Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Ghulam Rasul vs The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and Others45 TAX 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the liability for sales tax on a ginning mill. The petitioner, owner of a ginning mill, challenged the assessment of sales tax levied upon it for a period during which it allegedly leased its factory to a third-party business entity, Messrs Karachi Cotton Ginners, Lyallpur. While the Appellate Assistant Commissioner initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal subsequently reversed this decision, and the High Court affirmed the Tribunal's ruling. The core legal question involves the interpretation of liability for sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, specifically whether the owner of the mill or the holder of a seller's licence is liable for tax when the licensee becomes untraceable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the case requires a proper construction of the relevant statutory provisions regarding tax liability, as the matter is one of first impressions.
Questions settled- Whether the owner of a ginning mill or the holder of a seller's licence is liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act 1951 when the licensee is untraceable?
- Does the inability to trace a licensee under the Sales Tax Act 1951 shift the tax burden to the owner of the premises?
- Hayat and Other vs Amir1982 PLD Supreme Court 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff sought to implead the legal representatives of a deceased vendee-defendant who had died prior to the institution of the suit. The application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was filed within the statutory period of limitation, but the trial court's order formally granting the application was passed after the period of limitation had expired. The core legal question was whether, for the purposes of limitation under Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1877, a newly added or substituted defendant is deemed to have been made a party on the date the application to implead him was filed or on the date the court formally granted the application.
The Supreme Court held that when an application to implead a party is made within limitation, the order impleading the party relates back to and takes effect from the date on which the application was filed, not when it was allowed. A diligent litigant cannot be penalized for judicial delay or maneuvering by opposing parties.
Questions settled- Whether a newly added defendant is deemed to be made a party on the date the impleadment application is filed or when the court allows it for the purposes of Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1877?
- Does judicial delay in deciding an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC prejudice the limitation period of a diligent applicant?
- When does an order adding or substituting a party take effect if initiated by an application rather than suo moto by the court?
- Ghulam Rasool and Others vs Hazoor Ali1982 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the Lahore High Court set aside a trial court's decree, which had dismissed the suit based on the respondent's waiver of his right to pre-empt. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly concluded that the defendants' plea of waiver in the written statement contradicted the evidence presented at trial, thereby justifying the reversal of the trial court's factual findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a significant misreading of both the pleadings and the evidence. Specifically, the High Court erroneously restricted the 'prior to sale' waiver plea to a specific timeframe and failed to properly weigh the defendant's deposition and corroborating witness testimony. The Court held that a party's own deposition constitutes valid evidence that must be considered. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the appellate court's interference was based on a misreading of the record rather than a mere appreciation of evidence, and restored the trial court's decision.
Questions settled- Does the misreading of pleadings and evidence by an appellate court justify interference by the Supreme Court?
- Can a party's deposition be excluded from consideration as evidence in a civil trial?
- Does a plea of waiver 'prior to sale' in a written statement necessarily restrict the defense to a specific timeframe?
- Ghulam Nabi vs The State1982 SCMR 719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment confirming the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the prosecution's evidence given alleged inconsistencies between the F.I.R., the dying declaration, and trial testimony, and whether the recovery of pellets from a nearby wall supported the defence version of the incident. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the arguments. The Court held that minor discrepancies between a brief dying declaration and a detailed F.I.R. do not undermine the prosecution's case, especially when the deceased's presence and the medical evidence corroborate the ocular testimony. The Court affirmed that firing a lethal weapon at a victim is a serious offence, and the fact that a victim was killed by a single shot does not constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that physical evidence, such as pellets found in a wall, does not necessarily contradict the prosecution's version if there is no obstruction between the scene and the wall.
Questions settled- Does a brief dying declaration that omits details present in the F.I.R. undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
- Does the recovery of pellets from a wall near the crime scene necessarily invalidate the prosecution's version of the occurrence?
- Is the fact that a victim was killed by a single shot a mitigating circumstance justifying the reduction of a death sentence?
- Ghulam Muhammad vs Mst. Amiran Khatoon and Another1982 SCMR 996 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the dismissal of a Second Appeal by the High Court regarding the possession of agricultural land originally held by an occupancy tenant who died in 1925. The core legal question concerned whether one of the deceased tenant's widows had become an absolute owner of the property following statutory amendments, and consequently whether the plaintiffs possessed the requisite legal right and reversionary standing to institute a suit for possession against the petitioner, who claimed the land via a gift. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the fundamental legal objection regarding the maintainability of the suit—an objection not raised in the lower courts—concerning the plaintiffs' lack of reversionary rights, while ordering security for costs and maintaining the status quo as to possession pending the appeal.
Questions settled- Does a widow of an occupancy tenant acquire absolute ownership of proprietary rights under Section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act?
- Can a fundamental objection regarding the maintainability of a suit and the lack of plaintiff's legal standing be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Do daughters and co-widows possess reversionary rights qua the share of another widow in occupancy land?
- Ghulam Muhammad vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue and 21982 SCMR 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's land allotment. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for the first time that, despite his illicit possession of the disputed area following the cancellation of his previous allotment, he was entitled to purchase proprietary rights under Colony Notification No. 3215-79/3973-C-II, dated 3rd September, 1979. The petitioner contended that he met the eligibility criteria for landless persons or owners of less than a subsistence holding in continuous cultivating possession since before Kharif 1977. The Supreme Court observed that this specific legal argument regarding the notification had not been raised before the revenue authorities or the High Court, and thus those forums could not be faulted for failing to consider it. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the impugned judgment but granted the petitioner liberty to approach the relevant authorities with an application under the notification, directing those authorities to dispose of such an application in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Can a petitioner raise a new legal argument before the Supreme Court that was not presented before the lower courts or revenue authorities?
- Does the failure of lower forums to consider an argument not raised before them constitute a legal error?
- Ghulam Muhammad vs Major Rab Nawaz1982 SCMR 1159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for the re-admission of a Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal that had been dismissed due to the non-appearance of the petitioner and their counsel at the scheduled hearing. The petitioner sought restoration, attributing the absence to the illness of the Advocate-on-Record and a lack of knowledge regarding the hearing date by the arguing counsel. During the proceedings, the Advocate-on-Record contradicted the petitioner's assertion, stating that he had previously informed the clerk of the arguing counsel about the fixed date. The Supreme Court observed a direct contradiction between the statements of the two legal representatives. The Court held that because the statement of the Advocate-on-Record effectively refuted the grounds presented by the petitioner to justify the absence, the petitioner failed to establish 'sufficient cause' for the non-appearance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for re-admission, emphasizing that contradictory representations regarding the failure to appear do not satisfy the requirement for demonstrating sufficient cause to restore a dismissed petition.
Questions settled- Does a contradiction between the statements of an Advocate-on-Record and an arguing counsel regarding notice of a hearing date constitute sufficient cause for re-admission of a dismissed petition?
- Is the failure of counsel to appear at a scheduled hearing sufficient grounds for the dismissal of a Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal?
- Ghulam Muhammad vs Abdul Mateen Siddiqui and Other1982 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside proceedings initiated by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a property. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to quash a notice issued by the Settlement Commissioner calling upon a transferee to justify the transfer of property. The Supreme Court held that while interference under constitutional jurisdiction is generally not warranted merely upon the issuance of a show-cause notice, this specific case did not merit interference by the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the factual finding that the disputed property constituted a single residential unit rather than independent shops, thereby upholding the original transfer. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will refrain from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to interfere with High Court decisions that are in accord with intrinsic justice, particularly when the underlying factual findings regarding the nature of the property are well-supported by the record.
Questions settled- Is the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court justified merely upon the issuance of a notice by a Settlement Commissioner calling upon a transferee to justify a transfer?
- Does the Supreme Court have discretion to refuse interference when a High Court judgment is in accord with intrinsic justice?
- Can a property be considered an independent unit if it is part of a single residential house?
- Ghulam Muhammad Awan and Another vs Ilam Din and 2 Other1982 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, tenants of the property in question, challenged the dismissal in limine of their constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an ex parte ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the District Judge. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts and the High Court erred in refusing to set aside the ex parte ejectment proceedings and declining to interfere with the tenant's persistent non-appearance and default in payment of costs. The Supreme Court held that given the consistent conduct of the petitioners and their repeated non-appearances before the tribunals, no justification existed for interfering with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking extraordinary constitutional relief against concurrent orders of ejectment cannot succeed when their own conduct demonstrates persistent default and negligence in prosecuting their case.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction against an ex parte ejectment order where the tenants repeatedly failed to appear?
- Does persistent non-appearance and default in payment of costs disentitle a party from obtaining discretionary relief from the court?
- Whether an ex parte ejectment order passed after repeated defaults by the tenant warrants setting aside by the appellate court?
- Ghulam Muhammad and Another vs Irshad Ahmed and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged a Lahore High Court judgment setting aside an order of a Civil Judge which had refused execution of a pre-emption decree in favour of the respondents. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order passed by the Supreme Court during the pendency of a petition for leave to appeal, extending the time for depositing the balance of the sale price, becomes ineffective or is nullified upon the ultimate dismissal of the leave petition. The Supreme Court held that an interim order extending time, passed within the court's constitutional and inherent jurisdiction, remains lawful and effective notwithstanding the subsequent dismissal of the main leave petition, and a party should not suffer prejudice due to an act of the court. The court laid down the principle that valid interlocutory orders passed by an appellate court in aid of its jurisdiction—such as extensions of time for depositing pre-emption money—do not automatically lose their efficacy when the appeal or leave petition is finally dismissed on merits.
Questions settled- Does the final dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal nullify the previous operation and effect of an interlocutory order of extension of time passed during the pendency of that petition?
- Can an appellate court extend the time for depositing pre-emption money through an interim order during the pendency of an appeal or leave petition?
- Does a decree coming into existence by statutory force in favour of a vendee upon default of a pre-emptor override a validly passed interim extension order?
- Ghulam Jafar and 48 Others vs The S. S. P., Multan and Another1982 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the cancellation of a police departmental promotional examination and the consequent removal of the appellants' names from List 'B', Part I, due to widespread malpractices. The appellants challenged the action through a constitutional petition and an intra-court appeal, both of which were dismissed. The core legal questions involved the hierarchical supervisory jurisdiction of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police over the Superintendent of Police regarding the maintenance and revision of promotional lists, and the applicability of the principle of locus poenitentiae. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police possesses administrative and supervisory competence under the Police Act 1861 and the Police Rules 1934 to cancel a vitiated examination and remove improperly admitted names from promotional lists. The Court established that administrative supervision in the police force permits superior officers to correct irregularities and that the principle of locus poenitentiae does not bar corrective action against fraudulently or irregularly obtained examination results.
Questions settled- Does the Deputy Inspector-General of Police have the jurisdiction to cancel a departmental promotional examination and remove names from promotional List 'B' maintained by the Superintendent of Police?
- Whether the principle of locus poenitentiae applies to prevent the removal of names from a promotional list when the underlying examination is vitiated by widespread malpractices?
- What is the extent of supervisory control of a Deputy Inspector-General over a Superintendent of Police regarding the maintenance and revision of police promotional lists under the Police Rules 1934?
- Ghulam Hussain vs The State1982 SCMR 1113 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal conviction under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, Ghulam Hussain, was tried alongside two co-accused for attacking two individuals with dangs (lathis), resulting in multiple injuries. While the trial court convicted all three accused, the High Court subsequently acquitted the co-accused while maintaining the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner did not contest the occurrence of the incident or the prosecution evidence but argued that the proved facts did not constitute an offence under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court examined the motive behind the incident, the nature of the attack, and the specific number and location of the injuries inflicted. The Court held that, given the circumstances, the offence was correctly categorized under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the use of lathis in this context constituted lethal weapons sufficient to sustain the conviction for attempted murder.
Questions settled- Does the use of lathis in an attack constitute the use of lethal weapons for the purpose of a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained based on the nature and location of injuries inflicted during an assault?
- Ghulam Hussain and Another vs Nabi Bakhsh and Other1982 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding an order of remand passed by the revenue authorities regarding the transfer of property under settlement laws. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with a long-standing order of remand directed at determining afresh the eligibility of occupants for property transfer. The Supreme Court held that interference with an order of remand passed nearly a decade prior is unwarranted, particularly when the remand merely seeks a closer examination of eligibility and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that effect had not already been given to the remand directions. The key principle laid down is that the apex court will decline to grant leave to appeal against interlocutory remand orders of considerable antiquity where no prejudice or final injustice is demonstrated.
Questions settled- Will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of remand passed several years prior when its purpose is merely to re-examine the eligibility of occupants?
- Can leave to appeal be granted against a remand order when the petitioner fails to show whether the remand has already been executed?
- Ghulam Farid and 6 Others vs Abbasi Textile Mills Ltd. and 3 Other1982 SCMR 958 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that declared the allotment of certain evacuee property to the petitioners void. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute, having been sanctioned for acquisition by the Central Government in 1954 under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, was legally available for subsequent allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that because the land was sanctioned for acquisition prior to the notification creating the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951, it was excluded from the pool and thus could not be validly allotted to the petitioners in 1961. The Court affirmed that land sanctioned for acquisition under the Administration of Evacuee Property laws before the creation of the compensation pool does not form part of said pool and is immune from settlement allotments. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision that the petitioners' allotment was without legal authority.
Questions settled- Does land sanctioned for acquisition under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949 prior to the creation of a compensation pool form part of that pool?
- Can land excluded from the compensation pool be validly allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1951?
- Does a notification under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1951 exclude land for which acquisition sanction was previously granted?
- Ghazi and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court confirming the death sentences and convictions of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Hotu. The prosecution case rested on interested and inimical ocular testimony supported by circumstantial evidence, including motive, blood-stained recoveries, and forensic ballistic reports. The core legal question was whether the convictions could be sustained upon ruling out the highly delayed and uncorroborated circumstantial and forensic evidence, and in the presence of interested eye-witnesses with severe pre-existing enmity. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions and sentences, holding that unexplained and inordinate delay in dispatching and examining incriminating articles renders forensic and recovery evidence unsafe for reliance in capital charges. The court established that where corroborative circumstantial evidence collapses, uncorroborated and interested ocular testimony alone cannot securely sustain a capital conviction.
Questions settled- Whether a capital conviction can be sustained on interested and inimical ocular testimony alone when corroborative circumstantial evidence is ruled out?
- Does inordinate and unexplained delay in sending incriminating articles to the forensic and chemical laboratories vitiate the reliability of expert evidence?
- Whether the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by a co-accused casts doubt on the participation of the accused in the crime?
- Gaman and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order refusing them post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were accused of causing injuries to two individuals, with one petitioner allegedly inflicting a 'takwa' blow and the other a stick blow. While the High Court had granted bail to co-accused who were not charged with causing serious injuries, it denied bail to the petitioners, who had been in judicial custody since October 1974. The petitioners argued that the ingredients for an offense under Section 307 were not established. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the First Information Report, held that the High Court had not exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously in denying bail. The Court emphasized that the bail stage is not the appropriate time for the appreciation of evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no error in the High Court's exercise of judicial discretion regarding the grant of bail.
Questions settled- Is the bail stage an appropriate time for the appreciation of evidence in a criminal case?
- Can a High Court's refusal to grant bail be overturned if the discretion was not exercised arbitrarily or capriciously?
- Forbes Forbes Campbell & Co. Ltd., Karachi and 3 Others vs Habibur1982 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, concerning whether an employee's application to the Labour Court against his termination was within the period of limitation. The core legal question is whether the employee's initial telegram sent to the Managing Director seeking intervention constituted a formal grievance notice under the relevant labour laws, or whether the subsequent notice served upon the Branch Manager was the proper grievance notice, and whether the petition was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the initial telegram was merely a request for administrative intervention rather than a formal grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, and that the subsequent notice served on the Branch Manager was the proper grievance notice. Furthermore, the court held that labor laws are beneficial legislation meant to protect workers and must be construed liberally in favor of employees rather than used as procedural traps, and that a short delay was condonable under section 65-B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a telegram sent to a Managing Director seeking intervention against termination constitutes a formal grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
- How should labor laws enacted for the benefit of workers be construed by the courts?
- Whether the delay in filing an application before the Labour Court could be condoned under section 65-B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
- Feroze Din vs Mst. Meraj Begum and Other1982 SCMR 1117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The respondent landlord had initiated ejectment proceedings alleging default in rent payment. The petitioner initially challenged the Rent Controller's jurisdiction, claiming the property was a factory, and denied the landlord-tenant relationship, asserting ownership of the property himself. Throughout the proceedings, the petitioner maintained this denial, even challenging the authenticity of the rent deed. Only during the recording of evidence did the petitioner concede the tenancy. The Rent Controller, finding the denial of the relationship to be contumacious and frivolous, ordered immediate ejectment. The High Court upheld this decision, rejecting the argument that the principle of approbate and reprobate required an admission of default to trigger immediate ejectment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a tenant contumaciously denies the landlord-tenant relationship and sets up a frivolous claim of ownership, the Rent Controller is justified in ordering immediate ejectment without further inquiry into the merits of the default, as the tenant's conduct precludes equitable relief.
Questions settled- Can a Rent Controller order immediate ejectment when a tenant contumaciously denies the landlord-tenant relationship?
- Does the principle of approbate and reprobate apply only when a denial of the landlord-tenant relationship is accompanied by an admission of default?
- Is a tenant who denies the landlord-tenant relationship entitled to a full inquiry on the merits of default before an ejectment order is passed?
- Fazl Ur Rehman Khan and Others vs Halim Khan1982 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' civil revision petition, which had challenged concurrent findings of fact regarding a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether concurrent factual findings regarding the relationship of a pre-emptor as the vendor's brother—granting a superior right of pre-emption—are open to reconsideration in civil revision. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of evidence and the determination of relationship are purely questions of fact concurrently decided by the lower courts, and such findings cannot be interfered with in civil revision. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact based on evidence by lower courts are binding in civil revision and cannot be reopened merely on the ground of disagreement with the appreciation of evidence.
Questions settled- Whether the question of relationship between a vendor and a pre-emptor is a question of fact?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and appellate court be interfered with in a civil revision?
- Does a misreading of evidence argument alone warrant interference by a revisional court in concurrent factual findings?
- Fazalur Rehman Mahmood and Another vs Assistant1982 SCMR 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition directed against the dismissal of a writ petition and intra-court appeal by the High Court concerning the disputed allotment of agricultural land. The core legal question revolves around whether land once reserved in favour of a claimant by the competent Allotment Committee can subsequently be allotted to another party by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that prima facie force exists in the submission that land reserved for a claimant by a competent authority could not be lawfully allotted to anyone else, rendering subsequent inconsistent allotments without lawful authority. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents, and ordered that status quo be maintained pending the final decision of the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether land reserved in favour of a claimant by the Allotment Committee can be lawfully allotted to another party?
- Whether an allotment made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in disregard of a prior reservation by a competent authority is without lawful authority?
- Fazal Karim vs Muhammad Afzal and Other1982 SCMR 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit concerning a residential house in Sialkot, where the pre-emptor claimed a right of pre-emption as a co-sharer in the property. The vendee, whose father had predeceased his grandfather, raised defenses challenging the pre-emptor's sole inheritance claims under Islamic law, asserting co-ownership, invoking Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, and contending that a mandatory bequest ought to be presumed in favor of orphaned grandchildren under Islamic jurisprudence. Additionally, the vendee argued that the pre-emptor failed to establish the existence of a custom of pre-emption in the specific sub-division of the city prior to the enforcement of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the legal issues regarding inheritance, Islamic jurisprudence on mandatory bequests, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding local custom of pre-emption required detailed examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions of law.
Questions settled- Whether Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 accords with Islamic principles regarding inheritance rights of offspring of a predeceased child?
- Whether a mandatory bequest in favor of non-heir relatives can be presumed under Islamic law where no formal bequest was executed?
- Whether evidence of a custom of pre-emption in neighboring sub-divisions of a city is sufficient to establish its existence in a specific sub-division under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- Fazal Elahi and Others vs Capital Development Authority and Other1982 SCMR 469(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was submitted with a delay of 17 days. The petitioners sought condonation of this delay, arguing that the time spent pursuing a certificate of fitness for appeal in the High Court should be excluded from the limitation period, asserting that they acted in a bona fide manner. The Supreme Court examined the application for condonation and determined that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that their pursuit of the remedy in the High Court was conducted in good faith or in a bona fide manner. Consequently, the Court held that the grounds provided were insufficient to justify an extension of the limitation period. The petition was dismissed as time-barred, establishing the principle that a mere assertion of pursuing other remedies is insufficient for condonation of delay without a clear showing of good faith.
Questions settled- Is the time spent pursuing a certificate of fitness for appeal in the High Court automatically excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition in the Supreme Court?
- Does a mere assertion of pursuing a remedy in another forum satisfy the requirement of good faith for the purpose of condoning a delay in filing?
- Fazal Din vs Sadiq Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a second appeal concerning the pre-emption of agricultural land. The subject property, totaling 81 kanals and 1 marla, comprised two distinct categories: land allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and land surrendered and re-purchased under Martial Law Regulation Nos. 89 and 91 of 1961. The core legal question was whether these sales were subject to the right of pre-emption. While the trial court held that only the portion not forming part of the compensation pool was pre-emptiable, the appellate court and the High Court concluded that the entire land was subject to pre-emption. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent established in Haji Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Siddiq (PLD 1973 SC 347), affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that the legal position regarding the pre-emptibility of such land was settled by the cited authority, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Is agricultural land acquired under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, subject to the right of pre-emption?
- Does land surrendered and re-purchased under Martial Law Regulation Nos. 89 and 91 of 1961 constitute property subject to pre-emption?
- Fazal Azim and Another vs Tariq Mahmood and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court whereby a second appeal regarding the eviction of tenants from a shop was allowed and the landlords' application on the ground of personal requirement was decreed. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal, whether the landlord's temporary occupation abroad during protracted litigation negates bona fides, and whether the petition was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had misread the evidence regarding the landlord's personal requirement and that the High Court was justified in correcting the error, noting that a landlord's engagement in gainful occupation during protracted litigation does not negate bona fides. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principles laid down are that misreading of evidence warrants interference with concurrent factual findings in second appeal, and that a landlord seeking eviction is not expected to sit idle during protracted legal proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal?
- Does a landlord seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement sit idle during the pendency of eviction proceedings?
- Can the time spent in filing and pursuing a writ petition be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act?
- Does a landlord going abroad during litigation negate the bona fides of a personal requirement claim?
- Fazal Akbar vs Mst. Hussain Pari1982 SCMR 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant filed a pre-emption suit, and the trial court directed him to deposit a portion of the pre-emption money and furnish a security bond by a specific date. Due to the unexpected leave of the presiding Civil Judge, the appellant could not file the bond on the exact deadline, though he complied immediately upon the court's return. The trial court dismissed the suit for non-compliance, but the Additional District Judge restored it, finding the delay excusable. The respondent challenged this in the Peshawar High Court, raising a new factual plea regarding the timing of the cash deposit, which the High Court accepted, setting aside the appellate order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by entertaining a new plea of fact not raised in lower courts and by failing to provide the appellant an opportunity to explain the delay. The Court emphasized that revisional jurisdiction is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors and cannot be used to penalize a party for delays beyond their control.
Questions settled- Can a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction entertain a new plea of fact not raised in the lower courts?
- Is a party to a pre-emption suit liable to have their suit dismissed for non-compliance with a court order when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond their control?
- Does the scope of revisional jurisdiction allow a High Court to re-examine factual findings without providing the affected party an opportunity to produce evidence?
- Farid Khan vs The State1982 SCMR 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had previously rejected the petitioner's application for bail in a criminal case. The petitioner stood accused of an offence under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of bail pending trial, given the nature of the accusation and the statutory provisions governing bail. Upon hearing the arguments from both the petitioner's counsel and the State, the Supreme Court refrained from making detailed observations that might prejudice the trial. The Court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was not guilty of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or ten years' rigorous imprisonment or more. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the appeal, and granted bail to the petitioner, subject to the furnishing of a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Chiniot.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court have the authority to convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal for the purpose of granting bail?
- What is the standard for granting bail in cases involving offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
- Faqir Muhammad vs Muhammad Ramzan and Other1982 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant Faqir Muhammad against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby two respondents were acquitted of murder charges and their convictions were set aside, while four other accused persons remained acquitted. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appreciation of evidence, which led to the acquittal of the accused by extending the benefit of the doubt, suffered from perversity or material injustice warranting interference. The Supreme Court held that the High Court considered the evidence carefully and that its judgment was neither perverse nor resulted in material injustice. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that it will not interfere with an order of acquittal based on a careful appreciation of evidence unless the conclusions drawn by the lower court are perverse or have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an appellate court's judgment of acquittal when the appreciation of evidence is found to be careful and free from perversity?
- Can the testimony of chance witnesses who are party men and related to the deceased be relied upon without independent corroboration?
- Does a discrepancy regarding the time of occurrence, supported by medical evidence contradicting the oral testimony, justify the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
- Faizyab Khan vs Syed Aziz Ali Chishti1982 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the ejectment of the petitioner by the Rent Controller as upheld by the Additional District Judge. The core legal question is whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and whether the ejectment order requires interference. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had expressly recognized the respondent as his landlord in his reply to a legal notice, and since no objection was raised regarding the admissibility of these documents when tendered in evidence, they conclusively established the tenancy relationship. Consequently, the question of whether the property devolved by inheritance or gift became irrelevant. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the petitioner granted four months to vacate the premises upon payment of rent.
Questions settled- Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is established when the tenant admits the landlord in a reply to a legal notice?
- Can an objection to the admissibility of documents be raised subsequently if no objection was made when they were tendered in evidence?
- Does a tenant denying the landlord's title need to be heard when the tenant has previously recognized the landlord?
- F. A. Khan vs The Republic of Pakistan Etc.1982 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent dismissal of the petitioner's execution application by the executing court, the Additional District Judge, Lahore, and the Lahore High Court. The petitioner sought to execute a declaratory decree declaring his 1950 dismissal from service illegal, specifically praying for the recovery of arrears of salary and allowances. The core legal question was whether a declaratory decree that does not incorporate consequential relief for monetary recovery can be executed for the recovery of arrears of salary. The Supreme Court held that the executing courts rightly refused the request since the relief prayed for did not form part of the decree passed in the petitioner's favour. The key principle laid down is that an executing court cannot look beyond the decree or grant relief not expressly incorporated therein, though government departments are expected to honour and implement judicial declarations regarding illegal dismissals in good faith.
Questions settled- Whether a declaratory decree regarding the illegality of a dismissal from service can be executed for the recovery of arrears of salary and allowances when such relief is not part of the decree?
- Can an executing court grant monetary relief that was not expressly incorporated in the decree sought to be executed?
- Evacuee Trust Property Board vs Miraj Din and Other1982 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Evacuee Trust Property Board against the dismissal of its appeal by the High Court. The property in question was transferred to the respondents and a Permanent Transfer Deed was issued in 1963. In 1966, the Board sought cancellation of the transfer under section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, claiming the property was evacuee trust property. The Settlement Commissioner dismissed the application in 1968, finding it was private property. During the pendency of the Board's appeal before the High Court, the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 came into force, containing a saving provision under section 10(1)(b) validating bona fide transfers where Permanent Transfer Deeds were issued prior to June 1968. The High Court dismissed the appeal based on this provision. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal in light of the statutory protection afforded by the 1975 Act. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was unexceptionable as the statutory conditions for valid transfer under the 1975 Act were met, and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether an immovable evacuee trust property transferred with a Permanent Transfer Deed issued prior to June 1968 is deemed validly transferred under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
- Does the question of bona fide transfer under section 10(2) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 render interference unwarranted in proceedings initiated under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Evacuee Trust Property Board vs Mian Iqbal Mahmood and Other1982 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the Evacuee Trust Property Board against a High Court order dismissing its settlement appeal. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had become infructuous because the underlying matter was currently sub judice before a departmental forum under newly enacted legislation. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petition was filed three days beyond the prescribed limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, attributing it to an error by a departmental functionary regarding the filing of necessary documents. The Supreme Court rejected this explanation, finding it insufficient to warrant a special concession for the extension of time. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's reasoning that the matter remained pending before the appropriate departmental forum, where the petitioner retained the opportunity to raise its arguments. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of being time-barred and because the underlying dispute was already being addressed in the proper administrative forum.
Questions settled- Is an error by a departmental functionary regarding the filing of documents a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
- Can an appeal be dismissed as infructuous if the subject matter is currently sub judice before a departmental forum?
- European Grain & Shipping Ltd. and Messrs Sargodha Oil Industries Ltd1982 PLD Supreme Court 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-12Read full judgment →
- Elahi Bakhsh vs Chief Administrator, Waqf Property1982 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to a petition filed under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1959. The appellant challenged a notification regarding the takeover of property, but the petition was filed beyond the prescribed thirty-day limitation period. The District Court and the High Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, ruling that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1959 constitutes a 'special law' under Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1908. Consequently, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, which allow for the extension of time for sufficient cause, do not apply to proceedings under the Ordinance. The Court affirmed that it cannot, on grounds of hardship, import provisions into a statute that are neither expressly nor impliedly present. The strict limitation period prescribed by the Ordinance must be observed, as the legislation does not contemplate the court's power to condone delay.
Questions settled- Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to petitions filed under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1959?
- Is the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1959 considered a special law for the purposes of Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Can a court condone delay in filing a petition under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1959 based on hardship?
- Elahi Bakhsh and Others vs Allah Bakhsh and Other1982 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' suits for pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute, located within the municipal limits of Multan, constituted 'agricultural land' or 'urban immovable property' for the purposes of establishing a preferential right of pre-emption. The High Court had determined that the land was 'urban immovable property' based on its small size, its classification as 'Ghair Mumkin Abadi', its location surrounded by houses and a metalled road, and the fact that the alienations were intended for construction purposes. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, concluding that the High Court correctly applied legal principles regarding the appreciation of evidence in such cases. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's determination was well-considered and supported by the facts, and consequently, the petitions were dismissed as lacking merit.
Questions settled- Does the classification of land as 'Ghair Mumkin Abadi' within municipal limits generally categorize it as urban immovable property rather than agricultural land for pre-emption purposes?
- Is the intended use of land for construction purposes a relevant factor in determining whether it qualifies as urban immovable property?
- Ejaz Akhtar vs The State1982 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashment of proceedings. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether sufficient cause was shown for condoning a 33-day delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal. The court held that the ground advanced by the petitioner, namely suffering from eyesore preventing the timely acquisition of a certified copy, did not constitute a valid or reasonable cause for the extensive delay. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition as hopelessly time-barred, establishing the principle that routine medical ailments without demonstrating continuous incapacitation do not justify the condonation of significant delays in approaching the apex court.
Questions settled- Whether suffering from eyesore constitutes a sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Can an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of proceedings be maintained when the petition for special leave to appeal against its dismissal is time-barred?
- DR. Muhammad Rafiq vs District Judge, Lahore and 2 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition in a rent matter. The respondent-landlord had sought the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from a bungalow leased partly for residence and partly as a hospital, on the ground of personal requirement for himself and his son to set up a legal practice. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application, but the District Judge reversed the findings and ordered eviction, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a building partly let out as a hospital constitutes a scheduled building under the relevant rent restriction law, precluding eviction for non-scheduled businesses. The Supreme Court held that the legal practice of a lawyer is a scheduled business and that the premises could be lawfully vacated for the personal residence and scheduled business needs of the landlord and his son. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed with a four-month grace period for vacating the premises.
Questions settled- Whether a building partly let out as a hospital becomes a scheduled building under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can a leased building be ordered to be vacated for the personal use and residence of the landlord or his family members?
- Whether a lawyer's office constitutes a scheduled business allowing eviction of a tenant from a scheduled building?
- DR. Muhammad Elias Dubash vs Punjab Service Tribunal and Other1982 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an appeal concerning the compulsory retirement of the appellant under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, following an inquiry. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, Martial Law Order No. 23, and the bar on jurisdiction under the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 regarding orders passed by a Martial Law Administrator. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was not entertainable by the Court in view of clause (2) of Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981, which bars any challenge to an order passed by the Martial Law Administrator. The key principle laid down is that orders passed by the Martial Law Administrator are protected from judicial scrutiny under the constitutional provisions of the Provisional Constitution Order, rendering challenges to compulsory retirement orders through service tribunals unmaintainable.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by a Martial Law Administrator is assailable before a service tribunal?
- Does the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 bar challenges to orders passed by the Martial Law Administrator?
- Is an appeal competent under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 against a review order rejected by the Martial Law Administrator?
- DR. Faqir Muhammad vs Maj. Amir Muhammad Etc.S1982 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two petitions for leave to appeal filed by Dr. Faqir Muhammad against decisions of the High Court accepting regular second appeals in a land allotment dispute. The petitioner was allotted a plot under a housing scheme governed by the Punjab Urban Improvement Act, 1952, and executed an agreement granting him permission to enter the land and construct a house subject to plan approval. Following cancellation of his allotment for alleged non-compliance and re-allotment to a third party, the petitioner filed a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, seeking a declaration that he was the owner of the plot and an injunction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the suit, holding that the agreement did not confer ownership rights upon the petitioner to entitle him to a declaration of legal character as owner under Section 42. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner failed to seek the requisite consequential relief of specific performance of the agreement.
Questions settled- Can an agreement granting permission to enter land and construct a house confer full ownership rights for the purpose of a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Is a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable without seeking the consequential relief of specific performance where such relief is available?
- Whether cancellation of a plot allotment can be set aside through a suit for declaration of ownership when the plaintiff holds only a conditional agreement to construct.
- DR. Burjor N. Anklesaria vs MRS. Zenobia and Another1982 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal in an ejectment matter. The petitioner, a long-standing tenant of a residential bungalow, contested the ejectment application filed by the respondents, who claimed to be joint owners and landlords by virtue of inheritance and gift. The petitioner disputed their ownership and locus standi, arguing that an oral gift of immovable property was void under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that no valid attornment had taken place. The core legal question was whether the respondents qualified as 'landlords' under section 2(c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, so as to maintain an ejectment application. The Supreme Court held that the respondents fell within the definition of 'landlord' as persons for the time being entitled to receive rent, supported by notice and acknowledgment from the previous owner. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.
Questions settled- Whether a person claiming ownership through an oral gift can qualify as a landlord under section 2(c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does a communication from a former landlord acknowledging new owners suffice to establish the entitlement to receive rent?
- Whether a tenant can challenge the locus standi of a landlord without claiming ownership of the disputed property themselves?
- Dost Muhammad vs Abdul Rashid1982 SCMR 905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner-tenant regarding a commercial shop. The landlord had sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, personal requirement for himself and his sons, and the need for reconstruction. The Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment based solely on the reconstruction ground, rejecting the claims of default and personal requirement. The Additional District Judge maintained the ejectment order, affirming the reconstruction ground and reversing the finding on personal requirement, while upholding the finding against default. The High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's second appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings and additionally finding that the default in rent payment was established. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the findings of the lower courts were based on the appreciation of evidence. The Court reiterated the principle that it will not re-appraise evidence in such proceedings where no substantial question of law or principle is raised, thereby maintaining the concurrent findings of the courts below.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where concurrent findings of fact have been reached by lower courts?
- Is it permissible for a High Court in second appeal to reverse a finding of fact regarding default in rent payment if the findings of the lower courts were concurrent?
- Divisional Forest Officer, Sialkot and Aiiiothers vs Ganda1982 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order remanding a dispute over the cancellation of a land allotment. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in remanding the case to the Settlement authorities to determine whether land allotted to the respondent was legally part of a protected forest area and thus ineligible for allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s decision to remand the matter for fresh determination was appropriate given that the parties' rights remained unresolved and factual contentions regarding the forest notification and consolidation proceedings required further adjudication. The Court affirmed that where critical questions regarding the status of land—specifically whether it was validly notified as protected forest—remain disputed and unresolved, it is proper for the High Court to remand the case to the competent authority for a fresh decision rather than interfering prematurely. The Court declined to make observations on the merits of the forest notification, leaving those issues open for the remand proceedings.
Questions settled- Is it appropriate for the High Court to remand a case for fresh determination when the status of land as a protected forest remains disputed?
- Can a party be permitted to raise a new plea regarding the validity of a forest notification for the first time during remand proceedings?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order that directs a competent authority to resolve unresolved factual disputes regarding land allotment?
- Dilshad Bibi vs Muhammad Yunas and Other1982 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the orders of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's applications for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents in a case involving charges under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion perversely or arbitrarily in granting bail to the accused, particularly in light of identification parade evidence and the F.I.R. The Supreme Court held that the petition was without merit and dismissed it. The Court reasoned that the validity of the challenged orders depended entirely on the propriety of the initial High Court order granting bail, which had not been filed by the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the High Court had exercised its discretion perversely or arbitrarily under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the burden lies on the petitioner to provide the relevant orders and demonstrate that the lower court's discretion was exercised arbitrarily or perversely to warrant interference in bail matters.
Questions settled- Does the failure to provide the initial bail order in a petition for cancellation of bail preclude the appellate court from reviewing the exercise of discretion?
- Is the identification of an accused in a parade the sole factor relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What must a petitioner demonstrate to successfully challenge the grant of bail by a High Court?
- Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Another vs Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah1982 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner against the judgment of the High Court at Lahore. The core legal question concerns whether subsequent transferees of confirmed land allotments are entitled to notice and an opportunity of being heard prior to the cancellation of such allotments. The Supreme Court held that since the allottees were competent in law to transfer the lands upon confirmation without requiring prior consent from settlement authorities, the transferees acquired a valid interest and were entitled to notice on the fundamental principles of natural justice before any cancellation. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the validity of the underlying allotments must be determined by the settlement authorities in the presence of the affected transferees.
Questions settled- Are subsequent transferees of confirmed land allotments entitled to notice before the cancellation of such allotments?
- Whether allottees of confirmed land are competent to transfer the lands without obtaining prior consent from settlement authorities?
- Does a transferee acquire a legal interest when purchasing land from an allottee whose allotment is subsequently challenged?
- Dawood vs Muhammad Yasin1982 PLD Supreme Court 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court which allowed a landlord's second appeal and ordered the tenant to vacate a commercial shop on the grounds of personal requirement for the landlord's son and for reconstruction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether a landlord's pleas for ejectment on the grounds of personal use and reconstruction are mutually destructive, and whether combining them in a single application bars eviction. The Supreme Court held that the two grounds are not mutually destructive and can be validly combined, as the statutory provisions governing tenant protection and reconstruction can be harmoniously satisfied. The Court ruled that a landlord may seek eviction for both personal use and reconstruction simultaneously, provided the requirements are bona fide, and that the tenant's statutory rights under subsections (4), (5), (5-A), and (5-B) of section 13 do not negate the landlord's right to develop property.
Questions settled- Whether the grounds of personal use and reconstruction under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are mutually destructive?
- Can a landlord combine the grounds of personal requirement and reconstruction in a single ejectment application against a tenant?
- How do the statutory safeguards in subsections (4), (5), (5-A), and (5-B) of section 13 operate when eviction is ordered on both personal use and reconstruction?
- Does subsection (5-B) of section 13 restrict a landlord from converting or changing the nature of a building upon reconstruction?
- Maqsood Khan vs The State1982 SCMR 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant, Maqsood Khan, for the murder and robbery of a young girl, Mst. Hamida, under Sections 302 and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was sentenced to death and rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of a ten-year-old child eye-witness, identification parades, extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of stolen ornaments and sickles. The appellant challenged the reliability of the child witness, the validity of the identification parade, and the admissibility of the recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no universal rule discarding child witness testimony. The Court ruled that a child's evidence is admissible and reliable if it passes close scrutiny, is consistent, and is corroborated by subsequent conduct and physical evidence. The Court also upheld the recoveries as valid corroborative evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872.
Questions settled- What are the legal tests to determine the reliability and credibility of a child witness's testimony in a criminal trial?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a single child witness if it is corroborated by circumstantial evidence and recoveries?
- Whether the recovery of stolen ornaments at the instance of an accused in custody is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872 as corroborative evidence?
- Daulat Khan vs Bahadur Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, pre-emption, and alternatively for the refund of advance money. The core legal question concerned whether an indivisible agreement to sell involving multiple vendors, where the sale price was stated in a lump sum and one vendor was not a signatory, was capable of specific performance. The Supreme Court held that since the price could not be bifurcated and the contract stood as a single indivisible unit, it was not capable of specific performance. The Court laid down the principle that where a contract for sale involving multiple vendors specifies a lump sum price without proportioning shares and fails against a non-signing vendor, the entire contract fails and cannot be specifically enforced.
Questions settled- Whether an agreement to sell with a lump sum price involving multiple vendors can be specifically enforced when it fails against one of the vendors?
- Can a contract for sale be bifurcated when the price is stated in a lump sum and proportions are not known?
- Daraz Ali and Another vs Nathoo Khan1982 SCMR 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision filed by the vendees-defendants against a pre-emption decree. The core legal questions involved the computation of limitation due to the erroneous return and transfer of a first appeal concerning pecuniary jurisdiction, and whether the proper court-fee had been paid based on the definition of land revenue including rates and cesses under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the procedural delays and return of the appeal by the court did not prejudice the plaintiff's timely filed appeal, as the jurisdictional value fell within the enhanced pecuniary limits of the District Court, and that the factual finding regarding the court-fee and land revenue was properly determined. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does an act of the court in erroneously returning an appeal affect the computation of limitation for the appellant?
- Whether land revenue for the purpose of determining court-fee in a pre-emption suit includes rates on account of increase in the value of land due to irrigation under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967?
- Can a plea regarding the starting point of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit, not pressed before the lower appellate and high courts, be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore vs Messrs General Equipment1982 PLD Supreme Court 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals, by special leave, arise from a common judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing applications under section 17(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer a question of law regarding whether steel almirahs manufactured by the respondent were exempt from sales tax as products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 dated June 27, 1951. The core legal question was whether the determination of an article being a product of hammer works is a question of law or fact, and how the exemption notification should be construed. The Supreme Court held that the process used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact, and that the finding of the Tribunal that the goods were products of hammer work could not be disturbed. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory exemption does not require the manufacturing process to consist entirely of hammer work; rather, hammer work must be the dominant feature in producing the article.
Questions settled- Whether the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact or law?
- Does the exemption for products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 require the manufacturing process to consist entirely of hammer work?
- Can the High Court go behind a finding of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the manufacturing process?
- Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore vs General Equipment Merchants, Lahore46 TAX 48 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals, by special leave, arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing applications under Section 17(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, which sought to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding whether almirahs manufactured by the respondent were exempt from sales tax as products of hammer works under Sales Tax Notification No. 9 dated 27th June, 1951. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of the exemption notification and whether the determination that an article is a product of hammer works constitutes a question of law or a question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the manufacturing process does not need to be exclusively manual or solely composed of hammer work; rather, hammer work must be the dominant feature in the production. Furthermore, the Court held that the determination of the manufacturing process used to produce a particular article is a pure question of fact, and no question of law arises from the Tribunal's finding on this matter. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the manufacturing process of an article must be entirely the result of hammer work to qualify for sales tax exemption under Notification No. 9 dated 27th of June, 1951?
- Is the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article a question of fact or a question of law?
- Can the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal be directed to state a case and refer a question to the Court when the underlying finding is one of fact?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi vs Eastern Federal Union1982 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a certificated appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning tax assessments under the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the assessment for the chargeable accounting period ending December 31, 1952, which had become time-barred under the original section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, could be revived and validated by the subsequent introduction of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, via the Finance Act, 1957. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that although procedural statutes generally operate retroactively, they cannot be given retrospective effect to take away an accrued vested right or to reopen a past and closed transaction where the limitation period under the repealed provision had already expired before the amendment. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the assessment was time-barred and without legal validity.
Questions settled- Whether an amendment substituting limitation periods in a tax statute can revive an assessment that had already become time-barred under the repealed provision?
- Do procedural amendments operating retroactively affect vested rights accrued upon the expiry of a limitation period?
- Whether the provisions of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, apply of their own force upon incorporation into the Business Profits Tax Act without awaiting subordinate notification?
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi,Zone, Rawalpindi vs M. Bahar45 TAX 134 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal addressed whether interest paid by an assessee-firm on amounts received from minor relatives, which was held inadmissible for exemption under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 as borrowed capital, could alternatively fall within the scope of the general residuary provision of Section 10(2)(xvi) of the same Act as an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the special rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' applies where a special clause and a general clause cover the same narrow subject matter restrictively, it does not bar the application of a general clause if the two provisions are not mutually destructive or conflicting in substance. The Court found that the transaction constituted a loan and was appropriately deductible under Section 10(2)(iii), but that allowing it under Section 10(2)(xvi) was equally valid because the interest paid was indeed an expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether interest paid on amounts received from relatives which is inadmissible under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 can be allowed as an expenditure under Section 10(2)(xvi)?
- Does the rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' exclude the application of the general residuary clause for business deductions when a specific clause exists?
- When does the occasion to apply the rule that things special derogate from things general arise in the interpretation of tax statutes?
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi, Zone, Rawalpindi vs M. Sahar45 TAX 134 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the tax deductibility of interest payments made by an assessee firm to minor relatives on deposited sums. The core legal question was whether interest payments, if found inadmissible under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922 (which specifically addresses interest on borrowed capital), could alternatively be claimed as a business expenditure under the residuary Section 10(2)(xvi). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had allowed the deduction under Section 10(2)(xvi), despite finding the arrangement did not strictly constitute 'borrowed capital' under Section 10(2)(iii). The Supreme Court held that the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' (special provisions derogate from general ones) only applies when the scope of the general and special clauses is identical and creates a conflict. The Court determined that the interest payments in this case were, in fact, deductible under Section 10(2)(iii) as borrowed capital. Consequently, the Court affirmed the allowance of the deduction, holding that where an expenditure qualifies under both a specific and a general clause, the classification is immaterial, and the deduction remains valid.
Questions settled- Does the principle of 'generalia specialibus non derogant' preclude claiming a deduction under a general clause if it fails to meet the criteria of a specific clause?
- Can an expenditure be allowed as a deduction under a general clause if it also qualifies under a specific clause?
- Are interest payments on deposits used for business purposes considered 'borrowed capital' under the Income Tax Act 1922?
- Commissioner of Income Tax vs Eastern Federal Union Insurance46 TAX 6 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This certificated appeal under Section 66-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 read with Section 19 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the assessment of business profits tax for the chargeable accounting period ending 31-12-1952. The core legal question was whether the extension of the limitation period from four to six years via the incorporation of Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 into the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 by the Finance Act, 1957 applied retroactively to permit assessment after the original four-year limitation period had already expired on 31-12-1956. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the assessment made on 31-1-1958 was time-barred and invalid. The Court laid down the principle that while procedural amendments generally operate retrospectively, they cannot be given retroactive effect to revive a dead claim or extinguish a vested right where the limitation period under the unamended law had already expired before the amendment came into force.
Questions settled- Does a procedural amendment extending a period of limitation operate retroactively to revive tax liability that had already become time-barred under the unamended law?
- Can an assessment under the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 be validly made after the four-year limitation period under Section 14 has expired prior to the enactment of the Finance Act, 1957?
- Whether Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 protects an assessee's vested right from being defeated by a subsequent amendment extending time limits for assessment?
- Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and 2 Others vs Aslam1982 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs against a decision of the High Court. The core legal question for consideration is whether, in view of the specific prohibition contained in rule 10-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 against representation by an advocate in proceedings under those rules, a government servant is nevertheless entitled to be represented by counsel in departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court held that this question of law is of significant importance and likely to affect a large number of cases, thereby deserving an authoritative decision by the apex court. Consequently, the Court granted special leave to appeal, directed the appeal to be made ready on the existing record for an early hearing, and deferred the consideration regarding the suspension of the impugned High Court order.
Questions settled- Whether a party to proceedings under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 is entitled to be represented by an advocate in the face of the specific bar under rule 10-A?
- Does the High Court take a correct view in allowing a respondent to be represented through counsel during departmental proceedings despite statutory restrictions?
- Chiragh Din vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of a residential property under settlement laws, where the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the house to the predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 as a claimant displaced person in possession, while dismissing the petitioner's claim due to a lack of valid allotment and prior possession. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner established entitlement to the property through valid documentary evidence of prior possession and allotment. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to produce competent documentary evidence to substantiate his claim of prior possession, and the fresh documents relied upon did not support his assertion. The ratio decidendi is that factual claims of prior possession and allotment in settlement proceedings must be substantiated by reliable documentary evidence, failing which concurrent findings of revenue and settlement authorities will not be disturbed. The court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal in limine.
Questions settled- Whether an allottee claiming property transfer must establish prior possession through reliable documentary evidence?
- Can fresh documents produced for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction be relied upon without proper proof?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of settlement authorities regarding the lack of proof of possession?
- Chaudhry Abdul Haque vs Mst. Mustajab Bano and Other1982 SCMR 1103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition challenging an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute concerned two adjacent properties transferred to the appellant and first respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, via Permanent Transfer Deeds (PTDs). A controversy arose regarding a space between the properties, leading to conflicting site plans approved by settlement authorities and a remand order by the Settlement Commissioner for re-demarcation after the issuance of PTDs. The core legal question was whether Settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to determine or re-demarcate property boundaries after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued. The Supreme Court held that upon the issuance of a PTD, the property is removed from the compensation pool, rendering the Settlement authorities functus officio to deal with or re-demarcate the property, except strictly as provided under the Permanent Transfer Rules. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Do Settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to determine or re-demarcate property boundaries after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
- Does property leave the compensation pool upon the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Can Settlement authorities become functus officio regarding property transfers except as provided under the Permanent Transfer Rules?
- Chaudhri Wire Rope Industries Ltd. vs Sales Tax Officer, Special45 TAX 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the decision of a Sales Tax Officer regarding the taxability of a specific item. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court of Pakistan is whether a Sales Tax Officer possesses the jurisdiction to re-open and re-examine the liability of an item to sales tax after having previously determined, in an earlier assessment order dated 21-2-1975 for the assessment year 1969-70, that the said item was exempt from such tax. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider this jurisdictional issue, specifically addressing the finality or binding nature of prior assessment orders on the same subject matter. The Court ordered the case to be prepared for hearing on the existing record within six months, allowing parties to submit additional documents, and directed that the existing interim order shall continue to operate until the final disposal of the matter.
Questions settled- Does a Sales Tax Officer have the jurisdiction to re-open the question of tax liability for an item previously held as exempted in an earlier assessment order?
- Can a tax authority revisit an assessment decision regarding the taxability of an item after a final assessment order has been issued for a specific assessment year?
- Ch. Nusrat Ullah vs Athar Jamil1982 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's application under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the transfer of a civil suit pending before a Civil Judge in Lahore. The petitioner had sought transfer alleging bias and improper conduct on the part of the trial judge, which allegations were examined and rejected by both the District Judge and the High Court upon calling for a report from the trial judge. The core legal question concerns the exercise of supervisory and appellate discretion regarding the transfer of civil proceedings based on allegations of judicial bias. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the transfer application were based on the facts and circumstances of the case, were neither patently erroneous nor perverse, and did not raise any question of law of sufficient importance to warrant interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that transfer requests unsubstantiated by cogent proof and aimed at delaying proceedings will not be entertained.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts refusing to transfer a civil suit under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
- Can a civil suit be transferred on mere allegations of bias and family relations with the trial judge without substantiation?
- Whether an application for transfer of a suit aimed at delaying proceedings can be dismissed in limine?
- Ch. Muhammad Siddique vs Muhammad Rashid1982 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner. The petitioner, a tenant, was ordered by the Rent Controller under section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to deposit monthly rent before the 15th of each succeeding month. The petitioner deposited the rent for October 1977 on the 15th of November, 1977, leading the Rent Controller to strike off his defence and order ejectment on the grounds of wilful default. The petitioner contended that the delay was due to a bona fide mistake in interpreting the deadline, arguing that such an omission did not constitute wilful default. The Supreme Court noted conflicting interpretations regarding whether depositing rent on the 15th day satisfies a requirement to deposit 'before' the 15th. Finding that the case raised questions of considerable general importance regarding the interpretation of rent deposit deadlines and the definition of wilful default, the Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the execution of the ejectment order.
Questions settled- Does the deposit of rent on the 15th day of the month satisfy a judicial order requiring rent to be deposited 'before' the 15th of the month?
- Can a tenant's failure to deposit rent by the prescribed deadline be excused as a bona fide mistake to avoid the striking off of a defence?
- What constitutes 'wilful default' in the context of rent deposit orders under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain vs Election Tribunal and Another1982 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the election of a member to a local council under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether an Election Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to invalidate an election by inquiring into the correctness of an entry in the electoral roll—specifically, the transfer of a candidate's name between electoral units—after the roll has been finalized. The Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal acted without lawful authority in declaring the election void. The Court affirmed the principle that once a candidate's name appears on the electoral roll at the time of nomination, the entry is final and binding. Consequently, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to look behind the roll to determine if the enrollment or transfer was procedurally valid, provided the candidate meets statutory qualifications like age. The Court emphasized that the right to be enrolled as a voter is distinct from the right to be a candidate, and an election cannot be set aside based on challenges to enrollment entries that were not raised prior to the election.
Questions settled- Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of an entry in the electoral roll once it has been finalized?
- Is a candidate whose name appears on the electoral roll at the time of nomination qualified to contest an election despite allegations of improper registration?
- Can an Election Tribunal invalidate an election based on the alleged improper transfer of a candidate's name between electoral units?
- Ch. Muhammad Awais vs Muhammad Alam1982 SC M R283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a civil suit for the recovery of Rs. 20,000 based on a promissory note and receipt executed by the respondent. The trial court decreed the suit, but the Additional District Judge set it aside, holding that the promissory note was without consideration and executed under the pressure of criminal prosecution. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal, affirming the finding that no cash consideration had passed. The core legal question was whether the respondent successfully discharged the burden of proving the absence of consideration for an admitted promissory note. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower appellate court and the High Court—that no consideration had passed and the note was executed under pressure—were rooted in evidence and did not warrant interference. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed in limine, laying down the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact supported by the record regarding the absence of consideration in negotiable instruments.
Questions settled- Whether interference by the Supreme Court is justified when findings of the High Court regarding the absence of consideration in a promissory note are rooted in evidence?
- Does the burden of proving that no consideration passed rest heavily on the maker of a promissory note when execution is admitted?
- Can a promissory note executed under the pressure of criminal prosecution be held to be without valid consideration?
- Ch. Abdul Majid vs Muhammad Hanif and Other1982 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an election dispute where the petitioner challenged the election of the first respondent. The Election Tribunal, after a recount, declared the petitioner the winner, rejecting the respondent's preliminary objection regarding the non-joinder of a candidate. The High Court remanded the case, directing the Tribunal to reconsider the maintainability of the petition under Rule 66 of the Sind Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979, and to decide all issues on the merits. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the maintainability of the petition based on non-compliance with election rules, as Rule 68 vests this authority exclusively in the Election Authority prior to referral. However, the Court upheld the remand order regarding the merits. It established that an Election Tribunal must decide all issues, including those concerning alleged corrupt or illegal practices, simultaneously rather than piecemeal, as findings on such practices directly impact the validity of the votes cast and the final election result. The case was remanded for a comprehensive decision on all outstanding issues.
Questions settled- Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to dismiss an election petition for non-compliance with election rules under the Sind Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979?
- Is it mandatory for an Election Tribunal to decide all issues, including those on merits, simultaneously rather than deciding preliminary issues in isolation?
- Which authority is responsible for determining the initial maintainability of an election petition under the Sind Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979?
- Brig. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi vs Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur and Other1982 SCMR 991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenges orders regarding the resumption and distribution of land belonging to the appellant, the successor to the Ameer of Bahawalpur, passed under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 (M.L.R. 64) and the Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961. The core legal questions involved whether the property in question constituted impartible Ameerate property passing by the rule of primogeniture to the exclusion of other heirs, and the legality of the resumption and distribution orders. The Supreme Court held that the claim of the property being exclusively attached to the Ameerate was without force, but found that the distribution order passed by the Central Government suffered from infirmities requiring a fresh decision. Consequently, the impugned orders of the land authorities were set aside with directions to proceed afresh once the Central Government finalizes the distribution of properties among the heirs. The key principle laid down is that former rulers and their heirs are subject to general laws such as Martial Law Regulation No. 64, and land resumption cannot precede the exact determination of holdings.
Questions settled- Whether the property of the late Ameer of Bahawalpur is Ameerate property governed by the rule of primogeniture?
- Are the citizens belonging to former ruling families subject to the provisions of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1959?
- Can land authorities proceed with the resumption of excess land before the exact property holdings of individual heirs are finally determined?
- Bilal Hussain vs The State1982 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two criminal petitions filed by the petitioner, Bilal Hussain, challenging his convictions for attempted murder and illegal possession of a weapon. The petitioner was initially convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempted murder and under the Arms Ordinance for possession of a knife, with sentences of three years and one year of rigorous imprisonment, respectively. The High Court dismissed his appeals against both convictions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his actions constituted an offence under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 307. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, noting that the nature of the weapon and the location of the injury (the abdomen) justified the conviction under Section 307. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the offence were reclassified under Section 326, the sentence imposed was well within the permissible limits for that section, rendering the distinction practically immaterial to the petitioner's sentence. The petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the use of a knife to inflict an abdominal injury justify a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Does a reclassification of an offence from Section 307 to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 necessitate a reduction in sentence if the original sentence is within the statutory limits of the latter?
- Bharmal Alias Bahadur Khan and Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Multan Division, Multan and Other1982 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' application for setting aside the abatement of their writ petition. The sole contesting respondent had died on 7-8-1970, but the petitioners filed an application to bring legal representatives on record on 8-4-1971, falsely stating the date of death as 2-2-1971 to circumvent limitation issues. The High Court subsequently rejected the petitioners' applications for setting aside abatement and condonation of delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners deliberately made a false statement regarding the date of death and by their conduct disentitled themselves to equitable relief. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the High Court, ruled that no justification for interference was made out, and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a writ petition abates upon the death of the sole contesting respondent when legal representatives are not brought on record within time?
- Can a party that makes a false statement regarding the date of death to circumvent limitation be granted condonation of delay and setting aside of abatement?
- Does the High Court properly exercise its discretion in refusing to set aside abatement when the applicant is guilty of misleading the court?
- Begum Shams-UN-Nisa vs Said Akbar Abbasi and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and restoring an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute concerns the transfer of a shop originally allotted to a non-claimant displaced person who subsequently executed an Agreement of Association enabling the appellant-claimant to pay the transfer price from her compensation book. After the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed, the respondent acknowledged the appellant as his landlady by paying rent and filing an application for the fixation of fair rent. Years later, the respondent applied to the Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the Agreement of Association, alleging fraud and lack of consideration, which the Settlement Commissioner accepted. The Chief Settlement Commissioner declared that order a nullity under powers of general superintendence and control, which the High Court subsequently set aside via writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the allegations of fraud were baseless and that the respondent had long acquiesced in the transfer. Emphasizing that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised in aid of injustice, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Whether a party who has acknowledged a transferee as a landlord and sought fair rent can subsequently challenge the underlying Agreement of Association on grounds of fraud?
- Can the High Court exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction in a manner that restores an unjust order?
- Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner can direct subordinate authorities to ignore an order passed without jurisdiction?
- Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed bar a party from belatedly alleging fraud without timely challenge?
- Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs Income Tax Officer45 TAX 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against assessment orders passed by the Income Tax Officer against the late Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto for the assessment years 1972-73 to 1977-78. The assessment orders were issued and served upon the petitioner, one of the deceased's widows, after his death. The core legal questions involve the proper construction of Section 24-B of the Income Tax Act, specifically whether demand notices issued to a deceased person are valid, and whether a legal heir can be held liable for the entire tax liability of the deceased without a prior hearing. The Court held that a notice issued to a dead person is a nullity and that the respondent could not recover the entire tax liability from the petitioner, who was only entitled to a fractional share of the estate. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before such demands could be enforced. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the recovery of the tax amount pending the final hearing of the appeals.
Questions settled- Is a tax demand notice issued in the name of a deceased person a legal nullity?
- Can a legal heir be held liable for the entire tax liability of a deceased person without a prior hearing?
- Does Section 24-B(3) of the Income Tax Act 1922 exclude the right of a legal heir to be heard before tax recovery?
- Can a tax authority recover the full tax liability of a deceased person from a single heir whose inheritance share is limited?
- Begum Almas Daultana vs Manzoor Ahmad Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner and remanded the case for a fresh decision by a competent officer. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's order of remand was justified and whether the observations made by the High Court in its judgment would unfairly prejudice the proceedings upon remand. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the matter for a fresh determination, finding the order legally sound and unobjectionable. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the strong observations made by the High Court in its judgment were merely tentative in nature. The Court laid down the principle that when a case is remanded for a fresh decision, the competent officer must decide the matter strictly on its merits, based on the material adduced and contentions advanced, without being influenced by any tentative observations made by the High Court in its remand order.
Questions settled- Is an order of remand for a fresh decision by a competent officer justified when the original order is found to be without lawful authority?
- Should observations made by a High Court in a remand order be treated as binding findings or tentative observations?
- Can a competent officer decide a case on remand uninfluenced by tentative observations made by the High Court?
- Bashir Ahmed vs Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, Punjab and Another1982 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the decision of the Member, Board of Revenue. The petitioner had been allotted land under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme, while the respondent was a pre-existing lessee of the same land. Following a series of disputes regarding possession and subsequent litigation, the Member, Board of Revenue, set aside the petitioner's allotment, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Member, Board of Revenue erred in concluding that the purpose of the petitioner's allotment had not been fulfilled. The Supreme Court held that this issue constituted a question of fact, which could not be re-examined in appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the lower authorities' decisions, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and should not be exercised to perpetuate injustice, particularly where the respondent had long-standing possession and qualified for the 15 Years Lease Scheme.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court re-examine a finding of fact regarding the fulfillment of the purpose of a land allotment in a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Is the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court discretionary in nature?
- Should writ jurisdiction be exercised in aid of injustice?
- Bashir Ahmed and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed their application for the suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioners had been convicted under Sections 366 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving sentences exceeding four years of rigorous imprisonment. While their appeal against conviction was admitted for hearing by the High Court, their request for bail pending appeal was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the impugned order and found no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court judge in refusing to suspend the sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to maintain the incarceration of the petitioners during the pendency of their appeal.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing to suspend a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is a convicted person entitled to suspension of sentence as a matter of right pending an appeal?
- Bashir Ahmad Zia vs The Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal1982 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which declared the petitioner, an Assistant Manager at the Punjab Agricultural Development and Supplies Corporation, not to be a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that after completing his three-month probation, he became a regular employee entitled to protection under Standing Order 12(5). The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s duties, which included supervision of sale points, liaison with government departments, and educating farmers, were clerical or manual in nature, thereby qualifying him as a workman. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding, noting that the petitioner's duties involved managerial and supervisory functions rather than clerical or manual tasks. The Court held that an employee exercising delegated authority and performing supervisory duties, even if directed by a District Manager, does not qualify as a workman. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the Labour Courts lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's grievance.
Questions settled- Does an Assistant Manager performing supervisory and liaison duties qualify as a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- Can an employee be considered a workman if their duties are primarily managerial and supervisory rather than clerical or manual?
- Does the exercise of delegated authority by an employee exclude them from the definition of a workman?
- Bashir Ahmad Etc. vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1982 SCMR 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that refused to restore a constitutional petition previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the restoration of a petition where the petitioners failed to appear, despite their claim that a clerical error in the cause list regarding a counsel's name caused the absence. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners had engaged multiple counsel, and while one name was misspelled in the cause list, the other counsel were correctly listed. Furthermore, the High Court noted a history of non-appearance by the petitioners on previous dates. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in considering the overall conduct of the petitioners in diligently pursuing the case. The principle laid down is that in exercising discretionary power to restore a petition dismissed for default, the court is entitled to evaluate the petitioner's prior conduct and diligence in pursuing the litigation, and if such conduct is found deficient, the court may properly decline to exercise discretion in their favor.
Questions settled- Can a court refuse to restore a constitutional petition dismissed for non-prosecution if the petitioner's conduct shows a lack of diligence?
- Does a clerical error in a cause list regarding a counsel's name automatically entitle a party to the restoration of a dismissed petition?
- Is the exercise of discretion by a High Court in refusing to restore a petition subject to interference if it is based on the petitioner's overall conduct?
- Bashir Ahmad Etc. vs Mushtaq Ahmad Etc.S1982 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Banaras Khan Etc vs Chairman, WAPDA Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a land acquisition dispute where WAPDA acquired the petitioners' land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court misread evidence regarding relevant revenue entries (Khasra Girdawaries or Jamabandies) in assessing the classification and compensation value of the disputed land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to consider that the disputed fields were adjacent to well-irrigated Chahi land and shared the same potential, supported by presumption of correctness attached to Jamabandi entries. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Additional District Judge's decree assessing the land as Chahi. The key principle laid down is that the potential of agricultural land, such as its capacity to be irrigated by an adjacent well, must not be ignored when determining its classification and compensation value in land acquisition proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether the potential of land to be irrigated by an adjacent well can be considered in determining its classification for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
- Does a Jamabandi entry describing land as Chahi carry a presumption of correctness in land acquisition proceedings?
- Whether the High Court's order based on the misreading of Khasra Girdawaris or Jamabandies is liable to be set aside by the Supreme Court?
- Ballia and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentences of the petitioners for committing multiple murders in the Sahiwal district. The core legal question concerns the reliability of ocular evidence, the testimony of chance and child witnesses, and the requirement of independent corroboration where a co-accused has been acquitted on the same evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised regarding the presence of witnesses, the naturalness of the motive, the tainted nature of recovery evidence, and the implications of the co-accused's acquittal require further re-examination and consideration by the appellate forum. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted to reassess the evidence and test the sustainability of the capital convictions.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of a chance witness can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a capital case?
- Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the same evidence necessitate independent corroboration for sustaining the conviction of remaining co-accused?
- Can the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness sustain a conviction on a capital charge?
- Whether defective recovery evidence as to one accused undermines the entire prosecution case regarding weapon recoveries against other co-accused?
- Bahadur and Others vs Mir Afzal Khan and 7 Other1982 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a suit for declaration, correction of revenue records, and permanent injunction filed by Sar Anjam Khan regarding a landed estate, claiming ownership based on a dower deed. The trial court decreed the suit in respect of an 1/8th share, holding that the dower deed created only a life estate. On appeal before the High Court, the plaintiff's claim was accepted, and the original contesting defendants admitted the claim and ceased contesting. The appellants, who were tenants seeking potential allotment of excess land upon resumption under Martial Law Regulation No. 64, were impleaded during the appeal under Order XLI, Rule 20, C.P.C. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court examined the locus standi of the appellants. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had no present right, title, or interest in the subject-matter of the suit, being total strangers who merely sought to benefit from a prospective allotment contingent upon the repealed or contested shares of respondents who had themselves compromised and abandoned the contest. Consequently, the Court found that the appellants lacked locus standi, recalled the leave to appeal, and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether sitting tenants claiming potential land allotment upon resumption have locus standi to maintain an appeal regarding the title of the land?
- Does a dower deed conveying property to a wife operate to transfer the corpus or merely a life estate?
- Can parties impleaded as respondents or appellants in an appeal challenge a decree when the original contesting parties have admitted the claim and settled the dispute?
- Badla vs Khuda Bakhsh and Anotmr1982 PLD Supreme Court 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arose from a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land, which was decreed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent by the District Judge and upheld by the High Court. The defendant-petitioner contended that the transaction was an exchange rather than a sale, and alternatively, that if treated as a sale, it would be invalid under Martial Law Regulations 64 and 64-A of 1959 for reducing the vendor's remaining holding below the subsistence limit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the concurrent findings of fact that the transaction was indeed a sale disguised as an exchange. On the legal question of invalidity under the land reform regulations, the Court held that a civil court deciding a pre-emption suit is not required to test the validity of the sale on the touchstone of paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 64, provided a sale is established. The petition was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a transaction disguised as an exchange can be determined by the court to be a sale for the purposes of a pre-emption suit?
- Whether a civil court deciding a pre-emption suit is required to test the validity of the underlying sale under Paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959?
- Can a pre-emption suit be decreed if the sale allegedly violates the restrictions on reducing land holdings below a subsistence level under Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959?
- Aziz Ahmad vs Province of Punjab1982 SCMR 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a direct recruit to the Class II Service of the Industries Department, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his intra-court appeal by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question involved whether a recommendation made by the Punjab Civil Service (Appellate) Tribunal could be treated as a binding direction and whether the High Court correctly held that the petitioner's remedy lay before the Supreme Court under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the tribunal's earlier observation was merely a recommendation and not a direction, but because it had been misread as a direction in subsequent proceedings, the petitioner's proper remedy against the tribunal's subsequent order lay under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the authorities were only directed to examine the recommendation, and if accepted, the petitioner would have remedies before the Services Tribunal if his seniority was affected. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a recommendation made by the Punjab Civil Service (Appellate) Tribunal can be construed as a binding direction?
- What is the appropriate constitutional remedy against an order passed by a Service Tribunal?
- Does a government directive to merely examine a service tribunal's recommendation furnish a cause of action for a grievance?
- Aziz Ahmad and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, Jan Muhammad. The petitioners challenged the conviction, primarily contending that a conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the deceased's ability to speak rendered the First Information Report (F.I.R.) a fabrication and undermined the credibility of prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court considered whether the alleged medical impossibility of the deceased speaking after the neck injury invalidated the F.I.R. and the ocular evidence. The Court held that the medical evidence did not definitively establish that the vocal cords were severed, allowing the courts below to prefer the oral testimony regarding the deceased's ability to dictate the F.I.R. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that even if the F.I.R. were excluded, the remaining evidence from neutral and independent witnesses, alongside motive and recovery of weapons, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming that minor medical discrepancies do not automatically discredit reliable ocular testimony.
Questions settled- Can a court rely on ocular testimony regarding a dying declaration if there is an alleged conflict with medical opinion regarding the deceased's ability to speak?
- Does a potential conflict between medical evidence and the F.I.R. automatically discredit the entire prosecution case?
- Is the testimony of a neutral and independent witness sufficient to sustain a conviction even if other parts of the prosecution evidence are challenged?
- Azim Khan vs Rashid Ahmad Etc.1982 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted by the High Court to the respondents in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the respondents were entitled to pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case, including subsequent involvement in other criminal acts and specific firearm allegations. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the respondents' subsequent abscondence and involvement in another murder case, along with specific firearm attribution in the FIR, warranted the cancellation of their anticipatory bail. The key principle laid down is that subsequent criminal conduct such as abscondence in a murder case disentitles an accused from retaining pre-arrest bail, and minor evidentiary nuances do not justify pre-arrest bail in the face of specific fatal allegations.
Questions settled- Does subsequent abscondence in another murder case justify the cancellation of pre-arrest bail?
- Is the presence of multiple firearm injuries at the same point on a deceased person's body a sufficient ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
- Whether pre-arrest bail granted by a High Court can be cancelled by the Supreme Court upon conversion of a petition into an appeal?
- Attock Oil Co. Ltd., Rawalpindi vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi45 TAX 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions filed by Attock Oil Co. Ltd. concerning the assessment years 1955-56 to 1965-66, where the petitioner sought to set off expenses incurred in running and subsidizing schools for the children of its employees under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The core legal question is whether the educational expenses incurred by the employer under threat of an industrial dispute fall under Section 10(2)(xvi) or are barred by Section 10(2)(xvi)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer rejected the claim, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal accepted it. Subsequently, the Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the High Court's view and whether the expenses fall within the claimed statutory provision. The key principle laid down is that expenses incurred by an employer to meet employee demands to avert industrial disputes warrant a detailed examination regarding their deductibility as business expenditures under the Income Tax Act.
Questions settled- Whether expenses incurred by a company in running and subsidizing schools for the children of its employees fall under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- Are educational expenses incurred to meet employee demands and avert an industrial dispute hit by the provisions of Section 10(2)(xvi)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- Attock Oil Co. LT., Rawalpindi vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi45 TAX 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the tax deductibility of expenses incurred by the petitioner, Attock Oil Co. Ltd., for maintaining and subsidizing schools for its employees' children. The petitioner sought to set off these expenses against its income for the assessment years 1955-56 to 1965-66, invoking Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer had rejected the claim, citing Section 10(2)(xvi)(a), a decision initially overturned by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal but subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the expenses incurred by the company to meet employee demands and prevent industrial disputes qualify as deductible business expenses under Section 10(2)(xvi) or are excluded by the provisions of Section 10(2)(xvi)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Finding that the High Court's interpretation requires further examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the applicability of the statutory provisions to the petitioner's claim.
Questions settled- Whether expenses incurred by an employer for subsidizing schools for employees' children to avert an industrial dispute qualify as deductible business expenses under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income Tax Act 1922?
- Does the exclusion under Section 10(2)(xvi)(a) of the Income Tax Act 1922 apply to expenditures incurred by a company for the education of its employees' children?
- Ashraf vs The State1982 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of the appellant and convicted him under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Rafiq. The core legal question was whether the testimony of three eye-witnesses, all closely related to the deceased, was sufficient to sustain a conviction despite defense arguments that their presence at the scene was unnatural and their testimony required corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the eye-witnesses were natural witnesses whose presence at the scene—adjacent to their residence—was logical. The Court found no reason to disbelieve them, noting the absence of hostility between the parties. The holding establishes that the testimony of related witnesses is credible when they are natural witnesses, particularly when their accounts are corroborated by motive, medical evidence, and the appellant's subsequent abscondence. Consequently, the conviction was upheld, affirming that the High Court correctly relied upon the consistent and corroborated testimony of the eye-witnesses.
Questions settled- Can the testimony of closely related eye-witnesses be relied upon to sustain a murder conviction?
- Does the abscondence of an accused person serve as corroborative evidence in a murder trial?
- Is the testimony of eye-witnesses inherently unreliable if they are related to the deceased?
- Ashraf Alias Ashri vs The State1982 SCMR 666(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Ashraf alias Ashri, challenging the Lahore High Court's judgment that upheld his conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case rested on the ocular testimony of two witnesses and evidence of motive regarding a monetary dispute, following the stabbing of the deceased. The petitioner contended that the eye-witnesses were unreliable, arguing that one was a close relative of the deceased and the other was not a true eye-witness as he only witnessed the accused fleeing the scene. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and the findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the lower courts had properly considered the evidence and were justified in their conclusions. Emphasizing that it would not undertake a reappraisal of evidence merely to reach a different conclusion, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the findings of the courts below were based on reliable testimony.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court undertake a reappraisal of evidence in a criminal petition for leave to appeal where the lower courts have already considered the evidence?
- Is the testimony of a maternal uncle of the deceased inherently unreliable in a murder trial?
- Ashiq Hussain Shah vs Ashiq Ali Shah and Another1982 SCMR 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondent, Ashiq Ali Shah, of the murder of Amanat Shah. The respondent had been convicted and sentenced to death by the trial court based on evidence including an approver's testimony, extra-judicial confession, and recoveries of weapons. The High Court acquitted the respondent, finding significant evidentiary gaps and failing to exclude the possibility of innocence. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the prosecution's reliance on the 'last seen' theory, the approver's testimony, and the extra-judicial confession. The Court found the 'last seen' evidence improbable due to existing family enmity, noted the approver's statement was exculpatory and unreliable, and determined the retracted extra-judicial confession lacked credibility and was potentially influenced. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appreciation of evidence did not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference with an acquittal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the lower court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed or perverse.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment if the High Court's appreciation of evidence is not shown to be infirm?
- Is an exculpatory statement by an approver sufficient to support a conviction?
- Does the existence of family enmity render the 'last seen' theory improbable in a murder case?
- Asghar Ali vs The State1982 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, along with 18 others, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his pre-arrest bail petition by the High Court in a case involving offences under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, arising from an inquiry into the alleged forgery and cheating regarding the sale of State land. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail under the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly considering lack of sufficient opportunity during the inquiry and the grant of bail to co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail before arrest to the petitioner subject to furnishing security.
Questions settled- Whether an accused is entitled to pre-arrest bail when not given sufficient opportunity to explain allegations during an inquiry?
- Does the grant of bail to co-accused persons justify the concession of pre-arrest bail to another petitioner in the same case?
- Arman Gul vs The State1982 SCMR 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction for murder. The core legal question concerned whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, provided during a night-time occurrence, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when challenged on grounds of identification and lack of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, finding that the ocular testimony was consistent with the medical evidence, which confirmed the injuries were caused by a single shot fired from close range. The Court affirmed that interested witnesses are credible when their testimony is corroborated by the circumstances of the case, including the established motive and the subsequent abscondence of the accused. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that identification was impossible due to darkness, noting the presence of adequate lighting at the crime scene. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the prosecution had successfully established the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through reliable ocular evidence and the accused's flight from justice.
Questions settled- Can the testimony of interested witnesses be sufficient to sustain a murder conviction without independent corroboration?
- Does the abscondence of an accused person serve as corroborative evidence of guilt?
- Is ocular testimony regarding identification in a night-time occurrence reliable if the scene was illuminated?
- Can a conviction be upheld when ocular testimony is consistent with medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries?
- Arif Hussain and Another and Sube Shah vs The State Arif Hussain Etc.S1982 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-10Read full judgment →
- Anwarul Haq Khan vs Ch. Jamal Din and Other1982 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from civil petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether an ex parte judgment passed by the High Court against the petitioner was sustainable when the name of the petitioner's engaged counsel was omitted from the cause list, resulting in the petitioner being condemned unheard. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the absence of the counsel whose name was missing from the cause list was excusable, and passing an ex parte judgment without affording an opportunity of representation violated principles of natural justice. The Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and remitted the matters back to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits after hearing both parties. The key principle laid down is that where a counsel's name is omitted from the cause list and a party is consequently unrepresented and condemned unheard, any resulting ex parte order or judgment is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
Questions settled- Whether an ex parte judgment passed by the High Court is sustainable when the counsel's name was omitted from the cause list?
- Does the absence of a counsel whose name does not appear in the cause list constitute sufficient cause for non-appearance?
- Can an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice by condemning a party unheard be set aside?
- Anwar Ali vs Muhammad Azam1982 SCMR 1012 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Anjuman Araian, Bhera vs Abdul Rashid and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of a writ petition filed by the appellant, Anjuman Araian, Bhera, challenging the allotment and subsequent sale approval of evacuee trust land on which the appellant had constructed a mosque and madrassa. The core legal question is whether an unauthorized occupant or trespasser possessing no legal right or title to the property qualifies as an 'aggrieved person' with locus standi to invoke the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that a trespasser in unauthorized possession lacks the requisite locus standi to challenge transfer orders of property to third parties, as such possession confers no legal interest or legitimate expectation recognized by law. The court established the principle that invoking constitutional writ jurisdiction requires demonstrating a direct or indirect injury and a substantial, legally sanctioned interest in the subject matter, which does not extend to persons maintaining illicit or unauthorized occupation of public or trust properties.
Questions settled- Whether an unauthorized occupant or trespasser of property has the locus standi to maintain a constitutional writ petition against the transfer of such property?
- Can a person without any legal right or title in the corpus of a property be considered an aggrieved person under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
- Does a trespasser acquire a legitimate expectation or legal interest to challenge allotment and sale orders passed by the authorities regarding trust land?
- Amjad and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the High Court to two petitioners, Amjad and Mahmood, who were charged alongside seven others under Sections 302 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. During the investigation, the prosecution found the case against seven of the co-accused to be false, leading to their release on bail, while the petitioners remained challaned. The petitioners argued that because the initial version of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) was proven false regarding the majority of the accused, it lacked sanctity. Furthermore, they contended that only a single injury on the leg of the deceased was attributed to each of them. The Supreme Court, without delving into the merits of the case, held that in the specific circumstances presented, the petitioners were entitled to bail. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioners subject to the provision of sureties to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Bahawalnagar.
Questions settled- Does the falsity of a First Information Report regarding the majority of accused persons entitle the remaining accused to the grant of bail?
- Can the Supreme Court grant bail to accused persons when the lower courts have refused it based on the specific circumstances of the case?
- Amir Din and 2 Others vs Siddique and 5 Other1982 SCMR 242(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Letters Patent Appeal on merits in their absence. The petition was barred by 64 days. The petitioners contended that the limitation period should run from the date of their knowledge of the dismissal, as neither they nor their counsel were aware of the disposal. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the High Court's record showed a notice was sent to the petitioners' counsel by registered post acknowledgment due. Under the General Clauses Act, a presumption of service arises when a notice is sent by registered post. Since the counsel failed to file an affidavit denying receipt of the notice, the presumption of service stood unrebutted. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred.
Questions settled- Does the period of limitation for filing an appeal run from the date of knowledge of a judgment if the party claims they were not heard?
- Can a presumption of service of notice sent by registered post be rebutted without an affidavit from the addressee denying receipt?
- What is the legal effect of sending a notice to a counsel by registered post acknowledgment due under the General Clauses Act?
- Amir Din and 2 Others vs Muhammad Siddique and 5 Other1982 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition seeking to challenge an order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court at Bahawalpur dated 5th November 1974, which dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal on merits in the absence of the parties and their counsel. The petition was barred by 64 days, and the petitioners contended that limitation should run from the date of knowledge since they were unaware of the disposal. The core legal question was whether the period of limitation for filing the appeal should start from the date of knowledge when notice of the hearing had been sent by registered post. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed, noting that notice was duly sent by registered post acknowledgment due, raising a statutory presumption of service under the General Clauses Act, which remained unrebutted as the counsel failed to file an affidavit denying service. The key principle laid down is that the presumption of due service of notice sent by registered post stands unless effectively rebutted by proper evidence.
Questions settled- Does the period of limitation for an appeal start from the date of knowledge when a party claims ignorance of a judgment passed in their absence?
- What is the effect of sending a hearing notice by registered post acknowledgment due regarding the presumption of its receipt?
- Is an assertion of non-service sufficient without a supporting affidavit from the counsel?
- Aminullah vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of two brothers for the murder of their father. The core legal question addressed is the extent of the burden of proof on an accused person setting up a plea of alibi under Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Court held that the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely on the prosecution and never shifts. Regarding the plea of alibi, the Court ruled that an accused is not required to prove the plea affirmatively beyond reasonable doubt; rather, the accused need only produce evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable possibility of the alibi, thereby creating a reasonable doubt as to their presence at the crime scene. Applying this principle, the Court found the prosecution's evidence regarding the ocular testimony and motive to be unreliable and lacking independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitting both appellants by giving them the benefit of the doubt, as the prosecution failed to prove its case against them beyond reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when a plea of alibi is raised in a criminal trial?
- What is the standard of proof required for an accused to successfully establish a plea of alibi?
- Is an accused entitled to an acquittal if their alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt about their presence at the scene of the crime?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the prosecution case lacks independent corroboration and contains significant discrepancies?
- Amanullah Khan Durrani vs Government of the Punjab Etc.S1982 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service as Superintendent of Central Jail, Mianwali. The dismissal followed the escape of Indian convicts of sensitive nature during his tenure, which was attributed to gross negligence and inefficiency, including failure to follow the Jail Manual and directions regarding segregation and night inspections. The core legal questions involved whether the Inquiry Officer was legally bound to summon all requested defence witnesses under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, and whether the penalty of dismissal warranted interference under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer is not bound to summon every requested witness or document unless considered necessary, particularly where facts are established and admissions exist in the accused's own explanation, and that the quantum of punishment does not raise a substantial question of law of public importance. The key principle laid down is that an inquiry officer has discretion to dispense with unnecessary defence evidence, and the sufficiency of evidence and quantum of service penalties are primarily matters for the departmental authorities and the Services Tribunal.
Questions settled- Is an Inquiry Officer legally bound to summon every witness or document requested by an accused civil servant under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975?
- Does the quantum of punishment imposed on a civil servant raise a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Can admissions and assertions made in a civil servant's written explanation be used to draw inferences of guilt and dispense with further defence evidence?
- Amanullah and Others vs Rais Muhammad Bakhsh and Other1982 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained a status quo regarding the construction of an open-air cinema in Sadiqabad, District Rahim Yar Khan. The respondents had initially challenged the legality of a No-Objection Certificate granted to the appellants for the cinema's construction through a Constitutional Petition. However, by the time the petition was filed, the construction was already complete. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had applied correct legal principles in granting the status quo order, particularly given the completed state of the construction. Upon review, and noting that the respondents did not appear to contest the appeal and the Assistant Advocate-General for the Punjab government also declined to contest it, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court noted that the cinema had been operational since 1974. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, effectively resolving the dispute in favor of the appellants without an order as to costs.
Questions settled- Whether a status quo order is appropriate when the construction project in dispute is already completed?
- Can an appellate court set aside a status quo order if the respondents fail to contest the appeal?
- Allahyar vs The State1982 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which maintained his conviction under Section 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while acquitting his four co-accused. The occurrence involved a delay of 27 hours in lodging the First Information Report, wherein it was alleged that all accused were armed with dangs, whereas medical evidence showed that several injuries were caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Furthermore, the recovery from the petitioner consisted of an unstained dang. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the petitioner could be sustained on the testimony of eye-witnesses whose evidence had been rejected with respect to the co-accused, in the absence of independent corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that the case required further consideration regarding the distinction drawn by the High Court between the petitioner and the acquitted co-accused. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to examine the matter.
Questions settled- Can the conviction of an accused be maintained on the testimony of eye-witnesses whose evidence has been rejected regarding co-accused in the absence of independent corroboration?
- Whether the recovery of an unstained weapon constitutes sufficient corroboration to sustain a criminal conviction?
- Allah Yar and Others vs Begum Sarwar Khatoon and Other1982 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the respondent's retention of a specific parcel of land. The core legal question concerned whether an allottee of land who received excess area is entitled to exercise a choice regarding which portion to surrender and which precise area to retain upon surrendering the excess. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition lacked merit, affirming that an allottee indeed possesses the right to exercise a choice in the matter of retention and surrender of excess land. The court thereby established the principle that allottees have a recognized right to choose the land they retain when surrendering excess land allotments.
Questions settled- Does an allottee have the right to exercise a choice in the matter of retention and surrender of excess land?
- Whether the dismissal of a constitutional petition on the ground that the matter is concluded by a previous judgment suffers from any legal infirmity?
- Allah Wasaya vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the confirmation of death sentences awarded on two counts for double murder. The appellant was convicted of murdering his wife, Mst. Aisha Mai, whom he suspected of infidelity, and her younger sister, Mst. Jindan Mai, who intervened during the attack. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether a lesser sentence could be awarded due to the loss of self-control. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the sentence for the murder of the wife could be reduced to imprisonment for life in view of the mitigating factor of motive relating to suspected infidelity and loss of self-control, the death sentence for the murder of the sister must be maintained because her killing was deliberate, intentional, and unjustified, rather than accidental or merely incidental. The Court laid down the principle that the extenuating circumstances applicable to an initial murder committed under sudden rage do not automatically extend to a subsequent murder, which must be judged independently based on its own facts, intent, and circumstances.
Questions settled- Whether the sentence of death awarded for the murder of an unfaithful wife can be reduced to imprisonment for life when the crime is committed under grave and sudden provocation?
- Does the mitigation applicable to a murder committed in a fit of rage automatically extend to a subsequent murder committed during the same transaction?
- Whether the intentional killing of a person who intervenes to save the primary victim warrants a lesser penalty?