Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mabood Khan vs Agricultural Development Bank1985 SCMR 1896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-14
  leave to appealstatutory interpretationcorporation employeesspecial powers ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal involving the interpretation of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The core legal question concerns the proper construction and application of the provisions of the said Ordinance regarding corporation employees. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the statutory interpretation of the enactment, ordered security in the sum of one thousand rupees, directed the appeal to be prepared on the existing record with liberty for parties to file additional documents, and instructed the office to fix all connected appeals involving the same legal point for hearing together. The principle laid down relates to the necessity of authoritative judicial interpretation of special powers ordinances affecting corporation employees.

  Questions settled

  • How are the provisions of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 to be interpreted?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted in matters involving the interpretation of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978?
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• Ma Hmood vs Muhammad Siddique (Deceased) And Other1985 SCMR 1209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19
  leave to appealcourt fee deficiencycondonation of delaycompromise decreeprocedural lawdismissal of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a trial court's decision concerning the payment of court fees and the effect of a compromise on a suit. The core legal questions presented for examination are two-fold: first, whether the trial court's failure to explicitly indicate a deficiency in court fees entitles a plaintiff to condonation of delay in payment, particularly in light of established precedents such as Shahna Khan v. Aulia Khan and others, Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, and Gulzar Husain v. Abdur Rehman; and second, whether a trial court is justified in dismissing an entire suit despite a compromise having been reached between the plaintiff and a vendee. The Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these issues, directing that the appeal be heard on the existing record while permitting the parties to submit additional documentation as necessary. The order establishes the scope of the appellate review regarding procedural compliance in court fee matters and the impact of partial compromises on litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to indicate a deficiency in court-fee entitle a plaintiff to condonation of delay in payment?
  • Can an entire suit be dismissed notwithstanding a compromise entered into between the plaintiff and a vendee?
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• M. Usman Shah And Another vs Nizamuddin1985 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-06
  leave to appealcancellation of sale deedlimitation periodconsequential reliefsettlement authoritiesrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the transfer of property by settlement authorities and the subsequent cancellation of a sale-deed. The second petitioner was transferred a house on an L.H. Form, while the adjoining factory premises were auctioned to the respondent. A dispute arose regarding overlapping boundaries, leading to administrative findings that the house transfer did not include the factory portion. Meanwhile, the second petitioner transferred the house to his son, the first petitioner, via a registered sale-deed. The respondent filed a suit for the cancellation of the sale-deed and recovery of rent, which was ultimately decreed by the appellate court and upheld in revision by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the limitation period for challenging a fraudulent transaction and whether the suit was barred for omitting a consequential relief of possession. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the contentions, noting that the plea of limitation was not raised in the written statement and that possession relief was inapplicable since tenants occupied the property. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of limitation can be raised for the first time at the revisional stage when it was not pleaded in the written statement nor tried by the courts below?
  • Whether a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed is barred for want of a prayer for consequential relief of possession when the disputed property is in actual physical possession of tenants?
  • What is the starting point of limitation for a suit based on a fraudulent transaction when the date of knowledge is explicitly pleaded and undisputed in pleadings?
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• M. Afaq Mali K vs Mst. Iqbal Begum Alias Ballan1985 SCMR 1739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-02
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of suitcivil revisionleave to appealprocedural discretionnon-appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision petition. The petitioner had filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that a registered deed of gift in favor of his wife was illegal and void. During the trial, after two witnesses were examined, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear on the adjourned date, leading the trial court to dismiss the suit in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner's subsequent application for restoration was dismissed due to a lack of sufficient grounds, a decision upheld on appeal and revision. The petitioner argued that the court should have decided the case on merits rather than dismissing it in default. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal was legally sound and a proper exercise of discretion. The Court distinguished the cited precedents, noting they applied to the closure of evidence rather than non-appearance, and consequently refused the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court justified in dismissing a suit in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the plaintiff fails to appear on an adjourned date?
  • Does the failure to produce evidence on a scheduled date mandate a decision on merits rather than a dismissal in default?
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• Lt. Col. Mumtaz Raza Khan vs Additional Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-04
  special leave to appealland allotmentallotment cancellationconstitutional petitionexcess landtime-barred appealfactual contentionprior allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an Additional Settlement Commissioner's order. The original dispute involved the cancellation of agricultural land allotted to the petitioner, with respondents claiming prior valid allotments. The core legal questions revolved around the existence and validity of the Deputy Commissioner's 1962 cancellation order, the petitioner's entitlement to the land given other allotments, and the time-barring of the petitioner's appeal to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit. It held that factual contentions not raised before the High Court could not be inquired into at the special leave to appeal stage. The Court affirmed the findings that the petitioner's Khatooni was unsigned by a competent authority, he had obtained excess allotments, and the respondents' allotments were of a prior date, thus justifying the cancellation of the petitioner's allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a factual contention not raised before the High Court be inquired into by the Supreme Court at the stage of a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Can an agricultural land allotment be cancelled if the Khatooni is found to be unsigned by a competent authority?
  • Is an allotment of agricultural land justified if the allottee has already received excess land in other districts?
  • Does a prior, uncontroverted allotment to one party invalidate a subsequent allotment of the same land to another party?
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• Liaqat Shah And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 1415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-10
  murderdeath sentence commutationocular testimonyinjured witnessescorroborationgrave and sudden provocationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for the murders of four persons and murderous assaults on two others in a family dispute. The core legal question involved whether the oral testimony of related and injured eye-witnesses could be relied upon without independent corroboration regarding all accused despite the acquittal of a co-accused. The court held that the ocular testimony of natural and injured witnesses, corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of weapons, was truthful and reliable, and did not require independent corroboration. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where eye-witnesses are natural, present at the scene, and injured, and their testimony is consistent with the medical evidence and the number of injuries, their statements can safely form the basis of a conviction without needing independent corroboration. However, considering the young age of some appellants and the mitigating circumstances of grave and sudden provocation stemming from family honor and the influence of elder brothers, the death sentences of three younger appellants were commuted to imprisonment for life, while the convictions and death sentences of the two elder brothers were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and injured eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the acquittal of one co-accused necessarily discredit the entire ocular testimony against the remaining accused?
  • Can young age and the influence of elder brothers operate as mitigating circumstances to warrant the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether minor discrepancies and improvements in the statements of eye-witnesses are sufficient to discard their otherwise reliable testimony?
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• Liaqat Hayat And 5 Others vs Muhammad Sarwar Alias Feroz Ali And 21985 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-03
  power of attorneypresentation of appealcivil procedurelimitation periodirregularityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the non-compliance with the provisions of Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in filing a first appeal. The core legal question was whether the defect in the power-of-attorney and the presentation of the appeal by an advocate without proper execution within the limitation period constituted an incurable illegality or an excusable irregularity. The Supreme Court held that where the appeal was filed under instructions from the appellant and the defect lay merely in improperly completing the power-of-attorney, such a defect is an irregularity that can be condoned, attracting established legal principles. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-compliance with Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in filing an appeal is an incurable illegality or an excusable irregularity?
  • Can an appeal filed under instructions where the power-of-attorney lacks proper execution be treated as a validly presented appeal?
  • Whether an appellate court should allow an appellant to rectify a defective presentation or power-of-attorney before dismissing an appeal on limitation grounds?
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• Lehrasab Khan vs Mst. Aqil UN Nisa1985 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-16
  Regular Second AppealCivil RevisionJudicial DiscretionJurisdictional ValueIncompetent AppealConversion of Proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal on the grounds of incompetence. The petitioner had filed the appeal in a suit where the jurisdictional value was Rs. 200, a category for which second appeals had been abolished. The petitioner subsequently requested the High Court to convert the incompetent second appeal into a civil revision, a request the High Court declined to grant in the exercise of its judicial discretion. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was bound to allow such a conversion or if it remained a matter of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court possesses the power to allow the conversion of a second appeal into a civil revision, the decision to grant or refuse such a prayer rests entirely within the High Court's judicial discretion. Finding no grounds to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to convert a Regular Second Appeal into a civil revision?
  • Is the High Court bound to grant a request to convert an incompetent second appeal into a civil revision?
  • Does the refusal of the High Court to exercise its discretion to convert an appeal into a revision warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Laqa Ali vs Summary Military Court No.17, Lahore1985 SCMR 1079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-16
  writ jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefSummary Military Courtlachesconviction challengeextraordinary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had refused to interfere with the petitioner's conviction by a Summary Military Court. The petitioner, convicted under Martial Law Regulations 5, 10, 13, and 33, had served his full sentence of one month's rigorous imprisonment before filing the writ petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court was bound to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to determine the validity of a conviction when the petitioner had already served the sentence and delayed filing the challenge. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the writ petition, holding that the High Court's refusal to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction was unexceptionable given the petitioner's conduct. The Court established that while writ jurisdiction is available, it is discretionary, and a petitioner's failure to challenge a conviction during the pendency of a sentence, combined with an unexplained delay in filing, are relevant factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to grant relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to challenge a conviction after the sentence has already been served?
  • Is the conduct of a petitioner, including delay in filing a petition, a relevant factor for the High Court in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the High Court have an obligation to grant a declaration under Article 199 of the Constitution when an effective alternative remedy was available to the petitioner?
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• Lal Khan vs The Deputy Commissioner_Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land allotmentprior allotmentcancellation of allotmentnatural justiceconstitutional petitionpresumption of official acts
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals arising from concurrent decisions of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the appellants' constitutional petitions against the cancellation of their land allotments. The core legal question was whether the appellants had been issued notice and granted a hearing by the Settlement Commissioner before their subsequent land allotments were cancelled in favour of a prior allottee. The Supreme Court held that since the original record did not substantiate the claim of lack of notice and the prior allotment in favour of the contesting respondent remained undisputed and validly in the field, the subsequent allotments were rightly treated as nullities that created no vested rights. The Court laid down the principle that a subsequent land allotment made without the cancellation of a prior valid allotment is a nullity, and factual assertions regarding lack of notice in official proceedings must be substantiated by the record to rebut the presumption of regular performance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent land allotment can be sustained when a prior allotment in favor of another person holds the field?
  • Does a subsequent allottee acquire a vested right from an allotment that is made while a prior allotment remains uncanceled?
  • How is the presumption of proper performance of official acts under section 114 of the Evidence Act rebutted in proceedings challenging service of notice?
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• Lal Din Masih vs Mst. Sakina Jan And Another1985 SCMR 1972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-02
  ejectmentwrit jurisdictionfinding of factdefault in payment of rentpersonal needlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment proceeding initiated under the Rent Restriction Law on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal need. The Rent Controller ordered the tenant's ejectment, but the appellate authority reversed this decision and dismissed the landlord's petition. On a writ petition, the High Court interfered with the appellate order and restored the ejectment. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could not interfere with findings of fact recorded by an appellate forum. The Supreme Court held that while findings of fact are generally protected, interference is justified under writ jurisdiction if the appellate forum flouted statutory provisions or failed to follow the law laid down by superior courts. Finding that the appellate authority's conclusions on default and personal need were contrary to established legal principles and the evidence on record, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's interference and dismissed the petition, granting the tenant two months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its writ jurisdiction interfere with a finding of fact recorded by an appellate forum in rent matters?
  • Under what circumstances is the High Court justified in overturning an appellate rent authority's decision under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to issue rent receipts excuse a tenant from the obligation to tender rent?
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• Kifayatullah Alias Kifayat Khan vs The State1985 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-11
  post-arrest bailSpecial CourtjurisdictionSuppression of Terrorist Activities ActDistrict Dirnew grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for bail before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a criminal matter where the petitioner sought bail on the ground that the alleged offence fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, which had not yet been constituted in District Dir. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should entertain a ground for bail regarding the non-constitution of a Special Court when that specific ground was not pressed before or examined by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that because this ground was not raised before the High Court, the High Court could not ascertain the status of the Special Court's constitution or address the plea satisfactorily. The Court laid down the principle that new grounds concerning the non-existence of a trial forum must first be raised before the High Court, granting the petitioner liberty to move the High Court to consider this specific point.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new ground regarding the non-constitution of a Special Court for the first time before the Supreme Court in a bail application?
  • What is the proper forum to first ascertain and address the factual non-existence or non-constitution of a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act?
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• Khushal Khan vs Manager, Military Dairy Farm, Malir Cantt Karachi1985 SCMR 1895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-04
  service tribunalunauthorized absencedismissal from servicetransfer orderleave to appealdaily wager
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service. The petitioner, a daily wage worker at the Military Dairy Farm, Malir, was transferred to Ruk, Sukkur, but failed to assume duty, remaining absent despite multiple notices and a published show-cause warning. The core legal question concerned the legality of the petitioner's dismissal from service on grounds of unauthorized absence and whether he was denied a proper opportunity of being heard. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's unauthorized absence from his new station of posting remained unexplained, as his medical certificates covered only a later period, rendering his absence unjustified. The Court affirmed the dismissal and refused leave to appeal, establishing that failure to report to a transferred duty station coupled with prolonged unauthorized absence justifies disciplinary action and dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's failure to report to a transferred duty station justifies dismissal from service after due notice?
  • Can an employee claim denial of a hearing when multiple notices and a show-cause warning are issued for unauthorized absence?
  • Whether medical certificates covering a later period can justify prior unexplained absence from duty?
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• Khurshid Alam vs Settlement Commissioner, Lyallpur And 2 Other1985 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07
  settlement lawproperty transferdisplaced personsadministrative discretionproperty divisionclaimant rightsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a settlement dispute concerning the transfer of a residential property in Lyallpur under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The appellant, a claimant and prior allottee, challenged the Settlement Commissioner's decision to divide the residential portion and transfer separate units to the respondents, arguing that as a claimant, he was entitled to the entire property under the Schedule to the Act. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner acted within his authority in dividing the property into separate units and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with this administrative division. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner provided valid reasons for the division of the property into separate units. Consequently, the Court determined that the provisions of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Act were inapplicable once the property had been validly divided. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that it was justified in declining to interfere with the administrative division of the property, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Commissioner have the authority to divide a residential property into separate units for transfer purposes?
  • Is the High Court competent to interfere with the administrative division of property made by a Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does the entitlement of a claimant under the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 persist after a property has been validly divided into separate units?
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• Khurshid Ahmad And 28 Others vs Nadeem Iqbal And 23 Other1985 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-14
  eviction applicationmisjoinder of partieslandlord and tenantrent proceedingsconstitutional jurisdictiontechnical objectionstitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition against an eviction order. The core legal questions concerned whether a single, composite eviction application filed against multiple tenants was maintainable and whether the tenants could challenge the landlords' title through new factual arguments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the eviction order. The Court held that technical objections regarding the misjoinder of parties are inapplicable to rent proceedings where common questions of law and fact exist and no prejudice is demonstrated to the tenants. Furthermore, the Court established that factual controversies, including challenges to the validity of sale deeds or the transferor's title, must be raised at the trial stage and cannot be introduced for the first time during constitutional jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the Rent Controller's finding regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, based on evidence, was conclusive, and that tenants who fail to pay rent cannot avoid eviction by raising belated, unsubstantiated claims regarding the landlord's title.

  Questions settled

  • Is a single, composite eviction application maintainable against multiple tenants occupying different portions of the same property?
  • Can a party raise new factual arguments regarding the validity of sale deeds or title for the first time during constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are technical objections regarding the misjoinder of parties applicable to proceedings before a Rent Controller?
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• Khuda Dad And Others vs Fazal1985 SCMR 1503(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-27
  second appealconcurrent findings of factgiftdelivery of possessionappellate jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which reversed concurrent findings of fact made by the two lower courts regarding the validity of a gift. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in the exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction, is empowered to reverse concurrent findings of fact, specifically regarding the delivery of possession in a gift transaction, under the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the High Court exceeded its legal authority by interfering with these concurrent factual findings. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals. The principle laid down emphasizes that a High Court in second appeal is generally restricted from disturbing concurrent findings of fact unless there is a substantial error of law or procedure that warrants such interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reverse concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the reversal of a finding regarding the delivery of possession in a gift case by the High Court in second appeal constitute an excess of jurisdiction?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Sultan Muhammad And Another1985 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-10-28
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timetrial court discretionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal from a revisional order of the Judicial Commissioner, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, arising out of a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the trial court's discretion to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money under section 23, subsection (4) is restricted by statutory considerations or the period of limitation, and whether the Judicial Commissioner erred in interfering with the trial court's order in revision. The Supreme Court held that the discretion of the trial court under section 23(4) is absolute, is not restricted by statutory considerations or the period of limitation for the suit, and that the trial court committed no illegality or material irregularity in extending the time and awarding damages. The key principle laid down is that a trial court possesses absolute discretion under section 23(4) to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money without being constrained by the period of limitation for filing the suit, and such discretionary orders should not be interfered with in revision unless vitiated by illegality or material irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the discretion of the trial court to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money is absolute?
  • Can the time for depositing pre-emption money be extended beyond the period of limitation for the suit?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere in revision with a trial court's order extending the time for deposit?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Abdul Haque And Another1985 SCMR 1378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-02
  writ petitionrent matterejectmentdefault in rentbona fide personal needconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a rent dispute spanning multiple rounds of litigation, wherein the respondent-landlord sought the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from a commercial shop on the grounds of non-payment of rent and bona fide personal need. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction application, but the appellate authority reversed this finding, established the default in rent and personal need, and ordered ejectment. The tenant's Second Appeal from Order abated by operation of law, subsequent to which his constitutional writ petition before the High Court was dismissed. Upon further petition, the Supreme Court evaluated the matter and observed that the writ petition essentially agitated factual controversies which were not competent for writ jurisdiction. The Court held that factual findings concurrently arrived at by the appellate authority do not warrant interference under constitutional jurisdiction unless shown to be illegal or suffering from jurisdictional defects. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition is competent against concurrent factual findings in a rent matter?
  • Does default in payment of rent justify the ejectment of a tenant?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the dismissal of a writ petition relating to pure questions of fact?
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• Khawaja Jalal Din And Others vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 1359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-27
  abatementconstitutional petitionlimitation periodlegal representativescivil proceedingsretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Lahore High Court holding that a constitutional writ petition had abated totally due to the failure to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased writ petitioner and deceased respondents within the limitation period prescribed by Article 177 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The core legal questions were whether Article 177 or the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act applied to constitutional petitions of a civil nature, whether Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to such writ petitions, and whether amendments introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 had retrospective effect on pending abatements. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that writ proceedings of a civil nature attract the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and that Article 177 of the Limitation Act governs applications for the substitution of legal representatives in such matters. The Court laid down that the amendments to Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 are not retrospective and do not cure abatements that occurred prior to their enforcement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 177 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to an application for bringing on record legal representatives of a deceased party in a constitutional writ petition?
  • Do the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to constitutional petitions of a civil nature?
  • Are the amendments made by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 to Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 retrospective in nature?
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• Khan Muhammad Qureshi vs The Secretary to the Government of Pakistan and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-24
  service lawreversionstatutory interpretationCorporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinancepublic serviceappointment vs promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legality of an order reverting the appellant, an Estate Manager, from Grade-19 to Grade-18 under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The appellant was appointed to the post during the period specified in the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether Section 3 of the Ordinance, which authorizes the removal or reversion of employees appointed or promoted between 1972 and 1977, permits the reversion of an employee who was appointed to a post but not promoted to it. The Supreme Court held that the statutory power to revert is exclusively applicable to employees who were promoted during the relevant period, as the term 'his lower post or grade' presupposes a prior held position. Conversely, the power to remove from service applies to those appointed during that period. Since the appellant was appointed and not promoted, the authority lacked the power to revert him to a lower grade he had never held. Consequently, the Court set aside the reversion order, establishing that the power to revert under the Ordinance is strictly limited to cases of promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 authorize the reversion of an employee who was appointed but not promoted during the relevant period?
  • Can an employee be reverted to a lower post or grade that they never previously held under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978?
  • Is the power to remove from service and the power to revert to a lower post under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 applicable to different categories of employees?
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• Khan Badshah And Another vs Noorul Haq Through Legal Heirs And Other1985 SCMR 1434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-15
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionlimitation periodpendente litestatutory interpretationvendeeretrospective application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals involving the right of pre-emption under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption suit could be defeated by the vendee transferring the suit property to a third party with an equal or superior pre-emptive right after the expiry of the limitation period for filing a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that the 'Explanation' added to Section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, by the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1972, explicitly provides that a pre-emptor-plaintiff shall not be deemed to have lost a subsisting right of pre-emption if the vendee-defendant transfers the property after the period of limitation. The Court affirmed that this provision applies retrospectively to pending suits and appeals. Consequently, the Court ruled that transfers made after the limitation period cannot defeat the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption, thereby setting aside the contrary findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of suit property by a vendee to a third party after the expiry of the limitation period defeat a plaintiff's right of pre-emption?
  • Is the Explanation added to Section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, by the 1972 Amendment Act applicable to pending appeals?
  • Does the term 'appeal' in the Explanation to Section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, include second appeals?
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• Khaliq Ur Rahman vs Ameer Ud Din And Another1985 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-26
  bona fide personal requirementrented premisesevictioncross-objectionslandlord and tenantspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an eviction order against a tenant in residential premises. The landlord sought eviction on grounds of sub-letting, personal requirement, reconstruction, and rent default. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based solely on bona fide personal requirement, rejecting other grounds. On appeal, the High Court upheld the personal requirement finding and reversed the Rent Controller's decision regarding reconstruction, ordering eviction on both grounds. The tenant challenged this, arguing that the landlord's cross-objections in the High Court were incompetent under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court declined to address the maintainability of the cross-objections because the eviction order was independently sustainable on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. Regarding the personal requirement, the Court rejected the tenant's argument that a landlord living in rented accommodation must prove the insufficiency of that accommodation to seek possession of their own property. Relying on precedent, the Court affirmed that the statutory requirement for a landlord to not occupy another suitable residential building does not extend to rented premises. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory requirement that a landlord must not occupy another suitable residential building extend to rented premises?
  • Can an eviction order be sustained on the ground of bona fide personal requirement even if other grounds for eviction are contested?
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• Khalilur Rehman vs Syed Farzand Rizvi1985 PLD Supreme Court 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-23
  rent ejectmentbona fide personal needvacating premisesstatutory disqualificationlandlord and tenantrent receiptsurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a rent ejectment matter where the appellant-landlord sought the eviction of the respondent from non-residential premises on grounds of default and bona fide personal need. The core legal question was whether the landlord incurred a disqualification under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, specifically whether he had 'vacated' a similar building without sufficient cause, thereby barring him from seeking the tenant's eviction for personal use. The High Court had previously ruled against the landlord, interpreting the change in names on rent receipts for a different portion of the building as evidence of 'vacating' premises. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the mere change of names on rent receipts for a family-owned company did not constitute 'vacating' the premises. The Court clarified that the statutory disqualification applies only where a landlord, previously in possession of a building suitable for their business, vacates it without sufficient cause. As the landlord had not vacated any such premises, the disqualification did not apply, and the eviction order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does a change in the name of the payee on rent receipts for a commercial property constitute 'vacating' the premises under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • What is the scope of the disqualification under Section 13(3)(ii)(c) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 regarding a landlord's previous possession of similar premises?
  • Can a landlord be barred from seeking eviction for personal need if they have not personally occupied and subsequently vacated a similar building without sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalilur Rehman Khan, D. S. P. and Others vs Province of Punjab through Home Secretary, Punjab and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-09
  police servicecadre mergerseniority and promotionpast and closed transactionprovincial government powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions examining the applicability of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 regarding the seniority and pro forma promotion of former Police Sergeants following the conversion and merger of their posts with those of Sub-Inspectors. The core legal question concerned whether the omission of Sergeants from the Pay Revision Rules of 1959 implied the abolition of their cadre, and whether subsequent orders by the Inspector-General of Police altering their conditions of service without provincial approval were binding and barred the Provincial Government from granting uniform relief. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government possessed the exclusive statutory authority under the Police Act, 1861 to determine pay and conditions of service, that Pay Revision Rules do not create or abolish posts, and that the Inspector-General's unauthorized orders could not override the Government's executive competence to redress inequalities. The Court established that the passage of time rendering a transaction past and closed does not estop the competent authority from rectifying departmental anomalies and ensuring even-handed treatment among personnel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission of a cadre from Pay Revision Rules operates as an implicit abolition of the posts and cadre?
  • Does an order passed by the Inspector-General of Police without the approval of the Provincial Government possess legal efficacy under Section 12 of the Police Act 1861?
  • Can the Provincial Government rectify past unequal treatment and grant relief to civil servants despite a transaction being otherwise regarded as past and closed?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Saigol vs National Investment Trust Ltd. and 2 Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-27
  condonation of delaylimitation periodex parte decreecounsel negligenceintra-court appealsufficient causesetting aside ex parte decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order of the Sind High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal as time-barred under Article 151 of the Limitation Act 1908. The appellant sought setting aside of an ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was dismissed by a single Judge. The intra-court appeal was filed past the 20-day period of limitation along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 for condonation of delay. The appellant attributed the delay to his former counsel failing to inform him of the dismissal order and allegedly misinforming his new counsel regarding the limitation period. The High Court refused to condone the delay, finding gross negligence and lack of good faith. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that gross negligence or unverified reliance on an estranged advocate does not constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5. Negligence of a counsel or party does not automatically excuse delay, particularly when valuable rights have accrued to the opposite party.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a counsel to inform a client about the dismissal of an application constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a party rely on limitation advice given by an estranged advocate without independent verification to seek condonation of delay?
  • Whether unverified reliance on incorrect legal advice constitutes gross negligence barring the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Saeed vs The State1985 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-26
  misappropriationcriminal breach of trustanti-corruptionleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction for misappropriation of funds. The petitioner, an Octroi Clerk, was tried and convicted alongside a co-accused by the Senior Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Punjab, Lahore, for offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial court found the charges of misappropriation established and sentenced the petitioner to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000. Upon appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the findings of the lower courts. After hearing the arguments presented by counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The Court held that there were no valid grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, thereby maintaining the conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding criminal misappropriation?
  • Is a conviction under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when concurrent findings of guilt are established by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Khair Din vs The State1985 SCMR 1913 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-27
  criminal revisionde novo trialtransfer of caseleave to appealmagistrate section 30
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing his criminal revision, which had challenged the refusal of lower courts to grant a de novo trial following the transfer of his cases between magistrates. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to a de novo trial upon the transfer of criminal cases from one magistrate to another under the relevant procedural law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there was no flaw in the impugned order of the High Court and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, finding no merit for interference. The key principle laid down is that the mere transfer of a criminal case to a different magistrate does not automatically warrant a de novo trial of the proceedings already conducted, unless justifiable grounds under the law are established.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to a de novo trial as a matter of right upon the transfer of a criminal case to a different magistrate?
  • Does the High Court's dismissal of a criminal revision regarding the refusal of a de novo trial warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the transfer of criminal cases necessitates the recording of prosecution evidence afresh from the beginning?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim vs Hasan And Other1985 SCMR 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-03Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs The State1985 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-25
  criminal appealmurderidentification paradeocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtextra-judicial confessionvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Farid. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence in light of significant discrepancies between the medical report and the prosecution's narrative, the evidentiary value of an identification parade conducted eight months post-occurrence, and the credibility of an alleged extra-judicial confession. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the ocular evidence unreliable due to unexplained inconsistencies regarding the weapons used—specifically, the medical evidence indicated axe injuries while the prosecution alleged knife usage—and the failure of witnesses to identify all accused during the parade. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that identification parades conducted after an inordinate delay, involving witnesses with close familial ties to the complainant, lack probative value. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, granting the appellants the benefit of doubt and ordering their immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Does a marked inconsistency between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the weapon used undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Can an identification parade held eight months after the occurrence be considered reliable evidence?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who frequently acts as a prosecution witness reliable for proving an extra-judicial confession?
  • Does the failure of witnesses to identify one of the accused in an identification parade cast doubt on their identification of other co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh vs The State1985 SCMR 1880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-15
  bail pending appealsuspension of sentencerule of consistencymurderattempted murdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Karim Bakhsh against the High Court's order dismissing his application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail pending his appeal against conviction under sections 302, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal on the rule of consistency, given that co-accused attributed with injuries had already been released on bail under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, notwithstanding his additional conviction under section 307 for injuring a prosecution witness. The Supreme Court held that the case was a fit one for the grant of bail. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioner, thereby reinforcing the principle of consistency in the treatment of convicted co-accused regarding the suspension of sentences pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convicted person is entitled to bail pending appeal when co-accused assigned similar or graver roles have been released on bail?
  • Can the suspension of sentence be granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to a convict who has an additional conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Karamat Ali And 5 Others vs Khair Din And 6 Other1985 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-14
  displaced personsland settlementproduce-index-unitsallotment cancellationadministrative errorright of choiceresumption of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to displaced persons. The appellants, whose land claims were reduced following a re-evaluation of produce-index-units, were previously granted a right by a Letters Patent Bench to choose which land to surrender to satisfy their reduced claims. Subsequently, the High Court set aside a Settlement Commissioner's order that allowed the appellants to retain specific land in Chak No. 12/M.R. while cancelling allotments in D.G. Khan, reasoning that no unsatisfied claims existed. The core legal question was whether the High Court could deny the appellants the right of choice previously affirmed by a final judicial order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in denying this right. The Court affirmed that where the resumption of excess land is for rectifying administrative errors rather than penalizing fraud, the allottee must be permitted to exercise a choice regarding the land to be surrendered. The judgment establishes that such rights, once finalized by a competent court, cannot be arbitrarily revoked by subsequent judicial findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allottee have a right to choose which land to surrender when an allotment is reduced due to administrative error?
  • Can a High Court set aside an order granting an allottee a choice of land adjustment after that order has attained finality?
  • Is the resumption of excess land for rectification of administrative error considered a punitive measure?
  Read full judgment →
• Karam Din And Others vs Muhammad Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-24
  pre-emptiongift or saledisguised transactionimprovement of statusconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two pre-emption suits filed by the respondents against the petitioners, challenging two land transactions. The first transaction was a registered sale-deed executed by one Khair Din, and the second was a transaction of land from Khair Din's wife, Mst. Rajo, which was ostensibly executed as a gift. The respondents contended that the gift transaction was actually a sale disguised as a gift to defeat their superior pre-emption rights. The trial court dismissed the suits, finding the transaction to be a gift. However, the District Judge and the High Court reversed this, finding the transaction to be a sale. On petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower appellate courts. The Court held that the determination of whether a transaction is a genuine gift or a sale disguised as a gift is a question of fact. Finding no question of law and no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of fact, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction ostensibly executed as a gift can be scrutinized by courts to determine if it was actually a sale disguised to defeat pre-emption rights?
  • Does a finding on whether a transaction is a gift or a sale constitute a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Can a vendee successfully defeat a pre-emption suit under Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 if the transaction relied upon to improve their status is found to be a disguised sale rather than a genuine gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Kantola And Others vs Nazr Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05
  leave to appealoral salemutationfraudulent contractmisdescription of propertyregular second appealpossession of land
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, unsuccessful defendants, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their regular second appeal. The plaintiff-respondents had filed a suit for possession of disputed land based on an oral sale followed by a mutation. The plaintiffs claimed that their predecessor-in-interest had sold his entire allotted property, but through collusion with revenue authorities, erroneous Khasra numbers were entered in the mutation. The trial court and appellate courts decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, repelling the petitioners' contention that a fraudulent contract was void ab initio and unenforceable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the view taken by the lower courts regarding the enforceability of the oral sale was in conformity with the law, as the evidence showed an oral sale of the entire allotted property and subsequent misdescription could not defeat the claim. Consequently, the Court found no question of law requiring further examination and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an oral sale of property is rendered void ab initio and unenforceable due to a subsequent misdescription of Khasra numbers in the mutation?
  • Can a plaintiff claim possession of property sold under an oral sale when the mutation contains erroneous property numbers resulting from revenue authorities' collusion?
  Read full judgment →
• Kalu vs Muhammad Rashid And Another1985 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  res judicataproperty transferwrit petitionsettlement propertyfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute over the transfer of property No.SW-III-57-S-14, Bheem Street, Krishan Nagar, Lahore. The petitioner had previously challenged the transfer of this property in a 1968 writ petition, which was partly accepted by the Lahore High Court, granting the petitioner one room but rejecting claims for additional accommodation. The petitioner accepted this order at the time. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to claim additional portions of the property, specifically a courtyard, latrine, and kitchen. The Lahore High Court rejected this later petition on the grounds of res judicata. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for access to the room previously granted, implying a need for additional facilities. The Supreme Court held that granting such access would effectively require a review of the 1968 order, which had already finalized the scope of the transfer and denied additional accommodation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the matter was settled and could not be reopened.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a petitioner from claiming additional portions of a property after a prior writ petition regarding the same property has been adjudicated?
  • Can a court grant access to additional facilities in a property when a previous final order specifically denied claims for additional accommodation in that same property?
  Read full judgment →
• Kala vs Board of Revenue and ANOTHERs1985 PLD Supreme Court 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-18
  consolidation of holdingsrevisional jurisdictionexhaustion of remedieslimitationmiscellaneous applicationtechnical defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute under the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960. The appellant, whose land holding was reduced under a consolidation scheme, did not file an appeal but later filed a miscellaneous application challenging the scheme before the Additional Commissioner. The application was dismissed, and the appellant subsequently filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue, which was accepted. The High Court, however, set aside the Board's order on the grounds that the appellant had failed to exhaust the statutory appellate remedies, that the revision was barred by limitation, and that the initial application was not labeled as a revision. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the existence of an alternative appellate remedy does not bar the exercise of statutory revisional jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Ordinance. The Court further ruled that the non-mention of a specific statutory provision or the mislabeling of an application as a miscellaneous petition is a mere technicality that does not affect jurisdiction, and that the revision petition was filed within the prescribed limitation period from the date of the Additional Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960 dependent on the party first exhausting the statutory right of appeal?
  • Does the failure to label an application with the correct statutory provision or describing it as a miscellaneous application divest a statutory authority of its jurisdiction?
  • How is the limitation period of ninety days under Section 13(1)(b) of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960 computed when a revision is filed against an order of the Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• K.B. Raja Muhammad Walayat Khan vs The Commissioner of Income1985 SCMR 1326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-11
  income taxadvisory jurisdictionreference applicationdeed of settlementassignment of incomeremand of caseappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax reference arising from the assessment of rental income assigned by an assessee to his family members via a deed of settlement. The assessee challenged the inclusion of this rental income in his taxable income, leading to a reference before the Lahore High Court. The High Court, while answering the referred questions, observed that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had made errors of fact and law, and consequently directed the Tribunal to reconsider the appeals on their merits. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, contending that the High Court’s answers were inconsistent with its own findings regarding the sequence of the lease and assignment deeds. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the High Court exceeded its limited advisory jurisdiction by remanding the case for reconsideration of factual matters not properly before it, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to re-examine matters that had become final. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the submissions regarding the scope of the High Court's advisory jurisdiction and the Tribunal's authority required further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to remand a case to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for reconsideration of merits while exercising its advisory jurisdiction under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Is the High Court's answer to a referred question valid if it is inconsistent with the findings of fact recorded in the same judgment?
  • Can the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal re-hear or examine matters on which its order has already become final due to the absence of a reference against those specific findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Shaikh vs The State1985 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-18
  consecutive sentencesconcurrent sentencesimprisonment for lifeSection 35 CrPCaggregate punishmentmurderattempted murdersentencing legality
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the legality of consecutive sentences awarded to the appellant following his conviction at a single trial. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to imprisonment for life (25 years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 57, PPC) and seven years' rigorous imprisonment, respectively, with both sentences ordered to run consecutively. The Lahore High Court upheld the convictions and sentences. The core legal question was whether sentencing a convict to consecutive terms of imprisonment for life and seven years' imprisonment violates proviso (a) to Section 35(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which prohibits consecutive sentences aggregating more than fourteen years. The Supreme Court held that imposing consecutive terms exceeding the statutory limit violates Section 35(2)(a), Cr.P.C., and ordered both sentences to run concurrently rather than consecutively, partially allowing the appeal on the question of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether consecutive sentences aggregating more than fourteen years can be lawfully imposed upon a convict in a single trial under Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether a sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be ordered to run consecutively with another term of imprisonment awarded in the same trial?
  • How does the statutory restriction in proviso (a) to Section 35(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when sentencing an offender to multiple punishments in a single trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad Khan vs Shah Mir Hussain And Other1985 SCMR 2029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-17
  declaratory suitHissadari possessionconsent decreemisreading of evidenceconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court in a civil revision, which set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petitioner's declaratory suit. The petitioner had filed the suit to challenge a consent decree regarding 3 Kanals of land, alleging that he was in Hissadari possession of the property and that the vendors could not sell it. The trial court and appellate court both ruled in favour of the petitioner, holding the consent decree ineffective against his possession. However, the High Court reversed these findings upon reviewing the revenue record, concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his Hissadari possession over the specific disputed land and that the lower courts had misread the documentary evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the High Court was fully justified in setting aside concurrent factual findings where they were based on a misreading of documentary evidence. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in civil revision can interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on a misreading of documentary evidence?
  • Can a party challenge a consent decree as ineffective against their rights if they were not impleaded as a party to the original suit?
  • Whether failure to prove specific Hissadari possession over disputed land invalidates a claim challenging a land transaction.
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 1112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-29
  triple murdergrave and sudden provocationrecovery of weaponsinterested witnessesmitigation of sentencecommutation of death sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the convictions of the appellants for triple murder under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with certain sentence modifications. The core legal question concerned the reliability of interested ocular testimony, the veracity of weapon recoveries, and whether the assault was preceded by grave and sudden provocation arising from an incident where the complainant party threw crackers at a wedding party. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the prosecution's version regarding the origin of the assault and the immediate precursor events was doubtful and colored by animosity—finding that the attack was indeed provoked by the complainant party's mischief toward the wedding guests—the ocular evidence nonetheless stood sufficiently corroborated by prompt and genuine weapon recoveries. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions but altered the death sentences of two appellants to imprisonment for life on the ground that the retaliatory assault was an outcome of the insult meted out to the wedding party, while maintaining the remaining sentences with concurrent operation and benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that where the origin of an assault and the prosecution's account of immediate motive are found doubtful due to pre-existing enmity and provocation by the complainant side, such mitigating circumstances furnish an extenuating reason for commuting the death penalty to imprisonment for life, provided the core ocular testimony is corroborated by reliable and prompt recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the throwing of crackers at a wedding party by the complainant side prior to the assault constitute an extenuating circumstance justifying the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Whether prompt and unblemished recoveries of blood-stained weapons at the instance of the accused furnish sufficient corroboration to ocular testimony?
  • Can the prosecution's suppression of the true origin of an incident lead to the rejection of the narrative regarding the immediate prelude to the crime while still maintaining convictions based on established participation and recoveries?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamaluddin vs The State1985 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-22
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationulterior motivepolice harassmentnon-bailable warrantssuo motu
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had suo motu cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Khairpur, and directed the trial court to issue non-bailable warrants for his arrest. The petitioner was nominated in a murder case but was empty-handed, and the deceased's dying declaration did not implicate him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the pre-arrest bail and directing the issuance of non-bailable warrants. The Court held that cancelling pre-arrest bail does not automatically authorize a court to remand an accused to custody or issue non-bailable warrants without a police request. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the High Court erred by failing to consider the trial court's findings regarding the existence of deep-rooted enmity and the apprehension of police harassment for ulterior motives, which are valid grounds for pre-arrest bail. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, restoring the petitioner's bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of pre-arrest bail by a court automatically authorize the court to order the accused into police custody or issue non-bailable warrants in the absence of a police request?
  • Can a High Court cancel pre-arrest bail granted by a lower court without addressing or upsetting the lower court's findings regarding the apprehension of arrest for ulterior motives and harassment?
  • Whether deep-rooted enmity and the apprehension of police harassment for ulterior motives constitute valid grounds for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaliluddin vs Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. And Other1985 SCMR 1965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  petition for leave to appealwithdrawal of appealright of hearingfrivolous litigationSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Sind High Court dated 31 May 1984, which dismissed an appeal as withdrawn upon the request of the appellants. The petitioner, who was a respondent in that appeal, contended that he was aggrieved by the order because he was not afforded an opportunity of being heard prior to the dismissal of the appeal. The core legal question is whether a respondent in an appeal has a right to be heard when the appellants seek to withdraw their own appeal, and whether such withdrawal inherently prejudices the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had the absolute right to withdraw their appeal, and since the petitioner had not challenged the original judgment and failed to show any legal prejudice resulting from the withdrawal, he had no right of being heard. The petition was dismissed as totally frivolous, and the Court additionally recorded strict observations regarding the conduct of the Advocate-on-Record in filing repeated frivolous litigations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a respondent in an appeal have a right of being heard when the appellants choose to withdraw their appeal?
  • Can a respondent claim prejudice solely due to the voluntary withdrawal of an appeal by the appellant?
  • Whether filing repeated frivolous petitions warrants formal judicial observations regarding professional conduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Jalaluddin And 3 Others vs The State1985 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-25
  post-arrest bailmurdercriminal leave to appealinconsistent medical evidencevenue of crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Sind High Court dated 28-6-1984, which dismissed the bail application of the petitioners who were charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Dhalo. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail in light of alleged discrepancies regarding the venue of the crime between the F.I.R. and the Mashirnama of Wardat, as well as inconsistencies between the medical evidence and the prosecution case regarding the number of injuries. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no grounds were made out to interfere with the concurrent orders of the courts below refusing bail. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies in the venue of the crime or medical inconsistencies do not automatically warrant the grant of post-arrest bail at the leave stage when lower courts have properly considered the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be refused under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when there are alleged discrepancies in the venue of the crime?
  • Does inconsistency between medical evidence and the prosecution case regarding the number of injuries entitle an accused to bail?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent orders of the lower courts denying bail in a murder case without strong grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Jahanzeb vs The State1985 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-25
  murder convictiondeath sentencecompromisemitigation of sentencelife imprisonmentcriminal appealpardon
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Jahanzeb, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and sentenced to death. Following the confirmation of the sentence by the High Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the families of the appellant and the deceased reached a compromise, with the heirs of the deceased pardoning the appellant and receiving compensation of Rs. 10,000. The core legal question was whether a compromise between the parties in a murder case, where the death penalty was imposed, could justify a reduction in the sentence. The Supreme Court, satisfied that the compromise was voluntary and fair, maintained the conviction but set aside the death sentence, reducing it to life imprisonment. The Court relied on the principle established in Muhammad Bashir v. The State, holding that a compromise between the parties in a murder case, while not negating the conviction, constitutes a valid ground for mitigating the sentence of death to life imprisonment, while also granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the heirs of a deceased and the accused justify the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable when a death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaffar Hussain vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1985 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-14
  settlement lawsproperty transferpossession datequestion of factconstitutional jurisdictionsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a property plot in Lahore under the settlement laws. The petitioner challenged the transfer of the plot to the respondent, contending that the Additional Settlement Commissioner who dismissed his revision petition had a conflict of interest, having previously served as the Deputy Settlement Commissioner who initially transferred the property to the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to set aside a predecessor's order via a miscellaneous application. The Lahore High Court dismissed these contentions, finding they were not raised before the revising authority, and further concluded that the petitioner failed to prove possession prior to the cutoff date of 31-12-1959 required for entitlement under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, noting that the date of occupation is a question of fact determined by the lower court based on the record. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted and dismissed the petition, affirming that factual findings regarding possession dates are not subject to appellate review when supported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise objections regarding the jurisdiction or bias of a quasi-judicial authority for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction if they failed to raise them before the revising authority?
  • Is a finding regarding the date of occupation of a property, based on a review of the record, a question of fact that precludes interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a party who fails to establish possession of a property prior to 31-12-1959 qualify for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Jafar And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-03
  double murdermitigating circumstancesinterested witnesscorroborationdeath sentence commutationcommon intentioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences imposed on the appellants for the double murder of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses received sufficient corroboration and whether mitigating circumstances justifying a lesser sentence for the murder of one victim—who had maintained illicit relations with the appellants' sister—should extend to the murder of the second victim killed in the same transaction. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular evidence sufficiently corroborated by independent circumstances. Regarding sentencing, the Court held that because both murders occurred during the same transaction, the mitigating factors applicable to the first victim must also apply to the second. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentence for the murder of the second victim to life imprisonment. The judgment reinforces the principle that where multiple offenses arise from a single occurrence, mitigating circumstances affecting the motive or provocation for one act must be considered in sentencing for the entire transaction, ensuring consistency in the administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the corroboration of interested testimony require independent evidence of the occurrence?
  • Should mitigating circumstances regarding the murder of one victim extend to the murder of another victim killed in the same transaction?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment based on mitigating circumstances found in a related murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail vs Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore And Another1985 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  land settlementconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefallotment of landSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition arising out of a land settlement dispute. The petitioner claimed to be a confirmed allottee of the land since 1951 based on a certificate of entitlement under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, but verification subsequently resulted in a 'no land' finding, leading to the land in dispute eventually being allotted to respondent No. 2. The High Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction in favor of the petitioner, noting that neither party was at fault regarding their respective verifications and allotments, the petitioner committed a serious default by initially filing a writ petition against a dead person which remained pending for four years, and both parties stood on an equal footing as claimants settled in the same estate. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to show that the considerations weighed by the High Court were against any principle of law. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's exercise of discretion and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can decline to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction when both parties are equally innocent regarding land allotments?
  • Does a delay caused by filing a constitutional petition against a deceased person constitute a valid ground for refusing relief?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in constitutional jurisdiction without proof of a violation of a principle of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail vs Abdul Aziz And Other1985 SCMR 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  pre-emptionpossession by pre-emptionrejection of plaintdeposit of 1/5th amountimplied extension of timepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts rejecting a plaint in a suit for possession by pre-emption due to the pre-emptor's failure to deposit the requisite one-fifth of the pre-emption amount within the stipulated time. The core legal question was whether an inference of implied extension of time for depositing the amount could be drawn when the deposit was made significantly later than the deadline set by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the lower courts rejecting the plea of implied extension was correct, thereby upholding the dismissal of the suit and the petition. The key principle laid down is that failure to comply with a mandatory deposit order in pre-emption suits without a formal or validly inferred extension of time results in the rejection of the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inference of implied extension of time for depositing the pre-emption amount can be raised when the deposit is made after the expiry of the deadline fixed by the trial court?
  • Does the failure to deposit the 1/5th amount within the stipulated time warrant the rejection of the plaint in a suit for possession by pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Islam Riffat Siddiqui vs Mahmood Abid Rizvi1985 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-26
  rent depositstriking off defencenon-compliancebank draftsrented premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal against the striking off of his defence by the Rent Controller for non-compliance with a rent deposit order. The Controller had directed the appellant to deposit arrears of rent amounting to several months within thirty days. The appellant made partial and delayed deposits, which the authorities treated as wilful defiance. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held guilty of non-compliance under Section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance when bank drafts allegedly covering the deficit were lying with the Controller. The Supreme Court held that bank drafts issued in the name of the landlord rather than the Court do not constitute a valid deposit in compliance with the Controller's order. Consequently, the concurrent decisions of the lower courts were upheld and the appeal was dismissed, laying down the principle that furnishing instruments not payable to the court fails to satisfy mandatory rent deposit directives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bank drafts issued in the name of the landlord can be treated as a valid deposit in compliance with a rent deposit order?
  • Does delayed and partial deposit of rent amount to wilful and negligent defiance justifying the striking off of defence?
  • Can concurrent decisions regarding the striking off of a tenant's defence be interfered with when no valid deposit is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishfaq Ahmad vs The State1985 PLD Supreme Court 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-23
  quashment of proceedingsfalse chargepublic justicecognizance of offencecriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had initially lodged a complaint before the Assistant Commissioner against certain persons including a police officer, leading to the registration of a case. Following an investigation concluding the allegations were false, the Station House Officer initiated proceedings under Sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against the petitioner. The core legal question concerns whether the proceedings violate Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the proper authority competent to file a complaint for offences under Sections 172 to 190 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to make an authoritative pronouncement on the question and stayed the proceedings in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be initiated without a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a court from taking cognizance of offences punishable under sections 172 to 190 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 except on the written complaint of the specific public servant concerned or their superior?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmad vs Muhammad Mujtaba And 2 Other1985 SCMR 544. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-30
  evictionbona fide personal requirementconcurrent findings of factre-appraisal of evidenceconstitutional jurisdictionlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a constitutional petition challenging an eviction order. The petitioner, a tenant, faced eviction from a shop on grounds of default in rent payment and the landlord's bona fide personal requirement. Following an initial eviction order by the Rent Controller and subsequent appellate proceedings, the District Judge maintained the eviction based solely on the landlord's personal need. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement, particularly where the tenant alleged misappreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, as it sought a re-appraisal of evidence regarding a question of fact already concurrently determined by the statutory forums. The Court affirmed that such factual findings are not liable to be reopened in the absence of any demonstrated illegality in the proceedings, thereby upholding the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence regarding a question of fact that has been concurrently determined by lower statutory forums?
  • Does the fact that a landlord has previously obtained possession of adjacent premises preclude a claim of bona fide personal requirement for another property?
  • Is a finding of bona fide personal requirement by a Rent Controller and appellate authority subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction when no illegality is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and Others vs Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-09
  inter se senioritysubordinate police officersPolice Rules 1934Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974generalia specialibus non derogantimplied repealspecial lawgeneral lawdate of confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil service appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the inter se seniority of subordinate police officers for promotion to Deputy Superintendent of Police. The core legal question was whether the seniority of subordinate police officers is governed by Rule 12.2 of the Police Rules 1934 (which bases seniority on the date of confirmation) or by Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1974 read with Section 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 (which bases seniority on regular appointment).

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that the Police Act 1861 and the Police Rules 1934 constitute a special law enacted for a disciplined force, which co-exists with the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 as an existing law under Article 268 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Applying the legal maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant*, the Court ruled that the later general law did not impliedly repeal the earlier special law, and seniority must be determined under Rule 12.2 of the Police Rules 1934.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent general law on civil service impliedly repeal a prior special statute governing a disciplined force like the police?
  • Whether the inter se seniority of subordinate police officers is governed by Rule 12.2 of the Police Rules 1934 or Section 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Are rules framed under the Police Act 1861 saved as existing law under Article 268 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant apply to resolve conflicts between civil service statutes and police service regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore And Another vs Ali Abbas1985 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-02
  service tribunalsenioritypermanent posttemporary postleave to appealappointment date
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 28-12-1983, whereby the respondent's appeal was accepted, directing that he be treated as having been appointed to a permanent post of Probationary Sub-Inspector (P.S.I.) with effect from 12-9-1960 and his seniority reckoned accordingly. The core legal question revolved around whether a permanent post was indeed in existence on 12-9-1960 when the respondent was originally recruited, or whether it only became available on 1-6-1973. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel was unable to controvert the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal that a permanent post was indeed in existence on 12-9-1960 against which the respondent was entitled to be confirmed. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal's findings and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, laying down that concurrent factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding the availability of a permanent post at the time of appointment will not be interfered with where the department fails to disprove such existence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee recruited against a temporary post can be treated as appointed against a permanent post if such permanent post was in existence on the date of initial appointment?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a factual finding of the Service Tribunal regarding the existence of a permanent post when the department fails to controvert it?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah Khan vs The Provincial Government N.W.F.P., Peshawar1985 SCMR 1747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  service tribunalcompulsory retirementmisconductshow-cause noticenatural justicedepartmental proceedingsremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from departmental proceedings resulting in the compulsory retirement of the appellant, a Reader in a Magistrate's Court at Peshawar, on charges of misconduct relating to the procurement of a bail order. The core legal question examined was whether the failure to issue a final show-cause notice against the proposed penalty violated the principles of natural justice. Conceding on the basis of established precedent that the omission of a second show-cause notice vitiated the proceedings, the respondent's counsel agreed to a remand of the matter. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower decisions, and remanded the case to the Authorized Officer to resume proceedings from the stage of the second show-cause notice and decide the matter afresh. The key principle laid down is that failure to provide a final show-cause notice before imposing a major penalty in departmental proceedings constitutes a violation of natural justice, warranting a remand for rectification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to give a final show-cause notice against a proposed penalty in departmental proceedings violates the principles of natural justice?
  • Does the omission of a second show-cause notice warrant the remand of a disciplinary case to the Authorized Officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ali And Others vs Nazar Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-18
  pre-emptionlimitationtime-barred appealcertified copy of decree sheetcondonation of delayleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by unsuccessful defendants in a pre-emption suit against the Lahore High Court's judgment, which upheld the dismissal of their first appeal as time-barred. The core legal question concerns the computation of limitation for filing an appeal and whether the time spent obtaining a copy of the decree sheet can be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, or if sufficient ground exists for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that even after making all allowances and exclusions, the petitioners filed the copy of the decree sheet with a culpable delay of 36 days, and that a court's procedural direction to supply a document by a certain date remains subject to just exceptions, including objections as to limitation. Consequently, the Court ruled that neither statutory entitlement nor the appellate court's direction saved the appeal from being time-barred. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the principle that statutory limitation periods must be strictly adhered to despite procedural accommodations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the decree sheet can be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act when computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal?
  • Does a court's direction to supply a certified copy of a decree sheet by a specific date override statutory objections regarding the bar of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Illahi Bakhsh Samr00 And Others vs Registrar, Societies And Other1985 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-26
  petition for leave to appealterritorial jurisdictionwrit of quo warrantoelection disputenomination paper
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition regarding the election of the President of respondent No. 2 Institution on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The first petitioner's nomination paper had been rejected due to delayed receipt of consent, leading to the unopposed election of respondent No. 3. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether a Constitution petition filed in the nature of a writ of quo warranto can be dismissed by the High Court for want of territorial jurisdiction. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plea regarding the nature of the petition as a writ of quo warranto and its jurisdictional implications deserves consideration. The Court ordered that the appeal be heard on the existing record and extended the interim order previously passed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Constitution petition filed in the nature of a writ of quo warranto be dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction?
  • Whether the rejection of a nomination paper due to delayed consent warrants interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din And Another vs Muhammad Aslam And Other1985 SCMR 1604 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  pre-emptionleave to appealfinding of factRegular Second Appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioners, Ilam Din and Mst. Meraj Begum, challenging a judgment of the High Court dated 11-6-1978, which dismissed their Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A. No. 310 of 1978) in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its determination regarding the petitioners' alleged superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had dismissed the appeal on the basis that the matter was concluded by a finding of fact. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners' counsel failed to demonstrate that the High Court had misread or ignored any material evidence on the record concerning the issue in question. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the lower court misread or ignored material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact in a pre-emption case if the High Court has not misread or ignored material evidence?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court in a Regular Second Appeal conclusive if no misreading of evidence is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilahi Bakhsh and Others vs Mst. Bilqees Begum1985 PLD Supreme Court 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  forum of appealpecuniary jurisdictionpre-emption suitjurisdictional valueSuits Valuation Actagricultural landcourt feemarket value
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land where the trial court decreed the suit on payment of Rs. 2,000,000 as the market value/sale price, whereas the suit was originally valued notionally at Rs. 4,560.30 for jurisdictional purposes under the rules framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act 1887. The appellants directly challenged the decree in the High Court, but the High Court returned the appeal for presentation before the District Judge, holding that jurisdictional suit value determines appellate forum. The Supreme Court considered whether the forum of appeal under Section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 is determined by the original jurisdictional value fixed under the Suits Valuation Act 1887 or by the market value/decree price. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s ruling, declaring that under Section 18 of the Ordinance, the original jurisdictional value fixed by statute regulates both the forum of the suit and the forum of appeal, regardless of the ultimate decree amount or actual market value.

  Questions settled

  • Is the forum of appeal under Section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 determined by the original jurisdictional value fixed under the Suits Valuation Act 1887 or by the market value of the land?
  • Does the decree amount in a pre-emption suit alter the jurisdictional value for determining the proper appellate court?
  • Does the notionally fixed jurisdictional value in a suit for pre-emption of agricultural land regulate both the suit forum and the appeal forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Ikram And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-28
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionmurdervicarious liabilitycriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 379, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners, who allegedly chased, caught hold of, and grappled with the deceased while a co-accused fired the fatal shot, are entitled to bail in view of the application of vicarious liability under section 34. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly and without caprice in finding that section 34 was prima facie attracted to the facts, thereby disentitling the petitioners to bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where accused persons actively facilitate the commission of an offense by chasing and grappling with the victim, common intention is prima facie established, justifying the refusal of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who catches hold of a deceased during an assault is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Do the provisions of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply where co-accused facilitate a fatal shooting by grappling with the victim?
  • Did the High Court exercise its discretion properly in refusing bail based on the specific allegations in the F.I.R.?
  Read full judgment →
• Ihsanul Haq Piracha And Others vs Wasim Sajjad And Other1985 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-25
  Senate electiontechnocrat qualificationinterim suspensionbalance of convenienceelection petitionSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  Two applications were filed under Order XX, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 seeking interim suspension of the Election Tribunal's order declaring the appellants' election to the Senate as technocrats void under the Senate (Election) Act, 1975. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of qualifications for a technocrat under Section 5(1)(c) explanation (b) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, specifically regarding professional competence and recognition. The Supreme Court held that the appeals presented an arguable case and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellants, as allowing re-elections to proceed during the pendency of the appeal would cause unnecessary expenditure and waste if the appeals succeeded. Consequently, the Court suspended the impugned order of the Tribunal to stay the re-election process, while maintaining the status quo regarding the non-notification of the election and administration of oath.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will suspend the operation of an Election Tribunal's order declaring a Senate election void pending the disposal of the appeal?
  • What constitutes a technocrat based on professional competence and experience under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977?
  • Does the balance of convenience favour staying fresh re-elections when an elected candidate challenges an adverse decision by an Election Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ihsan Ur Rehman vs Mst. Najma Parveen1985 SCMR 1504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-04
  guardian and wardcustody of minorsrevision petitionleave to appealvisitation rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the custody of minor children between Ihsan-ur-Rehman and Mst. Najma Parveen. The Guardian Judge granted custody to the father, which was upheld on appeal by the Additional District Judge. The mother filed a revision petition before the High Court, which was entertained based on the precedent of Parveen v. Muhammad Ashar, holding that the revision was competent. Although the High Court agreed that the father was entitled to custody, it granted visitation rights to the mother during summer vacations and Eid holidays. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a revision petition against the appellate order of the Additional District Judge was competent in guardianship proceedings, given earlier Supreme Court pronouncements disapproving the relied-upon precedent. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the incompetence of the revision prima facie had force based on its prior ruling in Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay, and accordingly granted leave to appeal while suspending the operation of the impugned High Court order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition lies to the High Court against an appellate order passed under the Guardian and Wards Act?
  • Does a precedent holding revisions competent survive subsequent disapproval by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmed And Others vs The State And 5 Other1985 SCMR 992 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  reappraisal of evidencecriminal leave to appealmurderocular and medical conflictrecovery of weaponsinterested witnessesbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder trial under section 302 and other provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 148 and 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The trial court had convicted certain accused persons while acquitting others, leading to appeals and a revision petition before the High Court, which resulted in the acquittal of some co-accused and the confirmation of the death sentence of the petitioner Iftikhar Ahmed. Before the Supreme Court, contentions were raised regarding conflicts between ocular testimony and medical evidence concerning specific injuries, challenges to weapon recoveries, and non-compliance with section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding independent witnesses. The core legal question involved the reappraisal of evidence in a criminal case involving previous enmity and interested witnesses. The Supreme Court held that a reappraisal of the evidence was necessary in the interest of safe dispensation of criminal justice and accordingly granted leave to appeal in both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether reappraisal of evidence is warranted when ocular testimony allegedly conflicts with medical evidence in a murder case?
  • Does the non-compliance with statutory provisions regarding independent recovery witnesses under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the prosecution case?
  • Whether previous enmity between parties necessitates heightened caution and corroboration of interested witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Idrees Ahmad and Others vs Hafiz Fida Ahmad Khan and 4 Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  second appealrepeal of statutevested right of appealpending proceedingsrent restrictionsaving clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses three civil appeals and two civil petitions concerning the competency of a second appeal under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which was repealed by the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the repeal of the 1959 Ordinance destroyed the right of a second appeal to the High Court in proceedings that were pending at the time of the repeal. The Supreme Court held that the right to a second appeal in such pending cases remained intact and undisturbed, as section 27(2) of the repealing Ordinance expressly saved pending appeals and cases fixed for arguments or judgment to be disposed of in accordance with the former Ordinance. The Court laid down the principle that a vested right of appeal under a repealed enactment survives repeal unless the repealing statute explicitly or by necessary implication takes it away, and that saving clauses for pending proceedings preserve the graded appellate remedies previously available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second appeal is competent from the judgment of the Appellate Authority in a first appeal filed under the repealed Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • What is the effect of the repeal of a statute on the accrued right of appeal under the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Do the saving provisions in section 27 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, preserve the right of second appeal for pending proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim vs Hayat Gul And Other1985 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-21
  abscondencebail cancellationfurther inquirynon-bailable offencedying declarationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order granting bail to the respondent in a case involving murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether an accused who has absconded for a significant period is entitled to bail merely because co-accused persons were acquitted in his absence, and whether such abscondence can be disregarded under the guise of 'further inquiry'. The Supreme Court held that long abscondence is a relevant factor that cannot be ignored simply due to the acquittal of co-accused. The Court clarified that while rare exceptions exist (e.g., women, children, infirm persons, or cases under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898), abscondence generally weighs against the grant of bail. Furthermore, the Court held that the 'further inquiry' provision under Section 497(2) requires a specific judicial finding that there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the offense; without this prerequisite finding, bail cannot be granted on that basis. The bail order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons automatically entitle an absconding accused to bail?
  • Is long abscondence an irrelevant factor in bail proceedings if the co-accused have been acquitted?
  • What is the prerequisite finding required for a court to grant bail under the 'further inquiry' provision of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be released on bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a specific finding that there are no reasonable grounds to believe they committed the offense?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim And Others vs The Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 1500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-30
  consolidation of holdingsrevisional powerscollectorcommissionernullityultra viresleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings concerning landholdings in village Daukey, Tehsil Chunian, District Kasur. The petitioners' consolidation scheme was confirmed in June 1965. Subsequently, in February 1967, the Collector, purporting to act under section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, set aside the scheme and remanded the case. Multiple rounds of proceedings, remands, appeals, and revisions followed, culminating in orders by revenue authorities and the dismissal of the petitioners' constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question raised is whether an order passed directly by a Collector under section 13(2) without reporting the case to the Commissioner under subsection (3) is ultra vires and a nullity in law, thereby rendering all subsequent proceedings void. The Supreme Court held that the contention requires further consideration and granted leave to appeal, while ordering status quo regarding possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a Collector directly modifying or reversing a consolidation scheme under section 13 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, without reporting the case to the Commissioner under subsection (3), is ultra vires and a nullity in law?
  • Do subsequent proceedings and orders stemming from an initial void order of a Collector also become void and of no legal effect?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim And Others vs Assistant Commissioner_ Collector, Vehari And Other1985 SCMR 1774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-04
  Intra-Court Appealmaintainabilitycondonation of delaylimitationwrit petitionsettlement matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal challenging a High Court order that dismissed writ petitions related to settlement matters, and subsequently dismissed the petitioners' Intra-Court Appeals (ICAs). The core legal questions were whether an Intra-Court Appeal was maintainable against the High Court's order in these settlement proceedings and whether the delay in filing the petitions for leave to appeal could be condoned. The Supreme Court held that the Intra-Court Appeals were not maintainable, affirming the High Court's view, based on the provisions of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitions were time-barred by 843 days. The Court established the principle that pursuing a wrong remedy in a wrong forum does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the law of limitation. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions due to the lack of maintainability of the ICAs and the unexplained, significant delay in filing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition in settlement matters under the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  • Does pursuing a wrong remedy in a wrong forum constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibadat Yar Khan And Others vs Ataul Haq And Other1985 SCMR 1462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-20
  ejectmentrent restrictiondeposit of arrears of rentconstitutional jurisdictionbelated challengeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment proceeding instituted in 1966 by the respondents against the petitioner tenants. In 1967, the Rent Controller directed the tenants to deposit arrears of rent and future monthly rent pursuant to section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959). The tenants failed to comply and challenged the deposit order years later in writ proceedings, arguing that the order was illegal because it included rent for a period exceeding three years prior to the institution of the ejectment application. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the belated challenge after seventeen years could not be entertained in constitutional jurisdiction. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that while there is no absolute rule barring a new ground in writ jurisdiction, the court has discretion based on the circumstances. The Supreme Court concluded that the initial deposit order was consistent with the prevailing interpretation of law at the time it was made, and the tenants failed to raise the objection at earlier appellate stages or explain their failure to deposit even the future rent. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be permitted to raise a new ground of challenge for the first time in constitutional writ jurisdiction after a lapse of several years?
  • Does the inclusion of time-barred arrears of rent in a deposit order under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 render the entire order a nullity incapable of enforcement?
  • Is a tenant liable to have their defence struck out for non-compliance with a rent deposit order that was validly made under the prevailing judicial interpretation at the time?
  Read full judgment →
• Hyderabad Development Authority And Another vs Karam Khan Shoro1985 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-02
  land acquisitioncompensation assessmentmarket valuestatutory noticecompulsory acquisitionpotentiality of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over compensation for land acquired for the Hyderabad Water Supply Scheme. The Land Acquisition Officer initially awarded Rs. 20,000 per acre, which was enhanced to Rs. 1,08,900 per acre by the Additional District Judge and subsequently reduced to Rs. 70,000 per acre by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded exceeded the statutory limits prescribed under Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether the market value assessment was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the restrictive provisions of Section 25(2) of the Act, which limit compensation to the amount claimed, are contingent upon the valid service of notice under Section 9. As the appellants failed to establish that the requisite notice was served upon the landowner, the claimant was not precluded from seeking enhanced compensation. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court’s valuation of Rs. 70,000 per acre, noting that the land's potential and proximity to developing housing societies justified the assessment. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation on compensation under Section 25(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 apply if the statutory notice under Section 9 was not served?
  • Can a court award compensation exceeding the amount claimed by the landowner if the landowner omitted to file a claim due to lack of notice?
  • Is the potential future use of land a valid factor in determining its market value for compensation purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Hussain Ali Chandio vs The Secretary. Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And Other1985 SCMR 1735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-03
  writ jurisdictionfindings of factland allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actforgeryjudicial reviewmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the cancellation of agricultural land allotments in District Sanghar, which the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had invalidated, alleging the underlying transfer order was a forged document. The appellant challenged the High Court's decision, which had overturned the Commissioner's finding of forgery. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could lawfully interfere with a finding of fact by a subordinate tribunal, particularly when new evidence was introduced, and whether the tribunal's finding was sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court is competent to interfere with findings of fact by subordinate tribunals if such findings are based on "no evidence" or a "complete misreading of the evidence." The Court determined that the Commissioner’s conclusion of forgery was based on mere surmises rather than tangible evidence. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court generally does not substitute its own findings for those of a tribunal, it retains the authority to set aside findings of fact that lack evidentiary support or result from a misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a subordinate tribunal in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a finding of fact based on mere surmises without tangible evidence constitute a valid basis for a tribunal's decision?
  • Is the High Court permitted to set aside a tribunal's order if the finding is based on a complete misreading of the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hussain Ali Chandio vs The Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And Other1985 SCMR 1730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-02
  leave to appealremoval from servicepublic interestcorporation employeeservice tribunallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his removal from service. The petitioner was appointed as Deputy Manager Personnel by the Board of Trustees, Karachi Port Trust, and later removed from service by the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, Government of Pakistan, under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The petitioner challenged the removal, contending that the Tribunal's finding on limitation was erroneous and that his removal violated the provisions of the Ordinance as there was no evidence that the competent authority considered whether the removal was in the public interest, noting that the Tribunal improperly supplied its own grounds for the removal. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised legal questions of general importance, allowed the petition, and granted leave to appeal subject to exceptions as to limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the removal of an employee under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 requires the competent authority to be satisfied that the removal is in the public interest?
  • Can the Service Tribunal supply new grounds to support an order of removal that were not part of the original order or record?
  • Whether the petition for leave to appeal was barred by limitation under the circumstances of receipt of the Tribunal's judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hotel Metropole Ltd. vs Kitabistan Ltd. And Another1985 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-25
  ex parte ejectmentexecution proceedingsrestoration of possessiondismissal in defaultstay orderpending lisrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an execution proceeding regarding an ex parte ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The respondent's application to set aside the ex parte order was dismissed in default, leading to the appellant obtaining possession of the premises. The respondent subsequently obtained a stay order and an order for restoration of possession from the executing Court, which the High Court upheld. The core legal question was whether the executing Court could order the restoration of possession when the underlying application for setting aside the ex parte ejectment order had been dismissed in default, and whether a stay order could be granted in the absence of a pending lis. The Supreme Court held that the executing Court lacked the competence to grant a stay order on the date possession was taken because the respondent's application had already been dismissed, leaving no pending lis. Consequently, the Court set aside the order directing the restoration of possession, while allowing the proceedings to set aside the ex parte ejectment order to continue. The key principle is that a court cannot grant a stay order in the absence of a pending legal proceeding.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court grant a stay order when no application or lis is pending before it?
  • Does an executing court have the authority to order the restoration of possession if the application to set aside an ex parte ejectment order was previously dismissed in default?
  • Is a stay order effective if it is granted after the execution of the decree has already been completed?
  Read full judgment →
• Holy Family Hospital And Another vs Government of Sind And Another1985 SC M R593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Workers' Children Education OrdinanceEducation CessEstablishmentCharitable HospitalWelfare LegislationNon-profit institutionInterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from a common judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the constitution petitions filed by the Holy Family Hospital and the Liaqat National Hospital. The appellants, charitable institutions registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and operated on a non-profit basis, challenged notices requiring them to pay education cess under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972. The core legal question was whether charitable hospitals run on a non-profit basis fall within the definition of 'establishment' under section 2(b) of the Ordinance so as to be liable for the levy of education cess under section 3. The Supreme Court held that the term 'establishment' encompasses any premises where workers are employed for carrying on any service, regardless of whether the institution is run for profit or gain. The Court emphasized that welfare and beneficial legislation must be given a wide and liberal interpretation to advance the legislative intent of providing education to workers' children. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the High Court's judgment upholding the levy of the education cess was affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a charitable hospital run on a non-profit basis fall within the definition of 'establishment' under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972?
  • Is the levy of education cess under section 3 of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972 contingent upon the establishment being run for profit or gain?
  • How should welfare and beneficial legislation like the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972 be interpreted regarding the term 'establishment'?
  Read full judgment →
• Hissam Ud Din vs Mst. Faizan And 7 Other1985 SCMR 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19
  leave to appealabatementlegal representativesdeath certificateSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Appeal Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the application for setting aside the abatement caused by the death of Mahmood Ali and for bringing on record his legal representatives. The core legal question concerns whether the assumption that the petitioner resided in the same premises and was thus aware of the co-occupant's death justified dismissing the application as abated, despite a death certificate showing the death occurred in a different locality. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assumption and conclusion were not supportable under these circumstances, rendering it a fit case for granting leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that factual assumptions regarding a party's knowledge of a co-party's death must be tested against documentary evidence such as death certificates indicating different places of residence before denying relief against abatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for setting aside abatement can be dismissed on the assumption of shared residence when evidence indicates a different place of death?
  • Is a case where lower appellate assumptions regarding knowledge of a party's death are unsupported by evidence a fit case for grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Hilton International Company vs Avari Hotel Ltd.1985 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-27
  leave to appealad interim injunctionhotel managementarbitration agreementstay of proceedingsproprietary interestaccountsstatus quointerim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a decision of the Sind High Court's Appeal Bench, which modified an ad interim order issued under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, in a civil suit concerning the management and accounts of a hotel. The dispute arose from the plaintiff-respondent's unilateral rescission of a management agreement with the petitioner-lessee, alleging mismanagement and seeking a permanent injunction and rendition of accounts. The High Court's Single Judge had initially stayed proceedings for arbitration under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and imposed conditions on the petitioner's management, which the Appeal Bench further modified. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, consolidating it with a related appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution. The Court modified the ad interim relief, allowing the petitioner to manage the hotel according to the agreement, subject to conditions: no remittances outside Pakistan, counter-signature required only for cheques exceeding Rs. 2 lacs, cash retention limit of Rs. 50,000, maintenance of employee status quo, and open access to accounts. The proceedings in the suit were stayed pending the decision of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Under what conditions can an ad interim injunction be modified by an appellate court in a dispute over business management?
  • Can a court grant leave to appeal and consolidate it with another appeal arising from the same order but concerning a separate matter?
  • What factors are considered by the Supreme Court when modifying ad interim relief concerning the management of a business venture pending the outcome of a suit and arbitration?
  • Is it permissible for a court to stay proceedings in a civil suit pending the decision of appeals related to interim orders and arbitration references?
  • What specific conditions may be imposed on a party managing a business under an ad interim order to safeguard the interests of the other party, particularly regarding financial transactions and access to accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Hidayat Ali vs Muhammad Hussain And Another1985 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-24
  canal drainagewatercourseconsentrevision petitioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a revision petition and set aside an appellate court's order in a canal drainage dispute. The core legal question concerned the validity of a Divisional Canal Officer's order sanctioning a watercourse through the appellant's land, specifically whether the landowner was duly served and whether his grandson's consent to the watercourse was legally binding on him. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to establish that the High Court's findings—based on proper service of notice, the circumstances of representation, and admissions made in the original plaint acknowledging agreement to the watercourse—were erroneous or misread the record. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that a landowner is bound by the consent given during canal proceedings where subsequent conduct and pleadings demonstrate acquiescence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landowner is bound by the consent given by a family member in canal drainage proceedings when supported by subsequent conduct and pleadings?
  • Can an appellate court's finding based on a reading of record be interfered with when the appellant fails to bring the relevant documents on the paper-book?
  Read full judgment →
• Hidayat Ali And Another vs The Settlement Commissioner, Multan1985 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  property transfersettlement of claimsdivisibility of propertycompromise agreementevacuee propertyappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a property dispute regarding the transfer of Property No. 405-406, Chichawatni, District Sahiwal, which was originally allotted to the respondents' predecessor. The appellants, who occupied portions of the property, contested the transfer, leading to protracted litigation regarding whether the property was divisible or indivisible. Following various administrative orders and a remand by the High Court, the Settlement Commissioner ultimately declared the property indivisible and transferred it entirely to the respondents. The appellants challenged this in the Supreme Court, questioning the justification for transferring the entire property to the respondents when they had only applied for a portion. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties reached a compromise agreement. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise, which allocated specific portions of the property to the appellants and the remainder to the respondents, with directions for the exchange of possession and payment of transfer prices. The Court disposed of the appeal in terms of this settlement, directing the Settlement Department to implement the agreement and issue the necessary transfer orders accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise agreement reached between the parties during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Is a property transfer order by a Settlement Commissioner subject to judicial review regarding the divisibility of the property?
  • Does a compromise agreement between parties regarding property allocation supersede previous administrative orders of the Settlement Department?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat vs The State And Another1985 SCMR 1927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-26
  bail cancellationleave to appealsurrender of petitionerfugitive from justicecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dated 29-4-1985, which had cancelled his bail in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioner had failed to surrender to the authorities following the cancellation of his bail. The Court held that a petition for leave to appeal cannot be heard or entertained while the petitioner remains a fugitive from justice and has not surrendered. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground of non-surrender, while clarifying that the petitioner retains the liberty to file a fresh petition for leave to appeal once he has surrendered to the jurisdiction of the court. The principle established is that a petitioner seeking relief from the Supreme Court against the cancellation of bail must first surrender to custody before their petition can be heard.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be heard if the petitioner has not surrendered after bail cancellation?
  • Is a petitioner required to surrender to custody before seeking leave to appeal against a bail cancellation order?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Muhammad And 4 Others vs Election Authority And Other1985 SCMR 1909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-04
  election matterfresh pollconsent orderwrit petitiondiscretionary reliefequitable reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves five petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petitions in an election matter. The core legal question concerns the power of the Election Authority under section 17 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, to order a fresh poll, and whether the petitioners were entitled to relief. The Supreme Court held that while the counsel for the petitioners was technically correct that the Election Authority had no power to order a fresh poll based on prior interpretation, the petitioners were not entitled to equitable relief under Article 199 of the Constitution or discretionary relief of leave to appeal from this Court because they had consented to the re-poll before the Authority and participated in it upon defeat. The key principle laid down is that a party who consents to an order and participates in subsequent proceedings without immediate objection is disentitled to discretionary and equitable constitutional relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Election Authority has the power to order a fresh poll under section 17 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a petitioner who consented to a re-poll before the Election Authority entitled to equitable relief under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Will this Court grant discretionary relief of leave to appeal to a party who participated in a re-poll and was defeated after consenting to it?
  Read full judgment →
• Hav. Muhammad Akbar And Others vs Adalat Khan And Another1985 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-18
  rural sitessettlement schemeautomatic transferpossessionminor's entitlementwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the transfer of rural plots in village Barki Badhal, District Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who were in occupation of the plots since before 1961, were entitled to automatic transfer of the property under the relevant settlement scheme, despite subsequent transfers of the same plots to the petitioners in 1971. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the plots, being rural sites occupied by the respondents prior to the cutoff date, stood automatically transferred to them by operation of law. The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments, including the contention that one respondent was a minor at the relevant time, holding that the applicable scheme did not disqualify minors from claiming entitlement based on occupation. The Court concluded that the High Court correctly applied the law regarding the deemed transfer of rural sites, finding no merit in the petitions and dismissing them accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a settlement scheme for the transfer of rural sites disqualify a minor from claiming entitlement based on occupation?
  • Are rural plots occupied prior to the relevant cutoff date deemed transferred by operation of law?
  • Does the law governing the transfer of rural sites distinguish between local occupants and displaced persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Hashmat Iqbal vs Maqbool Ahmed Alias Makoo And 3 Other1985 SCMR 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-11
  leave to appealocular testimonyacquittalhostile witnessre-appraisal of evidencemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a State appeal against the acquittal of respondents in a murder case under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should grant leave to re-appraise evidence where the prosecution's case, based on ocular testimony, was contradicted by independent witnesses examined by the prosecution. The Court held that leave to appeal should be refused. It reasoned that when independent witnesses consistently testify that the incident was unwitnessed and occurred in darkness, and this testimony is not merely a result of being won over but provides a coherent alternative version, the prosecution's case is fatally diluted. The principle laid down is that where independent prosecution witnesses demolish the complainant's version of events by consistently asserting the occurrence was unwitnessed, the appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal or re-appraise evidence, as no useful purpose would be served in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal for re-appraisal of evidence when independent prosecution witnesses have contradicted the complainant's version?
  • Does the testimony of independent witnesses consistently stating that an incident was unwitnessed and occurred in darkness fatally dilute the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's ocular evidence is demolished by its own independent witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Hashmand vs Haji Sohbat Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-16
  ejectmentagricultural tenancylease renewalwaiver of rightsunauthorized constructionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld an ejectment order against a tenant of agricultural land. The petitioner, a lessee, was sued by the respondent landlord for ejectment based on allegations of rent arrears, unauthorized cutting of trees, and unauthorized construction of houses on the leased land. Following multiple rounds of litigation before revenue authorities, including the Collector, Additional Commissioner, and Board of Revenue, the ejectment order was maintained, and the petitioner was awarded compensation for improvements. The petitioner challenged these orders, arguing that the ejectment was ordered without jurisdiction as the landlord never alleged a violation of tenancy rights, that the construction was necessary for agricultural purposes, and that the landlord had waived the right of ejectment by renewing the lease. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the lower courts erred in their findings regarding the grounds for ejectment and whether the orders were consistent with the pleadings and applicable tenancy laws, specifically regarding the alleged change in land use.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord be deemed to have waived the right of ejectment by repeatedly renewing a lease?
  • Does the construction of temporary structures for agricultural family maintenance constitute a change in the nature of agricultural land?
  • Can a court order ejectment on grounds not specifically pleaded or asserted by the landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Nawaz Khan And Another vs Additional Settlement1985 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  evacuee propertyauction purchaserPermanent Transfer Deedprior transfereeproperty disputeC.H. Forms
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the identity and title of urban evacuee property, where two parties claimed ownership based on different modes of transfer. The respondents were transferees of the property via C.H. Forms since 1959, holding a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). The petitioners' predecessor-in-interest subsequently purchased what was purported to be a different property number through an auction held years later. Upon discovery that the properties were effectively the same, the Lahore High Court ruled in favour of the respondents, affirming their status as prior transferees. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld this decision, holding that the prior disposal of evacuee property must be given legal preference over a subsequent auction. The Court established the principle that if property has already been validly transferred to a party, it ceases to be available for auction; therefore, a subsequent auction of the same property is without lawful authority. The petitioners cannot succeed against prior transferees regarding the same property, though they may seek relief regarding the specific property they intended to purchase if it differs from the respondents' holdings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior transfer of evacuee property take precedence over a subsequent auction of the same property?
  • Is an auction of property that has already been transferred to another party valid?
  • Can an auction purchaser claim property that was previously transferred to a prior transferee via C.H. Forms?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Ali And Another vs Mst. Saeed Khatoon And Other1985 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-25
  urban settlementcomposite buildingtransfer of propertycivil court jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against a judgment of the High Court allowing a Constitution petition arising out of an urban settlement case concerning a composite building comprising shops on the ground floor and a hotel on the first floor. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court interfered with the order of the Settlement Commissioner by misreading the evidence. The core legal question revolved around the effect of a civil court judgment on matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of settlement authorities and whether the High Court rightly restored the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to decide settlement cases or pass new transfer orders on the basis of interim miscellaneous proceedings, rendering its judgment without lawful authority and effectively devoid of legal force once the foundational settlement orders were set aside. The Court laid down the principle that civil courts cannot usurp the exclusive jurisdiction of settlement authorities, and that interim proceedings not inter partes cannot form the basis of a binding civil decree affecting property transfers under settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to decide settlement cases and alter property transfers made by settlement authorities?
  • What is the effect of a civil court judgment that is based on interim settlement orders which have subsequently been set aside?
  • Can settlement authorities divide composite premises at the stage of miscellaneous applications behind the back of affected parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamayun vs The State1985 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-06
  culpable homiciderash and negligent drivingcompromisesentence reductionmitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained the petitioner's conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing the death of a person by driving a truck. Initially, the petitioner was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment, while a revision petition filed by the complainant seeking enhancement to a charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the parties presented a compromise, wherein the complainant, as the sole heir of the deceased, received compensation and expressed forgiveness, stating he had no further grievance. The State raised no objection to the compromise. The Supreme Court, exercising its discretion, converted the petition into an appeal and maintained the conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the petitioner. The key principle established is that in cases involving offences under Section 304-A, the court may consider a compromise between the parties as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the parties be considered as a mitigating factor in a conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to reduce a sentence to the period already undergone based on a compromise reached between the convict and the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Halim Alias Khalim vs The State1985 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-03
  child witnessinjured witnesscriminal petition for leave to appealmurderabscondencefirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court which upheld the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the petitioner under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court for the murder of a woman, along with a conviction under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for injuring a child. The core legal question involved the reliability of a child eyewitness who also sustained injuries in the incident, and whether conviction could be sustained upon such testimony supported by medical evidence and prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the straightforward testimony of an injured child witness, corroborated by medical evidence regarding close-range firearm injuries and the appellant's lengthy abscondence, is entirely reliable to sustain a conviction. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of an injured child witness, when found credible and consistent, carries immense evidentiary value and can safely form the basis of a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured child eyewitness can be relied upon for sustaining a murder conviction?
  • Does prolonged abscondence of an accused corroborate the prosecution case?
  • Whether medical evidence showing close-range firearm injuries supports the ocular account of an injured witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Muhammad Fazal Haque vs Abdul Hameed1985 SCMR 1601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-08
  ejectment applicationbona fide needlandlord and tenantrent controllerleave to appealappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a landlord, sought the ejectment of the respondent, a tenant, citing bona fide personal need for his son and default in rent payment. The Rent Controller initially granted the ejectment application based on the landlord's bona fide need. However, the High Court reversed this decision on appeal, reasoning that the landlord failed to deny the tenant's allegation in the written statement that another shop owned by the landlord had been rented out to a third party during the pendency of the proceedings. The petitioner challenged this reversal in the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's finding was based on an incorrect reading of the evidence and that the record did not conclusively support the claim that the other shop was rented out. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-examine the record, noting that it had granted leave in a connected petition for the same purpose, and ordered that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty for parties to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court reverse a Rent Controller's finding on bona fide need based on an unverified allegation in a written statement?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to deny an allegation regarding the renting of another property during litigation automatically negate a claim of bona fide personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Muhammad Buta and Another vs Habib Ahmad and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-08
  limitationcontinuing wrongmandatory injunctionrevisional jurisdictionwaiver of limitationappurtenant rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a suit for mandatory injunction filed by the appellants to demolish alleged illegal constructions made by respondents on a common courtyard. The trial court decreed the suit, holding that the construction constituted a continuing wrong under section 23 of the Limitation Act. The lower appellate court dismissed the respondents' appeal on merits regarding the legality of the construction without examining limitation due to waiver by the respondents. However, the Lahore High Court in revision re-opened the question of limitation, held the suit barred by time, and dismissed it. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the High Court was justified in re-opening limitation and whether the transfers included appurtenant rights to the courtyard. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act are mandatory and cannot be waived, and courts are duty-bound to dismiss time-barred suits apparent on the record. The Court further held that the constructions constituted a completed wrong rather than a continuing wrong under section 23, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar of limitation can be waived by the parties to a suit?
  • Does a wrong decision on limitation debar the High Court from revising such decision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the construction of a permanent structure on a common courtyard constitutes a continuing wrong under section 23 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali vs The State1985 SCMR 1037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-11
  murderattempted murderjail petitionocular testimonyinjured witnesscriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition arises from a criminal matter where the petitioner, Hakim Ali, was convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, along with convictions under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, for the murder of Mst. Sheeman and the attempted murder of prosecution witnesses following a dispute regarding a marriage proposal. The trial court and the High Court both upheld the convictions based on a promptly lodged first information report, natural eye-witness accounts, corroborative medical evidence, and the testimony of injured witnesses whose presence at the scene was unquestionable. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the ocular and medical evidence supporting the conviction for murder and attempted murder. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on credible evidence and that the defense's plea of false implication due to an alleged illicit connection was meritless. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of natural and injured witnesses, corroborated by prompt reporting and medical evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for capital crimes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured witnesses is sufficient to maintain a conviction for murder and attempted murder?
  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained on the basis of a promptly lodged first information report and natural eye-witness accounts?
  • Whether a plea of false implication based on an alleged ulterior motive of the police and local influential persons is acceptable without substantial proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Syed Ainullah vs Abdul Rashid1985 SCMR 1991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-13
  ejectmentlocus standirent restrictiontenantappealparty to proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the appellant landlord against tenant widows, during the pendency of which the respondent's application to be joined as a party was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that he was not a tenant. The respondent did not appeal that preliminary order. Subsequently, after the death of the widow tenants, the Rent Controller ordered eviction. The respondent appealed to the High Court, which set aside the eviction order. The core legal question was whether a person whose application to be joined as a party was rejected by the Rent Controller, and who failed to appeal that refusal, has the locus standi to file an appeal against the final eviction order. The Supreme Court held, following established precedent, that the respondent lacked locus standi to challenge the final order having failed to appeal the preliminary rejection. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal, subject to making up court-fee deficiencies.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person whose application to be joined as a party in rent proceedings is rejected have the locus standi to file an appeal against the final eviction order without having appealed the initial rejection?
  • Whether an appeal filed against a consolidated judgment of the High Court disposing of two separate appeals is maintainable as a single appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Samad Khan And Others vs Khalid Khan And Other1985 SCMR 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-22
  revisional jurisdictionBoard of RevenueMartial Law Regulation 115overriding effecttenancy rightsejectment suitsland reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue over orders passed by a Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue could exercise revisional jurisdiction over such orders, given the limitations in the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950, or whether Martial Law Regulation 115 (1972) provided an independent and overriding basis for such jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while Section 56 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950 might restrict successive revisions, Paragraph 3 of Martial Law Regulation 115 (1972) contains an overriding clause that supersedes conflicting laws. Consequently, Sub-paragraph (7) of Paragraph 25 of the Regulation explicitly empowers the Board of Revenue to call for the record of any case decided by a Collector or Commissioner to examine its correctness, legality, or propriety. The key principle laid down is that special legislation with an overriding effect supersedes general procedural statutes regarding the scope of revisional jurisdiction, allowing the Board of Revenue to exercise its powers notwithstanding procedural limitations in the Tenancy Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Board of Revenue have revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Commissioner under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950?
  • Does Martial Law Regulation 115 (1972) override the procedural limitations of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950 regarding revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can the Board of Revenue exercise revisional powers under Paragraph 25(7) of Martial Law Regulation 115 (1972) to review orders passed by a Collector or Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Nawazish Ali Khan vs Deputy Commissioner, Sahiwal And Another1985 SCMR 1379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-02
  land acquisitionhousing schemenon-proprietorsrural housingstatutory interpretationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition against the acquisition of the petitioner's land for a housing scheme. The petitioner argued that the acquisition was improper because non-proprietors, for whom the scheme was intended, had already constructed houses on other lands in the village, which should have been acquired instead. The petitioner relied on the proviso to Section 3 of the Punjab Housing Facilities for Non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Ordinance, 1974, claiming that the existing residential sites should have been prioritized for acquisition. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the existing houses were built on 'village Shamlat land' or 'land in Abadi Deh,' which are the specific statutory prerequisites for the proviso to apply. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's case did not fall within the scope of the proviso and dismissed the petition. The Court noted, however, that the petitioner should be compensated with one-third of the acquired land as per the rules framed under the Punjab Acquisition of Housing Act, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to Section 3 of the Punjab Housing Facilities for Non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Ordinance 1974 apply to all residential houses built by non-proprietors?
  • Must land acquired for a housing scheme under the Punjab Acquisition of Housing Act 1973 meet specific criteria regarding the nature of the land to trigger the proviso in Section 3 of the 1974 Ordinance?
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• Haji Mir Qalam Khan vs Gul Muhammad Khan And Another1985 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-26
  pre-emptionsubsistence holdingMartial Law Regulation 115arbitration awardlocus standidisguised saleexchange mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-emption suit where the appellant challenged an exchange mutation, alleging it was a disguised sale intended to defeat his right of pre-emption and that the transaction violated Martial Law Regulation 115 regarding the alienation of subsistence holdings. The core legal questions were whether the exchange transaction constituted a sale, whether it was void for violating land reform regulations, and whether the alleged arbitration proceedings between the parties were valid. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is a right of substitution based on the assumption that the underlying transaction is valid; therefore, a pre-emptor lacks locus standi to challenge the validity of the transaction itself. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence that the exchange was a disguised sale. Regarding the arbitration, the Court held that an award made without court permission, lacking proper stamp duty, and not registered as required by law, is ineffective. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, establishing that a pre-emptor cannot challenge the legality of the transaction they seek to pre-empt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emptor have the locus standi to challenge the validity of the transaction they seek to pre-empt?
  • Can an arbitration award regarding landed property be enforced without being made a rule of the court and without proper registration?
  • Does a pre-emptor need to file cross-objections to support a trial court's judgment on an issue decided against them in the appellate court?
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• Haji Jamil Ahmad vs Muhammad Ibrahim1985 SCMR 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-22
  review petitioninterim reliefscope of reliefrent controllerinjunctionpossession of premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an interim order passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner sought review of a previous order that had granted interim relief—specifically, restoration of possession of demised premises—which the petitioner had not actually requested in their initial petition. The core legal question was whether the Court could grant relief that exceeded the specific prayers made by the petitioner in their application. Upon review, the Court found merit in the contention that the relief granted went beyond what was sought, as the petitioner had only requested an injunction against the respondent to prevent the sale, encumbrance, or transfer of the property pending the final decision of the appeal. The Court held that it should not grant relief not specifically prayed for by the parties. Consequently, the Court recalled its previous direction regarding the restoration of possession and substituted it with an order restraining the respondent from selling, encumbering, or changing the status of the premises until the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant interim relief that was not specifically prayed for by the petitioner?
  • Is a court empowered to recall a direction in a previous order if it exceeds the scope of the relief requested by the parties?
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• Haji Ibrahim vs S. Rehmatullah (Represented By Legal Heirs)1985 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-20
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide requirementdeath of landlordsurvival of cause of actionheritable estatesubsequent eventsmoulding of relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an ejectment order passed against a tenant on the ground of the personal bona fide need of the landlord's adult son. During the pendency of the tenant's petition for leave to appeal, the original landlord passed away, prompting the legal question of whether the personal need of the son survived the landlord's death. The Supreme Court examined the nature of personal actions and the survival of heritable rights. It held that while a personal action generally abates if the beneficiary dies before an eviction order is made, once an eviction order is passed, it matures into a vested property right that forms part of the landlord's heritable estate. Consequently, the legal heirs can defend and execute the order. The Court further clarified that appellate courts possess discretionary power to take note of subsequent events to mould relief in the interest of justice. Because the specific beneficiary (the son) was still alive and had stepped into the shoes of the landlord, the cause of action survived, and the case was set down for a hearing on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the personal need of a landlord's son for whose benefit an eviction order was obtained survives the death of the landlord pending appeal?
  • Does an eviction order obtained on the ground of personal need become part of the heritable estate of a deceased landlord?
  • Can an appellate court take notice of subsequent events occurring after the passing of an eviction order to mould the relief?
  • Whether proceedings for ejectment based on personal need abate if the beneficiary dies before an order of eviction is actually made?
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• Haji Gul Muhammad vs Muhammad Ramzan And Another1985 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-05
  acquittalprivate defensereasonable doubtmurderculpable homicidecriminal appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondent of a murder charge under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent despite the prosecution's evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that the presence of the respondent's brother's dead body near the victim, the recovery of a weapon used by the victim to attack that brother, and the respondent's decision not to abscond from the scene, collectively raised a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's version of events. The Court determined that these circumstances supported the respondent's plea of private defense. Applying the principle established in Safdar Ali's case, the Court concluded that the respondent acted in defense of his brother, thereby justifying the acquittal. The Court affirmed that where the evidence supports a plausible defense theory, the prosecution must negate it beyond reasonable doubt, which was not achieved in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a dead body of an accused's relative at the scene of a crime support a plea of private defense?
  • Can an acquittal be upheld when the prosecution fails to negate a plausible defense theory beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Is the failure of an accused to abscond from the scene of a crime a relevant factor in determining the validity of a self-defense claim?
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• Haji Ch. Fazalur Rehman vs Hafiz Haseen Ahmad1985 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-07
  rented premisesevictionbona fide requirementconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantpersonal use
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which had upheld a Rent Controller's decision to evict the appellant from shop premises under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant had initially sought leave to appeal on the legal question of whether a landlord must prove the bona fide nature of their requirement for personal use to succeed under Section 14. However, upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had already framed and adjudicated upon a specific issue regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement. Both the Rent Controller and the High Court had concurrently determined, based on evidence, that the landlord did indeed require the premises in good faith for personal business use. The Supreme Court held that since this was a concurrent finding of fact supported by evidence on record, it was not liable to be reopened in the present proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as lacking substance, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the bona fide requirement of a landlord a relevant consideration for eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement for personal use when supported by evidence?
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• Haji Bashir Ahmad vs The Secretary to Government of Pakistan1985 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-03
  Civil servantRemoval from serviceAcademic exerciseService TribunalExpungement of remarks
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Central Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service as an Officer on Special Duty under section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core legal questions involved whether the removal under section 12-A required compliance with normal service safeguards, including an opportunity of hearing, and whether leave to appeal should be granted merely for an academic exercise when the petitioner no longer desired reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner stated he had no desire to join service, it would be improper to grant leave to appeal for an academic exercise, and thus refused leave. However, the Court directed the expungement of certain unessential adverse remarks made against the petitioner in the impugned judgment. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to grant leave to appeal for academic exercises when the petitioner does not seek reinstatement, and unnecessary adverse remarks in judgments lacking merits examination should be expunged.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted for an academic exercise when the petitioner does not wish to be reinstated into service?
  • Does action taken under section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 exclude the normal safeguards and considerations available in regular removal cases?
  • Can unessential adverse remarks made in a judgment be ordered to be expunged when the merits of the case were not examined?
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• Haji Aziz Muhammad vs Haji Jan Muhammad1985 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-17
  interim injunctioncivil revisiontemporary injunctionconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Haji Aziz Muhammad sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his civil revision against the District Judge's order concerning an interlocutory matter relating to an interim injunction. The petitioner had filed a suit for a declaration that he was the owner-in-occupation of the suit land and that his ejectment order was illegal, alongside an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Civil Judge, the District Judge, and subsequently the High Court all dismissed the application and subsequent challenges. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core question of whether interference was warranted in concurrent interlocutory orders regarding temporary injunctions. Holding that the three lower courts had successively considered and dismissed the application and that no important question of law or legal defect was demonstrated, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as meritless, establishing that concurrent interlocutory findings on interim injunctions without substantial legal defects shall not be disturbed by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent interlocutory orders passed by lower courts regarding temporary injunctions?
  • Does an interlocutory matter concerning an interim injunction necessarily require leave to appeal in the absence of an important question of law?
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• Haji Atta Muhammad vs Malik Shabbir Ahmad Khan And Another1985 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-10
  election disputelocal council electionelection tribunalcorrupt practicesirregularities in electionpresiding officerconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the Election Tribunal's order setting aside the petitioner's election to a local council. The core legal question concerned whether the appointment of an unauthorized stranger by the Presiding Officer to issue ballot papers and the commission of other material irregularities vitiated the election. The Supreme Court held that the association of an unauthorized person to perform crucial election duties, coupled with established malpractices and irregularities that materially affected the result, justified setting aside the election. The Court affirmed that such illegalities cannot be condoned on the alleged ground of candidate consent when no such consent was established and complaints were promptly lodged. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, establishing that unauthorized delegation of election duties and proven electoral irregularities render an election void as a whole.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of an unauthorized person to issue ballot papers vitiates an election?
  • Does the closure of polls before the scheduled time and discrepancies in ballot papers constitute material irregularities?
  • Can an unauthorized delegation of election duties be justified by the alleged consent of a candidate?
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• Haji Abdul Hameed Through Legal Heirs vs Mrs. Mumtaz Ayub1985 SCMR 1595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Haft Ilahi Bakhsh vs Noor Muhammad and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-15
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsPunjab Land Alienation ActRoznamcha Waqiatirevenue recordoral salebona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Lahore High Court was justified in reversing concurrent findings of fact in civil revision and whether proper legal effect was given to entries in the Roznamcha Waqiati. The plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership and possession based on prior oral transactions and admissions made before revenue officials in 1945 and 1947, which mutations were refused under the Punjab Land Alienation Act as the land was treated as agricultural. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the suit, holding the transactions required registration and that the appellant was a bona fide purchaser. The High Court reversed this, decreeing the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly interfered in revision because the lower courts had ignored material oral and documentary evidence, including the testimony of the official who recorded the admissions and contemporaneous documents showing the land was a building site (Ghair Mumkin Abadi). Consequently, the Punjab Land Alienation Act did not bar the sale, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was right to hold that presumption of correctness attached to the entries in the Roznamcha Waqiati?
  • Whether the Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was right to reverse the concurrent finding of the Courts below on a question of fact?
  • Whether land with a house built upon it constitutes land for the purposes of the Punjab Land Alienation Act 1900?
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