Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Allah Ditta and Others vs Lal Din and Other1982 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-28
  pre-emptionreview jurisdictionextension of timedeposit of pre-emption moneyact of courtdelay by court officedecree-sheet preparation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby a review application filed by the respondent was accepted and the date for depositing pre-emption money in a decree was altered. The core legal question was whether the High Court could validly review its earlier judgment and extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when the delay in compliance was caused by the late preparation of the decree-sheet by the court office, despite the pre-emptor having applied for copies in time. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party should not be made to suffer for the fault or negligence of the court's officials in failing to prepare the decree-sheet in a timely manner. The Court laid down the principle that the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' applies, and where the delay in complying with a deposit deadline is attributable to the court's failure to furnish the decree, the court possesses the necessary jurisdiction—whether in review or under other enabling provisions—to adjust the time to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can review its judgment to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when the decree-sheet was not prepared by the court office within the original deadline?
  • Can a party be penalized for failing to comply with a deposit deadline when the delay is attributable to the negligence or mistake of the court's agency in supplying a copy of the decree?
  • Does the mere labeling of an application as a review petition invalidate an order if the relief sought is sustainable under other provisions of law such as sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the maxim that no party shall suffer for the fault of the court applies to procedural deposit requirements in pre-emption suits?
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• Allah Ditta and Others vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab, Lahore and Othess1982 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-16
  customary lawancestral propertyevacuee propertydeclaratory decreealienationinheritance rightslegal necessity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld an order by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The dispute arose from agricultural land sold by a Muslim owner, Samanda, to an evacuee, Chanda Singh. A collateral of the owner, Hussain Muhammad, had successfully obtained a declaratory decree in 1910, establishing that the sales were invalid under customary law due to a lack of legal necessity. Following the death of the alienor in 1961, his heirs sought a declaration from the Custodian of Evacuee Property to inherit the land. The core legal question was whether the heirs could benefit from the 1910 decree and whether they were entitled to challenge the alienation despite the intervening rights of allottees under rehabilitation laws. The Supreme Court held that the Custodian was justified in recognizing the heirs' title based on the 1910 decree. The Court affirmed that Muslim Law heirs are entitled to impeach alienations of ancestral agricultural land made by a customary owner, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Are Muslim Law heirs entitled to impeach an alienation of ancestral agricultural land made by a customary owner?
  • Can the Custodian of Evacuee Property give effect to a prior civil court decree declaring an alienation invalid?
  • Does the death of a customary owner allow his heirs to claim inheritance rights over land previously alienated without legal necessity?
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• Allah Ditta and Other vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-22
  dacoitymurderextra-judicial confessionperson in authoritytracker evidencerecovery of stolen propertycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity and murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of tracker evidence, the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession made before a government official, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding the recovery of stolen property to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that while the tracker evidence was ambiguous and excluded from consideration, the conviction remained sound based on the remaining evidence. The Court affirmed that an extra-judicial confession made to a person who is not a 'person in authority'—lacking the power to intimidate or induce the accused—is admissible, provided it is voluntary and credible. Furthermore, the Court established that a conviction can be safely maintained when supported by a credible extra-judicial confession and the recovery of stolen articles from the accused's possession, even if other pieces of prosecution evidence are found unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Is an official of the Agriculture Department considered a 'person in authority' for the purpose of an extra-judicial confession?
  • Can a conviction be maintained solely on the basis of an extra-judicial confession and recovery of stolen property if other prosecution evidence is excluded?
  • Does the ambiguity of tracker evidence necessarily invalidate the entire prosecution case?
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• Allah Din vs Siraj Din and Another1982 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-03
  civil petition for leave to appealremand of caseconstitutional petitionsettlement authoritiesproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court passed in constitutional petitions, which set aside the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a property and the extent of excess area, remanding the case for fresh decision. The core legal question concerns the propriety of remanding the case for factual determination and fresh measurement by the settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order of remand was justified and suffered from no legal infirmity, as it provided an opportunity for the parties to have their grievances properly adjudicated based on fresh measurements and factual verification. The Supreme Court consequently dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal, affirming the remand order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a settlement dispute for fresh decision and measurements when factual aspects require careful resolution?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against a High Court order that remands a case for fresh adjudication without legal infirmity?
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• Allah Din vs Habib1982 PLD SC 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-14
  ejectmentnon-payment of rentburden of proofsecond appealconflicting findings of factlandlord and tenantonus of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an ejectment proceeding initiated by a landlord against a tenant for non-payment of rent. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the First Appellate Court reversed this, citing a lack of proof regarding non-payment and excluding the landlord's receipt book from evidence. The High Court dismissed the landlord's second appeal, holding that the findings of fact by the First Appellate Court were conclusive. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in second appeal when dealing with conflicting findings of fact between the trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by failing to perform a comparative assessment of the lower courts' reasoning. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the initial burden of proof lies on the landlord to show non-payment, a landlord's sworn testimony of non-receipt constitutes sufficient discharge of that burden, shifting the onus to the tenant to prove payment. Consequently, the Court restored the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to interfere in a second appeal when the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court are at variance with the trial court?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie in an ejectment proceeding for non-payment of rent once the landlord has testified on oath that rent was not received?
  • Can a landlord's sworn testimony of non-receipt of rent be sufficient to discharge the initial burden of proof in rent default cases?
  • Is a finding of fact by a first appellate court immune from interference in second appeal if it fails to consider material evidence or lacks logical reasoning?
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• Allah Din vs Dilawar Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-08
  dismissal for non-prosecutionadjournment requestabsence of counselformal applicationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan where neither the petitioner, his counsel, nor his Advocate-on-Record appeared to press the petition. Instead, a 'certificate' signed by the petitioner's counsel was delivered to the Court's Librarian via his clerk, requesting a fortnight's adjournment on the ground that the counsel's uncle had passed away. The respondents, who were present in person, objected, noting that the petitioner's counsel had previously obtained an adjournment on the last hearing date and had exhibited similar conduct in the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that while an oral request for adjournment was granted on the previous date, the counsel failed to file a formal application for adjournment on this occasion, relying instead on an informal certificate. The Court held that such a certificate cannot be treated as a formal application for adjournment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Can an informal certificate sent through a clerk be treated as a formal application for adjournment by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a petition can be dismissed for non-prosecution if the petitioner and their counsel fail to appear and only submit an informal request for adjournment?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-22
  review petitionfugitive from lawcriminal appealsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a review petition seeking the same benefit extended to co-convicts in an impugned judgment, following the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal. The core legal question is whether a petitioner who has become a fugitive from law is entitled to seek relief or review from the court. The court held that a fugitive from law is not entitled to seek any relief, including by way of review, and accordingly dismissed the petition while noting that the petitioner may seek relief from the executive authorities. The key principle laid down is that fugitives from law forfeit their right to audience and equitable relief in judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner who has become a fugitive from law entitled to seek review of a dismissed appeal?
  • Can a fugitive from law claim the benefit of a judgment extended to co-convicts?
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• Allah Bakhsh and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue and Other1982 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-20
  leave to appealconsolidation schemeboard of revenuewrit petitioncompensation for improvements
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a consolidation matter originating from village Gadhai, Tehsil Bhakkar, District Mianwali, where a consolidation scheme initiated in 1961 was finalized in April 1965. The petitioners challenged subsequent orders through appeals and revisions before revenue authorities up to the Board of Revenue, and eventually filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on 18-11-1975. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition and failing to grant compensation for improvements made by the petitioners on surrendered land. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not demonstrate any legal defect in the impugned judgment of the High Court and that the High Court was not the proper forum to grant compensation for improvements made during consolidation proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that revenue authorities and writ courts are not mandated to grant such compensation relief under the circumstances presented.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is the appropriate forum to grant compensation for improvements made on land surrendered during consolidation proceedings?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be sustained without showing a legal defect in the impugned High Court judgment?
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• Allah Bachaya and Others vs Mst. Qadul and Other1982 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-17
  presumption of marriagelegitimacyacknowledgement of paternitycohabitationMuslim Lawinheritancesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the District Judge's decree and restored the trial court's dismissal of the appellants' suit for a declaration of inheritance. The core legal question concerned whether a presumption of lawful marriage and legitimacy of children could be drawn from prolonged cohabitation and acknowledgements under Muslim Law where direct proof of marriage was absent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that continuous cohabitation, repute, and acknowledgement of paternity by the man raise a strong presumption of a valid marriage and legitimate birth, leaning in favour of legitimacy against concubinage. The key principle laid down is that where direct evidence of marriage is unavailable, permanent cohabitation coupled with acknowledgement and familial or societal repute justifies the legal inference of a lawful marriage under Islamic jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a valid marriage and legitimacy of children be presumed from prolonged cohabitation and acknowledgement under Muslim Law in the absence of direct proof of marriage?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in admitting additional evidence in second appeal to ensure a proper determination of the case in the interest of justice?
  • Does the law presume in favour of marriage and legitimacy as against concubinage when a man and woman cohabit for a number of years?
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• Ali Muhammad vs Muhammad Hayat and Other1982 SCMR 816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-20
  remandrevisional jurisdictionframing of issuesmaterial irregularityjudgment writingcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit where the trial court, after framing seven issues, decided the sixth issue in detail but summarily dismissed issues one through five without providing individual reasons. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, but the Lahore High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, set aside both judgments and remanded the case to the trial court for re-writing the judgment. The core legal question was whether a trial court is mandated to provide separate findings and reasons for each issue under Order XX Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether a failure to do so warrants a remand. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial court's failure to give reasons for each separate issue constituted a disregard of the mandatory provisions of Order XX Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, amounting to a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the High Court was fully competent under its revisional jurisdiction to remand the case for a proper determination of all issues.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally mandated to state its findings and reasons upon each separate issue under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the summary disposal of multiple issues based solely on the finding of a single issue constitute a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, remand a case to the trial court for re-writing a judgment that violates Order XX Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Ali Muhammad and Others vs Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue1982 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-12
  writ jurisdictionallotment of landforged documentsBoard of Revenuefindings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the Member, Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' land allotment, dated 15-3-1961, was genuine or forged, and whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the Board of Revenue's finding of fact. The Member, Board of Revenue, had determined that the petitioners obtained the allotment through forged signatures of the then S.D.O., Toba Tek Singh, and were holding the land illegally, subsequently ordering the resumption of the land. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded that the Member, Board of Revenue, reached a finding within his competent jurisdiction after due deliberation. The Court held that because the view taken by the Member, Board of Revenue was a possible view based on the evidence, it was not subject to interference under writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that findings of fact by a competent authority, when based on a possible view of the evidence, are not reviewable in writ proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with a finding of fact made by a competent authority if that finding is a possible view?
  • Is an allotment of land obtained through forged signatures subject to resumption by the Board of Revenue?
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• Ali Muhammad and Another vs Fateh Bibi and Another1982 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  evacuee propertycustodian jurisdictionacquiescenceconstitutional petitionsuperintendence and controldisplaced personswaiver of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the evacuee or non-evacuee status of a property. The petitioners, claiming the property was evacuee, sought to challenge the Custodian’s decision declaring it non-evacuee. The core legal questions concerned whether the Custodian possessed the authority to reverse a Deputy Custodian’s finding, and whether the Custodian retained jurisdiction to determine the property's status despite the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Custodian possesses plenary powers of superintendence and control under Section 43(4) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957, enabling the reversal of subordinate orders. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Custodian retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine the evacuee nature of property, as property not originally evacuee does not vest in the compensation pool. Crucially, the Court applied the principle of acquiescence, ruling that a party cannot participate in proceedings before a tribunal and subsequently challenge its jurisdiction only after receiving an adverse decision. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Custodian of Evacuee Property possess the power under Section 43(4) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 to reverse an order passed by a Deputy Custodian?
  • Can a party that has participated in proceedings before a tribunal challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction after an adverse decision is rendered?
  • Does the Custodian retain jurisdiction to determine the evacuee or non-evacuee nature of property after the enactment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• Ali Ahmad Sabri vs The State1982 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-23
  fugitive from justicebail misusecondonation of delaydeath sentencespecial leave to appealsurrender
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon an application seeking extension of time and permission to refile a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that confirmed the petitioner's sentence of death for murder. The core legal question concerns whether a convicted petitioner who has absconded, failed to surrender upon the dismissal of his appeal, and misused the concession of bail can be granted condonation of delay and permission to refile a time-barred petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was a fugitive from justice and had deliberately failed to surrender as required by the rules, thereby forfeiting his entitlement to discretionary relief. The ratio decidendi is that a fugitive from justice who abuses the process of law and the concession of bail is not entitled to condonation of delay or discretionary extensions for filing an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fugitive from justice is entitled to an extension of time for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the failure to surrender upon the dismissal of a criminal appeal disentitle a convict to discretionary reliefs from the court?
  • Can condonation of delay be granted to a petitioner who deliberately avoids arrest and absconds after the dismissal of his appeal?
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• Akhtar Abbas vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-25
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaymurder trialadjournments by defencedelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the refusal of the Baluchistan High Court to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory bail under the amended provisions of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of delay exceeding two years in the conclusion of the trial, and whether such delay was attributable to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in refusing bail because the trial had been delayed due to multiple adjournments sought by the defence on dates when witnesses were present, meaning the delay was partly attributable to the act or omission of the accused. The key principle laid down is that where an accused seeks adjournments that delay the trial, the mandatory statutory concession of bail based on a two-year delay does not apply, and it is not necessary to mathematically calculate the duration of delay caused by the defence as long as the trial's finalisation has been delayed by the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail after two years in custody if the trial is delayed due to adjournments sought by the defence?
  • Does the calculation of delay under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require quantifying the exact time consumed by defence adjournments?
  • Whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing bail when prosecution witnesses were present but their examination was postponed at the request of the defence?
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• Akhtar Abbas and Others vs Nayyar Hussain1982 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  writ proceedingssuo motu relieflimitationmutation of inheritancerevisopnrehabilitation settlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning a mutation of inheritance of abandoned agricultural land originally sanctioned on 27-2-1955. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in writ proceedings, could set aside an order that was not challenged in the writ petition and whether the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) had jurisdiction to entertain a revision against the Collector's order dismissing an appeal on the ground of limitation after an eight-year delay. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by granting relief outside the scope of the writ petition, as it is settled law that relief in writ proceedings must be confined to the prayer made and the court cannot issue a writ suo motu. The Court further held that the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner's order dismissing the revision as time-barred and beyond jurisdiction did not suffer from any legal defect. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, declaring the proceedings before the Additional Commissioner without lawful authority and setting aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court grant relief in writ proceedings that goes beyond the prayer made in the writ petition?
  • Whether an Additional Commissioner (Revenue) has jurisdiction to hear a revision against an order of the Collector dismissing a belated appeal on the ground of limitation?
  • Does an order of the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner dismissing a revision petition as time-barred suffer from any legal defect?
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• Akbar Yalmaz vs Government of the Punjab and Another1982 SCMR 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19
  seniorityservice tribunalregional cadredomicilecompassionate transferleave to appealfactual findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Inspector in the Excise and Taxation Department, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which denied his claim to seniority dating back to 1961. The petitioner, originally recruited to a regional cadre in the West Pakistan Excise and Taxation Department at Quetta based on a Quetta-Pishin domicile, was later transferred to the Punjab province. He argued that he was a Punjab domicile and entitled to seniority benefits for his prior service. The Service Tribunal, relying on a report from the Baluchistan Government, found that the petitioner had secured his initial appointment based on a Quetta-Pishin domicile and that his subsequent transfer to Punjab was granted on compassionate grounds, thereby justifying his placement at the bottom of the seniority list. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to challenge the factual findings of the Tribunal regarding his initial recruitment basis. As the matter rested on findings of fact rather than questions of law, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that factual determinations by the Tribunal are not subject to interference without a clear legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service tribunal's finding of fact regarding the basis of initial recruitment be challenged in the Supreme Court without a question of law?
  • Does a transfer granted on compassionate grounds entitle an employee to retain seniority from a previous regional cadre?
  • Is an employee recruited against a specific regional quota entitled to claim seniority upon transfer to another province?
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• Akbar Khan and Others vs Muhammad Anwar and Other1982 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-03
  customary lawancestral propertyalienationdowerreversionary rightsland disputefraudulent transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a land dispute governed by customary law, wherein the petitioners challenged the alienation of an entire ancestral land holding by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower. The core legal question was whether, under the customary law of District Attock, such an alienation is valid when the land value significantly exceeds the dower amount and the transaction effectively disinherits reversionary heirs. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had decreed the suit against the petitioners. The Court held that while custom permits a husband to gift a portion of his estate to his wife as dower, it does not sanction the alienation of an entire ancestral holding to satisfy a disproportionately small dower debt. The key principle laid down is that customary law does not protect alienations of ancestral property designed to defraud rightful heirs, and the scope of permissible alienation is limited by the proportionality between the dower amount and the property value.

  Questions settled

  • Does customary law permit a husband to alienate his entire ancestral land holding to his wife in lieu of dower?
  • Can an alienation of ancestral property be set aside if it is intended to defraud reversionary heirs?
  • Is the customary right of a husband to gift land to his wife limited by the proportionality of the dower amount to the land value?
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• Akbar Ali Shah and 3 Others vs Muhammad Shah and 4 Other1982 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-05
  review petitionsecond appealfinding of factappellate courtre-appraisal of evidencegift deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review of a prior order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from a dispute concerning the genuineness of signatures on a gift deed allegedly executed by a deceased donor. The core legal question was whether the High Court and the Supreme Court were justified in refusing to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the District Judge regarding the signatures, and whether a re-appraisal of evidence is permissible in second appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the grounds urged merely criticized the approach of the Court rather than pointing out an error patent on the face of the record, which is a prerequisite for review. The Court laid down the principle that the District Judge, acting as the first appellate court, is the final court of fact, and findings of fact recorded by it cannot be interfered with or re-appraised in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact recorded by a District Judge be interfered with in second appeal?
  • Is a mere criticism of the approach followed by the Court a valid ground for seeking review of an order?
  • Whether the final court of fact in the appellate hierarchy is the District Judge.
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• Ahmed vs The State1982 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-06
  murdercircumstantial evidencebenefit of the doubteyewitness credibilityidentification by torchlightmotivecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder conviction where the appellant, Ahmed, was accused of strangulating the deceased, Sanata, allegedly due to an illicit relationship with the deceased's wife. The core legal question revolves around the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the credibility of identification by torchlight in the dark, and the sufficiency of uncorroborated motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailants, noting significant discrepancies regarding the presence of eyewitnesses, the belated production of the torch used for identification, and the lack of corroboration for the alleged motive. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, ruling that the incident was an unseen murder committed in darkness. The key principle laid down is that in unwitnessed crimes occurring in the dark, uncorroborated oral testimony regarding identification by artificial light and assumed motive is insufficient to sustain a conviction, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt and an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether uncorroborated testimony regarding identification by torchlight in the dark is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does an assumed motive alone suffice to prove guilt when eyewitness testimony is discarded?
  • What is the legal effect of a belated production of an identification torch before the investigating officer?
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• Ahmed and Another vs Muhammad Shafi and Other1982 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  evacuee propertycivil court jurisdictionallotmentpossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning land originally sold in 1936 by the predecessor of respondents Nos. 1 to 3, whose subsequent suit for possession upon the vendor's death was decreed in 1946. Following the 1947 partition, the land was allotted to the petitioners as evacuee property. Upon the vendor's death in 1962, respondents sought possession based on the 1946 decree, which the civil court decreed, though the District Judge later accepted the petitioners' appeal. The Lahore High Court, however, accepted the respondents' regular second appeal. The core legal question is whether the civil court's jurisdiction was barred and whether the petitioners held rights extending beyond the vendor's lifetime. The Supreme Court held that only the evacuee rights of the non-Muslim mortgagee/purchaser to hold possession until the vendor's death were acquired and allotted, meaning the petitioners' rights ceased upon the vendor's death without requiring a declaration from the Custodian, and the civil court's jurisdiction was not barred regarding such limited rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal, while observing that the Government should allot alternative land to the petitioners in lieu of the forfeited property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under the evacuee laws when the property allotment pertained only to limited evacuee rights that expired upon the vendor's death?
  • Does an allotment of evacuee property encompassing the right to hold possession until a vendor's death survive the expiration of that vendor's lifetime without a declaration from the Custodian?
  • Whether petitioners deprived of an evacuee land allotment through no fault of their own are entitled to the allotment of land in lieu thereof?
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• Ahmad vs The State1982 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-06
  criminal appealmurdereyewitness testimonybenefit of doubtnon-seen occurrenceFIRidentification evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, motivated by illicit relations with the deceased's wife, strangulated the victim, with identification facilitated by a torchlight. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eyewitness testimony and the sufficiency of evidence in a case of alleged murder. The Supreme Court found the prosecution's case riddled with inconsistencies: the FIR recording was suspicious, the torch was produced with unexplained delay, and the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses at the scene was highly improbable given the darkness and their contradictory accounts. Furthermore, the court noted that the witnesses were not present when police arrived, contradicting their claims. Holding that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailants, the Court ruled that the incident was an unwitnessed occurrence. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, establishing the principle that where eyewitness accounts are improbable and uncorroborated, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unexplained delay in producing the sole source of identification, such as a torch, render eyewitness testimony unreliable?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on an unproven motive when the eyewitness testimony is found to be improbable?
  • Is the testimony of eyewitnesses credible if they were not present at the crime scene when the police arrived, despite claiming to have been left with the body?
  • What is the legal consequence when the prosecution fails to prove the identity of the assailants in a murder case?
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• Ahmad Mohi Ud Din vs Khalil Ahmad and Another1982 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-16
  quashment of proceedingsconciliation courtcriminal jurisdictionprivate complaintconcurrent jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan which partly accepted a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and quashed criminal proceedings against the respondent under section 341 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, holding that the matter was exclusively triable by a Conciliation Court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961. The petitioner contended that the Magistrate had concurrent jurisdiction and that the Conciliation Court could not award adequate punishment. The Supreme Court held that since the case was initiated on a private complaint rather than police investigation, the provisions regarding concurrent jurisdiction did not apply, and that the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 adequately provides mechanisms for transfer of cases to criminal courts where necessary. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate have concurrent jurisdiction over an offence triable by a Conciliation Court when the proceedings are initiated on a private complaint rather than a police investigation?
  • Can criminal proceedings under section 341 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be quashed on the ground that the matter is exclusively triable by a Conciliation Court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961?
  • What is the mechanism for transferring a case from a Conciliation Court to a competent criminal court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961?
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• Ahmad Khan vs Bashir Ahmad and Other1982 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  ejectmentbona fide requirementreconstructionwrit jurisdictiontenantcontempt of courtstay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby a writ petition filed by the landlord against the appellate court's dismissal of an ejectment application was accepted. The petitioner was a tenant of a shop against whom the respondent-landlord sought ejectment on grounds of default in rent and personal requirement for reconstruction. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the appellate court set aside the order, holding the landlord's requirement not to be bona fide. The High Court reversed this view and restored the ejectment. The core legal question was whether the High Court could properly interfere in its writ jurisdiction with the findings of the first appellate court under the rent restriction law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly intervened where the first appellate court's findings lacked proper justification. Additionally, a criminal miscellaneous petition for contempt of court regarding an alleged violation of a stay order was dismissed as unsubstantiated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court passed under the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the absence of ejectment proceedings against other tenants in the same building necessarily disprove the bona fide requirement of the landlord for reconstruction?
  • Can a party be punished for contempt of court for violating a stay order when service or knowledge of the stay order is denied and unproven?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Karachi Halva Merchants and Ahmad Food Products vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi46 TAX 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income tax referencearising out of orderquestion of lawabandoned groundsincome tax appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court dismissing an income-tax application. The core legal question is whether a question of law included merely as a ground in the memorandum of appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, but neither argued nor dealt with by the Tribunal, can be said to 'arise out of such order' for the purpose of a reference under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expression 'arising out of such order' does not encompass a question of law that was neither raised, argued, nor decided by the Tribunal. The Court laid down the principle that where a ground is taken in the memorandum of appeal but not pressed during the hearing, it is deemed abandoned, and no reference can be sought on a matter not actually agitated before or considered by the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a question of law included in the memorandum of appeal but not argued before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal can be said to arise out of its order under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Can a reference be sought under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on a ground that was taken in the grounds of appeal but not pressed or discussed during the hearing?
  • What is the scope and interpretation of the expression 'arising out of such order' under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Etc. S vs The State1982 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  ocular testimonyindependent corroborationbenefit of doubtmurderexpert opinioncriminal appealfirearm recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from convictions and sentences under sections 302, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to a double murder and assault. The core legal question examined by the Court was whether the ocular testimony adduced against the appellants required independent corroboration and, if so, whether such corroboration was available for each convict. The Supreme Court held that where ocular testimony is found to be at variance in material particulars—specifically where eye-witnesses falsely or mistakenly implicated an acquitted co-accused—the remaining testimony requires independent corroboration before it can safely sustain a conviction. The Court found that while corroboration in the form of firearm expert opinion existed regarding the appellant Abbas, no such independent corroboration was available against the other appellants. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the convictions and sentences of Arif, Ahmed, and Karamat, maintained the conviction of Abbas for murder while commuting his death sentence to imprisonment for life, and laid down the principle that corroboration must be sought not only for interested witnesses but whenever ocular testimony lacks absolute soundness and freedom from material doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony that is found to be at variance in material particulars requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Does corroboration need to be looked for only where witnesses are interested, or also in cases where the ocular testimony is not sound and doubt-free?
  • Whether the acquittal of a co-accused based on the rejection of a material part of the eye-witnesses' statements detracts from the intrinsic worth of their testimony against other co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din vs Shamas Din1982 SCMR 1020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30
  pre-emptiontenant's right of pre-emptionimprovement of statusco-sharerleave to appealcrucial stages of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment dated 17-7-1976 passed by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a second appeal arising from a pre-emption suit. The respondent filed a pre-emption suit claiming a preferential right as a co-sharer in the Khata against the petitioner/vendee, who was a tenant of Khasra No. 8 and mortgagee of Khasra Nos. 23 and 26. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Although the High Court found that the petitioner was a tenant of Khasra No. 8 and had improved his status under Section 21-A of the Pre-emption Act, it dismissed the appeal on the ground that the respondent was a co-owner in the Deh and held a superior right. The petitioner contended that as his pre-emptive right was protected qua Khasra No. 8 under Paragraph 25(3)(d) of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 115), he had improved his status prior to the suit, thereby defeating the pre-emptor's claim across all three relevant stages (sale, suit institution, and decree). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these substantial legal submissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant purchasing land comprised in his tenancy can defeat a pre-emptor's claim under Paragraph 25(3)(d) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972 even if the sale took place prior to Kharif 1972?
  • Whether an improvement of status by a vendee qua one portion of purchased land under Section 21-A of the Pre-emption Act can be utilized to defeat a pre-emptor's claim regarding other parcel(s) of land sold through the same transaction?
  • Whether a pre-emptor must maintain a superior right of pre-emption across all three crucial stages, namely the date of sale, the date of institution of the suit, and the date of the decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din Etc vs Chakra Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-03
  land resumptionpublic auctionland reforms regulationmutationdefault in paymentauction purchasers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the question of whether respondents were entitled to the benefit of paragraph 28 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, discharging grantees from liability for unpaid instalments, where the land originally granted to their predecessor had been validly resumed prior to the enactment of the regulation and sold by public auction to the appellants. The Supreme Court held that since the respondents failed to comply with the conditional remand order requiring them to deposit outstanding dues and a penalty within a specified timeframe, the original resumption order automatically revived, and the land stood lawfully auctioned and disposed of in favour of the appellants. Consequently, the respondents were not subsisting grantees of the land at the time the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 came into force and could not claim its benefits. The appeal was accordingly allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the order of the Member, Board of Revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to comply with a conditional order of a Deputy Land Commissioner results in the automatic revival of a prior land resumption order?
  • Are respondents whose land grant was resumed prior to the promulgation of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 entitled to the benefit of paragraph 28 of the Regulation?
  • Whether auction purchasers acquire a valid title when land is auctioned following the default and resumption from the original grantee?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Rashid Ahmad and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-06
  contempt of courtviolation of stay orderstatus quowilful disobediencecriminal originaldelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting the appellants for contempt of court for violating a stay order directing the maintenance of status quo passed in a writ petition. The core legal question was whether the appellants, including a revenue officer (Tehsildar), had willfully disobeyed the High Court's prohibitory order with sufficient notice of its contents. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had definite and authentic information regarding the stay order yet deliberately proceeded to deliver possession of the land in disregard of the court's command, thereby committing contempt. The Court affirmed that an official or party who proceeds with an action contrary to a known stay order cannot escape liability, and that reliable information conveyed by an advocate or recorded officially constitutes adequate notice. Consequently, the convictions and sentences were upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person can be convicted for the breach of a prohibitory order without formal service of the order, provided they had definite and authentic information of it?
  • Does the proceeding under Article 199 of the Constitution relating to a civil matter constitute a civil proceeding?
  • Whether a revenue officer executing a delivery of possession despite notice of a High Court stay order commits contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Adalat Khan vs Muhammad Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-29
  pre-emptionco-sharerleave to appeallegal representativeswaiver of pre-emptionabatement of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of the District Judge, Jhelum, which decreed a pre-emption suit in favour of the legal representatives of the original pre-emptor. The core legal question revolved around whether the right of pre-emption as a co-sharer is a personal right that abates upon the death of the pre-emptor before the conclusion of proceedings, or whether it survives for the benefit of his legal representatives. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner lacked substance and that the pre-emption rights and powers were validly maintained and pursued through the legal representatives. The Court laid down that the right of pre-emption in such context does not lapse to the detriment of the legal representatives where proceedings are duly constituted and contested, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption as a co-sharer come to an end upon the death of the pre-emptor before the final decree is passed?
  • Do the legal representatives of a deceased pre-emptor inherit an independent pre-emptive right or the pre-emptive rights held by the deceased?
  • Can a pre-emption suit proceed when the original pre-emptor dies after participating in the sale and filing a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Sattar and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-14
  criminal appealbailmurderattempt to murderrule of consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a bail petition filed on behalf of three accused persons facing charges under sections 302, 307, and 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition concerning two of the accused, Abdus Sattar and Ghulam Yaseen, but issued notice regarding the third accused, Suleman, whose attributed role pertained to section 325. The core legal question concerned whether Suleman was entitled to the concession of bail based on the rule of consistency and the specific role attributed to him. The Court held that on the stated facts and circumstances, particularly noting that Suleman's role was allegedly similar to that of a co-accused who had already been released on bail, the petitioner deserved the concession of bail. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and directed the release of the petitioner subject to furnishing appropriate bail bonds and sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused whose role is similar to that of a co-accused already released on bail is entitled to the concession of bail?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail be converted into an appeal and allowed by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Salam and Another vs S. M. Nasim, Additional Land Commissioner1982 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  land leaseeligibility criteriagovernment schemeactual cultivatorrevisional jurisdictionspecial leave to appealland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the cancellation of a land lease granted to the petitioners under a government scheme. The petitioners, both government servants, were initially granted land on a 13-year lease, but their leases were cancelled on the grounds of ineligibility. The core legal question was whether the petitioners met the eligibility criteria for the lease, specifically regarding cultivation requirements and residency, and whether the revisional authority was competent to adjudicate the matter. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to satisfy the mandatory eligibility conditions prescribed under the scheme, specifically those requiring actual cultivation of land and specific residency requirements. The Court reasoned that regardless of the petitioners' employment status as government servants, they did not qualify as eligible persons under the scheme's conditions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition in limine, establishing the principle that where a party is fundamentally ineligible for a grant under a statutory scheme, procedural challenges regarding the authority of the adjudicating officer become inconsequential.

  Questions settled

  • Does government service per se disqualify a person from being eligible for a land lease under the Punjab Government Scheme?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the competency of an adjudicating authority if they are fundamentally ineligible for the relief sought under the governing scheme?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for eligibility regarding land cultivation and ownership under the Punjab Government land lease scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs The State1982 SCMR 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-20
  murderright of self-defenceocular testimonyhostile witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder and attempt to commit murder. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular testimony of partisan and related witnesses could be safely relied upon without corroboration, and whether the appellant was entitled to the right of private defence given that he sustained injuries during the incident which the prosecution was allegedly bound to explain. The Supreme Court held that the presence and testimony of the eyewitnesses were fully established and corroborated by circumstances, and that the appellant, being the initial aggressor who returned armed with a knife after a previous altercation, could not claim the right of self-defence simply because minor injuries were sustained during the scuffle. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an aggressor who returns armed to attack victims can claim the right of private defence?
  • Can the testimony of a partisan or related eyewitness be accepted without corroboration if found reliable?
  • Whether minor injuries sustained by an accused during an affray vitiate the prosecution case when adequately explained or rebutted?
  • Does a hostile witness's previous statement transferred to the sessions file under the law retain evidentiary value?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Jan and Others vs Tila Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-07
  review petitionalienation of propertyundue influencequestion of factres judicataSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition seeking the review of an earlier order of the Court which had dismissed a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The underlying dispute pertains to the alienation of agricultural property by a vendor in favour of his son, which was challenged on grounds of unsoundness of mind, undue influence, and lack of consideration. The trial court and the Peshawar High Court both concluded that the vendor was of sound mind, no undue influence was exercised, full consideration was paid, and the subsequent suit was barred by constructive res judicata under the Civil Procedure Code. The core legal questions involved whether the inference drawn regarding undue influence constituted a question of law and whether the bar of res judicata applied. The Supreme Court held that an erroneous finding of fact based on an appraisal of evidence does not constitute an error of law without procedural defect, and concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in review or leave petitions. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an erroneous finding of fact arrived at after an appraisal of evidence amount to an error of law?
  • Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding the soundness of mind of a vendor and the absence of undue influence be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a new contention not raised at the time of the hearing of the original petition furnish a ground for review?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid Khan vs The Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner1982 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-27
  constitutional petitionproperty transferplinth areasettlement authoritiesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the refusal by departmental authorities to transfer additional land beyond three times the plinth area of a house already transferred to the petitioner. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether a claimant is legally entitled under the applicable laws and notifications to the transfer of property area exceeding three times the plinth area. Holding that no such legal entitlement or concession exists, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that in the absence of enabling legal provisions, notifications, press notes, or circulars supporting such a claim, an applicant cannot demand or be transferred property area in excess of the statutory or officially sanctioned limit of three times the plinth area.

  Questions settled

  • Is a claimant entitled to the transfer of property area in excess of three times the plinth area?
  • Whether notifications, press notes, or circulars provide a concession for the transfer of additional property area beyond the plinth area limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor vs The State And 6 Other1982 SCMR 970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-14
  post-arrest bailunlawful assemblyjudicial discretionmurderinfirmitybelated FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondents 2 to 7 in a murder case. The petitioner alleged that the respondents formed an unlawful assembly and committed the murder of Muhammad Yousaf, with specific injuries attributed to each respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in exercising its discretion to grant bail, particularly considering the age and infirmity of some respondents and the circumstances of the incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to grant bail was justified. Regarding the elderly respondents, the court affirmed that their medical condition, supported by the Medical Superintendent, warranted release. Regarding the other respondents, the court noted that the High Court correctly considered factors such as the belated FIR, the existence of a compromise, and the fact that the respondents themselves sustained injuries, suggesting the case did not clearly fall under the prohibition against bail for offences punishable by death or life imprisonment. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of injuries on the accused party provide valid grounds for a court to exercise discretion in granting bail in a murder case?
  • Is a medical report confirming senile cataract and advanced age sufficient grounds to grant bail to an accused charged with a non-bailable offence?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail if the order is based on relevant considerations like a belated FIR and cross-injuries?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor and Others vs Mst. Hawabai and Other1982 SCMR 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-09
  return of plaintpecuniary jurisdictionfresh suitcompromise decreelimitationmaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a decision by a Division Bench of the Sind High Court, which had set aside a Single Judge's order dismissing a suit. The respondents had originally filed a suit for setting aside a compromise decree, but the plaint was returned by the Civil Court due to a lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Instead of re-presenting that specific plaint, the respondents filed a fresh suit in the High Court with modifications. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff, upon the return of a plaint for lack of jurisdiction, is legally obligated to re-present the same plaint or if they may institute a fresh suit. The Supreme Court held that when a plaint is returned for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is under no legal obligation to file the same plaint before the proper forum and may instead file a fresh suit, provided it complies with the law of limitation. The Court affirmed the Division Bench's decision, ruling that the Single Judge erred in dismissing the suit on the grounds of maintainability.

  Questions settled

  • When a plaint is returned for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, is the plaintiff legally obligated to re-present the same plaint in the proper forum?
  • Can a plaintiff file a fresh suit after a previous plaint was returned for lack of jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of a fresh suit after the return of a previous plaint require the plaintiff to adhere to the law of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar vs Syed Razi Hussain Etc.S1982 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-30
  revisional jurisdictionscope of revisionjurisdictional errorleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal challenging the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. The core legal question addressed is whether the High Court exceeded its scope of authority under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by setting aside the concurrent findings of two lower courts that did not suffer from any jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the initial stay order and the submissions of counsel, determined that the High Court's interference with the lower courts' orders was potentially improper as those orders did not exhibit the jurisdictional defects required for intervention under the statute. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the limits of the High Court's revisional powers. The principle laid down emphasizes that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction is strictly confined to cases involving jurisdictional errors, and it cannot interfere with lower court findings simply based on disagreement, provided those courts acted within their legal competence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court exceed its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when it interferes with concurrent findings of lower courts that do not suffer from jurisdictional errors?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid, Etc. vs Additional Commissioner, Etc.S1982 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-02
  election petitionlocal councils electionmaterial effect on election resulttechnical objectionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a service/election matter where the petitioner challenged the order of the Election Tribunal declaring the entire election for an electoral unit void due to irregularities, which order was upheld in limine by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Election Tribunal to explicitly state that the irregularities materially affected the result of the election under rule 15 of the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petitions) Rules, 1979 vitiates the decision. The Supreme Court held that despite the technical omission of the exact statutory formula by the Tribunal, the nature of the irregularities—specifically regarding delimitation and tampering with ballot boxes—inherently demonstrated that the result was materially affected, rendering remand unnecessary. The key principle laid down is that where irregularities are grave enough to clearly impact the election outcome, the absence of a ritualistic recitation of statutory phrasing is a mere technicality that does not warrant interference or remand.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an Election Tribunal to explicitly use the statutory formula regarding material effect on election results vitiate its decision?
  • Whether irregularities in delimitation and ballot box handling are sufficient to declare an election void as a whole?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid Etc. and Ahmad Ali vs The States Abdul Rashidand Other1982 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-17Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadus vs Sikandar Khan Etcs1982 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionconcurrent findings of factco-ownershipleave to appealrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit regarding the sale of a house. The petitioner claimed a right of pre-emption based on contiguity and participation in amenities. A competing pre-emption suit was filed by the father of the vendee, claiming co-ownership of half the property. The trial court, affirmed by the district court and the High Court in revision, found that the vendor had only sold half the house, with the other half already belonging to the competing pre-emptor. The core legal questions concerned whether the competing suit constituted partial pre-emption and whether a party could simultaneously assert title and a right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the extent of the sale and the co-ownership of the competing pre-emptor were unassailable. The Court clarified that the rule against partial pre-emption was not violated where the suit correctly reflected the actual bargain, and distinguished the cited precedents, noting that the petitioner also failed to establish his own grounds for pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for pre-emption constitute partial pre-emption if the plaintiff sues for the actual portion of property sold, even if the sale deed fraudulently represented the sale of the entire property?
  • Can a pre-emptor simultaneously assert title to a portion of the suit property and claim a right of pre-emption regarding the remainder?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the extent of property sold, affirmed by lower courts, subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Rent Controller, Cantonment Hyderabad Andother1982 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-29
  ex parte ejectmentrent controlwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsdelay in proceedingsspecial leave to appealtenant default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an ejectment order. The petitioner, a tenant, faced an ex parte ejectment order from the Rent Controller, Hyderabad Cantonment, due to persistent failure to appear or file a written statement despite multiple adjournments over a year. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged this order through an application under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and subsequent appeals to the District Judge. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge regarding the ex parte ejectment were legally flawed or suffered from jurisdictional defects. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller acted lawfully in proceeding ex parte, as the petitioner was intentionally delaying court proceedings. Finding no evidence of mala fide or legal error in the concurrent findings, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to decline relief in its writ jurisdiction, concluding that there was no justification for interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller proceed with an ex parte ejectment order if a tenant repeatedly fails to appear or file a written statement?
  • Does the High Court have discretion to decline relief in writ jurisdiction when concurrent findings of lower courts are not shown to be legally defective?
  • Is an ex parte order passed by a Rent Controller due to intentional delay by the tenant legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid Etc vs Shahzada Asif Jan Erc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-29
  pre-emptionimprovement of statusrepealing ordinancesavings clausestatutory interpretationvendee status
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses several civil appeals arising from pre-emption suits in the North-West Frontier Province (N.-W. F. P.), primarily concerning the interpretation and effect of section 17(2) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950, which prohibits a vendee from utilizing any improvement in their status made after the institution of a pre-emptor's suit to defeat the claim. The core legal questions involved whether the repeal of the amending Act of 1967 by the West Pakistan Repealing Ordinance 1970 had the effect of removing subsection (2) of section 17 from the principal Act, and whether a subsequent acquisition of a co-vendee's share constitutes an improvement in status under the law. The Supreme Court held that the savings clause in the Repealing Ordinance preserved text amendments already incorporated into principal statutes unless a contrary intention was expressly stated, meaning section 17(2) remained a subsisting part of the 1950 Act. Furthermore, acquiring joint shares to become a sole owner constitutes an improvement in status. The Court laid down that repealing acts function as legislative spring-cleaning without reviving omitted text or removing existing statutory amendments unless expressly intended.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the repeal of an amending act by a repealing ordinance affects amendments previously incorporated into the text of a principal statute?
  • Does the acquisition of a co-vendee's share by a purchaser after the institution of a pre-emption suit constitute an improvement in status under section 17(2) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • Can a vendee utilize an exchange of land executed after the filing of a pre-emption suit to improve their title and defeat the pre-emptor's claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and Others vs Shamsher Ali and Other1982 SCMR 858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  inheritanceIslamic law of inheritancedistant kindredresiduariesnew pleafactual disputespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land inheritance. The petitioners, who are the children of Mst. Jaini, claimed a share in the estate of the deceased propositus, Nazir Ali. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as 'distant kindred', could inherit in the presence of the respondents, who were established as 'residuaries' of category No. 3 under Islamic law. The High Court had dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition, confirming that 'residuaries' have a preferential right of inheritance and exclude 'distant kindred'. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, refusing to entertain a new factual plea raised by the petitioners regarding the survival of another relative (Allah Diya) at the time of the propositus's death, as this factual point was not raised before the departmental forums and lacked authentic evidentiary support. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that new factual contentions requiring evidence cannot be raised for the first time at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether 'distant kindred' are excluded from inheritance under Islamic law in the presence of 'residuaries' of category No. 3?
  • Can a party raise a new factual plea for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the departmental forums or supported by authentic evidence?
  • Whether a case should be remanded to investigate a factual claim of survivorship when no supporting evidence has been produced over a prolonged period of litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue and Another1982 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-21
  special oathrecovery of rentleave to appealdismissal in liminebinding nature of oathrevenue court decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for the recovery of rent for two crops, Kharif 1973 and Rabi 1974, filed by the respondent against the petitioners. The Assistant Collector (Grade 1), Vehari, decreed the suit based on a special oath taken by the respondent following an offer made by the petitioners. The petitioners unsuccessfully challenged this decree through appeals and revisions before the Collector, the Additional Commissioner, and the Member, Board of Revenue. Subsequently, a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court was also dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought special leave to appeal, contending that only one petitioner, Abdul Majid, had offered to resolve the suit via special oath, rendering the decree non-binding on the others. The Supreme Court examined the record and found this factual assertion to be false. Consequently, the Court held that the decree was validly passed and that the merits of the case had been adequately addressed in prior proceedings. Finding no grounds for interference, the petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Is a decree passed on the basis of a special oath binding on all petitioners if the record indicates the offer was made on behalf of all?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a special oath offer?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed and Another vs Chief Settlement Commissioner Sind at1982 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-20
  settlement propertydivisibility of propertylocus standigross lachesconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a composite property on Lawrence Road, Karachi, under settlement laws. The core legal questions involve whether the property was divisible, whether the petitioners had the locus standi to challenge the transfer, and whether their challenge was barred by laches and limitation. The Supreme Court held that the determination of divisibility falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement authorities, that concurrent findings supported by site plans cannot be interfered with lightly, that persons who did not file claim forms lack locus standi, and that unexplained delays in pursuing statutory remedies and filing constitutional petitions render proceedings incompetent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the writ petition, establishing that concurrent factual findings of administrative tribunals regarding property divisibility and limitation are protected against interference in constitutional jurisdiction absent compelling justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of whether a settlement property is divisible or not falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement authorities?
  • Does a person who has not filed a claim form for a property possess the locus standi to challenge its transfer?
  • Whether a writ petition suffering from gross delay and laches is liable to be dismissed?
  • Can concurrent findings of settlement authorities regarding the indivisibility of a property be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs Faqir Muhammads1982 SCMR 1046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-14
  eviction petitionpersonal bona fide usetenantlandlordconcurrent findingscommercial premisesvacation of premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition was filed by an unsuccessful tenant challenging the order of the High Court, which in second appeal affirmed the first appellate court's decree for eviction on the ground of personal bona fide use. The landlord sought eviction asserting that he was occupying rented premises from which he was asked to vacate and possessed no other alternative premises. The petitioner contended that the landlord lacked bona fides because he manufactured jewellery whereas the demised shop was located in a market predominantly meant for selling jewellery. The Supreme Court observed that the landlord had no other premises available and intended to use the disputed property for both manufacturing and selling jewellery. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact established the landlord's genuine requirement, leaving no room for interference. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the tenant was granted one month's time to vacate the premises with mutual consent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the personal bona fide requirement of a landlord is established when he faces eviction from his rented premises and has no other suitable property available?
  • Whether carrying on both manufacturing and sale of goods in a shop satisfies the requirement of personal bona fide use for commercial premises?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq and 2 Others vs Chief Administrator, Auqaf and 5 Other1982 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  occupancy tenantproprietary rightscompensation depositPunjab Tenancy ActWaqf propertyChief Administrator of Auqaf
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the High Court in a property dispute concerning land held by a Khanqah as an occupancy tenant. The core legal questions involve whether a deposit of compensation for acquiring proprietary rights made by a third party on behalf of the occupancy tenant under the Punjab Tenancy (Validation and Extension of Period for Payment of Compensation) Ordinance, 1969 is valid, and whether the extension of time applies to pending matters and benefits the tenant. The Supreme Court held that the deposit made by the third party in the name of the shrine for its benefit constitutes a valid tender under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, and that the validating ordinance is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to be given full effect to extend the remedy to occupancy tenants. The petition was accordingly dismissed on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party deposit compensation on behalf of an occupancy tenant to acquire proprietary rights under the Punjab Tenancy (Validation and Extension of Period for Payment of Compensation) Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does section 3 of the Punjab Tenancy (Validation and Extension of Period for Payment of Compensation) Ordinance, 1969 apply to pending cases and annul previous judgments where occupancy tenants lost rights due to non-payment?
  • Whether the Chief Administrator of Auqaf as an occupancy tenant can benefit from a compensation payment made by a third party for the shrine?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hassan vs The State1982 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-10
  post-arrest bailmurderfirearm injuryfirst information reportcross-complaintcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Abdul Hassan, seeking post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Section 302 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on grounds of a cross-complaint and the release of co-accused on bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was directly charged with promptness in the First Information Report for causing fatal firearm injuries supported by medical evidence, and that the case against him warranted trial without interference with the prior bail decisions of other accused persons. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is directly and promptly implicated in the crime report with corroborative medical evidence, post-arrest bail at the pre-trial stage is properly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused directly charged with promptness in the First Information Report for fatal injuries is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the release of co-accused on bail automatically entitle another accused person to the grant of bail?
  • Can a cross-complaint filed subsequent to the initial First Information Report justify the grant of bail at the pre-trial stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Janjua vs Chief Engineer and Another1982 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-09
  service appealunauthorized absenceshow-cause noticepersonal hearingcompetent authorityleave to appealadministrative tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Research Assistant, challenged his removal from service following unauthorized absence from duty. After failing to resume work despite telegraphic and written directives, he was issued a show-cause notice and subsequently removed from service. His service appeal was dismissed by the Punjab Administrative Tribunal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his removal order and the show-cause notice were issued by the Secretary of the Department rather than the Government, which he alleged was the competent appointing authority. Additionally, he argued that he was denied a personal hearing. The Supreme Court observed that these specific legal points were not argued before the Tribunal and were absent from the impugned order. Consequently, the Court declined to entertain these new arguments, noting the lack of supporting material on the record. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim regarding the lack of a personal hearing, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he had requested one. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that new legal grounds cannot be raised for the first time in appeal without prior adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise legal arguments for the first time before the Supreme Court that were not argued before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a public servant entitled to a personal hearing if they have not specifically requested one during disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the failure to argue specific points before an administrative tribunal preclude their consideration in a subsequent petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed and Another vs Mst. Jafran and Another1982 SCMR 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14
  land allotmentsettlement disputecancellation of allotmentproduce index unitsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a factual controversy regarding the land allotment of Khasra No. 2781 measuring 8 kanals. The core legal question was whether the entire Khasra number had been validly allotted to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest and whether its subsequent partial allotment to the appellants was a nullity. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that in the absence of satisfactory evidence showing cancellation of the initial allotment of the entire Khasra number in favour of the respondents, any subsequent allotment of a part thereof to the appellants was a nullity in the eyes of law. The key principle laid down is that an existing land allotment must be formally and lawfully cancelled before any portion of the same land can be legally re-allotted to another person, and subsequent entries cannot override a prior subsisting allotment without clear proof of prior cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land already allotted to a person can be subsequently re-allotted to another person without prior lawful cancellation?
  • Can subsequent administrative records override a prior subsisting allotment in the absence of satisfactory evidence of cancellation?
  • Does an allotment of land remain operative if the alleged scoring out or deletion lacks supporting authority or record?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haleem vs The State And Another1982 SCMR 988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-23
  quashment of criminal proceedingsstay of criminal proceedingscivil and criminal litigationforgerycheatingparallel proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was filed against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which quashed criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents under Sections 420 and 467 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on the ground that the dispute was primarily of a civil nature. The core legal question was whether the pendency of civil litigation regarding a disputed agreement of sale justifies the quashing of criminal proceedings arising from the same facts and documents, or whether such proceedings ought merely to be stayed. The Supreme Court held that the mere pendency of civil litigation does not extinguish criminal liability where the alleged facts disclose the commission of criminal offences. To avoid conflicting findings between civil and criminal courts, the proper course in such matters is to stay the criminal proceedings until the final conclusion of the civil litigation, rather than quashing them. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and modified the High Court's order by directing that the criminal complaint remain stayed pending the civil proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of civil litigation justify the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated on the same facts?
  • What is the appropriate procedure for a court when civil and criminal proceedings involve the same document and subject matter?
  • Does the existence of a civil dispute negate criminal liability if the alleged facts disclose the commission of a criminal offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haleem vs Muhammad Amin Khan and Another1982 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-16
  local body electionsdisqualification of candidateservice of Pakistanincorporation by referenceretrospective applicationconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court whereby a constitutional petition challenging the election of the petitioner to a Town Committee was allowed. The core legal questions involved whether an employee of the Telephone Industries of Pakistan was disqualified from contesting local body elections under section 28 of the N.-W. F. P. Local Government Ordinance, 1979, read with President's Order No. 5 of 1977, and whether the disqualification applied retrospectively to unseat a member already elected. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that disqualifications for Parliament under President's Order No. 5 of 1977 were validly incorporated by reference into the Local Government Ordinance, and that a member could not continue to hold office if subsequently disqualified. The key principles laid down are that incorporation by reference of statutory disqualifications must be given full effect according to its plain language, and that provisions regarding disqualification and removal from a local council apply to sitting members regardless of the date of their initial election.

  Questions settled

  • Are disqualifications from the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies Election Order, 1977 incorporated by reference into section 28 of the N.-W. F. P. Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does an employee of the Telephone Industries of Pakistan suffer disqualification from contesting local council elections?
  • Can a disqualification provision in the N.-W. F. P. Local Government Ordinance, 1979 apply to remove a member already elected prior to the amendment?
  • Whether a member of a local council can be removed from office under section 34-1(a) of the N.-W. F. P. Local Government Ordinance, 1979 upon incurring a disqualification?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs The Administrator, Thal1982 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  allotment cancellationburden of proofbreach of contractcivil revisionspecial leave to appealproduction of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's civil suit. The petitioner challenged the cancellation of the allotment of Plot No. 356, which had been allotted to him on 14-4-1953 and subsequently cancelled due to alleged failure to perform lease agreement terms. The core legal question concerned the burden of proof regarding default under the contract and the production of departmental records. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, affirming that the plaintiff bore the responsibility to utilize coercive legal processes to summon departmental records if the opposing party failed to produce them. The key principle laid down is that a party alleging default must properly invoke legal mechanisms for the production of evidence and cannot shift blame for failing to do so.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the plaintiff to summon departmental records through coercive legal processes if the department fails to produce them?
  • Can a party blame the opposing department for non-production of records without resorting to legal coercive processes?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue and Another1982 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-25
  appointment of Lambardarvested rightwrit jurisdictionBoard of Revenuesecond reviewadministrative functionsrevenue administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition in limine. The matter pertained to the appointment of a Lambardar in Chak No. 329/W. B., Tehsil Lodhran, District Multan. The Collector appointed the respondent, but the Commissioner reversed this on appeal. Following revision and subsequent review proceedings, the Member, Board of Revenue, ultimately selected the respondent based on merits and suitability. The High Court declined to interfere under its writ jurisdiction, holding that no individual possesses a vested right to be appointed as a Lambardar, as such appointments are administrative actions aimed at facilitating revenue administration. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings, holding that revenue authorities are best suited to assess candidate qualifications and that an alleged error in an administrative choice does not render the decision without lawful authority where no vested right exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate have a vested legal right to be appointed as a Lambardar under land revenue laws?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional writ jurisdiction to set aside an administrative appointment of a Lambardar in the absence of a violation of a vested right?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor and Other vs Muhammad Ismail1982 PLD Supreme Court 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-08
  pre-emptionland reformssubsistence holdingalienationsubstitutionlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the defendant-vendee challenged the plaintiff's locus standi. The vendee argued that the pre-emption decree violated paragraph 24(4) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115, which restricted landowners with less than a subsistence holding from alienating their land except under specific conditions. The core legal question was whether the statutory restrictions on alienation under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 applied to a pre-emptor seeking to substitute the vendee through a court decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that a pre-emption decree is an adjudication by a court and the enforcement of a statutory right, which does not constitute an 'alienation' by the owner within the meaning of paragraph 24 of the Regulation. The Court laid down the principle that a pre-emptor merely substitutes the original vendee in an otherwise valid transaction, and statutory restrictions on voluntary alienations by landowners do not apply to involuntary substitutions resulting from the enforcement of pre-emption rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption decree constitute an alienation by sale, mortgage, gift, or otherwise within the meaning of Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
  • Are the statutory restrictions on land alienation imposed on vendors under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 equally applicable to pre-emptors seeking substitution?
  • Does the substitution of a vendee by a successful pre-emptor violate statutory prohibitions against the subdivision or alienation of subsistence holdings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor and Another vs Muhammad Bux and Another1982 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-18
  transfer of propertyresumption of propertydemand noticeauction confirmationsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a writ petition filed by the respondent regarding the transfer and resumption of a shop. Shop No. P-17, B-III was transferred to the respondent in 1967, but upon failure to make payment, a demand notice was issued, followed by the resumption of the shop on 30-6-1970. The respondent filed multiple applications seeking time to pay the transfer price, which were initially rejected by the authorities. Subsequently, the High Court accepted the respondent's writ petition. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was the applicability of paragraph 3-A of the Scheme to the respondent's application for payment of the balance price. The Supreme Court held that since the respondent's application was made within 90 days of the resumption order and before the auction was confirmed, paragraph 3-A was applicable with full force. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the decision of the Lahore High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether paragraph 3-A of the Scheme applies when an application for payment is made within 90 days of a resumption order?
  • Does an auction that has not yet been confirmed render a property unavailable for transfer under the relevant Scheme?
  • Can a petition for special leave to appeal be maintained against the acceptance of a writ petition by the High Court in property resumption matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar and Others vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar and Other vs Mst. Mumtaz1982 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-28
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial lawrental premisesappealtime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rental Premises Ordinance, 1979 as time-barred on the ground that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply. The core legal question is whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to appeals filed under section 21 of the Sind Rental Premises Ordinance, 1979, thereby allowing the extension of the limitation period for sufficient cause. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the special law prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act operates to exclude section 5. The key principle laid down is that where a special or local law provides a distinct period of limitation, the combined effect of section 29(2) clauses (a) and (b) of the Limitation Act, 1908 excludes the applicability of section 5 of the said Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to appeals filed under section 21 of the Sind Rental Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 exclude the application of section 5 of the said Act when a special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation?
  • Can the principles underlying section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 be invoked for condonation of delay when the statutory provisions of section 5 are expressly or impliedly excluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Baqi vs Abdul Basir Qureshi and Other1982 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  restitution of conjugal rightsTalaqunnatural offencedowermatrimonial disputespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the restitution of conjugal rights. The core legal question was whether a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights could be sustained when the husband had issued a notice of Talaq (divorce) and had allegedly attempted to subject his wife to unnatural sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Additional District Judge, which had set aside the trial court's decree for restitution. The Court held that the trial court erred in granting restitution because the husband had failed to prove the withdrawal of the notice of Talaq, and the finding that the husband attempted to subject the wife to unnatural intercourse provided a valid legal ground to decline the decree for restitution. The judgment reinforces the principle that a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights cannot be granted where the husband's conduct, such as attempted unnatural acts, renders cohabitation unsafe or inappropriate, and where a valid notice of Talaq remains unwithdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree for restitution of conjugal rights be granted if the husband has issued a notice of Talaq that remains unwithdrawn?
  • Does an attempt by a husband to commit an unnatural offence upon his wife constitute a valid ground to deny a decree for restitution of conjugal rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and Another1982 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-01
  evacuee propertytransfer formconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionfinding of factauction of propertysettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the settlement authorities. The petitioner claimed possession of an evacuee property since 1947 and asserted he filed an N.C.H. Form in 1966 under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, though the property was subsequently auctioned to a third party in 1971 and confirmed in 1973. His departmental appeal was treated as a revision under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, and dismissed on merits and limitation, a view affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a finding of fact regarding the non-filing of a transfer form is open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal regarding the non-filing of the form is unimpeachable in writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by statutory settlement authorities, such as the non-existence or non-filing of a claim form, cannot be interfered with by the High Court under its constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact regarding the filing of a transfer form in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether an appeal converted into a revision under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 can be dismissed on limitation?
  • Does inaction in pursuing a claimed settlement form for several years militate against the assertion of having filed it?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 1060 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  criminal leave to appealdouble murderappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessesFirst Information Reportfirearm recoveriesocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing an appeal against the conviction of the petitioners for a double murder under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the proper appreciation of ocular testimony, delayed naming of accused in the First Information Report, uncorroborated recoveries of firearms, and interested witnesses in a case involving previous land hostility. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding discrepancies in the First Information Report, lack of corroboration for interested witnesses, and improper reliance on unmatched weapon recoveries and motive carried considerable force, necessitating a complete re-appraisal of the evidence. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony comes from interested witnesses and is inconsistent with the initial First Information Report, strong and independent corroboration is legally required to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of closely related and interested witnesses requires strong and independent corroboration in a murder trial?
  • Does the omission of an accused person's name from the First Information Report, where the complainant claims prior acquaintance, create serious doubt regarding their subsequent implication?
  • Can the recovery of firearms that do not match the crime empties serve as valid corroborative evidence against an accused?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence when the lower courts fail to follow well-established rules relating to the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz and Others vs Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Rahimyar1982 SCMR 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-25
  Colonization of Government Landsdispossessionprivate dispute of titlegrant of leave to appealinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition concerning the powers of authorities under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 to order dispossession of the petitioners and deliver possession to private respondents. The core legal question raised is whether sections 19 and 32 of the said Act can be invoked for resolving private disputes of title between parties. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the point raised involves a substantial question of law of general public importance regarding the scope and applicability of the statutory provisions for private title disputes. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further, while directing that security be furnished and the interim order of dispossession remain suspended pending the final outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Do authorities under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 have the power to direct dispossession and deliver possession under sections 19 and 32 for settling private disputes of title?
  • Whether sections 19 and 32 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 can be used to resolve questions of proprietary title between private parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aleem vs Special Judge (Customs), Lahore and Other1982 SCMR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-09
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictioncriminal trialshort-circuiting trialSpecial Judge Customsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging criminal proceedings before a Special Judge (Customs). The petitioner had raised objections regarding the competency of the criminal proceedings, but the Special Judge formally charged him. After his criminal revision was dismissed, the petitioner sought annulment of the criminal case via a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed on the ground that it would not short-circuit the normal trial procedure through discretionary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's approach, confirming that invoking writ jurisdiction to deflect or short-circuit the normal course of a criminal trial is impermissible. Aligning its decision with established precedent, the Court held that the writ petition was not competent and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether writ jurisdiction can be exercised to short-circuit or deflect the normal course of a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aleem vs Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore1982 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-13
  leave to appealcompromiseland disputeGrow-More-Food SchemeSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed against the orders of revenue authorities regarding the allotment of disputed land under the Grow-More-Food Scheme. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the petitioner and respondent No. 4 reached a compromise to resolve the matter amicably by dividing the disputed land and the associated tube-well in equal shares. The core legal question concerned the final settlement of the land dispute based on the mutual agreement of the contesting parties. The Supreme Court held that the compromise reached between the parties is fair and serves to end the litigation in an amicable manner in accordance with their wishes. The Court laid down the principle that petitions may be disposed of in terms of a lawful and fair compromise arrived at between private parties to put an end to pending litigation, with directions to competent authorities to give effect to the settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached between the parties?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can direct competent authorities to give effect to a fair compromise settlement between litigants?
  Read full judgment →
• A. M. Qureshi vs Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Another1982 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  adjournmentforeign government jurisdictionex parte proceedingscostsrepresentation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an old pending appeal involving an important question of law regarding the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts over a foreign government. When the case was called for hearing after due consultation with the advocates-on-record, counsel for the respondents failed to appear, and a representative of the respondent government requested an adjournment to engage new counsel and seek instructions, citing the previous advocate's appointment as Additional Advocate-General. The appellant strongly opposed the adjournment due to the long pendency of the appeal and expenses incurred. The Court, balancing the necessity of proper representation for an important jurisdictional question involving a foreign state against the delay, granted a reasonable adjournment subject to the payment of costs by the respondents, while making it clear that no further adjournments would be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adjournment should be granted when a party's Advocate-on-Record fails to arrange representation due to a change in office?
  • Can costs be awarded as a condition for granting an adjournment to a foreign government?
  • Under what circumstances may a matter proceed ex parte against a foreign state respondent?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Muhammad Tufail vs The State1981 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-04
  post-conviction bailstatutory delaycriminal appeallife imprisonmentSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the refusal of the Lahore High Court to grant post-conviction bail to the petitioners, who were convicted under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The core legal question is whether the petitioners were entitled to bail as of right under subsection (1-A) of section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that their appeal had not been heard within two years of its filing. The Supreme Court held that while bail is generally to be allowed under the statutory provision if the appeal is not disposed of within two years, it can still be refused for recorded reasons, and interference was unwarranted since the High Court had recorded observations on the merits and the appeal was imminent for disposal during the upcoming circuit. The key principle laid down is that the statutory delay in hearing an appeal under section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not mandate automatic bail if the High Court records reasons for refusal and the appeal is near disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail as of right under section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if an appeal is not disposed of within two years?
  • Can the High Court refuse bail under section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after recording reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Zinda Mahmood Bajwa vs DR. Farhat Hasan and Other1981S C M R1174. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-22
  ejectmentrent arrearsfactual findingsconstitutional jurisdictionrent restrictionhandwriting expertleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against a tenant of a bungalow in Lahore Cantonment. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioner's eviction due to default in complying with an order under Section 17(8) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, which required the deposit of rent arrears. The petitioner contested the arrears, claiming prior payment and producing receipts, the genuineness of which the landlord denied. Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority rejected the petitioner's evidence, including the testimony of a handwriting expert. The Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, finding no grounds to interfere with the concurrent factual findings of the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed this decision, holding that the assessment of evidence regarding the genuineness of rent receipts constitutes a question of fact. The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction does not extend to re-evaluating factual findings made by lower tribunals, even if those findings might be considered erroneous. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the tenant was granted three months to vacate voluntarily.

  Questions settled

  • Is the assessment of evidence regarding the genuineness of rent receipts a question of fact or law?
  • Can a High Court interfere with the factual findings of lower tribunals in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does an erroneous factual finding by a lower tribunal warrant interference by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Zia Ullah Shah vs Syed Riaz Ahmad1981 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-01
  ejectmentstriking off defencetentative rentrent restrictionnon-compliancelandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing the petitioner's second appeal against an ejectment order passed under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller had tentatively determined the rent at Rs. 400 per month and directed the petitioner to deposit past and future rent accordingly. The petitioner instead deposited rent at Rs. 300 per month, asserting it was the correct rate, which led the Rent Controller to strike off his defence for non-compliance. The petitioner contended that because the tentative order is subject to final determination under Section 13(6), ejectment cannot be ordered without such final determination. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that tentative rent must be complied with subject to final adjustment on the merits. If a tenant fails to comply with the tentative deposit order, their defence is liable to be struck off, precluding them from contesting the proceedings further. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent order before final determination of the rent?
  • Does the requirement of final rent determination under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 prevent ejectment for failing to deposit tentative rent?
  • Is a tenant permitted to unilaterally deposit rent at a lower rate than that tentatively determined by the Rent Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• Zia Farhat Awan Etc. vs Aurangzeb Etc.1981 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-05
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionparticipator in amenities and appendagesShafi-i-Khalitright of irrigationdischarge of water
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants against a sale of land, claiming a superior right of pre-emption on the grounds of co-sharership, contiguity, and being a participator in amenities and appendages, specifically through a shared source of irrigation. The trial court decreed the suit, and the District Judge dismissed the vendees' appeal. However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the vendees' revision petition and dismissed the suit, holding that drawing water from separate water channels (Lakhtis) originating from a common canal does not make the parties participators in appendages or give rise to a superior right of pre-emption. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was the scope and meaning of clause 'secondly' of section 12 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, regarding whether drawing water from the same general watercourse confers the status of a participator in amenities and appendages (Shafi-i-Khalit). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that receiving water from a common water channel or distinct branches (Lakhtis) bifurcating at a distance is quite distinct from a right to discharge water over the suit land, and does not confer a superior right of pre-emption. The Court reaffirmed that drawing water from a common government source or canal does not constitute being a co-sharer in appendages.

  Questions settled

  • Does drawing water from a common water channel or a separate branch channel (Lakhti) give a plaintiff a superior right of pre-emption as a participator in amenities and appendages under section 12 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • What is the scope and meaning of the second clause of section 12 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, regarding the right of irrigation and discharge of water?
  • Can owners of land who draw water from a common watercourse claim the right of pre-emption as Shafi-i-Khalit?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaka Ud Din vs The Service Tribunal and 2 Other1981 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-10
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisappropriationlimitationcondonation of delaypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Service Tribunal, upholding his dismissal from service for the misappropriation of Government money while serving as a Sub-Post Master. The core legal questions involve the condonation of a significant delay of 299 days in filing the petition for leave to appeal and whether a factual contention not raised before the Service Tribunal can be agitated before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition was hopelessly barred by time as the explanation for the delay was vague and unsupported by an affidavit, and further noted that the contention regarding the inquiry proceedings was never raised before the Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that a petition for leave to appeal barred by a substantial delay without a satisfactory and supported explanation is liable to be dismissed, and new factual objections not raised before the lower forum cannot be permitted to be urged for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal barred by a long delay can be entertained without a proper and supported application for condonation of delay?
  • Can an objection regarding departmental inquiry proceedings, not raised before the Service Tribunal, be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahurul Hasan vs Mst. Ruqqia Begum and 4 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-25
  ejectmentcivil revisionrent restrictionlegislative competencerevisional jurisdictionpersona designataresiduary powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for Special Leave to Appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner on grounds of personal need and reconstruction. The Rent Controller's order was upheld by the District Judge, and the petitioner's subsequent civil revision petition was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the competency of a civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in rent matters, following the substitution of Section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance 1979. The Court held that the newly substituted Section 15(7) explicitly bars calling any order of the Controller into question in any court of law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal, or 'otherwise'. The term 'otherwise' is wide enough to exclude revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the legislative competence of the Governor of Punjab to amend the Ordinance, as rent control falls within the residuary legislative domain of the Province under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable against an appellate order of a District Judge passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 after its amendment by Ordinance IX of 1979?
  • Does the term 'otherwise' in Section 15(7) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether the Governor of Punjab was constitutionally competent to amend the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 via the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Din vs Mirza Ayub Baig .1981 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-06
  ejectmentpersonal requirementbona fide needlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the leave of the Court arose from a landlord's ejectment application against his tenant on grounds of default in rent, personal requirement, and damage to the property. The Rent Controller allowed the application, but the Additional District Judge and subsequently the High Court in second appeal dismissed it, holding inter alia that the landlord failed to mention the requirement for his son in the initial application and did not examine the son as a witness. The core legal question centered on whether the omission to explicitly plead a child's requirement or fail to produce the child as a witness defeats a bona fide personal requirement claim under rent restriction laws. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the Rent Controller's order, holding that a landlord's personal requirement under the law extends to the occupation of his children, and such a need can be established through evidence even if not explicitly pleaded in the initial application, and that the failure to examine the concerned son as a witness is not fatal to the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission in an ejectment application to specifically state that a premises is required for the occupation of a landlord's child is fatal to the claim?
  • Is it mandatory under the law for a landlord to examine as a witness the son for whose marriage and accommodation an ejectment is sought?
  • Does the failure to use the express terms 'bona fide' or 'good faith' in an ejectment application vitiate the landlord's claim for personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Yousaf and 2 Others vs Tile State1981 SCMR 958 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-10
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealappellate discretionspecial leave to appealcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted by a Magistrate for offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court that declined to suspend their sentences pending the disposal of their appeal. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to suspend sentences while the appeal remained pending. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion in refusing to suspend the sentences, noting that it would not delve into the merits of the evidence while the appeal was still pending before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court observed that the statutory provision regarding mandatory bail for sentences not exceeding three years, where the appeal has not been decided within six months, was not yet applicable in the instant case given the timeline of the conviction. Consequently, the petition for special leave was dismissed, affirming that the appellate court's discretion in suspending sentences should not be lightly interfered with by the Supreme Court at an interlocutory stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to suspend a sentence pending appeal?
  • Under what circumstances does Section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate the release of a convicted person on bail?
  • Should the Supreme Court evaluate the merits of evidence in a trial while an appeal is still pending in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqoob Khan vs Rasool Khan and Other1981 SCMR 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-30
  court-fee deficiencySection 149 CPClimitationexercise of discretionmemorandum of appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit regarding joint possession of land and a garden, where the plaintiffs were permitted to amend the plaint and subsequently required to address a court-fee deficiency. Upon remand by the High Court of Peshawar to consider court-fee deficiency and limitation on the memorandum of appeal, the Additional District Judge exercised judicial discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, permitting the plaintiffs to make up the deficiency within a specified time. The defendants challenged this order via a Revision Petition, contending that the appeal was time-barred due to late payment of the court-fee. The High Court dismissed the Revision Petition, prompting the current petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Order VII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not apply to appeals and that Section 149 empowers courts with discretion to permit payment of court-fee deficiencies at any stage. Once paid, the court-fee operates retrospectively as if paid in the first instance, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with discretionary rulings absent extraordinary circumstances. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order VII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to an appeal claimed to be time-barred due to deficient court-fees?
  • Can a court under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a party to make up a deficiency in court-fees after the period of limitation for filing an appeal has expired?
  • What is the legal effect under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a party pays a deficient court-fee after receiving permission from the court?
  Read full judgment →
• XEN, Western Bar Division, Multan, Etc. vs Elahi Bakhsh1981 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  service lawdepartmental inquirydouble jeopardyabatement of proceedingscivil court jurisdictionadministrative tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal arising from a service dispute involving a Patwari, Elahi Bakhsh, who was dismissed from service in 1968. The employee challenged his dismissal in a civil suit, which resulted in a declaration that the dismissal was inoperative due to a defective inquiry, though the trial court permitted the department to hold a fresh inquiry. Subsequent appellate proceedings in the District Court and the High Court modified the scope of this permission. The employee challenged the permission for a fresh inquiry, arguing it constituted double jeopardy. Conversely, the Department argued that the civil court lacked jurisdiction due to the abatement of proceedings under the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974. The Supreme Court held that a fresh inquiry is permissible when the initial inquiry was found to be legally defective, as this does not constitute double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that civil proceedings initiated before the prescribed date under the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, do not abate. Both petitions were dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a fresh departmental inquiry into misconduct constitute double jeopardy when the initial inquiry was set aside for legal defects?
  • Do pending civil proceedings regarding service matters abate under Section 8 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, if they were initiated before the prescribed date?
  • Can a civil court grant a declaration of illegal dismissal while simultaneously permitting the employer to conduct a fresh inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir Khan and 5 Others vs Budh Singh and 5 Other1981S C M R 11 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-03
  special leave to appealrehabilitation commissionerland allotmentrevenue recordFard Haqiatstatus quo order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of certain agricultural land allotments by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner. The petitioners, representing the deceased original claimants, argued that the cancellation was improper because their entitlements were not determined in accordance with the original revenue records (Fard Haqiat) received from India. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the entries in the relevant columns of the Fard Haqiat were correctly interpreted and applied in determining the petitioners' land entitlements. Upon reviewing the papers, the Supreme Court found merit in the petitioners' contention regarding the potential misinterpretation of these revenue records. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the true import of the entries. Pending the final disposal of the appeal, the Court issued an interim order restraining both the petitioners and the respondents from alienating or disposing of the disputed land, holding that such a measure was necessary in the interest of justice to preserve the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to grant leave to appeal when there is a potential misinterpretation of revenue records received from India regarding land entitlements?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue an interim order restraining both parties from alienating disputed land pending the final disposal of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Wary Am vs Muhammad Akbar Etc.S1981 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  leave to appealculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationocular evidenceappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order that set aside the conviction and life imprisonment of three respondents for murder, acquitting two and convicting the third, Muhammad Akbar, under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The petitioner challenged the High Court's rejection of ocular evidence and recovery of weapons. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's version of events in favor of the accused's plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the absence of physical evidence of dragging the deceased, combined with the location of the body inside the accused's premises, rendered the prosecution's narrative improbable. The Court held that the alternative version presented by the accused—that the deceased was killed upon being discovered in a compromising position—was probable. Consequently, the Court affirmed the acquittal of two respondents and the conviction of the third under Section 304, Part I, finding no grounds for interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court accept an accused's alternative version of events if the prosecution's narrative is contradicted by physical evidence at the crime scene?
  • Does the absence of dragging marks between the scene of the alleged incident and the location of the body undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 appropriate when the accused kills under grave and sudden provocation?
  Read full judgment →
• Wajid Ali vs The Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner (Land) and Other1981 SCMR 822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  settlement schemetransfer of propertyallotment disputethumb impressionleave to appealpresumption of official acts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of property under Settlement Scheme No. VII, where the petitioner claimed to have become the transferee of a house by operation of law due to continuous possession since before 1st January 1961. The contesting respondents obtained allotment of the same Khasra number, which was upheld by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Settlement Commissioner, and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in a writ petition, on the ground that the petitioner was present and had consented to the allotment by placing his thumb impression on the register. The core legal question was whether the lower authorities erred in treating the disputed thumb impression as genuine without forensic comparison. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any formal application by the petitioner to send the thumb impression to a Finger Print Expert, the competent authority was legally justified in relying on the normal presumption that official acts are regularly performed. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a settlement authority can rely on a thumb impression on an official register without forensic comparison when no formal application for expert examination is made?
  • Does a person who consented to an allotment by affixing their thumb impression retain locus standi to challenge the same allotment subsequently?
  • Can the presumption that official acts are regularly performed be invoked regarding disputed entries in allotment registers?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheeduddin Kitchlew vs Murree Improvement Town Trust Etc.1981 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  review petitionSupreme Court Rulesprocedural compliancerehearing of appeallegal representationscope of review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the petitioner against the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dismissing his appeal. The core legal questions were whether a review petition can be based on arguments not previously raised during the appeal, and whether the Court should relax procedural rules regarding the presence of counsel and the constitution of benches for review proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that a review cannot be sought on grounds that were available but not advanced during the initial hearing. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that review proceedings are not a rehearing of the original appeal. The Court reaffirmed that it will not relax the mandatory provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, specifically regarding the necessity of legal representation and the procedural requirements for review applications. The judgment clarifies that the concept of 'review' under the Supreme Court Rules is specific and distinct from generic judicial reconsideration, and that parties cannot seek to bypass established procedural rules by requesting larger benches or re-arguing settled matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be based on a plea that was available to the petitioner but not advanced during the original appeal?
  • Does a review petition constitute a rehearing of the original appeal?
  • Can a party demand a larger bench for a review petition in contravention of the Supreme Court Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed Khan vs The State1981 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-20
  dying statementmurdercorroborationleave to appealmedical evidenceperitonitisidentity of culprit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Waheed Khan, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Abdul Wahid under section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the reliability and sufficiency of a dying statement for conviction without corroboration regarding the identity of the assailant, and whether the medical evidence established the ingredients of murder where death resulted from peritonitis following stab wounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a conviction can safely be based on a prompt and truthful dying statement alone, and that medical evidence conclusively proved the fatal injuries directly damaged vital organs and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The key principle laid down is that a genuine dying statement, when made promptly and found reliable, is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction, and peritonitis resulting directly from knife wounds to vital organs satisfies the definition of murder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be safely based on a dying statement alone if the court is satisfied as to its genuineness and truth?
  • Does the failure of corroborative witnesses to identify the assailant impair the evidentiary value of a reliable dying statement?
  • Whether an offence falls within the definition of murder when death is attributed to peritonitis resulting from knife injuries inflicted on vital organs.
  Read full judgment →
• W. C. Austin vs Punjab Civil Service Tribunal and Other1981 SCMR 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-15
  seniority disputecivil serviceconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceadministrative tribunalclosed transactionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which concerned a dispute over the restoration of his seniority. The core legal question was whether seniority disputes constituted 'terms and conditions of service' amenable to constitutional writ jurisdiction and the impact of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, on prior tribunal decisions. The Supreme Court held that the petition was correctly dismissed by the High Court because seniority disputes did not fall within the scope of 'terms and conditions of service' under the Interim Constitution of 1972, rendering the constitutional petition incompetent. Additionally, the Court ruled that determinations made by the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal prior to the enactment of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, achieved finality as closed transactions, precluding further litigation. The Court clarified that the previous Tribunal did not qualify as a departmental authority under the 1974 Act. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that such seniority matters were not subject to judicial review under the invoked constitutional provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute regarding seniority fall within the definition of 'terms and conditions of service' under the Interim Constitution of 1972?
  • Can a matter decided by the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal before the enactment of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, be re-agitated?
  • Does the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal qualify as a departmental authority under the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Usman vs Allah Bakhsh and Another1981 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-05
  bail cancellationmurdercriminal appealfirst information reportjudicial discretionevidence evaluation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, D. G. Khan, in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in cancelling the bail given the evidence presented against the accused. The petitioner, charged with inflicting fatal knife blows on the deceased, argued that the prosecution's allegations were inconsistent and that the recovered weapon was not blood-stained. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, found that the First Information Report was promptly lodged and specifically implicated the petitioner in the fatal assault. Furthermore, the Court noted that the recovered knife was indeed blood-stained, and the medical evidence did not exclude the possibility of the injuries described. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court acted correctly in cancelling the bail. The principle laid down is that bail cancellation is justified when the record, including the First Information Report and forensic evidence, prima facie establishes the petitioner's involvement in a serious offense.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cancellation of bail by the High Court justified when the First Information Report specifically implicates the accused in a fatal assault?
  • Does the presence of blood-stained weapons recovered from an accused support the cancellation of bail in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail if the record supports the prosecution's allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Tile Province of Punjab vs Shabbir Hussain1981 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  service lawadvance incrementsretrospective operationvested rightsdeclaratory notificationservice tribunalpay revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the retrospective application of a government notification affecting salary increments. The core legal question was whether a government notification dated 27-1-1976, which imposed a cap on the total number of advance increments for educational qualifications, was declaratory in nature and could be applied retrospectively to deprive a teacher of vested rights to increments earned prior to the notification. The Supreme Court held that the notification was not declaratory, as the prior rules did not contain such conditions. Consequently, the notification could not operate retrospectively to divest the respondent of rights already accrued. The Court affirmed the principle that new conditions imposed on existing entitlements cannot be treated as declaratory to justify retrospective application, particularly when such application would adversely affect the vested rights of an employee. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government notification imposing new conditions on salary increments operate retrospectively?
  • Is a notification introducing a cap on previously uncapped advance increments considered declaratory in nature?
  • Does a government notification have the power to deprive an employee of vested rights to salary increments?
  Read full judgment →
• The Vice President vs Chairman, Punjab Appellate Tribunal and Other1981 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  constitutional petitionindustrial relationsnatural justicebiasjudge in his own causereinstatementinfructuous proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition in limine, based on counsel's concession that the matter was academic because the respondent employee had already been reinstated. The core legal question was whether the respondent's reinstatement pursuant to an Appellate Labour Tribunal order rendered the constitutional challenge to that order infructuous or academic, and whether the dismissal proceedings were vitiated by bias. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the matter as academic, as reinstatement under protest pending litigation does not render a challenge infructuous. However, the Court affirmed the underlying finding of bias, noting that the Vice President who initiated the trap, served the charge-sheet, and testified against the employee acted as a judge in his own cause. The principle laid down is that an employer's involvement in the investigative and adjudicatory stages of a disciplinary proceeding creates a conflict of interest that violates the principles of natural justice, rendering such proceedings legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reinstatement of an employee pursuant to an appellate tribunal order render a constitutional challenge to that order academic or infructuous?
  • Does an employer who initiates disciplinary proceedings, serves the charge-sheet, and testifies against an employee act as a judge in his own cause?
  • Can a mixed question of law and fact regarding an employee's status as a workman be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary Gov Er14ment of Ptjnjab vs Ahmad Kamaluddin1981 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  service tribunal jurisdictionadverse remarksannual confidential reportterms and conditions of servicecivil servantexpunction of remarksjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of the Punjab sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had ordered the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in the respondent's character roll. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to review and expunge adverse annual confidential remarks recorded by a superior officer, or whether such remarks were immune from judicial scrutiny as a subjective assessment. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that instructions governing the recording, communication, and expunction of such remarks, when read in conjunction with the Civil Servants Act, constitute part of the terms and conditions of service. Consequently, these remarks are not immune from review. The Court clarified that while the recording of remarks is the exclusive competence of superior officers, the process is subject to departmental representation and subsequent appeal to the Service Tribunal. The judgment established that limitations on judicial review applicable to constitutional courts do not restrict the appellate jurisdiction of Service Tribunals, which are empowered to determine both questions of fact and law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review and order the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in a civil servant's character roll?
  • Are instructions regarding the recording and expunction of annual confidential remarks considered part of the terms and conditions of service under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Do the limitations on constitutional jurisdiction regarding the review of adverse remarks apply to the appellate jurisdiction of Service Tribunals?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab and Others vs Muhammad Yousaf Khan1981 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-14
  civil revisionmaintainabilitydecreeappealable orderwritten statementremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arises from concurrent lower court decisions stemming from a judgment pronounced by a Civil Judge under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to file a written statement. The High Court had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision as not maintainable, holding that a second appeal lay to the High Court against the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court examined the definitions and provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically noting that an order under Order VIII, Rule 10 is an appealable order under Order XLIII, Rule 1(b) read with section 104, and thus does not constitute a decree. Consequently, no second appeal lay to the High Court, rendering the civil revision maintainable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and remanded the case back to the High Court for determination on merits in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 amounts to a decree?
  • Is a civil revision maintainable against an order when a second appeal to the High Court is barred?
  • Does an appeal lie from an appellate order passed under section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore vs Lahore Textile General1981 SCMR 1069 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08
  income taxpenaltyinstallmentsCentral Board of Revenueappellate tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which had summarily dismissed the petitioner's application challenging the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's decision. The Income-tax Officer had imposed a penalty on the respondent under section 46(1) of the Income-tax Act for failing to comply with a demand notice. The Tribunal had set aside the penalty because the Central Board of Revenue had permitted the respondent to pay its income-tax in installments, relying on precedent. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the penalty was not exigible under the law. The Supreme Court held that the permission granted by the Central Board of Revenue to pay tax in installments was a relevant circumstance for the Tribunal to consider when deciding the appeal against the penalty, and thus the Tribunal had acted within its jurisdiction in allowing the appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while leaving open the broader question regarding the correctness of the earlier precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the penalty imposed by the Income-tax Officer under section 46(1) of the Income-tax Act was not exigible under the law?
  • Is the permission by the Central Board of Revenue to pay income-tax in installments a relevant circumstance in an appeal against a penalty imposed for non-payment?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Universal Life and General Insurance Co1981 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-03
  income taxpermissible expensesillegal businessinsurance businesscertificate of insurancepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the allowability of establishment and salary expenses claimed by an insurance company for the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61. The respondent company had commenced its life insurance business prior to obtaining the requisite certificate from the Controller of Insurance under the Insurance Act. The Income-tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner disallowed a portion of the expenses on the ground that carrying on business without the certificate rendered it illegal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, and the High Court answered the reference in favor of the assessee, holding that tax authorities are concerned with income regardless of its lawfulness, and considerations of penal liability under insurance law are alien to income-tax law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that if income is subject to taxation even if earned unlawfully, corresponding expenses incurred in earning or attempting to earn such income cannot be denied solely on the ground of regulatory non-compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether expenses incurred before the actual commencement or formal certification of an insurance business are permissible deductions under income-tax law?
  • Does the carrying on of a business without obtaining a regulatory certificate disentitle the assessee from claiming deductions for establishment charges and salaries?
  • Are considerations of legality or penal liability under separate regulatory statutes relevant to the determination of taxable income and allowable expenses under income-tax law?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Lucky Stores &1981 SCMR 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-07
  income taxres judicataassessment yearclubbing of incomereference to high court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court answering a reference in the affirmative regarding the assessment of income tax for the years 1961-62 and 1962-63 for two concerns, Lucky Stores and Zubair Medical Stores. The Income-tax Officer had clubbed the income of both concerns under the sole proprietor Muhammad Tufail. The Appellate Tribunal and subsequently the High Court held that the income could not be clubbed, applying the principle of res judicata based on earlier assessment findings, as no new or fresh material had become available to the income-tax authorities. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the principles of res judicata can apply to income-tax proceedings subject to certain limitations, particularly where no fresh evidence with material bearing is available to re-open the matter decided previously after proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principles of res judicata apply to decisions of income-tax authorities in subsequent assessment years?
  • Can income from two separate business concerns be clubbed together in the absence of fresh material or evidence?
  • Is every assessment year under the Income-tax Act a distinct and unconnected unit for all purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs M. Bahar Ahmad & Sonss1981 SCMR 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-15
  income taxdeductible expenditureborrowed capitalstatutory interpretationgeneralia specialibus non derogantbusiness expenseinterest payment
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerned whether interest payments made by an assessee firm to minor relatives on deposited amounts, which were disallowed as 'borrowed capital' under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, could alternatively be claimed as a deductible business expenditure under the residuary Section 10(2)(xvi). The core legal question was whether the specific provision of Section 10(2)(iii) excludes the application of the general residuary provision of Section 10(2)(xvi) regarding interest payments. The Supreme Court held that while the rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' (things special derogate from things general) applies when provisions overlap in scope, it does not preclude the use of a general clause if the specific clause is not applicable or if the expenditure qualifies under both. The Court determined that the interest payments in question were indeed deductible as business expenditure. The key principle laid down is that the residuary clause (xvi) is not automatically excluded by the existence of specific clauses unless the subject matter and scope are identical and the specific clause is intended to be exhaustive and restrictive in that specific instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a specific provision in a statute automatically exclude the application of a general residuary provision?
  • Can interest payments disallowed under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act 1922 be claimed as deductible business expenditure under Section 10(2)(xvi)?
  • Under what circumstances does the rule of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant' apply to statutory clauses?
  Read full judgment →
• The Australasia Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Mangora Textile Industries,Swat1981 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-16
  civil procedurelist of witnessesjudicial discretionprocedural delayevidence productionCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant Bank filed a civil suit for recovery in 1965, which remained pending for over a decade. In 1977, the trial court rejected the Bank's application under Order XVI, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to file a list of witnesses, citing failure to comply with the seven-day filing requirement under Order XVI, Rule 1. The High Court upheld this rejection in revision. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to allow the Bank to produce witnesses due to procedural delay. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the lower courts erred in shutting out the evidence. The Court established that when determining whether to allow a late list of witnesses, courts must consider the reasonableness of the explanation, potential prejudice to the opposing party, and inconvenience to the court. Where a party provides a plausible explanation for delay—such as administrative difficulties following nationalization—and the opposing party suffers no prejudice, the court should permit the examination of witnesses produced by the party.

  Questions settled

  • What factors should a court consider when determining whether to allow a party to file a list of witnesses after the prescribed time limit?
  • Does the failure to file a list of witnesses within the time prescribed under Order XVI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prevent a party from examining witnesses produced by them at trial without court summons?
  • Can a court shut out evidence solely due to a procedural delay in filing a witness list if no prejudice is caused to the opposite party?
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• The Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property vs H. C. Bevan Pitman and Other1981 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  enemy propertyattachment of propertyexecution of decreepublic officerscheme of arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court concerning execution proceedings where funds of the Traders Bank Ltd. were attached to satisfy a decree. The Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property sought leave to appeal, arguing that the funds constituted enemy property under the Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order, 1965, and were protected under a scheme of arrangement sanctioned under section 153 of the Companies Act. The core legal question is whether funds attached and held under a court order prior to the enforcement of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance and rules can be classed as enemy property. The Supreme Court held that money validly attached and held under Order XXI, Rule 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the satisfaction of a decree before the relevant enemy property laws came into force does not constitute enemy property. The key principle laid down is that funds held by a public officer for the satisfaction of a court decree prior to the enactment of emergency laws regarding enemy property are not hit by such provisions and remain available to satisfy the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether funds attached under Order XXI, Rule 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure prior to the enforcement of emergency laws can be classed as enemy property?
  • Does money held in deposit for the benefit of the court for the satisfaction of a decree fall within the definition of enemy property?
  • Can a party raise objections regarding a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act when the property in question is held not to be enemy property?
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• Tasneem Kausar vs Muhammad Bashir Etc.S1981 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  cancellation of bailgrant of bailmedical groundsmedical boardill-healthdiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the order of the Lahore High Court dated 14-11-1979, which granted post-arrest bail to Respondent No. 1 on the ground of ill-health. The petitioner contended that the ground of illness was not raised in earlier bail applications and that the respondent's medical conditions could be treated within the jail hospital. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in granting bail on medical grounds based on a Medical Board's report. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had prudently ordered an examination by a Board of three eminent doctors, whose report confirmed that the respondent suffered from Diabetes Mellitus and indications of tuberculosis. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly and found no ground for interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its discretion in granting bail on medical grounds when supported by an independent Medical Board report?
  • Can bail granted on medical grounds by a High Court be interfered with where no perversity or improper exercise of discretion is shown?
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• Tanveer Hussain vs Inspector General of Police and Another1981 SCMR 1159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-22
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingspolice dismissalshow-cause noticecross-examinationservice tribunalnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a police constable, from service. The petitioner was dismissed following allegations by a Saudi Arabian national that the petitioner, while on duty at Lahore Railway Station, threatened him and misappropriated his valuables. The core legal questions addressed were whether the failure to produce the complainant for cross-examination vitiated the disciplinary proceedings, whether the show-cause notice was invalid for being a verbatim copy of the complaint, and whether the petitioner was denied a fair hearing. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the internal police records sufficiently established the petitioner's identity and assignment on the relevant train, rendering cross-examination of the complainant unnecessary. The Court further ruled that there is no legal requirement for a charge-sheet to be worded differently from the underlying complaint and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate he had requested a personal hearing. The judgment affirms that disciplinary actions based on credible internal records and complaints are valid absent procedural illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Is a show-cause notice invalid if it is a verbatim copy of the complaint?
  • Does the failure to produce a complainant for cross-examination automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is a personal hearing a mandatory requirement in disciplinary proceedings where the petitioner did not request one?
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• Talib Hussain vs The State1981 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-29
  hostile witnesstransfer of statementballistic expertmurder trialcircumstantial evidencecorroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the dismissal of the appellant's appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his conviction and death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his first cousin. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for murder could be sustained primarily on the basis of statements made by eye-witnesses before the Committing Magistrate that were transferred to the Sessions file under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when those same witnesses turned hostile at trial, alongside corroborative circumstantial and ballistic evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that statements of witnesses who resile at trial can validly be relied upon in preference to their trial testimony if corroborated. The Court laid down that previous statements transferred under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide a legally sound basis for conviction when supported by reliable corroborative evidence such as independent recoveries, ballistic matching, and medical reports, even if hostility at trial stems from a family compromise.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of statements made before the Committing Magistrate when the eye-witnesses resile and turn hostile at the trial?
  • Whether the earlier statement of a witness transferred to the Sessions file under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be preferred over their trial testimony?
  • Can the testimony of police officers regarding recoveries be relied upon independently to corroborate ocular and circumstantial evidence when eye-witnesses used for recovery turn hostile?
  • Are the recovery of empty cartridges matching a recovered licensed gun and the presence of a dead body in the accused's house sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a murder conviction?
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• Syed Tufail Ahmad vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan1981 SCMR 918 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-14
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionland settlementinheritance mutationconcurrent findings of factappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition relating to the final disposal of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The petitioner claimed to be the sister's son of a deceased property owner, alleging that his land settlement claim was fraudulently diverted and that respondents were unlawfully granted inheritance mutations. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent factual findings regarding the heirship and relationship of the respondents to the deceased could be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised pertained entirely to the appreciation of evidence and factual controversies settled by concurrent findings of fact by the lower authorities, warranting no interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower settlement authorities be interfered with in a constitutional petition?
  • Whether questions relating to the appreciation of evidence can form the basis for interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does an allegation of fraud regarding the transfer of a land claim warrant interference when based on disputed questions of fact?
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• Syed Rahim Shah vs Saeed Akhtar Etc.S1981 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  contempt of courtrevenue authoritiesvillage shamilatcompensationalternative legal remedycivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous application sought contempt proceedings against Revenue Department officials in Mansehra District for allegedly failing to apply the law declared by the Supreme Court in a previous judgment regarding the allocation of compensation for trees on village Shamilat. The core legal question was whether contempt proceedings are competent against administrative authorities for failing to follow a declaration of law when alternative civil remedies are being pursued and the subject matter of compensation was not strictly covered by the earlier judgment. The Supreme Court held that the application was misconceived because the petitioners had already filed a civil suit for the proper application of the law, and alternative legal remedies were available against any erroneous actions of the revenue authorities. The Court laid down the principle that contempt action does not lie for an alleged failure by administrative officials to apply a declared legal position where the aggrieved party has access to ordinary legal remedies such as a civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can contempt proceedings be initiated against revenue officials for failing to apply a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a party have the right to seek contempt of court when ordinary civil remedies for the same grievance are already being pursued?
  • Whether contempt of court arises when administrative authorities misinterpret or depart from a judicial precedent.
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• Syed Nazim Ali Etc, Syed Mustafa Ali, Etc vs Syed Mustafa Ali Etc.S Syed1981 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-08
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritieswrit petitiondiscretionary remedystaircase accessdemarcation order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-petitions for leave to appeal concerning a dispute over an evacuee property in Lahore, which was divided by Settlement Authorities into eastern and western portions. The core legal question involves the interpretation of transfer and demarcation orders regarding the exclusive versus common use of the property's sole staircase, and whether a writ petition should be granted to enforce an unjust claim that creates a deadlock for access. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions. The Court held that Settlement authorities could not transfer property entitlements in demarcation proceedings beyond what was granted in the original transfer order, and that division into two houses implied shared access to the only staircase. Furthermore, invoking the principle established in Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, the Court ruled that discretionary writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to foster injustice or deprive another party of access to their property.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities transfer property entitlements in demarcation proceedings that were not granted in the original transfer order?
  • Whether a writ petition can be invoked to enforce a claim that results in an injustice or creates a deadlock for access to property?
  • Does the division of an evacuee property into two houses imply the common use of the sole existing staircase?
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• Syed Nazar Ali vs Syed Ibne Ali and Other.1981 SC MR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-02
  Settlement Schemelimitationcondonation of delaywrit jurisdictionpossessiondiscretionary powerproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition concerning the transfer of property under the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII. The petitioner, who had been granted the property by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, contested the subsequent transfer of the same property to the respondent, whose appeal against the initial transfer was filed beyond the period of limitation. The core legal questions were whether the authorities erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal and whether the findings regarding actual possession were sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the condonation of delay was a matter of discretion for the competent forum, which could not be interfered with unless exercised illegally, capriciously, or arbitrarily. Additionally, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the settlement authorities and the High Court regarding the respondent's actual possession of the property since 1958. The judgment reaffirms that appellate courts will not disturb discretionary decisions on limitation or factual findings of possession supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with the discretion of a lower forum regarding the condonation of delay?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding possession by settlement authorities subject to interference in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of an appeal beyond the limitation period automatically invalidate the transfer of property if the delay is condoned?
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• Syed Nasir Hussain Zaidi vs Service Tribunal, Islamabad and Other1981 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-09
  service tribunalcivil servantefficiency and discipline rulesdepartmental punishmentauthorised officershow-cause noticepersonal hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges the dismissal of the appellant civil servant's service appeal by the Service Tribunal. The core legal questions involve whether the Service Tribunal's decision was vitiated due to non-compliance with rule 24 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974 regarding the Chairman's opinion, whether the Director of Audit had the requisite authority under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 to take disciplinary action against a Grade 16 officer, whether the show-cause notice was defective for failing to specify a tentative penalty, and whether a right of personal hearing existed under the applicable Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal was competent to function in benches pursuant to section 3-A added by Ordinance No. X of 1978, that the Director of Audit possessed the necessary authority as the designated Authorised Officer under the relevant government delegation, that failure to state a specific penalty in the initial notice does not prejudice the proceedings, and that the applicable appeal rules do not imply a right to a personal hearing. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the functioning of the Service Tribunal in benches under section 3-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 overrides the procedural requirement of consulting the Chairman under rule 24 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974?
  • Does the Director of Audit have the authority to take disciplinary action against a Grade 16 officer under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 based on the applicable government delegation of powers?
  • Is a show-cause notice vitiated if it fails to specify a tentative penalty and instead refers generally to the rule prescribing various penalties?
  • Do the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 implicitly exclude the right to a personal hearing in departmental appeals?
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