Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah Bokhari vs The State and Another Syed1981 PLD Supreme Court 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-11
  sanction for prosecutionofficial dutypolice encounterprivate complaintcriminal revisionquashment of proceedingsstage of sanction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal case involves cross-appeals arising from the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an Additional Sessions Judge's order issuing bailable warrants of arrest against a Deputy Superintendent of Police and others for the alleged murder of one Rana Muhammad Sadiq. The core legal question concerned the appropriate stage at which a trial court should determine the necessity of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the question of sanction need not be decided solely on the recitals of the complaint at the very outset, nor should proceedings be stifled prematurely; rather, the court should allow the parties to lead evidence and determine at any appropriate stage whether a reasonable connection exists between the act done and the discharge of official duty, suspending proceedings to enable the procurement of sanction if required. The appeals were accordingly dismissed subject to these observations.

  Questions settled

  • At what stage of the proceedings must the question of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be decided?
  • Can the necessity of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be determined solely by reference to the statements made in the petition of complaint?
  • What procedure should a trial court adopt if it appears during the course of proceedings that the accused was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties?
  • Are the findings of a judicial inquiry conducted under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relevant to assessing the necessity of sanction for prosecution?
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• Syed Muhammad Ishaq Shah vs Ghulam Muhammad1981 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-11
  ejectmentpersonal uselandlord and tenantbona fide needleave to appealsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which restored an ejectment order against the petitioner-tenant in favor of the respondent-landlord. The core legal question concerned the bona fide personal requirement of the rented shop by the landlord for himself and his sons. The Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment, finding the personal need established, but the first appellate court reversed this decision. On second appeal, the High Court held that the appellate court's findings were based on ignored or misread evidence, thereby restoring the ejectment order. The Supreme Court held that the landlord successfully established bona fide personal need through sufficient evidence showing that he and his sons were engaged in improvised means of livelihood and lacked a shop of their own. The Court affirmed that findings of fact based on proper evaluation of evidence by the Rent Controller and the High Court do not warrant interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord can seek ejectment of a tenant for the personal use of both himself and his sons?
  • Is a landlord required to produce every son in court and prove his specific qualifications to establish bona fide personal need for a commercial shop?
  • Whether findings of fact regarding personal need concurrently recorded by the Rent Controller and the High Court are open to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah vs Abdul Hamid and 5 Other1981 SCMR 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  private complaintpolice challanjoint trialcriminal procedureprocedural fairnessNoor Elahi principlecommittal proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the procedural conflict between a police-challan case and a private complaint case arising from the same criminal occurrence. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly ordered a joint trial of both cases, or whether the procedure established in Noor Elahi v. The State—requiring the complaint case to be heard first—should prevail. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to set aside the joint trial order. The Court held that the procedure laid down in Noor Elahi v. The State remains the governing principle. Where a private complaint and a police challan case arise from the same incident but involve different sets of accused or material discrepancies in allegations, the private complaint case must be tried first. This ensures the complainant is not prejudiced, allows for the examination of witnesses, and permits the Public Prosecutor to evaluate the prosecution's position after the initial evidence is thrashed out. This approach avoids procedural handicaps and serves the interests of justice by ensuring a comprehensive and fair trial process for all parties involved.

  Questions settled

  • When a private complaint and a police challan case arise from the same criminal occurrence, which case should be tried first?
  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance 1976 invalidate the procedural guidelines established in Noor Elahi v. The State regarding the trial of cross-cases?
  • Is a joint trial of a private complaint case and a police challan case permissible when the accused parties are not identical?
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• Syed Mir Muhammad vs N.W.F.P.Government through Chief Secretary1981 PLD Supreme Court 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-15
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceinquiry reportright to defenceservice lawbiasmajor penaltygovernment servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal upholding the appellant's removal from service following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the Inquiry Officer's appointment, alleged bias of the Inquiry Officer, the vagueness of charges, and the necessity of supplying the inquiry report to the accused. The Court held that the appointment of the Inquiry Officer by the Chief Justice in consultation with other judges was valid, and the Inquiry Officer was not biased by participating in the preliminary decision to hold an inquiry. Regarding the vagueness of charges, the Court found no material prejudice caused to the appellant. However, the Court held that in formal disciplinary inquiries, it is an implicit requirement of the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and the principles of natural justice that the accused must be furnished with a copy of the inquiry report to offer an explanation regarding adverse findings before a final decision is reached. Consequently, the failure to supply the report vitiated the disciplinary action, and the appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the participation of an Inquiry Officer in the administrative meeting that decided to hold an inquiry against a government servant constitute legal bias?
  • Is the failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report to an accused government servant a violation of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings be vitiated if the charges framed against a government servant are vague?
  • Does the appointment of an Inquiry Officer by the Chief Justice in consultation with other judges violate the requirement that the authorised officer must appoint the officer?
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• Syed Ghulam Abbas vs The Chief Administrator, Auqaf1981 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-16
  Waqf propertyAuqafprivate WaqfdedicationMussalman Waqf Validating ActMutwallileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the status of agricultural land dedicated by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the dedicated land constituted a private Waqf under the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913, thereby exempting it from the control of the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the dedication was absolute and irrevocable. The Court established that because the Waqf deed did not reserve any income for the maintenance or support of the donor’s family, children, or descendants, it did not fall under the provisions of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913. Consequently, the property was subject to the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the petitioner could not introduce a new, inconsistent plea regarding the validity of the Waqf under Shia law after the proceedings had commenced.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Waqf deed that reserves no income for the donor's family or descendants qualify as a private Waqf under the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913?
  • Can a party introduce an inconsistent plea to challenge the validity of a Waqf after the initial proceedings have commenced?
  • Does the absolute dedication of property as Waqf divest the donor of ownership and control?
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• Syed Alam vs Rabia Gul1981 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-22
  pre-emptionco-sharerunpartitioned propertysuperior right of pre-emptionirrigation amenitypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a suit for pre-emption. The petitioner sought pre-emption of land based on contiguous ownership and participation in amenities, which the trial court dismissed upon finding the respondent also had a contiguous land and was a co-sharer in an irrigating Lakhti. The District Judge allowed the petitioner's appeal, but the High Court subsequently accepted the respondent's revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a very small fractional share in an unpartitioned irrigating property is sufficient to confer the status of a co-owner for pre-emption purposes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a co-owner of unpartitioned property is an owner in every inch of the estate regardless of the small fraction of their share, and distinguished prior case law regarding public thoroughfares and common walls. The key principle laid down is that ownership rights in unpartitioned property extend to every part thereof, establishing superior pre-emptive right by virtue of co-ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-owner of unpartitioned property is considered an owner in every inch of the estate regardless of the size of their fractional share?
  • Does ownership of a minute share in an unpartitioned irrigating Lakhti confer a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Can a person claim a superior pre-emptive right based solely on being a co-sharer in a public thoroughfare?
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• Syed Akbar Ali Pukhari vs State Bank of Pakistan1981 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-10
  review petitionaudi alteram parteminquiry reportshow-cause noticere-hearingjurisdictional requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court of Pakistan's order dated 28-10-1980, which had dismissed his civil appeal against the High Court's dismissal of his constitutional petition. The petitioner raised several grounds, including the violation of the principle of audi alteram partem due to the non-provision of a detailed dismissal order, procedural violations by the Inquiry Officer in recording witness statements, and the failure to supply the inquiry report and serve a second show-cause notice. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was attempting to seek a re-hearing of the arguments already addressed and decided in the civil appeal, without satisfying the jurisdictional requirements necessary for maintaining a review petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, reaffirming that a review petition cannot be utilized as a platform for re-arguing a case to obtain a different decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek a review of a judgment solely to re-argue the merits of the case and obtain a different decision?
  • What jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied to maintain a review petition before the Supreme Court?
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• Syed Akbar Ali Bokhari vs State Bank of Pakistan1981 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-26
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justicereasonable opportunitystatutory corporationdismissal from serviceadministrative lawState Bank of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of the appellant, an Assistant Treasurer at the State Bank of Pakistan, for gross misconduct involving the alteration of Prize Bond records and abstraction of prize money. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings, conducted under the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, violated the principles of natural justice and statutory requirements by failing to provide a formal trial, cross-examination of witnesses, a copy of the inquiry report, or a second show-cause notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the disciplinary inquiry was fair and complied with the relevant Staff Regulations. The Court affirmed that while administrative authorities must act in good faith and provide a reasonable opportunity for the accused to explain their position and contradict prejudicial statements, they are not strictly bound to conduct a formal judicial trial, examine witnesses in the presence of the accused, or permit cross-examination, provided the essential requirements of fairness are met. The Court further clarified that statutory requirements applicable to industrial workmen under specific labor laws cannot be transposed onto internal bank regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement of 'reasonable opportunity' in disciplinary proceedings necessitate a formal trial with the right to cross-examine witnesses?
  • Can statutory requirements applicable to industrial workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 be applied to employees governed by specific internal bank regulations?
  • Is a Constitutional Petition maintainable against the State Bank of Pakistan regarding the enforcement of service terms?
  • Are administrative authorities required to provide a second show-cause notice indicating proposed punishment in the absence of a specific statutory provision requiring it?
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• Syed Ahmad Kamal vs Khan Mauj Din Khan and Other1981 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  special leave to appealremandsettlement authoritiesproperty transferdivisibility of propertypossessionpetition rendered infructuous
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court remanding a property dispute to the Settlement Authorities for a fresh decision. The dispute centers around the transfer and divisibility of a residential unit in Lahore between two rival claimants who had been in occupation since 1947-1948. In the earlier rounds of litigation, the High Court had determined that the petitioner's lawful possession was restricted to the upper story, a finding that remained final and binding, rendering subsequent contrary findings by the Settlement Commissioner without lawful authority. Furthermore, the petitioner actively participated in the remand proceedings without protest and submitted written arguments, thereby rendering the petition infructuous by conduct. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's remand order suffered from no legal or factual infirmity and that participation in remand proceedings without protest disentitles a party from challenging the remand. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who participates in remand proceedings without protest can subsequently challenge the remand order in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does a finding of fact regarding the extent of possession in an earlier round of litigation remain binding in subsequent proceedings?
  • Can the High Court remand a case to the Settlement Authorities when the lower settlement tribunals ignored binding factual determinations regarding possession?
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• Swati Qaum through Bacha Gul and Others vs Painda Khel Qaum and Other1981 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-10
  limitation periodtribal areaswrit jurisdictioncustomary duesrevisional powersconstitutional petitionadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition in limine, which challenged a revisional order passed by a Deputy Secretary to the Government of NWFP regarding customary dues in Dir District. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal filed before the Additional Commissioner was barred by time and whether the High Court had writ jurisdiction over the Tribal Areas of Dir, Chitral, and Swat. The Supreme Court held that the revisional order was erroneous because the limitation period for filing the appeal only commenced from the date the formal order was signed and communicated to the parties, and further held that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court stood validly extended by President's Order XXVII of 1973 prior to the disposal of the review petition. The appeal was accepted and the case remitted to the revisional authority for decision on merits, laying down that a competent authority cannot ignore material evidence regarding limitation when exercising revisional powers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal commences from the date of the oral announcement or the date the formal order is signed and communicated?
  • Can a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction in relation to the Tribal Areas of Dir, Swat and Chitral following the promulgation of President's Order XXVII of 1973?
  • Is a revisional decision liable to be quashed if it is arrived at in complete disregard of the material available on record regarding limitation?
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• Sultan Muhammad and 3 Others vs Malik Muhammad Aslam and 2 Other1981 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25
  evacuee propertywrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefestoppelredemption ordercompensation pool
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition challenging an order passed by the Custodian, Evacuee Property. The petitioners, who were occupants of property treated as evacuee property, sought to challenge a redemption order granted in favor of the respondent, which had effectively removed the property from the compensation pool. The petitioners had previously utilized this same redemption order in 1969 to successfully challenge their ejectment proceedings, arguing that the property was no longer evacuee property. Years later, they sought to challenge the legality of that same redemption order. The Supreme Court declined to examine the competency of the appeal against the delegatee of the Custodian. Instead, the Court held that the petitioners were barred from relief due to their own conduct. Having relied upon and benefited from the redemption order to protect their possession in 1969, they could not subsequently invoke the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the same order as illegal. The petition was dismissed on this ground of conduct alone.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has relied upon and benefited from an administrative order subsequently challenge that same order in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the conduct of a petitioner in prior proceedings affect the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction by the High Court?
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• Sultan Anmad, Etc. vs The State1981 SCMR 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-18
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyco-accusedvicarious liabilitybail adjudicationcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for bail filed by three accused persons facing trial for murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question addressed is whether the petitioners were entitled to the grant of bail based on the principle of consistency, given that co-accused facing similar charges under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code had already been granted bail by the High Court. The petitioners argued that their case was analogous to that of the co-accused, particularly noting that the fatal injury was attributed to a different individual, Altaf, who had not sought bail. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had erroneously dismissed the petitioners' bail application by misconstruing the circumstances under which the co-accused were granted bail. The Court held that the previous order granting bail to co-accused, which highlighted the existence of enmity and the specific attribution of the fatal shot to another person, was highly relevant. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granted bail to the petitioners, and established the principle that consistency in bail adjudication is essential when co-accused share similar legal standing and evidentiary circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is the principle of consistency applicable when granting bail to co-accused facing similar charges under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the fact that a fatal injury is attributed to a specific co-accused provide grounds for granting bail to other co-accused charged with vicarious liability?
  • Can a High Court judge dismiss a bail application based on a factual misapprehension regarding the basis upon which bail was previously granted to co-accused?
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• Suleman and Other vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-30
  death sentencemurderocular evidencecorroborationballistic expertbenefit of the doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a jail petition arising from the convictions and death sentences of four appellants for the murder of four persons who were on their way to a court appearance in a connected murder case. The core legal question involves evaluating the sufficiency and credibility of ocular evidence and whether necessary corroboration exists for each convicted appellant. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the convictions and death sentences of appellants Suleman, Abdul Karim, and Shah Nawaz were well-founded based on reliable eyewitness testimony, motive, and corroborative recoveries including ballistic evidence and blood-stained weapons, while appellant Pir Bakhsh alias Piru was given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted due to established enmity and a lack of corroborative evidence. The key principle laid down is that in capital cases involving interested witnesses and minor discrepancies, convictions can be sustained if corroborated by reliable circumstantial evidence, such as motive, weapon recoveries, and ballistic matching, but must be set aside where corroboration is entirely absent and previous enmity exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony regarding specific firearms are sufficient to discard ocular evidence in a murder trial?
  • Does the recovery of weapons and ballistic matching constitute sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an appellant be acquitted when there is a background of enmity and a complete lack of incriminating corroborative evidence linking him to the crime?
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• Sufi.Malik Muhammad Sarfraz vs Government of the Punjab through Its Chief Secretary and Other1981 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-15
  ad hoc appointmentconstitutional petitionalternate remedyservice tribunalwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged the termination of his ad hoc appointment as an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the constitutional petition in view of the availability of an alternate remedy before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's ad hoc appointment had expired and not been extended, and that the Punjab Service Tribunal provided a more adequate alternate remedy. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition, establishing that the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked when an adequate alternate remedy through a service tribunal is available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 when an alternate remedy is available before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment automatically expire upon the lapse of its stipulated term if not extended?
  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal considered a more adequate remedy in service matters than a writ petition?
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• State vs Hadi Bakhsh1981 SCMR 1008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-24
  double jeopardyfinality of judgmentState appeal against acquittalres judicatacriminal appealculpable homicidecompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the competency of a State appeal against an acquittal on a murder charge after the accused's conviction for a lesser offence had already been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the State could challenge the acquittal on the graver charge once the conviction for the lesser offence had attained finality. The Supreme Court held that the State's appeal was incompetent. The Court reasoned that once an appellate court has adjudicated upon an appeal against a conviction, the judgment becomes final, and the principle of res judicata, alongside the prohibition against double jeopardy, precludes the State from reopening the matter to seek a conviction on a graver charge arising from the same facts. The Court emphasized that the State should have pursued its appeal against the acquittal simultaneously with the accused's appeal. The key principle laid down is that the finality of criminal judgments prevents the State from challenging an acquittal on a graver charge after a conviction for a lesser offence arising from the same transaction has been confirmed on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the State appeal an acquittal on a murder charge after the accused's conviction for a lesser offence has been upheld by the High Court?
  • Does the principle of finality of judgments preclude the State from reopening a case after an appellate court has confirmed a conviction for a lesser offence?
  • Is a conviction for a lesser offence a bar to a subsequent prosecution or appeal for a graver offence arising from the same facts?
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• State through Advocate-General, N: W. F. P. Peshawar vs Amir Nazar1981 PLD Supreme Court 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-06
  appraisement of evidenceeye-witness testimonychild witnessidentification in fire lightmurder and arsonrestoration of trial court convictionappeal against acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a decision of the High Court acquitting three accused respondents who had been convicted by the trial court under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, including Section 302, for a murderous attack resulting in six deaths and the burning of a house. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in discrediting the testimonies of eye-witnesses, including a injured minor child and a mother who survived by hiding in a crop field, on grounds of minor omissions and non-appraisement of evidence. The Supreme Court evaluated the eye-witness evidence, night-time illumination caused by the house fire, and corroborative physical facts from the spot. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misappreciated the evidence and drew ill-conceived inferences regarding the eye-witnesses' presence and conduct. Reaffirming accepted principles of evidence appraisement, the Court ruled that minor omissions or child witness vulnerabilities do not automatically invalidate consistent identification of assailants when supported by ambient light and surrounding circumstances. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eye-witness can be rejected solely because she hid during a violent attack and failed to immediately report all details to the police?
  • Whether the testimony of a minor injured child witness can be relied upon when corroborated by physical evidence and surrounding circumstances?
  • Can identification of assailants by eye-witnesses be established where the crime scene is illuminated by a burning house?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Saifuddin1981 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-24
  foreign exchange regulationorder of dischargeright of appealmeaning of judgmentcriminal proceduretribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal raised the question of whether an appeal is competent under section 23-A(6) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act against an order discharging an accused person. The respondent was tried by a Tribunal under section 23-A of the Act and was discharged under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the prosecution evidence was recorded. The High Court dismissed the State Bank of Pakistan's appeal, holding that no appeal lies against an order of discharge. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of the term 'judgment' as used in section 23-A(6) of the Act, comparing it with its statutory meaning under the Code of Criminal Procedure and general legal definitions of finality. The Court held that 'judgment' under section 23-A refers exclusively to an order of conviction or acquittal, mirroring the Criminal Procedure Code, and does not encompass an order of discharge. Furthermore, an order of discharge lacks absolute legal finality because fresh proceedings can legally be initiated under certain circumstances. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that no appeal lies from an order of discharge under the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against an order of discharge of an accused is competent under section 23-A(6) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act?
  • Does the word 'judgment' in section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act include an order of discharge made under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Is an order of discharge under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a final and conclusive adjudication between the parties?
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• State and Other vs Muhammad Ali Chaudhri and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-09
  institution of complaintDrugs Actquashing of proceedingsDrug Inspectorapplication of mindCriminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court which quashed criminal proceedings against the respondents under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that the prosecution under the Drugs Act 1940 was not validly instituted by the Drug Inspector as required by Section 32 of the said Act. The core legal question was whether the complaint and challan filed in the trial court constituted a proper institution of the prosecution by the Drug Inspector under the Drugs Act 1940. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the matter for trial. The Court held that the record clearly demonstrated that the Drug Inspector had formally and factually instituted the complaint with full application of an independent mind, rendering the High Court's contrary assumption legally unsustainable. The key principle laid down is that where a complaint is authored, titled, addressed, and submitted by a statutory authority like a Drug Inspector detailing the offences and provisions invoked, it satisfies the statutory institution requirement, and a countersignature or accompanying police challan file does not negate the independent application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a prosecution under the Drugs Act 1940 is validly instituted when filed by a Drug Inspector?
  • Does the presence of a police challan file alongside a formal complaint by a Drug Inspector vitiate the institution of proceedings?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the assumption that a complaint was not instituted by the competent authority?
  • Does a countersignature by a statutory officer on a challan report negate the independent application of mind?
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• Sikandar And 2 Other vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-24
  ocular testimonychance witnessesmedical evidenceforensic delaychemical examinercriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the concurrent convictions of three appellants for murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony in light of allegations that the witnesses were 'chance witnesses,' discrepancies between medical evidence and the prosecution's version of events, and the evidentiary value of forensic recoveries delayed in transit. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the convictions. The Court held that reliable ocular testimony cannot be discarded based on speculative medical opinions regarding a victim's post-injury volitional capacity. It further established that delays in forwarding forensic samples to a Chemical Examiner do not automatically invalidate the evidence, provided the articles were properly sealed at the scene and there is no proof of tampering or bad faith by the police. The judgment reinforces that judicial reliance on medical evidence must be cautious, as doctors' opinions on volitional acts are variable and secondary to credible eyewitness accounts, and that forensic delays require cross-examination to establish prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular testimony be rejected solely based on a doctor's hypothetical opinion regarding a victim's ability to perform volitional acts after receiving a fatal injury?
  • Does an inordinate delay in sending blood-stained articles to a Chemical Examiner automatically render the forensic evidence inadmissible?
  • Is the testimony of witnesses who are not recorded haris in revenue records necessarily unreliable in a murder case?
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• Sikandar Ali vs Sind Services Tribunal and Other1981 SC M.R 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-07
  service appealwillful absencedepartmental inquiryleave to appealcondonation of delaydisciplinary proceedingsSind Services Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Sind Services Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding his dismissal from the position of Treasury Clerk. The petitioner had been dismissed for willful absence from duty following a departmental inquiry. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in dismissing the petitioner's appeal as non-maintainable due to the departmental appeal being time-barred, and whether the departmental authority's consideration of the appeal on merits implied a condonation of delay. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that, regardless of the procedural issues surrounding the departmental appeal and the alleged condonation of delay, the findings of the inquiry officer regarding the petitioner's willful absence were supported by ample material. The petitioner failed to provide cogent evidence, such as medical certificates or proof of unlawful detention, to justify his long absence. Consequently, the Court determined that remanding the case to the Tribunal would serve no useful purpose, as the underlying disciplinary findings were substantively sound.

  Questions settled

  • Does a departmental appellate authority's decision to consider an appeal on merits imply a condonation of delay?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable before a Tribunal if the preceding departmental appeal was time-barred?
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• Siddique and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-15
  criminal petitionmurderappraisement of evidenceocular testimonycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involves the proper appreciation of ocular and circumstantial evidence in a criminal murder trial arising from a dispute over illicit relations and an ensuing fatal attack with hatchets. The Supreme Court evaluated the findings of the lower courts, which had relied on eyewitness testimonies, motive, and recovery of blood-stained weapons, and dismissed the petition. The Court held that the concurrent appraisement of evidence by the trial court and the High Court suffered from no error of law or fact warranting interference, thereby affirming the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does the recovery of blood-stained weapons corroborate ocular testimony in a murder case?
  • Whether conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code is sustainable when multiple accused participate in a fatal attack?
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• Shuja Ud Din vs Haji Masitey Khan and Another1981 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-21
  ejectmentdefault in rentstriking off defencesufficient causeurban rent restrictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the landlords against the tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959. The Rent Controller directed the tenant to deposit rent, but the tenant defaulted on payments for multiple months. Consequently, the Rent Controller struck off the tenant's defence and ordered eviction. An appellate court remanded the case, holding that the tenant should have been granted an opportunity to prove sufficient cause for the default, namely illness. However, the High Court set aside the remand order and restored the eviction order, finding the plea of illness to be an afterthought not raised before the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether a tenant defaulting on rent deposits is entitled to an opportunity to establish sufficient cause for delay when such a plea was never raised before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that where no proper plea of illness was taken at the appropriate stage before the Rent Controller, the tenant cannot claim a right to an inquiry, and upheld the High Court's decision. The key principle established is that a defence of sufficient cause for rent default cannot be entertained if it is raised for the first time on appeal without having been pleaded before the Rent Controller.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can raise a plea of illness for the first time on appeal to justify a default in rent deposit?
  • Is a Rent Controller bound to hold an inquiry into sufficient cause for rent default when no such plea was raised in the reply to the default application?
  • Does an order striking off a defence for non-payment of rent warrant interference when the default is admitted and unexcused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs The State1981 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-17
  criminal leave to appealmurderocular testimonycircumstantial evidenceappreciation of evidencebenefit of under trial custodydismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code was dismissed and his sentence of life imprisonment along with a fine was maintained. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of ocular testimony in the absence of corroborating circumstantial evidence, particularly after the co-accused was acquitted and the High Court discarded the recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the credibility of the eye-witnesses were based on valid reasons and did not warrant interference, though it granted the benefit of section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the period of jail custody. The key principle laid down is that reliable and unimpeached ocular testimony alone can sustain a conviction for murder even if corroborative circumstantial evidence is discarded, provided the witnesses have no motive to falsely implicate the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when circumstantial evidence of recovery is discarded?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal merely because a co-accused was acquitted on different evidentiary considerations?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and Other1981S C M R 1168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-24
  revenue patwaridismissal from servicesettlement officerpowers of collectoradministrative jurisdictiondelegation of powersservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of a revenue Patwari by the Settlement Officer, Multan, acting under powers conferred by a government notification. The petitioner challenged the dismissal, arguing that the Settlement Officer lacked the legal competence to dismiss him because the petitioner was not involved in settlement work and his services were not placed at the Settlement Officer's disposal. The core legal question was whether the notification conferring the powers of a Collector upon the Settlement Officer was limited only to matters concerning settlement work, thereby rendering the dismissal order ultra vires. The Supreme Court held that the notification was widely expressed and conferred all powers of a Collector (except those under Chapter VI of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887) upon the Settlement Officer, without restricting his jurisdiction to settlement-related duties. Consequently, the Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that the Settlement Officer acted within his jurisdiction as a Collector. The key principle established is that where a notification confers the full powers of a Collector upon an officer without explicit limitation to specific departmental functions, that officer may exercise administrative powers, including disciplinary authority, over subordinates within the district.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification conferring the powers of a Collector upon a Settlement Officer limit that officer's jurisdiction solely to settlement-related work?
  • Can a Settlement Officer exercise disciplinary powers over a Patwari if the notification conferring Collector powers does not explicitly restrict those powers to settlement duties?
  • Is a Settlement Officer who is granted the powers of a Collector under the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887 subordinate to the District Collector in the exercise of those powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Said Muhammad Shah1981 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28
  condonation of delaylimitationnegligence of counselsufficient causemedical certificatepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan with a delay of 84 days, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The petitioner submitted that his counsel failed to inform him of the date of hearing or the eventual dismissal of his revision petition by the Lahore High Court, and further pleaded that an attack of enteric fever subsequently prevented him from filing the petition in time, producing a medical certificate in support. The primary legal question was whether counsel's failure to inform a client of a judgment, coupled with a doubtful medical certificate, constitutes sufficient cause to condone delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court rejected the medical certificate as an afterthought, noting it implausibly anticipated a future rest period extending over six weeks from the date of issuance. The Court held that a litigant bears the primary obligation to remain informed about the status of his case, and counsel's failure to notify him does not per se constitute sufficient cause to condone long delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's failure to inform a client of the outcome of a case constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Can a medical certificate that purports to anticipate a future period of illness and bed rest be accepted to explain a delay in filing?
  • Does a litigant bear an independent duty to keep informed about the progress and decision of their case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Rajada and Another1981 PLD Supreme Court 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07
  pre-emptionlimitation periodagricultural income-taxmutationsale of agricultural landpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal examined whether a sale of agricultural land effected in contravention of section 8 of the Punjab Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1951, and possession taken thereunder, could be used by vendees to plead the bar of limitation against a pre-emption suit filed within one year of the subsequent attestation of the sale mutation. The core legal question was whether the statutory invalidity under the tax act rendered the 1951 sale incomplete or void for the purposes of the pre-emption law and the starting point of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the invalidity or infirmity attaching to the sale was restricted solely to the incidence and payment of agricultural income-tax and did not render the sale incomplete or void for pre-emption purposes. The transaction constituted a complete sale upon delivery of possession in 1951, from which date limitation for filing the pre-emption suit commenced. The key principle laid down is that statutory restrictions on land transfers intended to prevent the evasion of agricultural income-tax do not invalidate the underlying transaction for other civil purposes such as pre-emption, and possession taken pursuant to such a transaction starts the period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a violation of section 8 of the Punjab Agricultural Income-tax Act 1951 render an oral sale of agricultural land void or incomplete for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • From what date does limitation start for a pre-emption suit when possession is delivered under a sale affected by a tax evasion restriction?
  • What is the scope and legal effect of statutory invalidity attached to land transfers under agricultural income-tax legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan1981 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08
  Rehabilitation and Settlement SchemeBinding precedentConstitutional petitionFull BenchWidow's estateAlienation of landLimited estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the alienation of agricultural land allotted to a widow under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The core legal questions were whether a High Court judge is bound by a Full Bench decision on a point of law when the Supreme Court has subsequently declared the law to the contrary, and whether a reference to a Full Bench automatically disposes of the underlying constitutional petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court judge correctly followed the Supreme Court's binding precedent over the earlier Full Bench decision. The Court established that under the Constitution, any decision of the Supreme Court on a question of law is binding on all other courts in Pakistan, superseding conflicting High Court Full Bench decisions. Furthermore, a reference to a Full Bench for a specific legal question does not automatically dispose of the underlying constitutional petition, which remains subject to final adjudication. The Court also rejected technical arguments regarding limitation, finding them unsubstantial in the context of the rehabilitation proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court judge bound to follow a Full Bench decision on a question of law when the Supreme Court has subsequently declared the law to the contrary?
  • Does a reference to a Full Bench for a specific legal question automatically dispose of the underlying constitutional petition?
  • Does a widow allotted land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme in lieu of a limited estate in India become an absolute owner competent to alienate it?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Jang vs Muhammad Salim and Another1981 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-15
  evictionrent defaultregistered sale deedunregistered sale deedconcurrent findingslandlord-tenant relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of lower courts ordering the eviction of the petitioner from a property due to default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, claiming ownership through a purchase deed, could challenge the eviction order based on the landlord-tenant relationship established by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's claim of ownership failed because his sale deed was both subsequent to and unregistered compared to the respondents' prior, registered sale deed. Consequently, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlord-tenant relationship. The Court affirmed that an unregistered, subsequent sale deed cannot supersede a prior, registered sale deed. Furthermore, as the petitioner failed to establish ownership, the finding of default in rent payment remained uncontested and valid. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, maintaining the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent unregistered sale deed take precedence over a prior registered sale deed?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord-tenant relationship be challenged in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction if they fail to pay rent and their claim of ownership over the property is legally invalid?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Bahadur vs Deputy Commissioner/Election Tribunal Etc.1981 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-01
  election petitionright to votedisenfranchisementpublic policyvoid agreementlocal government electionssupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the Election Tribunal's decision to set aside local government elections held on 25-9-79 in Electoral Unit No. 25, Union Council, Peelo Wance, Tehsil Khushab, District Sargodha. During the polling, all contesting candidates had mutually agreed with the Presiding Officer to exclude women voters and treat their votes as spoiled ballot papers. Subsequently, certain respondents filed an election petition challenging the election on the ground that women were prevented from voting, leading the Tribunal and High Court to set aside the election. The core legal question was whether candidates and a Presiding Officer can lawfully agree to disenfranchise voters. The Supreme Court held that registered voters possess a statutory right to vote which candidates cannot waive or compromise, and that an agreement depriving voters of their franchise is void ab initio as being against public policy and law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate have the right to refuse or not accept a vote from a registered voter?
  • Can a Presiding Officer legally agree with contesting candidates to disenfranchise women voters?
  • Is an agreement between candidates to exclude certain voters considered void ab initio as against public policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Murtaza Ali vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 41981 SCMR 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-21
  evacuee propertyJammu and Kashmir claimantSettlement Scheme No. VIlocus standiproprietary rightsresumption of propertyspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against the resumption and subsequent auction of evacuee property by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The property was originally transferred to a Jammu and Kashmir claimant, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad, under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The core legal question was whether the resumption of this property, following the transferee's departure from Pakistan, was lawful and whether the appellant, who had an agreement to purchase the property from the original transferee, had locus standi to challenge the resumption. The Supreme Court held that the resumption was lawful because the proprietary rights remained vested in the Central Government under the terms of the transfer, as the transferee had not paid the full value to secure unconditional ownership. The Court further held that the appellant lacked locus standi to challenge the cancellation of the P.T.D. as he had not informed the authorities of his interest, and the original transferee had abandoned the property. The key principle laid down is that where property is transferred to a Jammu and Kashmir claimant subject to Central Government proprietary rights, the transferee's rights are conditional, and the government may resume the property upon the transferee's repatriation or disappearance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of evacuee property to a Jammu and Kashmir claimant under Settlement Scheme No. VI vest unconditional proprietary rights in the transferee?
  • Does a person claiming an interest in evacuee property through an agreement to sell have locus standi to challenge the resumption of that property by the Settlement authorities?
  • Can the Settlement authorities resume property transferred to a Jammu and Kashmir claimant if the transferee has left the country and cannot be located?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Manzoor vs The State1981 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-12
  bailcriminal lawjudicial discretionleave to appealfatal shotpost-mortem report
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused to grant bail to the petitioner in a criminal case registered under Sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, who was accused of firing the fatal shot, sought bail on the grounds that other co-accused had been granted bail, that the prosecution case was allegedly belied by the investigation, and that there were inconsistencies between the First Information Report and the post-mortem report regarding the injuries sustained. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant bail constituted an arbitrary or perverse exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court had properly considered the relevant factors and that the attribution of the fatal shot to the petitioner justified the denial of bail at this stage. The Court affirmed that it would not interfere with the High Court's discretion when it has been exercised reasonably and not perversely.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail to co-accused automatically entitle another accused to bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in bail matters?
  • Is it appropriate for the Court to conduct a detailed assessment of evidence at the bail stage when a fatal shot is attributed to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat and 2 Others vs The State1981 SCMR 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-17
  criminal appealmurderocular evidenceSection 33 Evidence Actabsconding witnesscorroborationbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the procedural validity of transferring statements under Section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872 without strict proof of the witnesses' unavailability, and whether a conviction could be sustained on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness when physical evidence contradicted the prosecution's version of events. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to satisfy the strict requirements of Section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872, as the process server's hearsay report regarding the witnesses' abscondence was insufficient. Furthermore, the Court found the ocular testimony unreliable because it contradicted the medical evidence regarding the number of shots fired and the physical circumstances of the crime. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The judgment establishes that the prosecution must strictly prove the conditions for transferring evidence under Section 33, and that a conviction cannot rest on unreliable ocular testimony that contradicts established physical facts and medical findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a process server's report based on hearsay sufficient to satisfy the requirements for transferring a witness's statement under Section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the ocular testimony contradicts the medical evidence and the physical facts of the crime?
  • What is the effect of the prosecution's failure to examine material witnesses who were available to testify?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs The Controller of Examinations, University of the Punjab, Lahore and Another1981 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-02
  unfair meansdisciplinary proceedingseducational institutionreasonable opportunitynatural justiceuniversity disciplinemala fides
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the disqualification of a student by the University of the Punjab for using unfair means during an examination. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of "reasonable opportunity of showing cause" under Rule 20(a) of the University Rules, specifically whether it mandated the cross-examination of witnesses or formal trial-like procedures. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that disciplinary proceedings in educational institutions do not require the strict procedural formalities of a criminal trial. The Court reaffirmed that authorities must act in good faith and ensure the student is aware of the allegations and given a fair opportunity to respond. The key principle laid down is that educational authorities possess broad discretion to maintain discipline, akin to a parent or guardian. Consequently, there is a presumption of regularity in such proceedings unless the student proves mala fides. Absent such proof, authorities are not compelled to provide formal charge-sheets, administer oaths, or allow cross-examination, provided the essential principles of fairness are met.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement of a 'reasonable opportunity of showing cause' in university disciplinary proceedings mandate the cross-examination of witnesses?
  • Are educational institutions required to follow the strict procedural formalities of a criminal trial when disciplining students for using unfair means?
  • Under what circumstances does the burden shift to university authorities to establish charges against a student through formal evidence?
  • Is a student entitled to a formal charge-sheet in disciplinary proceedings conducted by a university?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali And Aother vs Mst. Shui Khelay1981 PLD Supreme Court 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  guardianshipcustody of minorsFamily Courtforum of appealright of appealproceduredeeming provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a custody dispute under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 and the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The mother filed for custody of her minor children following her husband's death, which was allowed by the Guardian Judge (Civil Judge) and affirmed by the High Court. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an appeal against an order passed by a Civil Judge acting as a Guardian Judge/Family Court lies to the District Court under Section 14(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, or to the High Court under Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 read with Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal is a substantive right and not a matter of procedure. Section 25 of the 1964 Act only regulates the trial procedure before the Family Court and does not govern appeals. Therefore, an appeal against an order of a Family Court presided over by a Civil Judge lies to the District Court under Section 14(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, rendering a direct appeal to the High Court incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'procedure' in Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 include the right of appeal under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Which forum has appellate jurisdiction over an order passed in a guardianship matter by a Family Court presided over by a Civil Judge?
  • Does Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 impliedly repeal or override Section 14 of the same Act in guardianship cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharie Ud Din and Others vs Commissioner, Multan Division, Multan1981 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-05
  land acquisitioncompensation claimremand orderfinding of factwrit jurisdictionfrivolous litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which arose from a dispute over compensation for land acquired under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. The petitioners claimed additional compensation for a 'pucca' structure (Haveli) allegedly existing on the acquired land. Despite multiple remands by appellate authorities and findings of fact by the Land Acquisition Collector that no such structure existed, the petitioners persisted in their claim, relying on a technical interpretation of the Commissioner's initial remand order. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner's remand order constituted a binding finding of fact regarding the existence of the structure, or merely a direction to consider the claim. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner's order, when read as a whole, merely directed the Collector to consider the petitioners' claim, not to accept the existence of the structure as a proven fact. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the consistent factual findings of the authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a remand order directing an authority to consider a claim constitute a binding finding of fact on the merits of that claim?
  • Can a party rely on a technical interpretation of a remand order to override consistent factual findings made by lower authorities?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order of remand that does not conclusively determine the existence of a disputed structure?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamsul Haq vs Muhammad Jalaluddin1981 SCMR 1189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-22
  rent restrictionstriking off defencedilatory tacticsconditional remandejectment proceedingsnon-compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the striking off of the petitioner's defence in rent proceedings. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority were justified in striking off the tenant's defence due to the failure to comply with a conditional remand order regarding the production of evidence and the payment of rent arrears. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had engaged in dilatory tactics, failing to comply with the specific directions of the High Court's remand order, which required the production of evidence on the first date of hearing. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions to dismiss the appeal and maintain the order striking off the defence. The key principle laid down is that where a remand order is conditional upon the timely production of evidence or compliance with procedural directions, a court is fully justified in refusing adjournments and closing the case if the party deliberately employs dilatory tactics to avoid such compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court justified in striking off a tenant's defence when the tenant fails to comply with a conditional remand order requiring the production of evidence?
  • Can an appellate authority refuse an adjournment request when a party has previously engaged in dilatory tactics to avoid service and compliance with court orders?
  • Does the failure to comply with a conditional remand order regarding the production of evidence justify the closure of a party's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamim vs Niamat Ali1981 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-26
  minor custodywelfare of the minorguardian and wardpaternal custodyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a custody dispute concerning a minor son aged about 11 or 12 years. The Guardian Judge and the High Court concurrenty held that the welfare of the minor lay in the custody of the father, considering that the child was over seven years of age, the mother lacked sufficient means and proper support, and the father had adequate financial resources to maintain and educate the child. The core legal question was whether the welfare of the minor, who was ailing and illiterate, necessitated custody with the mother despite the father's financial capacity and the personal law rule favoring paternal custody after the age of seven. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the welfare of the minor were justified, as the mother lacked the means and ability to properly care for and educate the child. The key principle laid down is that while the welfare of the minor remains the paramount consideration in custody matters, personal law presumes such welfare lies with the father after the child attains the age of seven, absent compelling reasons to the contrary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the welfare of a minor above the age of seven lie with the father under personal law when the mother lacks sufficient means and ability to look after the child?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the custody of a minor absent compelling reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Shameer vs Board of Revenue Etc.S1981 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  leave to appealState agricultural landleasehold rightsvested legal rightlocus poenitentiaeconstitutional petitionauction of State lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the Lahore High Court, concerning the grant of tenancy in State agricultural land. The petitioner was the highest bidder at an auction, but the Divisional Commissioner recalled his approval pursuant to a government directive suspending auctions, before a formal allotment letter was issued by the Collector. The core legal questions involved whether a vested legal right or contractual obligation was created without a formal written order under the relevant statute, and whether the competent authority possessed the power to recall the approval. The Supreme Court held that no tenancy or vested right is created under section 10(4) of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, until a written order is passed by the Collector and possession is taken with permission. Furthermore, the authority possesses locus poenitentiae to recall an unexecuted order. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vested legal right is created in State land without a written order passed by the Collector under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Does a competent authority possess the power to recall an unexecuted order or approval under the principle of locus poenitentiae?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained to enforce a disputed contractual obligation regarding State land leasehold rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamaun vs The Secretary, Education, Punjab Government, Lahore1981 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  constitutional petitionleave to appealnationalization of educational institutionsfundamental rightslocus standiexecutive assurance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Christian social worker, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition and review petition by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner had challenged the posting of a non-Christian Headmaster at Sacred Heart Cathedral High School and the supersession of certain Christian teachers following the nationalization of Christian educational institutions under Martial Law Regulation No. 118. He relied on an unsigned note of an interview with the President of Pakistan and a Law Department opinion, invoking fundamental rights to manage minority institutions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that executive assurances outside the law lack statutory force and cannot be enforced through court process, and that there is no fundamental right regarding the posting, transfer, or promotion of public servants. Furthermore, a social worker lacks standing to challenge service matters affecting others not party to the proceedings. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing principles regarding the enforceability of executive assurances and standing in service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does an assurance held out by the Executive outside the four corners of the law have the force of law or bind the courts?
  • Can a social worker maintain a constitutional petition challenging the posting, transfer, or promotion of employees in an institution where they are not employed?
  • Is there a fundamental right with regard to the posting, transfer, or promotion of a headmaster in a nationalized educational institution?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamas Ud Din vs Settlement Authorities through Chief Settlement1981 SCMR 746 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-14
  settlement lawremand orderconstitutional jurisdictionfactual findingsChief Settlement Commissionerland transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to land transfer based on the filing of a specific claim form (Form No. 9373). The High Court had previously remanded the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner with a specific direction to determine the true filer of the form and transfer the land accordingly. Upon remand, the Chief Settlement Commissioner determined that the respondent (Nizam Din) had filed the form but proceeded to transfer the land to the petitioner (Shamas-ud-Din) based on extraneous considerations. The High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, set aside this transfer, holding that the Commissioner was bound by the earlier remand order. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that factual findings by the Settlement Commissioner are binding and that the Commissioner is legally obligated to strictly comply with remand directions. The Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 199 to quash an order that violated its previous mandate, as there was no misreading of evidence or legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Is a factual finding made by a Chief Settlement Commissioner binding on the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a subordinate authority have the discretion to deviate from the specific directions contained in a High Court remand order?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash an order of a Settlement Commissioner that violates a previous remand direction?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakir Ali Khan and Others vs Tauhid Ahmad Khan Etc.S1981 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-15
  mandatory injunctionadditional evidencejudicial discretionwrit jurisdictioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for mandatory injunction filed by the petitioners seeking the removal of walls obstructing a passage. During the final arguments, the petitioners applied to produce additional evidence in the form of a site plan that had been annexed to the plaint but not formally proved during the trial. The trial court rejected this application, noting that another plan had already been exhibited. The petitioners challenged this rejection through a revision petition before the District Judge, which was dismissed, and subsequently filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which was also dismissed. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the production of additional evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision was a discretionary matter under the Code of Civil Procedure, and since there was no lack of lawful authority, the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, establishing that the production of additional evidence is not a right but a matter of judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Is the production of additional evidence a matter of right or judicial discretion under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a High Court interfere in a writ petition against an order of a civil court regarding the production of additional evidence where no lack of lawful authority is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Shailaja vs Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector1981 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-07
  land acquisitionconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealawardmeasurementsHyderabad Development Authority Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed her constitutional petition challenging the acquisition of her land in Hyderabad City. The core legal questions involved whether the land acquisition proceedings were vitiated due to alleged non-compliance with Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and whether the land ought to have been acquired under the Hyderabad Development Authority Act instead. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice suffered from the manner of land measurement and noted that possession had already been taken and storage tanks constructed on the disputed land. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant leave to appeal, affirming that discretionary constitutional relief is unwarranted where physical possession has changed and development has been completed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether non-compliance with procedural rules regarding land measurement vitiates land acquisition proceedings without proof of prejudice?
  • Whether land required for an authority must exclusively be acquired under its specific development act rather than the general Land Acquisition Act?
  • Does the completion of construction and taking over of possession preclude discretionary constitutional interference against land acquisition?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahsawar (Represented by His Heirs) vs Syed Najamul Hassan Etc.S1981 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-30
  amendment of plaintjudicial admissioninheritanceShia lawbona fideappellate stage amendmentpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, representing the original plaintiffs, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that disallowed an amendment to their plaint. The plaintiffs had originally sued for a share in land inheritance, conceding in their pleadings that a certain individual, Mst. Janat Bibi, was the daughter of the propositus, Ahmad Shah. After the trial court dismissed the suit based on Shia inheritance law—finding the plaintiffs were distant kindred excluded by the daughter—the plaintiffs sought to amend their plaint at the appellate stage to deny Mst. Janat Bibi’s parentage. The Supreme Court observed that the plaintiffs had previously admitted her parentage in both the original plaint and a related cross-suit. The Court found the proposed amendment lacked bona fides, noting the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence or specific sources for their new, contradictory stance after seven years of litigation. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that an amendment changing the fundamental factual basis of a case, particularly when lacking good faith and contradicting prior judicial admissions, should not be permitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party amend their plaint to introduce a plea that contradicts their previous judicial admissions?
  • Is an amendment to a plaint permissible if it is not bona fide and intended to prolong litigation?
  • Can a court deny an amendment to a plaint at the appellate stage if it fundamentally alters the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahro Khan and Others vs Board of Revenue, Punjab and, Another1981 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  State land leasetemporary cultivationColonization of Government Lands ActGovernment Grants Actlocus standiMartial Law Regulation 115
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for leave to appeal directed against judgments of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioners' writ petitions. The petitioners, who were previous yearly lessees of State land for temporary cultivation in District Muzaffargarh, claimed a right to the continued allotment or lease of such lands either on a tender basis or under a notified fifteen-year lease scheme. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners possessed a legally enforceable right to obtain State land leases and whether paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 applied to expired temporary State land tenancies. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had no vested right to demand fresh leases of State land, as the governing conditions granted absolute discretion to the Government, and that the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895, rendered the terms of such grants effective notwithstanding any contrary law. Consequently, the petitioners, having ceased to be tenants upon the expiry of their leases, lacked the locus standi to maintain the writ petitions, leading to the dismissal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Do tenants holding State land on a yearly tender basis possess a legal right to demand the renewal or grant of a fresh lease?
  • Does the Government retain absolute discretion in the selection of lessees for State agricultural land under the Colonization of Government Lands Act?
  • Does paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 apply to temporary State land tenants whose leases have expired?
  • What is the effect of section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, on conditions and limitations contained in a grant of land by the Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs Lahore Municipal Corporation1981 PLD Supreme Court 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-30
  civil proceduredismissal for want of evidencedecree-sheetcertified copycompetency of appealres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's suit for a permanent injunction under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to repeated failure to produce evidence. The petitioner's subsequent appeal before the District Judge was dismissed on the ground that it was not accompanied by a certified copy of the decree-sheet as required by Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code. The High Court upheld this dismissal in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that a dismissal under Order XVII Rule 3 was merely an order and not a judgment requiring a decree-sheet. The Supreme Court held that a decision under Order XVII Rule 3 is an adjudication on the merits that conclusively determines the rights of the parties, operating as res judicata, and thus constitutes a decree under Section 2(2) of the Code. Consequently, an appeal against such a decision is incompetent without a certified copy of the decree-sheet. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing a suit under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitutes a decree requiring a certified copy to be filed with an appeal?
  • Does a dismissal under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 operate as res judicata between the parties?
  • Is an appeal competent under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if it is filed without a certified copy of the decree-sheet?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Zulfiqar vs The State and Another1981 SCMR 893(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-02
  sapurdariinterim custodyvehicle seizurepossessionownership disputeCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court regarding the interim custody (sapurdari) of a truck. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting custody of the vehicle to the respondent, who was in possession of the truck at the time it was seized by the police, despite the petitioner's claim of ownership. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was consistent with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reasoned that since the petitioner conceded the respondent was in possession of the vehicle at the time of police seizure and acknowledged that the vehicle had frequently changed hands, there was no legal justification to interfere with the High Court's decision. The principle laid down is that under Section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the party in possession of property at the time of its seizure by the police is eligible to retain its custody pending the establishment of a better right or title by another claimant.

  Questions settled

  • Is the person in possession of a vehicle at the time of its seizure by the police eligible for its interim custody (sapurdari) under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a claim of ownership automatically entitle a party to the interim custody of a vehicle if they were not in possession at the time of seizure?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Wali Muhammad vs Shahnaz Naseem and Other1981 SCMR 902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-04
  custody of minorwelfare of minorwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsguardianshippaternal grandfathercustody agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld concurrent findings by the Guardian Judge and the appellate court granting custody of a minor child to his mother, the respondent. The petitioner, the paternal grandfather, sought custody based on his superior financial means and a prior written agreement with the respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its limited constitutional jurisdiction by refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the minor's welfare and the respondent's fitness. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error of law in the High Court's order. The Court affirmed that financial means are only one factor in determining the welfare of a minor and that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are generally immune from interference in writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the minor's prolonged stay with the grandfather during litigation created a new right to custody, emphasizing that the welfare of the minor remains the paramount consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the welfare of a minor subject to interference in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a prior written agreement between parents regarding child custody override the court's determination of the minor's welfare?
  • Can a party rely on the duration of a stay order obtained during litigation to argue for the continued custody of a minor?
  • Is the financial status of a claimant the sole determining factor in deciding the custody of a minor?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Riaz vs Mst. Nasim Akhtar and Other1981 SCMR 979(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-18
  leave to appealevictionbona fide requirementpersonal requirementurban area propertyrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a second appeal filed by respondent-landlords and passed an eviction order against the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, reversing the First Appellate Court's decision. The core legal questions involve whether mere ownership of other property in the same urban area by a landlord bars an eviction claim, and whether the respondents' witnesses failed to depose regarding personal requirement. The Supreme Court held that mere ownership of other property in the same urban area is not by itself a ground to refuse an eviction application on the ground of personal requirement, and dismissed the petition due to a failure to place copies of witness depositions on record to substantiate the petitioner's claims. The key principle laid down is that a landlord's ownership of other property in an urban area does not automatically negate their bona fide personal requirement for evicting a tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Is mere ownership of property in the same urban area by a landlord sufficient ground to refuse an eviction application based on personal requirement?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the appreciation of evidence regarding bona fide requirement without placing copies of witness depositions on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Fazal Karim vs Settlement & Rhabilitation Commissioner and 31981 SCMR 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-24
  Settlement Schemeproperty transferclaimant displaced personSettlement Commissioneravailable propertyjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a shop under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The petitioner, a local, sought the transfer of a shop in his possession, which the Settlement Commissioner had previously transferred to respondent No. 4, a claimant displaced person, by treating the petitioner's shop and respondent No. 4's shop as a single unit. The petitioner challenged this finding, alleging that the successor Settlement Commissioner's decision was contrary to the record and that the revision had been improperly reheard. The Supreme Court addressed whether the Settlement Commissioner's finding regarding the property being a single unit could be challenged and whether the property remained available for transfer to the petitioner. The Court held that the order of the Settlement Commissioner was within jurisdiction. Furthermore, because the property had already been transferred to the respondent for over twelve years, there was no available property for transfer to the petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VII. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that a validly transferred property cannot be re-transferred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property already transferred to a claimant displaced person be transferred to a local under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to determine whether two shops constitute a single unit for transfer purposes?
  • Can a court interfere with a transfer order that has remained in effect for over twelve years?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Abdul Aziz 7 and Others vs Kh. Hasan Joo and 5 Otaers Resp9ndents1981 SCMR 924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-09
  ejectmentbona fide requirementreconstructionpersonal usemutually destructive pleasrent restrictiontenant eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the tenants' Second Appeal from Order in a rent case. The landlords filed an ejectment application against the tenant petitioners on the grounds of default in payment of rent, bona fide requirement for reconstruction, and personal use. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge accepted the landlords' appeal and reversed the findings. The High Court held that no wilful default was committed, but upheld the finding regarding bona fide need for reconstruction and personal use. The core legal questions relate to whether the pleas of personal use and reconstruction are mutually destructive, and whether sufficient evidence existed to prove bona fides for reconstruction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the pleas of personal use and reconstruction are not mutually destructive, and that obtaining an approved site plan alongside the statutory safeguards under the rent law demonstrates the bona fides of the landlord's intention to reconstruct.

  Questions settled

  • Are the pleas of personal use and reconstruction mutually destructive in ejectment proceedings?
  • Does the production of an approved site plan sufficiently establish the bona fides of a landlord's intention to reconstruct?
  • What statutory safeguards and guarantees ensure a landlord reconstructs the premises after obtaining eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior Vice President (G. M.), National Bank of Pakistan, Zonal Office, Lahore vs Muhammad Javed Khan and 2 Other1981 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-12
  industrial relationsgrievance noticelimitation periodguaranteed rightsremand of caselabour courtspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the National Bank of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal's order dismissing a junior clerk's application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969. The respondent employee claimed ad hoc relief and special pay benefits, but the Appellate Tribunal had dismissed his claim solely on the ground of limitation without addressing the merits. The High Court held the grievance notice and petition were within time and further ruled on the merits of the claim. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and held that the grievance notice was not time-barred on the facts of the case, but found merit in the petitioner's contention that neither the Appellate Tribunal nor the High Court had properly addressed the core statutory requirement under section 25-A(1) as to whether the claimed benefits were guaranteed or secured by law, award, or settlement. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal for decision on merits in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 is barred by time when the employer's refusal was communicated via a general head office advice rather than a direct communication to the employee?
  • Does the limitation period for approaching a Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 run from the date of the original refusal or from the final response to the employee's grievance?
  • Whether the High Court, upon setting aside an appellate tribunal's order on a preliminary point of limitation, should remand the case for a decision on merits rather than deciding the merits itself without addressing specific statutory objections?
  Read full judgment →
• Sarwar Hussain vs Ghulam Qadir1981 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-06
  ejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshipconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealUrban Rent Restriction Ordinancedenial of titledefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The landlord filed an ejectment application alleging default in rent payment and unauthorised material alterations. The tenant denied the landlord-tenant relationship and claimed ownership over the premises. The Rent Controller evaluated documentary evidence proving the landlord's title by purchase from a lawful allottee, alongside oral testimony establishing tenancy, while noting contradictions in the tenant's own evidence regarding construction of the premises. Finding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and default, the Rent Controller ordered ejectment. This decision was upheld in first appeal by the District Judge and in second appeal by the Lahore High Court, both affirming the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was no valid reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by all three lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship established by lower forums?
  • Does a tenant's failure to produce satisfactory evidence of ownership prevent them from denying the landlord-tenant relationship established by documentary and oral evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sarhad Flour Mills Ltd. vs Punjab Flour Milling Corporation and Other1981 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-24
  interim orderstay of recoverybank guaranteedenationalisationdiscretion of High Courtwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court, which stayed the recovery of a sum of money from the petitioner subject to the furnishing of a bank guarantee. The petitioner, the Sarhad Flour Mills Limited, was nationalised under the Flour Milling Control and Development Act, 1976, and subsequently denationalised in September 1977 under the Flour Milling (Repeal) Ordinance, 1977. Following a notice to pay valuation dues, the petitioner challenged the recovery proceedings through a constitutional writ petition before the High Court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's discretion in conditioning the interim stay order on the furnishing of a bank guarantee rather than a simpler security, given the petitioner's financial losses. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of terms for interim relief falls within the discretionary domain of the High Court and that the requirement of a bank guarantee was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The petition was accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with the reasonable exercise of discretion by the High Court in granting conditional interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can condition an interim stay order on the furnishing of a bank guarantee?
  • Does the imposition of a bank guarantee for an interim stay constitute an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of discretion?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary terms imposed by the High Court for granting interim relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad vs Deputy Administrator, Residual Property and Another1981 SCMR738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  petition for leave to appealevacuee propertyunclean handsPermanent Transfer Deedfraudulent transferwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a disputed godown in Rawalpindi. The petitioner's initial claim was rejected and ordered to be auctioned in 1961, which decision attained finality when the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's leave petition in 1972. Notwithstanding this, the property was subsequently transferred to the petitioner's son and later to the petitioner via a deed of association and a Permanent Transfer Deed in 1973. Following eviction proceedings against the second respondent, notice was issued by the Deputy Administrator under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's ensuing writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner approached the court with unclean hands by failing to disclose that his son had obtained the property while his own appeal was pending, constituting a device to circumvent the court's prior orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while clarifying the petitioner's right to appear before the first respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who conceals material facts and approaches the court with unclean hands is entitled to discretionary relief under writ jurisdiction?
  • What is the proper construction of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Can a transfer obtained through a deed of association be challenged on the ground of fraud when prior claims over the property were conclusively dismissed by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan vs Raja Gul Zaman Khan and Other1981 SCMR 375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  settlement of landadministrative orderauction saleappellate jurisdictionreview jurisdictiondisplaced personswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the disposal of land in Rawalpindi, previously allotted to the appellant. The land was subsequently auctioned to respondent 1, an action confirmed administratively by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The appellant challenged this auction, and the same Additional Settlement Commissioner, acting in an appellate capacity, set aside the auction, finding the land was not available for transfer. The High Court, in a constitutional petition, held that this appellate order constituted an impermissible review of the Commissioner's own earlier administrative confirmation, rendering the order without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the initial confirmation of an auction is purely an administrative act, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. Consequently, the Commissioner was not disqualified from exercising appellate jurisdiction to correct the illegal disposal of land. The Supreme Court clarified that an administrative approval of an auction does not bar the same officer from later adjudicating the validity of that auction on appeal, as such an act does not constitute a review of a judicial order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the confirmation of an auction by an Additional Settlement Commissioner an administrative or a judicial order?
  • Can an officer who administratively approves an auction later hear an appeal against that same auction?
  • Does an appellate order setting aside an auction constitute a review of the officer's own previous administrative confirmation?
  • Is an auction of land valid if the property was not legally available for transfer at the time of the auction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Alias Dara and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-12
  sudden fightappreciation of evidenceculpable homicideself-defenceocular evidencespecial leave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two Criminal Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal arising from a murder case. The petitioners in the first petition challenged their conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, while the petitioner in the second petition challenged the acquittal of the accused from a charge of murder. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the prosecution's failure to explain injuries sustained by the accused during a sudden fight, and whether the plea of self-defence was applicable. The Supreme Court held that the case turned purely on the appreciation of evidence, which had been thoroughly examined by the lower courts. The Court affirmed the findings that the occurrence was a sudden fight without premeditation, and that the prosecution's failure to explain the accused's injury did not necessitate acquittal where other evidence was sufficient. The Court reiterated that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a violation of a legal principle was demonstrated. Consequently, both petitions were dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the accused during a sudden fight automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a criminal appeal?
  • Is a plea of self-defence available in a case of a sudden fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Khan and 2 Others vs Raja Khan and Another1981 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  civil court jurisdictionadverse possessionlandlord and tenantrevenue court jurisdictionplaint avermentspossession of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a challenge to a civil court decree granting possession of agricultural land. The petitioners argued that the suit for possession of agricultural land fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of revenue courts, asserting that the civil court lacked jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted by the nature of the dispute, specifically regarding the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant. The Supreme Court held that the civil court retained jurisdiction because the plaintiff's plaint explicitly averred that the petitioners were claiming adverse possession, rather than merely being tenants. The Court clarified that the ouster of civil court jurisdiction requires an agreed position between parties regarding a landlord-tenant relationship. Since the petitioners denied the tenancy and claimed adverse possession, the civil court was the appropriate forum to adjudicate the validity of that claim. The petition was dismissed as the legal basis for challenging the civil court's jurisdiction was unfounded.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court lose jurisdiction over a suit for possession of land if the defendants claim adverse possession?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a civil court ousted in a suit involving agricultural land when the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied by the defendants?
  • Should the jurisdiction of a court be determined solely by the averments in the plaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Ahmad Khan vs Aslee Khan and 7 Other1981 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-19
  writ jurisdictionadministrative lawland disputeChitralJudicial Counciladministrative discretionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment concerning land ownership disputes in the former State of Chitral. The petitioner contested the Deputy Commissioner's order, which partially deviated from the Judicial Council's advisory reports, arguing that the Deputy Commissioner acted arbitrarily in reallocating certain land plots. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to decide these disputes and whether his administrative order was subject to interference under writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Commissioner, acting on behalf of the Provincial Government following the merger of Chitral, held the primary authority to adjudicate the disputes, while the Judicial Council served only an advisory role. The Court found the Deputy Commissioner’s decision equitable and proper, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of law. The Court affirmed that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to sit in appeal over administrative decisions where no legal provision has been violated, and that advisory reports do not bind the final decision-making authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court exercise writ jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the merits of an administrative decision?
  • Does an advisory body's report bind the administrative authority that commissioned it?
  • Is an administrative decision made by a Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Provincial Government subject to interference without proof of legal violation?
  Read full judgment →
• Saqlain vs Mst. Hazra Begum and 2 Other1981 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-10
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIrevisional jurisdictiondelegated legislationultra vireslocus standiwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over evacuee property in Sibi. The petitioner claimed that the property comprised two separate houses (Nos. 1155 and 1155-A) and obtained a transfer order for House No. 1155-A from the Assistant Settlement Commissioner under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The respondents, who asserted the property was a single indivisible unit, successfully challenged this order in revision before the Settlement Commissioner. The petitioner's subsequent writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the property was divisible and whether the revision before the Settlement Commissioner was competent. The Court held that the determination of whether the property was one unit or two was a question of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities. Furthermore, the Court declared paragraph 5(3) of the revised Settlement Scheme No. VII ultra vires, ruling that the delegated power to frame schemes for the 'transfer' of property under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 did not authorize the creation of separate appellate or revisional forums that override the statutory provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who failed to object to the jurisdiction of a tribunal during its proceedings challenge that jurisdiction for the first time in a writ petition?
  • Does the power delegated to the Chief Settlement Commissioner to prepare schemes for the 'transfer' of property under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include the power to prescribe separate appellate or revisional mechanisms?
  • Is a finding by Settlement authorities on whether an evacuee property constitutes a single indivisible unit or multiple separate units a question of fact immune from interference under constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah and Others vs Kamal Din1981 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-25
  review petitionwithdrawal of petitioncounsel's authorityerror apparent on the face of the recordlegal representationSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed a petition for leave to appeal as 'not pressed' following a statement made by the petitioners' counsel. The petitioners sought review on the grounds that their counsel had withdrawn the petition without their consent despite having been paid full fees, and that the original petition involved significant legal questions warranting admission. The Supreme Court examined whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record justifying a review. The Court held that the dismissal order was based on the explicit statement made by the petitioners' counsel during the hearing. Consequently, the Court determined that any potential error lay solely in the statement made by the counsel, not in the judicial order itself. The Court affirmed that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, as the order correctly reflected the proceedings at the time, and therefore dismissed the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek review of an order dismissing a petition as 'not pressed' on the grounds that their counsel acted without consent?
  • Does a statement made by counsel in open court binding the client constitute an error apparent on the face of the record for review purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Saldera vs Muhammad Yar and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-25
  condonation of delaycriminal petitionacquittallimitationcapital offenceright to lifespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the convictions and sentences of the respondents under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether a delay of 38 days in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal or setting aside of a capital conviction can be condoned on grounds of the petitioner's old age, illness, and lack of awareness of the judgment date. The Supreme Court held that delay in filing such petitions by a private complainant will not be condoned unless the petitioner was kept out of knowledge or prevented by some act of the respondents themselves. The Court emphasized that an acquittal creates a precious right to life, protecting the accused from being placed in jeopardy of life through a time-barred petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine as barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned on the ground of the petitioner's old age and lack of awareness of the judgment?
  • Is a time-barred petition seeking to challenge an acquittal or setting aside of a capital conviction maintainable without showing prevention by an act of the respondent?
  • How strictly should the law of limitation be applied when a petition places an accused person's life in peril following an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Jafri, Advocate And Sh. A. Karim, vs The Income-Tax Appellate1981S C M R 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-07
  sales tax liabilityginning millwholesaler licenseestatutory interpretationtax assessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a ginning mill owner, challenged the imposition of sales tax by the Sales Tax Officer for a period during which the mill was allegedly leased to a business concern, Messrs Karachi Cotton Ginners, Lyallpur. While the Appellate Assistant Commissioner initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal subsequently reversed this decision. The petitioner's application for a reference to the High Court was rejected, and the High Court later decided the question of liability against the petitioner. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner abandoned the lease argument, instead contending that even if the petitioner ginned cotton under contract for the licensee, the untraceability of the licensee did not automatically shift the tax liability to the petitioner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the case involves the proper construction of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, specifically regarding the liability of a ginner versus a wholesaler licensee when the latter is untraceable. The Court identified the matter as one of first impression requiring judicial examination of the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a ginner is liable to pay sales tax under the Sales Tax Act 1951 when the wholesaler licensee is untraceable?
  • Does the mere untraceability of a licensed wholesaler shift the burden of sales tax liability to the ginner under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Saiyid Iqbal Hassan vs The State1981 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-16
  expunction of remarksjudicial conductsuo motu revisioncoordinate jurisdictionjudicial officerSection 561-A CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Judicial Officer, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which aimed to expunge adverse judicial remarks made against him. The petitioner had initiated suo motu criminal revision proceedings regarding the dismissal of complaints by a Magistrate, despite the fact that another Additional Sessions Judge had already adjudicated upon the same matter. The High Court had criticized the petitioner for acting without jurisdiction and for issuing non-bailable warrants against parties in a matter already disposed of by a court of coordinate jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to expunge these remarks given the petitioner's claim of bona fide action. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, as a judicial officer, had sufficient information to ascertain that the matter was already pending or disposed of elsewhere. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to expunge the remarks, holding that a judicial officer bears personal responsibility for ensuring jurisdiction is not exercised over matters already settled by coordinate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judicial officer seek expunction of adverse remarks under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the remarks were based on a finding of lack of jurisdiction?
  • Does a judicial officer have a duty to verify if a matter is already pending or disposed of by a court of coordinate jurisdiction before initiating suo motu proceedings?
  • Is a judicial officer absolved of responsibility for improper proceedings if the error was facilitated by the conduct of subordinate staff?
  Read full judgment →
• Saidullah and 6 Others vs Rehmat Ali and Another1981 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-14
  criminal revisioncognizance of offenceprocedural irregularitycomplaint dismissalmurder caseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a criminal revision petition arising from the dismissal of a complaint in a murder case and directed the trial court to proceed with the matter. The petitioners challenged the High Court's order primarily on procedural grounds, alleging that the complaint was lodged directly in the Court of Sessions in violation of Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the complaint was improperly addressed to the Sessions Court rather than the Magistrate. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complaint had, in fact, been initially lodged before a Magistrate, rendering the procedural objection regarding cognizance moot. Regarding the technical defect in the complaint's heading, the Court held that such a formal error is curable and does not invalidate the proceedings, as the court seized of the matter can direct the complainant to amend the description. The Court further clarified that observations made by the High Court in its order were tentative and would not prejudice the trial court's independent assessment of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a technical error in the heading of a complaint regarding the court's designation invalidate the proceedings?
  • Can a court direct a complainant to amend the description of the court in a complaint to correct a formal error?
  • Are observations made by a High Court in a revision order binding on the trial court during the subsequent trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Meer vs Ibadat Hussain and Another1981 SCMR 1105(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-03
  post-arrest bailmurdercross-injuriesleave to appealdiscretion of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 3-3-1980, whereby bail was granted to the respondent accused of murder. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail in a case involving cross-injuries where the respondent was attributed the fatal blow, and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the petition has no force and dismissed it, declining to interfere with the High Court's order as all relevant facts and considerations, including the number and nature of injuries on both sides and the background of the occurrence, were duly noted by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary exercise of bail by the High Court when all relevant facts and cross-injuries have been properly considered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting post-arrest bail where cross-injuries are involved?
  • Is bail to be refused solely on the ground that the accused is attributed the fatal blow in a case of mutual injuries?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Ahmad vs Zammured Hussain and 4 Other1981 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-18
  acquittalpetition for leave to appealunexplained injuries on accusedinjured eye-witnessessuppression of material factsself-defensenon-examination of independent witnessesocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the acquittal of four respondents in a murder case. The respondents were accused of inflicting deadly injuries on the deceased and two prosecution witnesses following a land dispute over a well. The defense pleaded self-defense, pointing out that two respondents and their female relative sustained unexplained injuries during the occurrence. The trial court rejected the ocular evidence because the injured eye-witnesses were interested and failed to explain the injuries on the accused side, a finding affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the medical evidence and held that the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the accused side, coupled with the non-examination of independent eye-witnesses mentioned in the FIR, indicated that the injured witnesses suppressed material facts. Consequently, the presence of injuries on prosecution witnesses did not automatically guarantee their veracity. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a prosecution witness is injured guarantee the truthfulness of their testimony if they fail to explain injuries on the accused side?
  • Whether the prosecution's failure to explain injuries sustained by the accused and their relative in the same occurrence creates a strong circumstance in favor of the defense?
  • What is the effect of withholding independent eye-witnesses named in the FIR from testifying at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad vs The State1981 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-29
  bail cancellationinvestigation reportfurther inquirypolice challanColumn 2pre-trial bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a High Court order that cancelled his bail in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 326, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been granted bail by the Additional Sessions Judge because multiple investigating agencies had found him innocent and placed his name in Column 2 of the police challan. The High Court subsequently cancelled the bail, relying on witness statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court, referencing established precedents, held that while the opinions of investigating officers do not constitute legal evidence, they are relevant to assessing the veracity of the prosecution's case. Given that four separate agencies found the petitioner innocent and he had not abused the concession of bail for over a year, the Court ruled the High Court's cancellation unjustified. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the bail was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the opinion of investigating officers finding an accused innocent constitutes a valid ground for granting bail?
  • Does the existence of witness statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically necessitate the cancellation of bail when multiple investigating agencies have found the accused innocent?
  • Is the cancellation of bail justified when an accused has not abused the concession of bail for a significant period?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad Khan and Another vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1981 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  constitutional petitionspecial leave to appealsettlement authoritiesclassification of landagricultural landbuilding sitejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the departmental authorities. The core legal question addressed is whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities possess the jurisdiction to declare and treat a particular piece of land, specifically Khasra No. 701, as a building site rather than agricultural land. The Supreme Court held that the authorities indeed have the jurisdiction to determine the nature of the land, and consequently, their decision cannot be termed as being without lawful authority, rendering the High Court's refusal to interfere unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations regarding the classification of land by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities fall within their competent jurisdiction and are not liable to constitutional interference unless shown to be without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities have the jurisdiction to declare land as a building site instead of agricultural land?
  • Can the High Court interfere under constitutional jurisdiction with a factual determination made by the Settlement Authorities regarding the nature of land?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Afimad Khan and Another vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1981 SCMR 970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  Settlement and Rehabilitation Authoritiesland classificationconstitutional petitionjurisdiction of authoritiesagricultural landbuilding site
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition regarding the classification of a specific plot of land. The petitioners sought the transfer of land bearing Khasra No. 701, contending that it should be classified as agricultural land rather than a building site. The core legal question was whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities possessed the jurisdiction to determine the nature of the land and whether their classification of the property as a building site was subject to judicial interference. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The Court affirmed that Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities have the requisite jurisdiction to declare and treat land as a building site. Consequently, the Court ruled that an order issued by these authorities within their jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be without lawful authority, and the High Court's refusal to interfere with such a determination was legally sound and free from error.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities have the jurisdiction to determine whether a piece of land is agricultural or a building site?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a decision of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities regarding land classification if the authorities acted within their jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Mohy Ud Din vs Secretary, District Allotment Committeeand1981 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25
  Inter Court Appealpetition for leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitationgood faithprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the High Court holding an Inter Court Appeal to be incompetent. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent Inter Court Appeal can be condoned as sufficient cause under the law of limitation to file a petition for leave to appeal against the original single bench order, when a binding precedent already existed declaring such appeals incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal is time-barred by 51 days and that the time spent on the incompetent appeal cannot be condoned, as the prior existence of the precedent negates the claim of acting in good faith. The petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent pursuing an incompetent Inter Court Appeal can constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the existence of a prior reported precedent preclude a party from claiming good faith in pursuing a mistaken legal remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Hussain vs LT. Col.. (Retd) Muhammad Sharif1981 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-21
  personal needevictionrented premisesgood faithnon-residential buildingleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, which ordered his eviction from a bungalow in Faisalabad. The landlord had sought eviction on the grounds of personal need for himself and his children. The petitioner argued that the landlord had acquired other accommodation during the proceedings, rendering the eviction unnecessary, and that the landlord's claim lacked good faith due to the timing of the application. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the premises were rented for both residential and commercial purposes, thus requiring a specific type of eviction ground. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly determined the factual issue of the landlord's need and the suitability of the accommodation. The Court further ruled that the petitioner could not raise the plea regarding the nature of the building (residential versus non-residential) for the first time at the Supreme Court level, as it required factual inquiry and was not pleaded in the written statement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant raise a plea that a building is 'non-residential' for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal if it was not pleaded in the written statement?
  • Does the acquisition of other accommodation by a landlord during appellate proceedings automatically necessitate a remand for reassessment of personal need?
  • What constitutes a 'non-residential building' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Saad Shibli and State vs The State and Another Puttan and Other (a)1981 PLD Supreme Court 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  withdrawal from prosecutionpublic prosecutorconsent of the courtjudicial discretionpublic policycriminal procedureexecutive instructions
  Summary & questions settled

  These two criminal appeals by special leave concern the governing principles applicable to the grant of consent by a court under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, allowing a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution. The core legal questions addressed the breadth of the Public Prosecutor's power of withdrawal, the extent to which instructions from the Executive or Government may be acted upon, and the judicial discretion required of the court in granting or refusing consent. The Supreme Court held that while the Public Prosecutor may act upon instructions from the Government or District Magistrate in a hierarchical administrative setup, the court must independently apply its judicial discretion to objective grounds—such as public policy, public peace, or the administration of justice—rather than acting as a mere rubber stamp or allowing the executive to preempt the judicial process. Applying these principles, the Court dismissed the appeal in the first case where withdrawal was sought on personal grounds and insufficient evidence without justification, but allowed the appeal in the second case where the mass prosecution arose from nationwide election disturbances in March 1977 and withdrawal served a legitimate public policy of ending acrimony and restoring societal harmony.

  Questions settled

  • What are the governing principles applicable to the grant of consent by a court under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the withdrawal from prosecution?
  • Can a Public Prosecutor act upon instructions from the Government or District Magistrate when moving an application to withdraw from prosecution?
  • Does the power of withdrawal under section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the disclosure of objective grounds related to public policy, public peace, or the administration of justice?
  • Is a court justified in refusing consent to withdraw from prosecution when the grounds relied upon by the executive merely attempt to preempt the judicial process without furthering justice?
  Read full judgment →
• S.H.M. Rizvi And 5 Other vs Maqsood Ahmad and 6 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-29
  service appealseniority listfinal orderjurisdiction of service tribunalprovisional senioritycivil servantdepartmental remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the competence of a service appeal filed before the Service Tribunal regarding a seniority list. The appellants challenged the respondent's decision to approach the Service Tribunal against a seniority list that was explicitly provisional and pending the disposal of objections. The core legal question was whether such a provisional list constitutes a 'final order' under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, thereby vesting the Tribunal with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was incompetent. The Court ruled that a seniority list inviting objections, which remains unfinalized, does not constitute a 'final order' determining the rights of the parties. Consequently, the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate until a final, determinative order is passed by the departmental authority. The Court established that where departmental authorities fail to finalize such lists, the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved civil servant is to represent the matter to the next higher authority or seek constitutional relief, rather than prematurely invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provisional seniority list, against which objections are pending, constitute a 'final order' under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Can a civil servant file an appeal before the Service Tribunal against a seniority list before the departmental authority has finalized it?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a civil servant when departmental authorities fail to dispose of objections to a provisional seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Roora and Another vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan & Bahawalpur Division and Anothres1981 SCMR 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-02
  settlement lawtransfer of propertyresidential housebuilding sitepermanent transfer deedwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition regarding the transfer of property. The relevant facts indicate that the property was transferred as a house by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to the predecessors of respondent No. 2, against which the petitioners subsequently claimed it was a plot with their own constructions under Settlement Scheme No. VI. Following protracted litigation and remands, the Settlement Commissioner examined the entire record and held that the property was a residential house and that there was no proof the petitioners constructed the rooms thereon, thereby upholding the transfer. The High Court affirmed this finding, noting that the petitioners only raised the dispute long after the issuance of the Permanent Transfer Deed and failed to establish their claims. The Supreme Court considered whether the property was a house or a building site and whether the construction was raised by the petitioners. Holding that the ultimate settlement authority and the High Court examined the facts in detail and properly determined the property to be a house, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that concurrent factual findings on settlement matters warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property transferred as a residential house can be claimed by occupants as a building site over which they raised constructions?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed bar subsequent attempts to reopen settlement proceedings after the commencement of ejectment proceedings?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings of settlement authorities and the High Court regarding the nature of a transferred property?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Muhammad vs Muhammad Nasib and Another1981 S CM R 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-20
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActSettlement AuthoritiesProperty auctionFinding of factWrit jurisdictionApplication of mindLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the physical extent of a property transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, having purchased a shop through auction, claimed it consisted of two rooms, while the respondent, a displaced person in possession of the composite property, contended it was a single-room shop. The Settlement Authorities initially ruled in the petitioner's favor, but the High Court remanded the matter due to a lack of application of mind. Upon remand, the Settlement Commissioner determined the shop consisted of only one room, a finding upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding the property's description was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Settlement Commissioner's decision was based on sufficient evidence, including a site plan and auction records describing the shop as triangular. The Court affirmed that findings of fact supported by material on record are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction, reinforcing the finality of administrative determinations when properly reasoned.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner when such finding is supported by evidence on the record?
  • Does a site plan describing a property as a single triangular room constitute sufficient evidence to determine the extent of a shop auctioned under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner after remand legally valid if it demonstrates an application of mind to the evidence, unlike the previous order?
  Read full judgment →
• Resham Khan vs District Judge, Attock Ahd Other1981 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11
  pre-emption suitcourt-feeswrit petitionalternative remedyconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a pre-emption suit which was subjected to a deficiency in court-fees by the Civil Judge. During revision proceedings before the District Judge, a conditional offer of compromise led to the appointment of a local commission, which failed due to a lack of confidence expressed by the petitioner. The District Judge subsequently dismissed the suit based on statements of the vendor and the plaintiff. The petitioner challenged this dismissal through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition was maintainable and appropriate against the order of the District Court. The Supreme Court held that assuming a writ petition could lie against a subordinate court, a civil suit was a more appropriate and adequate remedy to challenge the impugned order in the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, declining to examine the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition is an appropriate remedy when an adequate remedy by way of a civil suit is available to challenge an order of a subordinate court?
  • Can a High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction when the petitioner has an alternative and more appropriate remedy available?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Shah Etc. vs Presiding Officer, Summary Military Court1981 SCMR 945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17
  review petitionunclean handsdiscretionary reliefwrit petitionmartial law regulationdoctrine of necessitypetrol adulteration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted by a Summary Military Court under Martial Law Regulation No. 30 for petrol adulteration, filed review petitions against the dismissal of their petitions for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. Their original writ petitions before the High Court and subsequent leave petitions challenged the constitutional validity of Martial Law Regulation No. 30 and the establishment of Military Courts under the Doctrine of Necessity. The Supreme Court had previously dismissed the leave petitions on the merits, finding that the petitioners had come to court with unclean hands as the prosecution had proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and left the constitutional questions open. In the review petitions, the counsel argued that failing to decide the important constitutional questions constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, relying on an Indian Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court held that the cited precedent was distinguishable as it arose from a civil suit rather than discretionary writ proceedings. The Court reaffirmed that discretionary writ relief can be withheld from petitioners with unclean hands, and consequently dismissed the review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal of a court to decide important constitutional questions when dismissing a writ petition on the ground of unclean hands constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • Is the discretionary relief of a writ petition available to a petitioner who approaches the court with unclean hands?
  • Do principles governing the necessity of deciding all vital issues in civil suits apply equally to discretionary constitutional writ jurisdictions?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Bibi 4 and Others vs Abdul Latif and 3 Othbrss1981 SCMR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  displaced persons land settlementexcess allotmentlegal heirsnecessary partyconstitutional jurisdictionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises out of a property dispute concerning excess land allotments under refugee rehabilitation laws, specifically involving proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The core legal question was whether orders passed in revision and subsequent remand proceedings without impleading or giving notice to the legal heirs of deceased allottees were lawful and sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that failure to implead and hear the legal heirs of the deceased original allottees in the revision petition rendered the subsequent orders without lawful authority, causing the entire superstructure of later proceedings to fall. The key principle laid down is that judicial or quasi-judicial orders affecting property rights passed without notice to or representation of necessary legal heirs of deceased parties are void ab initio and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed in revision without impleading the legal heirs of a deceased party is without lawful authority?
  • Does the failure to issue notice to legal heirs vitiate subsequent remand proceedings and orders?
  • Can an allotment cancellation order survive if foundational revisional proceedings were conducted without necessary parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali and Another vs Noor Muhammad1981 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-17
  pre-emption suitinstitution of suitpresentation of plaintjurisdictional valuationAhlmad authoritylimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent regarding a sale transaction dated 10-04-1969. Although the Civil Judge dismissed the suit, the District Judge accepted the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit, a decision subsequently affirmed by the High Court in second appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the suit was barred by limitation due to improper jurisdictional valuation and improper presentation of the plaint, as it was received by the Ahlmad while the Civil Judge was on tour. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions, noting that the jurisdictional valuation was within the competent limits of the trial court and that presentation to the Ahlmad was valid under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that under Order IV Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a plaint may be presented to an officer duly authorized by the court in its behalf. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plaint validly presented when received by an authorized Ahlmad in the judge's absence on tour?
  • Whether presentation of a plaint to an officer appointed by the court satisfies the requirements of suit institution under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Razak Dad: vs Province of the Punjab1981 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  service tribunalterminations of serviceappointing authoritytemporary employeepolice rulesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, initially appointed as a Machine-Man and later serving as a temporary Sub-Inspector, had his services terminated by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi. He challenged the termination through a civil suit which was initially decreed in his favor, but upon abatement, the matter went to the Punjab Services Tribunal, which set aside the civil court's decree. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arguing that the Inspector-General of Police was his appointing authority and that his termination by the Senior Superintendent of Police was without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether the Inspector-General of Police was indeed the appointing authority and whether the termination was legally competent. The Supreme Court held that the Inspector-General was not the appointing authority, as the relied-upon document was merely a directive to the Deputy Inspector-General to make the appointment, and that the Superintendent of Police was competent to terminate the service. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Inspector-General of Police is the appointing authority for a temporary Sub-Inspector when the initial communication is merely a directive to the Deputy Inspector-General to make the appointment?
  • Does rule 12.8 of the Police Rules apply to persons not appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the preceding rules?
  • Whether the Superintendent of Police is competent to terminate the services of a temporary Sub-Inspector?
  Read full judgment →
• Rasool Muhammad vs Sheraz Gul Alias Siraj FTC.1981 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-14
  sentence enhancementmurdermitigating circumstancessudden quarreldying statementcormpensationcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking the enhancement of a sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the respondent for murder to the death penalty. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in substituting the death sentence with imprisonment for life on the ground of mitigating circumstances arising from a sudden quarrel. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing and restored the dismissed petition, holding that the existence of mitigating circumstances is a question to be determined on the facts of each case, and that a sudden quarrel and underlying provocation can justify a lesser penalty. The Court laid down the principle that the presence of a sudden quarrel and ongoing agitation can constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the imposition of imprisonment for life rather than the death sentence for a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suddenness of an affair and an ongoing quarrel can be treated as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition where the delay is primarily attributable to the gross negligence of the Advocate-on-Record?
  • Is a single stab blow to a vital part of the body invariably a bar to the imposition of a lesser sentence when preceded by a sudden quarrel?
  Read full judgment →
• Rao Qadeer Khan vs THB State1981 PLD Supreme Court 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-26
  post-arrest bailabscondencefraudforgeryabuse of processdiscretionary reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in multiple cases involving fraud, forgery, and misappropriation. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to bail notwithstanding allegations of abscondence, conduct amounting to abuse of process, and the merits of the accusations. The Supreme Court held that the petitions must be dismissed, finding that the petitioner's prolonged abscondence and repeated attempts to abuse the process of law disentitled him to the discretionary relief of bail, regardless of whether the offences fell within the prohibitory clause. The key principle laid down is that proven abscondence and the abuse of court process through frivolous or repetitive bail applications independently disentitle an accused person from receiving pre-trial bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does prolonged abscondence disentitle an accused person to the concession of bail?
  • Whether repeated applications for anticipatory bail and subsequent absence amount to an abuse of the process of law and court?
  • Can an accused person claim bail as a matter of right despite conduct that disentitles them to discretionary relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Subhan Ali vs Ch. Ghulam Rasul and Other1981 SCMR 1121(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Rana Jahandad Khan vs Muhammad Hussain and 6 Other1981 SCMR 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  settlement schemedisplaced personsagricultural landghair mumkin abadileave to appealproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a dispute over a parcel of land measuring 1 kanal 10 marlas situated in Chak No. 54/2-L, Tehsil Okara, District Sahiwal, which was initially confirmed in the petitioner's favour as agricultural land. The core legal question is whether the disputed property qualified as 'land' under the relevant settlement laws or as urban property ('ghair mumkin abadi') subject to transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Lahore High Court held that the property was ghair mumkin abadi used for commercial or residential purposes and not for agricultural purposes, thereby setting aside the Settlement Commissioner's order and upholding its transfer to the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's finding of fact based on a correct appreciation of the record was unexceptionable, and rendered the initial agricultural allotment legally invalid as a bar against the respondents' transfer. The key principle laid down is that properties recorded as ghair mumkin abadi without evidence of agricultural use cannot be treated as agricultural land for settlement purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property recorded as ghair mumkin abadi without evidence of agricultural use can be classified as land for agricultural transfer under settlement laws?
  • Can an initial invalid allotment of property as agricultural land serve as a bar to the transfer of the property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Muhammad Nawaz vs Government of the Punjab1981 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-10
  locus poenitentiaeanimus revertendireversion of civil servantrelaxation of rulesprobationerrecall of appointment order
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, previously serving as a Section Officer in the Punjab Civil Secretariat, was appointed as an Extra Assistant Commissioner (E.A.C.) in the P.C.S. (Executive Branch) in relaxation of rules as a direct recruit. He accepted express conditions including surrendering prior service seniority. Subsequently, the Governor of the Punjab issued a notification reverting the appellant to his previous post of Section Officer. The Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed the appellant's appeal on the ground that he was on probation and could have been terminated without notice. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the original appointment was lawfully made by a competent authority in relaxation of rules. The Court held that the subsequent reversion was merely a recall of the earlier valid appointment order based on an erroneous assumption that it should not have been made. Applying the principles of *locus poenitentiae* and *animus revertendi*, the Court held that once an order is acted upon and conditions fulfilled, the authority cannot recall it. The appeal was allowed, and the reversion order declared unlawful.

  Questions settled

  • Can a competent authority recall a validly issued appointment order after the appointee has accepted its terms and fulfilled the underlying conditions?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the government from reverting a civil servant whose appointment was lawfully made in relaxation of rules?
  • Can a probationer's reversion be justified as a recall of an appointment order on the assumption that the original appointment should not have been made?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Hassan Akhtar and Others vs Akbar Khan and Other1981 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-20
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedjurisdiction of settlement authoritiesrepeal of lawscivil suitwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over a plot of evacuee property in Rawalpindi, originally transferred to the second respondent via a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, having purchased the plot from the second respondent, filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction against the first respondent, who claimed ownership based on a subsequent transfer order. Following the repeal of the 1958 Act by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelled the second respondent's P.T.D. in 1979. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, suggesting he pursue his civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to cancel the P.T.D. after the 1975 Act's repeal. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting the order was passed without jurisdiction. It directed the parties to resolve their claims within the pending civil suit, allowing the first respondent to amend the written statement to include allegations of fraud, thereby ensuring the civil court determines the matter on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner retain jurisdiction to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition challenging an order passed without jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy in a pending civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Amir Zaman vs Nasiruddin Alias Bhola and 2 Othrers1981 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  Constitutional petitionelection resultsdiscretionary jurisdictionwrit petitionleave to appealHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had restrained authorities from announcing the results of an election in which the petitioner was a candidate for the position of Councilor. The core legal question was whether the High Court's discretionary order, which allowed the election to proceed but prohibited the declaration of results pending the resolution of a constitutional petition by a larger bench, was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's impugned order fell within its discretionary jurisdiction and did not violate any established law or principle. The Court reasoned that the petitioner would have the opportunity to present his arguments regarding the issues referred to the Full Bench during the subsequent hearing of the writ petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no justification for interference and dismissed the petition, affirming that the High Court's exercise of discretion in regulating the election process was appropriate under the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to restrain the announcement of election results pending the resolution of a constitutional petition?
  • Is an order by a Division Bench of the High Court to refer a matter to a larger bench subject to interference by the Supreme Court if it involves the exercise of discretion?
  • Does the restraint on declaring election results constitute a valid exercise of the High Court's power under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Rai Tulley Khan vs Ahmad Hassan Khan and Other1981 SCMR 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-30
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionwelfare of minornatural guardiansubsequent salespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's pre-emption suit and subsequent second appeal. The petitioner had filed a suit to pre-empt a sale of land, which was initially decreed by the civil judge. During the limitation period, the original vendees sold the land to a third party, Ahmad Hassan, who possessed an equal right of pre-emption as a village proprietor and was also related to the original vendees. The lower appellate court accepted the subsequent sale and dismissed the petitioner's suit, a view affirmed by the High Court in second appeal. The core legal questions involved the validity of a subsequent sale involving a minor's share, the competence of a natural guardian to effect such a transfer, and the requirement for a pre-locator to retain a superior right of pre-emption up to the date of the decree. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent sale was an act of good management and welfare for the minor, that the natural guardian was competent to act, and that the plaintiff must maintain a preferential right of pre-emption up to the date of the decree. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent sale of land by a minor through a natural guardian during the limitation period defeats a prior pre-emption suit?
  • Is a pre-emptor required to maintain a preferential right of pre-emption up to the date of the decree?
  • Whether a father acting as a legal guardian can transfer property on behalf of a minor if it constitutes an act of good management and welfare?
  Read full judgment →
• Rai Hafeezullah Tariq vs Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Sargodha and Another1981 SCMR 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-06
  constitutional petitionpreventive detentioninterim ordermartial law ordersurrender
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging an apprehended preventive detention order issued under Martial Law Order 12. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's interim direction requiring the petitioner to surrender to the Deputy Registrar of the Court as a precondition for hearing the petition, which the petitioner alleged amounted to facilitating his custody by Martial Law authorities. The Supreme Court held that the interim order, properly interpreted as merely informing the Martial Law Headquarters of the petitioner's surrender, was not open to any exception and warranted no interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that interim procedural directions requiring surrender in preventive detention challenges, when interpreted as non-coercive informational notices, do not violate constitutional rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can require a petitioner seeking relief against preventive detention to surrender to the court's officer as an interim measure?
  • Does an interim order directing a petitioner to surrender and informing Martial Law authorities amount to an unlawful delegation of custody?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with an interim order passed by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Rai Allah Jowaya Ems vs Akbar Khan and Another.1981 SCMR 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-28
  land revenuearrears of land revenuenatural justiceright of hearingcivil revisionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioners' civil suit regarding the recovery of land revenue as arrears. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were condemned unheard before the demand for land revenue arrears was created against them and recovery proceedings were initiated. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts established that the petitioners had indeed been summoned, heard, and given an opportunity to state their case and settle accounts before the revenue authorities, notwithstanding any informality in procedure. The Court further held that a new factual plea regarding the lack of a signature on the recovery certificate, not raised before the lower courts, could not be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed, affirming the principle that procedural informality does not vitiate proceedings where adequate notice and opportunity of hearing have been substantially afforded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recovery proceedings for land revenue arrears are vitiated if the procedure adopted by the revenue authorities is somewhat informal?
  • Can a new factual plea regarding the lack of a signature on a recovery certificate be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the opportunity of hearing given to a party can be interfered with in civil revision?
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• Rahmat Ali vs Muhammad Sarwar and Other1981 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-25
  leave to appealsale deed interpretationbeshiallotment of landconcurrent findings of factburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning the ownership of land allotted to the vendees following a sale transaction. The petitioner, having purchased land from the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, claimed entitlement to an additional 55 kanals and 7 marlas of land allotted later, arguing it constituted 'beshi' (excess) covered by the original sale deed. The trial court, the District Judge, and the Lahore High Court concurrently held that the additional land was not the subject matter of the sale and was not covered by the sale deed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner failed to produce the complete sale deed or the plaint to substantiate the claim. The Supreme Court observed that the nature of the additional allotment was a question of fact already determined by the lower courts. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that a sale deed's recital should be interpreted to include any property subsequently acquired by the vendor regardless of the source. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sale deed's recital can be interpreted to include property acquired by the vendor subsequent to the sale regardless of the source of acquisition?
  • Can a petitioner succeed in a challenge against concurrent findings of fact without providing the essential documents, such as the sale deed and plaint, on the record?
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• Qasim Shah and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-30
  criminal appealmurderattempted murdercommon intentionself-defenceinterested witnessesinjured witnessesappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court, challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the convictions and sentences of the four appellants under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the credibility of interested and inimical eye-witnesses without corroboration, and whether the appellants acted in private defence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the participation of the appellants, the presence of motive, and the rejection of the belated plea of self-defence were fully justified by the evidence on record, particularly as the injured eye-witnesses were stamped witnesses whose presence at the spot was indisputable. The ratio decidendi is that injured eye-witnesses provide sterling testimony of their presence, and a plea of self-defence raised belatedly at trial and contradicted by physical and geographical evidence cannot be sustained. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration in a criminal trial?
  • Can a plea of self-defence raised for the first time at trial, rather than during commitment proceedings, be accepted?
  • Whether the acquittal of one co-accused automatically entitles other co-accused to the benefit of doubt?
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• Qasim Ali and Another vs Mst. Hasham Bibi and Another1981 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  evacuee landallotmentsettlement authoritiesrehabilitation and settlement schemewrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the allotment of evacuee land situated in the Gujrat District, which was originally allotted to the respondent in 1967. The petitioners challenged the allotment several years later in 1972, but their appeals and subsequent revisions were dismissed by the Settlement Authorities. The High Court also dismissed their writ petition on October 21, 1975. The core legal question was whether the initial allotment of evacuee land was invalid for want of individual notice to sitting allottees of the village. The Supreme Court held that the initial allotment of evacuee agricultural land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme does not require individual notice to persons who have filed claims in the estate, as the arrival of the Rehabilitation or Revenue Officer in the village serves as sufficient notice. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that the disputed land was lawfully allotted to the respondent and was not available for subsequent allotment to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether individual notice is required to be given to sitting allottees of a village before the initial allotment of evacuee agricultural land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Does the arrival of a Rehabilitation or Revenue Officer in a village constitute sufficient notice for the initial allotment of evacuee land?
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• Qamaruzzaman vs The Cantonment Board, Rawalp1ndi1981 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-06
  cantonment assessmentannual valuepre-condition of depositstatutory appealwrit petition maintainabilityretrospective tax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition by the Lahore High Court. The dispute concerned the annual value and tax assessment of a hotel run by the appellant under the Cantonments Act, 1924. The appellant had filed an appeal before the District Magistrate under section 84 of the Act without depositing the disputed tax amount, leading to the dismissal of his appeal pursuant to section 87(b). The High Court upheld this dismissal and found the writ petition not maintainable due to the failure to fulfill the mandatory pre-condition of depositing the tax. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition on this ground and whether the pre-condition of deposit rendered the statutory appeal inadequate. The Court held that the deposit requirement under section 87(b) is mandatory and that the statutory appeal under section 84 was an adequate remedy which the appellant failed to properly pursue. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deposit of the disputed tax amount is a mandatory pre-condition for filing an appeal under section 87 of the Cantonments Act 1924?
  • Is the right of appeal under section 84 of the Cantonments Act 1924 rendered inadequate solely because the appellant is required to deposit the disputed tax amount?
  • Can a party challenge an assessment on the ground of retrospective enhancement before the superior courts when no such contention was raised in the lower statutory appeal?
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• Qamar Raza Siddiqi vs Ghayas Ud Din Khan and Other1981 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-02
  co-operative societiespermanent injunctionfraud particularsdecretal amountcivil revisionpetition for leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil revision by the High Court of Baluchistan. The petitioner had filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from recovering a decretal amount passed against him by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, alleging the claim to be false and fraudulent, but both the trial court and the appellate court dismissed his applications for interim relief, and the High Court dismissed his revision inter alia for lack of particulars regarding fraud. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's civil suit was barred under the relevant co-operative societies legislation given his role as secretary. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition was without merit, observing that the petitioner's claim was hit by section 54 read with section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, and that the plaint lacked proper particulars of fraud. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leaving the petitioner free to pursue other remedies available under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit challenging a decree passed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies is barred under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Is a plaintiff required to provide specific particulars of fraud in the plaint when alleging a fraudulent decree?
  • Does section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 apply to suits by members whose claims fall under section 54 of the said Act?
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• Qadir Bakhsh vs Saif Ur Rehman and Other1981 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  evacuee propertyallotment of landreview petitionabatement of appealcriminal tribelegal representative
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses a dispute concerning state agricultural land previously allotted to displaced persons. The core legal question involved whether the appellant, Qadir Bakhsh, was a properly impleaded party to the underlying revision proceedings, thereby competent to maintain review applications, and whether the appeal had abated due to the death of one of the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant had indeed been properly impleaded as a party before the Settlement Commissioner, that the High Court erred in holding otherwise, and that the appeal did not abate entirely as the interest of the surviving respondents was identical to that of the deceased. Furthermore, the Court found an error patent on the face of the record regarding the respondents' status as members of a criminal tribe. The appeal was accordingly accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the review orders of the Settlement Commissioner restoring the ejectment of the respondents were upheld. The key principle laid down is that a party validly impleaded in administrative proceedings is competent to seek review, and an appeal does not abate where the deceased party's interest is fully represented by co-respondents with identical interests.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party impleaded in revision proceedings before a Settlement Commissioner is competent to file a review petition?
  • Does an appeal abate entirely upon the death of one respondent when the interests of the remaining respondents are identical?
  • Whether an error patent on the face of the record justifies the setting aside of an order by a Settlement Commissioner?
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• Punjab Small Industries Corporation, Lahore vs Shamim Ahmad and Another1981 SCMR 1079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-02
  service lawreversionprobation periodstatutory protectioncivil suitemployment dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a decree in favor of the respondent, Shamim Ahmad. The respondent, formerly employed by the West Pakistan Small Industries Corporation, challenged his reversion from the position of Officiating Deputy Manager to Assistant Manager. Following the dissolution of the Corporation and the devolution of its rights and liabilities to the Province of Punjab, the respondent filed a civil suit contesting the reversion. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the Additional District Judge, Lahore, accepted the respondent's appeal and decreed the suit in his favor. The High Court subsequently dismissed the Corporation's Regular Second Appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address critical legal questions regarding the respondent's employment status, specifically whether he was serving during an extended period of probation at the time of the impugned action, the applicability of government rules at the relevant time, and whether the respondent was entitled to statutory protection regarding his reversion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the respondent was serving during an extended period of probation at the time the action of reversion was taken against him?
  • Whether the rules made by the Government were operative at the relevant time of the respondent's reversion?
  • Was the petitioner entitled to statutory protection regarding his reversion from the post of Officiating Deputy Manager?
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• Province of Punjab vs MFSSRS Combined Traders and Another1981 SCMR583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-08
  service of summonsrecognised agentarbitration awardobjections to awardspecial leave to appealdepartmental service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, the Province of Punjab, sought special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed its appeal arising from arbitration proceedings. A dispute over construction payments under an agreement was referred to arbitration, resulting in an award. The award was filed in court, and notices were issued to the parties. The notice addressed to the petitioner was returned by a departmental superintendent with an endorsement citing a lack of specific section details, and the petitioner subsequently filed time-barred objections, which were rejected by the trial court and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the service of the court notice upon the departmental superintendent constituted due service on the petitioner under the relevant procedural and administrative rules. The Supreme Court held that the superintendent was duly authorized as an agent to receive communications under the Manual of Secretariat Instructions, and the refusal to accept service amounted to an evasion of responsibility. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that service upon the authorized departmental agent was valid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental superintendent is competent to receive court notices on behalf of a government department as a recognized agent?
  • Does the return of a court notice by a departmental official with an evasive endorsement constitute valid service?
  • Whether objections to an arbitration award filed beyond the prescribed period can be entertained without sufficient cause?
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• Province of Punjab vs Amanat Ali1981 PLD Supreme Court 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  compulsory retirementpublic interestaudi alteram partemservice lawconstitutional interpretationshow-cause noticegovernment servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment concerning the compulsory retirement of a government servant under Article 178(4)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The core legal question was whether such compulsory retirement, upon completing twenty-five years of service, is penal in nature and necessitates a show-cause notice under the principle of audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement under the said constitutional provision is non-penal and does not carry any stigma or vindictiveness. Consequently, the government possesses absolute discretion to retire an officer in the public interest, a matter left to the subjective satisfaction of the employing authority. The Court ruled that no show-cause notice or formal inquiry is required for such retirement, as it does not constitute removal or dismissal. The High Court’s reliance on the audi alteram partem maxim and the requirement for a show-cause notice was deemed erroneous, as the constitutional amendment specifically intended to grant the government unfettered discretion in this regard. The appeal was accepted, and the retirement order was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Is compulsory retirement of a government servant under Article 178(4)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 penal in nature?
  • Does the compulsory retirement of a government servant after twenty-five years of service require a show-cause notice?
  • Can a court sit in judgment over the government's determination of public interest regarding the compulsory retirement of a civil servant?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to the compulsory retirement of a civil servant under Article 178(4)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
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• Prof. Muhammad Hanif Tahir vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24
  successor judgede novo trialcriminal procedurestatutory interpretationsingular and pluraltransfer of cases
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the jurisdiction of a succeeding Sessions Judge to proceed with a trial from the stage where it was left by his predecessors. The petitioner contended that under the amended Section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, only an immediate successor could continue the proceedings without a de novo trial, and that a successor of an immediate successor lacked such authority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected this argument, holding that the terms 'predecessor' and 'successor' cannot be restricted to mean only the 'immediate' predecessor or successor. The Court ruled that inserting the word 'immediate' would amount to reading words into the statute that are not there. Applying Section 13 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the Court held that the singular includes the plural, meaning 'successor' includes subsequent successors, thereby enabling any succeeding judge to continue the trial from the stage left by any predecessor.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term 'successor' in Section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is restricted to the immediate successor only?
  • Can a succeeding Sessions Judge proceed with a trial from the stage where it was left by a predecessor of his predecessor without recording fresh evidence?
  • Does the rule of statutory interpretation under Section 13 of the General Clauses Act 1897 apply to the interpretation of 'successor' in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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