications and requests for leave?
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• Ashiq Ali vs Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others1989 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-21
  identity of propertyfactual controversyabuse of process of lawexecuting courtleave to appealpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute concerning the identity and location of property. The lower courts, including the High Court, resolved the factual controversy regarding the property's identity and location against the petitioner, primarily based on the petitioner's own pleadings. The Supreme Court found that the questions raised were essentially factual and had been correctly determined by the courts below. Consequently, the Court found no justification for interference and refused leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court addressed the petitioner's intent to re-agitate the same plea before the executing court. The Supreme Court held that raising the same controversy again before the executing court would not constitute an honest pursuit and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The petition was dismissed with these observations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-agitate a factual controversy regarding property identity before an executing court after it has been resolved against them by the High Court?
  • Does the re-litigation of a settled factual issue before an executing court constitute an abuse of the process of law?
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• Ashfaq Muhammad vs Managing Director, Pakistan State Oils1989 SCMR 1671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-15
  dismissal from servicemisappropriationconstitutional jurisdictionintra-court appealterms and conditions of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner, a former Depot Officer of the Pakistan State Oil Company, for the misappropriation of 9,100 litres of petrol. The petitioner initially challenged his dismissal through a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed on the grounds that no service rules were produced to substantiate procedural irregularities and no evidence demonstrated the dismissal was passed without lawful authority. An Intra-Court Appeal subsequently affirmed this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his dismissal violated Section 16 of the Marketing of Petroleum Products (Federal Control) Act, 1974, which mandates the continuance of service under existing terms and conditions. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate how this provision was violated or that the Managing Director had altered his terms of service in a manner contrary to law. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish any merit in his challenge and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an employee of a managed company under the Marketing of Petroleum Products (Federal Control) Act, 1974, require proof of violation of specific service rules?
  • Can an employee challenge a dismissal order in constitutional jurisdiction without demonstrating that the order was passed without lawful authority?
  • Does Section 16 of the Marketing of Petroleum Products (Federal Control) Act, 1974, prevent the dismissal of an employee for misconduct if their terms and conditions of service remain unaltered?
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• Asghar Munir vs Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others1989 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  service tribunalsenioritycivil servantleave to appealpromotionjunior grade
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant working in WAPDA, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal regarding the fixation of his seniority. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can claim the settlement of seniority in a lower cadre for the purpose of claiming benefits in a higher grade when the applicable rules do not permit such benefit. The Supreme Court held that a civil servant has no right to demand the settlement of seniority in a junior grade unless the non-determination of that seniority directly affects their seniority in the higher grade under the applicable rules. Finding no question of law requiring further examination, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a right to get their seniority settled in a junior grade?
  • When can a civil servant claim the determination of seniority in a lower cadre while attacking their present seniority?
  • Does the non-determination of seniority in a lower grade necessarily aggrieve a civil servant?
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• Asghar Ali alias Sajid and 4 others vs Fazal Karim and another1989 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  leave to appealexecution of decreepurchasers pendente litelis pendensobjection petitioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by objectors against the dismissal of their civil revision concerning the execution of a decree for possession. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners, as purchasers pendente lite, could successfully object to the execution of the decree and whether their alternative grounds in the objection petition were legally competent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners' claim as purchasers pendente lite was rightly rejected under the principle of lis pendens, and further held that the objection petition on the remaining grounds was not competent. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the principle that purchasers pendente lite are bound by ongoing litigation and that objections on untenable grounds are incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Can purchasers pendente lite successfully object to the execution of a decree for possession?
  • Is an objection petition challenging a decree on other grounds competent when raised by purchasers pendente lite?
  • Does the principle of lis pendens apply to purchasers of property during the pendency of litigation?
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• Arshad Mahmood Jadoon vs Land Acquisition Collector, Abbottabad1989 SCMR 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-09
  land acquisitioncompensationconsolidation of appealsleave to appealappellate procedureadjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding compensation awarded for the acquisition of land. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred by consolidating two separate appeals concerning compensation for trees, arguing that the considerations and evidence relevant to one case improperly influenced the adjudication of the other. The Supreme Court examined whether, under the specific facts and circumstances, the appeals should have been adjudicated separately or, if consolidated, whether the evidence and its legal effect should have been analyzed distinctly for each matter. Noting that a related direct appeal was also pending in the High Court, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to further examine the propriety of the High Court's joint treatment of the distinct claims. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, permitted the filing of additional necessary documents, and ordered that the appeal be heard alongside the connected direct appeal filed by another party against the same impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Should separate appeals regarding land compensation be adjudicated distinctly rather than consolidated?
  • Does the consolidation of appeals require separate analysis of evidence and legal considerations for each case?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to allow considerations from one case to influence the outcome of a separate, albeit related, case?
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• Arshad Mahmood and others vs Maqbool Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-03
  compromiseappealpre-emptionsale pricesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of an appeal by Arshad Mahmood and others against Maqbool Ahmad and others. The core legal question concerns whether the pending appeal can be disposed of in terms of an out-of-court compromise reached between the parties. The Supreme Court accepted the joint request of the learned counsel for the parties and examined the duly signed compromise deed, which enhanced the sale price from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000 and stipulated the deposit of the additional amount by the pre-emptor decree-holder within one month, failing which the trial court decree would be set aside. Holding that the compromise is lawful and acceptable, the Court allowed the appeal and disposed of the matter in terms of the compromise deed, making no order as to costs. The key principle laid down is that appellate proceedings may be lawfully concluded and decrees modified in accordance with a genuine, lawful out-of-court compromise verified by the parties' counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal before the Supreme Court be disposed of in terms of an out-of-court compromise between the parties?
  • What is the legal effect of a default in depositing the enhanced sale price specified in a compromise deed?
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• Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer ,1989 PTD 935(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16
  income taxlawful authoritytax noticeconstitution petitionadministrative actionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the High Court dated 16-1-1986, which had presumably upheld certain tax-related notices issued by the Income-Tax Officer. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved the validity of an impugned notice dated 18-9-1984, along with subsequent notices dated 20-1-1985 and 26-1-1985, issued to the appellant, Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. The Supreme Court, upon review, allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appellant's Constitution petition, declaring the impugned notices to be issued without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court further issued a permanent restraint against the respondent, prohibiting them from acting upon, implementing, or taking any further action in pursuance of the aforementioned notices, either personally or through any agency. The judgment establishes the principle that administrative notices issued without lawful authority are void ab initio and unenforceable, and that the judiciary possesses the power to restrain tax authorities from acting upon such invalid notices to protect the rights of the taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court declare tax notices issued without lawful authority to be of no legal effect?
  • Does a court have the power to restrain tax authorities from acting upon invalid notices?
  • Is a Constitution petition an appropriate remedy to challenge administrative notices issued without lawful authority?
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• Anwar Khan and others vs Bakhsheesh Ah Mad and others1989 SCMR 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07
  pre-emptionwaiver of rightpetition for leave to appealconceded issueregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal, which arose from a suit for possession of land through pre-emption that was decreed in favor of the respondents and upheld by the District Judge. The core legal question concerns whether the respondents had waived their right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed because the issue of waiver was explicitly conceded and not pressed by the defendants' counsel before the trial Court, and was not argued before the lower appellate Court or raised as a ground in the Regular Second Appeal. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot be permitted to reagitate an issue in a higher forum that was explicitly conceded or abandoned as not pressed before the trial Court and omitted from grounds of appeal in intermediate appellate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise an issue in the Supreme Court that was conceded or not pressed before the trial Court?
  • Whether a Regular Second Appeal can be maintained on a point not argued before the lower appellate Court and omitted from the memorandum of appeal?
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• Anwar Ali and 4 others vs Hayat1989 SCMR 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-09
  pre-emptiontenant-vendeesuperior right of pre-emptionkhataleave to appealpartition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment in a pre-emption suit where the petitioners, who were tenants, purchased a fractional share of a larger khata. The core legal questions were whether the High Court was competent to decree the suit following the Supreme Court's ruling in Government of N.-W.F.P v. Malik Said Kamal Shah, and whether a tenant-vendee purchasing a share in a larger khata is entitled to retain the entire area under their tenancy from pre-emption or only the share corresponding to their purchase. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the controversy regarding the effect of Said Kamal Shah was resolved against the petitioners by Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali. Regarding the tenancy issue, the Court held that the vendees only acquired ownership to the extent of the fractional share purchased in the land under their tenancy, not the entire tenancy area. The key principle established is that a tenant-vendee purchasing a share in a larger khata becomes an owner only to the extent of the purchased share in every parcel of the land, including the land under their tenancy, and cannot claim protection for the entire tenancy area.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant-vendee who purchases a fractional share in a larger khata claim exemption from pre-emption for the entire area under their tenancy?
  • Does the decision in Government of N.-W.F.P v. Malik Said Kamal Shah preclude the High Court from decreeing a pre-emption suit in the circumstances presented?
  • Does a purchaser of a fractional share in a larger khata become an owner of the entire parcel of land under their tenancy or only to the extent of the share purchased?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad H.Malik vs Mst. Razia Begum1989 SCMR 1117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-12
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionconsent orderproduction of recordtrial court directions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court had disposed of the petitioner's constitutional petition based on the relief sought by the petitioner and the consent provided by the respondent. The High Court's order directed the trial court to ensure the production of relevant bank records regarding remittances by a specified date to facilitate the timely disposal of the case, while also allowing parties to present rebuttal evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged this order, expressing apprehension regarding potential technical difficulties in producing the entire record. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's direction was limited to the production of 'relevant record' only. Finding the petitioner's apprehension unsubstantiated and noting that the High Court had already granted the relief sought by the petitioner through consent, the Supreme Court held that no valid grounds existed for leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge an order in the Supreme Court that was passed by the High Court based on the petitioner's own requested relief and the respondent's consent?
  • Does a direction by the High Court for the production of 'relevant record' constitute a valid ground for appeal if the petitioner fears technical difficulties in producing the entire record?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad H. Malik vs Mst. Razia Begum and others1989 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  leave to appealspecific performanceappellate court dutynon-consideration of evidenceremand of caseprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a single order of the Lahore High Court arising from two consolidated suits concerning specific performance of a contract and a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's suit and decreed the respondent's suit. Upon appeal, the District Judge reversed the trial court's judgment. The High Court subsequently set aside the lower appellate court's judgment and remanded the matter because the lower appellate court failed to consider and examine the oral and documentary evidence produced by the respondent. The Supreme Court observed that the first appellate court is bound under the law to examine and consider the evidence produced by all parties and provide reasoned judgments. Agreeing with the High Court that the failure to consider material evidence warranted a remand for rehearing, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court cannot ignore evidence on the subjective assumption that it lacks quality. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the first appellate court required under the law to consider and evaluate the evidence produced by all parties before reversing a trial court's judgment?
  • Can an appellate court ignore evidence produced by a party on the ground that it is allegedly not of a quality that needs discussion?
  • Does the failure of a lower appellate court to consider material documentary and oral evidence justify the remand of the case for rehearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Faiz vs The Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority1989 SCMR 1742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  Service LawWAPDARemoval from serviceCompulsory retirementDepartmental negligenceService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the removal of the petitioner, a Director (Accounts) at the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner had been removed from service following allegations of misconduct, specifically related to negligence in handling departmental accounts and failure to maintain proper control over budgetary provisions. The Federal Service Tribunal had partially allowed the petitioner's appeal, setting aside the removal order and substituting it with an order of retirement. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the Tribunal's findings and the petitioner's arguments. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was unexceptionable, noting that the petitioner's admitted negligence in financial and budgetary oversight justified the disciplinary action taken. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, affirming the Tribunal's decision to retire the petitioner rather than remove him from service.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal substitute an order of removal from service with an order of retirement?
  • Does negligence in handling departmental accounts and budgetary control constitute sufficient grounds for disciplinary action under the WAPDA Act?
  • Is the finding of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding departmental negligence subject to interference by the Supreme Court if it is found to be unexceptionable?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir vs Province of Punjab and 2 others1989 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  proprietary rightsState landallotmentlease schemeleave to appealwrit petitionland reservation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which arose from the refusal of the authorities to grant proprietary rights to the petitioner over State land. The petitioner was allotted the land in 1971 under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, pursuant to a 15-year lease scheme. In 1979, the petitioner applied for proprietary rights, but the Collector rejected the application on the basis that the land was reserved for refugees from Jammu and Kashmir. After exhausting appellate remedies before the Board of Revenue and the High Court, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the relevant notification scheme and the petitioner's arguments regarding the applicability of the reservation condition. Ultimately, the petitioner conceded that the condition regarding the reservation of land was validly applicable to the grant of proprietary rights and that such rights could not be granted under the scheme governing the 1971 allotment. Consequently, the Court found no justification for granting leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can proprietary rights be granted on State land if the land is reserved for a specific class of persons under the governing scheme?
  • Does a condition regarding the reservation of land for refugees apply to the grant of proprietary rights for land allotted under a 15-year lease scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Muhammad and others vs Sardar and others1989 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-31
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionleave to appealsuperior right of pre-emptionquestion of factomission in plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by vendees against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court in a pre-emption case. The petitioners raised two primary contentions: first, that the suit was barred by the principle of partial pre-emption because the plaint failed to specifically mention a 1/6th share in an irrigation well included in the sale transaction; and second, that the respondents lacked a superior right of pre-emption as they were not owners in the village. Regarding the first issue, the Court held, relying on precedent, that an unintentional omission to mention a portion of the subject matter in the plaint does not constitute partial pre-emption. Concerning the second issue, the Court noted that the argument was not raised before the trial court and, being a question of fact, did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unintentional omission to mention a portion of the subject matter in a pre-emption plaint constitute partial pre-emption?
  • Can a question of fact not raised before the trial court be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Muhammad and others vs Member, Board of Revenue,N.W.F.P. and others1989 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-17
  right of pre-emptiontenant pre-emptionMartial Law Regulation 115Shariat BenchFederal Shariat CourtShariat Appellate Benchrepugnancy to Islamretrospective operation
  Summary & questions settled

  These proceedings arose out of two separate civil petitions for leave to appeal concerning pre-emption decrees granted in favor of tenants under Paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115). The core legal issue was whether a declaration by the Shariat Bench of the Peshawar High Court holding the tenant's right of pre-emption repugnant to Islamic Injunctions rendered pre-emption decrees passed before the Supreme Court's Shariat Appellate Bench decision of 1986 incompetent or ineffective. The Supreme Court converted the first petition into an appeal by consent and remanded it to the High Court for adjudication on merits. In the second petition, the Supreme Court held that under the proviso to Article 203-D(2) and Articles 203-F and 203-H of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, a declaration of repugnancy does not take effect until appeals are finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court fixed 31-07-1986 as the effective date for the invalidation of the provision, pre-emption decrees passed and affirmed prior to that date remained fully valid and enforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Shariat Bench recommendation to delete a statutory provision with immediate effect make the declaration of repugnancy operative upon announcement without a specified date under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the proviso added to Article 203-D(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 suspends the operation of a Shariat Bench judgment declaring a law repugnant to Islam during the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a declaration of repugnancy against Paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 render invalid pre-emption decrees passed and affirmed prior to the effective date specified by the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Akbar vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Revenue1989 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-17
  ad hoc appointmentregularization of servicescivil servicereversionconstitutional petitionleave to appealselection board
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had challenged the regularization of services of certain Naib Tehsildars. The petitioner and respondents Nos. 4-13 were initially appointed as Naib Tehsildars on an ad hoc basis. Following the promulgation of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988, a selection board was constituted under the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, to regularize ad hoc appointments. The respondents were selected for regular appointment, leading to the regularization of their services and the subsequent reversion of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the regularization process and the subsequent reversion of the petitioner were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the selection of the respondents was conducted on merits by a competent board in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's challenge, affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition, and refused leave to appeal, establishing that ad hoc appointees have no vested right to regularization over those selected on merit by a duly constituted board.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc appointee has a legal right to challenge the regularization of other ad hoc appointees selected by a duly constituted board?
  • Can a court interfere with the regularization of civil servants performed under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988, if the selection was made on merit?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Abdullah Khan vs Pak American Fertilizer Ltd. and another1989 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-28
  recovery of taxexport taxzila council taxseparate legal entitymanufacturer versus exporterpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which accepted the respondent's regular first appeal, set aside the trial court's decree, and dismissed the petitioner's suit for recovery of arrears of export tax. The petitioner had been leased the right to collect a tax imposed by the Zila Council on the export of fertilizers from District Mianwali and sued the respondent, Pak American Fertilizer Ltd., for unpaid tax on fertilizer consignments. The core legal question was whether the respondent company, as a manufacturer maintaining a factory railway siding, qualified as an 'exporter' liable to pay the tax, and whether it could be treated as the same juristic entity as its subsidiary, National Fertilizer Marketing Ltd., which handled sales. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly found that the respondent was solely a manufacturer and that the sales and exports were conducted by a separate corporate entity. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a manufacturer of goods can be held liable as an 'exporter' for the payment of an export tax under a Zila Council notification when its sales are conducted by a separate corporate entity?
  • Can a parent company and its subsidiary corporate entity be treated as one and the same juristic person for the purpose of tax liabilities without cogent evidence of unity?
  • Does the maintenance of a railway siding within factory premises for dispatching goods render the manufacturing concern an exporter in the eyes of the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Aminurrahman Khan and another vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry1989 SCMR 1948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  service tribunal jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceallotment of government accommodationcivil servantpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal as incompetent. The core legal question is whether the allotment of government quarters or houses falls within the terms and conditions of service of civil servants so as to attract the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the finding of the Service Tribunal regarding the incompetency of the appeal is unexceptionable, as the allotment of quarters and houses is not a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the petitioners being granted a grace period of two months to vacate and hand over possession of the quarter. The key principle laid down is that disputes regarding government accommodation allotment do not constitute terms and conditions of service for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a service tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allotment of quarters and houses is included in the terms and conditions of service of civil servants?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals relating to the allotment of government accommodation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ami Chand vs Fajroo1989 SCMR 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-28
  gift mutationleave to appealfraud and misrepresentationdelivery of possessioninchoate giftstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court, District Judge, and the High Court, which dismissed a suit challenging the validity of a gift mutation. The petitioner, owner of 164 kanals and 4 marlas of land, alleged that a mutation of gift attested in 1966 in favour of his three daughters and the respondent, Fajroo, was fraudulent and misrepresented. The petitioner contended that he never gifted land to the respondent and that the respondent received a disproportionately larger share (5/6th) compared to the petitioner's daughters (1/6th). Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the gift remained inchoate due to the non-delivery of possession. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the contentions regarding the lack of motive for the gift, the disproportionate distribution of land, and the legal requirement of delivery of possession for a valid gift. Finding that these contentions raised substantial questions requiring deeper judicial scrutiny, the Court granted leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court ordered that the status quo be maintained between the parties pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-delivery of possession render a gift inchoate under the law?
  • Can a mutation of gift be challenged on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the donor's intent?
  • Is a disproportionate distribution of land in a gift deed a material circumstance for determining the validity of the gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Ameer Hussain and others vs Ahmad Zaman Khan and others1989 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-20
  Katchi Abadievacuee landallotment cancellationproprietary rightscompensation poolstatutory amendmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the validity of notifications declaring certain evacuee lands as Katchi Abadi under the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972. The core legal questions involved whether confirmed allotments of land stood cancelled upon the issuance of notifications declaring an area as Katchi Abadi, whether permanently transferred land could be classified as evacuee property for such purposes, and whether the High Court correctly interfered with questions of fact regarding the existence of a cluster of houses. The Supreme Court held that by virtue of subsequent statutory amendments extending the definition of evacuee land retrospectively, permanently transferred land could indeed be declared as Katchi Abadi, and that the High Court erred in summarily determining disputed questions of fact without taking evidence. The appeals were consequently allowed, subject to specific determinations regarding an industrial brick-kiln concern.

  Questions settled

  • Whether confirmed allotments of evacuee land stand cancelled upon the issuance of a notification declaring the area as Katchi Abadi under the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972?
  • Can land that has been permanently transferred to a refugee or claimant still be treated as evacuee property for the purpose of declaration as a Katchi Abadi?
  • Whether the High Court can properly resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the existence of a cluster of houses on evacuee land without taking formal evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of the extended definition of evacuee land introduced by the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah and others vs Mst. Ghulam Janat and others1989 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07
  locus standiadditional evidencerecurring cause of actionlimitationinheritanceleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The core dispute involved the validity of a property sale by the original owner, Ali Muhammad, and the plaintiffs' locus standi to challenge it, which depended on proving their predecessor-in-interest, Fateh Din, was an heir of Ali Muhammad. While the trial and first appellate courts had conflicting findings regarding the relationship and the sale, the High Court set aside these findings, resolved the limitation issue in the plaintiffs' favor as a recurring cause of action, and admitted additional evidence regarding the pedigree table under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings on the relationship were sustainable even without the additional evidence, as oral evidence already supported the claim. The Court affirmed that the cause of action was recurring, dismissed objections regarding non-joinder of parties, and refused leave to appeal, noting that the findings were based on evidence and did not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court admit additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if it is necessary to pronounce judgment?
  • Does a claim regarding inheritance rights against a disputed property sale constitute a recurring cause of action for the purposes of limitation?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence if no legal infirmity is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar and anothers vs Raja and another1989 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodphysical possessionoral salemutationrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' second appeal and upholding the judgment of the Additional District Judge, which had set aside the trial court's dismissal of pre-emption suits as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption suits were filed within the period of limitation, which turns on the date physical possession of the disputed land was transferred under an oral sale transaction. The Supreme Court held that the revenue records, corroborated by oral evidence, clearly established that physical possession was delivered to the vendee-appellants on the date of the oral sale transaction, prior to the attestation of the mutation, and not on the date of attestation. Consequently, the period of limitation commenced from the date of taking physical possession pursuant to section 30 of the Punjab Limitation Act, rendering the subsequent pre-emption suits time-barred. The Supreme Court accordingly accepted the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Additional District Judge, and restored the trial court's judgment dismissing the suits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation in a pre-emption suit run from the date of physical possession taken under an oral sale transaction?
  • What is the evidentiary value of revenue record entries regarding the delivery of possession in pre-emption cases?
  • When does time begin to run for the purpose of limitation under section 30 of the Punjab Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar and another vs Mst. Khan Bibi and 42 others1989 SCMR 1624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-17
  inheritancecollateralsconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision challenging concurrent findings of the lower courts. The dispute concerned the inheritance rights of the petitioners, who claimed to be collaterals of the deceased, Noor Muhammad. The trial court had dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioners were related to the deceased at too remote a degree to inherit. This decision was upheld by the Additional District Judge in appeal and subsequently by the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to challenge these findings. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit because the arguments raised pertained exclusively to questions of fact that had already been concurrently decided against the petitioners by the lower courts. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact are not subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction unless a significant question of law is demonstrated. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, maintaining the finality of the lower courts' factual determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is a finding regarding the degree of relationship for inheritance purposes considered a question of fact?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rehman and others vs Amtul Qayyum and another1989 SCMR 1817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-16
  consolidation schemeallocation of landwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionBoard of Revenueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court. The High Court had declined to interfere with an order of the Board of Revenue, which affirmed the order of the Additional Commissioner making adjustments in a consolidation scheme. These adjustments resulted in the petitioners being deprived of certain fields in the Nian area, though they did not allege receiving less land than their total entitlement. The core legal question was whether orders made by consolidation authorities regarding the allocation of land can be challenged through writ jurisdiction under the Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision and refused leave to appeal, holding that orders passed by consolidation authorities concerning the allocation or adjustment of land are not appropriate matters for agitation or interference under writ jurisdiction. Relying on established precedent, the Court reiterated that the allocation of specific land parcels during consolidation proceedings falls within the exclusive domain of consolidation authorities and does not warrant constitutional review.

  Questions settled

  • Can orders made by consolidation authorities regarding the allocation of land be agitated in writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with adjustments in a land consolidation scheme under its constitutional jurisdiction when total land entitlement is preserved?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rasi vs Member (Cons.), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 61989 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  consolidation of holdingsland disputeBoard of Revenueleave to appealwrit jurisdictionland improvement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, in a consolidation of holdings case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the improvement of land made by a party during the pendency of consolidation proceedings creates a vested right or entitlement that overrides the legitimate claims of other parties to the land in dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the order of the Member, Board of Revenue was neither unlawful nor without jurisdiction. The Court held that the mere fact that a petitioner has improved the land after consolidation proceedings have commenced does not deprive the respondents of their legitimate entitlement to the land in dispute. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no legal infirmity in the High Court's reasoning and refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the finality of the revenue authority's decision regarding the land allocation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the improvement of land by a party during the pendency of consolidation proceedings entitle that party to retain the land against the legitimate entitlement of others?
  • Is an order passed by a Member, Board of Revenue in a consolidation matter subject to interference if it is neither unlawful nor without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs The Commissioner; Sargodha Division and others1989 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-07
  service tribunalannual confidential reportadverse entryleave to appealsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Allah Rakha against the order dated 20-9-1982 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal concerning an adverse entry in his annual confidential report for the year 1972. The core legal question involves determining whether the Tribunal's order suffered from any error of law or presented a question of public importance warranting interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel failed to point out any error of law or question of public importance, and that the Tribunal's order was in accordance with law and not a fit case for leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with service tribunal orders upholding adverse confidential reports in the absence of legal error or a question of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding an adverse entry in an annual confidential report without an error of law?
  • Is an adverse entry in an annual confidential report a matter raising a question of public importance?
  • When will leave to appeal be refused against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Zafar (Minor) and others1989 SCMR 1236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-12
  customary lawlegal necessitycivil revisionretrospective operationstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute involving a decree granted under Custom, which had invalidated a sale on the grounds of lack of consideration or legal necessity. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's civil revision against this decree. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the validity of the decree in light of Section 2-A(b) of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, arguing that this legislative change effectively annulled such decrees. The petitioner further contended that the exceptions regarding past and closed transactions or transferred possession were inapplicable because the vendors were still alive, meaning the decree had not yet become operative. The Supreme Court found that the legal questions raised by the petitioner required further examination and granted leave to appeal. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court directed that the status quo regarding the property and its character be maintained by all parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 2-A(b) of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, have the effect of annulling decrees granted under Custom based on lack of consideration or legal necessity?
  • Can a decree under Custom be considered inoperative if the vendors have not yet died?
  • Do the exceptions regarding past and closed transactions apply to a decree where possession has not been transferred?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State1989 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-13
  double murderjudicial confessionfamily honourmitigation of sentenceocular evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which modified the appellant's death sentence to life imprisonment following his conviction for double murder. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conviction could be sustained despite significant discrepancies in the prosecution's ocular evidence and the acquittal of his co-accused, given that the appellant had confessed to the killings in his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution's version was riddled with material contradictions and largely disbelieved by the High Court, the appellant's own judicial confession provided a sufficient basis for conviction. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to maintain the conviction but upheld the reduction of the sentence from death to life imprisonment, acknowledging the element of family honour as a mitigating factor. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case is discredited, a conviction may still be sustained if the accused's own version or confession provides a reliable admission of guilt, though such circumstances may warrant a lesser penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the accused's confession when the prosecution's ocular evidence is disbelieved?
  • Does the commission of murder to vindicate family honour entitle an accused to the exception under Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an accused entitled to a lesser penalty when the murder was committed to vindicate family honour?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Muhammad Iqbal1989 SCMR 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-17
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factpetition for leave to appealsuit for possessionownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision, affirming concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts in a suit for possession based on ownership of land measuring one Marla. The core legal question was whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts and upheld in civil revision could be interfered with by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact arrived at after properly applying the mind to the evidence on record by the lower courts cannot be disturbed in these proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual determinations of lower courts where evidence has been duly evaluated.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court disturb concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower courts and upheld in civil revision?
  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal is maintainable against an order dismissing a civil revision based on factual determinations?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1989 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-06
  pre-emptionrevenue court decreecivil court jurisdictionfraud and collusionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a pre-emption matter arising from the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, in which the vendee sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions examined by the court include whether a Civil Court can question a decree granted by a Revenue Court in a pre-emption matter, whether a Civil Court can set aside such a decree in cases of fraud and collusion notwithstanding the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure without framing specific issues and affording an opportunity to lead evidence, and whether the Supreme Court can decide the propriety of the competing decrees on merits under the circumstances. Granting leave to appeal, the court held that the matter required detailed examination of these questions and directed the preparation of the appeal on the existing record along with the filing of additional documents, while ordering the maintenance of status quo subject to the petitioner furnishing security for mesne profits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Civil Court question the decree granted by a Revenue Court in a pre-emption matter?
  • Whether a Civil Court can set aside a Revenue Court decree in cases of fraud and collusion without framing issues and affording an opportunity to lead evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can decide the question with regard to the propriety of competing decrees on merits under the circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Iftikhar Hussain Shah and another1989 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  criminal appealappraisal of evidenceself-defensereasonable doubtacquittalreappraisal of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder and arms possession charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its reappraisal of evidence when faced with conflicting prosecution and defense versions of a fatal incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly reappraised the evidence, noting that the trial court had failed to properly test the veracity of witnesses and had erroneously relied on inadmissible statements made to the police. The Supreme Court affirmed that where two versions of an occurrence exist, the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the veracity of witnesses must be tested rather than simply accepting the prosecution's narrative. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court misapprehended evidence regarding the recovery of crime empties and the plausibility of the defense's self-defense plea. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, finding no violation of legal principles in the High Court’s assessment of the facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court rely on a statement made to the police to incriminate an accused?
  • How should a court evaluate evidence when the prosecution and defense present conflicting versions of an occurrence?
  • Is the recovery of crime empties valid corroborative evidence if they do not match the weapon allegedly recovered from the accused?
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• Allah Ditta vs Ghulam Fatima and another1989 SCMR 1947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-20
  gift challengesubsequent alienationdonor testimonydonee admissionconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal refusedRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by a subsequent purchaser against the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The underlying dispute arose from a suit filed by respondent No. 2 (alleged donor) challenging a purported gift made in favour of respondent No. 1 (alleged donee) and the consequential alienation made by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. The suit had been decreed in favour of respondent No. 2 by the lower courts. The Supreme Court observed that the alleged donor did not acknowledge making the gift, and his testimony was believed by the courts below. Furthermore, the donee herself resiled from her initial admission regarding the gift. Consequently, the basis for upholding any subsequent alienation in favour of the petitioner vanished. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts did not suffer from any error of law or principle. Finding no justification for interference, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent alienation by an alleged donee can be sustained when the alleged donor disowns the initial gift and is believed by the courts?
  • What is the evidentiary weight of an interested donee's statement regarding a gift when the alleged donor denies having made such a gift?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the invalidity of a gift be interfered with in the absence of an error of law or principle?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Board of Revenue and 2 others1989 SCMR 1676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-15
  service appealdismissal from servicerevenue officialsfraudulent leaseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of service appeals by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore. The petitioners, revenue officials including a Qanoongo and a Patwari, were dismissed from service following an inquiry into allegations of misconduct regarding the fraudulent lease allotment of 112 kanals of land, which consisted largely of sand dunes and a highway, through fictitious reports and manipulated revenue records. The core legal question concerns whether the Punjab Service Tribunal committed any illegality or violated any rules in upholding the dismissal orders after examining the factual and legal aspects. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had thoroughly examined both cases, ensured the petitioners were afforded opportunities to defend themselves, and correctly dismissed the appeals. The Court laid down the principle that leave to appeal will be declined when petitions fail to raise any substantial question of law of public importance and the concurrent findings of the service tribunal disclose no legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against the dismissal of a service appeal where no question of law of public importance is involved?
  • Did the Punjab Service Tribunal err in law by dismissing the service appeals of revenue officials found involved in fraudulent land allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Din vs Habib1989 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-16
  land inheritanceMuslim Law of Inheritanceadoptioncompromise decreeleave to appealShariat application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in a land inheritance dispute. The core legal question involves the distribution of the estate of the deceased, Ranjha, specifically examining the impact of the Punjab Shariat Application Act V of 1962 (as amended by Ordinance XIII of 1983) on the inheritance rights of the parties. The dispute originated from a 1946 mutation where the respondent, Habib, claimed ownership of the land based on an adoption by the deceased, which was contested by the petitioner. A previous 1947 compromise decree had divided the property. Following the death of the original owner, the petitioner sought possession, leading to litigation regarding limitation, adverse possession, and heirship. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether, under the relevant Shariat Application laws, the estate must be distributed according to Muslim Law of Inheritance, the legal validity and effect of the respondent's adoption, and the binding effect of the prior compromise decree on the current inheritance claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Shariat Application Act V of 1962, as amended by Ordinance XIII of 1983, mandate the distribution of a deceased's estate according to Muslim Law of Inheritance?
  • What is the legal effect of an adoption of a son on the inheritance of property under the applicable law?
  • What is the effect of a previous compromise decree on a subsequent suit for possession of the same land?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad and another vs Mst. Rashidan and others1989 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  leave to appealinheritancegiftburden of proofconcurrent findings of factdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the decree in favor of the respondents regarding inheritance and a gift of property belonging to the parties' father. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of evidence, concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, and the proper placement of the burden of proof concerning the alleged gift. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact suffered from no legal infirmity and that the burden of proof was correctly placed given the nature of the dispute, noting that no prejudice was suffered by the parties. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of a jurisdictional error or material irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding inheritance and gift can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the burden of proof regarding a disputed gift was wrongly placed on the petitioners?
  • Does an alleged misplacement of the burden of proof furnish justification for setting aside concurrent findings of fact where no prejudice is suffered?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Banda and another vs Niaz Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-16
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantrecovery of rentdisputed titleeviction applicationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by landlords against concurrent findings of the High Court and appellate courts dismissing their civil revision and writ petition, which arose from a civil suit for recovery of rent and an eviction application. The core legal question is whether the petitioners established their ownership of the disputed property to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, and whether a rent note could establish such a relationship independently of disputed title. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to establish their title, that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed without proof of title in the circumstances of the case, and that the relied-upon rent note did not pertain to the disputed property. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the dismissal of the petitioners' claims on both merits and factual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant can be established without proving ownership of the disputed property in the circumstances of a case?
  • Does a rent note that does not relate to the property in dispute suffice to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can a suit for recovery of rent and an application for eviction succeed if the petitioners fail to establish their title?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs Muhammad Sharif and others1989 SCMR 1791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-03
  pre-emptioncourt-feememorandum of appealdeficiency in court-feeextension of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal, which itself affirmed the dismissal of a first appeal by the Additional District Judge on the sole ground of a deficiency in the court-fee on the memorandum of appeal. The core legal question was whether the appellate court was justified in refusing to extend time to make up the deficiency in the court-fee under Section 6 of the Court-fees Act, where the deficiency arose due to new rates introduced by the Punjab Finance Act, 1973, and was not contumacious or mala fide. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court and the High Court erred in refusing to allow the appellant to make good the deficiency, especially since no objection was raised by the office or the court upon admission and the appellant had paid the fee indicated in the decree sheet. The Court laid down the principle that under Section 6 of the Court-fees Act, a duty is cast upon the court to determine the correct amount of court-fee, and where a shortfall is not contumacious or mala fide, the appellant should be granted an opportunity to make up the deficiency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is bound to allow an appellant to make up a deficiency in the court-fee on a memorandum of appeal where the shortfall is neither contumacious nor mala fide?
  • Does Section 6 of the Court-fees Act cast a duty upon the court to determine the correct amount of court-fee?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of deficient court-fee without first affording the appellant an opportunity to make good the deficiency?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh and others vs Muhammad Shafi and another1989 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-17
  evacuee propertymortgage redemptionsettlement authoritiesleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the restitution of land originally mortgaged by a Muslim to a non-Muslim prior to independence, which was subsequently declared evacuee property, allotted to a claimant, and purchased by the petitioners. The core legal question is whether the failure of a mortgagor's successor-in-interest to lodge a claim before the Settlement Authorities regarding mortgaged land extinguishes their right to seek restitution against a bona fide purchaser from a refugee allottee. The Supreme Court held that the Member, Board of Revenue erred in holding that the failure to lodge a claim with settlement authorities bars the mortgagor's right, as such a view conflicts with established precedent. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision setting aside the Board of Revenue's order, laying down that failure to assert claims before settlement authorities does not override settled law protecting redemption rights against evacuee property transfers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a mortgagor to lodge a claim before the Settlement Authorities regarding mortgaged land extinguishes their right to seek restitution?
  • Does an order of the Member, Board of Revenue contrary to settled Supreme Court precedent regarding evacuee property warrant interference in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh and others vs Abdul Qadir and others1989 SCMR 1314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  pre-emptioncourt-feedeficiency in court-feepetition for leave to appealvaluation of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which accepted the respondents' Regular Second Appeal and decreed their pre-emption suit. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the pre-emptors failed to make up the deficiency in court-fee within the time specified by the trial court and that the suit was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the suit could be dismissed for non-payment of court-fee when the exact amount of court-fee payable had not yet been determined by the court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the suit could only be dismissed if the pre-emptors failed to make up the deficiency after the court-fee had been properly determined. The Court affirmed the principle that a plaintiff cannot be non-suited for failing to pay a deficiency that has not been judicially determined, following the precedent in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit be dismissed for failure to make up a deficiency in court-fee when the exact amount of court-fee payable has not yet been determined by the court?
  • Does the failure to correct the valuation of a suit within the given time attract rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when court-fee remains undetermined?
  Read full judgment →
• Alim Din vs Niaz Muhammad alias Daula and 4 others1989 SCMR 1132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  leave to appealconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionpossession of propertysettlement schemere-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had affirmed the lower appellate court's judgment. The suit was originally instituted for the possession of a small plot of land measuring 5 Marlas in Khasra No. 7492, claimed to have been allotted to the petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was validly allotted the specific plot claimed by him or a different piece of land, and whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower forums warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that no justification existed for setting aside the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below, as the case did not present any violation of law or principle justifying a re-appraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence will not be disturbed in leave to appeal proceedings unless a clear violation of law or principle is demonstrated. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a civil matter during leave to appeal proceedings?
  • Is a re-appraisal of evidence permissible when no law or principle has been violated by the impugned judgments?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher vs Mst. Bilqees Begum1989 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-22
  compromisesettlement agreementbataicivil appealdispute resolution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal arising from a dispute between the parties, Ali Sher and Mst. Bilqees Begum. The core legal question concerned the final resolution of the litigation through a mutually agreed-upon settlement. Upon review, the Court noted that the parties had reached a formal compromise regarding the suit land. The terms of this compromise, which were duly recorded and signed by the appellant, the respondent, their respective counsel, and the respondent's attorney, stipulated that the respondent shall pay half of the batai of the suit land to the appellant until his death. The agreement further specified the annual payment amount of Rs. 1,500, the payment schedule, and the modalities for payment, including the requirement for written receipts or alternative payment methods such as cross cheques or money orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in accordance with the terms of the compromise, with parties directed to bear their own costs throughout the proceedings, thereby settling the dispute based on the voluntary agreement of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise reached between the parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement signed by parties and their counsel binding in appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Raza Shah vs Ahmad Bakhsh1989 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-09
  leave to appealpre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption which was initially decreed, but the District Court allowed the respondent's first appeal and set aside the decree. The petitioner's subsequent civil revision was dismissed by the High Court on 8-12-1981, leading to the current petition seeking leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner could be non-suited solely due to a deficiency in the court-fee. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held, relying on its precedent in Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another (PLD 1984 SC 289), that the contention regarding the deficiency in court-fee supported the petitioner's case. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, directed that the appeal be prepared on the present record with liberty to file additional documents, and ordered it to be fixed for hearing along with similar cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff be non-suited solely on account of a deficiency in the court-fee?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a pre-emption suit is dismissed due to court-fee deficiency in light of established precedent?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muzaffar vs Taj Muhammad and 2 others1989 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  petition for leave to appeallandlord and tenantejectment petitionrelationship of landlord and tenantjurisdiction of rent controllerlicensee
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the judgment of the Additional District Judge, which reversed the Rent Controller's dismissal of an ejectment petition and ordered the eviction of the petitioner. The core legal question concerns the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the consequent jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, as the petitioner contended he was a licensee rather than a tenant, making a Civil Court the only competent forum. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions regarding the relationship of the parties and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller require closer examination. The key principle laid down is that where the foundational relationship of landlord and tenant is disputed and the evidence suggests a different legal status such as a licensee, the jurisdictional competence of the Rent Controller warrants detailed consideration by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties?
  • Does the Rent Controller have jurisdiction to proceed against a person whose status is alleged to be that of a licensee?
  • Can an appellate court reverse the finding of a Rent Controller regarding the existence of a tenancy relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muzaffar vs Mst. Amtul Begum and 3 others1989 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-26
  res judicataleave to appealwrit petitionsupreme courtconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, which held that the decision in an earlier writ petition brought by the petitioner operated as res judicata. The core legal question is whether a prior judgment rendered in a writ petition filed by the same petitioner constitutes res judicata to bar subsequent proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts' finding on res judicata was free from any legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that a prior judicial decision involving the same parties and subject matter, particularly from a writ petition previously instituted by the same litigant, effectively operates as res judicata to preclude subsequent agitation of the same issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decision in a prior writ petition brought by a petitioner operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings?
  • Can concurrent findings regarding the application of res judicata be sustained if they suffer from no legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs Ch. Muhammad Ali and 3 others1989 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-01
  Lambardari appointmentwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary jurisdictionBoard of Revenueleave to appealadministrative appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Constitutional petition concerning the appointment of a Lambardar. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary writ jurisdiction in upholding the Board of Revenue's decision to deny the petitioner's appointment. The High Court had based its dismissal on two primary factors: first, that the petitioner already held the position of Lambardar in two other villages, and second, that the reasoning provided by the Member, Board of Revenue for the refusal was substantial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the High Court's decision. The Court held that the High Court's approach regarding its discretionary writ jurisdiction in Lambardari appointment cases was unexceptionable. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the principle that the High Court's discretionary jurisdiction in administrative appointments, particularly where valid grounds for refusal exist, will not be lightly disturbed by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction in Lambardari appointment cases?
  • Is the fact that a candidate already holds the position of Lambardar in other villages a valid ground for the Board of Revenue to refuse a new appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Haider Shah vs Manzur Mehdi and others1989 SCMR 1133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-15
  leave to appealdeclaratory suitgiftconcurrent findingsdiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff against the dismissal of his declaratory suit, appeal, and subsequent civil revision challenging a gift made by him in favour of the respondents. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's challenge to the gift on merits and technical grounds warrants interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since all courts below found against the petitioner on merits and the petitioner did indeed make the gifts in dispute in favour of his own son and grandson, the Court would decline to grant leave to appeal in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, notwithstanding any technical or procedural defects. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal where concurrent findings on merits are against the petitioner and the transaction in question involves a gift made to close family members, despite alleged technical defects.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings on merits regarding a gift?
  • Does a technical or procedural defect warrant interference when a gift is made to one's own son and grandson?
  • Can discretionary jurisdiction be exercised to refuse leave to appeal in a declaratory suit challenging a gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs Sher Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-14
  Border Allotment Committeeallotment disputeunauthorized occupationleave to appealIntra-Court Appealproperty rightsstay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of a property (Kotha) by the Border Allotment Committee. The petitioner, Ali Gohar, was allotted the property in 1961, a decision later affirmed by the Committee, which also determined that the respondents were in unauthorized occupation and directed them to vacate. The respondents had previously failed in civil litigation to establish ownership and had their subsequent writ petition dismissed by the High Court on grounds of alternative remedy and the presence of disputed questions of fact. However, a Division Bench of the High Court later accepted the respondents' Intra-Court Appeal. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that his 1961 allotment was valid and that the respondents were unauthorized occupants. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's arguments, noting that the petitioner had been properly allotted the property and should not be deprived of his legitimate entitlement. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the continuation of the stay order until the final disposal of the main appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be deprived of a property allotted to them by a competent authority like the Border Allotment Committee when the occupants are found to be in unauthorized possession?
  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against a judgment dismissing a writ petition on the grounds of alternative remedy and disputed questions of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar Khan vs Sher Ayaz and others1989 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-30
  co-sharerjoint propertypermanent injunctionpartitionjoint holding
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning a suit for permanent injunction filed by the appellant to restrain respondents from raising construction over joint land. The core legal question was whether a co-sharer can deal with joint immovable property or change its nature without partition by metes and bounds and without the consent of other co-sharers. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that each co-sharer is interested in every inch of joint property and cannot alter its nature or raise construction until the property is partitioned by metes and bounds in accordance with law. The Court laid down the principle that a co-sharer cannot act in a manner that invades the rights of other co-sharers by changing the nature of joint property prior to formal partition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-sharer can raise construction over joint property without a formal partition?
  • Can a decree for perpetual injunction be issued to restrain a co-sharer from changing the nature of joint property?
  • Does a co-sharer have an interest in every inch of joint immovable property irrespective of the quantity of their share?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar and others vs Chief Secretary, Government of Sind and others1989 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servantsseniorityMartial Law Order 114Martial Law Order 23reinstatementnext below rulepromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of four consolidated appeals filed by civil servants who were retired from service under Martial Law Order 114 in March 1972 and subsequently reinstated under Martial Law Order 23 in 1978. The core legal question was whether civil servants who remained out of service during that period could claim seniority in the next grade over officers junior to them prior to retirement who were promoted while the appellants were out of service. The Supreme Court held that the matter is governed by the principles laid down in Government of Pakistan v. Junejo Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 1987 SC 427), which established that reinstated officers are not entitled to automatic promotion under the 'next below' rule but are to be placed in the position they would have enjoyed absent retirement, pursuant to the Establishment Division's Office Memorandum dated 5th July 1978. The Court concluded that even though one of the appellants secured a favorable seniority determination in a lower grade via an appellate order, his subsequent supersession in the higher grade occurred due to promotions made while he was out of service. Consequently, all appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil servants retired under Martial Law Order 114 and reinstated under Martial Law Order 23 can claim automatic seniority over officers promoted during their absence from service?
  • Does the rule established in Government of Pakistan v. Junejo Muhammad Iqbal apply to determine the seniority of officers reinstated under Martial Law Order 23?
  • Are Office Memorandum instructions of the Establishment Division regarding reinstatement seniority applicable notwithstanding contrary provisions in normal rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bin Abdul Qadir vs Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 1301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-13
  evictiondefault in payment of rentpower of attorneyformal proofconcurrent findings of factpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition, which had challenged concurrent orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. The core legal question concerns whether a power of attorney used to initiate eviction proceedings by a bank landlord can be challenged for lack of formal proof when it was received in evidence without objection before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that since the power of attorney was admitted into evidence without any objection at the relevant stage before the Rent Controller, the petitioner is precluded from subsequently contending that it was not formally proved. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's default in rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power of attorney can be challenged for lack of formal proof when it was received in evidence without objection before the Rent Controller?
  • Does the failure to pay rent from January 1980 onwards render a tenant a defaulter liable to eviction?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Asghar Shah vs Bagh Ali and others1989 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-10
  settlement proceedingswithdrawal of revisionfinality of ordersreview jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionadministrative lawremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the finality of a withdrawal application in settlement proceedings. The appellant filed a revision petition regarding the transfer of a house but subsequently filed an application to withdraw it. Although no formal order was initially recorded, the Settlement Commissioner later confirmed the revision stood withdrawn as of the date of the withdrawal application. The appellant later attempted to retract the withdrawal, prompting the Settlement Commissioner to review his previous order and remand the case for fresh determination. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to review his own order and revive proceedings once a revision petition had been effectively withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the revision petition was validly withdrawn upon the appellant's initial request, and the Settlement Commissioner lacked the legal authority to review his subsequent order confirming that withdrawal. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment, ruling that the Settlement Commissioner's remand order was illegal and without lawful authority, as the revision petition was no longer pending and the matter had attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner review an order confirming the withdrawal of a revision petition?
  • Does a revision petition stand withdrawn from the date of the application for withdrawal, even if a formal order is not immediately recorded?
  • Can a party revive a revision petition after formally requesting its withdrawal and allowing the proceedings to be consigned to record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Asghar and another vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, (Land)_A.C. and 2 others1989 SCMR 1536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  land settlementP.I. Unitsleave to appealConstitutional petitionSettlement Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Constitutional petition regarding a land settlement dispute. The core legal question involves the determination of whether the petitioners possessed the requisite 109 P.I. Units at the relevant time for adjustment against disputed land. During the proceedings, the petitioners' counsel had previously undertaken to withdraw the petition if they could not satisfy the respondents regarding the availability of these units. Upon hearing, the respondents' counsel acknowledged some ambiguity in the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner/Collector regarding the availability of units, suggesting that the matter required clarification by the Settlement Authorities. The Supreme Court, after examining the relevant documents and considering the arguments, determined that the case warranted further examination of the questions raised by both parties. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to file necessary additional documents and ordering the Settlement Department to produce the relevant records for the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ambiguity in a lower authority's order regarding the availability of P.I. Units warrant further judicial review by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when there is a dispute regarding the factual determination of land units available for adjustment?
  Read full judgment →
• Alamgir Khan vs Aqiq Khan1989 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-16
  petition for leave to appealtime-barredcondonation of delayrevisional jurisdictionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against the orders of the Peshawar High Court, Circuit Bench Abbottabad, dated 23-6-1987 and 8-9-1987, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and subsequent writ petition arising from concurrent failures before revenue authorities and civil courts. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a petition for leave to appeal that is barred by time against a revisional order, and the propriety of invoking writ jurisdiction to challenge a prior revisional order passed by the same High Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition against the revisional order was time-barred with no sufficient ground for condonation, and that the writ petition was rightly dismissed as no jurisdictional defect was shown and the High Court could not set aside its own revisional order through writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a High Court cannot exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside its own prior order passed in revisional jurisdiction, and time-barred petitions without valid grounds for condonation will be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal filed beyond the period of limitation can be entertained without sufficient grounds for condoning the delay?
  • Can the High Court set aside its own order passed in revisional jurisdiction by subsequently exercising its writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against concurrent judgments of revenue authorities and civil courts without highlighting any jurisdictional defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam and others: vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue,1989 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  consolidation proceedingsjudicial orderevidentiary weightaffidavitsmutual consentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition regarding a consolidation matter. The core dispute arose from an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, which adjusted the Khatas of the parties based on their alleged mutual consent. The petitioners contested this, claiming they had not consented, and submitted affidavits to the High Court to support their position. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that the petitioners' affidavits could not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the judicial order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, which recorded the consent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that a judicial order recording consent in a consolidation proceeding carries significant weight and cannot be easily overturned by subsequent affidavits asserting a lack of consent. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lacking substance.

  Questions settled

  • Can affidavits submitted by parties be given greater weight than a judicial order recording consent in a consolidation matter?
  • Is a judicial order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue regarding adjustments in Khatas subject to interference when based on recorded mutual consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Ali Khan and anothers vs Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar1989 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-08
  Evacuee propertyConstitutional petitionWrit jurisdictionLachesNon-joinder of necessary partyTransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, granted leave by the Supreme Court, challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment dated June 7, 1974, which dismissed a Constitutional Petition concerning the transfer of urban evacuee property. The property was initially transferred to appellant No. 1, then set aside, and subsequently transferred to respondent No. 5. The appellants' writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on two grounds: laches and the failure to implead the purchaser from respondent No. 5 as a necessary party. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the High Court was justified in refusing relief in its writ jurisdiction when all necessary parties were not impleaded. The Court emphasized that the respondents' written statement provided sufficient notice to the appellants regarding the existence of the second transferee, who was a necessary party. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's finding that the writ petition was rightly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court refuse relief in its writ jurisdiction if all necessary parties are not impleaded?
  • Does a written statement identifying an absent party constitute sufficient notice for the petitioner to implead them?
  • Is non-joinder of a necessary party a valid ground for dismissing a Constitutional Petition in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Al1 and others vs Muhammad Hanif and another1989 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  specific performanceState landalienationcivil revisionleave to appealagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendant petitioners against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of lower courts decreeing the respondents' suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal question concerned whether a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell State land could be decreed in the absence of sanction from the competent authority under section 19 of the Colonization of the Government Lands Act. The Supreme Court held that the statutory limitation under section 19 pertains to actual alienation and not to an agreement to alienate, and consequently, a decree for specific performance of the contract suffers from no legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that an agreement to alienate State land and a subsequent decree for specific performance do not violate the bar on alienation contained in section 19 of the Colonization of the Government Lands Act 1912.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 19 of the Colonization of the Government Lands Act prohibit an agreement to alienate State land?
  • Can a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell State land be decreed without sanction from the competent authority?
  • Does a decree for specific performance of a contract regarding State land suffer from infirmity due to lack of prior sanction for alienation?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali Khan Mirza vs The Additional District Judge and others1989 SCMR 1399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentrent restrictionframing of issuescontumacious default
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order against the petitioner, who occupied the first and top floors of a property transferred to the respondents. The respondents issued a notice under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act demanding rent at Rs. 300 per month, which the petitioner ignored, opting instead to deposit Rs. 75 per month with the Rent Controller. The respondents filed an ejectment application under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, which was granted by the Rent Controller and upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller was required to frame a specific issue on default after establishing the landlord-tenant relationship, or if ejectment could be ordered summarily. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where default is manifest and admitted through the record, the failure to frame a formal issue causes no prejudice. The court affirmed that a tenant who contumaciously ignores a valid rent notice and persists in paying an incorrect, lower rate is not entitled to further inquiry on the issue of default.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Rent Controller required to frame a specific issue on default if the default is manifest from the record?
  • Does the failure to frame an issue on default invalidate an ejectment order where the tenant has contumaciously failed to pay the assessed rent?
  • Can a tenant who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant but continues to deposit rent at a lower rate be considered a defaulter?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali and 4 others vs The Province of the Punjab and 2 others1989 SCMR 1040 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-14
  deficiency in court-feeextension of timeland acquisition compensationRegular First Appealbona fide mistakediscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the Lahore High Court was justified in rejecting the appellants' application under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and dismissing their Regular First Appeal due to a deficiency in court-fee. The appellants' land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Senior Civil Judge acting as the District Court, they filed an appeal bearing an insufficient court-fee stamp of Rs. 15 instead of the required amount. Upon the deficiency being pointed out during arguments, an application under section 149, C.P.C. read with sections 8 and 28 of the Court Fees Act 1870 was filed. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the appellants failed to establish a bona fide mistake. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were victims of circumstances and the oversight regarding the court-fee was not a wilful default on their part, particularly considering the role of counsel and the failure of court functionaries to scrutinize the document. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, granted the application under section 149, C.P.C., and allowed fifteen days for the appellants to make up the deficient court-fee, laying down principles regarding the lenient exercise of discretion for bona fide mistakes in court-fee matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 should be rejected when a memorandum of appeal is insufficiently stamped due to an oversight?
  • Does the failure of court functionaries to detect a court-fee deficiency at the time of filing afford a ground for leniency to an appellant?
  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing an appeal for deficient court-fee without considering the bona fides of the litigants and the circumstances involving their counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Din alias Ahim vs The State1989 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-16Read full judgment →
• Ahmed And Other vs Abdul Aziz And Other(K.L.R. 1989 Revenue Cases 166) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionIslamic InjunctionsrepugnancyShariat Appellate Benchstatutory interpretationsubsisting rightconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of petitions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking to clarify the scope and effect of the judgment in Government of N.W.F.P. vs. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 S.C. 360) regarding the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 and related laws. The core legal question was whether the declaration of repugnancy to Islamic Injunctions in Said Kamal Shah's case rendered the entire pre-emption law ineffective or only the specific provisions explicitly struck down, and whether requirements like 'Talabs' could be engrafted onto the remaining statutory provisions. The Court held that the Shariat Appellate Bench's jurisdiction under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution is limited to striking down specific provisions found repugnant. Consequently, only those provisions explicitly declared repugnant ceased to have effect on 31.7.1986. The remaining statutory provisions of the pre-emption law, where not specifically challenged or struck down, remain intact and enforceable. The Court established the principle that it cannot legislate or engraft new requirements, such as 'Talabs', onto the surviving statutory law, and that pre-emption suits must be adjudicated based on the law as it stands after the specific repugnant provisions are removed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of repugnancy in Said Kamal Shah's case render the entire Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 ineffective or only the specific provisions struck down?
  • Can the Supreme Court engraft requirements like 'Talabs' onto the surviving provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the Shariat Appellate Bench under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution allow for the striking down of laws in an omnibus manner without specific examination?
  • Must a pre-emptor possess a subsisting right of pre-emption at the time of sale, institution of the suit, and the decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Yar and others vs Muhammad Ashiq and others1989 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-04
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionvested rightspre-emption decreecourt-fee deficiencyremandcrucial datecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a pre-emption suit where the vendees sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment. The pre-emptors claimed a superior right, and the trial court initially dismissed the suit as time-barred and deficiently stamped. On appeal, the District Judge remanded the case, setting aside the findings on limitation and directing the trial court to determine court-fee deficiency and re-determine issue No. 6-B regarding superior right. The District Judge's order, dated 20-7-1986, recorded findings on the pre-emptors' superior right. Subsequently, the Civil Judge determined the court-fee deficiency on 29-1-1987. The core legal question was whether the pre-emptors' right had vested before the crucial date of 31-7-1986, after which certain pre-emption grounds became unenforceable. The Supreme Court held that mere findings recorded by the District Judge on 20-7-1986 did not constitute a formal, executable pre-emption decree. Since no such decree had been passed by 31-7-1986, the pre-emptors could not claim a vested right, and their suit for possession was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • When does a pre-emptor's right vest in the context of pre-emption law?
  • Do findings recorded by an appellate court regarding a superior right of pre-emption constitute a vested right before a formal decree is passed?
  • Can a pre-emption suit succeed if a formal decree of possession is not passed before the crucial date of 31-7-1986?
  • What is the effect of a remand order on the finality of findings in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad vs Muhammad Nawaz and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  triple murderacquittal appealappreciation of evidencecredibility of witnessFirst Information Reportcriminal appealcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of triple murder charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of the sole eyewitness, Ahmad, who admitted to consulting village elders before lodging the First Information Report (FIR) due to existing enmity. The Supreme Court examined whether this consultation cast doubt on the authenticity of the FIR and the witness's reliability. The Court held that the eyewitness's testimony, in the absence of independent corroboration, was insufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly given the lack of weight in the recovery and medical evidence regarding the identity of the assailants. Affirming the acquittal, the Court laid down the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with a judgment of acquittal unless there is a serious defect in the reasoning or a disregard for accepted principles of evidence appreciation, and that the mere possibility of a different view is insufficient to overturn such a finding.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the consultation of village elders by an eyewitness before lodging an FIR necessarily undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Can medical evidence and recovery evidence alone sustain a conviction in a murder case without reliable eyewitness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Mst. Safia Blgum vs Abdul Aziz Ibrahim and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-04
  pre-emptionShariat Appellate BenchSaid Kamal Shah caseco-sharercontiguitytalabsrepugnancy to Islamconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple petitions seeking to clarify the scope and effect of the landmark Shariat Appellate Bench decision in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) regarding pre-emption laws in Pakistan. The core legal questions involved whether statutory provisions not explicitly struck down by the Shariat Appellate Bench remained in force, whether Islamic legal requirements like Talabs could be automatically engrafted into statutory pre-emption laws, and whether pending suits based on remaining grounds like co-ownership or contiguity could proceed after 31 July 1986. The Supreme Court held that under Chapter 3-A of Part VII of the Constitution, the Shariat jurisdiction only invalidates specific statutory provisions explicitly declared repugnant to Islam; it confers no power to engraft Islamic principles or observations onto surviving statutes. Consequently, surviving statutory grounds such as co-ownership or contiguity remain available, and pending pre-emption suits based on such preserved grounds can proceed to trial, allowing parties to amend their pleadings where necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court or Shariat Appellate Bench have jurisdiction to engraft Islamic legal principles into surviving statutory provisions not expressly declared repugnant?
  • Do statutory pre-emption rights based on co-ownership or contiguity remain enforceable after the deadline fixed in Said Kamal Shah's case where specific provisions were not struck down?
  • Can the requirement of making Talabs be imported into statutory pre-emption laws without legislative amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali Siddiqui vs Sargodha Central Cooperative Bank Limited and another1989 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  recovery of finesentence of imprisonment in defaultlimitation period for fineattachment of propertysubstantive law versus adjective law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a fine imposed under the Pakistan Penal Code could be realized after the appellant had served out his substantive sentence and the default sentence, and whether the issuance of a warrant under section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was barred. The appellant was sentenced on October 12, 1959, to multiple terms of imprisonment, including ten years under section 120-B, and a fine of Rs. 50,000. He was released in August 1966. Subsequently, in 1968, the Sessions Judge ordered the attachment of cash recovered from the appellant to satisfy the unpaid fine. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appellant's revision, leading to the appeal. The Supreme Court held that where an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for a term longer than six years, liability to pay the fine continues until the expiration of that period pursuant to section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and remissions are not counted for this limitation period. Furthermore, adjective law cannot control substantive law, and possessing means to pay constitutes a sufficient special reason under the proviso to section 386(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to issue a warrant. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amount of fine imposed on an offender can be realized after he has served out his substantive sentence and default sentence when the substantive sentence exceeds six years?
  • Whether the period of remission granted to a prisoner is to be counted for the purpose of the limitation period for recovery of fine under section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the proviso to subsection (1) of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prohibits the issuance of a warrant for the levy of fine after the offender has undergone imprisonment in default?
  • Whether having the means to pay a fine constitutes a special reason for issuing a warrant for the levy of fine notwithstanding the offender serving the full term of imprisonment in default?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Fakhruddin vs Muhammad Paryal and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-30
  state land allotmentamenity plotslocus standidiscretionary powerpublic interest litigationcolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals challenging a High Court judgment regarding the Government of Sind's allotment of state land parcels in Sukkur to the respondents. The appellants contended that the disputed plots were reserved as amenity plots for a children's park and that their grant for residential and medical clinic purposes violated the statement of conditions issued under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912. The core legal questions were whether the plots were legally reserved as amenity land and whether the appellants possessed the locus standi to challenge the government's discretionary allotment. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to establish that the plots were ever officially reserved for amenity purposes, noting that mere recommendations did not constitute a legal reservation. Consequently, the Court affirmed the government's authority under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 to dispose of state land. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellants lacked locus standi to challenge the allotments, as they were not applicants and held no personal interest in the property. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere recommendation or suggestion to use land as a park constitute a legal reservation of that land as an amenity plot?
  • Does the statement of conditions issued under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 fetter the discretion of the Provincial Government to allot state land?
  • Do neighbors who are not applicants for state land have the locus standi to challenge the government's allotment of such land?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Abdul Hameed and 7 others vs Mst. Naseem Begum1989 SCMR 2038 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  succession certificateMuslim Law of inheritancecompensation distributiontrusteeleave to appealadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision regarding the distribution of compensation money paid following the death of one Abdul Ghafoor in Saudi Arabia. The High Court had ruled that the respondent, the widow of the deceased, was entitled to the entire amount exclusively, based on an entry designating her as the beneficiary. The petitioners, representing other heirs, challenged this, arguing the funds should be distributed according to Islamic law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether there was sufficient material to determine the conditions of the payment, whether the High Court erred in failing to call for additional evidence, and whether the respondent held the funds as a trustee for all heirs. The Court further sought to determine if the compensation amount was liable to be distributed among all legal heirs under Muslim Law of inheritance. The Supreme Court granted the leave to appeal and permitted the petitioners to file additional fresh material for consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred in failing to call for additional evidence to determine the conditions of a compensation payment?
  • Whether a widow receiving compensation for a deceased spouse holds the funds as a trustee for all legal heirs?
  • Whether compensation money paid upon the death of an individual is liable to be distributed among all heirs in accordance with Muslim Law of inheritance?
  Read full judgment →
• Aftab Ahmad vs The Water and Power Development Authority and others1989 SCMR 1534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  civil servicedismissal from serviceremoval from servicegross negligenceshow-cause noticeleave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had converted the petitioner's dismissal from service into removal from service. The petitioner, a Lineman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), was dismissed following a fatal accident of an Assistant Lineman under his supervision, which was attributed to the petitioner's gross negligence. The petitioner challenged his dismissal before the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, which declined jurisdiction, and subsequently appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing, examined the merits, and dismissed the appeal while modifying the penalty. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the law, as the petitioner had refused to receive the show-cause notice despite repeated efforts. The Court affirmed that the fatal accident resulted from the petitioner's lack of sense of duty and declined to grant leave to appeal, finding no merit to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disciplinary proceedings are valid if a public servant refuses to receive a show-cause notice despite repeated efforts?
  • Can a civil servant seek relief from a Labour Court if the court lacks jurisdiction over the service matter?
  • Whether gross negligence resulting in a fatal accident of a subordinate justifies the termination of a supervisor's services?
  Read full judgment →
• Adam Khan vs Mian Rafiuddin and others1989 SCMR 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-26
  constitutional petitionland commissionmartial law regulationland resumptiontenant allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which allowed a constitutional petition filed by the successors-in-interest of a deceased landowner and set aside orders passed by the Land Commission Authorities. The core legal question concerned the determination of land excess under Martial Law Regulation 115 and whether the High Court erred in interfering with factual determinations regarding land calculations and the benefit of gifts under Martial Law Regulation 64. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal on the basis of a concession made by the respondents' counsel, allowing the appellant-tenant to retain the specific land allotted to him. The Court held that the appeal succeeds to the extent of the area allotted to the appellant in view of the mutual agreement of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can act as an appellate court to decide pure questions of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of Land Commission Authorities?
  • Can an appeal by a single tenant succeed to the extent of the specific land allotted to him based on a concession made by the respondents?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid. vs Abdul Karim1989 SCMR 1824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-08
  evictionbona fide personal requirementleave to appealrent restrictionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Rent Controller's eviction order. The core legal question concerned whether the landlord had successfully established a bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises for his son to set up a business and facilitate his marriage, including the sufficiency of presently available accommodation and allegations of alternate properties. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding the bona fide personal need were based on proper and cogent reasons derived from the evidence. Consequently, the petition was found to be devoid of merit and was dismissed, affirming the concurrent orders of eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement for eviction can be interfered with when supported by evidence?
  • Does a landlord's requirement of premises to set up a business for his son's marriage constitute a valid ground for eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Sattar and others vs Nawab Din and others1989 SCMR 1204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-06
  pre-emptionlimitationcourt closurecivil revisioncontempt application
  Summary & questions settled

  These two matters arise out of the same case, involving a civil petition for leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption matter and a related contempt application. In Civil Petition No. 1140 of 1984, the vendees challenged the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, focusing primarily on the question of limitation. The core legal question examined was whether the pre-emption suit filed on 1-9-1975 was time-barred, considering that the trial court was closed on 31-8-1975. The Supreme Court held that since the suit could not have been instituted prior to 31-8-1975 due to the court closure, a suit filed on the next open day (1-9-1975) was within time, thereby refusing leave to appeal. Additionally, the Court declined to deal with the contempt application on merits at this stage, resulting in the dismissal of both petitions. The key principle laid down is that when a court is closed on the last day of limitation, a suit instituted on the next immediate working day is within time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit filed on the reopening day of a court is within time when the limitation period expired while the court was closed?
  • Can a contempt application be dismissed without being addressed on merits at a preliminary stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Sattar and another vs The Federal Land Commissioner and 181989 SCMR 1545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  Land Reformsmartial law regulationcultivating tenantsremand for fresh inquirywrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court concerning the implementation of Land Reforms under Martial Law Regulation (M.L.R. 115). The petitioners claimed the disputed land as cultivating tenants under Paragraph 18(1) of the Regulation, while contesting respondents claimed it under Paragraph 18(3). Two conflicting inquiry reports were generated—one favorable from the Patwari and another unfavorable from the Assistant Commissioner. Ultimately, the authorities remanded the case for a fresh inquiry, which the petitioners unsuccessfully challenged in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the remand order and the second inquiry initiated by the Assistant Commissioner were lawful. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to interfere with the remand order, noting that the remand provided an opportunity for both parties to support their claims and that the fresh inquiry would proceed uninfluenced by prior adverse observations on merits. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a remand order for a fresh inquiry in land reform matters can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when conflicting reports exist?
  • Can a second inquiry initiated by an Assistant Commissioner regarding tenancy claims under land reforms be challenged as without lawful authority?
  • Does a remand order providing an opportunity for a fresh inquiry prejudice the rights of the contesting parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs The Chief Engineer, Sargodha Electricity, Sargodha1989 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-08
  back benefitssuspension periodhonourable acquittalservice tribunalwater and power development authorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority serving as a Line Superintendent, was caught accepting a bribe and subsequently convicted by a Special Judge. Upon appeal, the High Court acquitted him due to lack of satisfactory corroboration, leading to his reinstatement in service. However, the Authority denied him full pay and allowances for the suspension period, and his subsequent appeal to the Service Tribunal was dismissed on the finding that his acquittal was not honourable. Seeking leave to appeal, the core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee acquitted on technical grounds rather than honourably is entitled to full back benefits for the period of suspension. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's finding that the acquittal was not honourable was sound, and therefore upheld the denial of full pay and allowances. The key principle laid down is that an employee whose acquittal is not honourable is not automatically entitled to full benefits of pay and allowances for the period spent under suspension.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension upon acquittal?
  • Does an acquittal lacking honourable circumstances disentitle a public servant from claiming full back benefits?
  • Can the Service Tribunal uphold the denial of suspension benefits based on a finding that an acquittal was not honourable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman Babar vs N.W.F.P. through the Chief Secretary, Government1989 SCMR 928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-08
  compulsory retirementservice tribunalproportionality of punishmentmisconductdepartmental proceedingsrevenue officer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Tehsildar, challenged his compulsory retirement from service following departmental proceedings. He was accused of attesting land mutations in violation of revenue laws, specifically regarding land already subject to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner argued before the Service Tribunal that he acted in routine without knowledge of the prior acquisition award, a defense rejected by the Tribunal on the basis of his official position as the Revenue Officer of the circle. Upon seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the penalty of compulsory retirement was disproportionate, particularly noting that other individuals involved in similar defaults received only minor penalties. The Supreme Court observed that the Service Tribunal failed to adequately consider the issue of proportionality in sentencing. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the punishment imposed was excessive and discriminatory compared to the treatment of others similarly situated, thereby requiring further judicial review of the administrative action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the imposition of a severe penalty like compulsory retirement for misconduct require consideration of proportionality when others involved in similar defaults received minor penalties?
  • Is a Revenue Officer presumed to have knowledge of land acquisition awards within their circle of jurisdiction?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal based on the failure of a Service Tribunal to consider the proportionality of a disciplinary penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Razzak Shah vs Abdul Alim Durreshani and others1989 SCMR 1039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  abatement of appeallegal representativesimproperly constituted appealdelay and negligencedeath of appellantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan where the respondents sought dismissal on the grounds that the appellant had deceased years prior to the grant of leave to appeal, and his legal heirs had not been brought on record. The core legal question was whether an appeal could proceed when leave was granted to a deceased person and no steps were taken to implead legal representatives for over fourteen years. The Court held that the appeal was improperly constituted. It observed that the appellant died in 1975, yet leave to appeal was granted in 1980 without the Court being informed of his death. Furthermore, the legal heirs failed to seek impleadment for an additional nine years after the grant of leave. The Court refused to grant indulgence for this unpardonable delay and negligence in prosecuting the appeal. The principle laid down is that an appeal becomes improperly constituted when the appellant dies before the grant of leave and the legal heirs fail to take timely steps to implead themselves, rendering the proceedings liable to dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal proceed if leave to appeal was granted to a deceased person?
  • Does an unexplained delay of fourteen years in impleading legal heirs justify the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Is an appeal considered improperly constituted if the appellant dies before the grant of leave and no legal representatives are brought on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs The State (Copy)1989 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealsentence mitigationdeath penaltygrave and sudden provocationextenuating circumstancesmurderattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code, was entitled to a lesser sentence due to the background of enmity involving the prior molestation of his sister by the deceased and the complainant. The Supreme Court held that while the conviction was correctly maintained, the background of enmity involving the dishonouring of the appellant's female relative constituted an extenuating circumstance. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the conviction and the sentence of fine. The Court affirmed that where a crime is committed in the context of a long-standing grievance involving the molestation of family members, the accused may be entitled to a lesser penalty, as the sting of continuing provocation serves as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the history of enmity involving the molestation of a family member constitute an extenuating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court commute a death sentence to life imprisonment based on the background of the crime?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Saqlain Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-03
  bona fide personal needevictionconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factrent restrictionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Constitution Petition challenging an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller and upheld by an Additional District Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide personal need for the premises. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly declined to exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to re-examine concurrent findings of fact, particularly when the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of material evidence before the High Court. The Supreme Court further emphasized that a petitioner cannot raise a new plea of misreading or non-reading of evidence in the Supreme Court if such a plea was not argued before the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that constitutional jurisdiction is not intended for the reappraisal of evidence where concurrent findings are based on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a plea of misreading or non-reading of evidence in the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the High Court?
  • Is the High Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction available to re-examine concurrent findings of fact made by rent tribunals?
  • What is the remedy for a tenant if a landlord fails to occupy premises after obtaining an eviction order based on personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs C.S.C. and another1989 SCMR 1417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-01
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsenquiry officerleave to appealservice tribunaladministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a Junior Clerk challenging a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 24-5-1984, which had upheld disciplinary proceedings against him. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Authorized Officer and the Authority are legally bound to accept the recommendations made by an Enquiry Officer in a disciplinary inquiry. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the Tribunal, which had concluded that while the Enquiry Officer may have favourably commented upon the appellant, the Authorized Officer and the Authority are under no legal obligation to agree with or follow such recommendations. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding, holding that the Tribunal's decision was in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Court determined that no valid grounds existed to grant leave to appeal, as the disciplinary authorities possess the discretion to disagree with an Enquiry Officer's findings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reinforcing the principle that an Enquiry Officer's report is recommendatory rather than binding upon the competent disciplinary authority.

  Questions settled

  • Are the Authorized Officer and the Authority legally bound to agree with the recommendations of an Enquiry Officer in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does a favourable report by an Enquiry Officer create a binding obligation on the disciplinary authority to exonerate the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid Khan and others vs Swat Textile Mills Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-01
  land acquisitionsurplus landsettlement agreementrevenue officerproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the return of surplus acquired land to the original owners by the respondents. The parties reached a settlement agreement before the Supreme Court, wherein the respondents consented to return the surplus acquired land to each appellant/petitioner at a fixed market rate of Rs. 55,000 per kanal. The core legal question addressed by the Court was the practical implementation of this settlement, specifically the determination of the exact surplus area claimable by each individual appellant. The Court held that the District Collector, Abbottabad, must appoint a competent Revenue Officer to ascertain the surplus area for each appellant within one month, ensuring the participation of all parties. The Court directed that the appellants must deposit the requisite price for their respective entitlements by a specified date. The key principle laid down is that in land acquisition disputes involving surplus land return, the Court may facilitate settlement by directing administrative authorities to verify and quantify individual entitlements based on the agreed-upon terms, ensuring procedural fairness and compliance through judicial oversight.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct a District Collector to ascertain the surplus area claimable by appellants in a land acquisition dispute?
  • Is a settlement agreement regarding the return of surplus acquired land at a fixed market price enforceable through judicial direction?
  • What is the procedure for determining individual land entitlements when parties have agreed to the return of surplus acquired land?
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• Abdur Rahim and others vs Mst. Sughran Bibi1989 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-23
  pre-emptionsinker doctrineagreement to sellminor's propertyguardian judge sanctionsuit for pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the petitioners (vendees) challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order of remand. The core legal question was whether a sale transaction involving a minor vendee, which was purportedly completed before the filing of the pre-emption suit but lacked the necessary sanction from the Guardian Judge until after the suit's institution, could be treated as a completed sale to avoid the doctrine of sinker. The Supreme Court held that the transaction on behalf of the minor remained merely an agreement to sell until the Guardian Judge's sanction was obtained. Consequently, the sale could not be considered completed before the institution of the suit. The Court affirmed that such a transaction, finalized after the suit's commencement, provided no legal benefit to the vendees in defeating the pre-emption claim. The petition was dismissed as the petitioners' counsel conceded that the transaction was only an agreement to sell until the requisite judicial sanction was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale transaction involving a minor, which requires the Guardian Judge's sanction, constitute a completed sale before such sanction is obtained?
  • Can a sale transaction finalized after the institution of a pre-emption suit be used to avoid the doctrine of sinker?
  • Is an agreement to sell sufficient to establish a completed sale for the purpose of defeating a pre-emption claim?
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• Abdullah vs Mst. Janna T Bibi and others1989 SCMR 735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-06
  inheritancelimited ownergift deedcustomary lawMuslim personal lawmutation of inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of landed property originally owned by one Nabia, who died in 1947 without male issue. Inheritance was initially mutated in favor of his widow, Mst. Rehmoon. Mst. Rehmoon subsequently gifted the entire property to her son from a previous marriage, the petitioner, Abdullah. The respondents, being the daughters and nephews of the deceased Nabia, filed a suit for joint possession of 7/8th of the land. The petitioner argued that Mst. Rehmoon held the property as a full owner under custom and was entitled to gift it. The lower courts decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Mst. Rehmoon was merely a limited owner. The Court affirmed that even without the application of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act 1962, the gift was unsustainable. Upon the death of the original owner, the widow was entitled only to a 1/8th share, while the respondents were entitled to the remaining 7/8th share of the estate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a widow holding property as a limited owner under custom is entitled to gift the entire estate to the exclusion of other legal heirs?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act 1962 affect the validity of a gift made by a limited owner prior to its enactment?
  • What is the entitlement of a widow in the estate of her deceased husband who died without male issue under customary law?
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• Abdullah Khan vs The Director, Labour Welfare, N.W.F.P., Peshawar and 2 others1989 SCMR 1193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-16
  service lawinter se senioritycivil servantseniority determinationmerit-based seniorityappointment order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal regarding a dispute over inter se seniority between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner contended that he was senior to the respondent based on 'merit' assigned at the time of appointment, despite both being appointed on the same day. The Tribunal held that the assignment of merit was merely ceremonious, lacking any formula or marks, and that no statutory rule supported seniority based on such 'merit'. The core legal question was whether seniority could be determined by 'merit' in the absence of any statutory rule or regulation prescribing such a mode. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, noting that the petitioner failed to identify any law or rule supporting his claim. The Court held that in the absence of statutory provisions governing the determination of seniority by 'merit', the Tribunal's reliance on age and the date of joining service as determining factors was legally sound and not prohibited by law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can seniority be determined based on 'merit' in the absence of a statutory rule prescribing such a mode?
  • Is the determination of seniority based on age and date of joining service permissible when no other statutory criteria are established?
  • Does an appointing authority's informal assignment of 'merit' create a legally enforceable right to seniority?
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• Abdul Wahid and others vs Khail Gul and another1989 SCMR 1771(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  ejectmentleave to appealconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 12-11-1988, which dismissed the civil revision and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing the ejectment suit in favour of the respondents. The core legal question concerned whether interference was warranted against concurrent factual findings establishing the tenancy of the petitioners over the disputed house. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the three courts below holding the petitioners to be tenants under the respondents on payment of khakrim constituted a pure finding of fact not warranting interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by subordinate courts in ejectment matters where the relationship of landlord and tenant is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding tenancy in an ejectment matter?
  • Can a tenant deny the ownership of the landlord based on an unproven oral purchase?
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• Abdul Waheed vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab Local1989 SCMR 1415 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-02
  service lawstoppage of incrementscumulative effectservice tribunaldisciplinary penaltyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by an Officiating Assistant Municipal Engineer against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner challenged an order issued by the respondent, which had imposed a penalty of stopping three increments with cumulative effect. The core legal question before the Tribunal was the validity of imposing a penalty of withholding increments with cumulative effect. The Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the order but modified the penalty, ruling that increments cannot be stopped with cumulative effect, and consequently converted the punishment to stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the Tribunal's modification of the penalty was in accordance with the law. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision to rectify the penalty by removing the cumulative effect was legally sound. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, affirming that the Tribunal's modified order was not contrary to law. The key principle established is that the stoppage of increments in service matters cannot be imposed with cumulative effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can a penalty of stoppage of increments be imposed with cumulative effect in service matters?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to modify a disciplinary penalty imposed by a department?
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• Abdul Wahab Khan vs Government of the Punjab and 3 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-08
  service matterconstitutional jurisdictionService Tribunalbar of jurisdictionintra-court appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal by the Lahore High Court concerning a service dispute involving a departmental proceeding and the appointment of an authorized officer. The core legal question addressed is whether the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters lying within the competence of a Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that Article 212 explicitly bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain proceedings in respect of matters to which the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extends. The Court laid down that where an impugned departmental order is not immediately appealable before the Service Tribunal, the aggrieved civil servant must await a final or appealable order before approaching the tribunal, and cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal has been established under Clause (1) of Article 212 of the Constitution for dealing with service matters?
  • Whether the phrase no other Court in Clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution includes the High Court?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred in respect of matters to which the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extends?
  • Can a petitioner approach the High Court against a departmental interlocutory order that is not appealable before the Service Tribunal?
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• Abdul Sattar Qureshi and others vs Senior Civil Judge and others1989 SCMR 1215(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  pre-emptionconsent decreecompromiseauthority of counselleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendees in a pre-emption case challenging a consent decree and the subsequent dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners' counsel possessed the authority to enter into a compromise agreement. The Supreme Court held that the compromise was in fact entered into directly by the parties themselves, and the counsel merely made a statement in proof of that existing agreement rather than negotiating it independently. Consequently, the Court found no justification for granting leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, establishing that where a compromise is established to be between the parties themselves and verified by counsel, the validity of the consent decree remains unimpaired.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a counsel has the power to enter into a compromise agreement on behalf of a party?
  • Does a statement made by a counsel in proof of an agreement between parties validate a consent decree?
  • Is leave to appeal maintainable against a consent decree where the compromise was settled directly by the parties?
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