Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Karam Ali Shah vs Mazhar Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  order of acquittalinherent powersquashmentleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the High Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by an Illaqa Magistrate under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and remanded the case for trial. The core legal question for consideration is whether resort can be made to section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for setting aside an order of acquittal passed under section 249-A when a specific remedy against acquittal is provided under section 417 of the Code. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court noted the contention that the inherent powers under section 561-A cannot be invoked where an express remedy is available under the Code, and directed the appeal to be readied for an early hearing while continuing the interim order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether resort is possible to section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for setting aside an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate under section 249-A of the Code?
  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be availed of when another express remedy is provided by the Code?
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• Kanwar Sarfaraz Umar Khan vs Federal Service Tribunal And Other1986 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  service lawlimitation periodwrong forumappointment validityage relaxationservice tribunaltermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from the position of Assistant Manager, Waqf Properties. The petitioner was removed from service under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. Following the rejection of his departmental representation, the petitioner erroneously filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court instead of appealing to the Service Tribunal within the statutory limitation period. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal both as time-barred and on merits, citing lack of educational qualifications, over-age status, and political considerations in his appointment. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's decision. While the Court did not address the limitation issue, it found no merit in the petition. Crucially, the petitioner's counsel conceded that the petitioner was over-age at the time of appointment and that no order relaxing the age limit had ever been passed. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that an appointment made without requisite qualifications or age relaxation is unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a writ petition in a High Court instead of an appeal before the Service Tribunal toll the limitation period for the service appeal?
  • Can an appointment be sustained if the appointee was over-age at the time of appointment and no relaxation order was issued?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable where the petitioner fails to meet the educational and age requirements for the post?
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• Kanwar Ijaz Ali vs 1Rshad Ali and 2 Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-27
  election petitioncorrupt practicesadjournment of pollrecounting of ballot papersrepresentation of peoples act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 67(3) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976 challenges the judgment of the Election Tribunal dismissing an election petition filed against the victory of the returned candidate in a Punjab Provincial Assembly election. The core legal questions involved whether illegal and corrupt practices were committed by the successful candidate, whether the Presiding Officer was legally obligated to adjourn the poll under section 27 due to an alleged disturbance, and whether the Returning Officer and Election Tribunal erred in refusing a recount of ballot papers. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to prove corrupt practices or that a serious incident occurred necessitating the adjournment of the poll, and further held that a recount of ballot papers cannot be claimed as a matter of right but requires valid grounds and a reasonable request under section 39. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs, affirming the principle that election challenges and requests for recounts must be substantiated by concrete evidence rather than assumptions and suppositions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Presiding Officer under a legal obligation to adjourn the poll when a minor disturbance occurs at a polling station?
  • Can a recounting of ballot papers be claimed as a matter of right by a contesting candidate?
  • What conditions must be satisfied for a Returning Officer to order a recount of ballot-papers under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976?
  • Does an election petitioner bear the burden of proving allegations of illegal and corrupt practices against the successful candidate?
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• Kaniz Fatima And Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 1866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-24
  evacuee propertylachesconstitutional petitionsettlement authoritiesresumption of propertyremand orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns seven petitions for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of Constitutional petitions by the Sind High Court on the grounds of laches regarding urban settlement disputes. The petitioners, having purchased evacuee properties in Jacobabad between 1960-1962, faced resumption orders by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. Although a Settlement Commissioner later ordered the restoration of certain properties conditional upon payment of the reserve price, the petitioners failed to comply or faced subsequent adverse orders after a remand by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying critical legal questions regarding whether the High Court's previous remand order negated the defense of laches for the period preceding it, whether the benefit of a restoration order could be revoked without a challenge by an opposing party, and whether the requirement to pay a reserve price instead of the auction price was legally sound. The Court also addressed procedural issues regarding notice requirements for payment and the necessity of impleading third parties who had acquired the disputed properties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court remand order in a writ petition negate the defense of laches for the period preceding that order?
  • Can a benefit granted by a Settlement Commissioner's order be revoked by a High Court or an authorized officer without the order being challenged by an opposing party?
  • Is a petitioner required to pay the reserve price or the auction price for the restoration of evacuee property?
  • Must third parties who have acquired disputed properties be impleaded in proceedings concerning the restoration of those properties?
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• Kameen Wazir vs The State1986 SCMR 2002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26
  leave to appealcriminal bailpost-arrest bailrule of consistencyattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court dated 2-4-1986, whereby the petitioner's request for pre-trial bail under sections 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code was refused, while bail was granted to his co-accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner's case was distinguishable from that of the co-accused who had been granted bail, particularly regarding the principle of consistency in bail matters. The Supreme Court held that the plea that the petitioner's case could not be distinguished from that of the released co-accused deserved consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the petition, and directed the case to be transferred to the Peshawar Registry for hearing during the upcoming court session.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-trial bail should be granted to an accused whose case is indistinguishable from co-accused who have already been granted bail?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when considering bail applications for co-accused facing trial under sections 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Kaisar Singh Alias Sardar Khan vs Abdul Majid And Other1986 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-18
  evacuee propertyadverse possessionancestral landwrit jurisdictioncustodian of evacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sikh by birth who embraced Islam and remained in Pakistan after Partition, sought a declaration from the Deputy Custodian that his ancestral land was non-evacuee property, claiming ownership through adverse possession. The Deputy Custodian rejected the plea, a decision upheld by the Custodian and the High Court in writ jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the petitioner established adverse possession and whether he should be permitted to retain his ancestral share. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove adverse possession. Regarding his ancestral share, the Court observed that although he seemingly lost it due to pressing an incorrect plea for the entire property, it was open to him to seek legal remedies to reopen the matter if legally possible. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Did the petitioner successfully prove ownership of the land through adverse possession?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere in its writ jurisdiction regarding the Custodian's order?
  • Can a party who unsuccessfully claims an entire property on a wrong plea subsequently seek to recover their admitted ancestral share?
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• Junaid Ahmad Soomro vs Haji Mehboob Ali Bhayo and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-02
  election petitiondisqualification of candidategovernment contractorsubsisting interestrepudiation of contractpenal statute constructionRepresentation of the Peoples Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an Election Tribunal's decision declaring the appellant's election void due to his alleged disqualification as a government contractor. The core legal question was whether the appellant held a subsisting interest in government contracts on the nomination date, thereby violating the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977. While the Tribunal held the appellant disqualified, the Supreme Court, by a majority, allowed the appeal. The Court held that disqualification provisions, being penal in nature, must be strictly construed. It established that where a candidate has unequivocally repudiated or abandoned a contract, and the government has not accepted performance or kept the contract alive through valid mutual agreement, the candidate ceases to have a subsisting interest for disqualification purposes. Unilateral extensions of time by the government after a clear abandonment are legally ineffective to maintain a subsisting interest. Consequently, the Court ruled the appellant was not disqualified, set aside the Tribunal's order, and dismissed the election petition, emphasizing that the possibility of exercising undue influence must be real, not merely theoretical.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate's unilateral abandonment of a government contract terminate their subsisting interest for the purposes of election disqualification?
  • Can a government department unilaterally extend a contract after the contractor has clearly repudiated it to maintain a subsisting interest for disqualification purposes?
  • Should penal provisions regarding election disqualification be construed strictly?
  • Does the mere existence of an unfinalized account regarding a completed government contract constitute a subsisting interest disqualifying a candidate?
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• Jumma Gul vs Surat Khan And Other1986 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  murder trialinterested witnessesocular testimonyabscondencecorroborationacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's acquittal of the respondents, who were initially convicted by the trial court for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the ocular testimony of witnesses deemed interested and partisan, and whether the alleged abscondence of the accused provided sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding no legal infirmity in the High Court's reasoning. The Court held that while the testimony of interested witnesses is not inadmissible, it requires corroboration as a rule of prudence, which was absent here. Furthermore, the Court clarified that mere allegations of abscondence, without formal proceedings or proclamations under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, do not constitute sufficient evidence to corroborate ocular testimony. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal and dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is there an inflexible rule that the testimony of interested witnesses must be rejected without corroboration?
  • Does the mere allegation of abscondence, without formal proclamation under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, constitute sufficient corroboration of ocular testimony?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of ocular testimony from partisan witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration?
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• Juma Khan And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  concurrent sentencesimprisonment for lifedouble murdersentencing clarificationaggregate imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking clarification regarding whether multiple sentences of imprisonment for life imposed on the petitioners for a double murder are to run concurrently or consecutively. The petitioners were originally sentenced to death on two counts by the trial court, which was reduced to imprisonment for life on each count by the High Court, and subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court without specifying the concurrency of the sentences. The core legal question is whether multiple sentences of imprisonment for life resulting from a single trial must run concurrently when not expressly directed otherwise, and how section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 limits the total period of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the sentences of imprisonment for life on each count shall run concurrently and not consecutively, noting that under section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the total period of imprisonment at one trial cannot exceed 25 years. The principle laid down is that multiple sentences of life imprisonment arising from the same trial run concurrently to respect the statutory aggregate limits of imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple sentences of imprisonment for life imposed at one trial are to run concurrently or consecutively when the judgment is silent on the matter?
  • Does the total period of imprisonment at one trial exceed twenty-five years under section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court review its own judgment under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after it has been upheld by the Supreme Court?
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• Jetharam vs Weram And Other1986 SCMR 1056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-15
  enhancement of sentencedeath penaltymitigating circumstanceshouse trespassdouble murderpremeditation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a double murder case where the respondent was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment on each count. The complainant sought enhancement of the sentence to death, which was rejected by the High Court on the grounds that the incident occurred without premeditation, at the spur of the moment, and that the respondent had reacted to resistance and intervention by the victims. The Supreme Court examined whether these factors constituted mitigating circumstances. The Court held that where an accused armed with a deadly weapon commits house-trespass at night, he cannot plead mitigation if he kills the inmates who resist him or attempt to arrest him. Finding no valid mitigating circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and enhanced the sentence of life imprisonment to death on both counts.

  Questions settled

  • Can an armed intruder who commits house-trespass at night plead mitigation of sentence on the ground that he killed the inmates in the heat of the moment when they resisted or tried to capture him?
  • Does the failure to put a motive to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify the award of a lesser penalty when guilt is otherwise established by sufficient evidence?
  • Can a court rely on an unproven possibility of the accused sustaining injuries during the incident as a mitigating factor for sentencing if the same was excluded from the assessment of guilt?
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• Jehangir Khan vs The State1986 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-11
  murder convictionocular testimonycircumstantial evidencecriminal appealidentification paradeprocedural lapsescorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder while reducing the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution's case was fatally undermined by alleged procedural lapses, including the failure to produce the Tonga in court, the omission of chemical analysis for blood on the Tonga, the absence of an identification parade, and alleged discrepancies in the timing of witness statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the ocular testimony of independent witnesses, corroborated by circumstantial evidence—specifically the appellant's arrest from his house surrounded by villagers and the recovery of a weapon smelling of freshly fired gunpowder—was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court established that procedural omissions, such as the failure to scrape blood from evidence or produce physical objects, do not automatically invalidate a prosecution case when the remaining evidence is unimpeachable and consistent. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that identification parades are unnecessary when the identity of the accused is established through reliable ocular testimony and immediate circumstantial corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce a physical object used in the commission of a crime in court automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is an identification parade necessary when the identity of the accused is established through reliable ocular testimony?
  • Can adverse inferences be drawn from the prosecution's failure to collect or chemically analyze all available physical evidence if the remaining evidence is sufficient to prove guilt?
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• Javid Ahmad Bhatti vs The Director General, Federal Investigation1986 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-11
  misconductdisciplinary proceedingsremoval from serviceshorter procedureshow-cause noticeservice tribunalfederal investigation agency
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector in the Federal Investigation Agency (F.I.A.), was removed from service following allegations of misconduct. While still under training, the petitioner visited the office of the District Education Officer, misrepresenting himself as an 'Inspector' of the F.I.A. and misbehaving with officials. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, utilizing the shorter procedure which dispenses with a formal inquiry. The 'authorised officer' found the petitioner guilty of misconduct and recommended removal, a decision upheld by the Director-General, F.I.A. The petitioner appealed to the Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, affirming the findings of guilt and the appropriateness of the punishment. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the matter and found that the objections raised by the petitioner had been adequately addressed by the Service Tribunal. The Court held that no question of law of public importance arose, thereby dismissing the petition and affirming the removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Can disciplinary action be taken against a government servant using the shorter procedure under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 without a formal inquiry?
  • Is the removal from service of a government servant for misconduct, upheld by the Service Tribunal, subject to appeal before the Supreme Court if no question of law of public importance is involved?
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• Jalal Din vs Ata Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-02
  evacuee propertyclaims commissionerforged documentforfeiture of allotmentre-agitating settled issuesrejection of plaintres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a long-standing property dispute concerning the transfer of portions of an evacuee property to the petitioner and respondent No. 1, respectively. The petitioner alleged that respondent No. 1 relied on a forged verification order to obtain his compensation book and property transfer. The Claims Commissioner confiscated the respondent's property portion under section 14(2) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. After previous rounds of litigation where superior courts found the Claims Commissioner's order was based on assumptions and 'no evidence'—especially since the respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings—the petitioner subsequently filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that the verification order was a forgery. The lower civil courts rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the High Court dismissed subsequent revisions. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a party cannot re-agitate questions and issues already conclusively decided by superior courts through a fresh civil suit. The petition was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Claims Commissioner can order the forfeiture of property under section 14(2) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 without a well-considered finding based on evidence that a fraud or false claim was committed?
  • Can a party file a fresh civil suit to re-agitate questions and matters already heard and finally decided by superior courts?
  • Does a civil court have the jurisdiction to entertain a suit that seeks to challenge findings and decisions already rendered by the High Court and the Supreme Court between the same parties?
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• Jabir Ali vs Qurban Ali And Another1986 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-14
  pre-emptionlimitationfraudulent concealmentcause of actionoccupancy tenantmutationdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land originally mutated as a mortgage in 1961. Subsequently, in 1969, the vendee obtained a declaratory decree stating the transaction was actually a sale, upon an oath taken on the Holy Quran by the vendor. The pre-emptor then filed a suit for possession by pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the limitation period for filing the pre-emption suit commenced from the date of the original mortgage mutation or from the date when the real nature of the transaction as a sale became known through the declaratory decree. The Supreme Court held that where a transaction is disguised to conceal a sale and defeat pre-emption rights, limitation begins from the date the real nature of the transaction comes to the pre-emptor's knowledge, applying principles related to fraudulent concealment and limitation. The Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the trial Court for a fresh decision on merits, laying down that devices used to defeat pre-emption must be legitimate rather than fraudulent.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period commence for filing a pre-emption suit where the original transaction was fraudulently disguised as a mortgage?
  • Does the concealment of a sale transaction under the guise of a mortgage amount to fraud for the purpose of extending limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether a pre-emptor has a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer when the sale transaction is established through a subsequent declaratory decree?
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• J.H. Abraham vs Aziz Aslam1986 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-07
  civil procedurewitness listproduction of documentsjudicial discretionrevisional jurisdictionunlisted witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision petition challenging the trial court's decision to allow the respondent-plaintiff to produce unlisted witnesses and documents. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted within its discretion under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when permitting the examination of a witness and the production of documents not included in the original list submitted by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion, and the High Court correctly upheld this decision in its revisional jurisdiction, finding no legal infirmity. The judgment reaffirms the principle that while Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandates the submission of a witness list within seven days of the settlement of issues, the court retains the discretion to permit additional evidence upon showing good cause, provided that the court records its reasons for granting such permission. Finding no merit in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court permit the examination of witnesses not included in the original list submitted under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the trial court required to record reasons when granting permission to produce unlisted witnesses or documents?
  • Does the High Court have the authority in revisional jurisdiction to uphold a trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the production of unlisted evidence?
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• Ismat Ullah vs Khawaja Sharif Bakhsh And Other1986 SCMR 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07
  ejectmentreconstructionsanctioned planlandlord and tenanturban rent restrictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions filed against a judgment of the High Court dismissing writ petitions challenging tenant ejectment orders. The core legal question concerns whether the landlord's failure to initially file all leaves of the sanctioned reconstruction plan along with the ejectment petition mala fide undermined the bona fides of the ejectment application under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court held that the complete sanctioned plan consisting of three leaves was indeed produced in evidence and that the tenants failed to raise this specific objection in their written statements before the Rent Controller, making it a belated attempt to confuse the issue. The court dismissed the petitions, affirming that the landlord's plea for reconstruction was duly substantiated and the concurrent findings below contained no misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to initially attach all leaves of a sanctioned reconstruction plan to an ejectment application proves a lack of bona fides on the part of the landlord?
  • Can a plea regarding the sanctioned reconstruction plan, not raised in the written statement before the Rent Controller, be permitted to be urged for the first time during writ proceedings?
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• Ismail (Deceased) Represented By Muhammad Yusuf vs Muhammad1986 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-08
  pre-emptionwithdrawal of pre-emption moneyre-deposit of pre-emption moneyregular second appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal in a pre-emption suit on the ground that the petitioners had withdrawn the pre-emption money during the pendency of the appeal without waiting for formal court permission, notwithstanding that they later re-deposited the amount pursuant to conditional permission granted by the court. The core legal question concerns the effect of withdrawing pre-emption money during appellate proceedings and the subsequent re-deposit of the amount, as well as the appellate court's power to grant time for depositing pre-emption money. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding the withdrawal and re-deposit of pre-emption money and the conduct of the proceedings require detailed examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of pre-emption money during the pendency of an appeal without formal court permission warrant the dismissal of the appeal?
  • Can an appellate court permit the re-deposit of pre-emption money previously withdrawn by a pre-emptor?
  • Whether an appellate court has the power to grant reasonable time for the deposit of pre-emption money when dealing with a pre-emption appeal?
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• Island Textile Mills Ltd. vs V/O Technoexport And Another1986 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-03
  Arbitration Actstay of suitarbitration agreementnon-signatory partyallegations of fraudspecial leave to appealdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had stayed civil suit proceedings and referred the dispute to arbitration under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the arbitration clause in the agreement was not applicable to all parties, specifically noting that one defendant was not a signatory to the agreement. Furthermore, the petitioner raised concerns regarding the location of the arbitration in Russia, the location of evidence and property in Pakistan, and allegations of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the machinery's production yield. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, determining that the case involved substantial questions of law. These questions include whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to stay the suit, whether an arbitration clause can bind a non-signatory defendant, and whether allegations of fraud and the complexity of the dispute render a matter unsuitable for arbitration. The Court ordered that the stay on arbitration proceedings continue pending the final appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an arbitration clause be invoked to bind a defendant who is not a party to the underlying agreement?
  • Is a dispute involving complex allegations of fraud and misrepresentation suitable for referral to arbitration?
  • Should a court stay civil proceedings in favor of arbitration when the location of evidence and property is in a different jurisdiction than the proposed seat of arbitration?
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• Islamuddin vs Muhammad Hussain And Another1986 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-14
  ejectmentdefault in rent depositstriking off defencerent controllerspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner-tenant's appeal against an order striking off his defence and directing his eviction for non-compliance with a rent deposit order under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question concerns whether the tenant committed default in depositing monthly rent pursuant to the Rent Controller's order under section 16(1) of the Ordinance, and whether such default justified striking off his defence under section 16(2). The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower fora regarding the tenant's unexcused delay in depositing the rent for August 1980 were unexceptionable, and that the question of exercising discretion did not arise as no sufficient cause or plea of circumstances beyond control was established. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to deposit monthly rent by the prescribed date warrants striking off the tenant's defence under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance?
  • Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding a default in rent deposit be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a tenant entitled to the exercise of judicial discretion in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for failing to deposit rent on time?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Railways vs Karachi1986 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  temporary injunctionstatus quoland disputeinterim reliefexpeditious disposalirreparable loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which had modified a temporary injunction granted by a trial court regarding a land dispute. The petitioner, claiming ownership of 357.58 acres, sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering with its possession or undertaking construction activities on the land. The High Court had permitted the respondent to continue certain development works, such as laying roads and sewerage lines, while restraining alienation of the property. The core legal question concerned the appropriate interim relief pending the final adjudication of the suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal. The Court held that in disputes involving potential irreparable harm and the risk of costly future removal of structures, the maintenance of the status quo is the preferred legal course. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, directed the parties to seek expeditious disposal of the suit within six months, and ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding the disputed land until the suit's final determination.

  Questions settled

  • When should a court order the maintenance of status quo in a land dispute involving potential construction?
  • Is the Supreme Court generally inclined to interfere with interim injunction orders?
  • What is the appropriate judicial response when construction on disputed land might cause irreparable loss to the successful party?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence1986 SCMR 898 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-17
  service tribunalsenioritycivil servantsdirect recruitspromoteesquota rulesregularizationassumption of charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenged the judgment of the Service Tribunal regarding the seniority, pay, and allowances of direct recruits versus promotees to the posts of Aerodrome Officers in the Civil Aviation Department. The core legal questions involved the correctness of the Tribunal's decision to anti-date the appointments of direct recruits, the operation of recruitment quotas, and the absorption and regularization of Airport Managers Grade-III. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in anti-dating appointments by ignoring the date of assumption of charge under Fundamental Rule 17, misinterpreting the quota rules and departmental instructions governing the sequence of recruitment and roster operation, and failing to account for the relaxation of rules regarding the absorption of Airport Managers. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Service Tribunal, establishing that direct recruits cannot claim seniority or pay prior to assuming charge and that established departmental instructions and statutory recruitment rules regarding quotas and regularization must be strictly followed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether direct recruits can claim seniority, pay, and allowances from the date of selection or recommendation by the Public Service Commission, ignoring the date of assumption of charge?
  • How should the roster of vacancies be operated in a cadre with fixed quotas for departmental promotion and direct recruitment?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal can set aside the regularization of promotees and absorption of officers made by the competent authority in accordance with relaxed recruitment rules?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry of Communications And Others vs Abdul Karim Shaikh And 2 Other1986 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-14
  service tribunalgovernment servants efficiency and discipline rulesauthorised officernatural justicedisciplinary proceedingsservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three appeals arising from a consolidated judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary proceedings initiated against government servants under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Leave to appeal was initially granted to examine whether the same person could be designated as both the 'Authority' and the 'Authorised Officer'. However, the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to decide this specific question, instead disposing of the appeals on a short ground. The Service Tribunal had set aside the penalty orders because the civil servants were deprived of the examination of their cases at two distinct stages, thereby prejudicing their interests and violating principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court found the Tribunal's view unexceptionable, noting that no prejudice was caused to the appellants as the Tribunal had left the matter open for further lawful consideration. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the same person can be designated as both the Authority and the Authorised Officer under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Does the combination of the functions of the Authority and the Authorised Officer prejudice the fair trial and defence of a government servant in disciplinary proceedings?
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• Irfan Ashiq vs General Manager, Kundian Nuclear Complex And Other1986 SCMR 1820(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-21
  leave to appeallimitation periodacquittal appealstatutory limitationcertified copycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that had accepted the Government's appeal against the petitioner's acquittal. The petitioner was originally charged under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Government's appeal against the acquittal was barred by limitation. The petitioner contended that even after excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the trial court's judgment, the appeal was filed one day beyond the prescribed sixty-day limitation period. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the timeline—noting the acquittal date of 10-8-1981, the application for a certified copy, and the subsequent filing date of 26-11-1981—found that the petitioner's contention regarding the limitation period raised a substantial issue requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to specifically consider the question of limitation. The holding establishes that where a prima facie case is made out that an appeal was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation, leave to appeal should be granted to adjudicate the issue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the calculation of the limitation period for filing an appeal against an acquittal include the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment?
  • Is an appeal filed one day beyond the statutory sixty-day limitation period considered time-barred?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal regarding a question of limitation?
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• Iqbal vs The State1986 SCMR 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtinterested witnessesabscondenceself-defencecorroborationocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Rehmatullah. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and his father, an absconder, fired at the deceased due to prior enmity. The trial court convicted the appellant but acquitted his co-accused, citing a tendency to implicate relatives. The High Court maintained the conviction, relying on ocular testimony and the appellant's abscondence. The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the prosecution's case contained significant inconsistencies, particularly regarding the role of the deceased's revolver and the lack of a plausible motive for the appellant. It emphasized that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution, and the accused is not required to specifically plead self-defence to benefit from facts emerging from the prosecution's own evidence. The Court concluded that the interested witnesses were unreliable, and abscondence alone, in the absence of other corroborative evidence, was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an accused to formally plead self-defence preclude the court from considering evidence of self-defence emerging from the prosecution's own case?
  • Can abscondence serve as sufficient corroboration for the testimony of interested witnesses in a criminal trial?
  • Is the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus applicable to the testimony of witnesses who are found to be partially unreliable?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused based on the unreliability of prosecution evidence regarding their involvement necessitate the acquittal of the remaining accused if the evidence against them is similarly tainted?
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• Iqbal Ahmad Siddiqui vs Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad And Other1986 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-06
  service tribunalseniority listcadre separationreversionleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority and threatened reversion in government service. The petitioner, an Accountant Superintendent, challenged a revised seniority list issued following a prior judgment of the Service Tribunal in another case holding that ordinary and selection grade Upper Division Clerks constitute separate cadres. The core legal question is whether a judgment of the Service Tribunal rendered in a case to which an employee was not a party can automatically form the basis for altering their long-standing seniority and causing their reversion without independent adjudication of their own departmental cadre status. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that substantial questions of law of general importance were raised and noting that the correctness of the basic judgment of the Service Tribunal was already under consideration by the Court in a connected matter. The Court ordered that status quo be maintained pending the interim relief decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment of the Service Tribunal delivered in a case to which an employee was not a party is binding upon them for the purpose of refixing their seniority?
  • Does the introduction of national pay scales legally separate the cadres of ordinary and selection grade Upper Division Clerks?
  • Can an employee be subjected to reversion on the basis of a revised seniority list formulated pursuant to a judicial precedent rendered in a different department or case?
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• Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan vs Allied Bank of Pakistan and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-13
  ad interim attachmentindustrial development bankcompetency of appealspecial jurisdictionsurety liabilitystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting an appeal against an ad interim attachment order passed by a District Judge under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961. The core legal questions involved whether an ad interim attachment order is appealable under the Ordinance and the proper interpretation of the court's power to order ad interim attachment of properties. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the High Court was incompetent because section 39 of the Ordinance provides a complete code and allows appeals only against specific final orders under subsections (7) and (9), whereas an order disposing of an application to recall an ad interim attachment is interlocutory and not appealable. Furthermore, the Court interpreted subsection (3) of section 39, establishing that the power of the District Judge to order interim attachment of hypothecated and surety properties is circumscribed by the requirement to estimate the value needed to cover the outstanding claim and costs, preventing the mechanical attachment of all properties regardless of value. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order refusing to recall an ad interim attachment under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 is appealable?
  • Does section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 provide a complete code for the enforcement of claims by the bank excluding general procedural laws?
  • Is a District Judge legally required to estimate the value of properties before ordering ad interim attachment under section 39(3) of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961?
  Read full judgment →
• Income Tax Officer, Company Circle XII, Karachi vs Messrs Shaikh Miran Bux Karam Bux Ltd. And 25 Other1986 SCMR 1255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-06-14
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causetime-barredincome tax assessmentprevious year definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns twenty-six petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Income Tax Officer against a judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had invalidated a notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue regarding the definition of the 'previous year' for rice exporters under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had established 'sufficient cause' to condone the significant delay in filing these petitions. The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were filed well after the limitation period and the petitioner's admission order in a related case. The petitioner attributed the delay to the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the admission order, secure sanction for funds, and prepare the petitions. The Court held that the explanation provided for the delay was unsatisfactory and lacked necessary details, particularly regarding the time spent securing funds. Consequently, the Court dismissed all petitions as time-barred, emphasizing the requirement for a petitioner to explain each day of delay to establish sufficient cause.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time taken to obtain sanction for funds constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing a petition?
  • Is a petitioner required to explain each day of delay to satisfy the court for condonation?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of being time-barred when the explanation for delay is unsatisfactory?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah And Others vs Mst. Khurshid Akhtar1986 SCMR 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-12
  pre-emptionZar-e-Panjumextension of timediscretion of courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a revision petition, which had upheld an appellate order extending the time for a pre-emptor to deposit Zar-e-Panjum (1/5th of the sale price). The core legal question was whether the lower appellate court and the High Court properly exercised their discretion in extending the time for depositing the pre-emption money upon a finding of a bona fide mistake. The Supreme Court held that the extension of time for depositing Zar-e-Panjum falls within the discretion of the court, and where the appellate court has exercised this discretion on the material available to take a view different from the trial court, such exercise of discretion does not warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of any important question of law or compelling reasons. The key principle laid down is that the appellate court is competent to review and extend the time for depositing pre-emption money upon sufficient cause or bona fide mistake, and its discretionary orders in this regard will not be lightly interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appellate court is competent to extend the time for depositing Zar-e-Panjum in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the extension of time for depositing pre-emption money require the showing of a bona fide mistake or sufficient cause?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the lower appellate court and the High Court regarding the extension of time?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Khan Malik vs N. W.F.P. Through Secretary, Forest Department And Other1986 SCMR 1970(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-13
  partition deedjoint propertyconcurrent findings of factroyalty rightsforest rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a declaration of exclusive entitlement to royalty payments derived from tree-cutting in specific forest compartments, relying on partition deeds dated 1932 and 1961. The trial court rejected this claim, finding that the 1932 partition deed only addressed the 'Bandajat' (pasture lands) of the village and did not partition the forest area, which remained the joint property of three tribes. This finding was affirmed on appeal by a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the petition for leave to appeal against these concurrent findings. The Court held that the lower courts' determinations were based on questions of fact. As the petitioner failed to demonstrate that these findings were vitiated by misreading or non-reading of material evidence, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent judgments. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless the petitioner can establish that such findings resulted from a misreading or non-reading of material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Can a partition deed limited to pasture lands be construed as a partition of forest property?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmad And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-16
  bailmurder caseinvestigating officerchallanjudicial discretioncriminal procedureinnocence report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order refusing bail to three individuals accused of murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in denying bail when the Investigating Officer, in a subsequent complete challan, had declared the petitioners innocent and placed them in Column 2, contrary to an earlier incomplete challan. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing bail. The Court affirmed that the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding the innocence of an accused is not binding upon the court. The key principle laid down is that the Investigating Officer cannot act as the final judge of guilt or innocence; rather, it is the duty of the trial court to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of an accused after recording and evaluating the evidence of eye-witnesses. Given the specific allegations of active participation and the firing of fatal shots by the petitioners, the High Court’s refusal to grant bail was justified.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding the innocence of an accused binding on the court when deciding a bail application?
  • Can a court refuse bail to an accused person if the police have placed them in Column 2 of the challan?
  • Does the filing of an incomplete challan followed by a complete challan declaring an accused innocent preclude the court from assessing the evidence independently?
  Read full judgment →
• Imdad Ali Khan vs Pakistan and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-09
  civil servantad hoc appointmentregularization of promotionhigher post emolumentsservice tribunalpromotion quotaincrements
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed cross-appeals arising from a judgment of the Service Tribunal concerning a civil servant's claims regarding promotion, regularization, and pay emoluments. The core legal questions examined whether a civil servant temporarily transferred to a higher grade post is entitled to regular promotion without a vacant reserved post, and whether such a civil servant is entitled to increments in the higher pay scale during the tenure of that service. The Supreme Court held that a civil servant cannot claim regular promotion to a higher post when no reserved promotion quota post is available and statutory prerequisites have not been fulfilled, meaning the Service Tribunal cannot substitute itself for the Departmental Promotion Committee. However, the Court further held that a civil servant called upon to discharge the full duties of a higher post, and who suffers from no ineligibility or deficiency, is entitled not only to the minimum pay of the higher scale but also to the increments falling due for the period those duties are performed. Both appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim regular promotion to a higher grade post when no reserved promotion quota post is available under the applicable recruitment rules?
  • Can the Service Tribunal substitute itself for the Departmental Promotion Committee to assess suitability and regularize a promotion?
  • Is a civil servant who is called upon to discharge the full duties of a higher post entitled to increments in the pay scale of the higher post for the duration of such service?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din And Another vs Abdul Majid And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-20
  pre-emptioncourt-feelimitationplaint rejectionOrder VII Rule 11pecuniary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the vendees challenged an order directing the plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court-fee. The petitioners contended that since the limitation period for the pre-emption suit had expired by the time the court ordered the deficiency to be made up under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the plaint should have been rejected rather than allowing the deficiency to be cured. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents including Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, held that the question of limitation does not arise when a court exercises its power under Order VII, Rule 11 to determine deficient court-fee. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff has a right to be afforded at least one opportunity to make up such deficiency. Since the respondent complied with the court's order within the specified time, the trial court acted correctly. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, finding no merit in the petitioners' arguments regarding the application of limitation or the court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing a suit bar a court from granting an opportunity to make up deficient court-fee under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to at least one opportunity to make up a deficiency in court-fee under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Hussain Shah And Another vs The State And 7 Other1986 SCMR 1631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03Read full judgment →
• Ihsanurrehman vs Mst. Najma Parveen1986 PLD Supreme Court 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05
  custody of minorsguardianshiprevisional jurisdictionWest Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964Guardians and Wards Act 1890maintainability of revisionSection 115 CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was directed against a Lahore High Court judgment which modified Family Court and District Court orders regarding the custody of minor children on a civil revision filed by the respondent mother. The core legal question was whether a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or Section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 is maintainable before the High Court against decisions of a Family Court acting as a Guardian Judge, and whether the Supreme Court's prior ruling in Sakhawat Ali v. Mst. Shui Khelay required reconsideration following the 1980 proviso added to Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. Reaffirming Sakhawat Ali, the Supreme Court held that Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 expressly bars the application of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, including Section 115 revisions, to Family Court proceedings. It further held that Section 25 of the 1964 Act applies procedural rules of the 1890 Act only to the original trial before the Family Court and not to post-decision appellate or revisional forums. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's revisional judgment as passed without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable against a judgment or order of a Family Court in guardianship and custody matters?
  • Does Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 extend the procedural provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 to appellate and revisional remedies?
  • Does the 1980 amendment adding a proviso to Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 alter the appellate jurisdiction defined under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikharullah vs Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Cooperative, Food and Agriculture Division, Islamabad1986 SCMR 1436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24
  service appealinquiry reportshow-cause noticenatural justicedisciplinary proceedingscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in an appeal filed by Iftikharullah against the Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Cooperative, Food and Agriculture Division, Islamabad. The core legal question revolves around whether the failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report and to issue a second show-cause notice vitiates the penalty imposed on a civil servant. The Supreme Court accepted the concession made by the learned Deputy Attorney-General, based on precedent, that the omission to furnish the inquiry report and issue a second show-cause notice renders the penalty unsustainable. Consequently, the Court held that the penalty order must be set aside and directed that the proceedings be resumed from the stage of supplying the inquiry report and affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause. The key principle laid down is that natural justice requires supplying an inquiry report and issuing a second show-cause notice before imposing a penalty in disciplinary proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report to an employee vitiates the penalty imposed?
  • Is the issuance of a second show-cause notice mandatory before imposing a penalty in disciplinary proceedings?
  • What is the appropriate relief when a penalty is set aside due to procedural non-compliance in disciplinary actions?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad vs Amiruddin And Another1986 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-09
  evacuee propertyre-auctionresumptionProvisional Transfer OrderP.T.O.official malfeasancesettlement commissionerservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a writ petition challenging an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the resumption and re-auction of evacuee property. The core question was whether property purchased by respondent No. 1 via auction, for which full payment was made and a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) issued, could validly be resumed and re-auctioned to the petitioner. The Settlement Commissioner found that respondent No. 1 had paid the full price and that the department's resumption was based on official malfeasance, noting that resumption notices were neither necessary nor served. Consequently, the re-auction and transfer to the petitioner were declared void and illegal. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that where full payment was made and auction confirmed, resumption proceedings without proper basis or notice are entirely void and illegal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evacuee property fully paid for by an auction purchaser can be resumed and re-auctioned due to departmental error or malfeasance?
  • Whether resumption proceedings conducted without serving notice on the transferee are void and illegal?
  • Whether the High Court correctly dismissed a writ petition challenging a Settlement Commissioner's order that set aside an invalid re-auction of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad And Others vs Ghulam Farooq And Other1986 SCMR 1794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30
  pre-emptionamendment of plaintKhasra numbersale-deed descriptioncivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order of the Additional District Judge, Attock, regarding a pre-emption suit. The core legal dispute arose when the pre-emptor sought to amend his plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct the Khasra number of the suit property, which differed from the number stated in the registered sale-deed. The trial court initially allowed the amendment, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, holding that such an amendment was impermissible. The High Court subsequently interfered with this revisional order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the significant legal question of whether a pre-emptor can seek to amend a plaint to correct a property description (Khasra number) that contradicts the registered sale-deed, or whether such an amendment effectively constitutes an unauthorized judicial correction of the underlying sale-deed itself. The Court recognized that this issue requires deeper examination to determine the limits of permissible amendments in pre-emption litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor amend a plaint to correct a Khasra number that differs from the description in the registered sale-deed?
  • Does an amendment to correct a property description in a pre-emption suit amount to an unauthorized correction of the sale-deed by the Civil Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Hussain vs Allah Bakhsh1986 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04
  review petitionerror apparent on the recordmortgagee rightsrevocation of giftnew plea in review
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 17th June, 1984. The petitioner sought review primarily on the ground that the court erroneously noted in its narration of facts that the original owner had redeemed the mortgage prior to alienation, whereas the actual position was that the equity of redemption had been sold, extinguishing the mortgage. The petitioner argued this inaccuracy might expose him to further litigation and affect his mortgagee rights. The petitioner also raised a new plea regarding the revocation of a gift under section 42 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court held that since the pointed inaccuracy in the narration of facts was immaterial to the core decision determining the validity of the sale, it did not constitute an error apparent on the record warranting review. Furthermore, the court held that a new plea not raised during the main appeal or leave granting stage cannot be entertained in review. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an immaterial inaccuracy in the narration of facts in a judgment constitute an error apparent on the record for the purposes of review?
  • Can a new plea not raised during the main appeal or leave granting stage be considered at the review stage?
  • Does the dismissal of a sale affect the unadjudicated mortgagee rights of a party when no issue regarding them was raised and determined in the main judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Humayun And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-13
  free fightself-defenceprivate defenceconcurrent findingscriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the convictions of the petitioners for murder and causing injuries under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the plea of self-defence is available to an accused party in a situation characterized as a free fight. The trial court and the High Court had concurrently found that the incident involved a free fight between the parties over the possession of government-owned land, during which both sides sustained injuries. The Supreme Court declined to re-appraise the evidence regarding the free fight, finding the lower courts' findings based on cogent evidence. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the plea of self-defence is not available to either party in a case of a free fight. This judgment reinforces the established legal principle that when an incident is determined to be a free fight, the right of private defence cannot be invoked by the participants.

  Questions settled

  • Is the plea of self-defence available to an accused in a case of a free fight?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of an incident as a free fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Humayun Akhtar vs Federation of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-24
  review petitioncivil servantservice tribunal jurisdictionsuspensionpopulation welfare planning
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a review of a judgment of the Supreme Court passed on a civil petition for leave to appeal, contending that his matter was not properly disposed of without a hearing. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim to be a civil servant prior to his induction under the relevant ordinance so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal regarding his suspension. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not a civil servant at the time of his suspension and its extension, as he had not yet been selected and appointed under the Population Welfare Planning Programme Ordinance 1981, and therefore the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant him relief. The petition for review was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person claim to be a civil servant prior to selection and appointment under the Population Welfare Planning Programme Ordinance 1981?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a person who was not a civil servant at the relevant time of suspension?
  • Does the applicability of Government rules with regard to Efficiency and Discipline automatically confer civil servant status for invoking Service Tribunal jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Hidayatullah vs Federation of Pakistan And Another1986 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15
  service matterabatement of proceedingsMartial Law RegulationProvisional Constitution Orderdismissal from serviceconstitutional validity
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Sub-Divisional Magistrate, challenged his dismissal from service which had been effected under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 on May 30, 1970. Following the dismissal of his appeal by the Service Tribunal on November 18, 1979, the appellant sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the pendency of these proceedings, C.M.L.A. Order No. 3 of 1982 was promulgated on August 30, 1982, which introduced Article 13-A into the Provisional Constitution Order. The core legal question before the Court was the effect of this new constitutional provision on pending litigation challenging actions taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58. The Supreme Court held that Article 13-A(b) of the Provisional Constitution Order explicitly validated all actions taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 and mandated that all pending proceedings challenging such actions must abate immediately. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellant's appeal stood abated by operation of law upon the promulgation of the C.M.L.A. Order, resulting in the disposal of the matter without further adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the promulgation of Article 13-A of the Provisional Constitution Order cause the abatement of pending appeals challenging dismissals under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
  • What is the legal effect of Article 13-A(b) of the Provisional Constitution Order on proceedings impugning actions taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
  Read full judgment →
• Hazrat Gul vs Ajmal Khan And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29
  cancellation of bailOffence of Zinafurther inquiryHudood Ordinancebail discretionNikah validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal sought the cancellation of bail granted to two respondents by the Lahore High Court in a case involving charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The respondents, accused of offenses under sections 10, 11, and 16 of the Ordinance, had initially been refused bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Attock. Subsequently, the High Court granted them bail, reasoning that the respondents had entered into a marriage without external compulsion and that the validity of the alleged Nikah required further evidentiary inquiry, thus bringing their case within the scope of further inquiry. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order to determine if the High Court had exercised its discretion legally. Finding no illegality in the High Court's reasoning regarding the necessity of further inquiry into the marriage's validity, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the grant of bail. The petition was dismissed on the grounds that it lacked merit, affirming the principle that bail may be granted where the prosecution's case requires further investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim of valid marriage in a Zina case constitute grounds for further inquiry regarding bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order granting bail if no illegality is present?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad vs Muhammad Khan And Other1986 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-24
  criminal petitionocular accountunexplained injuriesmaterial contradictionsinterested witnessesmurderassault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the acquittal or decision of the lower courts in a criminal case involving charges of murder and assault. The core legal question examined by the courts was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt through ocular and medical evidence, and how the presence of unexplainable injuries on the person of the accused party affected the prosecution case. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding material contradictions, the absence of independent eye-witnesses, and the failure of the prosecution to explain the numerous injuries sustained by the accused party justified the dismissal of the petition. The key principle laid down is that failure to explain injuries sustained by the accused in the same transaction and reliance on interested witnesses without independent corroboration can fatally weaken the prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the accused party affects the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of closely related and interested witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions regarding the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad vs Muhammad Akbar And Another1986 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-02Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad And Others vs Mst. Gulab Bano And Other1986 SCMR 1539(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27
  inheritancecustomary lawMuslim Personal Lawretrospective effectsuccessionland disputecollaterals
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment concerning a land inheritance dispute involving the estate of one Maula Bakhsh, who died prior to 1948. The petitioners, collaterals of the deceased, contested the inheritance distribution which had favored the deceased's daughter. The High Court had dismissed the appeal, applying the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983. The Supreme Court examined whether the retrospective operation of the 1983 Ordinance applied to successions occurring before the enforcement of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1948. Relying on the precedent established in Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1985 SC 407), the Court held that the Amending Ordinance of 1983 has complete retrospective effect. Consequently, the deceased is deemed to have inherited the property under Muslim Personal Law, and his own inheritance must be governed by the same law. Finding the High Court's judgment unexceptionable, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the retrospective application of the Ordinance governs successions that occurred during the period when customary law was previously applicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, have retrospective effect regarding successions occurring prior to the 1948 Act?
  • Is the inheritance of a person who died before the enforcement of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1948, governed by Muslim Personal Law by virtue of the 1983 Amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Ali vs Abdul Malik1986 SCMR 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-14
  evictiondefault in payment of rentleave to appealreappraisal of evidencerent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court which allowed the landlord's appeal and ordered the tenant's eviction from the demised premises on the ground of default in the payment of rent. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of evidence by the High Court regarding the alleged default in rent payment from April to September 1974 and whether the tenant's plea of lump sum payment and subsequent money order warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the arguments advanced by the petitioner merely sought a reappraisal of evidence, and since the High Court's appreciation of evidence was rooted in the record, no interference was justified. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the concurrent or appellate appreciation of evidence by the High Court when it is rooted in the record?
  • Does a plea regarding the mode of rent payment amounting to a request for reappraisal of evidence justify interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Hashmat Ali vs Muhammad Sharif And Other1986 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-06
  pre-emption suitcourt fee deficiencyextension of timeconstitutional jurisdictionprocedural discretionrevisional order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging a revisional order regarding the payment of court fees in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted within its discretion in granting an extension of time for the plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court fees, particularly when the suit was filed without any initial court fee payment and near the expiry of the limitation period. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents regarding the discretionary power of courts to grant extensions for court fee deficiencies, held that the trial court and the revisional court had passed legal and appropriate orders. The High Court was correct in refusing to interfere with these orders under its constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle affirmed is that courts possess the discretion to allow the making up of court fee deficiencies, and such procedural exercises of discretion, when legally sound, are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant an extension of time for the payment of court fees in a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a high court justified in refusing to interfere with a trial court's procedural order regarding court fee deficiency under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of a suit on the last day of limitation without initial court fee payment automatically disentitle a plaintiff from seeking an extension to make up the deficiency?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Shahab Din vs Abdul Majid And Other1986 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-29
  tenant evictionscheduled buildingpersonal useconstitutional jurisdictionquestion of factrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a tenant's petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an eviction order passed by the Additional District Judge. The landlord sought eviction of the commercial premises on the ground of personal use for his son. The core legal question was whether the premises constituted a 'scheduled building' providing extra protection against eviction under rent laws, and whether findings of fact by a rent forum can be reviewed in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact by an exclusive statutory forum are not reviewable in constitutional jurisdiction, and furthermore, that the law provides identical grounds for eviction for non-residential and scheduled buildings, offering no extra protection to tenants of scheduled buildings regarding personal use eviction. The key principle laid down is that the statutory provisions for eviction on the ground of personal use apply equally to non-residential and scheduled buildings without distinction.

  Questions settled

  • Are findings of fact determined by a statutory forum of exclusive jurisdiction reviewable in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does the law extend any extra protection or distinction to the tenant of a 'scheduled building' in the matter of eviction on the ground of personal use compared to a non-residential building?
  • Can a tenant raise a plea regarding the nature of the premises as a scheduled building during evidence when no such plea was taken in the written statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Muhammad Ismail Habib And Others vs Deputy Settlement1986 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  settlement lawproperty transferremand orderindivisibility of propertyadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a property dispute concerning the transfer of a flat under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner’s order, which transferred the entire flat to respondent No. 2 following a remand, was legal and proper, particularly given the petitioner's argument that the Commissioner failed to consider the possibility of partitioning the property. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order and found that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had explicitly addressed the issue of divisibility, recording a clear finding that the flat was self-contained and indivisible. Consequently, the Court held that the criticism leveled by the petitioners was unjustified and that the Commissioner had acted within his authority. The Court affirmed the decision, concluding that no valid grounds for judicial interference existed, as the lower authority had properly applied its mind to the specific directions given during the remand. The judgment reinforces the principle that administrative findings of fact, such as the indivisibility of a property unit, are not subject to interference when supported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order transferring an entire property unit is legal if the authority has recorded a finding that the unit is indivisible?
  • Does a failure to consider partitioning a property invalidate a settlement order if the property is found to be self-contained and indivisible?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Mohsin Ahmad Abbasi vs Muhammad Siddiq And Another1986 SCMR 936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  settlement of propertyavailable propertyauctiontransfer of propertyindivisible unitwrit jurisdictionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition concerning the ownership of a "Chaubara" (upper room) situated above Shop No. 442. The core legal question was whether this Chaubara, having been transferred to the appellant’s predecessor-in-interest, could subsequently be auctioned by settlement authorities as "available property." The Supreme Court held that the Chaubara constituted a single, indivisible unit that had already been validly transferred to the appellant. The Court found that the property was not "available" for auction, as it lacked a separate entrance and had not been partitioned into distinct units. Consequently, the High Court’s finding that the structure comprised two separate parts was deemed unsustainable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that once a property is transferred, it cannot be treated as available for auction by settlement authorities. The judgment establishes that administrative authorities cannot unilaterally auction property already subject to a valid transfer order without proper legal cancellation, and that the physical characteristics of a property, such as the lack of a separate entrance, are critical in determining its status as a single unit.

  Questions settled

  • Can property that has already been transferred to a party be subsequently auctioned as 'available property' by settlement authorities?
  • Does a structure lacking a separate entrance and not partitioned constitute a single, indivisible unit for the purpose of property transfer?
  • Is a finding by a High Court regarding the divisibility of a property sustainable if it contradicts the established transfer history of the unit?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Abdur Rahim Khan and Others vs West Pakistan Government through the Secretary, Resettlement and Claims, Lahore and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  land acquisitionvested rightsThal Development Actsmall landholdersvalidating ordinancestatutory interpretationretrospective legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding land acquisition under the Thal Development Act, 1949. The core legal questions were whether the Thal Development (Validating) Ordinance, 1971, extinguished the vested rights of small landholders to retain land under Section 21(2) of the Act (as amended in 1955), and whether government-issued Press Notes possessed statutory force. The Supreme Court held that the Validating Ordinance was intended to cure procedural defects in prior acquisitions but did not nullify the substantive vested rights conferred upon small landholders (those owning less than 15 acres) by the 1955 amendment. Consequently, the authorities were obligated to give effect to these statutory exemptions. The Court further affirmed that Press Notes, lacking statutory force, could not override or create enforceable legal rights contrary to the Act. The key principle laid down is that while validating legislation may retrospectively cure procedural irregularities in acquisitions, it does not extinguish substantive vested rights created by subsequent statutory amendments unless explicitly stated. The Court allowed the appeals, directing the respondents to recognize the appellants' entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Thal Development (Validating) Ordinance, 1971, extinguish the vested rights of small landholders to retain land under Section 21(2) of the Thal Development Act, 1949?
  • Do government-issued Press Notes regarding land acquisition possess statutory force?
  • Does the Thal Development (Validating) Ordinance, 1971, validate illegal acquisitions made prior to the Thal Development (Amendment) Act, 1955, without affecting rights created by the amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hajiani Sher Bano And Others vs Mst. Khatija Bai1986 SCMR 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-17
  evictionreconstructionexecution of decreebuilding control regulationsretrospective operationvested rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of tenants' objections to the execution of an eviction order. The tenants were ordered to be evicted by the Rent Controller on the ground of reconstruction, and the eviction order attained finality after the High Court dismissed the tenants' appeal. Subsequently, the tenants objected to the execution of the eviction order, relying on a public notification issued by the Karachi Building Control Authority under the Sind Building Control Ordinance, 1979, which suspended certain building plan permissions lacking agreements for alternate accommodation. The Rent Controller and the High Court both dismissed the objections. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that subsequent administrative regulations or notifications cannot operate retrospectively to undermine or render inexecutable a final judicial adjudication and vested rights accrued thereunder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent administrative regulations can render a final eviction order passed by a competent court inexecutable?
  • Can building control regulations operate retrospectively to affect past and closed transactions and final adjudications?
  • Does a public notification suspending building plan permissions erase or override an order of eviction that has attained finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Sardar Khan vs Sultan Mahmood And Other1986 SCMR 1150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-24
  criminal appealappeal against acquittalmurderre-appraisal of evidenceabatement of appealcredibility of eye-witnessesmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to the complainant to examine the correctness of an acquittal judgment passed by the Lahore High Court in a murder case. The complainant and the deceased were allegedly attacked by the respondents due to a prior employment dispute and enmity. The trial court had convicted the accused under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the High Court reversed the conviction and recorded an acquittal after re-appraising the evidence concerning motive, the exact time of occurrence based on stomach contents and solar position, and the credibility of eye-witnesses. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the main accused died in a police encounter, causing the appeal to abate as to him. Upon reviewing the remaining case against the co-accused, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings and reasons for acquittal were not unreasonable, manifestly wrong, or violative of established legal principles governing interference with acquittals. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the surviving respondent was ordered to be released.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court if the reasons given are not unreasonable or manifestly wrong?
  • Can the contents of the stomach alone be considered a safe pointer to determine the exact time of death or occurrence?
  • What is the effect on a criminal appeal when the main accused is killed during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Whether inconsistencies and improvements in the statements of eye-witnesses are sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Said Khan vs Aya Khan And Another1986 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-29
  pre-emptionco-sharerpreferential rightjoint khatasale mutationproprietary interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the concurrent findings of the lower courts which decreed a pre-emption suit in favor of the respondents. The core legal question was whether the respondents qualified as co-sharers in Khata No. 295 so as to possess a preferential right of pre-emption regarding the sale of specific Khasra numbers. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were indeed co-sharers, noting that a prior partition between predecessors-in-interest did not exclude joint ownership rights because the vendees of Hissadari shares had stepped into the shoes of the previous owner. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the appellant's appeal. The key principle laid down is that purchasers of Hissadari shares acquire proprietary interests in a joint khata, preventing a prior partition from rendering another owner an exclusive owner so as to defeat co-sharer status for pre-emption purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether vendees of Hissadari shares step into the shoes of a co-sharer in a joint khata?
  • Does a Khangi partition make an owner an exclusive owner if prior sales of Hissadari rights subsist?
  • Do co-sharers have a preferential right to pre-empt the sale of land in a joint khata?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Punhoon vs Province of Sind And Other1986 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  locus standideclaratory suitevacuee propertyspecific reliefvested interesttransfer of propertymaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a suit as not maintainable. The petitioner sought a declaration that the transfer of an evacuee plot to the respondent was illegal, claiming fraud. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed the necessary locus standi to challenge the transfer under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, despite having no subsisting interest in the property. The Supreme Court held that the suit was correctly dismissed. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff seeking a declaratory decree must demonstrate a valid and subsisting interest in the subject property. It established the principle that a mere desire to bid for property at a future auction, contingent upon the cancellation of an existing transfer, does not constitute a vested right or legal character within the purview of Section 42. Consequently, without a subsisting legal right or interest, the petitioner lacked the standing to maintain the suit, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person have locus standi to challenge the transfer of an evacuee property if their own application for transfer was previously rejected?
  • Can a mere desire to bid for property at a future auction constitute a vested right sufficient to maintain a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Is a plaintiff required to possess a valid and subsisting interest in property to seek a declaration regarding its transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Nazir Ahmad vs Muhammad Shafi And Other1986 SCMR 1817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-09
  quashment of proceedingsnon-prosecutionadjournmentdismissal of petitionrevival of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four petitions for quashment of proceedings that have been pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan for four years. The petitioner's counsel requested an adjournment to obtain fresh instructions from the clients, citing a lack of contact over a significant period. The Court addressed the core question of whether an adjournment should be granted in a long-standing matter where the petitioner has failed to maintain communication with their legal representative. The Court held that no sufficient justification was provided for the delay in seeking instructions. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed for non-prosecution. The Court established the principle that while petitions may be dismissed for non-prosecution due to a lack of diligence or communication, a mechanism for revival remains available. Specifically, the Court ruled that if the Advocate-on-Record subsequently establishes contact with the clients and determines that the subject matter of the petitions remains live and actionable, they may file an application for the revival of the dismissed petitions. The matter was disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be dismissed for non-prosecution when counsel fails to obtain instructions from the client?
  • Is it permissible to revive a petition previously dismissed for non-prosecution if the subject matter remains alive?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Sharif vs Sh. Muhammad Anwar Saeed And Other1986 SCMR 1603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24
  election petitionleave to appealre-appraisal of evidenceconcurrent findings of factlocal government electionswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Haji Muhammad Sharif against a High Court judgment that dismissed his writ petition challenging an Election Tribunal's order. The petitioner, who had won the election for Electoral Unit No. 70-LMC, faced an election petition filed by the respondent alleging illegalities and irregularities. The Election Tribunal accepted the respondent's petition, and the High Court subsequently upheld this decision after reviewing the evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought a re-appraisal of the evidence already considered by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner essentially requested a factual re-evaluation, which had already been conducted by the High Court. Affirming the finality of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below, the Supreme Court declined to re-examine the evidence. The petition was dismissed on the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of a substantial question of law not previously settled.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence that has already been considered by the Election Tribunal and the High Court?
  • Can a petitioner seek leave to appeal on grounds that merely request a re-evaluation of factual findings?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in election matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Shafi And Another vs Mst. Maqbool Afza And Other1986 SCMR 1634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-16Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Riaz vs Assistant Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01
  no-confidence motionUnion CouncilChairmanwrit petitionleave to appealwilful abstention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed against a resolution passed by a Union Council approving a no-confidence motion against the petitioner as Chairman. The core legal questions involved whether the holding of the special meeting at a later time on the same day vitiated the proceedings and whether the petitioner was unlawfully deprived of his right to address the members under relevant rules. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view was unexceptionable, noting that the requisite two-thirds majority voted for the motion and that the petitioner, having been present outside the venue, wilfully refrained from participating in the meeting. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner who wilfully refrains from participating in a properly convened meeting cannot subsequently challenge the validity of the proceedings or claim prejudice based on timing or alleged denial of the right to address the house.

  Questions settled

  • Does holding a special meeting for a no-confidence motion at a later time on the same day vitiate the resolution when the requisite majority votes in favor?
  • Can a Chairman who wilfully refrains from participating in a no-confidence meeting claim that he was deprived of his right to address the members?
  • Whether the High Court can inquire into disputed questions of fact regarding attendance and participation in a local council meeting under writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Ramzan Saifi vs Mian Abdul Majid and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-20
  civil procedureadjournmentproduction of evidencedismissal of suittrial court discretionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that remanded a civil suit to the trial court. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly invoked Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to close the plaintiff's evidence and dismiss the suit for failure to produce evidence on the adjourned date. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. are only applicable when an adjournment is granted at the specific instance of the party seeking time to perform an act, such as producing evidence. In this case, the adjournment was necessitated by the absence of the Presiding Officer on leave, not by the plaintiff's request. Consequently, the trial court erred in penalizing the plaintiff under Rule 3. The Court reaffirmed the established principle that Rule 3 cannot be invoked unless the default in performing the required act occurs following an adjournment specifically granted at the defaulting party's instance. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply when an adjournment is granted due to the absence of the Presiding Officer rather than at the request of a party?
  • Is it a prerequisite for the application of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 that the adjournment must have been granted at the instance of the party who subsequently defaults?
  • Can a court penalize a party for failing to produce evidence on a date when the adjournment was necessitated by the court's own administrative circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Ramzan And 3 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-24Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Ismail And Others vs Wadho Akharo Trust1986 SCMR 1672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-15
  petition for leave to appealrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsdismissal of revisioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 10-12-1984, which dismissed a revision application filed by the petitioners and upheld the concurrent judgments and decrees of the trial court and the District Judge, Thatta. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under the law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no exception, either in law or on facts, could be taken against the High Court's refusal to interfere with the concurrent findings through its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate courts upheld in revision by the High Court unless a clear error of law or fact warrants the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the concurrent findings of lower courts upheld by the High Court in revision?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be maintained against a High Court's refusal to exercise revisional jurisdiction when no error of law or fact is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Din vs Mst. Shakila Begum And Other1986 SCMR 1076 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-01
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementbona fide needlandlord and tenantappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 5 November 1984, which reversed the Rent Controller's order and ordered the petitioner's eviction from the demised shop on the ground of personal requirement. The core legal question concerned whether the landlord established a bona fide personal requirement for the shop in question to carry on business. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings of fact regarding the personal requirement of the respondent landlord were based on a proper appreciation of evidence and did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by the appellate court regarding bona fide personal requirement, when consistent with well-settled principles of evidence appreciation, warrant no interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Rent Controller's findings regarding personal requirement?
  • Does a landlord establish a bona fide personal use requirement when seeking to set up a grocery business for a major son previously earning a livelihood on a pushcart?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent or appellate findings of fact in rent matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Asghar vs Malik Shah Muhammad Awan and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-27
  election petitionrecount of votesconsent orderapprobate and reprobatepower of reviewelection tribunaljurisdiction by consent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 7(3) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976 arose from an order of the Election Tribunal dismissing an application for review of a consent order directing a recount of votes in an election petition. The appellant, a declared successful candidate, challenged the Tribunal's jurisdiction to order a recount and to entertain a review under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Election Tribunal's powers to order a recount, the effect of party consent on jurisdiction, and whether the power to try a suit as a civil court includes an inherent power of review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party who freely consents to a procedure or agreement before a tribunal cannot subsequently approbate and reprobate by challenging that jurisdiction while enjoying its benefits. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the power of review is not a necessary adjunct of trial powers and cannot be implied merely from provisions conferring civil court powers unless expressly provided.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who freely consents to a procedure before an Election Tribunal subsequently challenge its jurisdiction?
  • Does the power of a tribunal to act as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure include an inherent power of review?
  • Whether an Election Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to order a recount of votes in appropriate cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Dher Wali And Others vs Haji Ahmad Din And Other1986 SCMR 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIIlocus standivested rightauctionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over three shops in Kohat, classified as evacuee property, which were subject to protracted litigation regarding their disposal via auction or settlement. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision, which had allowed writ petitions filed by occupants who had submitted L.S. Forms under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The petitioners argued that the property was not available under the Scheme and that a prior Settlement Commissioner's order directing an auction had become final. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioners, as potential bidders, possessed the standing to challenge the rights of occupants who had acquired a vested interest under the Settlement Scheme. The Court held that a potential bidder lacks the standing to compete with a person who has acquired a vested legal right under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, nor can they compel authorities to auction the property. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioners had no locus standi to contest the occupants' claims, and dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a potential bidder in an auction of evacuee property have the locus standi to challenge the rights of an occupant who has filed a claim under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Can a potential bidder compel the Settlement authorities to auction property when another party has acquired a vested right under a Settlement Scheme?
  • Does an order for auction of evacuee property that remains unimplemented prevent occupants from subsequently filing forms under a later Settlement Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Banaris Khan And Others vs Central Governmentthrough Secretary, Defence And Military Estate Officer And Another1986 SCMR 1805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-09
  leave to appealstay of executionland acquisitionenhancement of compensationgovernment appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court dated 24-2-1986, whereby the High Court confirmed an interim stay of execution granted in favor of the Central Government against a land acquisition compensation decree. The core legal question concerned the propriety of staying the execution of a money decree for enhanced land compensation against the Government pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that the reasons given by the High Court for staying execution were sound, noting that substantial loss might be caused to the Government, that no difficulty would arise in recovering the amount from the Government if the appeal failed, and that under Order XXVII Rule 8-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, security could not be required from the Government. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether execution of a decree for enhanced land compensation can be stayed against the Government pending appeal?
  • Is the Government required to furnish security under Order XLI Rules 5 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when seeking a stay of execution?
  • Does an objection petition under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act accompanied by an application under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute a valid reference to the designated court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Allah Dad vs The Lahore Central Co Operative Bank Ltd. And Other1986 SCMR 1552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  recovery suitsecond appealhypothecation of goodsmisreading of evidenceexecution stagespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a second appeal judgment passed by the High Court, which decreed a recovery suit filed by the respondent Bank against the petitioner for an outstanding loan. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in law in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts regarding the hypothecation of goods and whether subsequent payments made through Martial Law processes could be adjusted during the trial rather than the execution stage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly interfered with the lower courts' findings due to their misreading and omission of evidence, and that the question of subsequent adjustment of payments is a matter to be raised before the executing court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that trial courts are concerned with fixing liability while execution stages handle subsequent adjustments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of lower courts in a second appeal when there is a misreading of evidence?
  • At what stage can a judgment debtor seek adjustment of payments made subsequent to the decree?
  • Is a bank required to give adjustment for hypothecated goods taken away by the debtor himself?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ali Muhammad vs Mohan Lal1986 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-22
  eviction proceedingsrented premiseshotel premisesrepeal of statutebona fide personal useleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which set aside an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller. The petitioner had sought to evict the respondent from demised premises on the grounds of bona fide personal use. The Rent Controller initially ruled in favor of the petitioner; however, the High Court overturned this decision, determining that the premises in question constituted a hotel, thereby rendering the provisions of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 inapplicable to the eviction proceedings. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court involves whether eviction proceedings initiated under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, can validly continue following the repeal of that Ordinance by the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, specifically regarding hotel premises. Recognizing that this legal issue affects a significant number of cases, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and directed that the matter be heard by a larger Bench of four judges to provide an authoritative interpretation of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can eviction proceedings initiated under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 continue after its repeal by the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 apply to premises classified as a hotel?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ali Bux vs Imam Bux And Other1986 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-05
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationscriminal proceduremurderabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents in a murder case. The respondents had previously been denied pre-arrest bail by the High Court, a decision which was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. Despite this, the respondents filed a fresh application for pre-arrest bail in the High Court, which was granted. The complainant challenged this second grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that once an application for pre-arrest bail has been dismissed by the High Court and that order has been upheld by the Supreme Court, the accused cannot file a fresh application for pre-arrest bail in the High Court. The court ruled that the appropriate remedy for the accused is to surrender before the trial court and seek bail under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, cancelled the bail granted to the respondents, and directed them to approach the trial court for bail on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused file a fresh application for pre-arrest bail in the High Court after a previous application for the same relief has been dismissed and upheld by the Supreme Court?
  • Is it permissible for an accused to seek pre-arrest bail from the High Court after the case has been transferred to a trial court?
  • What is the appropriate legal course for an accused whose pre-arrest bail application has been dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Imdadullah vs The State1986 SCMR 1671 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-04
  bailpetition for leave to appealmurdercriminal trialdiscretionary order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which had declined to grant bail to the petitioner pending his trial for an offense under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant bail was legally justified or factually erroneous given the circumstances of the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no legal or factual basis to interfere with the High Court's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby upholding the lower court's order denying bail. The judgment affirms the principle that appellate courts will not disturb a lower court's discretionary order regarding bail unless there is a demonstrable error in law or fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court order denying bail if no legal or factual error is found?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed if the High Court's reasoning for denying bail is sound?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs Ahsan Ali And Other1986 SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  settlement propertylimitation periodauction salepresumption of regularitytransfer of propertyconstitutional petitionsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of composite property in Sukkur City under settlement laws. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant’s appeal against the auction of the property was time-barred, whether the appellant had prior knowledge of the auction, and whether the property was transferable under the relevant Settlement Schemes. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Settlement Commissioner's findings. The Court held that the appellant had prior knowledge of the auction, as evidenced by his application for charge money, rendering his subsequent appeal time-barred. Furthermore, the Court determined that the property did not qualify for transfer under the invoked Settlement Schemes, as the appellant failed to establish the necessary criteria for such transfer. The Court reiterated the principle of the presumption of regularity for official acts, noting that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that notices were properly served by authorities. Additionally, the Court affirmed that eligibility for property transfer under specific settlement schemes is strictly construed based on the defined nature of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presumption of regularity apply to the service of notices issued by settlement authorities in the absence of contrary evidence?
  • Can an appeal against an auction be entertained if the appellant had prior knowledge of the auction and failed to file within the limitation period?
  • Does a property qualify for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VI if it was not completely destroyed by natural calamity?
  • Is a party entitled to the transfer of property under Settlement Scheme No. I if they fail to establish the expenditure incurred on reconstruction?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Khan vs The Election Tribunal And Other1986 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-27
  election disputedisqualification of candidateworker's seatstatutory corporationlocal government electionelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld an Election Tribunal's order annuling the petitioner's election success. The petitioner, an employee of a government-owned statutory corporation, contested and won an election for a worker's special interest seat in the Municipal Committee, Dera Ghazi Khan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the election under the relevant local government laws. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was indeed disqualified under section 21(f) and section 21(e) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, as he fell within the excluded category of workers employed by a statutory corporation controlled by the government, regardless of the broader definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that statutory disqualifications for government and corporate employees under local government laws supersede general definitions of workers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of a government-controlled statutory corporation is disqualified from contesting local government elections for a worker's seat?
  • Does the definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 override specific disqualifications provided in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is an employee transferred outside the constituency ineligible to contest a special interest worker seat for that constituency?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd. And Others vs National Industrial Relations1986 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-11
  status quointerim reliefwrit petitionexpeditious disposalconsent orderappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court which had vacated an earlier status quo order while directing that the main writ petition be heard within one month. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had previously granted leave to appeal, noting that the requirements for interim relief appeared to be met and that the vacation of the status quo order required reconsideration. Upon hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed that its previous directions for an early hearing and the High Court's own direction to decide the matter within one month had not been complied with, partly due to the records being requisitioned by the Supreme Court office. With the consent of the respondents, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order vacating the status quo. The Court held that the status quo must be maintained during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court and reaffirmed the direction that the main writ petition be decided within one month, with the period commencing upon the return of the records to the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court restore a status quo order during the pendency of a writ petition in the High Court by consent of the parties?
  • Does the requisitioning of records by the Supreme Court office justify a delay in the High Court's compliance with an order to decide a case within a fixed timeframe?
  • Is a direction for the expeditious disposal of a writ petition within a specific timeframe enforceable upon the return of case records to the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar And 3 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-24
  chance encountercommon intentioninterested witnessesindependent corroborationrule of cautionmurderhurtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises out of convictions recorded against the appellants under sections 302 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in sentences of life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment. The High Court had dismissed the convicts' appeal and partially allowed a revision for enhancement of fine. The core legal questions involved whether the incident was a premeditated attack or a chance encounter, whether common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was attracted, and how interested ocular testimony should be evaluated in the presence of long-standing hostility and injuries to both parties. The Supreme Court held that the incident was a chance encounter arising spontaneously without premeditation, that the mischief of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was not attracted against all accused due to lack of independent corroboration for individual participation, and accordingly altered and set aside certain convictions while maintaining others, alongside adjusting compensation and granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to one of the appellants. The key principle laid down is that in sudden chance encounters involving pre-existing enmity and interested witnesses, the rule of caution requires independent corroboration before fastening constructive liability through common intention for major capital offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an incident occurring spontaneously in a hospital between parties with prior enmity constitutes a chance encounter rather than a premeditated attack?
  • Does the absence of independent corroboration for interested ocular testimony preclude the application of constructive liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a chance encounter?
  • Can the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be granted to an aged appellant subject to an enhancement of compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad vs Khurshid Ali And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-09
  land settlementjudicial recordLetters Patent Appealmortgagee unitslocus standiwrit jurisdictionappellate practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition concerning land settlement rights. The petitioner sought to claim additional land based on 'mortgagee units' and a 1962 policy letter, arguing these were not properly considered. The core legal questions were whether a party can introduce new arguments in appeal that were not raised before the High Court, and whether the petitioner retained rights to excess land following a prior Letters Patent Appeal decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the record of proceedings maintained by a High Court judge regarding arguments presented is conclusive and cannot be contradicted by counsel's assertions. Consequently, the Court refused to entertain the new arguments. Furthermore, the Court held that the prior Letters Patent Appeal decision conclusively determined the petitioner’s entitlement, thereby extinguishing his rights to the excess land and depriving him of standing to challenge its subsequent allotment to the respondent. The judgment reinforces the principle that judicial records of proceedings are sacrosanct and that appellate courts will not entertain arguments not raised in the court of first instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new legal argument in the Supreme Court that was not presented before the High Court?
  • Is a statement of fact recorded by a High Court judge regarding proceedings before them conclusive?
  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge the allotment of land after a final judicial determination that they have no rights to that specific area?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad And 8 Others vs Muhammad Anwar And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-28
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantcompromise decreerent controller jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, claiming to be landlords, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their constitutional petition and ejectment application by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question involved whether the Rent Controller, possessing limited jurisdiction, could examine, ignore, or set aside a civil court decree passed on the basis of a compromise that conclusively determined the property rights and title between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's forum of limited jurisdiction was not competent to scrutinize or challenge a compromise decree, and any relief against it should have been sought through the hierarchy of civil courts or appropriate legal recourse for fraud or undue influence. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, laying down the principle that a compromise decree settling title issues cannot be circumvented or ignored before a rent forum of limited jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller of limited jurisdiction set aside or ignore a civil court decree passed on the basis of a compromise?
  • Whether a compromise decree determining property rights can be challenged before a rent forum instead of civil appellate or revisional courts?
  • Does a compromise decree conceding claims regarding property title operate as a bar in subsequent ejectment proceedings before a Rent Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Sher And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-10
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquirycriminal appealbail bonds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioners Gul Sher and another, who were implicated in a double murder case. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail when no specific role of causing fatal firearm injuries is attributed to them, and the blunt weapon injury allegedly caused by them did not contribute to the death according to the medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under the relevant criminal procedure provisions, making it a fit case for the grant of bail. The court allowed the appeal and admitted the petitioners to bail subject to furnishing appropriate security bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person to whom no specific fatal role is assigned and whose blunt weapon injury did not contribute to the death is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • When can a criminal case be considered a fit case for further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Rehman vs The State1986 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-03
  leave to appealmisappropriationjoinder of chargestransfer of casejurisdictionanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Gul Rehman, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld his conviction under sections 409, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, while reducing his sentence. The petitioner contended that the departmental audit report exonerating him was ignored, and material witnesses were not examined. The Supreme Court considered whether the trial for more than three offences committed over a period exceeding one year was lawful, whether the joinder of charges caused prejudice, and whether evidence recorded by a Special Judge lacking jurisdiction could sustain a conviction by the transferee court. Finding that these points required consideration, the Court condoned the delay in filing and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial of an accused for more than three offences of the same kind committed in a period of more than one year is lawful?
  • Whether the joinder of charges has caused prejudice to the accused in his defence?
  • Whether evidence recorded by a Special Judge from whose Court the case was transferred on the ground of want of jurisdiction can sustain a conviction recorded by the transferee Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-06
  legal representationcounsel engagementappellate procedurejail petitionprocedural directions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the procedural status of an appeal pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, specifically regarding the legal representation of the appellants. The core legal question addressed by the Court pertains to the status of counsel engaged for the limited purpose of leave to appeal proceedings versus the subsequent conduct of the main appeal. Upon being informed by the Advocate-on-Record that the previously engaged counsel, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, was retained only for the leave to appeal stage and not for the appeal itself, the Court held that it was necessary to ensure the appellants were properly represented. Consequently, the Court directed the issuance of notices to the appellants to arrange for new counsel to prosecute their appeal. Additionally, the Court ordered the office to verify the current status of the appellants' sentences with jail authorities to determine if they had already been served and if the appellants had been released. The Court further directed that this case be fixed for hearing at Rawalpindi, alongside a connected jail petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is counsel engaged for leave to appeal proceedings automatically retained for the subsequent appeal?
  • What procedural steps should the Court take when the original counsel disclaims authority to represent appellants in the main appeal?
  • Does the Court have a duty to verify if appellants have served their sentences before proceeding with an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Khan And 2 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1825(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-11
  bailconflict of opinionleave to appealstatutory interpretationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a conflict of opinion in the High Court regarding the interpretation of the fourth proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The learned Single Judge in the current bail application did not follow the view previously expressed by another Single Judge of the same court in a reported judgment. The core legal question concerns the correct interpretation and application of the said statutory proviso governing bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal in order to resolve the existing judicial conflict regarding the interpretation of the provision. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal to resolve conflicting interpretations of statutory provisions among High Court benches.

  Questions settled

  • How should the fourth proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be interpreted when conflicting views exist in the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to resolve a conflict of opinion within the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab and Another vs S. Tassadaq Hussain1986 PLD Supreme Court 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-25
  civil servicenatural justicesummary proceduredisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticecorruption chargesservice tribunaldue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the removal of a Magistrate from service under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The Government of Punjab challenged the Service Tribunal's decision, which had set aside the removal. The core legal question concerned whether the authority could validly utilize the summary procedure under Rule 6(3) to remove a civil servant based on vague charges and secret reports without conducting a regular inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the summary procedure is not inherently illegal for corruption charges, it does not confer arbitrary power. The Court emphasized that when charges are vague and lack full disclosure of the underlying evidence, a regular inquiry is mandatory to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot abdicate its decision-making duty to secret agencies or rely on undisclosed reports. The judgment establishes that procedural shortcuts cannot be used to bypass the fundamental requirement of providing the accused with a fair opportunity to defend against specific, substantiated allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the summary procedure under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 be used to remove a civil servant without a regular inquiry?
  • Does the use of secret reports as the sole basis for disciplinary action against a civil servant violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is an authority required to conduct a regular inquiry when the charges and statement of allegations against a civil servant are vague and lack specific details?
  • Can a competent authority abdicate its decision-making responsibility to secret agencies in disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab and Another vs Ehsanul Haq Sethi1986 PLD Supreme Court 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-21
  Annual Confidential Reportadvisory remarksservice tribunaljudicial independencedirectory vs mandatoryreporting officerservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Punjab Service Tribunal's order expunging remarks from a District and Sessions Judge's Annual Confidential Report (ACR). The core legal questions concerned whether the time schedule for recording ACRs is mandatory or directory, whether 'advisory' remarks constitute adverse entries, and the competency of the Acting Chief Justice to initiate such reports. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the remarks. The Court held that ACR time schedules are directory, not mandatory, as no penal consequences are prescribed for non-compliance. It further clarified that 'advisory' remarks are not inherently adverse or stigmatizing unless an officer fails to heed the advice and improve. Additionally, the Court affirmed that the Acting Chief Justice, as the head of judicial administration, possesses plenary powers to initiate ACRs for judicial officers. The Tribunal erred by assuming the reporting officer was influenced by subsequent events without evidence and by questioning the administrative authority of the Chief Justice. The judgment establishes that advisory remarks serve as a caution for self-correction rather than a permanent adverse entry.

  Questions settled

  • Are the time schedules prescribed for recording Annual Confidential Reports mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Do 'advisory' remarks in an Annual Confidential Report constitute adverse entries?
  • Does the Acting Chief Justice have the authority to initiate Annual Confidential Reports for members of the judicial service?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Zaman vs Zafar Ali Khan and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07
  revisional jurisdictionadditional evidencequestion of factdismissal in defaultpre-emptionparcha peshiscope of revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court passed in revisional jurisdiction, which set aside an appellate judgment in favour of the appellant pre-emptor. The appellant's pre-emption suit had been dismissed in default, but was later ordered to be restored by the District Judge on appeal, who accepted the appellant's factual plea supported by a parcha peshi issued by the court Reader. However, upon a revision petition, the High Court re-examined the Reader and fresh evidence, re-appraised the facts, held the parcha peshi to be a forgery, and reversed the appellate judgment. The core legal question was whether the High Court could record or admit fresh evidence in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reverse findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that revisional powers are primarily intended for correcting jurisdictional errors and subordinate court mistakes, and erroneous decisions of fact are ordinarily not revisable except under specific limited circumstances, and the High Court improperly re-assessed evidence and recorded fresh testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the revisional judgment, and restored the appellate judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court could have decided a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 so as to reverse the impugned judgment on recording or admission of fresh evidence in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Are erroneous decisions of fact revisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can additional evidence be recorded at the revisional stage under section 151 or Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to overturn findings of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sind And Another vs Ch. Fazal Muhammad And Another1986 SCMR 1838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-26
  Section 12(2) CPCfraud and misrepresentationlimitation periodarbitration awardleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed an application filed by the Government of Sind under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners alleged that a decree obtained by the respondents was secured through fraud and misrepresentation regarding an arbitration agreement and previous litigation history. The High Court had dismissed the application on the grounds that the petitioners failed to raise these pleas during earlier proceedings and that the application was time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal questions as whether Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is available to a party who failed to raise the plea of fraud or misrepresentation in original proceedings, and what the applicable limitation period is for such an application, particularly considering the provision was enacted in 1980. The Court held that these issues, being matters of first impression, warranted a detailed examination by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable if the plea of fraud or misrepresentation was not raised in the original proceedings?
  • Does Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provide a remedy for parties who were unable to raise the plea of fraud at earlier stages due to reasonable cause?
  • What is the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, particularly where the impugned judgment predates the 1980 amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan And Others vs Muhammad Hussain And 5 Other1986 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06
  service tribunalcivil servantspay and allowancesleave to appealfinality of judgmentclarification of orderlength of service formula
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of Pakistan sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against orders of the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had issued clarification orders regarding the payment of salary and allowances to civil servants who had performed duties in Grade-18, despite initial appointment stipulations limiting pay to their lower substantive grades. The principal judgments, which held that these civil servants were entitled to Grade-18 pay and increments, had attained finality as they were not challenged. The Government challenged the Tribunal's subsequent clarification orders, which applied a 'length of service' formula to calculate the arrears. The Supreme Court observed that the principal orders establishing the entitlement had become final and were not under appeal. The Court held that the clarification orders did not exceed the scope of the original judgments and could not be challenged independently of those final orders. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, effectively maintaining the Tribunal's clarification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a clarification order issued by a Service Tribunal be appealed independently if the principal judgment it clarifies has attained finality?
  • Does a clarification order that adheres to the scope of a final judgment constitute a new, appealable order?
  • Is leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 granted when no question of law of public importance arises?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N. W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary And Another vs Muhammad Ajmal And 2 Other1986 SCMR 2007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-25
  retrospective promotionservice lawseniority listadministrative lettersProvincial Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of N.-W.F.P. against the judgment of the Provincial Service Tribunal, which set aside the retrospective promotion of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The core legal issue was whether the Government possesses the authority to grant civil servants promotion with retrospective effect in the absence of a specific governing law, rule, or regulation, and whether administrative letters can confer such powers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision and refused leave to appeal, holding that the Government failed to produce any rule or regulation authorizing retrospective promotion. The Court laid down the key principle that administrative letters are purely executive instructions that cannot be equated with law or statutory regulations, nor can they be pressed into service to affect or override the established rights of parties regarding seniority and promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Government grant civil servants promotion with retrospective effect in the absence of an express rule or regulation?
  • Do administrative letters carry the force of law or regulation to affect the legal rights of parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Golden Roadways Transport Bus Service Okara, District Sahiwal vs The Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Okara, District Sahiwal1986 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-14
  toll taxcantonment boardhighway tolltoll thoroughmunicipal taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging a notification issued under section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, levying a toll tax by the Cantonment Board, Okara, on motor vehicles, lorries, and buses plying on a portion of the Grand Trunk Road within cantonment limits. The core legal questions involved whether the Cantonment Board was competent to levy a toll tax on a highway not owned by it, whether the levy was justified under Item No. 6 or Item No. 12 of the third schedule of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, and the proper construction of the term 'per trip'. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that ownership of the highway is not a prerequisite for levying a toll thorough, that the tax was validly imposed as a toll under Item No. 6 rather than Item No. 12, and that 'per trip' correctly signifies a one-way entry into the cantonment area. The key legal principles established are that toll thorough can be legally levied for the use of a public highway regardless of the levying authority's ownership of the land, and that tolls are distinct from property taxes on vehicles.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Cantonment Board levy a toll tax on a highway that is not owned by the Board?
  • Does the power to levy taxes in the nature of tolls under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 apply to motor vehicles?
  • What is the legal definition and distinction between a toll tax and a tax on vehicles?
  • How should the expression 'per trip' be construed in the context of a toll tax levied for entry into a cantonment area?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Malik vs Government of Pakistan And Another1986 SCMR 1593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-04
  service lawsenioritypro forma promotioninfructuous appealcivil serviceTribal Area Group
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by a civil servant regarding his seniority and consequential promotion benefits within the Tribal Area Group (T.A.G.). The appellant, initially a member of the Provincial Civil Service of Baluchistan, later joined the All Pakistan Unified Grades and subsequently the T.A.G. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having had his seniority claim in the T.A.G. accepted by the Federal Service Tribunal, was entitled to full consequential benefits, including promotion or pro forma promotion, despite having retired. The Service Tribunal had previously held that the appellant's seniority claim was of academic importance only, as he had retired and no junior had been promoted to Grade-20. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant sought these benefits. However, during the proceedings, it was established that the Department had implemented the Tribunal's directions regarding seniority. As the respondents confirmed that all due benefits for the period of service had been provided, the Supreme Court held that the appeal had become infructuous and dismissed it accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal regarding service seniority and promotion benefits become infructuous if the department has already implemented the tribunal's directions and provided all due benefits?
  • Can a retired civil servant claim pro forma promotion if the seniority dispute has been resolved in their favor?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul Khan And Another vs Mst. Jindan And Another1986 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08
  family arrangementproperty alienationlimited ownerestoppel by conductShariat lawretrospective effectleave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their suit challenging a property alienation made by Mst. Jindan, a limited owner, in 1960. Mst. Jindan and Mst. Mitho, as widows, held their deceased husband's estate as limited owners. In 1933, Mst. Mitho alienated her share, and a family arrangement was allegedly made whereby Mst. Jindan was acknowledged as the full owner of her half share, granting her the right to alienate it. The petitioners, one of whom (Mst. Gaman) was a minor at the time of the arrangement and a beneficiary of Mst. Mitho's earlier alienation through her husband, challenged Mst. Jindan's subsequent gift. All three lower courts concurrently found that a valid family arrangement had taken place, estopping the petitioners from challenging the alienation. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, ruling that the family arrangement, validly entered into in 1933 by the concerned parties, was binding, and the subsequent West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, did not retrospectively invalidate it. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a family arrangement entered into by limited owners and reversioners bind subsequent heirs who were minors at the time but benefited from a related transaction?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, retrospectively invalidate family arrangements validly made prior to its enactment?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding a family compromise generally immune from challenge in the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party who has benefited from one part of a family arrangement later challenge another part of the same arrangement?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-11
  criminal appealsentence reductioncompromisegrievous hurtwrongful confinementmitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of the petitioners for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing their sentences. The petitioners, convicted of causing grievous hurt and wrongful confinement, sought relief following a compromise reached with the victim, Mirza Mumtaz Beg, who expressed a desire for amicable future relations and stated he had forgiven the assailants without receiving compensation. The core legal question was whether the court should permit the compounding of the offences based on this compromise. The Supreme Court held that given the nature of the attack and the injuries inflicted, the case was not appropriate for compounding. However, the Court established the principle that a genuine compromise and forgiveness by the victim, motivated by a desire for peaceful co-existence, constitutes a valid ground for the mitigation of sentence. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but reduced the sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone and remitted the fines imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be set aside solely on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the victim?
  • Does a victim's forgiveness and desire for peaceful co-existence constitute a valid ground for the reduction of a sentence?
  • Is a case involving grievous hurt and wrongful confinement suitable for compounding based on a compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Settlement Commissioner, Karachi And Another1986 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  displaced persons compensationearmarking schemecomposite propertyunit divisibilitysettlement commissionertransfer of propertyevaluation price
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of a composite property comprising a residential portion and shops under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, a local in possession of the residential house, applied for its transfer, which was initially rejected based on an erroneous evaluation of rent. While the appellant's appeal was pending, the property was subjected to an earmarking scheme and allotted to respondent No. 2. The High Court's Letters Patent Bench had remanded the case to determine whether the building constituted a single unit and to recalculate the evaluation price. The Supreme Court held that the remand was an unnecessary exercise since the Settlement Commissioner had already rendered a well-reasoned finding that the residential portion and the shops were separate units and that the appellant was entitled to the transfer of the house based on the correct rental evaluation. The Court ruled that the property was not lawfully available for disposal under the earmarking scheme while the appellant's entitlement proceedings were still pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench and restored the order of the Settlement Commissioner transferring the residential portion to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a composite property can be disposed of under an earmarking scheme while a claimant's appeal regarding entitlement to the residential portion is still pending?
  • Is a Letters Patent Bench justified in remanding a case to settlement authorities when the primary questions of fact regarding unit divisibility and rental evaluation have already been cogently determined by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Whether the determination of property unit divisibility and evaluation price falls exclusively within the competence of the Settlement Authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Pir Bakhsh And Other1986 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-07
  leave to appealpre-emptionremand orderjudgments of variancegift versus salecivil first appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee against the Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a civil first appeal from a remand order. The core legal question concerns the approach of the High Court in a first appeal from a remand order where lower courts rendered judgments of variance regarding the true nature of a transaction alleged to be a gift versus a sale in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court should have examined the disputed facts following the rule applicable to judgments of variance, a deeper scrutiny of the record by the Supreme Court revealed that the first appellate judgment was well-founded on evidence and more rational than the trial court's decision. The Court laid down that in cases of variance between lower courts, the High Court must scrutinize the facts, but where the appellate forum's view is sound and rational, interference is unwarranted. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to examine disputed facts in a first appeal from a remand order when lower courts have rendered judgments of variance?
  • Can the Supreme Court undertake a deeper scrutiny of evidence when lower courts give conflicting findings regarding the nature of a transaction?
  • Does a transaction structured as a gift deserve protection against a claim of pre-emption when found to be a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Shah vs Kamal Khan1986 SCMR 1605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-02
  ejectmentpersonal requirementresidential premisescommercial uselandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside the eviction order passed against the respondent-tenant by the Rent Controller. The appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondent from a room forming part of his residential house, which was being used for commercial purposes, on the ground of bona fide personal use as a Baithak. The core legal question was whether a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant for personal residential requirement from premises that, although of a residential character by nature and structure, were let out and used for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that if premises essentially constitute a part of a residential house by their very nature and structure, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction on the ground of personal residential requirement, notwithstanding their commercial use by the tenant. The key principle laid down is that the physical nature and structure of the premises as residential governs the landlord's right to seek eviction for personal use, regardless of the tenant's commercial usage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant from premises of a residential character for personal use when the tenant has been using the same for commercial purposes?
  • Does the nature and structure of the premises govern the landlord's right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool And Others vs Suba (Deceased) Represented By Ghulam1986 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29
  pre-emptionsale deedmutationMartial Law Regulationvoid transactionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which decreed a pre-emption suit in favour of the respondent. The petitioners contend that the underlying transaction, a sale deed dated 12-7-1969, was void ab initio because it violated Martial Law Regulation No. 64. Consequently, the Revenue Authorities had refused to sanction the mutation of the sale on 6-12-1969. The petitioners argue that since no valid sale existed in the eyes of the law, there was no transaction capable of being pre-empted, and the lower courts erred in characterizing the transaction as a re-sale or return of property. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether a pre-emption suit is maintainable when the purported sale transaction is legally invalid due to non-compliance with statutory regulations, specifically Martial Law Regulation No. 64, and whether the lower courts misconstrued the nature of the transaction by treating it as a re-sale.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit be maintained against a sale transaction that has been refused mutation due to violation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
  • Does a sale deed that violates Martial Law Regulation No. 64 constitute a valid sale capable of being pre-empted?
  • Is a court justified in decreeing a pre-emption suit by re-characterizing an invalid sale as a re-sale or return of property?
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• Ghulam Qadir Khan And 12 Others vs The Multan Central Co Operative1986 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-23
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionloan recoveryco-operative bankcivil court jurisdictiondiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 5-12-1979, which dismissed a constitutional petition concerning the recovery of a loan obtained from the Multan Central Co-operative Bank Limited. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain challenges regarding loan recovery proceedings after an award had been made and the principal liability satisfied. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners' liability had been determined, the loan amount repaid, and the challenge raised only technical questions regarding civil court jurisdiction without disputing the underlying debt, the case was not a fit one for the discretionary exercise of granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, noting that the High Court's judgment did not suffer from any prima facie legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted merely to examine technical questions of jurisdiction when the underlying financial liability has been satisfied?
  • Does the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court warrant interference in concurrent findings regarding loan recovery and civil court jurisdiction?
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• Ghulam Nabi vs Farrukh Latif And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-16
  Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961Section 7 notice of Talaqmaintenance allowanceeffectiveness of divorcereconciliation periodFamily Courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge decreeing a wife's suit for maintenance on the ground that the alleged divorce (Talaq) had not become effective under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The petitioner contended that the wife's participation in proceedings before the Union Council Chairman constituted sufficient notice and service of Talaq. The Supreme Court examined the record and affirmed the lower courts' factual findings that service of notice of Talaq on the wife was not proved and the evidence contained material discrepancies. Reaffirming established precedent, the Supreme Court held that under Section 7 of the Ordinance, a Talaq does not become effective until proper notice is delivered to the Chairman of the Union Council and the statutory ninety-day period for reconciliation expires; failure to provide such notice deems the Talaq revoked. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Talaq becomes effective under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 without serving formal notice thereof on the Chairman of the Union Council?
  • What is the effect of a husband's failure to serve notice of Talaq on the Chairman under Section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Whether the participation or appearance of a wife before the Chairman of the Union Council dispenses with the statutory requirement of serving notice of Talaq under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
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• Ghulam Nabi vs Diam And Another1986 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  murderdying declarationhired assassincommon intentionacquittalbenefit of doubtmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding a murder case. The petitioner Khamisa challenged his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the complainant challenged the acquittal of the respondent Daim. The prosecution alleged that the accused were hired assassins who murdered the deceased, Muhammad Jahangir. The Supreme Court examined the validity of the dying declaration, the impact of the failure to prove motive against the accused, the delay in recording witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the lack of an identification parade. The Court held that the conviction of Khamisa was justified, noting that the recovery of a weapon matching the crime scene evidence corroborated the prosecution's case. Regarding Daim, the Court upheld his acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to establish his common intention or active role in the crime, thus entitling him to the benefit of the doubt. The Court affirmed that failure of motive does not necessarily invalidate a prosecution case when other evidence is sufficient.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove motive against an accused necessarily invalidate the entire prosecution case?
  • Can the late recording of witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be excused if the prosecution case was disclosed earlier?
  • Is the acquittal of a co-accused justified when no active role or common intention is established by the evidence?
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• Ghulam Nabi And Others vs Mst. Sadiqan1986 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appealcontempt of courtsecond appealcivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment in a pre-emption suit. The respondent had successfully pre-empted a sale made in favour of the petitioners, asserting a superior right of pre-emption. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent, a decision which was subsequently upheld by the District Judge in the first appeal and by the High Court in the second appeal. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Additionally, a separate civil miscellaneous petition was filed seeking the initiation of contempt of court proceedings against the petitioners. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the case did not involve any substantial question of law warranting interference by the apex court. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition for leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the application for contempt proceedings was without substance and did not necessitate any judicial action. Accordingly, both the petition for leave to appeal and the application for contempt proceedings were dismissed by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit involving concurrent findings of fact by lower courts raise a question of law sufficient for Supreme Court interference?
  • Are contempt of court proceedings warranted when a petition for leave to appeal against a pre-emption decree is dismissed?
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• Ghulam Nabi And Another vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-23
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurderinjured eye-witnesscredibility of witnessacquittalcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions arising from a criminal trial concerning a murder and assault incident stemming from a prior quarrel and motive of revenge. Ghulam Nabi was convicted of murder and attempted assault, while co-accused Rashid and Ghulam Farid were initially convicted by the trial court, subsequently acquitted by the High Court, which maintained Ghulam Nabi's conviction. Ghulam Nabi sought leave to appeal against his conviction, whereas the complainant filed a petition against the acquittal of the co-accused. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan pertained to whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses, partially disbelieved regarding certain co-accused, could safely form the basis of maintaining a conviction for another accused without independent corroboration, and conversely, whether such witnesses should be fully believed as to all assailants when their presence at the scene is established by their injuries. The Supreme Court held that the reasoning adopted by the High Court in accepting the testimony against one accused while rejecting it against others lacked convincing strength. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions for a thorough examination of the issues raised. The key principle laid down is that the reliability of injured eye-witnesses requires careful scrutiny and consistent evaluation when their evidence is sought to be split regarding different accused persons.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an injured eye-witness be relied upon for convicting one accused when the same testimony has been disbelieved regarding other co-accused?
  • Whether the presence of injuries on the persons of eye-witnesses guarantees the truthfulness of their account as to the identity of all assailants?
  • Does the rejection of prosecution evidence against certain co-accused necessitate independent corroboration for maintaining the conviction of the remaining accused?
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• Ghulam Mustafa And Others vs Yaqub And Other1986 SCMR 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04
  allotment cancellationvested rightsavailable propertyrehabilitation and settlementIhata allotmentnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the validity of an allotment of a building site (Ihata No. 115) to the appellants and its subsequent cancellation in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions were whether the appellants held a valid allotment order for the disputed land and whether such an allotment could be cancelled and re-allotted to others without notice or legal justification. The Supreme Court held that the appellants possessed a valid allotment order under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, which created a vested right. The Court determined that because the land was already validly allotted to the appellants, it was not 'available property' for subsequent transfer to the respondents. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, restoring the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands). The key principle laid down is that land once validly allotted under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme cannot be subsequently transferred to other parties, as it ceases to be available property for such allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Can land that has been validly allotted under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme be subsequently transferred to another party?
  • Does an allottee of a building site under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme acquire a vested right that prevents subsequent cancellation without notice?
  • Is land that has been reserved for the extension of a village Abadi and subsequently allotted as a building site considered 'available property' for later allotment as agricultural land?
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