Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Mst. Zohra Bibi and 3 Others vs Muhammad Boota and 2 Other1983SCMR610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land in District Sheikhupura, originally allotted to respondent No. 1 in 1955. Following a re-verification process, the land was cancelled from the respondent's name in 1960 and allotted to the petitioners in 1961. The respondent successfully challenged this in a constitutional petition, where the High Court remanded the matter to Settlement Authorities to re-examine the respondent's claim and entitlement. The petitioners sought leave to appeal, arguing that the re-verification document relied upon by the High Court was not genuine and that, as long-term possessors, they should be entitled to the land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's remand order was appropriate because the case involved a factual controversy regarding the genuineness of documents that could not be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that directing the disposal of land 'in accordance with law' is legally sound, as neither the parties nor the courts can dictate a specific outcome contrary to statutory procedure. Leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Is a remand order by the High Court appropriate when a case involves a factual controversy regarding the genuineness of documents?
- Can a court direct the disposal of disputed land in a manner other than 'in accordance with law'?
- Should the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a remand order that requires further factual inquiry by the original forum?
- Mst. Zainab Bibi and Another vs Muhammad Hanif and Other1983 SCMR 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land inherited by Rahim Bakhsh, which was subsequently gifted to his daughter and grandson. The respondents, claiming to be reversioners, challenged the gift, asserting that the property was ancestral and that the family was governed by custom rather than Shariat law, thereby restricting the donor's power of alienation. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed this decision, finding that the property was ancestral and the parties were governed by custom. The High Court upheld this reversal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the family followed Shariat law, citing the equal inheritance of the predecessor's property as evidence. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found that the petitioners failed to prove the application of Shariat law and that the evidence supported the respondents' claim that the family was governed by custom. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the property was ancestral and the alienation was subject to customary restrictions.
Questions settled- Whether the burden of proof lies on the party asserting that a family is governed by Shariat law instead of custom in matters of ancestral property?
- Does the equal division of inherited property among sons necessarily prove that a family is governed by Shariat law rather than custom?
- Can a gift of ancestral property be challenged by reversioners if the donor was governed by custom?
- Mst. Walian vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Circle I, Fareedkot1983 SCMR 1281 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns several petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the division and transfer of a residential property in Lahore. The core legal questions involved whether 'locals' could claim property under Settlement Scheme VIII when the property was not deemed 'available'; whether the court could order the redivision of property to create independent units for the benefit of such occupants; whether a party is bound by a compromise finalized in court; and whether a mistaken belief regarding the limitation period constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that property not treated as 'available' under Settlement Scheme VIII could not be redivided for the benefit of locals who failed to apply under Settlement Scheme I. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a party cannot repudiate a compromise they subscribed to in court, and that a bona fide misunderstanding of the limitation period is insufficient for condonation of delay. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that claimants cannot demand portions beyond what was in their possession.
Questions settled- Can property not deemed available under Settlement Scheme VIII be redivided for the benefit of local occupants?
- Is a party permitted to repudiate a compromise arrangement that they finalized in court?
- Does a bona fide mistaken belief regarding the limitation period constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
- Can a claimant demand additional portions of property beyond what was in their possession at the time of transfer?
- Mst. Shah Rukh Zamani Begum vs Syed Manzoor Hussain Naqvi1983 SCMR 1132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which set aside an ex parte order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller against the respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the ejectment order on the finding that no proper service of summons or notice was effected on the tenant. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether notice of the ejectment application was duly served is essentially a question of fact. Since the High Court based its finding on the absence of bailiff reports and service records, and the petitioner failed to properly urge for an inquiry into the missing record before the High Court, no interference was warranted. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact regarding the service of process, when rendered by the High Court based on the available judicial record, will not be lightly interfered with by the apex court.
Questions settled- Whether the question of service of notice in ejectment proceedings is a question of fact?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact regarding service of summons recorded by the High Court?
- What is the effect of the absence of bailiff reports and service records on an ex parte ejectment order?
- Mst. Sardar Begum Sub Maj. (RTD.) Aziz Ahmad vs Sub Maj. (RTD.) Aziz1983 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These cross-appeals by special leave arise from a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the transfer and partition of an evacuee house in Peshawar. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of an agreement of association under settlement laws, whether such an agreement can be unilaterally cancelled upon a subsequent reduction in the transfer price, and whether Settlement Authorities possess the jurisdiction to partition property jointly transferred to co-sharers. The Supreme Court held that an agreement of association once filed is final and cannot be unilaterally altered or withdrawn by a party, and that subsequent reductions in the transfer price do not affect the agreed percentage shares of the transferee and the associating claimant. Furthermore, the Court held that the Settlement Authorities become functus officio after transferring the property and lack the statutory jurisdiction to partition joint properties, such power vesting exclusively in civil courts. The appeals were accordingly dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Whether an agreement of association once filed before the Settlement Authorities can be unilaterally cancelled or modified by one party?
- Does a subsequent reduction in the transfer price of an evacuee property affect the percentage shares agreed upon between a transferee and an associating claimant?
- Do Settlement Authorities possess the jurisdiction to partition a property jointly transferred to a transferee and an associate in specified shares?
- At what point do Settlement Authorities become functus officio with respect to the transfer of evacuee property?
- Mst. Sakina Bibi vs Walayat Khan and Another1983 SCMR 1151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition, converted into an appeal, arose from a maintenance suit where the petitioner was awarded Rs. 300 per month. The respondent husband appealed this decree but failed to affix the requisite court-fee on the memorandum of appeal. Despite an objection regarding the deficiency of court-fee, the respondent failed to rectify the error or seek an extension of time. The appellate court dismissed the appeal due to this deficiency. The respondent subsequently challenged this dismissal via a writ petition in the High Court, which interfered with the appellate court's order. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an order dismissing an appeal for deficient court-fee. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal, as the respondent was negligent and failed to make up the deficiency or request time to do so. The Court emphasized that when a party is contumacious or negligent in paying court-fees, dismissal is justified. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the appellate court's dismissal order.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal for failure to make up a deficiency in court-fees when no request for extension of time was made?
- Is the High Court justified in interfering with an appellate court's order dismissing an appeal for deficient court-fees where no illegality was committed?
- Does a party's failure to rectify a court-fee deficiency after an objection is raised justify the dismissal of their appeal?
- Mst. Rehmat Bibi and Another vs Mir Rashid Ahmad and Another1983 SCMR 1091 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the transfer of a house in favour of the respondent Mir Rashid Ahmad. The house was initially transferred to the respondent in 1963, and the petitioners challenged this transfer in 1968 based on an earlier un-decided form allegedly filed by their predecessor-in-interest in 1959. After protracted proceedings and a remand, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 8-10-1976 validated the transfer to the respondent. The core legal question concerned the effect of unexplained delay and laches in pursuing a settlement claim, as well as the lack of active pursuit by the claimants after the death of their predecessor. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine due to the prolonged unexplained delay of the petitioners in pressing their case until 1968 despite their predecessor having passed away in 1961. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether unexplained delay in pressing a transfer claim under settlement laws justifies the dismissal of a writ petition?
- Can successors-in-interest successfully challenge a property transfer after a prolonged period of inaction following the death of their predecessor?
- Mst. Rafiqan and 2 Others vs Jalal Din1983 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a custody dispute over a minor girl, Mst. Surayya, born to Mst. Habiban and Jalal Din, whose marriage was dissolved in 1973. Following the mother's remarriage in 1979, the minor remained with her maternal relatives. The father's application for custody was granted by the trial court, and subsequent appeals and revisions were dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the custody order properly prioritized the welfare and expressed wishes of the minor. Upon interviewing the minor, who was over ten years old and intelligent, the Court observed her strong preference to live with her mother, noting her unhappiness with the father. The Court held that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody matters. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, restored the minor's custody to the mother, and established specific visitation rights for the father, while prohibiting the removal of the minor from Faisalabad without consent. The principle laid down is that the welfare and expressed preference of a minor are decisive factors in determining custody arrangements.
Questions settled- Does the welfare of a minor take precedence over the father's right to custody in a dispute between parents?
- Can the court consider the expressed wishes of a minor child when determining custody?
- Is it permissible for an appellate court to grant visitation rights to a parent while awarding custody to the other?
- Mst. Parveen vs Mst. Jamsheda Begum and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning urban immovable property in Kohat. The appellant challenged a High Court judgment that reversed a trial court decision, which had initially dismissed the respondents' suit on the grounds that the property was exempt from pre-emption under Section 5(d) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act. The core legal questions were whether the suit was time-barred due to initial undervaluation and subsequent payment of court fees, and whether the appellant qualified as a "resident" of Kohat under the Act. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to allow the payment of court fees, and that such compliance cured the initial defect without rendering the suit time-barred. Regarding the residence issue, the Court affirmed the High Court’s finding of fact, noting that residence is a context-dependent concept involving intention and evidence. The Court established that no universal rule defines "residence," and appellate courts should not interfere with factual findings on residence unless they contravene established principles of evidence.
Questions settled- Can a suit be dismissed as time-barred solely because the plaint was initially undervalued and court-fees were paid after the limitation period?
- Does the payment of court-fees under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 relate back to the date of the original institution of the suit?
- Under what circumstances can a plaint be rejected for undervaluation under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is the determination of 'residence' for the purpose of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act a question of fact that precludes appellate interference if based on evidence?
- Mst. Naziran Begum and Others vs Ghulam Nabi and Other1983 SCMR 1289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a dispute over the transfer of a residential house in Lahore under settlement laws, previously occupied by two brothers, Ghulam Hussain (predecessor-in-interest of the appellants) and Ghulam Nabi (respondent No. 1), where the property was originally allotted solely to Ghulam Nabi. The core legal questions involved whether the Settlement authorities consciously examined the divisibility of the house and whether the appellants' predecessor possessed a better entitlement based on earlier possession. The Supreme Court held that the question of divisibility and the plea of better entitlement based on earlier possession had never been raised or pleaded before the Settlement authorities throughout the prolonged litigation, and the house had consistently been held to be an indivisible compact unit transferred rightly to the sole allottee in occupation. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
Questions settled- Whether the question of divisibility of a property can be raised for the first time before the superior courts when it was not pleaded before the settlement authorities?
- Does possession dating back earlier confer a better entitlement if it was never pleaded during the settlement proceedings?
- Mst. Mumtaz Begum vs Qazi Jamiluddin and 4 Other1983 SCMR 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court delivered on 17th January, 1974. The core legal question was whether the time spent in obtaining a certified copy of the writ petition could be excluded for the purpose of limitation, in addition to the time spent obtaining a copy of the impugned judgment, to condone a significant delay of 96 days in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that there is no legal basis to tag on the time taken in the preparation of a copy of the writ petition with the time spent on the impugned judgment for limitation purposes. Consequently, no sufficient ground for condonation of delay was made out, and the petition was dismissed as barred by time.
Questions settled- Whether the time spent in obtaining a certified copy of the writ petition can be excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- Can the time taken in preparing a copy of a writ petition be tagged onto the time spent in preparing a copy of the impugned judgment?
- Mst. Mumtaz Begum vs Mst. Mukhtiar Begum and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's revision petition upholding the concurrent dismissal of her pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land. The core legal question concerns the alleged collusiveness of a transaction where the original vendees transferred the suit land to a subsequent vendee in recognition of his superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the transaction between the first and second vendees occurred prior to the institution of the petitioner's suit, meaning it could not be deemed collusive or intended to defeat the petitioner's legitimate rights. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a transfer in recognition of a superior pre-emptive right made before the filing of a pre-emption suit is valid and unassailable on grounds of defeat of rights.
Questions settled- Whether a transfer of land by initial vendees in recognition of a superior right of pre-emption prior to the institution of a pre-emption suit is legally valid?
- Can a transaction between a first vendee and a subsequent vendee made before the filing of a pre-emption suit be challenged as collusive to defeat the plaintiff's rights?
- Mst. Memoona Begum vs Syed Mahmood Ali (Represented by Heir)1983 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a dispute over the transfer of a divisible evacuee property, House No. C/288 Moti Bazar, Rawalpindi, between the appellant transferee and the respondent. Initially, the entire house was transferred to the appellant, but subsequent administrative proceedings by settlement authorities resulted in the house being divided into eastern and western portions. Following a remand order by the High Court directing the Settlement Commissioner to determine whether the appellant was an allottee of any portion of the western side of the house, the Settlement Commissioner concluded that her allotment was confined to the north-eastern portion and ground floor, and accordingly assigned the western portion to the respondent and the eastern portion to the appellant. The appellant challenged this decision through a constitutional petition, which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the finding was one of fact and free from legal infirmity. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the allotment orders and held that the interpretation adopted by the Settlement Commissioner of the ambiguous allotment documents was reasonable and based on relevant evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, ruling that concurrent findings of fact on the scope of an allotment order do not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction unless tainted by manifest perversity or illegality.
Questions settled- Whether a finding of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the scope of an allotment order can be interfered with in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does an ambiguous description in an allotment order regarding the ground floor justify the interpretation adopted by the Settlement Commissioner based on the property's previous history and documentary evidence?
- Mst. Maqbool Begum and Others vs Gullan and Other1983 SCMR 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition seeking review of an order passed by the Supreme Court in a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether the mandatory requirement under Rule 6, Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980—which stipulates that a review petition must be drawn by the same Senior Advocate who appeared and argued the original petition—can be waived or exempted. The Court examined an application filed by the Advocate-on-Record requesting exemption from this rule and the dispensation of the presence of the original Senior Advocate at the hearing. The Court held that no sufficient grounds were established to justify granting such an exemption or dispensing with the mandatory procedural requirements. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed for non-compliance with the established rules of the Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural rules regarding the filing and representation of review petitions are mandatory and strictly enforceable, and cannot be bypassed without valid and sufficient justification.
Questions settled- Is it mandatory for a review petition to be drawn by the same Senior Advocate who argued the original petition under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
- Can the Court grant an exemption from the requirement that a review petition be drawn by the original counsel?
- What is the consequence of failing to comply with Rule 6, Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1980 regarding the drafting of a review petition?
- Mst. Latifa Khanum and Others vs Mian Abdul Wahid and Other1983 SCMR 1249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court which accepted the respondents' writ petition and declared that the Deed of Association accepted by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner correctly incorporated the intention of the parties, while setting aside the Settlement Commissioner's order. The core legal question concerns whether the legal heirs (widow and children) of a deceased property holder could challenge a Deed of Association after attaining majority, where the deceased had admitted before the settlement authorities that he held the property on behalf of his brothers and sisters. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked locus standi to challenge the arrangement in view of the clear admission made by their predecessor-in-interest during the settlement proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that successors-in-interest cannot resile from or challenge binding admissions and valid settlements entered into by their predecessor.
Questions settled- Whether the legal heirs of a deceased person have the locus standi to challenge a Deed of Association after attaining majority when the deceased had admitted before settlement authorities that he held the property on behalf of his siblings?
- Does a successor-in-interest inherit the limitations and binding admissions made by their predecessor in settlement proceedings?
- Mst. Lalan Bibi vs Mst. Ghulam Zohran and Other1983 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of her Regular Second Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court. The core legal question was whether interference was warranted against concurrent findings of fact in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were unexceptionable and rightly maintained by the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below in the absence of any legal flaw or misreading of evidence.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts in second appeal?
- Can a second appeal be maintained against concurrent findings of fact without showing a substantial question of law?
- Mst. Kubra Bibi and Another vs Abdul Haq and 7 Other1983 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the inheritance of Butey Khan and the subsequent allotment of land. The petitioners, who were not parties to a previous Supreme Court order directing the Rehabilitation Authorities to determine the legitimate heirs, challenged the Chief Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction to reopen and cancel their allotment. The core legal question was whether a party who actively participates in proceedings before an administrative authority without objecting to its jurisdiction can subsequently challenge the authority's decision on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that because the petitioners had fully participated and acquiesced in the proceedings before the Settlement authorities, they were precluded from raising jurisdictional objections after an adverse decision. The Court reiterated the established principle of acquiescence and waiver in jurisdictional matters, ruling that a party cannot challenge the jurisdiction of a forum after taking a chance on a favorable outcome.
Questions settled- Can a party who fully participates in proceedings before an administrative authority without objection later challenge the authority's jurisdiction after an adverse decision is rendered?
- Does the principle of acquiescence prevent a party from disputing the binding nature of a court order to which they were not originally a party if they subsequently litigated the merits of the issue before the relevant authority?
- Mst. Kishwar Sultan Jehan Begum vs Settlement Commissioner1983 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an intra-court appeal in a long-standing settlement dispute concerning the auction of an evacuee cinema house. The petitioner, having purchased the cinema in 1962, defaulted on the balance of the auction price and engaged in extensive, protracted litigation across multiple writ petitions and prior Supreme Court proceedings. The core legal questions involve whether the property could be resumed and re-auctioned following defaults on a prior consent order, the applicability of amendments to Settlement Scheme No. VIII regarding the requisite payment percentage to bar resumption of industrial concerns and cinema houses, and the application of the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata to repeated constitutional petitions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to comply with the binding consent order and subsequent extensions, that the special 75% threshold under the amended Settlement Scheme No. VIII applied to cinema houses to bar resumption (which the petitioner had not met), and that re-agitation of settled issues was barred by res judicata. Leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether a transferee of an evacuee cinema house can challenge resumption proceedings after failing to comply with the terms of a binding consent order?
- What is the applicable percentage of the transfer price that must be paid under paragraph 2 of Reconstituted Settlement Scheme No. VIII to bar the resumption of industrial concerns and cinema houses?
- Does the principle of res judicata bar a litigant from re-agitating questions directly and substantially in issue in earlier disposed of writ petitions?
- Can a litigant be permitted to raise grounds in a fresh petition that were available during previous rounds of litigation arising from the same cause of action?
- Mst. Khurshid Begum vs Malku and Other1983 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Mst. Khurshid Begum sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a trial court order impleading her as a party in a civil suit for possession of agricultural land filed by the respondents against a third party. The core legal questions examined were whether the trial court's order impleading a party amounted to 'a case decided' to attract the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the appellant was a proper or necessary party to the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was indeed a proper and necessary party to the litigation as her inclusion would eliminate multiplicity of litigation and enable full and proper adjudication of the controversy, and that the trial court's order was a procedural step that did not amount to a 'case decided' so as to warrant High Court interference. The key principle laid down is that an order directing the impleading of a party in a pending suit does not ordinarily amount to a case decided under section 115 unless it directly prejudices the rights or obligations of the parties.
Questions settled- Whether an order of the trial Court impleading a person as a party in a civil suit amounts to a 'case decided' under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is a person claiming a share in joint property through the common ancestor a necessary or proper party in a co-sharer's suit for possession against an alleged trespasser?
- When does an interlocutory order regarding the addition of a party attract the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs Mumtaz Khan and 2 Other1983 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute where the petitioner-wife obtained ex parte decrees for dissolution of marriage, dower, and maintenance against her soldier-husband. The petitioner had provided an incorrect village address in her plaints, and despite process server reports indicating the respondent was on active border defence duty, the trial court ordered substituted service and proceeded ex parte. The respondent's subsequent applications to set aside the decrees were dismissed as time-barred by the trial and appellate courts. The Lahore High Court, however, set aside these orders and directed a fresh trial due to non-compliance with the Soldiers (Litigation) Act 1925. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court's failure to serve the respondent through his Commanding Officer under Order V Rule 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (applicable via the Family Courts Act 1964) rendered the ex parte decrees unlawful. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Sections 10 and 11 of the Soldiers (Litigation) Act 1925, the application was within the 90-day limitation period, and the period of active service under special conditions must be excluded.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can order substituted service on a serving soldier without attempting service through his Commanding Officer as required by Order V Rule 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- What is the applicable limitation period for a serving soldier to apply for setting aside an ex parte decree under the Soldiers (Litigation) Act 1925?
- Whether the period during which a soldier is serving under special conditions must be excluded when computing the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree?
- Does the subsequent remarriage of a wife bar the High Court from exercising its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte divorce decree obtained in violation of mandatory service procedures?
- Mst. Kalsoomun Nisa vs Abdul Shakoor and Other1983 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a property dispute involving the estate of the deceased Abdul Karim. The petitioner, the widow of the deceased, claimed ownership of a house in lieu of dower, while the respondent, Muhammad Ismail, claimed a share as a collateral heir. The trial court initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the first appellate court reversed this, finding the respondent was a collateral heir entitled to a share and that the dower amount had been interpolated from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000. The petitioner challenged the appellate court's decision, specifically contesting the impleading of the respondent's legal representatives after the respondent's death during the appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the substitution of legal representatives was procedurally valid and whether the finding on the dower amount was sustainable. The Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the dower interpolation were justified and that the substitution of legal representatives was procedurally sound, as the application was timely and properly addressed. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions.
Questions settled- Does the definition of 'legal representative' under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 include a person who intermeddles with the estate of a deceased person?
- Can a party who claims possession of a deceased's estate based on a will be considered an intermeddler for the purpose of being impleaded as a legal representative?
- Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the interpolation of a dower deed subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
- Mst. Kalsoom Khanum vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1983 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a settlement matter in which leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the pendency of the appeal, the sole contesting respondent passed away, and his legal representatives issued a notice to the appellant to implead his heirs. The appellant's Advocate-on-Record failed to file the requisite application within the statutory period of 90 days, subsequently filing it along with an application for condonation of delay. The core legal question before the court was whether the delay in bringing the legal heirs on record should be condoned. The court held that the grounds put forward for condonation of delay were unconvincing, and accordingly dismissed the application for condonation. The key principle laid down is that where an application to implead legal heirs of a deceased party is not filed within the statutory period and no sufficient or convincing grounds for condonation are shown, the application will be rejected and the appeal will stand abated.
Questions settled- Whether delay in filing an application to implead legal heirs of a deceased respondent can be condoned without convincing grounds?
- What is the consequence of failing to implead legal heirs within the statutory period of 90 days?
- Mst. Inayat Begum vs Mst. Hayat Bibi (Represented by Legal Heirs) and Other1983 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the withdrawal of a civil suit by respondent No. 1, Mst. Hayat Bibi, which was dismissed as withdrawn by the Administrative Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, on 31-10-1973. The core legal question involves the validity of the withdrawal of the suit and whether such a withdrawal could subsequently be retracted or challenged, alongside issues regarding compensation and the lower appellate courts' treatment of the factual assumptions surrounding the withdrawal application. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these contentions further, while directing that the status quo order continue during the pendency of the appeal, with a clarification that pending possession proceedings before the Additional District Judge shall not be stayed. The key principle highlighted is that questions regarding the legal efficacy of withdrawing a suit coupled with an averment of compensation require detailed examination when lower forums fail to properly address material facts.
Questions settled- Whether a suit once dismissed as withdrawn can subsequently be revived or challenged on the ground that the withdrawal was unauthorized?
- Does an appellate court err in law by failing to consider material averments regarding compensation in a withdrawal application?
- Can proceedings regarding possession continue independently while an appeal concerning the underlying suit is pending before the Supreme Court?
- Mst. Iffat Begum and Others vs MRS. A. Majid and Other1983 SCMR 1002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over property rights and easements between the occupants of two adjacent evacuee houses, 'Parkash Villa' and 'Kalash Villa', both formerly part of the 'Springfield Estate' in Murree. The respondent (plaintiff) filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and injunction against the petitioners (defendants), alleging unauthorized construction of doors and windows by the petitioners and interference with the respondent's compound and easement rights. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, a decision partially upheld by the District Judge and subsequently affirmed by the Lahore High Court in second appeal. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that because the common passage and surrounding open land are jointly owned by the parties, the respondent could not establish a claim of easement in the absence of a formal demarcation of the joint property. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the legal contentions raised regarding the nature of easement rights over joint property require further judicial consideration.
Questions settled- Can a claim of easement be maintained over property that is jointly owned by the parties?
- Does the absence of formal demarcation of joint property preclude a party from asserting easement rights against a co-owner?
- Mst. Haftzan Begum vs District Judge, Attock And 2 Other19837 SCMR 1957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from an ejectment application filed by the appellant under section 13 of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which resulted in an ex parte eviction order against the respondent. The respondent's subsequent application to set aside the ex parte order was rejected by the Rent Controller. On appeal, the District Judge upheld the refusal to set aside the ex parte order but nonetheless proceeded to set aside the original ex parte ejectment order itself. The core legal question was whether the appellate court could interfere with and set aside the original time-barred order of ejectment when the appeal was solely directed against the subsequent refusal to set aside the ex parte order. The Supreme Court held that the District Judge erred in law by setting aside the original order when no appeal had been validly filed against it and the time for appeal had expired. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court cannot set aside an original order which was not challenged within time and where no appeal against it was competent or pending.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court set aside an original ejectment order when the appeal is only directed against a subsequent order refusing to set aside an ex parte order?
- Whether an appellate court can interfere with a time-barred order without an application for condonation of delay?
- Mst. Hafeez Begum and Others, vs Abdus Sattar1983 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition where the petitioner failed to pay rent for three consecutive months, thereby committing a breach of the Rent Controller's order dated 10th May 1980 which had granted protection against ejectment for eight years. The core legal question was whether the Executing Court could go behind the terms of the original rent order based on the petitioner's plea that the respondent agreed to collect the rent personally. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Executing Court could not go behind the clear stipulations of the order and that the petitioner, having breached the order, was not entitled to any relief. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot excuse non-compliance with a judicial order by relying on oral understandings contrary to the express terms of that order, and an executing court cannot look behind the decree or order being executed.
Questions settled- Can an executing court go behind the terms of an order passed by a Rent Controller?
- Does failure to pay rent in accordance with a conditional protection order disentitle a tenant to relief against ejectment?
- Is a tenant's plea that the landlord promised to collect rent personally a valid defense against a breach of a specific rent payment order?
- Mst. Feroze Begum vs LT. Col. Muhammad Hussain1983SCMR606 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the Family Court's decision delivering custody of two minors to their father (the respondent) under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The father, a Lt. Colonel, claimed custody on the grounds of his superior financial status and educational capacity, whereas the mother was illiterate and lacked independent income. The Supreme Court observed that both courts below failed to analyze the evidence, including the minors' academic success under their mother's care and their preference to remain with her. The Court held that under Islamic law, while the father is the natural guardian, the paramount and overriding consideration in custody matters is always the welfare of the minor, which encompasses material, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being. The mother's poverty is not a disqualification for custody, as the father remains legally bound to maintain them. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the custody orders.
Questions settled- Whether the financial superiority of a father can override the welfare of the minors in determining custody under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
- Does the poverty or illiteracy of a mother automatically disentitle her to the custody (hizanat) of her minor children?
- What constitutes the 'welfare of a minor' when deciding custody disputes between divorced parents?
- Mst. Fazal Bibi and Others vs Settlement Commissioner and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave examined the legality of a deed of association executed on 28-12-1962 between a claimant and a non-claimant under settlement laws, and the validity of a subsequent Settlement Commissioner's order setting aside transfers after the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). The Supreme Court held that while the association of a non-claimant at the relevant time initially contravened existing instructions, the subsequent removal of such restrictions and the application of equitable principles under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act validated the transaction. Furthermore, the Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted without jurisdiction by summarily setting aside orders passed by an officer of co-ordinate jurisdiction and by interfering with a P.T.D. without a proper inquiry establishing fraud or forgery. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment declaring the Settlement Commissioner's order to be without lawful authority.
Questions settled- Whether a deed of association between a claimant and a non-claimant executed at a time when such association was restricted becomes valid upon the subsequent removal of such restrictions?
- Can a Settlement Commissioner interfere with a Provisional Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) without holding a proper inquiry and recording a finding of fraud or misrepresentation?
- Whether a Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdictional competence to set aside an order passed by another officer of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction?
- Does Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act apply to cure a defect where a transferor erroneously represented authority to transfer immovable property to a non-claimant?
- Mst. Fatima vs Abdul Hamid and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave examines whether the High Court rightly interfered with the transfer of a property by settlement authorities in favour of the appellant, Mst. Fatima. The core legal questions involve the effect of filing an 'E' form and participating in an earmarking scheme upon a previously filed settlement form (C.H. Form), the finality of property divisibility findings, and the limits of constitutional jurisdiction over settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that by participating in the earmarking scheme through an 'E' form, the appellant had irrevocably abandoned her earlier C.H. Form, and substitution of a house was legally impermissible outside specified government instructions. Furthermore, the High Court correctly set aside extraneous grounds relied upon by lower settlement authorities and upheld the prior transfer to the contesting respondent, Abdul Hameed. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing principles regarding the irrevocability of election between settlement schemes and the binding nature of prior divisibility determinations.
Questions settled- Does the filing of an 'E' form and participation in an earmarking scheme amount to the abandonment of a previously filed C.H. Form under settlement laws?
- Can settlement authorities transfer a property to a claimant in lieu of a house drawn in a lottery outside the exceptions specified in government instructions?
- Whether the High Court can interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with settlement orders that rely on grounds totally extraneous to the settlement scheme?
- Does a belated C.H. Form entitle a claimant to reopen the transfer of a property that has already been disposed of?
- Mst. Farosha vs Fazal Gul and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave examines the legal question of whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is competent to amend a decree based on a compromise in a previous suit during the hearing of a second appeal arising from a separate, subsequent proceeding. The dispute originated from a 1939 civil suit disposed of by a compromise, wherein the appellant relinquished full ownership of agricultural land in exchange for a limited life interest subject to defeasance upon remarriage, but the trial court omitted this limitation from the formal decree. Decades later, the respondents filed a new suit alleging the appellant had remarried and lost her rights. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by invoking section 152 suo motu in a collateral proceeding to amend the 1939 decree after a lapse of 34 years, thereby depriving the appellant of her right of hearing. The Court ruled that an appellate court hearing a second appeal from a subsequent suit is not seized of the earlier decree for the purposes of amendment, and that correction of a decree must be sought before the court that passed it. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court in exercise of its power under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is competent to amend a decree based on a compromise between parties to a suit?
- Can a court correct or amend a previous decree collaterally while hearing proceedings arising from a separate, subsequent suit?
- Does the power of the court under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to amend judgments, decrees, or orders apply without any time limit?
- Whether an appellate court hearing a second appeal can suo motu order the rectification of a decree passed in an entirely different set of proceedings?
- Mst. Farkhunda Sultana vs Abdur Razaq1983 SCMR 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a landlord's petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had set aside an order of ejectment passed against the tenant by the Rent Controller. The landlord had sought ejectment on the grounds of default in rent payment, bona fide personal requirement for her son, and unauthorized alterations. The Rent Controller had ordered ejectment after finding the tenant in default and guilty of unauthorized alterations, but the High Court reversed this, holding that there was no default given the uncertain rate of rent, no unauthorized alteration due to acquiescence and increased property value, and no proved bona fide personal requirement since the son was not examined as a witness. The Supreme Court considered the arguments regarding the misreading of evidence and the necessity of examining the son, but found that the High Court's view was based on a fair consideration of the evidence and suffered from no illegality or perversity. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether non-examination of the beneficiary son is fatal to a claim of bona fide personal requirement in ejectment proceedings?
- Can a landlord claim a higher rate of rent based on an oral agreement when a written agreement setting out enhancement terms is repudiated by both parties?
- Does acquiescence and an increase in property value preclude a landlord from seeking ejectment on the ground of unauthorized alterations?
- Mst. Bibi vs Ismail and Other1983 SCMR 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court in a civil revision petition. The underlying dispute relates to inheritance and ownership of agricultural land. The appellant had filed a suit for a declaration that she was entitled to a 3/4th share in the estate of the deceased Noor Muhammad, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld by the District Judge. During the pendency of the respondents' revision petition in the High Court, the High Court issued an interim stay order clarifying the status quo regarding the possession of the disputed land based on documents and statements of tenants in possession. The Supreme Court examined the rival contentions regarding the alleged misreading of documents by the High Court. Finding that the High Court's discretion was exercised based on statements and concessions made by counsel regarding the cultivating possession and attornment of tenants, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim clarification. The appeal was disposed of with an observation expressing hope that the High Court would give priority to the pending revision petition and decide the core limitation issue expeditiously.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an interim stay order passed by the High Court based on an examination of cultivating possession and tenant attornment?
- Can an appellate or revisional court's exercise of discretion regarding interim relief be challenged on the ground of alleged misreading of documents?
- Mst. Began vs Mst. Bai1983 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the inheritance of an estate. The respondent, a Muslim widow who succeeded to tenancy rights upon her husband's death in 1946 under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912, acquired proprietary rights in 1959. Following the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, her estate was treated as terminated under Section 3, and mutation was sanctioned distributing 1/4th share to her and 3/4th to her deceased husband's sister. The widow challenged the mutation, claiming absolute ownership unaffected by the 1962 Act, succeeding up to the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' decrees, holding that under Section 30-A(1) of the Colonization Act, a female acquiring proprietary rights holds a limited estate analogous to a customary life estate. Consequently, Section 3 of the 1962 Act applied to terminate her limited estate, restricting her entitlement to her 1/4th Shariat share.
Questions settled- Whether the acquisition of proprietary rights under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 confers full ownership or creates a limited estate akin to customary law?
- Whether a limited estate held by a Muslim female under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 stands terminated by virtue of Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
- Does a female tenant who acquires proprietary rights under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 become a fresh stock of descent upon her death?
- Mst. Amro and Others vs Sawab Gul and Other1983 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a long-standing property dispute concerning a house originally given as dower to a widow who held it as a limited owner under custom, and subsequently mortgaged. Reversioners instituted a suit for possession by redemption upon payment of the mortgage charge. The lower courts dismissed the suit on various grounds including res judicata, but the Peshawar High Court accepted the plaintiffs' second appeal and granted possession upon payment of Rs. 310. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether a decree for possession could be passed without compensating the mortgagees for costs incurred in reconstructing the house. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to press the relevant issue regarding improvements before the first appellate court and did not raise it before the High Court, and further found no material on record to support the contention. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Whether a decree for possession by redemption can be passed without allowing mortgagees the costs incurred for the reconstruction of the property?
- Can an issue regarding compensation for improvements not pressed before the first appellate court be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court?
- Whether limited owners under custom possess the right to alienate property left by the last full owner without legal necessity?
- Mst. Amna vs Iind Additional District Judge, Hyderabad and Other1983 SC MR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging lower court decisions in proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act. The petitioner had originally sought custody of two minor children. However, the High Court held that the petition had been rendered infructuous because both children had attained majority during the pendency of the proceedings. The petitioner argued that the children had not reached majority and that the High Court should have decided the jurisdictional question involved in the lower appellate court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not challenge the finding on age since it was based on her own admissions made in the petition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed that where a petition becomes infructuous due to minors reaching majority, deciding pure legal questions would be an exercise in futility. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Does a custody petition under the Guardians and Wards Act become infructuous once the minors attain majority?
- Can a party challenge a finding of fact regarding a minor's age that was based on their own admissions in the pleadings?
- Should a court adjudicate legal issues raised in a constitutional petition if the underlying relief sought has become infructuous?
- Mst. Akhtari Khanum vs Abdul Aziz Khan and Other1983 SCMR 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Mst. Akhtari Khanum sought possession of land measuring 31 Kanals and 2 Marlas in village Lund Khowar, Mardan, which was allotted to her against her verified evacuee claim. Her suit for possession and mesne profits was decreed by the trial court, and the decree for possession was upheld through the appellate hierarchy up to the Peshawar High Court. However, in the concluding portion of its judgment, the High Court suo motu reduced the allotted area to 21 Kanals and 2 Marlas by treating the recorded area as a clerical mistake. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine the justification of the High Court in rectifying the alleged clerical mistake despite consistent revenue records. The Supreme Court held that since the revenue records and settlement authorities consistently verified the area as 31 Kanals and 2 Marlas, the High Court was not justified in reducing the area. The appeal was accepted and the High Court's order was amended to restore the appellant's entitlement to the full 31 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land.
Questions settled- Was the High Court justified in assuming jurisdiction to rectify a so-called clerical mistake in the revenue record regarding the area of land allotted?
- Can the High Court reduce the area of land allotted to a claimant against a verified evacuee claim when the revenue papers consistently record the larger area?
- Mst. Akhtar Jehan Begum and 4 Others vs Muhammad Azam Khan1983 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by special leave arising from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had set aside an order of ejectment and remanded the case. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller is bound to finally determine the quantum or rate of arrears of rent before issuing a tentative rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether non-compliance with such a tentative order warrants striking off the tenant's defence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that for the purpose of a tentative rent order under Section 13(6), the Rent Controller is required to determine the amount of arrears or rate of rent only approximately, not through a final adjudication or regular trial prior to the deposit. The key principle laid down is that compliance with a tentative rent order is a mandatory condition precedent, and failure to comply with it results in the automatic striking off of the tenant's defence and summary ejectment without requiring a prior final inquiry into the actual payment status.
Questions settled- Whether a Rent Controller is required to finally determine the quantum of arrears of rent before passing a tentative rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does the failure of a tenant to comply with a tentative rent deposit order legally justify the striking off of the tenant's defence and summary ejectment?
- Can a tenant withhold compliance with a tentative rent order on the ground that a regular trial or evidence is necessary to establish the actual amount of rent due?
- Mrs. Asia Mahmood vs Miss Aziz Begum1983 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mrs. Asia Mahmood against a decision of the Service Tribunal. The petitioner had previously obtained a remand order from the Supreme Court by representing that she had been condemned unheard due to improper service of notice. Upon remand, the Service Tribunal found that this representation was a misstatement of facts, noting that the petitioner had actually appeared, filed written arguments, and had been given full opportunity to defend her interest. The Tribunal re-decided the matter against the petitioner. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner failed to justify the previous misrepresentation. The Court found that the petitioner had obtained the earlier remand order by abusing the process of the Court through the suppression of material facts regarding her prior participation in the proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner had disentitled herself to any relief and dismissed the petition without hearing the merits of the case, emphasizing that parties who obtain relief through misrepresentation of facts before the Court forfeit their right to be heard.
Questions settled- Does a party who obtains a remand order through the misrepresentation of facts forfeit the right to be heard on the merits of the case?
- Can a party be denied a hearing if they have abused the process of the Court in previous proceedings?
- Is a Service Tribunal competent to review its own previous order?
- MRS. Alima Ahmad vs Amir Ali1983 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had set aside an eviction order against a tenant. The petitioner, a landlady, sought the tenant's ejectment on grounds of default in rent payment for the period between April 1970 and February 1971. While the Rent Controller initially refused eviction due to the landlady's history of accepting accumulated rent, the first appellate authority reversed this, finding no change in the tenancy terms. However, the High Court subsequently held that because the original tenancy agreement had expired, the specific stipulations regarding the time and manner of rent payment were no longer binding, allowing the tenant to pay within sixty days. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's reasoning regarding the expiration of tenancy terms required a more authoritative pronouncement. The core issue concerns whether the terms of a tenancy agreement, specifically regarding the time and manner of rent payment, persist when a tenant continues to hold over after the expiry of the original agreement.
Questions settled- Does a tenancy agreement's stipulation regarding the time and manner of rent payment continue to apply when a tenant holds over after the agreement expires?
- Can a landlord's practice of accepting accumulated rent be used to excuse a tenant's default in payment?
- Is judicial discretion in rent matters exercised arbitrarily if it ignores the express terms of a tenancy agreement?
- MRS. Abdul Rehman Arain vs Mehmoodul Hasan1983 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from an ejectment application filed against the widow of a deceased tenant. The core legal question raised is whether an ejectment application against the widow alone is competent without impleading the other heirs of the deceased tenant who are also in possession of the demised premises. The Court granted leave and allowed the petition, holding that the appeal would be heard on the present record with liberty for parties to file additional documents. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises pending the decision of the appeal, subject to the condition that she continues to deposit rent in court in accordance with earlier orders.
Questions settled- Is an ejectment application competent against only the widow of a deceased tenant when other heirs are in possession of the demised premises?
- Under what conditions can a tenant be protected from eviction pending the hearing of an appeal?
- MR. Yahya Bakhtiar, Advocate vs The State through the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad1983 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the judgment of a Special Court convicting the appellant, a former Attorney-General and holder of a representative office, of misconduct under Article 3 of the Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order, 1977, for alleged electoral rigging during the March 1977 National Assembly elections. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was afforded a fair trial—specifically regarding the appointment of defense counsel in his absence without proper authorization—and whether the prosecution had established the charges of electoral rigging through direct or indirect evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed serious legal errors by appointing unauthorized counsel, denying the appellant the right to cross-examine key prosecution witnesses, and refusing to recall those witnesses. Furthermore, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove through positive evidence that the appellant was personally responsible for, or had instigated, the electoral malpractices. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Whether a special court can appoint a defense counsel for an accused in his absence without a written and signed power-of-attorney or proper statutory authorization?
- Can a candidate be held criminally liable for electoral misconduct or rigging committed by an agent without positive evidence that the acts were done at the candidate's instigation or instructions?
- Does the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses render their oral testimony inadmissible in evidence?
- Whether the sanction for prosecution required under the Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order, 1977, was validly issued by the competent authority?
- Mohib Raziq vs Shah Muhammad and Another1983 SCMR 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the grant of pre-arrest bail to an accused charged with murder. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail is appropriate in a murder case where the accused is named in the FIR (which serves as a dying declaration) and medical evidence supports the injuries, despite the fact that the eye-witnesses named in the FIR had not yet provided statements to the police. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in granting bail. The Court emphasized that a dying declaration, if proved, can form the basis of a conviction, and the mere absence of immediate support from eye-witnesses does not negate the existence of a prima facie case. The Court laid down the principle that pre-arrest bail in serious offenses like murder should be rare and is not justified where a prima facie case exists, the accused is named in the FIR, and the motive is established. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower court orders and cancelled the respondent's bail.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be based solely on a dying declaration?
- Does the failure of eye-witnesses to support an FIR at the initial stage automatically negate a prima facie case against an accused named therein?
- Is the grant of pre-arrest bail in a murder case appropriate when the accused is named in the FIR and medical evidence supports the allegations?
- Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail?
- Moharram All vs The State and Another1983 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging an order of detention imposed for the alleged violation of an ad interim injunction. The core legal question concerns the appropriate penalty for the disobedience of a temporary injunction order issued during civil proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the penalty of four months' detention in a civil prison imposed by the trial court was excessive under the circumstances. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Court ruled that the period of rigorous imprisonment already undergone by the petitioner was sufficient to meet the ends of justice and accordingly reduced the detention period to that already undergone. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts may review and mitigate disproportionate penalties imposed for the disobedience of interim court orders.
Questions settled- Whether the penalty imposed for the disobedience of a temporary injunction can be reduced by an appellate court?
- Is detention in a civil prison the appropriate remedy for the wilful disregard of a status quo order?
- Can a petition against an order punishing for the violation of an injunction be converted into an appeal?
- Mohammad Arif Effendi vs Egypt Air1983 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an agent of the respondent, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed an Intra Court Appeal concerning the denial of interim relief, specifically attachment before judgment and injunctions against the respondent's remittance of earnings abroad. The core legal question was whether the respondent's routine remittance of earnings through the State Bank of Pakistan constituted an attempt to defeat a potential decree, thereby justifying attachment under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that routine business remittances do not equate to the removal of assets intended to defeat a decree. However, to protect the petitioner's financial interests and ensure compliance with previous court orders regarding the petitioner's agency commission, the Court modified the interim relief. The principle laid down is that while the court possesses inherent jurisdiction to preserve property for the benefit of a potential decree-holder, such relief must be balanced against the ongoing business operations of the parties, and routine commercial remittances do not automatically warrant attachment before judgment.
Questions settled- Does the routine remittance of business earnings by a foreign entity through the State Bank of Pakistan constitute an attempt to defeat a potential decree warranting attachment before judgment?
- Can a court exercise its inherent jurisdiction to preserve the property of a defendant for the benefit of a potential decree-holder?
- Is the High Court the appropriate forum to ensure obedience to its own orders under Article 187(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Mistri Muhammad Nazir vs Mian Muhammad Shafi and Other1983S C M R 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition was filed against the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal, wherein the petitioner claimed rights over the disputed property. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that the property was disposed of on January 29, 1960, prior to the issuance of a Press Note dated May 3, 1960, which governed properties converted to other uses after August 14, 1947. The petitioner contended that the Court overlooked his pre-existing rights under paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. I, promulgated in July 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that it was doubtful whether any rights accrued to the petitioner under the said paragraph. Furthermore, the Court noted that this specific contention was never pressed during the appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner against the original disposal order of January 29, 1960. Consequently, the grounds for review were found to be unsustainable.
Questions settled- Can a petitioner raise a ground in a review petition before the Supreme Court if that ground was not pressed in the appeal before the lower settlement authorities?
- Does the subsequent issuance of a Press Note affect the validity of a property disposal that was finalized prior to its publication?
- Miss Rukhsana Rashid vs Principal, King Edward Medical College, Lahore And Other1983 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the denial of the petitioner's admission to the first M.B., B.S. class for the 1979-1980 session. The petitioner, daughter of a private medical practitioner, sought admission under a specific quota reserved for children of doctors. The core legal questions were whether the admission rules were applied retrospectively and whether the petitioner was illegally denied a seat within her category. The Supreme Court found that the admission rules were in operation prior to the session in question, and that the petitioner was rightfully denied admission because other candidates in her category possessed higher marks. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, noting that three years had elapsed since the academic session, and displacing students currently in their third year would be inequitable. The Court held that discretionary relief is inappropriate when significant time has passed and the merits of the underlying claim are factually unsupported.
Questions settled- Can a court deny discretionary relief in an admission matter if significant time has elapsed since the academic session?
- Is it permissible to challenge admission rules on the basis of retrospective application if the rules were in effect prior to the application date?
- Does a candidate have a legal right to admission under a quota system if other candidates in the same category have higher merit marks?
- Misri Khan vs Kala Khan and Other1983SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondents of murder charges, overturning their conviction by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in discarding the prosecution's evidence, particularly regarding the recovery of crime weapons and the corroboration of ocular testimony, in a case involving deep-seated family enmity. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had rejected the recovery evidence based on the alleged partiality of an attesting witness and the timing of the recovery, without sufficiently addressing the trial court's reasoning. Finding that the High Court's dismissal of the recovery evidence and the subsequent lack of corroboration required deeper judicial scrutiny to prevent a potential miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The principle affirmed is that appellate courts must provide robust, legally sound reasons when discarding trial court findings on evidence, especially when such findings are central to the conviction and the assessment of corroborative material.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court discard evidence of recovery of crime weapons solely on the ground that the recovery occurred on the last day of police remand?
- Is the testimony of a witness related to the complainant party inherently unreliable in a criminal trial?
- Does the existence of bitter enmity between parties automatically necessitate the rejection of motive as corroborative evidence for ocular testimony?
- Misbahuddin and Others vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of appellant Misbahuddin, along with life imprisonment sentences for his co-appellants, for murder and hurt under Sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellants attacked the deceased and injured witnesses following a dispute. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to explain injuries sustained by Misbahuddin, suggesting a sudden fight. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's shifting motives and the unexplained contemporaneous injuries on Misbahuddin indicated a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel without undue advantage or cruelty. Consequently, the Court held that the case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court ruled that in a sudden fight, the question of common intention does not arise, making vicarious liability inapplicable. Misbahuddin's conviction was altered to Section 304, Part I, and the convictions of the co-appellants under Section 302/34 were set aside, substituting them with individual convictions under Section 324.
Questions settled- Whether a sudden, unpremeditated fight arising from a minor dispute where both parties sustain injuries falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can the principle of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to hold co-accused vicariously liable in a sudden fight?
- Is the right of private defence available to an accused when the court determines the transaction to be a sudden fight under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Mirza Tahir Baig and Others vs Cantonment Board, Multan Cantt. and Another1983 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a civil revision petition regarding a dispute over easement rights and the construction of commercial buildings by the Cantonment Board, Multan. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, alongside an application for a temporary injunction, which were concurrently dismissed by the lower courts. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the parties reached an amicable settlement to resolve the grievance concerning restricted passage to the petitioners' houses. The respondents undertook to remove the front and back walls of a specific shop to serve as a passageway, cover the drains, and refrain from building structures projecting into the street. In consideration of this binding undertaking, the petitioners agreed to withdraw their pending civil suit. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition in terms of the compromise.
Questions settled- Can a petition for leave to appeal be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached between the parties before the Supreme Court?
- Whether easement rights over an open space in a Cantonment area can form the basis of a suit for permanent injunction?
- Mirza Muhammad Saeed vs Shahabuddin and 8 Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The petitioner had initially filed an appeal against a decree for specific performance in the District Court, despite the jurisdictional value of the suit exceeding the District Judge's pecuniary limits. Consequently, the appeal was returned for presentation to the proper forum, resulting in a significant delay in filing before the High Court. The core legal question was whether the delay caused by the counsel's error in filing the appeal in the wrong forum could be condoned under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the counsel's mistake was not a bona fide error made with due diligence, but rather the result of gross negligence. The Court laid down the principle that while courts may condone delays arising from bona fide mistakes, they will not grant relief under the Limitation Act where the error stems from a lack of due care and caution, leaving the aggrieved client to seek damages against the negligent counsel.
Questions settled- Can a delay caused by a counsel's gross negligence in filing an appeal in the wrong forum be condoned under the Limitation Act 1908?
- Does a mistake arising from a lack of due diligence and caution constitute 'sufficient cause' for the extension of limitation?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a litigant who suffers loss due to the gross negligence of their legal counsel?
- Mirza Maqbool Ahmad vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and Another1983 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a property dispute concerning a residential building in Hyderabad previously transferred to the appellant, a claimant displaced person, under the Earmarking Scheme, culminating in the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) in 1960. Respondent No. 2, a local occupant whose initial transfer form had been rejected because the property's evaluation exceeded Rs. 10,000, subsequently moved a miscellaneous application years later, leading the Additional Settlement Commissioner to re-examine the valuation and direct the disposal of the respondent's form, which decision was maintained by the High Court. The core legal question was whether settled transfer proceedings and an issued P.T.O. could be reopened on a miscellaneous application based on a subsequent discovery regarding the market value of the property. The Supreme Court held that once a transfer attains finality under the relevant statutory provisions, it cannot be reopened on grounds of newly discovered facts or altered valuation. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and Additional Settlement Commissioner, and restored the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order.
Questions settled- Whether settled transfer proceedings and an issued Permanent Transfer Order can be reopened on a miscellaneous application based on a subsequent discovery regarding the market value of a property?
- Does a local occupant whose transfer form was rejected for property valuation exceeding Rs. 10,000 have the right to have the matter reopened years later?
- Whether an Additional Settlement Commissioner can set aside a finalized transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, on time-barred and misconceived miscellaneous proceedings?
- Mian Said Baghdad vs Said Mian and 2 Other1983 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of two respondents by the Peshawar High Court, reversing their convictions and sentences of death and life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot and killed the deceased in a mosque following a dispute over a refuse dump. The High Court acquitted the respondents on several grounds, including an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), discrepancies in the complainant's testimony regarding his presence, the deferral of eye-witness examinations to the next day, and physical inconsistencies between the single entry wound on the deceased and the pellets recovered from the scene. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the appeals, held that the High Court's appraisal of the evidence did not violate any legal principles or ignore material facts. The Court reaffirmed that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with unless the findings are unreasonable, opposed to established rules of evidence, or suffer from patent error.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
- Does a delay in examining eye-witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 weaken the prosecution's case?
- Can an acquittal be reversed if the High Court's view of the evidence is reasonable and does not suffer from patent error, even if a different view is possible?
- Mian Muhammad and Others vs The Municipal Committee through Its1983 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court. The petitioners, who occupied shops in Khushab, initially paid rent to the Municipal Committee but later paid rent to the Government of the Punjab after the Government claimed ownership of the site. When the Municipal Committee resolved to demolish the shops to construct a bus stand, the petitioners challenged the action. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting pending proceedings under M.L.O. 821 and the historical tenancy relationship. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dismissal, holding that the status of the petitioners as tenants, trespassers, or licensees constituted a controverted question of fact. The Court laid down the principle that disputed questions of fact regarding the status of occupants and property title cannot be resolved under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and the appropriate remedy for such disputes lies before a civil court of competent jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a disputed question of fact regarding an occupant's status as a tenant, trespasser, or licensee be resolved under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- What is the appropriate legal forum for resolving a title dispute and tenancy status between occupants, a municipal committee, and the provincial government?
- Does the existence of a factual controversy regarding property ownership and tenancy bar the maintainability of a constitutional petition?
- Messrs Vulcan Company Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan and Other,1983 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing its constitutional petition regarding the levy of customs duty and sales taxes on a Mercedes Benz car in its possession, which had been smuggled into Pakistan in contravention of import and custom laws. Although the petitioner was exonerated from the actual act of smuggling, the High Court held that the acquisition and possession of the vehicle created a liability to pay the duties and taxes if the owner wished to retain the goods. The Supreme Court examined the contentions regarding the interpretation of section 156(11) of the Customs Act, holding that the statutory language is comprehensive and applies to the circumstances of the case, rejecting the restrictive interpretation proposed by the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view that the incidence of customs duty and sales tax falls on imported goods and the current owner seeking retention is liable, and therefore dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a person exonerated of actual smuggling is liable to pay customs duty and sales tax on a smuggled vehicle found in their possession if they wish to retain it?
- Does section 156(11) of the Customs Act 1969 apply only to goods imported with the intention of re-exporting them?
- Messrs Tiger Wire Product Ltd. vs S. Abrar Hussain1983 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that ordered the eviction of the petitioner from demised premises under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the landlord's requirement for personal use is invalidated if the landlord also intends to accommodate dependent relations, and whether the size of the property relative to the landlord's needs is a valid ground for a tenant to object. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a landlord seeks eviction for personal use, the inclusion of dependent family members in that requirement does not negate the bona fide nature of the claim. The Court affirmed that once a landlord establishes a bona fide personal requirement, the law does not prohibit them from accommodating others in the property. Furthermore, the Court held that a tenant cannot object to the size of the premises or claim the landlord is being extravagant, as such matters do not undermine the landlord's right to occupy their own property.
Questions settled- Is the requirement of a landlord to accommodate dependent relations relevant when determining the bona fide nature of a personal use eviction claim?
- Can a tenant object to an eviction order on the grounds that the property is too large for the landlord's genuine needs?
- Does the law prohibit a landlord from accommodating others in a property after obtaining possession for personal use?
- Messrs Thaver & Co. Ltd. vs Mrs. Mumtaz Begum1983 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the striking off of the petitioner-tenant's defense for failing to comply with a rent deposit order issued by the Rent Controller under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner argued that the defense should not be struck off under Section 16(2) of the Ordinance before the final determination of the rate of rent and arrears, as contemplated by Section 16(3) of the same Ordinance. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that the legal question regarding the interplay between Section 16(2) and Section 16(3) did not arise in the present case because the rent deposit order was passed with the consent of the parties, there was no genuine dispute regarding the rate of rent, and the tenant had failed to deposit any rent after the application for striking off the defense was filed. Consequently, the Court found the case unsuitable for granting leave to appeal, noting that the broader legal question was already pending consideration in another case.
Questions settled- Can a tenant's defense be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order passed with the consent of the parties?
- Does the failure to deposit rent after an application for striking off the defense has been filed justify the striking off of the defense?
- Messrs Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd.S vs Government of Sind and Another1983 SCMR 1298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-09-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Messrs Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. against the Government of Sind and another. The core legal questions concern whether urban immovable property tax can be lawfully levied in the absence of necessary machinery provisions within the governing act or its rules, and whether such tax can be levied without an assessing authority being duly created under the relevant legislation. The Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine these substantial questions of law, noting that leave had already been granted in similar matters. Furthermore, the Court granted interim relief restraining the recovery of the impugned tax subject to the petitioners furnishing a bank guarantee for accrued and accruing dues, and ordered security for costs.
Questions settled- Whether it is possible for urban immovable property tax to be levied in the absence of any machinery provisions being present in the Act or in the rules thereunder under which the purported levy is being made?
- Whether it is possible for urban immovable property tax to be levied in the absence of an assessing authority having been duly created under the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act and/or the rules framed thereunder?
- Messrs Qureshi Construction Co. Ltd.S vs Government of Sind and Another1983 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a judgment and order of the Sind High Court dismissing a revision petition regarding the price payable for industrial plots allotted to the petitioner. The core legal question concerns whether a subsequent government policy letter reducing the price of industrial plots applied retrospectively to the petitioner's prior allotment or only to future transactions. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent decision reducing the rate was applicable solely to allotments made after the petitioner's plots and did not alter the terms of the existing contract. The Court laid down the principle that government policy letters regarding price reductions apply prospectively to future transactions unless expressly stated otherwise, and a party cannot unilaterally force altered terms onto a concluded allotment without a breach by the respondents.
Questions settled- Does a subsequent government policy reducing the price of industrial plots apply retrospectively to prior allotments?
- Can an allottee of industrial plots unilaterally enforce a reduced price policy issued after the initial allotment?
- Whether the High Court's dismissal of a revision petition regarding plot pricing warranted interference by the Supreme Court?
- Messrs Moulvi Ali Muhammad Nazar Muhammad Butt vs Barkat Ali1983 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent orders of ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from a shop on the ground of reconstruction under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal question raised was whether the lower courts and the High Court failed to establish that the landlord's requirement for reconstruction was reasonable and backed by good faith as mandated by law after its 1965 amendment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court and the lower forums had indeed recorded findings regarding the bona fide and urgent need of the landlord for reconstruction. Furthermore, the Court noted that adequate statutory protections exist under the penal provisions of the rent law to safeguard the tenant's interests in the event the landlord fails to carry out the reconstruction. The key principle laid down is that where concurrent findings of bona fide requirement for reconstruction are present, and statutory safeguards against non-reconstruction exist, ejectment orders under rent restriction laws shall be maintained.
Questions settled- Whether the bona fides of a landlord are relevant when seeking ejectment on the ground of reconstruction?
- What remedies are available to a tenant if a landlord procures ejectment for reconstruction but fails to carry it out?
- Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the reasonable and good faith requirement of premises for reconstruction open to interference in leave to appeal?
- Messrs Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. and Others vs Salahuddin Khan and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the execution proceedings and appellate judgments arising from a previous consent order of the Supreme Court dated November 24, 1976, which had settled a dispute over the management and directorship of a public limited company, Messrs Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. The core legal questions involved whether a consent order embodying a private settlement and terms of office of company executives is executable through execution proceedings, whether the removal of a company executive on subsequent grounds furnishes a fresh cause of action outside execution proceedings, and the extent of relief permissible under constitutional and execution jurisdiction. By majority decision, the Supreme Court held that disputes regarding subsequent removals of company executives on new facts give rise to a fresh cause of action and cannot be resolved through execution proceedings of a declaratory consent order. The Court laid down that execution proceedings cannot be utilized to adjudicate new factual controversies or grant mandatory injunctions reinstating corporate officers beyond the scope of declaratory relief.
Questions settled- Can a consent order incorporating a private agreement regarding corporate offices be executed through execution proceedings?
- Does the subsequent removal of a company executive give rise to a fresh cause of action distinct from an earlier consent order?
- Can a High Court issue a writ of mandamus to reinstate a corporate officer in execution or constitutional proceedings?
- Are disputed questions of fact regarding the internal management of a company resolvable in execution proceedings?
- Messrs Four Friends Construction Company, Lahore vs Messrs Domez1983 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil review petition arises from an order dismissing Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1979 on 9-4-1980. The petitioner sought a review and filed an application for condonation of a 45-day delay in filing the petition, claiming an apprehension that the appeal was fixed for re-arguments because it had only been partly heard when court time ended. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient and proper cause for condoning the delay, as there was no explanation for the period between obtaining a copy of the order on 24-5-1980 and the filing of the petition on 23-6-1980. The core legal principle established is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must account for each and every day of delay after acquiring knowledge of the disposal of the matter and the expiration of the limitation period. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as time-barred.
Questions settled- Whether a petitioner seeking condonation of delay must account for each and every day after the expiry of the limitation period?
- Is an apprehension that an appeal was fixed for re-arguments sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing a review petition?
- What is the consequence of failing to provide a proper explanation for the delay between obtaining a copy of the judgment and filing a review petition?
- Messrs Fatima Export Corporation and Another vs Habib Bank Ltd.1983 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal challenging both an ex parte decree and a subsequent order refusing to set it aside. The appellants had filed a single consolidated appeal in the High Court against both the ex parte decree and the refusal order, paying full court-fees for the decree. The High Court affirmed the refusal order but failed to address the merits of the underlying ex parte decree. The Supreme Court granted leave to determine whether the High Court was obligated to decide the first appeal against the ex parte decree on its merits. The Supreme Court held that since a first appeal was filed and full court-fees were paid, the High Court was legally required to dispose of the challenge to the ex parte decree, regardless of whether it was consolidated with the appeal against the refusal order. The Court ruled that the failure to address the merits of the decree was an error, and remanded the case to the High Court for determination on the merits, leaving the issue of limitation for the High Court to consider.
Questions settled- Is a High Court required to decide the merits of a first appeal against an ex parte decree even if it is consolidated with an appeal against an order refusing to set aside that decree?
- Does the payment of full court-fees on a consolidated memorandum of appeal satisfy the requirement for challenging an ex parte decree?
- Can a court dismiss an appeal against an ex parte decree without addressing its merits when the appellant has raised grounds challenging the decree's validity?
- Messrs Everyday Pictures Ltd. vs Chamman Begum.1983 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing the petitioner tenant's First Rent Appeal and upholding concurrent orders for ejectment on the grounds of default in rent and personal bona fide requirement. The core legal question was whether the lack of a formal notice under section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, from the transferee-landlord vitiated the ejectment proceedings for default, and whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal need could be reassessed. The Supreme Court held that where the tenant had actual notice of the transfer of ownership from the previous authority and had voluntarily paid rent to the new landlord for several months, the statutory purpose of section 13-A was fulfilled, precluding the tenant from claiming prejudice; furthermore, concurrent findings of fact on personal need cannot be re-appraised. The Court laid down the principle that actual knowledge and acknowledgment of a change of ownership by paying rent obviates the strict necessity of a formal notice under section 13-A for establishing default, and that lack of notice does not affect ejectment applications maintained on independent grounds such as personal need.
Questions settled- Does the failure of a transferee-landlord to serve a formal notice under section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, bar an ejectment petition for default where the tenant had actual knowledge of the transfer and paid rent?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the personal bona fide requirement of a landlord be re-appraised by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
- Does the non-service of notice under section 13-A affect the maintainability of an ejectment application on grounds other than default in payment of rent?
- Messrs Dada Ltd. vs Madrasa Mazharul Uloom Association1983 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a second appeal filed by the petitioner against an eviction order issued under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents' claim of bona fide requirement for the rented premises was valid, specifically challenging the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact. The petitioner argued that the respondents owned another property, an Eidgah, which could potentially be utilized for the same purpose, thereby negating the bona fide requirement for the disputed premises. The Supreme Court observed that the property in dispute was distinct from the Eidgah property. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement, holding that there was no justification to re-open the matter. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide requirement in rent matters, when based on relevant circumstances, are generally not subject to interference in further appeal.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord in a rent eviction case?
- Does the existence of an alternative property owned by a landlord necessarily negate the bona fide requirement for the disputed premises?
- Messrs Chaudhri Wire Rope Industries Ltd. vs The Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle I, Lahore1983 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the re-opening of a sales tax assessment. The core legal question is whether the Sales Tax Officer possessed the jurisdiction to re-open the question of the tax liability of the item in dispute, notwithstanding that in an earlier assessment order dated 21-2-1975 for the assessment year 1969-70, the officer had categorically held the said item to be exempted from sales tax. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider this jurisdictional issue, directed the case to be made ready for hearing within six months on the existing record with liberty to the parties to add relied-upon documents, and ordered that the interim order shall continue in the meantime.
Questions settled- Whether the Sales Tax Officer has the jurisdiction to re-open the question of liability of an item to sales tax after having held it exempted in an earlier assessment order?
- Can a tax authority review or re-assess an item previously granted an exemption in a finalized assessment order for a specific assessment year?
- Messrs Bambino Ltd. vs Messrs Selmor International Ltd. and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order directing the restitution of possession of a rented premise to the second respondent. The petitioner, a landlord, had obtained an ex parte ejectment order against a previous tenant, but during execution, the second respondent—who had been lawfully inducted as a new tenant by the petitioner—was dispossessed. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, operating under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, possessed the jurisdiction to order restitution of possession to a person wrongly dispossessed, given that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not apply to these proceedings in its entirety. The Supreme Court held that while the Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable, Rent Controllers are free to follow its equitable principles. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller has the inherent authority to ensure justice in execution proceedings, including the restitution of possession to a third party wrongly dispossessed, and confirmed that such orders are appealable under the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to order restitution of possession to a person wrongly dispossessed during the execution of an ejectment order?
- Are the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before a Rent Controller under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Is an order passed by a Rent Controller in execution proceedings appealable under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Messrs Adam Ltd. vs Abdul Sattar1983 SCMR 1313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the termination of an accountant's services by his employer, Messrs Adam Ltd. The respondent challenged his termination before the First Sind Labour Court under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Labour Court ruled in his favor, but the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed this, finding the respondent was not a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court subsequently set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that the Labour Court's decision was not an 'award' subject to appeal and that the Labour Court's factual finding regarding the respondent's status as a 'workman' was final. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the High Court correctly declined to re-appraise evidence regarding the nature of the respondent's duties. The Court held that factual findings by a Labour Court concerning whether an employee performs clerical or supervisory duties are not subject to re-examination by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Is a decision of a Labour Court under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, appealable as an 'award'?
- Can a High Court re-examine findings of fact regarding an employee's status as a 'workman' in its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the designation of 'Chief Accountant' automatically exclude an employee from the definition of a 'workman' under labour laws?
- Member Federal Land Commission vs Abdul Qadir Khan and Other1983 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from civil petitions directed against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning land reforms and the interpretation of Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The first respondent, a retired civil servant, had purchased extensive lands and subsequently transferred portions of it by way of gift to his legal heirs and a non-legal heir (daughter-in-law) prior to the promulgation of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. Upon scrutiny of his declaration, authorities differed on the permissible retention limits and the validity of the transfers. The Federal Land Commission in suo motu revision restricted the respondent's retention. The Peshawar High Court in writ jurisdiction upheld the respondent's right to retain a larger area and validated the gift in favour of the daughter-in-law, holding that the embargo under paragraph 10 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 did not apply to a non-heir as defined under paragraph 7. The Supreme Court considered these aspects in light of the statutory provisions governing land transfers and retention limits.
Questions settled- Whether a transfer of land made by way of gift in favour of a non-legal heir is hit by the embargo placed under paragraph 10 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
- What is the extent of land a civil servant who purchased land can retain under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
- Does the Federal Land Commission possess suo motu revisional powers to examine orders passed by provincial land authorities?
- Mehrban vs Abdul Hamid alias Majid (Hamidullah) and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the convictions and death sentences of the respondents for murder and rioting, acquitting them of all charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court's appraisal of the evidence and rejection of the ocular testimony was based on safe principles of criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court committed no error in disbelieving the prosecution witnesses. The Court laid down the principle that where eye-witnesses are closely related and partisan, and their testimony suffers from grave inherent improbabilities, material contradictions with medical evidence regarding the weapons used, and the withholding of true facts concerning the death of a person on the scene, their testimony cannot safely be relied upon without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the admission of an accused coupled with a self-defence plea cannot be selectively used to convict him when the entire prosecution fabric is tainted with falsehood and suppression of truth.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of partisan and closely related eye-witnesses can form the basis of a capital conviction without independent corroboration?
- Does a material contradiction between the ocular account of weapons used and the medical evidence regarding injuries invalidate the prosecution case?
- Can an accused's statement admitting presence and acts be used to sustain a conviction when the prosecution story is found to be riddled with suppression of truth and improbabilities?
- Whether the High Court's reappraisal of evidence in an appeal against conviction warrants interference by the Supreme Court when based on sound principles of caution?
- Mehram Khan and Others vs Fateh Khan and Other1983 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from two petitions concerning agricultural land disputes involving allegations of encroachment. The core legal question raised was whether a civil court lacks jurisdiction to determine a question of encroachment and whether the appointment of a retired Qanoongo as a local commissioner was legally valid. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while demarcation of boundaries is within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities, a civil suit is necessary to claim possession of encroached land, and appointing a retired field Qanoongo with the consent of the parties when serving revenue officers are unavailable is permissible and in accordance with applicable rules. The Court laid down the principle that civil courts possess the jurisdiction to entertain suits for possession following demarcation in boundary disputes, and local commissioners may be appointed from retired revenue personnel not below the rank of field Qanoongo when necessary.
Questions settled- Does a civil court have jurisdiction to determine the question of encroachment and award possession of agricultural land?
- Can a retired field Qanoongo be appointed as a local commissioner in boundary dispute cases when serving revenue officers are unavailable?
- Can a claim of adverse possession be sustained where the encroachment itself was denied by the party?
- Mehraj Din and Others vs Mst. Mehraj Bibi and Other1983 SCMR 1135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a civil appeal regarding the maintainability of a review application under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed after the withdrawal of an appeal against the trial court's order rejecting a plaint. The core legal question was whether a review application is competent if an appeal against the order sought to be reviewed was previously filed and subsequently withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of an appeal effectively removes the appeal from the record, thereby allowing the litigant to benefit from the legal fiction that no appeal had been preferred. Consequently, a review application filed after such withdrawal is maintainable. However, on the merits of the case, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the trial court's order to pay the requisite court fee under Section 7(v)(c) of the Court Fees Act 1870, and had failed to provide any justification for such non-compliance. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order.
Questions settled- Is a review application filed after the withdrawal of an appeal competent?
- Does the withdrawal of an appeal create a legal fiction that no appeal was ever preferred?
- Can a court reject a plaint for non-compliance with an order to pay court fees if the plaintiff fails to provide justification for non-compliance?
- Mehdi Khan and Others vs The State and Another1983 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioners by an Additional Sessions Judge in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's discretion to grant bail, given the trial court's alleged misreading of the record regarding the petitioners' specific roles in the fatal assault and the validity of the investigation's findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction, as the trial court had ignored material evidence in the First Information Report regarding the petitioners' participation in the attack on the deceased. Furthermore, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the investigation's reliance on unauthorized oaths to place accused persons in column No. 2. The Supreme Court affirmed that where a lower court misreads material evidence, its exercise of discretion is subject to interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with a trial court's order granting bail if the trial court misread the record?
- Is a counter-version filed by complaint two months after an occurrence a sufficient ground for bail?
- Does the placement of an accused in column No. 2 of a police report based on unauthorized oaths bind the court in bail proceedings?
- Mdad Alt & Company vs Superintendent of Customs Etc.1983 PLD Supreme Court 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the liability of the appellant's hotel to pay central excise duty. The core legal question was whether the appellant could claim an exemption from excise duty by bifurcating its billing into separate charges for room rent and breakfast, such that neither individual charge exceeded the Rs. 25 daily threshold, even though the aggregate daily charge for the room and breakfast exceeded that amount. The Supreme Court held that the exemption notification, which excluded services where the daily rent of a room, with or without charges for breakfast, did not exceed Rs. 25, was unambiguous. The Court ruled that the exemption is unavailable if the total amount charged for the room, including optional services like breakfast, exceeds the prescribed limit. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the practice of issuing separate bills does not circumvent the tax liability if the aggregate daily charge exceeds the threshold. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the departmental authorities' assessment.
Questions settled- Does the separation of room rent and breakfast charges in hotel billing allow for an exemption from excise duty if the aggregate daily charge exceeds the statutory threshold?
- Are services, facilities, and utilities provided by a hotel considered 'excisable services' under the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944?
- Does the exemption notification for hotel services apply when the total daily charge for a room, including optional services, exceeds the specified monetary limit?
- Mazhar Hussain Khan and Others vs Government of West Pakistan1983 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition regarding the classification of evacuee land for allotment purposes. The core legal question was whether the Rehabilitation Commissioner’s 1958 Memorandum, which reclassified specific evacuee lands as 'canal irrigated' for allotment, was valid and effectively superseded the general instructions contained in paragraph 29 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Rehabilitation Commissioner possessed plenary power under paragraph 23 of the Scheme to issue instructions for its proper implementation, which included the authority to amend or vary previous instructions. The Court established the principle that a statutory functionary empowered to issue orders for the implementation of a scheme retains the authority to amend or vary those orders, provided they remain consistent with the scheme. Consequently, administrative instructions issued under such delegated power can supersede prior general instructions, and judicial orders passed in direct contravention of valid administrative directives are void ab initio and may be ignored by the relevant authorities.
Questions settled- Does the Rehabilitation Commissioner have the power to amend or vary instructions issued under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
- Can administrative instructions issued under paragraph 23 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme supersede the general instructions in paragraph 29?
- Are judicial orders passed by settlement authorities in contravention of valid administrative instructions void ab initio?
- Does the General Clauses Act 1897 confer the power to amend or vary orders upon a statutory functionary?
- Maula Bakhsh Etc. vs Mst. Bushra Khatoon Etc.S1983 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of a Letters Patent Bench, which had set aside the transfer of disputed property in favour of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Maula Bakhsh, due to unsigned C. H. Forms. The core legal questions involve whether the absence of a signature or thumb-mark on a C. H. Form is a curable defect under paragraph 7 of Scheme No. I, and whether the Letters Patent Appeal had abated due to the delayed substitution of legal representatives following the death of Maula Bakhsh. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the curability of the defect and the abatement of the appeal require formal consideration. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues further.
Questions settled- Whether the absence of a signature or thumb-mark on a C. H. Form is a curable defect under paragraph 7 of Scheme No. I?
- Whether a Letters Patent Appeal abates if an application to implead legal representatives is filed beyond the prescribed period without showing sufficient cause?
- Master Nizam vs Abdul Majid and Another1983 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's First Rent Appeal, which challenged an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal questions involve the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, the necessity of a registered sale-deed for property transfer where legal restrictions apply, and the validity of service of notice regarding the transfer of ownership. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord-tenant relationship and default in rent were properly made, noting that the petitioner's own pleadings admitted the absence of a registered sale-deed due to the location of the property and that notice under section 13-A was duly served and established. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless, upholding the lower courts' findings.
Questions settled- Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant can be established without a registered sale-deed in respect of properties where registered conveyances are not applicable?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding default in rent are open to further scrutiny in a petition for leave to appeal?
- Whether service of notice of attornment is established when the tenant's signatures on court pleadings tally with the acknowledgment receipt?
- Maqbool Ahmad vs The State1983 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of ocular testimony from closely related witnesses in the presence of subsisting enmity and the possibility of identification at the time of the occurrence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below was free from any violation of legal principles and that concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses and identification would not be interfered with. The key principle laid down is that the assessment and belief of evidence is a matter of fact, and appellate interference is unwarranted where lower courts have properly evaluated ocular testimony despite related witnesses and previous enmity.
Questions settled- Can ocular testimony from witnesses closely related to the deceased be relied upon without corroboration in cases of subsisting enmity?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses and identification of the assailant?
- Does the appreciation of evidence by lower courts warrant interference when no violation of a principle of law has been committed?
- Maqbool Ahmad and Others vs Mst. Hanifa Bibi and Other1983 SCMR 1247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed an application filed by the petitioners seeking to avoid a compromise decree previously passed in a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could repudiate a compromise agreement, which had been accepted by their counsel and their brother in open court, on the grounds that they were personally absent and had not authorized the compromise. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners failed to establish any valid basis to challenge the compromise. The Court observed that the petitioners' counsel had approved the settlement, and the compromise was dictated in open court, leaving no ambiguity requiring clarification. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that a party is bound by a compromise entered into by their counsel in open court, especially when the record indicates the settlement was accepted and no credible evidence exists to suggest the counsel lacked authority or that the compromise was invalid.
Questions settled- Can a party avoid a compromise decree on the ground that they were not personally present when it was entered into?
- Is a compromise entered into by a counsel in open court binding on the parties?
- Does a court have grounds to set aside a compromise order when the counsel for the parties has approved it?
- Maqbool Ahmad and Another vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1983 PLD Supreme Court 337 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which disposed of a writ petition in an urban settlement dispute by directing the parties to seek remedy in a civil court, holding that the Settlement Authorities had become functus officio after issuing Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.Ds.). The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities possessed jurisdiction to clarify, determine, or demarcate specific portions, such as the roof of a transferred property, after the issuance of P.T.Ds., or if the parties must resort to a civil court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Settlement Authorities are competent to determine questions and interpret transfer orders by demarcating portions of a building included in respective transfers when a dispute arises between transferees of separate properties. The Court laid down that while Settlement Authorities generally become functus officio after P.T.D. issuance, they retain jurisdiction to clarify or demarcate exact portions or resolve disputes concerning the inclusion of specific parts like roofs, and that the civil court's prior determination of lacking jurisdiction barred referring the parties back to it.
Questions settled- Whether the Settlement Authorities become functus officio to determine and demarcate properties after the issuance of the Permanent Transfer Deed?
- Do Settlement Authorities have jurisdiction to clarify or determine whether a roof of a transferred property was included in the transfer documents?
- Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction refer parties to a civil court when a civil court has already finally held that the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities?
- Manzoor vs Home Secretary and Other1983 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, previously convicted of an offense under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had his conviction reduced to section 304-I by the High Court. After serving his sentence and being released, the complainant filed a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the original murder charge. The Supreme Court granted leave, resulting in the petitioner's re-arrest and subsequent detention pending the appeal. The Supreme Court eventually allowed the appeal against acquittal, restoring the original life imprisonment sentence. The core legal question was whether the period of detention served by the petitioner while the appeal against his acquittal was pending before the Supreme Court should be counted towards his total sentence. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that such detention must be computed towards the sentence. The principle laid down is that the period an accused spends in custody during the pendency of an appeal against acquittal before the Supreme Court must be credited against the sentence ultimately imposed upon the restoration of the conviction.
Questions settled- Should the period of detention served by an accused during the pendency of an appeal against acquittal before the Supreme Court be counted towards the sentence eventually imposed?
- Is a petitioner entitled to credit for time spent in custody while an appeal against their acquittal is being heard by the Supreme Court?
- Manzoor Niaz Faruki vs Mian Gulzar Ahmad1983 PLD Supreme Court 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld an ejectment order against the appellant for failure to comply with a rent deposit order. The core legal question was whether the appellant's failure to deposit rent strictly 'before' the 15th of the month, and a specific delay in one month's deposit, constituted a default warranting the striking off of his defence under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of fact that the appellant had failed to comply with the Rent Controller's order. The Court affirmed that depositing rent on the 15th day did not satisfy an order requiring payment 'before' the 15th. Furthermore, the Court established a procedural principle to prevent protracted litigation: Rent Controllers should direct tenants to file copies of bank challan receipts within one week of deposit. This practice ensures landlords can monitor compliance and address defaults promptly, thereby avoiding the long-standing disputes seen in the present case.
Questions settled- Does a rent deposit made on the 15th day of the month satisfy a judicial order requiring payment before the 15th day?
- Can a tenant's defence be struck off for failure to comply with a Rent Controller's order under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- What procedural measures should Rent Controllers adopt to ensure timely verification of rent deposits by landlords?
- Manzoor Hussain vs THR State1983 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a murder case. The core legal question involves the appreciation of evidence regarding the time and place of the occurrence, the credibility of prosecution witnesses, and whether the sentence of death was appropriate given the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the time and place of the occurrence, and that the natural witnesses were credible and corroborated by medical evidence. However, upon examining the features of the case—specifically that the shooting occurred in the heat of the moment following a hot exchange of words—the Court granted leave to appeal restricted to the question of sentence. The key principle laid down is that while concurrent findings on guilt based on properly appreciated evidence will not be re-examined, mitigating circumstances such as a sudden quarrel and the heat of the moment warrant a re-examination of the appropriateness of the death sentence.
Questions settled- Whether the absence of wad or pellet marks on the ground or adjoining wall disproves the prosecution's case regarding the place of occurrence?
- Does the empty stomach of the deceased corroborate the prosecution witness's testimony regarding the time of occurrence?
- Whether a shooting that occurs in the heat of the moment after an exchange of abuses warrants a re-examination of the death sentence?
- Can concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts be interfered with when the evidence has been carefully appreciated?
- Manzoor Hussain vs Mst. Zohra Bibi1983 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in a pre-emption suit. The respondent, Mst. Zohra Bibi, successfully claimed a superior right of pre-emption in the trial court, asserting she was the daughter of the original owner. The first appellate court reversed this finding, but the High Court restored the trial court's decree, finding the appellate court's decision was based on a misreading of evidence. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, has the jurisdiction to disturb a finding of fact when the first appellate court has reversed the trial court's finding (a judgment of variance). The Supreme Court notes conflicting precedents regarding the scope of interference in second appeals, particularly distinguishing between concurrent findings and judgments of variance. The Court grants leave to appeal to authoritatively settle whether the High Court can reverse findings of fact in such circumstances, noting that while findings of fact are generally final, judgments of variance require careful scrutiny of the appellate court's reasoning.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact in a second appeal when the first appellate court has reversed the trial court's decision?
- Does a judgment of variance by a first appellate court enjoy the same immunity from interference in second appeal as a concurrent finding of fact?
- Under what circumstances can a finding of fact by a first appellate court be considered arbitrary or capricious, justifying interference in a second appeal?
- Manzoor Hussain and Others vs Sajawal and Other1983 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision against an order allowing the amendment of a pre-emption suit plaint. The core legal questions pertained to whether condonation of delay in filing the petition was justified based on a clerk's failure to check copying branch notices, and whether a pre-emption suit plaint could be amended to cover substitute land allocated to vendees during consolidation proceedings pending litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was barred by time without sufficient cause for condonation. On the merits, the Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in allowing the amendment, which contained no jurisdictional error warranting revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court reiterated the established principle that a pre-emptor is entitled to follow substitute land obtained by vendees in consolidation proceedings during the pendency of litigation.
Questions settled- Whether failure of a counsel's clerk to check copying branch notices constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing an appeal or petition?
- Can a pre-emptor amend the plaint in a pre-emption suit to claim substitute land allocated to the vendees in consolidation proceedings during the pendency of the suit?
- Does an order allowing an amendment of a plaint under discretionary jurisdiction constitute a jurisdictional error subject to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Manzoor Hussain and 6 Othrss Muhammad Azim and 15 Others vs Zulfiqar Ali and Other Ali Mohtisham Khan and 14 Other Zulfiqar Ali and 9 Other1983 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves three consolidated petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a Lahore High Court judgment concerning land allotment disputes. The primary legal questions concerned the validity of land allotments made to claimants under Martial Law Regulations 89 and 91, specifically whether temporary allotments to Jammu and Kashmir refugees could be cancelled without notice, and whether alienation of land under the relevant Scheme was permissible before full payment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions of A.I. Mohtisham and Manzoor Hussain, holding that the Board of Revenue acted within its discretion to allow vendees to pay defaulted installments, as alienation with the Collector's sanction is valid under the Scheme. However, the Court granted leave to appeal to the Jammu and Kashmir refugee petitioners. The ratio established is that while land transactions under Martial Law Regulations 89 and 91 are generally immune to challenge, the cancellation of temporary allotments to Jammu and Kashmir refugees without notice is legally impermissible and potentially void, necessitating further judicial review.
Questions settled- Can temporary land allotments made to Jammu and Kashmir refugees be cancelled without notice to the allottees?
- Is an agreement for the sale of land valid under the Scheme for the disposal of land surrendered under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 if the Collector's sanction is obtained?
- Does the Board of Revenue have the authority to allow vendees to pay defaulted installments on land surrendered under Martial Law Regulations?
- Manzoor Ahmad vs The. State1983 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Manzoor Ahmad, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased Iqbal. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony from an interested witness who harbored previous enmity against the accused, the legal effect of the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive, and whether such testimony required independent corroboration for a capital conviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where an eye-witness is shown to have an existing enmity or bias against the accused, her uncorroborated testimony cannot be safely relied upon to sustain a capital conviction. The Court laid down that the failure of motive does not automatically falsify the prosecution case as a whole or render an eye-witness completely untruthful, but where the witness's impartiality is compromised by underlying enmity, independent and cogent corroborative material is strictly required. Consequently, as the recoveries and other supporting testimonies were discarded and no valid corroboration existed, the benefit of the doubt was extended to the appellant, leading to the setting aside of his conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive automatically destroy the entire prosecution case?
- Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an eye-witness who harbors previous enmity against the accused can form the sole basis for a capital conviction?
- Can a previous statement made before a Committing Magistrate be utilized as substantive evidence at the trial without being lawfully transferred under Section 33 of the Evidence Act?
- Under what circumstances does the failure of the prosecution to establish a motive affect the quantum of sentence or the credibility of eyewitness accounts?
- Mamman vs Abdul Aziz and 6 Other1983 SCMR 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the allotment of land under the Ejected Tenants Scheme. The petitioner, Mamman, claimed rights to the land based on a 1962 order declaring the original allottee, Abdul Majid, ineligible and protecting the petitioner's possession under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The respondents, heirs of Abdul Majid, successfully challenged this in a revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, who found the 1962 orders were passed without lawful authority and that the petitioner was not a tenant entitled to protection. The core legal question was whether the petitioner established a valid entitlement to the land and whether the 1962 orders had attained finality. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any entitlement under the Ejected Tenants Scheme or status as a tenant under the Act. The Court affirmed that a petitioner must succeed on the strength of their own case, not the weakness of the respondents, and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can a petitioner succeed in a land dispute based solely on the alleged weakness of the respondent's case?
- Does a person in possession of land without a formal allotment qualify as a tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
- Can a sub-tenancy be created under the Ejected Tenants Scheme?
- Malik Zulfiqar Ahmad vs The State and Other1983 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's application for the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before the Special Judge (Customs) under section 156(1) clauses 77, 89, and 90 of the Customs Act, 1969, relating to the alleged smuggling and mortgage of a Mercedes Benz car. The core legal question is whether the import and handling of a motor car not specifically listed in the notification under section 2(s) constitutes 'smuggling' punishable by imprisonment, or whether it merely attracts confiscation and penalties under other provisions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the legal contentions raised regarding the scope of smuggling definitions, the effect of notifications under section 16 of the Customs Act and section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, and the applicability of specific versus general penal clauses require detailed consideration. The Court laid down that violations of notifications under section 16 resulting from restrictions on items not covered under section 2(s) do not constitute smuggling punishable with imprisonment before the Special Judge (Customs).
Questions settled- Does the import of a motor car not specifically mentioned in notifications under section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969 constitute 'smuggling' punishable by imprisonment?
- Whether violation of notifications issued under section 16 of the Customs Act, 1969 or section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 exclusively attracts confiscation and pecuniary penalty rather than prosecution?
- Can general penal provisions under section 156(1)(77) of the Customs Act, 1969 be invoked when a specific provision like section 156(1)(14) applies?
- Malik Nazir Ahmad vs Muhammad Ali Khan and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the decision of the Settlement Commissioner to transfer a property to a displaced person claimant. The core legal dispute involved the cancellation of an allotment by Settlement Authorities due to an alleged failure to pay the balance price of the house, despite the claimant having provided compensation books for adjustment. The Settlement Authorities had failed to adjust the available funds from the second compensation book, leading to the erroneous cancellation of the allotment and the subsequent inclusion of the property in an auction list. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities were at fault for failing to adjust the available compensation funds, which were already in their possession. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the claimant could not be penalized for the administrative oversight of the authorities. The principle established is that a party cannot be deprived of their property rights due to an administrative failure or omission by the state authorities to perform a mandatory adjustment of funds already submitted.
Questions settled- Can a property allotment be cancelled for non-payment of the balance price if the Settlement Authorities failed to adjust compensation funds already in their possession?
- Does the failure of Settlement Authorities to adjust available compensation books constitute a valid ground for cancelling an allotment?
- Malik Khan Muhammad vs Abdullah and Other1983 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging the High Court's order which set aside the transfer of an evacuee shop made in favour of the petitioner by the Settlement Authorities. The core legal question concerned whether a tenant, who entered into a rent deed with the auction-purchaser of a property, could subsequently claim and obtain the transfer of the same property in his own name under the settlement schemes by creating confusion regarding property numbers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was eminently just and proper, affirming that a tenant who rented the property from the rightful auction-purchaser and execution of a rent deed could lay no claim to the shop. The court laid down the principle that a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord from whom he took the property on rent, and that Settlement Authorities cannot arbitrarily transfer properties to tenants in derogation of valid auction purchases and issued permanent transfer documents.
Questions settled- Can a tenant who executed a rent deed for an evacuee property subsequently obtain its transfer in his own name under the settlement schemes?
- Whether the Settlement Authorities can transfer a property to a tenant in disregard of a valid auction purchase and issued permanent transfer documents?
- Does a tenant have any lawful claim to a property he obtained on rent from the rightful owner?
- Malik Ghulam Muhammad Khan and 3 Others vs Maula Bakhsh and 31983 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These four petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the pre-emptor/plaintiff, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, against the judgment of the High Court accepting four civil revision petitions and setting aside the decrees passed in his favour. The core legal questions involved whether an improvement in a vendee-defendant's status after the institution of a pre-emption suit affects the pre-emptor's right under Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, and whether a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was competent. The Supreme Court observed that an improvement of status prior to the filing of a pre-emption suit successfully defeats a pre-emptor's claim with an inferior right, whereas an improvement made after the suit's institution is barred by Section 21-A. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider the pre-emptor's claim against the respondent who improved his status after the institution of the suit, while holding that a new plea challenging the competency of the revision petitions under Section 115 CPC could not be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.
Questions settled- Does an improvement in a vendee's status made after the institution of a pre-emption suit affect the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption under Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- Can a party raise an objection regarding the competency of a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not urged in the High Court?
- Malik Afzal Ali vs Malik Ashraf Ali1983 SC M R1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent against his brother, the petitioner, on the ground of personal requirement. Although the Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment petition, the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and ordered eviction. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine. During the pendency of the matter, no stay was granted and the petitioner was evicted from the premises on 17-01-1982. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petition survived or had become infructuous following the execution of the eviction order. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner had already been ejected from the shop, the petition had become infructuous. Addressing the petitioner's contention that the respondent subsequently sold the property in violation of statutory provisions, the Court observed that the petitioner could seek appropriate remedies under the law for any such post-eviction violation.
Questions settled- Does a petition challenging an eviction order become infructuous once the tenant has been actually ejected in execution of the order?
- Can a post-eviction sale of the property in alleged violation of statutory provisions be determined in an appeal against the eviction order when the tenant has already been ejected?
- Major (Retd.) A. S. K. Samad vs LT: Col. (Retd.) A. Hussain and Another1983 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which upheld the Rent Controller's decision to strike off the petitioner's defence in ejectment proceedings and order eviction due to an alleged failure to deposit rent. The core legal question was whether the striking off of a defence for non-deposit of rent is mandatory or if technical compliance, such as depositing rent in earlier proceedings between the same parties, mitigates the default under the relevant rent control legislation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioner's argument regarding the technical nature of the default and the prior history of rent deposits warranted further judicial consideration. The Court allowed the petition, suspended the eviction order subject to the petitioner continuing to deposit rent, and directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record. The principle established is that where a tenant has a history of depositing rent in court in related proceedings, a failure to deposit in a specific case may be viewed as a technical default rather than a wilful violation justifying the extreme penalty of striking off the defence.
Questions settled- Does a history of depositing rent in court in earlier proceedings between the same parties mitigate a failure to deposit rent in a subsequent case?
- Is the striking off of a defence for non-deposit of rent under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 an automatic consequence or can it be excused for technical reasons?
- Mahboob Elahi vs Muhammad Zaman1983 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a landlord's application for ejectment. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from a shop on grounds of default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement. While the Rent Controller and the first appellate court dismissed the application, the High Court accepted the landlord's second appeal, finding that the landlord's personal need was established. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred by interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, held that while the High Court generally lacks the competence to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, it is justified in doing so where the lower courts have misread the evidence or based their conclusions on extraneous considerations not supported by the record. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that misreading of evidence or reliance on extraneous factors allows for appellate interference with factual findings.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal?
- Does the misreading of evidence by lower courts justify interference by the High Court in a second appeal?
- Is a conclusion based on extraneous considerations not supported by evidence a valid ground for setting aside concurrent findings of fact?
- Mahand vs Muhammad Sharif and Other1983 SCMR 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, nephews of the last male owner Maula Bakhsh, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court judgment dated 13th May, 1980, which held they had no claim to the property held by Mst. Fateh Bibi, the daughter of Maula Bakhsh. The property originally devolved upon Mst. Bhago, who gifted it to Mst. Fateh Bibi via a registered deed in 1946. Post-migration, Mst. Fateh Bibi obtained land allotments, a portion of which was awarded to reversioners by revenue authorities. The Board of Revenue upheld this division, but the High Court set it aside through a constitutional petition, finding the allocation to collaterals without lawful authority. The core legal question concerned whether revenue authorities and the High Court correctly determined the inheritance and gift rights regarding self-acquired property versus collateral succession. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners regarding factual determination by the Board of Revenue and the inheritance rights of collaterals require further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with the factual determinations of the Board of Revenue in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Whether collaterals are entitled to inherit a share in property gifted to a daughter by a limited owner?
- What is the extent of a daughter's right of inheritance concerning self-acquired property of her father against collaterals?
- M. Sharif Hilal and Another vs Additional Settlement Commissioner1983 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning a house originally transferred to a widow, Mst. Amina Begum, under the settlement laws. The core legal question involves the legality of the resumption and subsequent auction of a transferred property while an application challenging the unilateral enhancement of its price and requests for installment payments were pending consideration before the settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the auction of the property while the price enhancement issue was sub judice was wholly unwarranted and any rights claimed thereunder were devoid of validity. The ratio decidendi is that settlement authorities cannot legally auction a property previously transferred when the transferee's challenge to price enhancement and related applications remain pending and undecided. The key principle laid down is that administrative actions affecting vested property rights, such as auction and resumption during pending adjudications on valuation, are illegal and void.
Questions settled- Whether a property can be legally auctioned while a dispute regarding the enhancement of its price is pending before settlement authorities?
- Does an auction conducted during the pendency of an application questioning price enhancement convey valid rights to the auction purchaser?
- Is the resumption of a transferred property valid when the transferee has already paid a substantial portion of the original price and applied for installments?
- M. S. Chaudhry and Another vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and Other1983 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding their claim to seniority in service. The petitioners were initially appointed as temporary Section Officers in 1959 under the Section Officers Scheme but failed the qualifying examinations conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission in 1960 and 1961. Consequently, they were allowed to continue in service without encadrement in the Central Secretariat Service as a matter of departmental concession. They later passed the qualifying examination in November, 1976 and were placed on a regular footing under a 1977 notification, prompting their claim for seniority from their original 1959 appointment dates. The core legal question is whether temporary Section Officers who failed initial qualifying examinations but were retained in service as a concession are entitled to seniority from their initial appointment date prior to regular encadrement. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' retention without encadrement did not confer any right to seniority from their initial appointment date, as encadrement and regular status were achieved only after passing the 1976 examination. The key principle laid down is that service rendered as a concession without formal encadrement does not accrue seniority rights prior to regular appointment.
Questions settled- Are temporary Section Officers who failed initial qualifying examinations entitled to seniority from their original date of appointment?
- Does retention in service as a departmental concession confer a right to encadrement in the Central Secretariat Service?
- From which date does a Section Officer accrue seniority upon qualifying the promotional examination?
- M. A. Hafeez Khan and 9 Others vs Riaz Ahmad Mehra and 3 Other1983 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal concerns whether a non-evacuee mortgagor's interest in property is extinguished upon its acquisition by the Central Government as evacuee property under Section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The property in question, mortgaged by a local to an evacuee, was transferred to the petitioners by settlement authorities. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the acquisition of property under the Act does not extinguish the rights of a non-evacuee mortgagor. The Court ruled that only the evacuee mortgagee's interest vests in the Custodian or the compensation pool, while the mortgagor’s right of redemption remains unaffected. Consequently, the settlement authorities lacked the power to transfer the mortgagor's interest, and the mortgagor is entitled to redeem the property upon discharge of the mortgage debt. The Court established that a non-evacuee mortgagor’s interest does not form part of the compensation pool and is not subject to forfeiture merely due to the property's status as evacuee property.
Questions settled- Does the acquisition of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, extinguish the rights of a non-evacuee mortgagor?
- Is a non-evacuee mortgagor required to obtain a declaration under Section 22 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, to preserve their equity of redemption?
- Does the interest of an evacuee mortgagee in a property constitute the entirety of the interest that vests in the Custodian upon acquisition?
- Lyallpur Chemical & Fertilizers Ltd vs Punjablabour Appellate Tribunal1983 SCMR 1100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a constitutional petition filed by an employer. The dispute originated from a labour matter where the Labour Appellate Tribunal had ruled in favour of the employee, finding that the employee had not signed the resignation letter submitted by the employer and condoning the delay in filing the employee's grievance before the Labour Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the Tribunal's findings of fact regarding the signature and the exercise of discretion in condoning the delay. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's findings of fact regarding the signature were unexceptionable and that the Tribunal possessed the requisite authority to review and overturn the Labour Court's findings concerning the delay. Consequently, the Court found no legal error or violation of principle in the Tribunal's approach, determining that the petition lacked merit and dismissing it accordingly.
Questions settled- Does a Labour Appellate Tribunal have the authority to overturn a Labour Court's finding regarding the condonation of delay?
- Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact made by a Labour Appellate Tribunal in its writ jurisdiction?
- Is the condonation of delay in filing a grievance petition a matter within the discretionary field of the Labour Appellate Tribunal?
- LT.Gen. Sardar Farooq Shaukat Khan Lodhi vs Taleh Muhammad and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside an order by the District Collector resuming a Lambardari land grant due to the grantee's failure to maintain livestock as required by government instructions. The core legal question was whether the resumption of the tenancy required a formal notice for rectification of the breach under the Breeding of Pedigree Livestock Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the specific conditions violated were not part of the original Scheme but were separate tenancy conditions, thus invoking paragraph 29 of the Scheme, which allows for determination of tenancy without prior notice, rather than paragraph 26. Furthermore, the Court held that even if paragraph 26 applied, the requirement for notice was substantially complied with through open inquiries and the grantee's participation in proceedings, and the breach was not rectifiable given the long-standing, deliberate failure to maintain the required livestock. The principle laid down is that where a breach of tenancy conditions falls outside the specific scope of a scheme's rectification clause, or where the breach is not rectifiable, formal notice is not a prerequisite for resumption.
Questions settled- Does the failure to maintain livestock as required by a government notification constitute a breach of the Breeding of Pedigree Livestock Scheme justifying immediate resumption of land?
- Are the provisions of paragraph 26 and paragraph 29 of the Breeding of Pedigree Livestock Scheme independent of each other?
- Is a formal notice for rectification of a breach required under paragraph 26 of the Breeding of Pedigree Livestock Scheme when the breach is not capable of rectification?
- Does substantial compliance with the requirement of notice for rectification of a breach suffice to validate an order of resumption of a government land grant?