Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Mst. Khadija Begum vs Government Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1985 (CL.) 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed her constitutional petition challenging the confiscation of 46 tolas of gold ornaments seized from her person at Lahore Airport. Upon arrival from Dubai, the petitioner failed to declare the gold, which was subsequently discovered during a personal search following suspicious behavior. The customs authorities confiscated the gold, citing violations of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and the Import & Export Control Act, 1950, as punishable under the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioner argued that the ornaments were visible and not concealed, requesting permission to re-export them under Section 142 of the Customs Act, 1969. The departmental authorities rejected this, finding the goods were concealed and not voluntarily declared. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, noting that the petitioner's failure to declare the gold and the circumstances of its discovery undermined her plea of bona fides. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the departmental findings in its constitutional jurisdiction, as the confiscation was justified by the petitioner's conduct.
Questions settled- Does the failure to declare gold ornaments upon arrival at an airport justify their confiscation under the Customs Act, 1969?
- Can a passenger claim the right to re-export goods under Section 142 of the Customs Act, 1969, if those goods were concealed and not voluntarily declared?
- Is the High Court's refusal to interfere with departmental findings of fact in a constitutional petition legally sound when the petitioner's bona fides are in question?
- Mst. Irshad Begum vs Muhammad Afzal And Another1985 SCMR 1691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which granted bail to the respondent, Muhammad Asghar, who was accused of murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the order granting bail to the accused should be interfered with, particularly in light of concerns that the High Court's observations might prejudice the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, primarily noting that the trial was scheduled to commence shortly, and therefore, it was inappropriate to interfere with the bail order at that stage. Regarding the petitioner's apprehension that the High Court's observations would adversely affect the prosecution, the Supreme Court held that such concerns were unfounded. The Court established the principle that a trial court is duty-bound to decide a case based on its own independent assessment of the evidence adduced before it, rather than being influenced by observations made during bail proceedings. Consequently, the petition was dismissed without disturbing the bail order.
Questions settled- Does an observation made by a High Court Judge during bail proceedings bind the trial court in its final adjudication?
- Should the Supreme Court interfere with a bail order when the trial is imminent?
- Mst. Iqbal Begum And Others vs Amih Khan And Another1985 SCMR 1749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of land in village Mirjan. The core legal question was whether the defendant-vendee's admission regarding the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption was correctly interpreted by the lower courts as applying to the entire suit property, or if it was limited to a specific portion. The trial, appellate, and High Court had all concluded that the defendant conceded the plaintiff's superior right across all disputed Khatas. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts committed a patent error by extending an admission concerning only one specific Khewat (Khewat No. 355) to the entire suit property, which included a larger portion (Khewat No. 345) where the plaintiff was not a co-sharer. Furthermore, the courts failed to adjudicate other grounds for the plaintiff's alleged superior right, such as ownership in the estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and remanded the case for a fresh determination on the merits of the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption.
Questions settled- Can an admission regarding a specific portion of land be legally extended to the entire suit property in a pre-emption case?
- Does a co-sharer in one Khewat automatically possess a superior right of pre-emption over the entire land sold?
- Is a court required to independently determine the superiority of a pre-emption claim when the defendant's admission is limited in scope?
- Mst. Hashmat Bibi And Others vs Gulzar Muhammad And Another1985 SCMR 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hamida Begum vs Custodian, Evacuee Property And Other1985 SCMR 1560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the validity of land sales made by Mst. Iqbal Begum, a Mazhabi Sikh, to members of another agricultural tribe without the Deputy Commissioner's sanction, and whether such land became evacuee property. The primary issue was whether a person declared a member of an 'agricultural tribe' under the Punjab Alienation of Lands Act, 1900, loses that status upon converting from Sikhism to Islam, thereby exempting their land alienations from the Act's sanction requirements. The Supreme Court upheld its previous Full Bench decision, ruling that conversion to Islam does not strip an individual of their status as a member of a notified agricultural tribe. Consequently, the sales without the required sanction remained void, and the land did not become evacuee property. The court affirmed that religious conversion does not alter one's caste or tribal status for the purposes of the Punjab Alienation of Lands Act, 1900, and that the Supreme Court retains ultimate jurisdiction to interpret such legal questions regardless of prior administrative findings by the Custodian of Evacuee Property.
Questions settled- Does conversion to Islam strip an individual of their status as a member of a notified agricultural tribe under the Punjab Alienation of Lands Act, 1900?
- Are land sales by a member of an agricultural tribe to another agricultural tribe void if made without the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner?
- Does the Supreme Court have the authority to determine the status of land under the Punjab Alienation of Lands Act, 1900, notwithstanding prior findings by the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
- Mst. Haleeman vs Rehmat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 1273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The matter concerns a dispute over agricultural land originally allotted to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest in 1954 and transferred to him in 1964. Following his death, the respondents inherited the property and filed a suit for possession against the petitioners, who were alleged trespassers. During the pendency of this suit, the property was purportedly transferred to the petitioners under Scheme No. VII without formal resumption proceedings. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, a decision upheld by the appellate courts. The core legal question was whether the civil court lost jurisdiction once the property was transferred to the petitioners under Scheme No. VII, necessitating the respondents to approach settlement authorities instead. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' findings. The holding establishes that where property has already been validly transferred to a predecessor-in-interest, it ceases to be available for settlement; consequently, a subsequent transfer under a settlement scheme is ineffective, and the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate possession against those claiming under such an invalid transfer.
Questions settled- Does a civil court lose jurisdiction over a property dispute if the property is transferred under a settlement scheme during the pendency of a suit?
- Can property already transferred to a predecessor-in-interest be validly settled in favor of another party under Scheme No. VII?
- Is a transfer of property under a settlement scheme valid if made without proper resumption proceedings?
- Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Haji Saleh Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from three constitutional petitions challenging the disposal of property by the Member, Board of Revenue, which the High Court dismissed primarily on the ground that the appellant lacked locus standi. The appellant, the wife of a pre-Independence owner, claimed rights over the property, having managed it and collected rent from tenants for years, a fact recognized by the administration. The core legal question was whether the appellant possessed sufficient interest in the property to maintain a constitutional petition against the transfer of said property to the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, having a recognized, long-standing, and arguable interest in the property, did indeed possess the necessary locus standi to challenge the administrative decision. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal on the ground of lack of standing was set aside. The principle laid down is that a party who has a live, vital, and arguable interest in property, supported by administrative recognition and prior dealings, cannot be summarily denied the right to seek judicial review on the basis of lacking locus standi.
Questions settled- Does a person who has been recognized by the administration as having the right to collect rent from a property possess sufficient locus standi to challenge the transfer of that property in a constitutional petition?
- Can a High Court dismiss a constitutional petition solely on the ground of lack of locus standi when the petitioner has demonstrated an arguable, vital interest in the subject matter?
- Is it appropriate for an appellate court to remand a case to the High Court for a decision on merits when the High Court dismissed the petition prematurely on a preliminary point of standing?
- Mst. Ghulam Bibi and Others vs Sarsa Khan and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a second appeal in a land exchange dispute. The core legal question examined was whether the plaintiffs should have been permitted to amend their plaint to convert a suit for declaration of ownership into a suit for specific performance of a contract of exchange. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing the amendment on grounds of delay, alleged negligence, or lack of bona fides, emphasizing that procedural rules are designed to advance justice and determine real questions in controversy rather than to entrap litigants through technicalities. The Court ruled that amendments to pleadings should be liberally allowed at any stage of proceedings, including appellate stages, provided they do not change the fundamental cause of action or the basic nature of the suit. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, the amendment of the plaint permitted subject to costs, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether a plaintiff can be permitted to amend a plaint to convert a suit for declaration into a suit for specific performance of a contract?
- Does mere delay in applying for the amendment of a pleading justify its refusal by the court?
- What is the scope and interpretation of the expression 'at any stage of the proceeding' under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether an amendment of a plaint should be allowed if it does not change the fundamental cause of action or the nature of the suit?
- Mst. Dilshad Akhtar vs Member, Board of Revenue And Another1985 SCMR 1986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dismissing the appellants' constitutional petition arising out of a settlement dispute. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of the Member Board of Revenue acting as Chief Settlement Commissioner to entertain and inquire into a settlement matter after the promulgation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, and the prematurity of challenging an interim assumption of jurisdiction through a constitutional petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the constitutional petition before the High Court was premature as the Member Board of Revenue had not yet rendered a final decision on the merits, and it was improper to invoke writ jurisdiction prior to a final determination. The appeal was dismissed while observing that nothing in the judgments should influence the final decision on merits by the Member Board of Revenue.
Questions settled- Whether a constitutional petition against an interim order assuming jurisdiction in a settlement dispute is premature before a final decision on merits is rendered?
- Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to inquire into a settlement matter under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974?
- Mst. Chunno Begum vs Settlement Commissioner (Land), Khairpur And Other1985 SCMR 1331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of a Letters Patent Bench of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal regarding the cancellation of her land allotment. The appellant, a claimant displaced person, was allotted land in 1960. Subsequently, the third respondent, whose prior allotment covered the same land and was made without notice to him, applied for cancellation of the appellant's allotment, which was ultimately cancelled by the Settlement Authorities under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal questions were whether the Settlement Authorities were competent to cancel the allotment after a lapse of time without a formal condonation of delay under appeal or revision provisions, and the scope of powers under Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction exercisable under Section 11 of the Act is not subject to any period of limitation and is distinct from appellate and revisional powers, allowing the Settlement Authorities to correct a patent error and terminate an illegal allotment made behind the back of a prior allottee. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the jurisdiction exercisable by Settlement Authorities under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is subject to any period of limitation?
- Can powers under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 be assimilated to the revisional jurisdiction provided under Section 19(1) of the said Act?
- Whether an allotment of land made behind the back of a prior allottee and without cancelling the prior allotment is a nullity in the eye of law?
- Are Settlement Authorities empowered to correct a patent error resulting in inconsistent allotment orders independently of the provisions of appeal and revision?
- Mst. Bashiran vs Khadim Hussain And Other1985 SCMR 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a land settlement dispute. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, which dismissed her writ petition on the grounds that the subject matter had already been conclusively settled by a prior compromise between the parties in earlier litigation. The petitioner argued that she had entered into the previous compromise under a misapprehension of her legal and factual rights, and therefore, the Settlement Authorities should have been permitted to re-open the matter. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found that the earlier compromise was detailed, deliberate, and based on mutual consideration to avoid prolonged litigation. The Court held that a compromise judgment, once entered into by parties with full authority and representation, constitutes a binding settlement that precludes the re-opening of the same issues. Finding no merit in the claim of misapprehension, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition, upholding the finality of the compromise decree.
Questions settled- Can a party challenge a compromise decree on the grounds of alleged misapprehension of rights after the compromise has been acted upon?
- Does a compromise judgment in an earlier round of litigation operate as a bar to re-opening the same dispute before Settlement Authorities?
- Is a detailed compromise agreement entered into by counsel with authority binding on the parties?
- Mst. Asghari Begum And Others vs Sardar Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, heirs of a former occupant of a godown, filed a petition alleging contempt of court against the respondents. The core dispute arose from a 1961 Settlement Commissioner's order, which declared the godown separate property to be auctioned, a decision that attained finality upon the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court in 1972. The petitioners alleged that during the pendency of that litigation, the respondents fraudulently obtained the transfer of the property through a forged and ante-dated C.S. Form under Scheme No. VIII, subsequently obtaining a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) and executing sales of the property. The petitioners contended that these actions constituted disobedience of the Supreme Court's 1972 order. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' allegations regarding the forgery of the transfer form and the order of transfer required an extensive inquiry into disputed questions of fact. Consequently, the Court determined that such matters could not be adjudicated for the first time in contempt proceedings. The petition was dismissed as no case for contempt was established.
Questions settled- Can allegations of forgery and fraud regarding property transfer be adjudicated for the first time in contempt proceedings?
- Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into disputed questions of fact during contempt proceedings?
- Mst. Asghari And Another vs Sharafat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their civil revision in limine against the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The underlying dispute involved the identity, extent, and demarcation of evacuee properties transferred to the respective predecessors of the parties, namely House No. C-35/A and House No. C-34 situated in Bhakkar. The trial court had appointed a Settlement Inspector as a local Commissioner to inspect the spot, and based on his report and other evidence, concluded that the petitioners had illegally occupied a portion belonging to the respondents' property. The core legal question was whether the local Commissioner had exceeded his mandate and whether such a report could form the basis of adjudication in a factual demarcation dispute. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a local Commissioner for spot inspection and demarcation was proper, and the concurrent factual findings based on evidence and the commissioner's report were unexceptionable. The Court laid down the principle that a dispute concerning the identity and demarcation of property is essentially factual, and where lower courts have considered all relevant material reasonably, leave to appeal will be refused.
Questions settled- Whether the appointment of a local Commissioner is proper for determining the identity and demarcation of properties in dispute?
- Can a local Commissioner's report be made the basis of adjudication after inviting objections and considering it alongside other evidence?
- Does a dispute regarding the identity and demarcation of property raise a substantial question of law warranting leave to appeal?
- Mst. Amina Begum Represented by Legal Heirs vs SH. Muhammad Nazir and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the classification and allotment of land in Rawalpindi, originally recorded as a brick kiln in revenue records. The core legal question was whether the land's nature, for the purpose of disposal under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, should be determined by its actual use at the time of Partition in 1947 or by subsequent administrative reclassification. The Settlement Commissioner had failed to consider the land's status at Partition, erroneously treating it as culturable land. The High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, corrected this error, holding that the land's status at Partition is the determinative factor for its disposal. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that administrative authorities cannot define the limits of their own jurisdiction regarding jurisdictional facts. The Court held that when an administrative authority fails to apply the correct legal test—specifically the actual use at Partition—it commits an error of law and jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court correctly intervened to set aside the erroneous findings without needing to remand the case for further fact-finding.
Questions settled- Does the actual use of land at the time of Partition determine its classification for disposal under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act?
- Can an administrative authority define the limits of its own jurisdiction regarding jurisdictional facts?
- Is the High Court empowered to correct an error of law and jurisdiction by an administrative authority without remanding the case?
- Mst. Allah Wasai And Others vs Yar Muhammad1985 SCMR 1605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, who were unsuccessful defendants in a civil suit, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their regular second appeal. The respondent had instituted a suit in 1967 seeking possession of an immovable residential property purchased via a registered deed in 1950, claiming the petitioners were in permissive possession. The trial court dismissed the suit based on limitation and adverse possession, but the first appellate court decreed the suit after finding the possession was permissive, which decision was affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the appellate court went beyond the pleadings and whether the suit was time-barred due to adverse possession. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact regarding permissive possession based on family relationship and the boundaries in the registered sale-deed were sustainable, and no question of law required further examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that permissive possession by family members does not ripen into adverse possession.
Questions settled- Whether possession among family members residing jointly can be treated as adverse possession for the purpose of limitation?
- Can an appellate court specify property in a decree based on the boundaries indicated in a registered sale-deed?
- Does a concurrent finding of fact regarding permissive possession warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
- Mst. Akhtar Begum vs Mian Aziz And Other1985 SCMR 1617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership and possession of agricultural land following competing claims based on separate agreements to sell. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff, holding an unregistered agreement to sell, could maintain a suit for declaration and injunction against a subsequent vendee, and whether the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could be invoked by a plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that while an unregistered sale agreement does not confer full title due to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff could rely on Section 53-A as a shield to protect possession against the vendor and subsequent purchasers. The Court clarified that Section 41 regarding ostensible owners was inapplicable as the vendor was the actual owner. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff may seek protection of possession based on part performance, provided the contract is enforceable. Consequently, the Court modified the relief to declare the plaintiff's right to possession under an enforceable contract rather than absolute ownership.
Questions settled- Can a plaintiff use Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act as a shield to protect possession in a suit?
- Does an unregistered agreement to sell confer full title to the purchaser under the Transfer of Property Act?
- Does Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act apply when the transferor is the actual owner of the property?
- Can extrinsic evidence be used to supply missing details in an agreement to sell to satisfy the requirements of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act?
- Mst. Aisha vs Manzoor Hussain and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a revision petition regarding the custody of a minor girl. The core legal question was whether the custody of a 12-year-old minor should remain with her maternal grandmother or be restored to her natural father. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the District Judge, which had restored custody to the father. The Court held that while courts generally prefer the mother in custody disputes, the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration. In this instance, the Court found that the father was the more suitable guardian because the mother had remarried, and the maternal grandmother had failed to provide the minor with education. The Court further observed that the minor's own preference is not always the decisive factor, as children can be influenced by the custodian. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of the minor is the primary test in custody matters, and a father may be preferred over a maternal grandmother when the mother has remarried and the grandmother has failed to ensure the minor's education.
Questions settled- Is the preference of a minor child always the decisive factor in determining custody?
- Can a father be granted custody of a minor over a maternal grandmother when the mother has remarried?
- Does the failure of a guardian to provide education for a minor impact the determination of the minor's welfare?
- Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Syed Saghirul Hassan And Other1985 SCMR 1758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was challenged on the basis that the appeal was improperly constituted due to the death of the original appellant and respondents prior to the filing of the petition. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed against deceased parties, where the legal representatives were not impleaded despite being known and recorded in the lower court's judgment, could be maintained or cured. The Court held that the appeal was incompetent and defective from its inception. It rejected the petitioner's excuse that the certified copy of the judgment failed to mention the legal heirs, finding this claim contradicted by the record. The Court determined that because the petitioner failed to provide a plausible explanation for the gross negligence in failing to implead the correct parties, the appeal could not be sustained. The principle laid down is that while the Court has the power to remedy procedural defects, it will not exercise such discretion where the appeal is fundamentally defective at the time of filing and the party fails to demonstrate sufficient cause or faultless conduct.
Questions settled- Can an appeal filed against deceased parties be maintained if the legal representatives were not impleaded at the time of filing?
- Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to remedy a defect where an appeal was filed against deceased parties without sufficient cause?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal competent if the appellant fails to implead the correct legal representatives despite the record showing their names?
- Mst. Ahmedunnisa And Others vs Mst. Parveen Siraj1985 SCMR 2012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court upholding the eviction of the petitioners from demised premises on the ground of personal bona fide need of the respondent-landlord. The core legal question was whether a landlord who resides abroad and has foreign nationality can maintain a claim for the personal bona fide use of property in Pakistan during occasional visits. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for personal occupation, even if temporary and for occasional visits, constitutes valid own occupation under the law, preventing landlords from being denied their property rights merely due to foreign residence. The key principle laid down is that a landlord residing abroad is entitled to seek eviction for personal use during visits to Pakistan or upon a permanent return, ensuring rent restriction laws are not rendered nugatory for overseas Pakistanis.
Questions settled- Can a landlord residing abroad claim personal bona fide need for premises in Pakistan during occasional visits?
- Whether temporary or occasional occupation of a house by an overseas landlord constitutes personal use under rent laws?
- Does permanent settlement in a foreign country disentitle a landlord from seeking eviction of tenants for own use?
- Mst. Afrozi Jan And Others vs Mst. Zoojan And Other1985 SCMR 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the validity of a land sale executed by an attorney on behalf of the original owner, Jaffar Khan. The petitioners challenged the sale, alleging the owner was insane and the transaction was fraudulent and without consideration. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the first appellate court decreed it, finding the sale fraudulent. The High Court, in second appeal, modified the decree, upholding the sale's validity and granting the petitioners only the alternative relief of the sale price. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere with the first appellate court's findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that where the trial court and the first appellate court reach conflicting findings on the same evidence, the High Court may compare them to determine which is supported by the record. The Court affirmed that an appellate finding lacking logical basis or evidentiary support is not immune from interference. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a sale by a duly authorized attorney is binding on the principal even if the agent fails to remit the consideration.
Questions settled- Can the High Court in second appeal interfere with a finding of fact made by the first appellate court?
- Does a conflict between the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court allow for interference in second appeal?
- Is a sale of land by an attorney binding on the principal if the attorney fails to remit the sale consideration to the principal?
- Mrs.Dilshad Hussain vs Pakistan Industrial Credit And Investment1985 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from petitions for leave to appeal concerning the remuneration of a Liquidator appointed by the High Court for the winding-up and liquidation of a company. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was to determine the appropriate criteria and governing rules for fixing a Liquidator's remuneration. Specifically, the Court sought to clarify whether such remuneration should be structured as a fixed commission based on the sale of company assets, a fixed salary, or a combination of both, and to establish the underlying principles that should guide judicial orders in this regard. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these issues comprehensively. While the Court rejected the prayer for an interim order, it directed that the appeals be prepared on the existing record for an early hearing and dispensed with the requirement for furnishing security. The Court emphasized the necessity of establishing clear, consistent principles for judicial oversight in the liquidation process, ensuring that remuneration is determined on a sound, equitable basis rather than arbitrary assessment.
Questions settled- What criteria should govern the High Court in fixing the remuneration of a Liquidator appointed for winding-up a company?
- Should a Liquidator's remuneration be based on a fixed commission on asset sales, a fixed salary, or a combination of both?
- What are the principles that should guide judicial orders regarding the remuneration of a court-appointed Liquidator?
- Mrs. Zohra Arshad And Others vs Major Tehmas Khan And Other1985 SCMR 827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a bungalow in the Lahore Cantonment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The respondent, having failed in previous litigation to challenge the transfer of the property to the appellants' predecessor, sought to reopen the matter by claiming that the area exceeding three times the plinth area of the bungalow was not legally transferred. The High Court had accepted this argument, slicing the property and ordering the transfer of the excess area to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's instructions, which mandated that cantonment properties be transferred as single units to avoid violating Cantonment Land Administration Rules, were a valid exercise of statutory discretion. The Court ruled that the excess area did not automatically revert to the state. Furthermore, the Court found the respondent’s claim barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, as he had failed to raise these arguments in his initial 1964 writ petition. The impugned High Court judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Does the second proviso to Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 mandate the automatic exclusion of land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house?
- Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner issue instructions to treat cantonment properties as single units despite the provisions regarding excess area in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Does the failure to raise a specific legal plea in an earlier writ petition bar the party from raising it in subsequent proceedings under the principle of constructive res judicata?
- Mrs. Rehana Saeed And Another vs Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Education And Another1985 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court was brought by civil servants working as Lecturers against the decision of the Service Tribunal, which had upheld the modification of their date of regularisation from 1st September 1972 to 17th July 1974. The core legal question was whether the Ministry of Education could validly regularise the appellants' ad hoc appointments from a date prior to the Establishment Division's notification excluding the posts from the purview of the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that the Ministry of Education acted without jurisdiction and committed an obvious mistake by antedating the regularisation to a period when consultation with the Public Service Commission was mandatory. The Court laid down the principle that an erroneous executive order issued in excess of authority cannot attain finality or confer vested rights, and that regularisation of an ad hoc appointment cannot precede the date on which statutory hurdles, such as mandatory consultation with the Public Service Commission, are lawfully removed.
Questions settled- Can an executive ministry regularise an ad hoc appointment from a date prior to the exclusion of the post from the purview of the Public Service Commission?
- Does an erroneous departmental order regularising service from an unauthorized date attain finality and create vested rights?
- Whether the correction of an obvious administrative error regarding the date of regularisation can be legally objected to?
- Mrs. Iqbal Idrees Malik vs Rehmat Ali Shah And Other1985 SCMR 1682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order passed by the Lahore High Court disposing of ongoing litigation in terms of a compromise endorsed by the petitioner. The core legal question is whether a compromise statement made by a party in court can be set aside on the alleged ground of duress and lack of legal representation. The Supreme Court held that the petition fails and must be dismissed, noting that the petitioner was an educated lady, accompanied by her brother, fully aware of the nature of the dispute, a beneficiary of the compromise, and had made the statement of her own accord without any sustainable proof of duress. The key principle laid down is that mere subsequent second thoughts by a party regarding a compromise duly and consciously endorsed in court do not constitute a valid ground for setting aside a judicial order based thereon.
Questions settled- Can a compromise statement made in court by an educated party be set aside on the ground of duress without substantiating proof?
- Does the absence of legal representation at the time of endorsing a compromise in court invalidate the compromise?
- Can subsequent second thoughts by a party constitute a sufficient ground for upsetting an order passed on a compromise?
- Mrs. Badrun Nisa Rehm an vs K. C. Mamoo1985 SCMR 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which set aside an eviction order previously obtained by the landlord against the tenant. The landlord had sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, unauthorized construction, and unauthorized subletting. While the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority upheld the eviction based on unauthorized construction and subletting, the High Court reversed this decision, accepting the tenant's plea of waiver due to the landlord's continued acceptance of rent after gaining knowledge of the alleged violations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying two primary legal questions for examination: first, whether the doctrine of waiver was legally established given the circumstances of the landlord's acceptance of rent; and second, whether the tenant was procedurally entitled to raise the plea of waiver for the first time before the High Court, having abandoned it during the proceedings before the Rent Controller and the first Appellate Court.
Questions settled- Can a tenant raise a plea of waiver for the first time in the High Court after abandoning it before the Rent Controller and the first Appellate Court?
- Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord after gaining knowledge of unauthorized construction and subletting constitute a waiver of the right to seek eviction?
- Moulvi Abdul Aziz Khan vs Nawab Sarfraz Ali Khan1985 SCMR 1900 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These review petitions were filed against this Court's order dismissing earlier civil petitions, on the ground that the High Court had allegedly mistaken Mutation No. 1077 for the sale mutation when it was actually an inheritance mutation, while the true sale mutation was No. 1107. The core legal question was whether a factual mis-description regarding mutation numbers in the lower court's judgment warrants a review of this Court's order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that no ground for review was made out because the point had neither been taken in the petitions for leave to appeal nor argued at the initial hearing, and in any event, the error in the High Court's order amounted to nothing more than a mere mis-description that had no bearing on the outcome. The key principle laid down is that minor factual mis-descriptions not raised at the appropriate stage do not constitute sufficient grounds for the review of a final order.
Questions settled- Whether a review petition is maintainable on a factual point not raised in the original petition for leave to appeal or during its hearing?
- Does a mere mis-description of a mutation number by the High Court constitute a sufficient ground for review of the Supreme Court's order?
- Monoo Gul And Other. vs Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1985 (CL.) 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court concerning the seizure of goods by Customs authorities. The core legal question involves the interpretation of the phrase 'notice given' under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969. Specifically, the Court must determine whether the statutory requirement to 'give notice' within two months of seizure is satisfied by the mere issuance of a show cause notice by the authorities, or whether it mandates the actual service of such notice upon the affected party. The petitioners contend that the legislative intent requires effective service to ensure the party is properly apprised of the allegations, while the State argues that 'giving notice' refers only to the act of issuance, asserting that requiring actual service would incentivize evasion. Recognizing this as a case of first impression requiring an authoritative interpretation of the statutory language, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the ambiguity regarding the procedural obligations of the Customs authorities under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969.
Questions settled- Does the phrase 'notice given' in Section 168(2) of the Customs Act 1969 require the actual service of the notice on the accused or merely the issuance of the notice?
- Is the requirement to 'give notice' under the Customs Act 1969 satisfied by the dispatch of a notice regardless of whether it is successfully served on the addressee?
- Mohib Ali vs The State1985 SCMR 2055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment. The appellant admitted to killing the deceased with a shotgun but raised the defense of grave and sudden provocation, claiming he found the deceased in a compromising and naked position with his wife inside his house. The prosecution contended that the appellant followed the deceased from a shop and shot him. The Supreme Court examined whether the offense fell under Section 304 instead of Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court observed that the deceased's body was found fully clothed fifty yards away from the appellant's house near his tied mare, and there was no independent corroborative evidence to substantiate the plea of moral laxity. The Court held that a mere unsubstantiated allegation of moral laxity does not constitute grave and sudden provocation, and dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a mere unsubstantiated allegation of moral laxity or Siahkari can legally constitute grave and sudden provocation to reduce a murder charge from Section 302 to Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Does the physical location and state of the deceased's body, if inconsistent with the accused's narrative of catching the deceased in flagrante delicto, negate the plea of grave and sudden provocation?
- Moeenuddin And Others vs Sibghatullah And Other1985 SCMR 1103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit concerning the pre-emption of a land sale. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, Sibghatullah, after the defendants' evidence was closed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The defendants unsuccessfully appealed through the first and second appellate courts. The core legal questions were whether the trial court acted arbitrarily in closing the defendants' evidence and whether the suit was collusive, specifically regarding its financing by a third party. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision to close evidence was justified due to the defendants' dilatory conduct. Furthermore, the Court found that the High Court had adequately addressed the issue of collusion, noting that the plaintiff testified the suit was for his own benefit and that the alleged financier denied any involvement. The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption, finding no legal infirmity in the lower courts' decisions, and consequently refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can a trial court close a party's evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to persistent delays?
- Is a finding of fact regarding a superior right of pre-emption subject to interference by the Supreme Court if no legal infirmity exists?
- Can an appellate court remedy an omission in the trial court's judgment regarding the determination of a specific issue?
- Mistri Miraj Din And Another vs Muhammad Yamin And Other1985 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, claiming to be licensees of the original tenant Fazal Ahmad, filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging an ejectment order passed against the tenant. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine holding that the petitioners, having no independent right and claiming only as workers of the tenant, were not aggrieved parties. In the petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the second ejectment petition was barred by the principles of res judicata under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and sought to assert an independent right. The Supreme Court held that the second ejectment petition was not barred as the questions for determination differed from the first petition, that the plea of an independent right could not be entertained at that stage, and that licensees cannot subsequently change their admitted position. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a licensee of a tenant can challenge an ejectment order against the tenant as an aggrieved party?
- Does a second ejectment petition become barred by res judicata under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance when the questions for determination differ?
- Can a party change its admitted position as a licensee of the tenant to claim an independent right at the appellate stage?
- Mist. Tahira Khatoon And Others vs Ch. Sultan Muhammad Khan, Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a property dispute under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to decide a second revision petition on 31 May 1962, following the omission of Section 20(2) of the Act by Ordinance II of 1962. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction because the statutory savings clause in Ordinance XIII of 1962 required that the record of the case must have been called for prior to 13 January 1962. Upon reviewing the official record, the Court found no evidence that the record had been summoned by the requisite date. Consequently, the Court set aside the Chief Settlement Commissioner’s order, declaring it to have been passed without lawful authority, and upheld the original auction sale of the property. The key principle established is that where a statute provides a savings clause for pending proceedings contingent upon a specific procedural act (calling for the record), the absence of such a positive order on the record vitiates the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Did the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to decide a second revision petition after the omission of Section 20(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Does the presumption of regularity regarding official acts apply when the record fails to show that the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were met?
- What is the effect of the savings clause in Ordinance XIII of 1962 on pending second revision petitions under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Miss Rosie Dennis vs Shaukat Ali1985 SCMR 1988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a landlord's application for the eviction of a tenant from residential premises in Quetta. The landlord, a 70-year-old school headmistress residing in school-provided accommodation, sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement due to her impending retirement. The Rent Controller and the High Court dismissed the application, reasoning that the landlord's intent was mala fide because she had previously sold another property and failed to provide specific retirement details. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if these conclusions were based on conjecture and if the prior sale of property barred her claim. The Court held that the landlord, owning no other property in Quetta, was entitled to reside in her own house upon retirement. It found the lower courts' conclusions regarding mala fide intent to be based on surmises rather than evidence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an eviction application remains maintainable even if a landlord could have pursued specific retirement-related provisions, provided other valid grounds like rent default exist. The appeal was allowed, and eviction was ordered.
Questions settled- Does the prior sale of a residential property by a landlord automatically negate a claim of bona fide personal requirement for another property?
- Can an eviction application be maintained under the general provisions of a rent ordinance if the landlord also qualifies for a specific retirement-based eviction provision?
- Are findings of mala fide intent in eviction proceedings valid when based on surmises rather than concrete evidence?
- Miss Rahila Mumtaz vs Commissioner And Another1985 SCMR 1286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought a Permanent Residence Certificate for Kotri, District Dadu, which was denied by the District Magistrate and the Commissioner on the grounds that she was born and educated in Karachi and lacked a permanent abode in Kotri. The Sind High Court dismissed her constitutional petition, affirming that the findings of fact regarding her residence were conclusive and not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld this decision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to a Permanent Residence Certificate based on her father's domicile and whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the departmental findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the departmental authorities had sufficient material to conclude the petitioner was not a permanent resident of Kotri. The Court affirmed that a parent's domicile certificate cannot be the sole basis for granting a Permanent Residence Certificate, as the relevant rules require an independent inquiry into the applicant's actual residence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the findings of fact were supported by evidence and beyond the scope of constitutional review.
Questions settled- Can a Permanent Residence Certificate be granted solely on the basis of a parent's domicile certificate?
- Is a finding of fact by departmental authorities regarding an applicant's residence subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the possession of a domicile certificate automatically entitle an applicant to a Permanent Residence Certificate?
- Mirza Safdar, Jang vs The State1985 SCMR 1054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-20Read full judgment →
- Mirza Mustafa Beg vs Mst. Khatoon Hadi1985 SCMR 2033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court which upheld the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from a commercial shop ordered by the Rent Controller. The respondent-landlord sought eviction on the ground that the tenant had materially impaired the value and utility of the building by demolishing the common intervening wall between two adjoining rented shops to convert them into a single unit. The Rent Controller and the High Court both ordered eviction, rejecting the tenant's defense of prior consent. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether there was any legal basis or evidence on record to support the conclusion that the demolition of the wall materially impaired the utility or value of the building. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the record lacked evidence to substantiate the finding of impairment, and granted interim stay against eviction subject to regular rent deposits.
Questions settled- Whether the demolition of a common intervening wall between two rented shops constitutes material impairment of the value and utility of the building under rent laws?
- Is a finding of material impairment of a building's value and utility required to be supported by evidence on the record?
- Can leave to appeal be granted when the lower courts draw conclusions regarding property damage without supporting evidence?
- Mirza Muhammad Munawar And Others vs Muhammad Yaqoob And Other1985 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerned petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing second appeals in an ejectment execution proceeding. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of Section 15(7) and (8) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to execution matters, the commencement of the limitation period for executing a conditional ejectment decree, and the binding nature of a compromise decree where a condition was initially met but subsequently overturned by higher courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court correctly found the execution application was not time-barred. The limitation period for the conditional decree, which depended on the outcome of a revision before the Settlement Commissioner, commenced from the date the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal (3-12-1974), thereby finalizing the decision against the tenants. The Court affirmed that the compromise decree remained binding, as the Settlement Authority's initial favorable decision merged into the subsequent orders of the High Court and Supreme Court, ultimately rendering the condition unfulfilled. Section 15 of the Limitation Act was also deemed applicable.
Questions settled- When does the limitation period commence for the execution of a conditional ejectment decree?
- Are the provisions of Section 15(7) and (8) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance applicable to execution proceedings?
- Does an initial favorable decision by a lower authority bind parties to a compromise decree if that decision is subsequently overturned by higher courts?
- Can a compromise decree be executed if the condition upon which it was based is ultimately not met after appeals to higher courts?
- Mirza Akbar Ali vs National Bank of Pakistan1985 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil revision petition challenging the execution of a money decree passed on September 24, 1969. The petitioner, a judgment-debtor, objected to the fourth execution application filed on June 25, 1981, contending that it was time-barred under the repealed Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 because it was not filed within three years of the dismissal of the previous execution application, despite being within the twelve-year limit prescribed by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the repeal of Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 preserved a vested right in the judgment-debtor to insist on the three-year limitation period for subsequent execution applications. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that limitation law is primarily procedural and the repeal of Article 182 removed the three-year clog on execution applications. The Court ruled that a judgment-debtor has no vested right in such a procedural restriction, and since the application was within twelve years of the decree, it was valid under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Does the repeal of Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 preserve a vested right in a judgment-debtor to object to execution applications filed beyond three years of a prior dismissal?
- Is the limitation period prescribed for successive execution applications under the repealed Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 considered a procedural law or a substantive vested right?
- Can an execution application be maintained within twelve years of a decree under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if it is filed more than three years after the dismissal of a previous execution application, following the repeal of Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Mirza Abdul Razzaq vs Barkat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 1235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the Lahore High Court rejecting a reference from the Sessions Judge against a Magistrate's order in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant had obtained possession through execution of an ejectment order but was forcibly dispossessed by the respondents within two months prior to initiating proceedings. The Magistrate found that the appellant was wrongfully dispossessed and deemed to be in possession under the first proviso to Section 145(4), but instead of restoring possession, referred the parties to a competent court regarding title, which the High Court maintained due to title disputes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under Section 145, a Magistrate is strictly precluded from inquiring into title and must confine proceedings to actual possession or wrongful dispossession. Where wrongful dispossession within two months is established, the word 'may' in Section 145(6) is coupled with a duty and has a compulsive effect, requiring the Magistrate to order restoration of possession rather than referring parties to civil courts.
Questions settled- Can a Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 examine questions of proprietary or possessory title?
- Whether the word 'may' in Section 145(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 imposes a mandatory duty on the Magistrate to order restoration of possession once wrongful dispossession under the proviso to subsection (4) is established?
- Under what circumstances can a Magistrate refer parties to a competent civil court under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Mirza Abdul Azizthrough His Legal Heirs vs Shahzadi Taj Bakht And Other1985 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 2-7-1979, which dismissed a constitutional petition concerning a land settlement dispute between displaced persons holding unsatisfied produce index units. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner was entitled to land allotted against the respondents' units and whether the Settlement Commissioner was justified in dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, upholding the High Court's findings that the appeal was competently dismissed as time-barred due to knowledge of the allotment order and that both parties stood in an equal capacity as sitting allottees on merits. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact regarding limitation and the equal standing of sitting allottees, supported by cogent reasons and unrefuted by documentary evidence, will not be interfered with in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal treated as time-barred by a Settlement Commissioner can be interfered with when the appellant had knowledge of the impugned allotment order?
- Whether sitting allottees holding unsatisfied produce index units stand in an equal capacity on merits regarding disputed land allotments?
- Mir Ahmad vs Ataullah And Other1985 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises out of pre-emption suits involving similar questions of law and fact regarding the application of the doctrine of sinker to joint vendees. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court had rejected the vendees' plea that the doctrine of sinker would not operate against them where co-owners and tenants jointly purchased land. The core legal question revolves around whether joint purchasers with differing individual pre-emptive qualifications, or those who are tenants over only a portion of the purchased survey numbers, lose their right to defend the sale through the application of the principle of sinker when joined with strangers or non-qualified co-purchasers in an indivisible transaction. The Supreme Court noted that previous precedents attract the doctrine of sinker in such indivisible purchases, though certain complexities and review petitions warranted a re-examination of the rule. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the connected petition and directed that the matters be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration by a larger bench of five judges.
Questions settled- Does the doctrine of sinker apply when co-owners and a tenant join in an indivisible joint purchase of land?
- Can a vendee protect a sale pro tanto where they are a tenant on only a portion of the jointly purchased land?
- Whether joint vendees who lack pre-emption qualifications over certain survey numbers lose their right to defend the entire transaction.
- Mian Ziauddin vs Punjab Local. Government And Other1985 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises out of an election dispute concerning the interpretation of election rules regarding voter identification. The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his election petition by the Election Tribunal and the subsequent failure of his writ petition before the High Court. The core legal question revolves around whether a Presiding Officer is strictly mandated to require the production of a national identity card by a voter before issuing a ballot-paper, in light of the amended provision of rule 34(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the point requires consideration and granted leave to appeal to examine the mandatory nature of the requirement under the amended rule.
Questions settled- Whether the Presiding Officer is strictly required to demand a national identity card from a voter before issuing a ballot-paper under rule 34(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979?
- Mian Zaiuddin vs Punjab Local Government And Other1985 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal examines whether the non-observance of the substituted sub-rule (1) of Rule 34 of the Punjab Local Councils Election Rules, 1979, requiring the production of a National Identity Card before issuing a ballot paper, vitiates an election as a whole. The appellant challenged the election of respondent No. 2, alleging that numerous voters were permitted to cast votes without producing identity cards. Both the Election Tribunal and the High Court dismissed the challenge, holding the requirement to be a mere irregularity rather than a mandatory condition that voids an election. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and held that when read alongside Section 19 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, the requirement is directory rather than mandatory because statutes regulating official conduct without declaring non-compliance to be null and void are generally construed as directory, and rules cannot overreach the parent statute. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Whether the requirement to produce a National Identity Card under Rule 34(1) of the Punjab Local Councils Election Rules, 1979 is mandatory or directory?
- Does the non-compliance with Rule 34(1) of the Punjab Local Councils Election Rules, 1979 vitiate an election as a whole?
- Can rules framed under an Ordinance prescribe a mandatory requirement that goes beyond or over-reaches the parent statute?
- Mian Shahbaz Ahmad vs Haji Muhammad Tariq And Other1985 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a constitutional petition, setting aside an election tribunal's decision and restoring respondent No.1 to an elected municipal office. The core legal questions involved whether respondent No.1 suffered from statutory disqualifications under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, specifically concerning membership of a political party's executive committee or involvement in subversive activities based on a past Summary Military Court conviction. The Supreme Court held that the election tribunal's findings were conjectural, that the refusal of the Governor to grant exemption did not independently create a disqualification without proof of the underlying condition, and that a conviction occurring more than three years prior to the election required affirmative evidence of prejudicial activities against Pakistan. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether the refusal by the Governor to relieve a candidate from a disqualification creates a disqualification independently of whether the disqualification was actually incurred?
- What standard of proof is required to establish that a candidate is an office-bearer of a political party under Section 21(h) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
- Does a conviction by a Summary Military Court older than three years prior to an election automatically operate as a disqualification without affirmative evidence of prejudicial activities?
- Can an election tribunal declare an election void based on conjectural findings and surmises regarding a candidate's background?
- Mian Munir Ahmad vs The State1985 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These criminal appeals arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing applications under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of proceedings pending before a Labour Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings before a Labour Court, despite the Labour Court not being subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of appeals or revisions. The Supreme Court held that section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies to proceedings before any court dealing with offences under laws other than the Pakistan Penal Code unless specifically excluded, as it falls under the expression 'otherwise dealt with' in section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court further held that powers under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and section 561-A are co-extensive. On the merits, the Court quashed the proceedings because the workers in question were contractor's employees, not direct employees of the factory.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings pending before a Labour Court?
- Are the powers of a trial court under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 co-extensive with the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A?
- Whether a factory owner is required to issue attendance tickets under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 to workers employed by an independent contractor?
- Mian Muhammad Abdullah vs The State1985 SCMR 1936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mian Muhammad Abdullah against an order of the Lahore High Court concerning the amount of security required for bail. The petitioner, former Managing Director of a defunct Finance Company with substantial liabilities, was directed by the Company Judge to furnish security and deposit his passport. Upon failing to furnish the security, warrants were issued, he was arrested, and subsequently granted bail by the High Court subject to furnishing a heavy surety of Rs.25 lacs. The core legal question concerns the appropriateness and reduction of the excessive bail amount when the accused is unable to arrange sureties. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and, with the consent of the official Liquidator and Additional Advocate-General, held that the interest of the company could be adequately safeguarded by reducing the bail amount while increasing the number of sureties. The Supreme Court accordingly reduced the bail amount to Rs.5 lacs, laying down that excessive bail conditions that impede release may be adjusted to balance the interests of justice and the recovery of dues.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court reduce the amount of bail and increase the number of sureties to facilitate the release of an accused who is unable to furnish heavy security?
- Whether the bail amount fixed by the High Court can be modified with the consent of the official liquidator and the state counsel?
- Mian Gul Shah And Others vs Sayed Farman Shah And Other1985 SCMR 1789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-01Read full judgment →
- Mian Aizad Bakhsh vs Sheikh Muhammad Afzal1985 SCMR 1003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order refusing to condone a delay in filing an appeal. The petitioner initially filed an appeal before a District Judge, which was later returned for presentation to the High Court due to a lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the appeal in the correct forum, caused by the counsel's mistaken advice, warranted condonation under the law. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the plea for condonation. The Court held that while a party may rely on counsel, gross ignorance of the law or negligence by counsel does not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay. The key principle laid down is that 'mistaken advice' by a counsel, when amounting to gross negligence or ignorance of clear legal provisions regarding jurisdiction, cannot be successfully urged as a sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing an appeal in the proper forum.
Questions settled- Can a delay in filing an appeal caused by a counsel's gross ignorance of law be condoned?
- Does the filing of an appeal in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction due to counsel's advice constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
- Is a litigant entitled to condonation of delay based solely on the mistaken advice of their legal counsel?
- Mian Abdul Hafeez vs Mst. Faridunnisa1985 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that remanded an ejectment case to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision on issues previously left undecided or erroneously determined. The core legal questions were whether the High Court possessed the discretion to remand the case rather than deciding it itself, and whether the term 'personal requirement' under the rent laws extends to the needs of a landlord's children regardless of their dependency. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its discretion under Order XLI, Rules 23, 24, and 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as the appellate court is not mandatorily required to decide all issues itself. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the ground of personal requirement for 'own occupation' under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 is not restricted to the landlord alone but extends to the bona fide needs of their children and their dependents. The Court upheld the remand order but modified it to exclude the provision of leading additional evidence, as the parties had already concluded their evidence.
Questions settled- Is an appellate court mandatorily required under Order XLI, Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to decide issues left undetermined by the trial court?
- Does the ground of personal requirement for 'own occupation' under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 extend to the needs of a landlord's children?
- Can the personal requirement of a landlord include the needs of the dependents of the landlord's children?
- Is the appellate court empowered to remand a case to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision when material issues were not decided by the lower courts?
- Messrs Zulfiqar Associates Ltd. And Messrs Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd.1985 SCMR 1570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a common order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions challenging an interlocutory order passed by a Special Judge (Banking). The respondent bank had filed a recovery suit against the petitioners and others based on a letter of credit issued for the import of machinery by a predecessor company, which was subsequently reconstituted into three separate companies. In their applications for leave to defend the suit under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioners expressly admitted liability to the extent of one-third. The Special Judge granted leave to defend but conditioned it upon the deposit of one-third of the suit amount in court. The High Court dismissed the subsequent constitutional petitions, holding that the trial court's discretion was properly exercised and not arbitrary or perverse. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view, holding that the contentions related to the merits of the controversy within the special court's jurisdiction and did not warrant interference under constitutional jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the petitions.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can make the grant of leave to defend a banking suit subject to the condition of depositing a portion of the suit amount upon an admission of liability?
- Can the High Court interfere in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction with an interlocutory discretionary order of a court of competent jurisdiction regarding leave to defend?
- Messrs Swat Textile Mills Ltd. vs Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad1985 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the validity of the levy of Central Excise duty on the basis of production capacity under subsection (4) of section 3 of the Central Excise and Salts Tax Act, 1944, inserted by the Finance Act, 1966. The core legal question involved the challenge to section 3 of the Act as ultra vires regarding the imposition of duty on the basis of capacity and actual production following amendments to the 1962 Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the issues raised were fully covered and settled by a prior common judgment of the Court in Zaibtan Textile Mills Limited v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1983 SC 358). The established principle is that matters concerning the constitutional validity of the production capacity tax provisions under the Central Excise and Salts Act stand resolved in accordance with the precedent set in the Zaibtan Textile Mills case.
Questions settled- Whether section 3 of the Central Excise and Salts Tax Act, 1944, providing for the imposition of duty on the basis of production capacity, is ultra vires?
- Does the judgment in Zaibtan Textile Mills Limited v. Central Board of Revenue fully cover and govern challenges to the Central Excise duty levied on production capacity?
- Messrs Siddiq Textiles Ltd. vs Board of Revenue, Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the resumption of state land by the Provincial Government, which had been allotted to the appellant for industrial purposes. The core legal question was whether the delivery of possession to the appellant was unauthorized and whether the government could unilaterally resume the land without providing an opportunity for a hearing. The Supreme Court held that the administrative memoranda issued by the Financial Commissioner, which governed the sale of land for industrial purposes, constituted valid statements of conditions under the Colonization of Government Lands Act. Although the Collector’s delivery of possession technically deviated from the 1959 memorandum's procedural requirements, the Court found that the government’s long-standing acquiescence implied approval. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellant was entitled to procedural fairness. The key principle laid down is that where a party has been placed in possession of land by state authorities and has established an industrial unit, the government cannot summarily resume such land without adhering to the principle of audi alteram partem, regardless of whether specific statutory notice provisions apply.
Questions settled- Can the government summarily resume state land allotted for industrial purposes without providing the allottee an opportunity of hearing?
- Do administrative memoranda issued by the Financial Commissioner regarding land disposal constitute valid statements of conditions under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
- Does the government's long-term acquiescence to a Collector's unauthorized delivery of possession imply approval of the transaction?
- Is a writ petition challenging the resumption of state land barred by delay if filed shortly after the final notice of resumption?
- Messrs Shahi Bottlers Ltd. vs The Assistant Collector, Customs And Other1985 SCMR 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed by a company engaged in manufacturing the beverage R.C. Cola, challenging the classification of imported concentrates used in its preparation. The core legal question is whether these imported concentrates fall under head 21.07 or head 33.04 of the Pakistan Custom Tariff for the purpose of levying sales tax. The High Court determined that the concentrates are covered under head 21.07 as food preparations and flavoring extracts rather than head 33.04 as odoriferous substances, given that they serve as the chief ingredients of the beverage rather than merely imparting a pleasant smell. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan agreed with the reasoning and findings of the High Court, holding that the classification under head 21.07 is correct. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, while granting the petitioner a period of one month to pay the additional sales tax in cash in lieu of encashment of the bank guarantee.
Questions settled- Whether imported beverage concentrates fall under head 21.07 or head 33.04 of the Pakistan Custom Tariff?
- Do beverage concentrates that act as chief ingredients rather than merely imparting odor qualify as odoriferous substances under tariff head 33.04?
- Messrs Qamaruddin Ahmad & Co. vs Government of Pakistan1985 SCMR 1775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a construction contract dispute between a firm and the Government of Pakistan regarding a hospital project. The contract was cancelled by the Government, leading to the forfeiture of the appellant's assets and the imposition of a liability. The dispute was referred to a sole arbitrator, whose award was subsequently made a rule of the court. The appellant challenged the award, alleging procedural irregularities, including the extension of time for the award, the arbitrator's consideration of a C.I.D. report, the denial of evidence production, and failure to determine liability. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court correctly extended the time for the award under the Arbitration Act, whether the arbitrator committed misconduct by considering external reports, and whether the arbitrator failed to address the merits of the claims. The Court held that the appellant's participation in proceedings after the initial time limit constituted acquiescence, justifying the retrospective extension of time. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of arbitrator misconduct regarding the C.I.D. report or the denial of evidence, affirming the lower courts' findings that the award was based on a proper consideration of the parties' claims and evidence.
Questions settled- Can a court retrospectively extend the time for an arbitrator to make an award under the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Does a party's participation in arbitration proceedings after the expiry of the time limit constitute acquiescence to an extension?
- Does the mere production of a document by a party during arguments, without the arbitrator relying on it, constitute misconduct?
- Messrs Premier Sugar Mills & Distillery Company Ltd., Mardan vs The Collector of Customs, Karachi And Other1985 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the confiscation of imported centrifugal machines by the Collector of Customs for violating import price restrictions. The appellant, a sugar manufacturing company, imported machinery exceeding the Rs. 10,000 limit set by the import policy, despite holding a license for general machinery. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of Section 167(8)(a) and (b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and whether the issuance of an import license automatically waives price restrictions imposed under the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held that the price restriction was a valid condition of the license and that the appellant’s import violated the law. The Court rejected the argument that the 'personal use' clauses in Section 167(8) govern all preceding paragraphs, ruling instead that each paragraph is distinct and independent. Consequently, the Court affirmed the confiscation and penalty, holding that the issuance of a license does not inherently waive specific price ceilings established by government notifications, and that the appellant’s contravention was punishable under the Sea Customs Act.
Questions settled- Does the issuance of an import license automatically waive price restrictions imposed by government notifications?
- Are the provisions of Section 167(8)(a) and Section 167(8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, distinct and independent offenses?
- Do the final paragraphs of Section 167(8)(a) and Section 167(8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, regarding bona fide personal use, govern all preceding paragraphs in those subsections?
- Can price restrictions on imported goods be considered a 'specified description' under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878?
- Messrs Pakistan State Oils Company Ltd. vs Khalil Ahmad Anwar, Rent1985 SCMR 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a tenant of commercial premises, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its constitutional petition challenging the Rent Controller's disposal of preliminary objections. The original landlord, Syeda Qamar Sultana, had initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioner on grounds of default, personal requirement, and reconstruction. Following her death, the respondents were impleaded. The petitioner contested the landlord's title and the validity of the proceedings, arguing that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, noting that the ejectment application was pending, evidence remained to be recorded, and no jurisdictional defect existed. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, holding that where a landlord-tenant relationship is admitted, the Rent Controller possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine all relevant facts and legal issues. The Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass statutory proceedings or challenge interlocutory orders, especially when the Rent Controller is legally empowered to adjudicate the controversy on its merits. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.
Questions settled- Can a tenant invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a Rent Controller's preliminary order while the main ejectment application is still pending?
- Does the Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and related legal issues?
- Can constitutional jurisdiction be used to bypass statutory proceedings before a Rent Controller?
- Messrs Pak Company,Sargodha vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone1985 SCMR 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment upholding an Income-tax Officer's assessment and refusal to renew a firm's registration under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal questions were whether the Officer had sufficient material to assume the existence of "dasti books" for 1964, and whether the Officer was legally required to exercise independent discretion regarding the refusal of registration after making a "best judgment" assessment. The Supreme Court held that the finding regarding the existence of books was a question of fact based on evidence, which the Court would not disturb. However, the Court ruled that while "best judgment" assessment is a mandatory consequence of default, the refusal of registration is a separate, punitive, and discretionary act. The Income-tax Officer must apply an independent mind and record reasons for denying registration, rather than treating it as an automatic consequence. Furthermore, the Court established that the proviso to Section 23(4) requiring notice applies to the refusal to renew registration, ensuring procedural fairness. The appeal regarding registration was allowed.
Questions settled- Does a 'best judgment' assessment under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, automatically mandate the refusal or cancellation of a firm's registration?
- Is the refusal to renew a firm's registration under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, a discretionary act requiring the recording of reasons?
- Does the proviso to Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, regarding notice for cancellation of registration apply to the refusal to renew a firm's registration?
- Messrs New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Enqu Iry Officer, War Risks1985 SCMR 1317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by Messrs New Jubilee Insurance Company challenged a High Court judgment dismissing its constitutional petition against notices issued by the Inquiry Officer, War Risks Insurance, under the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971. The Inquiry Officer sought to determine the insurable value of the appellant's building at forty times its gross annual rental value pursuant to rule 7(a) read with Explanation I(iv) of the War Risks Insurance Rules, 1971. The core legal questions were whether the formula of forty times the annual rental value for determining the insurable value of a building was ultra vires the parent ordinance and unreasonable, and whether the allowance for depreciation under rule 7(a) applied to completed buildings. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that insurance contracts are based on the fundamental principle of indemnity and that the arbitrary formula of forty times rental value had no nexus with the actual insurable value of the property, rendering it ultra vires and unreasonable. The Court further held that the allowance for depreciation applies to completed buildings as well as those under construction.
Questions settled- Whether the formula prescribing forty times the annual rental value for determining the insurable value of a building under the War Risks Insurance Rules, 1971 is ultra vires the parent statute?
- Is a contract of insurance fundamentally a contract of indemnity limited to the actual loss sustained by the insured?
- Does the allowance for depreciation under rule 7(a) of the War Risks Insurance Rules, 1971 apply to completed buildings or solely to buildings under construction?
- Can punctuation in a statutory provision be ignored or subordinated to achieve a reasonable and consistent interpretation that avoids absurdity?
- Messrs Narumal Jetomal And Another vs Special Court of Sind And Other1985 SCMR 2032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the jurisdiction of a Special Court established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners, whose rice mill and pledged paddy stocks were nationalized by the Government, faced a recovery suit filed by the respondent bank regarding a cash credit facility. The petitioners contended that the suit was incompetent before the Special Court, arguing that the Rice Milling Corporation of Pakistan and the Government were necessary parties who should have been the primary defendants. The Supreme Court observed that the legal points raised by the petitioners, particularly regarding the competency of the suit under the special provisions of the Banking Ordinance given the involvement of nationalized entities, warranted further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Special Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the recovery suit under the circumstances presented.
Questions settled- Is a suit for recovery of a cash credit facility competent before a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, when the underlying pledged assets were nationalized?
- Does the involvement of the Rice Milling Corporation of Pakistan and the Government as necessary parties affect the jurisdiction of a Special Court established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
- Messrs Mairaj Sons And Others And vs United Bank Ltd. And Other1985 SCMR 987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a banking recovery suit instituted by United Bank Ltd. against the petitioners for the recovery of Rs. 96,30,854.77 under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners filed an application for leave to appear and defend the suit, alleging that documents were obtained under undue influence and in blank forms, and that adequate security via equitable mortgage already existed. The trial court granted conditional leave to defend subject to the deposit of the entire decretal amount in cash, which condition was upheld by both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the condition imposing a cash deposit for granting leave to defend was justified despite existing mortgaged properties, and whether interest formed part of the 'loan' under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's discretionary order requiring cash deposit as a condition for leave to defend was not illegal or misconceived given the disputed sufficiency of securities, and declined to interfere with the concurrent findings. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can validly impose a condition of cash deposit for granting leave to defend a banking recovery suit when properties are already mortgaged?
- Does the definition of 'loan' under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 include interest or is it confined solely to the principal amount?
- Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with a discretionary order of the trial court requiring a cash deposit for granting leave to defend?
- Messrs Lassani Brothers vs The Commissioner of Incometax and oTHERss1985 PLD Supreme Court 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law by dismissing the reference application without answering the referred question of law regarding the sustainability of a penalty imposed under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court committed no infirmity or misapprehension, as the appellant's counsel had failed to press or question the power to impose the penalty before the High Court, and a court cannot be expected to decide a referred question not urged before it. The key principle laid down is that the High Court is not bound to answer a question of law in a reference application if the party concerned chooses not to press or argue the same during the hearing.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court is required to answer a question of law in a reference application when the party concerned does not press or argue the point before it?
- Whether an application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 can be dismissed if the counsel fails to question the imposition of penalty during the hearing?
- Messrs Khawaja Brothers Lahore And Another vs The Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 1915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-29Read full judgment →
- Messrs Khair Muhammad Brothers vs Pakistan Through Airport Manager, Karachi Airport And 14 Other1985 SCMR 1785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sind High Court which dismissed the petitioner's Letters Patent Appeal and upheld the decree passed against them for the recovery of rent due under a contract. The core legal question involved the interpretation of a contract concerning the operation of a restaurant and rest house at the Karachi Airport, specifically whether the petitioner's obligation to pay rent was contingent upon the Government's performance of an undertaking regarding exclusive aircraft supplies and passenger accommodation by airlines. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly interpreted the terms of the contract, finding that the covenant of payment by the petitioner was absolute and unqualified, and that the contract did not bind third-party airlines to source exclusively from the petitioner. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that unambiguous contractual obligations cannot be treated as mutually dependent without clear contractual language to that effect.
Questions settled- Whether the obligation to pay rent under a commercial contract can be treated as contingent upon the performance of a separate clause without explicit contractual language?
- Are third-party airlines bound by the terms of a contract executed solely between the Government and a caterer to which they were not parties?
- Messrs Ilam Din Abdul Rehman Karyana Merchants, Represented By Abdul Sattar And Another vs Master Sardar Elahi1985 SCMR 1914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an ejectment proceeding instituted by the respondent against the petitioner, claiming to be the transferee of the disputed property by auction. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application upon finding that the property had not been transferred to the respondent and that no statutory tenancy existed, which findings were upheld in first appeal. In second appeal, the High Court held that the property had been transferred to the respondent, though it agreed that no landlord-tenant relationship existed and thus the ejectment application was rightly dismissed. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, grievance being that the High Court should not have disturbed the concurrent finding of fact regarding title. After hearing counsel, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court erred in disturbing the concurrent finding of fact on title in second appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court in second appeal can disturb a concurrent finding of fact regarding title?
- Is an ejectment application maintainable in the absence of a contractual or statutory relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Messrs Homes Limited, Karachis vs The Commissioner of Income Tax1985 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal, which, upon agreement of the learned counsel for the parties, was converted into an appeal. The core question involved the interim relief pending the final disposal of a constitutional petition relating to an income tax demand. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and directed that the impugned demand from the appellant-company be held in abeyance pending the final disposal of Constitution Petition No. 727-D of 1984. This relief is subject to the appellant furnishing a bank guarantee for 50 percent of the demand and executing security for the balance amount to the satisfaction of the Nazir of the High Court within one month. The Court laid down the principle that interim protection against tax demands can be granted upon furnishing adequate security and bank guarantees pending constitutional proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether an interim order of the High Court can be substituted by consent of the parties in the Supreme Court?
- What conditions may be imposed for holding a tax demand in abeyance pending a constitutional petition?
- Is a bank guarantee required to be unconditionally encashable if the underlying constitutional petition is dismissed?
- Messrs Haji Maula Bakhsh & Sonss vs Collector of Customs And Another1985 SCMR 1547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the confiscation of imported glass sheets by Customs authorities due to alleged non-compliance with the weight, thickness, and value specifications stipulated in the import license issued under the Export Bonus Scheme. The appellants challenged the confiscation orders, arguing that the goods did not violate the relevant Public Notice and that the cause of action for the second lot of goods was distinct from the first lot, which had been the subject of a previously dismissed writ petition. The core legal question was whether the principle of res judicata or the bar against filing successive writ petitions on the same facts precluded the appellants from maintaining the current petition. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the appellants could not raise different pleas at different times to file multiple writ petitions on the same facts. Affirming the principle that res judicata applies to writ petitions, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the appellants were barred from re-litigating the matter.
Questions settled- Does the principle of res judicata apply to successive writ petitions filed on the same facts?
- Can a petitioner raise different pleas at different times to file multiple writ petitions on the same cause of action?
- Are goods imported in violation of the description specified in an import license subject to confiscation under the Sea Customs Act?
- Messrs Haji E. Doosa & Sons Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax1985 SCMR 2030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a claim for refund of sales tax paid on gunny bags used as packing material for the export of guar-gum for the assessment year 1960-61. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the refund claim, but the Assistant Commissioner and subsequently the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, relying on instructions issued by the Central Board of Revenue. Upon a reference application, the High Court answered the question of law in the negative against the assessee, following a precedent of the Supreme Court. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court arguing that the High Court failed to consider the binding nature of the Central Board of Revenue instructions exempting packing material used in exported goods. The Supreme Court held that the points raised regarding the exemption granted by the Central Board of Revenue deserved consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether packing material such as gunny bags qualifies as partly manufactured goods under section 2(12) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- Whether sales tax paid on packing material used for exported goods is refundable under the relevant exemption notifications and Central Board of Revenue instructions?
- Messrs Habib Insurance Co. Ltd.s vs Commissioner of Incometax1985 PLD Supreme Court 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the assessee, an insurance company, examined whether the High Court of Sind correctly interpreted section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act read with rules 3 and 6 of the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act regarding the taxability of appreciation in book value of investments and realization from sold properties. The appellant contended that since the investments were made out of initial subscribed capital rather than insurance premium income, and the company acted as an ordinary investor, the resulting appreciation and capital gains were not profits derived from the business of insurance and thus not chargeable to tax under the First Schedule. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant carried on no other business except insurance, all its assets, incomes, and gains were relatable to the insurance business. Consequently, pursuant to section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act, tax computation must be based on the annual accounts furnished under the Insurance Act in accordance with the self-contained provisions of the First Schedule, which explicitly include appreciation and realization gains on investments. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether appreciation in the book value of investments and realization from properties sold by an insurance company are chargeable to tax under section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act read with rules 3 and 6 of the First Schedule?
- Do assets and investments acquired from the initial subscribed capital of an insurance company fall outside the scope of the insurance business for tax purposes?
- Whether notional appreciation in the value of assets can be treated as income and charged to tax under the First Schedule of the Income-tax Act?
- Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Kaycee Corporation Proprietary Firm1985 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that refused to treat a suit as a summary matter under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a suit based on a promissory note loses its summary character when the plaint references underlying accounts and collateral security. The Supreme Court held that the High Court took an overly narrow view. The Court ruled that a suit based on a promissory note remains maintainable under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, even if the plaint references collateral security or accounts, as these details merely establish the consideration for the note. Consequently, the respondent's failure to apply for leave to defend within the prescribed ten-day period meant they were precluded from contesting the suit, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply to such procedural defaults. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, affirming that the suit was properly framed under summary procedure.
Questions settled- Does a suit based on a promissory note lose its summary character under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the plaint references underlying accounts and collateral security?
- Can a defendant apply for leave to defend a summary suit after the expiration of the ten-day period prescribed by Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for leave to appear and defend a summary suit?
- Messrs Fateh Timber Mart vs Messrs Gilani Timber Mart1985 SCMR 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that restored a trial court decree regarding the eviction from premises housing a Saw Mill. The core legal question was whether premises comprising land, structures, and an installed Saw Mill constitute a 'building' or 'rented land' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Supreme Court held that premises where machinery for an industry or factory is installed and let out along with the land do not fall within the definitions of 'building' or 'rented land' provided in the Ordinance. Consequently, such industrial concerns are excluded from the operation of the Ordinance, and the relationship between the parties is governed by the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Court affirmed that the nature of the property as an industrial concern places it outside the statutory rent restriction framework, and thus, the civil court correctly exercised jurisdiction. Leave to appeal was refused as no substantial question of law requiring further examination was presented.
Questions settled- Does a running industrial concern, such as a Saw Mill, fall under the definition of 'building' or 'rented land' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Are premises containing industrial machinery excluded from the operation of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Does the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 apply to a lease of an industrial concern?
- Messrs Daily Hilal E Pakistan vs Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal And Other1985 SCMR 918 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition is directed against the order of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner-newspaper's constitutional petition, which had upheld the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision granting reinstatement with back benefits to respondent No. 3, a former Officer on Special Duty whose services were terminated due to retrenchment. The core legal question was whether an employee working as an Officer on Special Duty and Manager in a newspaper establishment qualifies as a 'workman' or 'newspaper employee' entitled to invoke Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Section 17 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, a newspaper employee is deemed to be a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and thus entitled to seek redress for grievances under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The key principle laid down is that newspaper employees, by statutory fiction under Section 17 of the 1973 Act, enjoy the rights of workmen to challenge termination through labor forums.
Questions settled- Whether an Officer on Special Duty in a newspaper establishment qualifies as a newspaper employee under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
- Does a newspaper employee have the right to invoke Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for the redress of individual grievances?
- Are the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applicable to newspaper establishments under Section 17 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
- Messrs Al Iblagh Limited, Lahore vs The Copyright Board, Karachi And Other1985 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a dispute over copyright registration for a series of cassettes containing lectures and sermons of the late Maulana Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi, which applications were dismissed by the Registrar of Copyrights and subsequently on appeal by the Copyright Board, Karachi. The appellant challenged the Board's order through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction on the ground that the respondents' offices and records were located in Karachi. An Intra-Court Appeal having also been dismissed, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether orders passed by federal authorities like the Copyright Board, having central offices in one province but exercising jurisdiction nationwide, can be challenged only in the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction those offices are located. The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court and the Sind High Court possess concurrent jurisdiction to entertain constitutional petitions against orders of pan-national federal authorities that affect parties within their respective territories. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Lahore High Court for decision on merits.
Questions settled- Whether orders passed by a federal authority with a central office in one province can be challenged in a High Court outside that province?
- Does a High Court have territorial jurisdiction to issue a writ against a federal functionary performing functions within its province regardless of the location of the authority's headquarters?
- Do multiple High Courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to entertain constitutional petitions against nationwide federal bodies affecting parties in different provinces?
- Messrs Abdul Ghaffar I, Davera vs The Central Board of Revenue And Other1985 SCMR 912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged the recovery of short-levied customs duty on imported cutch block, which the customs authorities assessed at a higher value than declared. While the Deputy Collector of Customs imposed both duty and a personal penalty, the Director of Vigilance Wing subsequently upheld the duty but set aside the penalty, explicitly finding no evidence of mala fide intent or deliberate deflation of value by the petitioner. The petitioner’s revision to the Central Board of Revenue and subsequent constitutional petition to the High Court were unsuccessful. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court identified two critical legal questions. First, whether the department possessed a reliable basis to reject the petitioner's documentary evidence regarding the import price. Second, whether the appellate finding that the petitioner lacked mala fide intent effectively brought the case within the scope of Section 32(3) of the Customs Act 1969, thereby rendering the show-cause notice issued nearly one year after the event time-barred and illegal. The Court granted leave to appeal to further consider these issues.
Questions settled- Whether a show-cause notice for short levy of customs duty issued after four months is time-barred under Section 32(3) of the Customs Act 1969?
- Does a finding of lack of mala fide intent in undervaluation of goods preclude the application of extended limitation periods for customs duty recovery?
- What constitutes a reliable basis for customs authorities to reject a declared import value and substitute it with a higher valuation?
- Messrs a Slam Saeed & Co. vs Messrs Trading Corporation of Pakistan1985 PLD Supreme Court 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave was filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan arising out of arbitration proceedings concerning a contract for the purchase and export of rice. The core legal questions were whether an arbitrator could award damages for breach of contract based on resale price differences beyond the explicit provisions of a default clause in the agreement, and whether inviting public tenders satisfied the mandatory notice requirement under Section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and varied the decree, restricting the respondent's recovery solely to the forfeiture of Call Deposit Receipts specified in the contract's default clause. The Court laid down that under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872, where a contract expressly stipulates the compensation or penalty for breach, an arbitrator cannot import terms to grant damages outside that clause. Furthermore, individual notice under Section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 is mandatory prior to resale, and general public notices or tenders do not cure non-compliance.
Questions settled- Does general public notice or invitation of tenders satisfy the notice requirement under Section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930?
- Can an arbitrator award damages for breach of contract beyond or outside the specific terms of an express default clause?
- Whether stipulations not expressed in a written contract can be implied by a court or arbitrator where an express clause governs default?
- Messrs a and B Food Industries Ltd. And Others vs Commissioner of Income Tax_Sales Tax1985 SCMR 1959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from three petitions for leave to appeal filed by a private limited company manufacturing biscuits, which consumed vegetable ghee in its manufacturing process. For the assessment years 1968-1969, 1969-1970, and 1970-1971, the petitioner claimed a refund of sales tax on the vegetable ghee consumed, arguing that the tax was merged with excise duty under a capacity duty scheme and subsequently exempted by a notification dated 16-06-1967. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the claim on the ground that since the levy of sales tax on vegetable ghee was abolished and not paid, no refund could be claimed. Although the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the petitioner's appeals, the High Court answered the reference in the negative, holding that no refund was due where no sales tax had actually been suffered. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to render an authoritative decision, noting that whether a taxpayer is entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials after the levy is exempted under a consolidated capacity duty scheme is an important question of law.
Questions settled- Whether a manufacturer is entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials consumed in production when the tax on such raw materials was merged into capacity duty and subsequently exempted?
- Can a refund of sales tax be claimed under the Sales Tax Act 1951 for an item that has suffered no actual sales tax due to an exemption notification?
- Mehrab Shah Through His Legal Heirs vs Shah Zaman And Other1985 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents seeking declaration and possession of disputed land. The defendant had claimed title by adverse possession in his written statement, but at trial abandoned that plea and claimed inheritance, though he failed to produce any documentary evidence such as a mutation of inheritance. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the entries showing ownership in the column of cultivation in the revenue records take precedence over entries in the column of Lagan (rent). This decision was affirmed by both the District Court and the High Court on second appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower courts correctly applied the law. The Court affirmed that entries in the column of cultivation prevail over entries in the column of Lagan unless otherwise corroborated by strong evidence, and that oral evidence unsupported by documentary proof cannot displace explicit revenue entries.
Questions settled- Do entries in the column of cultivation in revenue records take precedence over entries in the column of Lagan?
- Can a defendant establish a claim of ownership through inheritance without producing documentary evidence such as an inheritance mutation?
- Is oral evidence alone sufficient to displace recorded entries of ownership in revenue records?
- Mehr Muhammad Sarwar and Others vs The State and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This suo motu review arose from an error in a previous Supreme Court order which incorrectly held that Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had been repealed by the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance 1981. The Supreme Court corrected this error, clarifying that the saving provisions in Section 7 of the 1981 Ordinance preserved Section 249-A, which remains on the statute book. On the merits of the underlying appeal, the petitioners challenged the High Court's dismissal of their quashment application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought to quash proceedings under Section 145 of the Code initiated during the currency of a civil court's interim injunction regulating possession. The Supreme Court held that where a civil court is seized of the dispute and has regulated possession via an injunction, a Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to proceed under Section 145. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh adjudication.
Questions settled- Does Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 remain on the statute book despite the repealing provisions of the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance 1981?
- Does a Magistrate have jurisdiction to proceed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a civil court has already issued an interim injunction regulating possession of the same property?
- What is the effect of a saving provision in a repealing statute on provisions omitted from consideration in the main repealing schedule?
- Mehr Din (Represented By His Legal Heirs) vs Dr. Bashir Ahmad Khan And 2 Other1985 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a review petition arising from a civil appeal concerning a pre-emption suit over a plot of land situated in Sialkot. The core legal question revolved around whether the disputed property was agricultural land or urban immovable property at the time of the sale, thereby determining its pre-emptibility, and whether a presumption of continuing agricultural use could be drawn from previous Jamabandi entries. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts correctly established that the land had ceased to be agricultural land and was occupied as a building site prior to the sale, rendering it urban immovable property not subject to pre-emption. The Court laid down that periodical Jamabandi entries reflect the state of affairs up to their preparation date, and no legal presumption can be raised under the law to extend that classification forward to the date of sale without supporting contemporaneous records such as the register Girdawari.
Questions settled- Whether land ceased to be agricultural and converted into urban immovable property is subject to right of pre-emption?
- Can a presumption of continuing agricultural land use be raised from past Jamabandi entries without contemporaneous Khasra Girdawari records?
- Does a defect in the wording of an additional issue vitiate trial proceedings where parties were fully cognizant of the real controversy and led evidence thereon?
- Mehboob Elahi (Decased) Through His L.Rs. vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 2038 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a property dispute over House No. C.241/9, Sukkur, originally allotted to Asloob Elahi in 1949. Following his death, conflicting claims arose between his son from his first marriage, Mehboob Elahi, and his widow, Mst. Iqbal Begum. Mehboob Elahi sought transfer of the property based on his own allotment, while denying the original allotment of his father and characterizing the widow as a mere licensee. The Settlement authorities, after reviewing the evidence, found that the property had been subject to a family arrangement where the sons from the first marriage received commercial premises, while the widow and her children occupied the disputed house. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly upheld the findings of fact regarding possession and entitlement made by the Settlement authorities. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the findings of fact regarding actual possession and the existence of a family arrangement were supported by evidence and not liable to interference in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that a party cannot repudiate their earlier factual stand to advance a new case on appeal.
Questions settled- Can a party in a property dispute repudiate their earlier factual stand before the Settlement authorities to advance a new case on appeal?
- Are findings of fact regarding possession and family arrangements made by Settlement authorities liable to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the suppression of material facts in a C.H. Form regarding the original allotment of a property affect the validity of a subsequent transfer claim?
- Mawaz Khan And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court affirming the conviction of the appellants under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in death sentences and long-term imprisonments. The core legal question was whether the incident constituted a premeditated attack by the accused or a sudden fight between two armed groups where injuries were sustained mutually, thus attracting individual criminal responsibility rather than common intention. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the deceased and the injuries sustained by the accused themselves established that the occurrence was a sudden fight rather than a premeditated assault. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions under sections 302/34 and 307/34, altering them to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under sections 304 Part I and 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key legal principle laid down is that in a sudden fight where both groups are armed and exchange fire, the question of common intention or common object is excluded, and criminal responsibility becomes strictly individual based on specific acts.
Questions settled- Does a mutual exchange of fire and unexplained injuries on both parties convert a premeditated attack into a sudden fight?
- Can common intention be imputed to accused persons in a case of a sudden fight involving armed groups?
- What is the effect of unexplainable injuries on the prosecution witnesses and accused persons in determining the nature of an affray?
- Mawas Khan vs Subedar Meher Dill1985 PLD Supreme Court 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal examined the interpretation and application of section 29 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act in the context of competing pre-emption suits and the stay of proceedings. The appellant had purchased land through two separate sale transactions, both of which became the subject of pre-emption suits. The trial and appellate courts, as well as the High Court, stayed the proceedings or disallowed defences in accordance with section 29, which mandates that where a claim or plea of pre-emption is derived from ownership of property whose title is liable to be defeated by another pre-emption claim, the court shall not decide the claim or plea until the connected pre-emption suit has been finally decided. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 29 operates as an express departure from section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to prevent litigants from defeating pre-emption laws through split transactions or interdependent acquisitions. The Court established that neither a pre-emptor nor a vendee-defendant can rely upon a right derived from a transaction that remains vulnerable to superior pre-emption claims until that underlying title has become fully indefeasible.
Questions settled- Does section 29 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act prohibit a court from deciding a pre-emption claim or defense when the underlying title is subject to a pending pre-emption suit?
- Whether section 29 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act constitutes an express departure from the general principles of stay of suits under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a vendee-defendant successfully set up a defence based on an acquired status or property transaction that remains liable to be defeated by a right of pre-emption?
- Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan vs Nawabzada Sarfraz Ali And Other1985 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of civil revisions by the Lahore High Court, which upheld concurrent findings declaring an agreement to sell land and a subsequent mutation of sale as illegal and fraudulent. The core legal questions involved whether an agreement to sell units (entitlements) made when no allotment existed was valid, whether a revoked power-of-attorney could support a mutation, and whether the doctrine of feeding the estoppel applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the lower courts' findings that the agreement was void ab initio because it concerned non-saleable entitlements rather than existing property, and violated the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Furthermore, the Court held that the power-of-attorney was invalid due to prior revocation, and the payment of consideration was not established. The Court refused to entertain the plea of feeding the estoppel, noting that it involved questions of fact not raised or framed as issues before the trial courts, and thus could not be invoked at the appellate stage.
Questions settled- Can an agreement to sell land be enforced if the transferor held no subsisting allotment at the time of the agreement?
- Does the doctrine of feeding the estoppel apply if the issue was not raised or framed before the trial courts?
- Is an agreement to sell units of land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme void ab initio if the units are not considered saleable property?
- Can a mutation of sale be sustained if the power-of-attorney used to execute it was previously revoked?
- Maulana Kausar Niazi And Another vs Mahmood Azam Farooqi And 6 Other1985 SCMR 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three contempt of court applications filed against various public officials and media representatives, alleging that the publication of certain material was intended to influence the course of justice in a pending case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the respondents, by broadcasting or telecasting specific content, committed contempt of court, and whether their subsequent apologies were sufficient to purge the contempt. The Court noted that the respondents had initially submitted a conditional apology but subsequently withdrew all defenses and tendered an unqualified and unconditional apology, both in writing and orally before the Court. Expressing satisfaction with the respondents' genuine contrition, the Court accepted the apologies and discharged the contempt notices. However, the Court emphasized the growing, concerning tendency to influence judicial proceedings through public utterances or powerful media instruments. It laid down the principle that public functionaries and all concerned must refrain from any actions that might hinder the smooth administration of justice, stressing that courts must be allowed to perform their functions freely to ensure the rule of law.
Questions settled- Can an unconditional and unqualified apology purge contempt of court proceedings?
- Does the publication of material intended to influence pending judicial proceedings constitute contempt of court?
- What is the duty of public functionaries regarding the administration of justice and judicial proceedings?
- Maulana Abdul Wahid And Others vs Haji Rasool Bakhsh1985 SCMR 2002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute over the alleged sale of land, where the respondent filed a pre-emption suit under the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 (referred to as Ordinance I of 1968 in the judgment). The core legal question was whether a pre-emption suit is maintainable and requires a reference to a Tribunal when the alleged sale is categorically denied by both the purported vendor and vendee, and no documentary evidence of the sale exists. The Supreme Court held that the existence of a sale is the fundamental prerequisite for a cause of action in pre-emption matters. Since the parties unequivocally denied that any sale occurred and no evidence supported the respondent's claim, no "civil dispute" existed to warrant a reference to a Tribunal. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order, restoring the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. The key principle laid down is that in pre-emption cases, the fact of sale must be established as a condition precedent to the existence of a justiciable dispute; absent such proof, the suit lacks a cause of action.
Questions settled- Does a pre-emption suit maintainable when the alleged sale is denied by both the vendor and the vendee?
- Is a reference to a Tribunal under Ordinance I of 1968 required when no evidence of a sale exists?
- What is the fundamental prerequisite for a cause of action in a pre-emption suit?
- Mati Ur Rehman And Another vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from criminal petitions filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioner for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, while reducing the sentence of death to life imprisonment due to an unestablished motive. The core legal question involved the re-appreciation of ocular testimony, identification of the accused, and the propriety of the lesser sentence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the eyewitness testimony was reliable, the identity of the accused was established beyond doubt, and the High Court rightly reduced the sentence to life imprisonment given the shrouded motive. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact based on satisfactory appreciation of broad-daylight ocular evidence will not be interfered with, and that an unestablished motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance justifying the substitution of the death penalty with life imprisonment.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence already satisfactorily evaluated by the courts below?
- Is an unestablished motive a valid mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to life imprisonment?
- Whether concurrent findings regarding the identity of the culprit in a broad-daylight occurrence are open to interference?
- Mat. Khurshid Bibi vs Allah Ditta1985 SCMR 1097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing an appeal against an order of the Additional District Judge, which had reversed the trial court's dismissal of a pre-emption suit and remanded the matter. The core legal question concerns whether the plaintiff in a pre-emption suit regarding urban immovable property must prove the existence of the custom of pre-emption in the specific locality or sub-division at the time of the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1930, and whether any presumption exists in favour of such custom. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the lack of evidence of the existence of the sub-division and the custom at the relevant time, supported by prior case law, require detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and continued the interim stay until the final disposal of the appeal, establishing that the existence of the custom of pre-emption must be proved as a matter of fact in each case without any presumption.
Questions settled- Whether the right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable property requires proof of the custom of pre-emption at the time of the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1930?
- Is there any legal presumption in favour of or against the existence of the right of pre-emption in a given locality?
- Whether proof of the custom of pre-emption in a sub-division of a town must be established by evidence in each case?
- Masti Khan And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition arose from the conviction of petitioners Masti Khan and Mumtaz under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mumtaz deceased. The trial court had convicted the petitioners while acquitting two co-accused, and the High Court subsequently dismissed their appeal. The prosecution's case rested on ocular testimony, recovery of weapons (including a gun matching an empty cartridge from the spot and a human blood-stained hatchet), motive stemming from a pre-emption suit, and medical evidence. The petitioners challenged their convictions on the grounds that the First Information Report (FIR) was recorded at a bus stand rather than the police station, which they argued was a suspicious circumstance, and that the eye-witness testimony and recoveries were unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the recording of the FIR at the bus stand was not a material circumstance in this case and repelled the contention. Finding the convictions to be justified based on the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.
Questions settled- Does the recording of a First Information Report at a bus stand instead of the police station automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if some co-accused are acquitted on the benefit of doubt?
- Masood Ahmad Alias Maqsood Ahmad vs The State1985 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from the refusal of bail to the petitioner, who faces charges under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for demanding illegal gratification. The prosecution alleges the petitioner, an employee of the Lahore Development Authority, demanded a bribe to extend a construction deadline, leading to a trap operation where he was apprehended with marked currency. Following his initial arrest, the petitioner allegedly resisted and escaped with the assistance of others, resulting in additional charges under Sections 224, 225, 186, 332, 353, and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought bail after the High Court previously directed the trial court to conclude proceedings within three months, granting liberty to reapply if the deadline was missed. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances and the High Court's prior order. Finding that the lower courts exercised their discretion legally and properly, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no sufficient grounds existed to interfere with the refusal of bail.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion of lower courts in bail matters when the discretion has been exercised legally and properly?
- Can a petitioner be granted bail when they have allegedly resisted arrest and escaped custody during a trap operation?
- Masihuddin Through Legal Heirs vs A.M. Marghoob And Other1985 SCMR 2078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a protracted dispute over the tenancy and eviction proceedings regarding a shop in Liaquatabad, Karachi. The original landlord, Masihuddin, initiated eviction proceedings against a tenant identified in the rent agreement as A.M. Marghoob. Subsequently, A.M. Siddiqui, the father of the named tenant, claimed the tenant was a minor and that he himself was the actual allottee of the property, leading to conflicting litigation, including an ex parte decree for rent and multiple rounds of ejectment proceedings. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the tenant, having had his initial objections overruled in earlier proceedings, could re-agitate similar pleas during the execution stage of the eviction order. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the interests of justice necessitated a comprehensive re-examination of both factual and legal contentions. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the lower appellate court, remanding the matter to the Rent Controller to hear and decide the objections to the execution application afresh in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Can a party raise objections in execution proceedings that were already overruled in earlier stages of the litigation?
- Is it permissible for a court to remand a matter to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision when both parties consent to re-litigating factual and legal pleas in the interest of justice?
- Maqbool Ahmad vs Muhammad Akram And Another1985 SCMR 1528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged an order by a learned single Judge of the Sind High Court, which granted post-arrest bail to the respondent, Muhammad Akram, in a case involving a murderous assault under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The respondent had initially been granted bail by an Additional Sessions Judge, but that bail was subsequently cancelled due to allegations that the injuries were inflicted on a vital part of the body and that the accused had threatened witnesses. The High Court, upon revision, set aside the cancellation order, reasoning that the identity of the victim and the intent behind the assault required further inquiry, and finding insufficient evidence regarding the alleged threats to witnesses. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the High Court's interference with the cancellation order was justified. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had not violated any principles governing the grant of bail, finding no valid justification to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Is the High Court justified in setting aside an order of an Additional Sessions Judge cancelling bail when the evidence regarding the accused's intent and alleged threats to witnesses is inconclusive?
- Does the alleged infliction of injuries on a vital part of the body automatically preclude the grant of bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with a High Court's order granting bail?
- Manzoor And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 2082 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which rejected the petitioners' request for post-arrest bail in a case involving offenses under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to bail on the rule of consistency when co-accused have been released on bail, notwithstanding specific incriminating roles attributed to the petitioners in the first information report. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of bail by the High Court was unassailable because specific parts and active participation in murders and murderous assault were assigned to the petitioners in the FIR, distinguishing them from co-accused found innocent by the police. The petition was dismissed with the observation that the petitioners may renew their bail application before the trial court after material evidence has been recorded.
Questions settled- Whether bail can be refused to accused persons to whom specific parts and active participation are assigned in the first information report?
- Does the release of co-accused found innocent by the police automatically entitle other co-accused to bail?
- Can an accused renew a bail request before the trial court after material evidence is recorded?
- Manzoor Ahmad vs XXIV Civil Judge, Karachi And Other1985 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an ex parte maintenance decree passed by a Civil Judge in Karachi. The petitioner, a husband, argued that the Karachi court lacked territorial jurisdiction as the parties resided in Mandi Bahauddin, where related matrimonial litigation was pending. The core legal question was whether the Lahore High Court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction over a decree passed by a court outside its territorial limits, and whether such a petition was maintainable given the existence of alternative remedies. The Supreme Court held that the petition was correctly dismissed by the High Court. The ratio rests on the principle that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and generally not available where an adequate alternative remedy, such as an appeal before the District Judge, exists. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had already raised objections in the executing court, rendering the constitutional petition premature. Additionally, the Court emphasized the husband's legal obligation to maintain his wife and children, finding the maintenance amount reasonable.
Questions settled- Can a High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction over a judgment passed by a court located outside its territorial jurisdiction?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy, such as an appeal, is available to the petitioner?
- Does the existence of pending objections in an executing court render a constitutional petition challenging the underlying decree premature?
- Manzoor Ahmad vs Ejaz Ahmad Bhatti And Other1985 SCMR 1797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a consolidated judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal disposing of four service appeals. The core legal question involved the validity of the transfer and subsequent regularization, pro forma promotion, and seniority of the contesting respondents from the ministerial establishment to the subordinate executive establishment of the Food Department following the enforcement of the 1962 recruitment rules. The Supreme Court held that prior to the 1962 rules, there was no separation of cadres or prohibition of transfers, and since the respondents had not been formally allocated to specific regional cadres upon encadrization, the Government acted within its plenary powers in permitting their transfers, granting relaxations, and conferring pro forma promotions and seniority. The Court further held that long-standing seniority enjoyed under legal orders could not be arbitrarily undone, and the case involved no question of law of public importance. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether the Government has the power to permit transfers and grant pro forma promotions and seniority where employees were not formally allocated to specific regional cadres upon the encadrization of service rules?
- Can long-standing seniority enjoyed by civil servants under legal orders passed by competent authorities be arbitrarily undone after several years?
- Does a service tribunal remand order that directs a fresh decision constitute a final determinative finding on the merits of seniority?
- Manzoor Ahmad Khan vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation1985 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging the Lahore High Court's judgment which declared the transfer of a house to the petitioner, a non-refugee, as without lawful authority and void, because the property was in possession of a Jammu and Kashmir refugee. The core legal question was whether the deletion of subsection (5) of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 impliedly repealed paragraph 19 of Settlement Scheme No. IV, thereby removing the bar on transferring such properties to non-refugees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the deletion of subsection (5) did not detract from section 16B and the settlement schemes framed under it, and houses in possession of Jammu and Kashmir refugees remained excluded from the compensation pool. The key principle laid down is that properties in possession of Jammu and Kashmir refugees are protected from transfer to persons who are not refugees from the occupied territory, notwithstanding the deletion of section 30(5) of the Act.
Questions settled- Does the deletion of subsection (5) of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 repeal paragraph 19 of Settlement Scheme No. IV by implication?
- Are houses and shops in possession of Jammu and Kashmir refugees available for transfer to persons who are not refugees from the occupied territory?
- Does a petitioner lacking locus standi have the right to challenge weaknesses in the opposing party's case?
- Manoo Gul And Others vs Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 1829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their writ petition arising from the seizure of a truck and smuggled goods by the Custom Intelligence and Investigation Staff. The core legal question for determination was the interpretation of the phrase 'notice given' under section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969—specifically, whether 'giving notice' requires the actual service of the show-cause notice upon the person concerned or merely the issuance of the notice within the stipulated period. The Supreme Court noted that this was a case of first impression requiring an authoritative pronouncement and granted leave to appeal to consider whether 'give notice' means issuing the notice or effecting service on the accused. The key principle revolves around statutory interpretation of notice requirements in seizure and confiscation proceedings under customs law.
Questions settled- Do the words 'notice given' under section 168(2) of the Customs Act 1969 mean the issuance of a notice or the actual service of the notice upon the accused?
- Whether failure to serve a show-cause notice within two months of seizure mandates the return of seized goods under section 168(2) of the Customs Act 1969?
- Malik Wahid Bakhsh vs Mst. Fazal Bibi And Other1985 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent, Mst. Fazal Bibi, against the petitioner. The petitioner, having previously executed a rent note in favor of the respondent, subsequently challenged the landlord-tenant relationship, contending the property was evacuee trust property and thus outside the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. The Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the Lahore High Court all rejected this plea. The core legal question was whether a tenant who executed a rent note is estopped from denying the landlord's title upon discovering the property might be evacuee trust property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's conduct—specifically his unilateral decision to pay rent to the Evacuee Trust Property Administration without informing the respondent—precluded him from challenging the landlord's status. The Court emphasized that the nature of the property was a matter between the Administration and the landlord, and noted that the Evacuee Trust Property Board possessed the authority to validate transfers under the relevant statute. The petition was dismissed as the lower courts' findings were upheld.
Questions settled- Can a tenant who has executed a rent note subsequently deny the landlord's title on the basis that the property is evacuee trust property?
- Does the payment of rent to the Evacuee Trust Property Administration by a tenant behind the back of the landlord invalidate the existing landlord-tenant relationship?
- Does the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board have the authority to validate the transfer of property under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
- Malik Nur Hayat Noon And Others vs Additional Chief Land1985 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, involving common questions of law regarding land commission proceedings. The petitioners sought leave to appeal against orders passed by the Additional Chief Land Commissioner. Upon review, the Court noted that leave to appeal had already been granted by the Supreme Court in earlier, related petitions, specifically C.P.S.L.A. No.240-R of 1976 and C.P.S.L.A. No.241-R of 1976, which involved identical legal issues. Counsel for the petitioners informed the Court that those earlier appeals had already been heard and the judgment was currently reserved. Following this, the Supreme Court held that in the interest of consistency and judicial economy, leave to appeal should also be granted in the present cases. The Court directed that the petitions be prepared on the existing record, granted liberty to the parties to file additional documents, and ordered the appeals to be scheduled for hearing immediately following the announcement of the judgment in the previously mentioned connected appeals.
Questions settled- Should leave to appeal be granted when identical legal questions are pending adjudication in other connected matters?
- Can the Supreme Court consolidate or align the hearing of new petitions with previously heard appeals involving common questions of law?
- Malik Noor Muhammad And Others vs Ata Muhammad And Another1985 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The respondents filed a pre-emption suit for possession of land, and the trial court ordered them to deposit Zar-e-Punjam by 23-7-1963. The respondents deposited the amount on the due date itself rather than before it, leading the trial court to reject the plaint under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act for non-compliance. On appeal, the Lahore High Court accepted the appeal on the grounds that the deposit constituted valid tender or that an extension of one day ought to have been granted, and remanded the case for a fresh decision. The petitioners challenged this decision before the Supreme Court through a petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court considered the contentions that the High Court erred in holding the deposit as sufficient compliance and in substituting its discretion for that of the trial court after a considerable lapse of time, and consequently granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether depositing Zar-e-Punjam on the last date specified amounts to sufficient compliance with a court order directing deposit before that date?
- Can the High Court substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court in extending time for depositing pre-emption money?
- Whether a delay of fourteen years in challenging the trial court's exercise of discretion affects the High Court's justification to interfere?
- Malik Muhammad Iqbal And Others vs Malik Roshan Din And Other1985 SCMR 1383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had restored a trial court's decree in a civil suit concerning a claim for a one-third share in agricultural land. The plaintiffs alleged that previous property alienations were sham transactions and that an understanding existed to distribute the property equally among brothers, effectively challenging transactions dating back to 1938. The trial court had granted the decree, conditional upon the payment of court fees for an additional share inherited during the proceedings. The first appellate court dismissed the suit, but the High Court restored the trial court's decree. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the lower courts erred by failing to record oral evidence and by improperly admitting and misreading a statement (Exh. P.7) made by a deceased party in separate proceedings. The Supreme Court found that these contentions regarding the admissibility of evidence and the legal implications of the Colonization of Government Lands Act required closer scrutiny and an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted, and a status quo order was issued.
Questions settled- Does the failure to record oral evidence in a civil suit regarding property alienations constitute a legal error warranting appellate intervention?
- Can a statement made by a party in separate proceedings be admitted as evidence without disposing of objections regarding its admissibility?
- What is the effect of Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 on the acquisition of proprietary rights and subsequent property claims?
- Malik Ghulam Rasool vs Government of Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 1107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal challenging orders reverting him from the post of Labour Officer to his substantive post of Stenographer. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioner's promotions as Assistant Labour Officer and Labour Officer were made against quota reserved for promotion or initial recruitment, and whether his ad hoc appointment stood regularized and protected under Martial Law instructions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's appointments were in excess of the quota reserved for promotees and that regularisation of an ad hoc appointment does not grant a higher status than that of an ad hoc appointment liable to reversion upon the availability of direct recruits. The court concluded that no question of law of general public importance arose, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether an ad hoc appointment after regularisation under Martial Law instructions acquires a higher legal characteristic than an ad hoc appointment?
- Does promotion made in excess of the quota reserved for promotees entail liability of reversion upon the availability of direct recruits?
- Mahmood Bakhsh And Others vs Allah Bakhsh1985 SCMR 1705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing their Regular Second Appeal, which had upheld the reversal of the trial court's decree by the District Judge. The core legal question concerned whether the vendor, Shamsuddin, was insane at the time of executing the land sale in June 1962. The Supreme Court held that both the first appellate court and the High Court were fully justified in concluding that no sufficient proof of insanity at the relevant time was brought on record, noting that the medical evidence only indicated senile dementia in 1963, a year after the transaction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding mental capacity at the time of a transaction will not be interfered with unless unsupported by evidence.
Questions settled- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the sanity of a vendor at the time of a sale transaction can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
- Does medical evidence of senile dementia in 1963 suffice to prove insanity during a land sale executed in June 1962?