Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Khurshid vs The State1981 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-10
  briberyillegal gratificationappreciation of evidencecriminal appealconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and two-year rigorous imprisonment sentence for the offence of bribery under Section 165-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner offered a bribe of Rs. 250 to an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police to induce him to arrest an opponent of the petitioner's relative and to assist in a pending investigation. The petitioner denied the allegations, claiming false implication by the police at the behest of his enemies. Both the trial court and the High Court found the evidence against the petitioner credible and consistent. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's contentions regarding evidentiary discrepancies and the alleged lack of motive for the bribe. Finding no legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence, and seeing no grounds to interfere with the sentence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence in a bribery case?
  • Does the offer of a bribe to a public servant to influence an investigation constitute an offence under Section 165-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Abdul Khaliq Khan1981 PLD Supreme Court 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-23
  pre-emptionindivisible salenon-joinder of partieslimitation periodagricultural landtenant's right of pre-emptionmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns eight civil appeals arising from pre-emption suits filed by tenants against a joint sale of agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the sale was divisible, thereby allowing a suit against only one co-vendee, and whether the limitation period for such suits is governed by the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 or the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the sale was indivisible because the specific price contribution of each vendee was not indicated in the mutation, rendering the suit defective for non-joinder of a necessary party. Furthermore, the Court held that the right of pre-emption exercised by tenants under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 is essentially a right originating from the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913; therefore, the limitation period prescribed by Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 applies. The principle laid down is that where a sale is joint and indivisible, failure to implead all necessary parties within the statutory limitation period is fatal to the suit, and the limitation period for pre-emption suits by tenants is governed by the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sale of land by multiple vendees considered divisible if the mutation does not specify the separate price contribution of each vendee?
  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit filed by a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 fall under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 or the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a pre-emption suit proceed if a necessary co-vendee is not impleaded within the period of limitation?
  • Does the failure to implead a necessary party in a pre-emption suit result in the dismissal of the entire suit?
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• Muhammad Khan and 3 Others vs Abdul Majid and 2 Other1981 SCMR923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-16
  appeal by special leaveex parte orderrecall of orderstatus quoremand of caseomission apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court dated 14th December, 1977, which dismissed an application to recall an earlier ex parte order vacating a status quo order obtained by the appellants. The appellants sought the recall on the ground that the ex parte vacation order was obtained through misrepresentation and that their counsel had missed the previous hearing due to a genuine illness involving an eyesore. The High Court's order failed to make any mention of this illness. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that this omission constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, requiring the matter to be remanded to the High Court. The appeal was accordingly accepted, and the case remanded to the High Court for a fresh disposal after considering the counsel's illness.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of the High Court failing to notice the genuine illness of a counsel when considering an application to recall an ex parte order?
  • Does an omission of a material fact like counsel's illness on the face of the High Court order warrant a remand of the case for fresh disposal?
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• Muhammad Jaffar Leghari and Others vs Chairman, Federal Land1981 SCMR 1103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-10
  Federal Land CommissionMartial Law Regulation No. 115biassuo motu jurisdictionleave to appealland resumption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging an order of the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission directing the resumption of land under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal questions involve whether the Chairman was legally biased due to prior political statements against the landowners, whether the Chairman could competently exercise powers sitting singly despite an authorization naming 'Chairman and Members', and whether suo motu revisional jurisdiction could be invoked upon an application by tenants who were allegedly not aggrieved persons. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these substantial questions of law, which also arose in connected matters, and ordered that the petitioners' possession not be disturbed pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Minister acting as Chairman of the Federal Land Commission can be considered legally biased after making public statements expressing hostility towards specific landowners prior to deciding their case?
  • Whether the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission is competent to exercise powers sitting singly when the authorizing notification refers to the 'Chairman and Members'?
  • Whether the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission can validly exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction upon an application filed by tenants who may not qualify as aggrieved persons in law?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Hidayatullah and 2 Other1981 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02
  bail cancellationreview of judgmentcriminal procedurepre-arrest bailtrial delayjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a Sind High Court order that refused to cancel bail granted to respondents in an attempted murder case. The High Court had declined to cancel the bail, reasoning that doing so would constitute an impermissible review of its own previous order. The core legal question was whether a High Court is barred by the principle of review from cancelling bail it had previously granted under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its reasoning; the power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) is distinct and does not constitute a review of a judgment under Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court affirmed that the High Court possesses the authority to cancel bail granted by itself or subordinate courts. Despite this legal error by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, finding no merit in cancelling the bail due to the petitioner's own role in delaying the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a bail order by the High Court under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute an impermissible review of a judgment under Section 369 of the same Code?
  • Is the High Court empowered to cancel bail that it has previously granted itself?
  • Does Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 control the exercise of power under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Ismail Memon vs Government of Send and Another1981 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-07
  service tribunalpresentation of appeallimitation periodsubmission by postcondonation of delaystoppage of incrementsprocedure rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Sind Services Tribunal dismissing a departmental service appeal filed by the petitioner against a disciplinary order imposing the penalty of stoppage of four increments. The petitioner had dispatched his appeal by post from Khipro within thirty days of receiving the final departmental order, but it was received at the Tribunal's office after the thirty-day limitation period had expired. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on grounds of improper presentation under Rule 7 of the Sind Services Tribunal (Procedure Rules) 1974 and for being time-barred under Section 4 of the Sind Services Tribunal Act 1973. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's order and dismissed the petition. The Court held that where the law or procedure rules require an act or presentation to be done in a specified manner—namely personal presentation by the appellant or counsel—it must be done in that manner and none other, making submission by post improper. Additionally, the date of actual receipt in the Tribunal's office, not the date of dispatch by post, governs the calculation of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Services Tribunal is properly instituted if submitted by post when procedural rules require personal presentation by the appellant or counsel?
  • Whether the date of dispatch by post or the date of actual receipt in the Tribunal's office determines compliance with the period of limitation for filing an appeal?
  • Does the failure to present an appeal in the mandatory manner prescribed by rules justify the rejection of the appeal?
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• Muhammad Ismail and Others Niamat Ali and Others vs The Punjab1981 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08
  state landproprietary rightsprovincial cabinetexecutive authorityrules of businessallotment policyadministrative competence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves leave petitions concerning land disputes between petitioners claiming to be cultivating tenants and 'Mela Base evictees' seeking proprietary rights. The core legal question was whether a Provincial Cabinet decision granting proprietary rights to evictees could override previous administrative and judicial findings favoring the petitioners' status as tenants, and whether the subsequent implementation of this policy by a Minister was legally competent under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government possesses the inherent competence to formulate policy regarding State land and to confer rights upon specific classes of persons, regardless of prior contrary administrative or judicial findings, provided the authority is competent. The Court further held that the executive authority of the province, exercised through the Chief Minister and Provincial Ministers, allows for policy implementation by Ministers under the Rules of Business. The principle laid down is that the Government is not estopped from changing its policy regarding the allotment of State land, and that a Minister, acting within the scope of their department, is competent to implement such policy decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Provincial Government policy decision regarding the allotment of State land override previous administrative or judicial findings favoring existing tenants?
  • Does a Provincial Minister have the authority to implement policy decisions regarding State land under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the Provincial Government estopped from conferring proprietary rights on a class of persons simply because a previous administrative decision held them ineligible?
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• Muhammad Irshad vs Abid Hussain and Other1981 SCMR 1260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-30
  bail cancellationmurder caseage determinationcriminal procedurefresh evidenceHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to the respondent in a murder case, primarily on the finding that the respondent was under 16 years of age. The petitioner challenged this order before the Supreme Court, contending that the respondent was actually over 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence and submitting documentary evidence, including a birth entry, to contradict the affidavit previously relied upon by the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that the material now presented by the petitioner was not available to the High Court at the time of the initial bail order, partly because the complainant was not represented during those proceedings. Consequently, the Court declined to adjudicate the factual dispute regarding the respondent's age directly. Instead, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with the direction that the petitioner may approach the High Court for the cancellation of bail, where all new evidence and grounds may be properly urged and considered in the first instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner seek cancellation of bail in the High Court based on new evidence not previously presented?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to determine a disputed question of fact regarding an accused's age in the first instance?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mehraj Din, Etc.S1981 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-28
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitiondisposed of propertyauction transfersettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of the petitioner's claim regarding a disputed plot. The core legal question concerned whether a portion of the auctioned property remained undisposed and available for transfer to the petitioner despite a belated application. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit because the factual plea regarding the partial auction was never raised before the Additional Settlement Commissioner nor included in the prayers of the writ petition before the High Court, and the property had already been finally disposed of in favour of the respondents via PTO and PTD long before the petitioner filed any competent form. The key principle laid down is that new factual pleas not raised before lower forums or in the constitutional petition cannot be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new factual plea regarding a partial auction be raised for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Whether a property already transferred through a P.T.O. and P.T.D. remains available for allotment upon a belated application.
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs The Returning Officer Etc.1981 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-13
  election disputethrown away votesdisqualified candidatefresh electionelectoral lawnotorious disqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the election of a respondent as a Member of a Union Council but refused to declare the petitioner, who secured the next highest number of votes, as the successful candidate. The core legal question was whether votes cast for a disqualified candidate should be treated as 'thrown away' votes, thereby allowing the runner-up to be declared the winner, or whether a fresh election is required. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that votes cast for a disqualified candidate are only considered 'thrown away' if the disqualification was notorious and established at the time of the poll, leading to a reasonable inference of willful perverseness by the electors. Where disqualification depends on complex legal arguments or facts, votes are not treated as thrown away. Consequently, the Court held that the election must be held afresh rather than declaring the runner-up as the winner, dismissing the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances are votes cast for a disqualified candidate considered 'thrown away'?
  • Does the disqualification of a candidate automatically result in the runner-up being declared the winner?
  • Is a fresh election required when a candidate is disqualified but the disqualification was not notorious at the time of the poll?
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• Muhammad Idris vs Mst. Shah Jahan Begum and Other1981 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-10
  willful defaultrent evictionstatutory obligationburden of proofsecond appealconcurrent findingsrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from eviction proceedings initiated against a tenant for default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether a tenant’s failure to pay rent for over four years constituted "willful default" under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether a prior practice of irregular rent collection established a binding agreement to accept rent at long intervals. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision to set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that a tenant has a statutory obligation to pay rent, and the burden of proving an agreement to pay at long intervals rests heavily on the tenant. The Court clarified that a landlord’s mere acceptance of rent at irregular intervals does not establish a binding agreement to accept rent at such intervals. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that appellate courts may interfere with concurrent findings if the discretion exercised by lower courts is perverse or contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere acceptance of rent at irregular intervals by a landlord establish a binding agreement to accept rent at long intervals?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish an agreement to pay rent at long intervals?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts if the discretion was exercised perversely?
  • Does a failure to pay rent for a period of over four years constitute willful default in the payment of rent?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Sheikh Muhammad Tufail and Other1981 SCMR 877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-05
  rent matterlandlord and tenant relationshipejectment applicationconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealblowing hot and coldconduct of petitioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition in a rent matter. The dispute originated when the respondent filed an ejectment application under Section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance on the ground of default. The petitioner denied the existence of a landlord and tenant relationship between himself and the respondent, despite having expressly pleaded in earlier eviction proceedings initiated by a third party that he was in fact a tenant of the respondent. The Rent Controller and appellate courts relied on his prior admission and ordered his eviction. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether a party who takes contradictory positions in successive legal proceedings is entitled to equitable relief in constitutional jurisdiction or leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having blown hot and cold by adopting inconsistent stances whenever suited to him, was disentitled by his conduct from receiving discretionary relief. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party taking inconsistent and contradictory stances in successive legal proceedings is entitled to discretionary constitutional relief?
  • Can a prior admission of a landlord and tenant relationship made in earlier proceedings be relied upon to order eviction in subsequent proceedings?
  • Does a party's conduct of blowing hot and cold disentitle them to the grant of leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Sharif1981 SCMR 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-08
  evacuee propertymortgagee rightsallotmenthidden evacuee propertyrehabilitation authoritiescharge over land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding 94 kanals and 15 marlas of agricultural land situated at Ahmadpur East, District Bahawalpur, originally owned by a Hindu evacuee. The petitioner claimed possession through a derivative mortgage, while the respondents received an allotment from the Chairman of the Allotment Committee of the Evacuee Property on 22-6-1964. The petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction, which was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, leading to unsuccessful appeals before the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal questions related to whether a mortgagee of evacuee property acquires a vested right to ownership and the legal consequences of failing to disclose possession under rehabilitation laws. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, as a mortgagee, was only entitled to have a charge created in his favour and acquired no vested right in the evacuee land, particularly after failing to disclose his possession under the relevant statute. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mortgagee of evacuee property acquire a vested right of ownership in the mortgaged land?
  • What is the effect of failing to disclose possession of evacuee property to the Rehabilitation Authorities under Section 3 of Act XII of 1957?
  • Is a mortgagee of evacuee property entitled to anything more than a charge created in their favour?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Anwar Etc.S1981 SCMR 930 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-27
  criminal appealmurderacquittalchance witnessmedical evidenceappreciation of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of the murder of Fazal Hussain under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had convicted the respondents based on the testimony of two eye-witnesses, motive, and recovery of weapons, which the High Court subsequently set aside. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appreciation of evidence by the High Court regarding the ocular account, chance witnesses, and medical evidence suffered from legal infirmities warranting interference. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the medical evidence fundamentally contradicted the eye-witnesses' version of how the attack occurred and that the alleged eye-witnesses were in fact chance and interested witnesses who had not actually seen the incident. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is irreconcilable with the physical and medical evidence, and where eye-witnesses are shown to be unreliable chance witnesses, an acquittal order by the appellate court will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the ocular testimony is contradicted by the medical evidence?
  • Can a witness who fails to explain their presence at the crime scene be classified as a reliable eye-witness?
  • Whether the presence of specific injuries on a deceased person's body can disprove the prosecution's sequence of events regarding how the attack took place?
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• Muhammad Hussain Patel vs Habib Walt Muhammad, Etc.PLD 1981 Supreme Court I · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-29
  rent duedefault in payment of rentejectmentconservancy chargeslease agreementtransfer of propertyurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four civil appeals directed against a consolidated judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed second appeals filed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the expression 'rent due' under section 13(2)(i) of the Rent Ordinance includes water and conservancy charges agreed upon in the rent deed, making non-payment a default warranting ejectment. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statutory definition in the Rent Ordinance, recourse must be had to the general law, specifically section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, under which anything a tenant agrees to render in consideration of property enjoyment constitutes rent. The Court ruled that 'rent due' encompasses all contractual monetary obligations agreed to be paid to the landlord, including agreed taxes and conservancy charges. Consequently, the tenants' failure to pay these charges constituted a default in the payment of rent due, and the appeals were accepted, restoring the order of ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expression 'rent due' appearing in section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 includes water and conservancy charges agreed to be paid by a tenant?
  • Does the definition of 'rent' under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 apply for interpreting 'rent due' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Whether the failure to pay agreed conservancy charges and taxes constitutes a default in the payment of rent rendering the tenant liable to ejectment?
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• Muhammad Hassan Khan and Others vs Mirza Abdul Hamid1981 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-13
  ejectmentrent restrictionstriking off defencewilful defaultleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the striking off of the petitioners' defence in an ejectment application under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the petitioners committed a wilful default in depositing rent pursuant to the Rent Controller's order and whether a specific issue regarding wilful default needed to be framed. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's order was clear and unambiguous, that the failure to deposit rent by the stipulated date constituted a default, and that the explanation tendered by the petitioners was untenable, rendering the default wilful. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that provisions of section 13(6) of the Ordinance are mandatory and attract the prescribed penalty unless non-compliance is shown to be due to causes beyond the tenant's control or unavoidable circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, are mandatory?
  • Does a failure to deposit rent by the stipulated date attract the penalty of striking off defence under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Is it necessary to frame a specific issue on the question of whether a default in depositing rent was wilful when the rent order is clear and unambiguous?
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• Muhammad Hamza and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue and Other1981 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  evacuee propertyland allotmentoccupancy rightsrehabilitation settlement schemepowers of provincial governmentcustodian
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging an order concerning the land allotment of Muhammad Bakhsh, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and respondents, originally made in 1954. The core legal question is whether certain land could be treated as evacuee property and whether the Provincial Government had the power to declare it as such. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Punjab Government lacked the authority to declare any property as evacuee property, as such a power exclusively vested in the Custodian. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, affirming the High Court's view that the ownership of the land continued to vest in the Provincial Government while only the occupancy rights pertained to the evacuee interest. The key principle laid down is that the Provincial Government cannot unilaterally declare property to be evacuee property without a determination by the Custodian.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government has the power to declare a property to be evacuee property?
  • Does an evacuee interest confined to occupancy rights vest ownership in the beneficiary?
  • Can a notification by the Provincial Government override the statutory requirement for declaring evacuee property?
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• Muhammad Hafeez vs Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Sargodha1981 SCMR 1171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  revenue court jurisdictionlandlord and tenantquestion of titlestay of proceedingsconstitutional petitionejectment suitPunjab Tenancy Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petitions by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld revenue court decisions finding him to be a tenant and ordering his ejectment and a money decree. The petitioner's maternal grandfather had gifted agricultural land via registered deeds to another grandson, whose successor subsequently initiated revenue proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the revenue court should have stayed proceedings pending a civil suit challenging the gift deed, and that the mandatory sixty-day timeline under the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977 was violated. The Supreme Court held that the revenue court possessed exclusive jurisdiction over tenancy matters under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, and the mere raising of a question of title did not oust that jurisdiction or necessitate staying the revenue proceedings. Furthermore, the timeline objection could not be raised for the first time in a constitutional petition without prior rectification attempts. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere raising of a question of title in a pending civil suit oust the jurisdiction of a revenue court in a tenancy matter?
  • Must revenue court proceedings be kept in abeyance until a civil suit concerning the underlying property title is finally decided?
  • Can an objection regarding the violation of a statutory timeline for deciding an ejectment suit be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Hafeez Khan vs The Secretary to the Government of Punjab Local Government, Social Welfare and Rural Development, Lahore and Other1981 SCMR 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-09
  special leave to appealconsent orderwrit petitiondismissal in limineservice termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine. The petitioner, a former employee of the Lahore Development Authority whose services were terminated, had previously challenged his removal through a writ petition. That earlier petition was disposed of on the basis of a consent order wherein the Lahore Development Authority agreed to give the petitioner a fresh appointment with compatible emoluments, and both the petitioner and his counsel consented to the arrangement in court. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to set aside the consent order and filed fresh writ petitions alleging lack of consent and breach of the undertaking. The core legal question revolves around whether a party can resile from a valid consent order and whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge the same. The Supreme Court held that the consent order was passed with the free consent of the petitioner and his counsel, and the petitioner's subsequent attempt to resile from it was untenable. The Court laid down that a party cannot unilaterally resile from a lawful consent order duly accepted in court by the party and their counsel, and dismissed the petition as frivolous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can subsequently resile from a consent order passed by the court with the mutual consent of the parties and their counsel?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable to challenge a lawful consent order previously accepted by the petitioner in court?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition in limine when the petitioner attempts to resile from a binding commitment made in judicial proceedings?
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• Muhammad Gulzar vs Muhammad Ashrap and 3 Other1981 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  cross versionsmurder trialacquittalretrialillegalityappellate jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the acquittal of respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The core legal question concerns the legality of a trial judge disposing of a criminal case by relying on evidence and reasons recorded in a separate cross-case rather than discussing the evidence on record independently. The Supreme Court held that deciding a case on the basis of testimony appearing in a cross-case is entirely illegal, not permissible under the law, and vitiates the judgment, with the defect being incurable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court further affirmed the High Court's discretion refusing to order a retrial under the circumstances and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that each cross-case must be decided independently on its own evidence, and a trial judgment relying upon evidence from another case stands vitiated.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a trial judge to decide a criminal case based on evidence and reasons recorded in a separate cross-case?
  • Does a judgment that relies on testimony from a cross-case stand vitiated by an illegality?
  • Is the illegality of basing a judgment on evidence from a cross-case curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court decline to order a retrial after setting aside a vitiated judgment?
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• Muhammad Siddiq vs Muhammad Sharif1981. SCMR 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-11
  evictionwilful defaultnon-payment of rentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantpartitionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the eviction of the petitioner from a shop in Lahore ordered by three lower courts on the grounds of non-payment of rent and the respondent landlord's personal bona fide requirement for business. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner's refusal to attorn to the respondent after a partition among co-owners constituted wilful default and whether the plea of collusion regarding the partition was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner committed wilful default by failing to pay rent to the respondent despite being directed to do so by the co-owners, that the concurrent findings of fact regarding partition and default cannot be disturbed, and that the respondent's personal requirement for the shop is established. The Court laid down that a tenant who persists in denying the landlord's title after partition among co-owners is liable to eviction for wilful default, and that concurrent factual findings on partition and personal need supported by evidence will be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's refusal to pay rent to the transferee or partition-holder after a partition among co-owners amount to wilful default?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the partition of property and tenant default be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a tenant liable to eviction on the ground of personal bona fide requirement when the landlord proves he has no other suitable shop?
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• Muhammad Fazil and Another vs Settlement & Rehabilitation1981 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-11
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIIconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingstransfer of propertyauction-purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from petitions for leave to appeal concerning the disputed transfer of an evacuee house in Kharian. The core legal question involved whether the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court correctly evaluated concurrent findings and the necessity of documentary evidence under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, as well as whether an auction-purchaser of an adjacent plot held title to the disputed house. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his lawful discretion in setting aside the transfer of the house to Sufi Muhammad Karim due to a lack of supporting documentary evidence upon remand, and that the auction-purchaser, Muhammad Fazil, had no valid claim over the house as it formed no part of his auctioned plot. The Court affirmed the dismissal of both writ petitions, establishing the principle that superior tribunals and constitutional courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact supported by evidence and falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Department.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner interfere with the orders of subordinate tribunals when those tribunals act contrary to previous remand directions?
  • Does the purchase of an evacuee plot at an auction confer title over a separate neighboring house structure?
  • Is a formal separate notice required for the cancellation of a property transfer when the affected party has already been given a full opportunity of being heard?
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• Muhammad Din and 2 Others vs The State1981 SCMR 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-21
  leave to appealcommon intentionculpable homicidegrievous hurtappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partly allowed a criminal appeal by converting the petitioners' convictions from section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 325, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with corresponding reductions in sentences, while maintaining convictions under sections 452 and 323 read with section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved whether common intention or similar intention was established among the petitioners during the assault and whether the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' subsequent conduct demonstrated a clear common or developed intention to cause grievous hurt upon entering the victim's house, and that the acquittal of co-accused did not warrant the petitioners' acquittal given specific incriminating evidence against them. The Court laid down that concurrent factual findings based on proper appreciation of ocular and medical evidence by lower courts will not be disturbed in the absence of a contravention of law or principle, and that the acquittal of some co-accused does not automatically entitle remaining accused to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused persons on the basis of benefit of doubt is a valid ground for the acquittal of remaining convicted co-accused?
  • Can common intention develop spontaneously during the course of an occurrence when the accused enter a premises?
  • Does minor discrepancy between ocular account and medical evidence regarding the number of blows render the eye-witness testimony unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs Munir Hussain and 2 Other1981 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-07
  rent restrictionevictionfunctus officiorent controllersettlement authoritiesexecution of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal concerning eviction proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller, having previously struck off the petitioner's defence for failure to deposit rent, became functus officio and lacked the jurisdiction to subsequently order physical eviction once a pending settlement dispute regarding property ownership was resolved. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's initial order was not a final determination of the entire lis, as it explicitly deferred physical eviction pending the outcome of settlement proceedings. Consequently, the subsequent order for eviction was not a review of the earlier order but a continuation of proceedings. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller retained jurisdiction to implement the eviction once the condition precedent—the settlement decision—was met. The principle laid down is that where an order explicitly keeps proceedings in abeyance pending a collateral determination, the court does not become functus officio and may proceed with execution once that condition is satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller become functus officio after striking off a tenant's defence if the order explicitly defers physical eviction pending a settlement dispute?
  • Can a Rent Controller proceed with physical eviction after the resolution of a pending settlement dispute if the initial eviction order was kept in abeyance?
  • Does the implementation of an eviction order, following the resolution of a condition precedent, constitute an impermissible review of a previous order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Baqir Qureshi vs Mst. Razia Begum1981 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-18
  leave to appealrent restrictionevictiondefault in rent paymentpersonal needprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959. The petitioner challenged the eviction on two primary grounds: first, that the Ordinance does not permit eviction for failure to pay rent in advance, even where such an agreement exists between the parties, as the statute only recognizes default in payment after the due date (the end of the month); and second, that the High Court erred by failing to hear arguments regarding the landlady's personal need, dismissing it summarily as a conclusive finding of fact. The Supreme Court found that the points raised by the petitioner regarding the interpretation of the rent statute and the procedural fairness in the High Court required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directed the petitioner to furnish security, and ordered the maintenance of the status quo, conditional upon the tenant continuing to pay rent in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 permit eviction for failure to pay rent in advance when such payment is stipulated by agreement?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction for non-payment of rent before the expiry of sixty days from the date the rent became due?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Baqar Qureshi vs Mst. Razia Begum1981 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-21
  default in payment of rentadvance rentagreement of tenancyejectmentlandlord and tenantstatutory grace period
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the ejectment of the appellant-tenant on the grounds of default in the payment of rent and bona fide personal need. The core legal question was whether an agreement between the parties to pay rent in advance overrides the statutory provision allowing sixty days for payment, or if failure to pay by the agreed date—plus a statutory grace period—constitutes a default under the rent restriction law. The Supreme Court held that clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance comprises two distinct situations: where time is fixed by agreement, rent becomes due on that date and must be paid within fifteen days thereafter, preserving the sanctity of the contract; whereas the sixty-day period applies only where there is no agreement. The Court concluded that the tenant committed a default by failing to pay the advance rent within the statutory grace period following the agreed dates, thereby dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to pay rent in advance override the sixty-day statutory period for rent payment?
  • What is the effect of a fixed time for payment in an agreement of tenancy under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • When does rent become due under the first part of clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam vs Khalid Javed Gillan, Etc.S1981 SCMR 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-22
  bailreview petitionalibimurder trialtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition arising from an order of the Supreme Court granting bail to the first respondent, who was facing trial for murder. The core legal question centered on whether grounds existed to review and recall the bail order, which had been granted primarily on the basis of a plea of alibi supported by a medical certificate from a doctor. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the applicant failed to establish any error on the face of the record, as the challenges raised against the medical officer's integrity, newspaper clippings, and the respondent's mental condition were either irrelevant, unsupported by admissible evidence, or attempts to introduce new material that could have been produced earlier. The Court laid down the principle that bail orders are based on tentative assessments of material, that observations made therein do not prejudice the trial court's independent evaluation of evidence, and that review petitions cannot be entertained on the basis of fresh evidence omitted through prior negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail order be reviewed on the basis of new material that could have been produced at the original hearing through reasonable diligence?
  • Whether newspaper reports can be treated as admissible evidence in judicial proceedings for the purpose of a review petition?
  • Does an observation made in a bail order prejudice the trial court's final assessment of the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub Butt vs Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar and Oti113rs1981 PLD Supreme Court 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-01
  revisional jurisdictionSpecial CourtBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979interlocutory orderssubordinate courtCode of Civil Procedure 1908expeditious recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of revision petitions by the Peshawar High Court, which had refused to interfere with orders passed by a Special Court established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, over interlocutory orders passed by a Special Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court lacks revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding orders of the Special Court. The Court established the principle that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, is a special law that excludes the application of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, a Special Court is not a 'subordinate court' within the meaning of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Ordinance expressly bars challenges to interlocutory orders, ensuring the finality of Special Court proceedings to facilitate expeditious recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 over orders passed by a Special Court established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 considered a subordinate court to the High Court for the purposes of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appeal be filed against an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case before a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Etc. vs The State1981 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25
  post-arrest bailself-defenceappreciation of evidencediscretionary powercriminal liabilitycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's order dismissing the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 326, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite specific overt acts attributed to them in the F.I.R. and the potential application of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners argued that they acted in self-defence, citing their possession of the property where the incident occurred, and further contended that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel. The Supreme Court held that the plea of self-defence involves complex questions of fact requiring evidence, which the High Court correctly declined to determine at the bail stage. The Court affirmed that the High Court's discretion in refusing bail was not exercised perversely. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that disputed factual claims, such as the right of self-defence or the nature of the altercation, are not sufficient grounds for granting bail when specific incriminating acts are alleged.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of self-defence be determined at the bail stage when it involves disputed questions of fact?
  • Does the mere allegation of a sudden quarrel constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Is the status of a petitioner as a student a sufficient ground for the grant of bail in serious criminal offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Dost Muhammad Etc.S1981 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  Board of Revenuereview jurisdictionerror apparent on the face of the recordThara sitesfrontage principlegovernment instructionsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the scope of review powers exercised by the Board of Revenue and the interpretation of government instructions regarding the disposal of 'Thara' sites (open spaces) in Sargodha. The core legal questions were whether a successor Member of the Board of Revenue could review a predecessor's order based on a different interpretation of facts, and whether the 'frontage' principle was the correct criterion for transferring these sites. The Supreme Court held that the power of review under Section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, is limited to grounds analogous to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, such as an error apparent on the face of the record. It ruled that a mere difference of opinion or a re-evaluation of evidence does not constitute a valid ground for review. The Court affirmed that the 'frontage' principle, ensuring Tharas are transferred to the owner of the shop they front, was the correct interpretation of the government's policy. Consequently, the review order was set aside, and the original order restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere difference of opinion between two Members of the Board of Revenue constitute a valid ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction?
  • Is the scope of review under the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, limited to grounds analogous to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a successor Member of the Board of Revenue review an order passed by their predecessor?
  • Does the frontage of a shop create a preferential right to the purchase of an adjacent Thara site under government policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and Anothnrs vs The State1981 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-13
  criminal petitionidentification paradecommon intentionmurderattempted robberyspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for special leave to appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of the petitioners, Muhammad Ashraf and Muhammad Akram, for murder and attempted murder committed during an attempted robbery on a train. The petitioners were initially convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the High Court subsequently dismissing their appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the identification parade was legally flawed due to alleged police interference and that the court relied on an incorrect railway timetable. They further argued that their apprehension near the railway track was implausible. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding no evidence to substantiate the claims regarding the identification parade or the railway timetable's impact on the court's findings. The Court held that the petitioners' arguments failed to undermine the concurrent findings of the lower courts. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unsubstantiated objection regarding the conduct of an identification parade suffice to invalidate the identification process?
  • Can a conviction be challenged on the basis of a minor discrepancy in a railway timetable if the court's conclusion regarding the occurrence remains unaffected?
  • Is the apprehension of accused persons near a crime scene inherently unbelievable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and Another vs Jan Muhammad1981 SCMR 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-08
  evictiondefault in rentpersonal requirementurban rent restrictionsecond appealconcurrent findingstenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment, damage to the property, and personal requirement for setting up his son in business. The Rent Controller ordered eviction after finding default and establishing bona fide requirement, but the Additional District Judge on appeal condoned the default as technical and set aside the eviction. The Lahore High Court allowed the landlord's second appeal and restored the eviction order. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's alleged misreading of the written statement vitiated the appreciation of evidence regarding default. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding a wilful default of fifteen months and the lack of credible explanation or consent for delayed payments justified the eviction, and that a landlord is not barred from setting up a son in business merely because the sons are currently cultivating agricultural land. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of fifteen months in the payment of rent constitutes a wilful default warranting eviction?
  • Can a landlord seek the eviction of a tenant for personal requirement to set up a son in business merely because the son is engaged in cultivating agricultural land?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding a tenant's default in rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs The State1981 PLD FSC 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  review jurisdictioncriminal appealFederal Shariat Courtdiscretionary powercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for review filed in a criminal appeal decided by the Federal Shariat Court on 28 March 1981, following the recent conferral of review powers upon the Court. The core legal question concerns the scope and exercise of this newly granted review jurisdiction in criminal appeals where no formal rules have yet been framed. The Court held that the power of review is discretionary in nature, and the Court elects to be guided by the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the review of criminal cases. Consequently, the Court ruled that it will not normally interfere in the exercise of review jurisdiction with decisions previously rendered in criminal appeals, noting that such jurisdiction was primarily conferred in connection with Shariat Petitions. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Shariat Court can exercise review jurisdiction over its decisions given in criminal appeals?
  • What principles govern the exercise of review jurisdiction by the Federal Shariat Court in the absence of framed rules?
  • Is the power of review conferred upon the Federal Shariat Court mandatory or discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs Principal, King Edward Medical College and Another1981 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-07
  medical college admissionreserved seatsgeneral quotaprospectus rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the refusal of King Edward Medical College, Lahore, to admit him on merit. The petitioner had previously secured admission to Ayub Medical College on a reserved seat for Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas. The core legal question was whether a candidate already admitted to a medical college on a reserved seat is entitled to apply for and claim fresh admission on merit in another medical college. The Supreme Court held that the authorities rightly excluded the petitioner pursuant to the prospectus rule prohibiting a candidate previously admitted in another medical college from applying for fresh admission. The Court ruled that a candidate who has opted for a special seat cannot claim seats in the general quota and that his remedy lies in seeking readmission in the college where he was previously admitted. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate previously admitted to a medical college on a reserved seat can apply for fresh admission to another medical college on merit?
  • Does opting for a special or reserved seat disentitle a candidate from competing for seats available in the general quota?
  • Can a candidate claim admission to a particular medical college as a matter of legal right after securing a seat in another medical college?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs The State1981 SCMR 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-12
  cancellation of bailJaphamurderSection 302 PPCcommon intentionapprehended on the spotbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of the Lahore High Court in Criminal Revision No. 97 of 1977, dated 26th July 1977, whereby bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge was cancelled. The case arose from an FIR registered under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging that the petitioner held the deceased in a Japha (embrace/grapple), facilitating his co-accused to deliver fatal dagger blows. The petitioner contended that he was empty-handed, that allegations of Japha are frequently fabricated to falsely implicate individuals, that a co-accused had been discharged, and sought the benefit of doubt for grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion in cancelling bail. The Court observed that the petitioner was apprehended on the spot and that a specific, definite allegation of holding the deceased in a Japha was attributed to him in the FIR. At this preliminary stage, benefit of doubt could not be extended. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who allegedly held the deceased in a Japha to facilitate co-accused in inflicting fatal injuries is entitled to the grant of bail?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended at the bail stage to an accused captured on the spot with a specific role assigned in the FIR?
  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its discretion by cancelling bail granted to an accused assigned the role of catching hold (Japha) of the deceased during a murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad and Other vs The State1981 PLD SC 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-07
  murderinjured eye-witnessinterested witnesscorroborationrecovery of crime weaponspolice witnesstestimony of policeman
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was directed against a decision of the High Court confirming the appellants' conviction and sentences under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the testimony of ocular witnesses who were close relatives of the deceased required independent corroboration to sustain a conviction, and whether the evidence of recovery of weapons of offence could be established solely on the testimony of an investigating police officer after the private recovery witness was disbelieved. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. The Court held that the eye-witnesses, including an injured witness, were natural and reliable, particularly as they were also closely related to the appellants and would not falsely implicate them. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that the evidence of a police officer regarding recovery cannot be automatically discredited or rejected merely because of his official status as a policeman, provided his testimony is trustworthy.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a police officer sufficient to prove the recovery of crime weapons if the private recovery witness is disbelieved?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of eye-witnesses who are closely related to both the victim and the accused?
  • Does the mere status of a witness as a police officer render his testimony regarding recoveries unreliable in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs The State1981 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-09-04
  interim bailbail cancellationcommittal proceedingscriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for special leave to appeal along with a criminal miscellaneous application for the cancellation of bail previously granted to the petitioners Muhammad Amin and Irshad Ahmad Khan. The core legal question concerns whether bail granted through interim orders should be cancelled or continued while committal proceedings are ongoing before the magistrate. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that it would be inappropriate to express any opinion on the nature and quality of the prosecution evidence while inquiry proceedings were nearing completion. Consequently, the court decided to allow the interim bail orders to stand and left the determination of bail to the concerned trial court upon the committal of the petitioners to the Court of Session, with the consent of the parties. The key principle laid down is that where inquiry proceedings are at a concluding stage, superior courts may maintain interim bail and defer the question of post-arrest bail to the trial court upon committal.

  Questions settled

  • Should interim bail be continued when inquiry proceedings are near completion?
  • Can the Supreme Court defer the decision of bail to the trial court upon committal of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Muhammad Gulzar and 2 Other1981 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  acquittalright of private defencerevisional jurisdictioncriminal revisionsudden fightcommon intentionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a criminal revision petition challenging the acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in acquitting the respondents, who claimed the right of private defence, and whether the appellate court should have interfered with the trial court's findings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings, which were based on evidence including the presence of injuries on both sides and the recovery of broken furniture, were neither perverse nor flimsy. Consequently, the High Court correctly declined to exercise its revisional jurisdiction to order a retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed that where both parties sustain injuries in an occurrence, the plea of private defence is a valid consideration, and in the absence of legal error or perversity in the assessment of evidence by the trial court, the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal, nor will it re-evaluate the evidence to substitute its own findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal where the trial court's findings are based on evidence and are not perverse?
  • Does a co-accused have the right of private defence if they acted to protect their companion who was also injured in the same occurrence?
  • Is a case of sudden fight under Exception IV to section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, applicable when both parties have sustained injuries?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin and 6 Others vs Chief Settlemetn Commissioner, Lahore and 3 Other1981 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-24
  garden allotmentcancellation of allotmentlacheswrit petitiondelayrehabilitation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of a temporary garden allotment made in favor of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and its subsequent re-allotment to another respondent in 1961 by an officer of the Central Record Office. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners' challenge against the allegedly without-jurisdiction cancellation and re-allotment orders was barred by laches due to their pursuit of departmental verification remedies rather than timely approaching the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the petitioners contended the cancelling officer lacked competence and that no departmental appeal lay against such orders, their failure to promptly challenge the orders via a writ petition and instead pursuing delayed verification proceedings for several years constituted fatal laches. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that inordinate delay in seeking constitutional remedies cannot be condoned based on mistaken departmental pursuits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition challenging an allotment cancellation order is barred by laches when the petitioner pursues departmental verification instead of timely judicial remedies?
  • Can a party be excused for delay in approaching the High Court on the ground that they were pursuing administrative proceedings before departmental authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Member, Board of Revenue and 7 Other1981 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-29
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIIProperty ResumptionSubstituted ServicePTDConstitutional PetitionLocus StandiTransfer Price
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the resumption of property (House No. 5-6/4, Quetta) by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the resumption of property and subsequent auction to the petitioner were validly executed despite procedural lapses in serving notice and providing the defaulter an opportunity to pay the transfer price. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the resumption order was invalid due to non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of paragraph 3(2) of Chapter II of Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Court emphasized that substituted service by publication did not absolve the authorities from the obligation to inform the defaulter of the cancellation order, which would have allowed them to pay the outstanding transfer price. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument regarding lack of locus standi, affirming that the legal representatives of a deceased transferee possess the right to pursue litigation concerning valuable property rights. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does substituted service by publication satisfy the mandatory requirement to inform a defaulter of a property resumption order under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Can the legal representatives of a deceased transferee maintain a constitutional petition to challenge the resumption of property?
  • Does the failure to comply with mandatory procedural requirements in Settlement Scheme No. VIII invalidate an order of property resumption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Hasan Bibi and Other1981 SCMR 875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-04
  rent caselandlord and tenantdefault in rentconcurrent findingsejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Muhammad Ali Shah against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his Second Appeal from Order in a rent case. The core legal question concerned the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and whether the petitioner was a defaulter in the payment of rent. The Supreme Court held that the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is a question of fact conclusively decided by three courts below through concurrent findings, and since the petitioner admittedly failed to pay rent to the landlord, he was rightly ordered to be evicted. The petition was dismissed with costs as it was found to be without any substantial ground and filed merely to gain time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is a question of fact concluded by concurrent findings of the lower forums?
  • Can a tenant who admits non-payment of rent to the claimed landlord be classified as a defaulter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Butt vs Ghulam Rasul1981 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-13
  leave to appealejectmentex parte proceedingstransfer of caserent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's ejectment from the disputed premises. The core legal question concerns the validity of ex parte proceedings taken against the petitioner following the administrative transfer of the rent case to another Rent Controller, and whether the petitioner had proper notice of such transfer. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the petitioner's counsel did appear before the transferee Court—thereby establishing notice—and that the petitioner had no case on merits were unexceptionable and did not warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, granting the petitioner three months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ex parte proceedings can be initiated when a case is transferred administratively and the party or their counsel fails to appear after initial appearance?
  • Does a concurrent finding of fact regarding the appearance of counsel before a transferee court warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Etc. vs Abdul Hadi Etc.1981 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-16
  rejection of plaintabuse of process of lawfraudSection 12(2) CPCOrder VII Rule 11 CPCbar to separate suitlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute wherein the tenant instituted a fresh civil suit challenging the landlord's title and seeking a declaration that prior orders, including a final Supreme Court order confirming ownership, were illegal and obtained by fraud. The trial court and first appellate court rejected the suit, but the High Court remanded the matter on second appeal, holding that the plaint could not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court granted leave, reversed the High Court's decision, and restored the rejection of the plaint. The Supreme Court held that Order VII Rule 11 CPC is not exhaustive regarding summary dismissal or rejection of a plaint. It further ruled that re-agitating settled title issues constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Crucially, under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, any challenge to a final judgment or decree on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction must be brought by filing an application before the court that passed the final order, rather than through an independent suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 exhaustive of all situations in which a plaint can be rejected or a suit dismissed summarily?
  • Can a separate civil suit be filed to challenge a final judgment or order on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does re-agitating a title already conclusively determined by the Supreme Court constitute an abuse of the process of law justifying summary rejection of a plaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad vs Muhammad Yaqub and 6 Other1981 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-22
  bail cancellationmurderdelay in challanwitness tamperingsecurity proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave to appeal petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing to cancel the pre-trial bail granted to the respondents who are accused in a murder case registered under sections 148 and 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the propriety of cancelling bail on the grounds of subsequent submission of the challan and allegations of witness tampering. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the State has already initiated security proceedings under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to address threats to prosecution witnesses, interference with the bail order is unwarranted at this stage. The Court laid down the principle that if police remedial action proves ineffective and accused persons persist in tampering with witnesses, the petitioner may approach the committing court under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for cancellation of bail, regardless of the High Court's earlier refusal order. Consequently, the leave petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted due to delayed challan and conflicting police reports should be cancelled upon the subsequent submission of the challan?
  • Can bail be cancelled on the ground that the accused are attempting to suborn prosecution witnesses when the State has already initiated security proceedings?
  • Does a High Court order refusing to cancel bail prevent the committing court from subsequently cancelling bail under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the accused persist in tampering with witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1981SCMR 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-21
  review petitionrecall of judgmentnullity in lawrehearing of appealbench compositionomission of judge nameprocedural defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed challenging the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 31st May 1980 on the ground that it constituted a nullity in law. The petitioner contended that the appeal was originally heard by a four-Judge Bench comprising the Chief Justice and three other Judges, but due to an inadvertent omission of the Chief Justice's name from the judgment sheet panel, the draft judgment was never circulated to him for his opinion, resulting in a judgment delivered by only three Judges. The Supreme Court acknowledged the substance of this submission, observing that the failure to circulate the judgment to a member of the Bench who had heard the appeal constituted a serious shortcoming requiring the rehearing of the appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the review petition, recalled its previous judgment dated 31st May 1980, and directed that the main appeal be listed for rehearing before the Bench.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment delivered without circulating the opinion to a member of the Bench who heard the appeal is a nullity in the eye of law?
  • Can a judgment be recalled on review if a Judge who originally heard the appeal was inadvertently omitted from giving his opinion?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abbas vs The State1981 PLD Supreme Court 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-18
  sanction for prosecutionpublic servantcriminal law amendmentcorruptionjurisdiction of special judgestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four criminal appeals and a review petition challenging convictions for corruption-related offences. The core legal question is whether the statutory requirement for prior sanction for prosecution under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, applies to an accused who was a public servant at the time of the alleged offence but had ceased to be one by the time of prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for prior sanction for prosecution under the Act does not extend to individuals who are no longer public servants at the time the court takes cognizance of the offence. The Court reaffirmed that the protection afforded by the Act is intended for serving public servants to ensure the orderly functioning of public services. The Court clarified that the explanation regarding the 'appropriate Government' in Section 6(5) serves only to identify the relevant authority for granting sanction when it is required, not to extend the scope of the protection itself. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the earlier precedents correctly interpreted the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is prior sanction for prosecution under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 required for a person who has ceased to be a public servant at the time of prosecution?
  • Does the definition of 'appropriate Government' in the explanation to Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 extend the requirement of sanction to former public servants?
  • Does the jurisdiction of a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 terminate if the accused ceases to be a public servant before the trial?
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• Mufti Mushtaq Ahmed ) vs Tide Federation of Pakistan1981 PLD Supreme Court 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-16
  civil servantworkmanService Tribunallimitationfinal orderdepartmental revisionremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal against removal from service as incompetent and time-barred. The core legal questions were whether a railway employee performing clerical duties at the relevant time is a civil servant or a workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923, and whether an order passed in departmental revision after 1st July 1969 constitutes the final departmental order for maintainability under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. The Supreme Court held that determining whether an employee is a workman or a civil servant depends on the nature of duties actually performed at the relevant time rather than mere job designation. Because the appellant was performing clerical duties when the charges arose, he was a civil servant. Additionally, the court held that final orders under Section 4 include revisional orders exhausting departmental remedies. Since the Vice-Chairman of the Railway Board passed the revisional order after 1st July 1969, the appeal was competent. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and remitted the matter to the Service Tribunal for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nature of duties actually performed at the relevant time determine whether an employee is a civil servant or a workman?
  • Does a departmental revisional order constitute a final order for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Ordinance 1973?
  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal maintainable where the final departmental revisional order was passed after 1st July 1969?
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• Mst. Zohra Irshad and, Anqthers vs Messrs S. K. & F. CompanyPLD 1981 Supreme Court 598. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-05
  ejectmentdefault in rentrent controller jurisdictionadvance renttentative rent orderres judicataurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the Rent Controller and appellate authorities were justified in ordering the ejectment of the tenant appellants for default in rent, notwithstanding a payment of Rs. 30,000 made to a partner of the landlord firm. The core legal questions involved the limited and special jurisdiction of the Rent Controller regarding money claims, the nature of tentative rent orders under rent restriction laws, and whether unrelated financial transactions or loans can be adjusted against monthly rent or shield a tenant from default. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's jurisdiction is restricted to matters specified in the relevant rent ordinance and cannot extend to adjudicating upon independent money lending, borrowing, or loan repayment disputes totally unconnected with the tenancy. Furthermore, interlocutory tentative rent orders do not operate as res judicata for final adjudications. The Court ruled that the payment of Rs. 30,000 was not advance rent and could not be set off against rental default, affirming the concurrent findings of lower tribunals and dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller extends to adjudicating upon money lending, borrowing, and repayment disputes totally unconnected with the tenancy?
  • Does a tentative rent order passed under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 operate as res judicata on the ultimate outcome of proceedings after evidence is recorded?
  • Can an independent loan or payment made to a partner of a landlord firm be adjusted towards monthly rent to save a tenant from default?
  • Whether a Rent Controller is justified in ordering ejectment of a tenant who fails to pay rent for the disputed period and whose plea of advance rent is found to be unsubstantiated?
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• Mst. Zainab Bibi and Other vs Mst. Bilqis Bibi and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-23
  apostasydissolution of marriagelegitimacy of childrenacknowledgment of paternitybaptism certificatepreponderance of probabilityShia inheritanceprobative value of admissions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the distribution of the estate of the late Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, specifically regarding the legitimacy of his marriage to the first appellant, Mst. Zainab Bibi, and the legitimacy of their children. The core legal questions were whether the first appellant's conversion to Christianity during her prior marriage to another man automatically dissolved that marriage, and whether her subsequent marriage to the deceased was valid. The Supreme Court held that under the law applicable in 1924, a Muslim wife's apostasy from Islam automatically dissolved her marriage, rendering her free to remarry. The Court further held that the baptism certificate produced was admissible and substantive evidence, and that the deceased's repeated public acknowledgments of the first appellant as his wife and the other appellants as his children were of high probative value, sufficient to establish the marriage and legitimacy. The Court laid down that in civil proceedings, the standard of proof is a preponderance of probability, and that solemn admissions made by a deceased person in prior court proceedings regarding his marital status are highly reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Did the apostasy of a Muslim wife from Islam automatically dissolve her marriage prior to the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939?
  • Is a baptism certificate admissible and substantive evidence under the Evidence Act 1872 when the author is unavailable to testify?
  • Does Section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 have retrospective effect on marriages dissolved by apostasy before its enactment?
  • What is the evidentiary value of solemn admissions made by a deceased person in prior court proceedings regarding their marital status?
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• Mst. Zaibun Nisa and Others vs Syed Amjad Hussain Bokhari and Another1981 SCMR 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19
  Constitutional petitionbona fide personal needevictionfindings of factwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the order of the High Court upholding the decision of the District Judge, which ordered the eviction of the petitioners on the ground of genuine bona fide personal need of the landlords. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the appellate authority in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact recorded by the District Judge did not suffer from any omission or misreading of evidence, and therefore the High Court's refusal to interfere under its Constitutional jurisdiction was fully justified. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by a lower appellate court based on proper appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with in Constitutional jurisdiction unless vitiated by misreading or non-reading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact recorded by a District Judge in Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does a finding of fact based on evidence suffer from infirmity merely due to re-appraisal without showing omission or misreading of the record?
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• Mst. Saeeda vs Lal Badshah1981 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  family courtpersonal attendanceappearance through agentsdissolution of marriageleave to appeallegal practitioners
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from family court proceedings where the wife sought dissolution of marriage and insisted on the personal presence of her husband on each date of hearing. The Family Court dismissed her application, allowing the husband to be represented by an agent or counsel, a view upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether it is obligatory for parties to be personally present on each date of hearing under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and whether the provision permitting representation for pardanashin ladies excludes general representation by counsel. The Supreme Court held that the personal attendance of parties is not indispensable and that a party can be represented by an agent or counsel, as section 18 of the Family Courts Act does not take away the right of an advocate to appear and act for a client under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is it obligatory for parties to be personally present on each date of hearing in proceedings under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Does Section 18 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 take away the right of a counsel to appear and act for a client under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973?
  • Can a party to a family suit be represented by an agent or counsel during proceedings?
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• Mst. Rashida Bibi vs Muhammad Ismail1981 SCMR 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-01
  custody of minorwelfare of minorGuardians and Wards ActMuslim Lawmaintenancecustody dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that upheld a Guardian Judge's decision granting custody of a minor son to his father. The petitioner (mother) argued that the lower courts were unduly influenced by a presumption under Muslim Law that a male child over seven years old should be in the father's custody, and that the father's failure to pay maintenance should have disqualified him. The Supreme Court examined whether the lower courts relied solely on legal presumptions or on the welfare of the minor. The Court held that while there is no absolute presumption in Muslim Law that overrides the welfare of the child, the lower courts had correctly evaluated the evidence, finding that the mother lacked the means to properly educate and care for the child, whereas the father had the means. The Court affirmed that a father's failure to pay maintenance does not automatically disentitle him to custody. The petition was dismissed, as the lower courts' findings were based on the child's welfare rather than mere legal presumptions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to pay maintenance automatically disentitle a father from obtaining custody of his minor child?
  • Is the custody of a minor child to be determined based on a presumption under Muslim Law or on the welfare of the minor?
  • Can a court grant custody of a minor to a father based on his superior financial means to provide education and care?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raheel Begum and 7 Other vs Muhammad Zahir and 2 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-04
  displaced persons compensation and rehabilitationearmarking schemec.h. form restorationform e cancellationsettlement authoritiestransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside orders of the Settlement authorities transferring a disputed house to the appellants (heirs of a claimant displaced person) and directed reconsideration of a non-claimant respondent's application. The core legal question was whether a claimant displaced person, who withdrew their C.H. Form to participate in an earmarking scheme by submitting Form 'E', could seek the restoration of their C.H. Form upon failing to secure any property under that scheme. The Supreme Court held that while filing Form 'E' operates as a cancellation of the prior C.H. Form to prevent multiple allotments, it does not permanently debar a claimant from seeking the restoration of their C.H. Form or applying for available properties if they remain unsuccessful in the earmarking process through no fault of their own. The Court laid down that the choice to participate in an earmarking scheme is irrevocable regarding simultaneous claims, but does not forfeit a claimant's statutory right to compensation or prevent the revival of a withdrawn form when the earmarking fails and the property remains unallotted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the submission of Form 'E' to participate in an earmarking scheme permanently bars a claimant displaced person from seeking the restoration of a previously withdrawn C.H. Form upon failing to secure any property?
  • Can a revisional authority under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 restore a C.H. Form that was previously cancelled due to participation in an alternative allocation scheme?
  • Whether settlement authorities are legally bound to consider a pending application for the restoration of a C.H. Form before transferring the same property to a non-claimant applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazir vs Hafiz Ghulam Mustafa Etc.S1981 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-15
  custody of minorGuardians and Wards Actremarriage of motherprohibited degreewelfare of minorcustody agreementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from proceedings under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, wherein the Guardian Judge directed the petitioner mother to restore custody of her minor daughter to the respondent father, which decision was affirmed on appeal by the High Court. The core legal questions involved whether a mother who remarries a man outside the prohibited degree to her minor daughter retains custody, and the effect of a previous agreement surrendering custody. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that awarding custody to a mother who has remarried a person not within the prohibited degree to the ward effectively places the minor under the charge of a stranger, which is contrary to her welfare. Additionally, the Court noted that the mother's voluntary agreement executed at the time of divorce to surrender custody after five years served the minor's welfare in the circumstances. Finding sound reasons and no legal error in the concurrent orders below, the Court declined to interfere.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mother who remarries a person not within the prohibited degree to her minor daughter is entitled to retain custody of the minor?
  • Whether a voluntary agreement entered into at the time of divorce surrendering minor custody can be given effect to determine the welfare of the minor?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent lower court findings on minor custody where no legal error is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Memoona Begum and 7 Others vs Fda Hussain and Another1981 SCMR 1226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-04
  tenancy disputeejectmentwaiver of rightsconsent decreeexecution proceedingslegal heir
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over tenancy rights in a room in Karachi, following the death of the original tenant, Abdul Kadir Patel. The petitioners, heirs of the deceased, challenged ejectment proceedings initiated by the landlord (respondent No. 1) against another heir (respondent No. 2). Following multiple unsuccessful legal attempts to intervene through applications under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, including applications for impleadment and objections to execution, the petitioners filed a civil suit and subsequent revisions, all of which were dismissed by lower courts and the High Court. The Supreme Court addressed the core question of whether the petitioners could continue to challenge the ejectment order after having previously consented to vacate the premises in the High Court. The Court held that the petition lacked merit, ruling that the petitioners' prior consent to vacate constituted a waiver of their legal right to pursue the claim further. The principle laid down is that a party who has consented to vacate premises in judicial proceedings is foreclosed from subsequently challenging the merits of the ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party's consent to vacate premises in judicial proceedings constitute a waiver of their right to further challenge the ejectment order?
  • Can heirs of a deceased tenant maintain a challenge to an ejectment order after previously consenting to vacate the premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehraj Begum Alias Mst. Majan and Another vs Settlement &1981 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-14
  Settlement Schemetransfer of propertyarrears of rentlocus standifinding of factwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of the petitioners' claim for the transfer of a property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The petitioners, heirs of a deceased tenant, sought the transfer of a house in Lahore, but their application was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, a decision affirmed through subsequent appellate and revisional proceedings. The core legal questions were whether the initial rejection order was passed without jurisdiction due to a lack of hearing, whether representation by a family member in the proceedings was valid, and whether the petitioners were entitled to transfer despite significant rent arrears. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact regarding the proceedings were unassailable and that the representation by the petitioners' son was sufficient. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that a tenant in arrears of rent is not entitled to the transfer of the property under the relevant settlement laws, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact recorded by settlement authorities be re-agitated in writ proceedings?
  • Does the representation of a party by a family member in settlement proceedings constitute valid representation in the absence of a formal power of attorney?
  • Is a tenant who is in arrears of rent entitled to the transfer of the property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam Bibi and 13 Others vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum and 4 Other1981 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  Rehabilitation and Settlement Schemeexclusive jurisdictionconfirmed allotteeinheritance disputeverified claimwrit jurisdictionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the inheritance of property rights following the death of a right-holder, Muhammad Akbar, who held a verified claim for agricultural land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme but died before any specific land allotment was confirmed. The core legal question was whether the inheritance dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation and Settlement authorities or was cognizable by Civil and Revenue Courts. The Supreme Court held that because the deceased held only a verified claim and no confirmed allotment at the time of his death, the matter remained within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation authorities. The Court distinguished this from cases involving confirmed allottees, where the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts is not barred. The key principle laid down is that while succession to the estate of a confirmed allottee is beyond the purview of the Settlement Scheme and cognizable by Civil Courts, disputes regarding the inheritance of rights to allotment held by a deceased right-holder prior to confirmation remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts extend to inheritance disputes involving a deceased right-holder who had not yet received a confirmed allotment?
  • Are disputes regarding the inheritance of rights to allotment held by a deceased right-holder under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation authorities?
  • Does the bar under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 apply to the succession of the estate of a confirmed allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila Latif vs Ghulam Yazdani Khan and Other1981 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-17
  personal requirementevictiontenantlandladyspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a decision of the Lahore High Court affirming the lower appellate authority's findings regarding the bona fide personal requirement of the respondent landlady for eviction of the petitioner tenant. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court correctly evaluated the appreciation of evidence by the lower appellate forums and whether the landlady's subsequent death and other conduct extinguished the ground for eviction. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate authority gave convincing reasons for upsetting the Rent Controller's findings, that the children's requirement survived the landlady's death during litigation, and that concurrent findings of fact based on unrebutted evidence were unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by appellate forums based on proper re-examination of evidence and un-rebutted statements on oath will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court, and a ground for personal requirement concerning children does not abate upon the death of the original landlady.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ground for personal requirement for eviction come to an end upon the death of the landlady during the pendency of litigation when children's requirement is also pleaded?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by appellate forums regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord?
  • Is failure to produce documentary evidence regarding health and schooling sufficient to discard un-rebutted oral statements on oath in rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Izzat vs Allah Ditta1981 PLD Supreme Court 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  fraudvoid documentnon est factumlimitation periodpermanent injunctionancillary reliefpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave arose from a Regular Second Appeal dismissing the appellant-wife's suit for a declaration that a registered sale deed executed in favour of her husband was void due to fraud and lack of consideration, alongside a prayer for permanent injunction restraining him from claiming ownership or possession. The core legal questions involved the applicability of Articles 91, 95, and 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 and whether a party alleging fraud in the execution of an instrument is bound to seek its cancellation. The Supreme Court held that where a person's signature or thumb impression to a document is obtained by misrepresenting its character (such as a power of attorney disguised as a sale deed), the transaction is non est and void ab initio, rendering Articles 91 and 95 inapplicable when cancellation is merely ancillary to the primary relief of protecting possession. The Court laid down that a plaintiff in lawful possession, threatened by a void instrument, is not obliged to sue for its cancellation within a restricted period, and limitation runs from the accrual of the threat to possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for declaration and permanent injunction where cancellation of a fraudulent deed is merely ancillary is governed by Article 91 or Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does limitation for filing a suit run from the date of the execution or knowledge of a fraudulent document when the plaintiff remains in continuous possession of the property?
  • Whether an instrument executed through fraudulent misrepresentation as to its very nature is void ab initio or merely voidable under section 19 of the Contract Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hashmat Bibi and Others vs Gulzar Muhammad and Other1981 SC MR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-06
  review petitionconstitutional jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against this Court's order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal, which had challenged a Lahore High Court judgment allowing a writ petition regarding the division of a small property measuring 125 square yards. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in setting aside the unanimous exercise of jurisdiction by the Settlement authorities and whether a review could be entertained on the basis of new documents not previously produced. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside orders without lawful authority as there was ample material showing the property was divisible, and further held that a review cannot be permitted on the basis of material that was available but not produced during the earlier proceedings. The key principle laid down is that the High Court may interfere in constitutional jurisdiction with Settlement authorities' orders if they suffer from a lack of lawful authority, and a review petition cannot serve as a vehicle to reargue a case or introduce new evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court set aside an order of the Settlement authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether a review petition can be permitted on the basis of material that was available but not produced earlier?
  • Is a review application maintainable when it is merely an attempt to reargue the original petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Habibunnisa Alias Mst. Bivi vs Zafar Iqbal and Another1981 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-25
  ocular testimonyappreciation of evidenceeye-witness credibilityacquittal reversalcriminal appealmurder convictionnatural witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which acquitted the respondent of murder and house trespass charges, reversing a conviction by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in discarding the testimony of two natural, disinterested eye-witnesses—the deceased's widow and a neighbor—on the basis of minor discrepancies, lack of proven motive, and procedural conduct following the incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's rejection of this evidence was based on hypothetical reasoning and flimsy grounds. The Court reaffirmed that the testimony of natural, disinterested witnesses, who have no animosity toward the accused, should not be lightly brushed aside, especially when corroborated by medical evidence and a promptly lodged F.I.R. The Court emphasized that minor contradictions in statements, particularly when witnesses are under severe emotional distress or shock, do not necessarily undermine their credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the original conviction under Section 302 and Section 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and upheld the sentence imposed by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of natural and disinterested eye-witnesses be discarded solely on the basis of minor contradictions in their statements?
  • Does the failure to prove a specific motive for a crime necessarily invalidate the testimony of eye-witnesses?
  • Should the evidence of a witness be rejected because they did not immediately disclose the identity of the culprit to every person they encountered in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event?
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• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Abdul Qayyum and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-03
  dissolution of marriagetalaqkhulamubara'trevocation of talaqinheritancemuslim family laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This case addresses whether a dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the deceased husband constituted an irrevocable divorce by mutual consent (Mubara't) or Khula, thus excluding the application of section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 regarding revocation and notice. The appellant sued for dissolution, later alleging she was divorced via a written Talaqnama following a Jirga, which the husband initially denied or attempted to revoke. Upon the husband's death, his heirs sought a declaration that the appellant was not his legal wife and thus not entitled to inherit. The trial court and District Judge ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that the Talaq was revoked for lack of notice under section 7. However, the High Court reversed this, finding the transaction amounted to Mubara't, rendering revocation inapplicable. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the evidence demonstrated a unilateral pronouncement of Talaq under pressure rather than a voluntary dissolution by mutual consent or Khula. The Court concluded that the High Court erred in classifying it as Mubara't, thereby setting aside the judgment and restoring the lower appellate court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a divorce pronounced under pressure and without mutual consent constitutes a divorce by mutual consent or Mubara't?
  • Does section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 apply to a unilateral pronouncement of Talaq?
  • Can a divorce be treated as Khula or Mubara't in the absence of evidence showing mutual consent or waiver of dower?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima and Another vs Khushi Muhammads1981 SCMR 1066 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-29
  civil revisionmaintainabilitysupreme court jurisdictiondistrict court statusconstitutional petitionrevisional powerscode of civil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two civil miscellaneous petitions arising from orders passed by District Judges in revisional jurisdictions. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan is whether a civil miscellaneous petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable against an order passed by a District Court while exercising revisional powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petitions are incompetent and dismissed them. The ratio decidendi is that when a District Court exercises revisional powers conferred upon it under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, it does not acquire the status of a High Court; rather, it remains a subordinate civil court. The key principle laid down is that the mere conferment of concurrent revisional powers by the legislature upon the District Court does not alter its statutory identity to equate it with a High Court created under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan lies against an order passed by a District Court in exercise of revisional powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does the conferment of revisional powers on a District Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure elevate its status to that of a High Court?
  • What is the distinction between the jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under the Constitution and the powers exercised by a District Court under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima Bibi and Others vs Settlement Authorities through Chief1981 SCMR 740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesagreement of associationwrit petitionlachesdelayres judicataleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the transfer of a composite evacuee property consisting of shops and residential portions in Chichawatni. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner originally transferred the property to claimant displaced persons, who subsequently entered into an agreement of association with the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners regarding one shop. Through subsequent revision proceedings and supplementary orders before settlement authorities, the transfer in favour of the petitioners was adversely affected and ultimately upheld as invalid by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners challenged this order via a writ petition in the Lahore High Court after an inordinate delay of several years, which was dismissed on grounds of res judicata and laches. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the matter and agreed with the High Court that the constitutional petition was liable to be dismissed due to gross laches and unexplained delay in challenging the administrative order. The court laid down the principle that unexplained inordinate delay in challenging adverse administrative orders through a writ petition warrants dismissal on the ground of laches.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition challenging an administrative order of the settlement authorities liable to dismissal on the ground of inordinate delay and laches?
  • Can an associate of a transferee challenge an adverse settlement order after a delay of several years without a tenable explanation?
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• Mst. Bashiran and 4 Others vs Pakistan through General Manager, P.1981 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  review petitionfatal accidentworkmen compensationemployer negligencerailway employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 17-9-1976, which dismissed an appeal arising from the dismissal of a civil suit for compensation regarding the fatal accident of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, an employee of the railway who fell from a ladder while descending from a roof. The core legal question was whether the railway authorities were negligent under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, for failing to provide safety measures such as a lifeline while descending a ladder. The Supreme Court held that the slipping of the deceased's foot was not associated with any defect in the ladder or negligence of the employer, and that safety belts or lifelines are not designed or required for climbing down a ladder where hands remain free to secure oneself. The review petition was accordingly dismissed, as no error or sufficient ground for review was established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the scope of review in the Supreme Court extends to re-evaluating factual findings without a demonstrated error?
  • Does the failure to provide a safety belt while climbing down a ladder constitute actionable negligence under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855?
  • Can an employer be held liable for an accident caused by an employee's accidental slipping where no defect in equipment or lack of ordinary precaution is proved?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Barkatey and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue and Other1981 SC M R259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12
  constitutional petitionmutationlife estaterehabilitation authoritiescivil suitadequate remedyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of an order passed by the High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed by the petitioners regarding the entitlement to land allotted to three ladies in lieu of property left in India. The revenue authorities had sanctioned mutations treating the title of the ladies as a life estate and determined inheritance accordingly. The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities rather than rehabilitation authorities, argued errors in their determined shares under Islamic law and paragraph 46 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme, and contended they were full owners rather than life estate holders. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the dispute is of a factual nature requiring evidence and proper adjudication by a civil court, reiterating that a mutation by itself does not settle the entitlement of parties. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the view that writ jurisdiction was not justified when an adequate remedy of a civil suit exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutation by itself is intended to settle the entitlement of parties?
  • Can revenue authorities determine inheritance rights involving disputed factual questions through mutations?
  • Is a constitutional petition an appropriate remedy when an adequate remedy of filing a civil suit is available for resolving disputed land entitlements?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakht Bang vs Mst. Jamila Alias Afsar Jan and Onws1981 PLD Supreme Court 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-24
  ex parte decreeservice of summonscopy of plaintlimitation periodpartition suitincarcerationdirectory provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside an appellate order that had vacated ex parte preliminary and final decrees in a partition and accounts suit. The core legal questions concerned whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree is barred by Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 when the summons was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint under Order V Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether non-compliance with said rule renders the service of summons ineffective. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of Order V Rule 2 is directory rather than mandatory, and its non-compliance constitutes a procedural irregularity rather than an illegality that vitiates service, meaning a defendant served with a summons but lacking a copy of the plaint must seek an adjournment rather than claim invalid service. The Court laid down that due service refers to the summons under Order V rules 9 to 30, and where a defendant is duly served, time under Article 164 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree is hit by the bar of Article 164 of the Limitation Act when the summons was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint in accordance with Order V Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does the failure to supply a copy of the plaint along with the summons render the service of summons ineffective or illegal?
  • Is the provision of Order V Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring a summons to be accompanied by a copy of the plaint mandatory or directory?
  • Whether incarceration in jail on a capital charge constitutes sufficient cause to extend the limitation period under Article 164 of the Limitation Act for setting aside an ex parte decree when the party was duly served?
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• Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan vs Messrs United Bank Ltd. and Another1981 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-13
  execution of decreejudicial saleprivate offerlimitation periodinherent powers of courtpublic auctionmortgaged property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind, which dismissed the petitioner's application to set aside a sale of mortgaged property executed pursuant to a final foreclosure decree. The core legal questions involved whether an application to set aside a judicial sale was barred by limitation under Article 166 of the Limitation Act, and whether a court could accept a private offer for the sale of property in execution proceedings when public auction had become impracticable, despite the provisions of Order XXI, rule 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the application was indeed time-barred, as time ran from the date the private offer was accepted, and that the issuance of a sale certificate was merely an administrative act. Furthermore, the Court held that in the absence of explicit statutory prohibition, a court may exercise its inherent powers to adopt an alternative mode of sale, such as a private offer, to serve the ends of justice when public auction fails, provided due notice is given and no substantial injury or prejudice is proven by the judgment debtor. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation for filing an application to set aside a judicial sale run from the date the sale offer is accepted or from the date of the issuance of the sale certificate?
  • Can a court accept a private offer for the sale of property in execution proceedings when a public auction has proved impracticable?
  • Are irregularities in the publication of a proclamation of sale considered illegalities that render the sale a nullity without proof of substantial injury?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Begum and 9 Others Muhammad Fazal and Another vs Chief1981 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina Bibi vs Pehlwan Shah and Other1981 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07
  leave to appealacquittalinimical witnessappreciation of evidencecorroborationtainted evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by Mst. Amina Bibi against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of the charge of murder. The primary legal question before the Court was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence by discarding the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses and setting aside the conviction passed by the trial court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, finding that the sole eye-witness examined was an inimical witness related to the deceased whose testimony contained material inconsistencies with his previous statements and medical evidence. The Court reiterated the established legal principle that the testimony of an interested or inimical witness requires independent corroboration and that one piece of tainted evidence cannot be corroborated by another piece of tainted evidence. Finding the High Court's view reasonable and based on cogent reasons, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the appreciation of evidence and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can one piece of tainted evidence be used to corroborate another piece of tainted evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with a High Court's order of acquittal where the High Court's appreciation of evidence is based on cogent and reasonable grounds?
  • Whether the testimony of an inimical and interested witness can form the sole basis of conviction without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina Begum vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1981 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-31
  agreement of associationsettlement propertyforged documentconcurrent findings of factprocedural defectleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that maintained the cancellation of an agreement of association regarding disputed property. The petitioner, Mst. Amina Begum, challenged the cancellation, arguing that the respondent, Mst. Fatima, had acquiesced for nine years before seeking permission to pay the property price, which implied the validity of the agreement. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the factual findings of the Settlement Authorities regarding the validity of the agreement and whether the agreement was legally binding despite procedural irregularities. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine. The Court held that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Settlement Authorities, which had thrice determined the agreement to be a forged document. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that the failure to record the statements of the parties at the time of presenting an agreement of association constitutes a fatal procedural defect, rendering the agreement non-existent in the eye of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by Settlement Authorities regarding the validity of an agreement?
  • Is an agreement of association legally valid if the statements of the parties were not recorded at the time of its presentation?
  • Does a long delay in challenging an agreement of association automatically validate the agreement despite findings of forgery?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ameer Bibi and Others vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab, Lahore Arts Other1981 SCMR 1209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12
  evacuee propertyCustodian of Evacuee Propertydeclaration of non-evacuee propertywrit petitionleave to appealfinality of ordersbona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine a writ petition directed against an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The Custodian had upheld the Deputy Custodian's order determining that only a 7/70 share of the disputed land was non-evacuee property, while the remainder was evacuee property, following an earlier 1949 declaration under Section 8 of the West Punjab Protection of Evacuee Property Act 1948. The petitioners contended that the land was never treated as evacuee property prior to January 1, 1957, and argued for protection as bona fide purchasers. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the 1949 declaration explicitly found only 7/70 share to be non-evacuee, thereby by implication treating the remaining property as evacuee. The Court held that the declaration had achieved finality against the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and could not be reopened. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaration limiting a non-evacuee share in a property implicitly treats the remainder of the property as evacuee property?
  • Can a declaration rendered by a Deputy Custodian regarding evacuee status that has attained finality be challenged by the successors-in-interest of the applicant?
  • Whether new pleas regarding the jurisdiction of Custodian authorities can be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Nazir and 2 Other1981 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-28
  habeas corpuscustody of minorwrit jurisdictionguardian courtillegal detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus regarding the custody of a young girl, Mst. Zahida Perveen. The petitioner, the maternal grandmother of the girl, alleged that the girl was being detained by her paternal uncle. The High Court had previously dismissed a similar petition, relying on the girl's statement that she wished to reside with her paternal uncle, and subsequently dismissed a second petition, directing the petitioner to approach the Guardian Court for legal guardianship. The core legal question was whether habeas corpus proceedings are an appropriate remedy for resolving a custody dispute between relatives when there is no evidence of illegal or forcible detention. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere, affirming that the dispute was essentially a matter of custody to be resolved by the Guardian Court, rather than through extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that habeas corpus is not the proper forum for determining custody disputes where no forcible detention is established.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ of habeas corpus an appropriate remedy for resolving a custody dispute between relatives?
  • Can a court direct a party to seek relief from a Guardian Court instead of issuing a writ of habeas corpus in a custody matter?
  • Does the absence of forcible detention preclude the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Abbasi Begum vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima1981S C M R 752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-06
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in payment of rentfresh cause of actionurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's second appeal by the Lahore High Court, upholding the eviction order passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The respondent landlady filed an eviction application on the ground of default in rent, which was allowed by the Rent Controller and affirmed in successive appeals. The petitioner contended that the fresh eviction proceedings were barred under section 14 of the Ordinance due to protracted prior litigation. The core legal questions pertained to whether the fresh eviction application was barred by section 14 and whether it was founded on a fresh cause of action. The Supreme Court held that the application was based on a continuing default and a fresh cause of action arising after the settlement of demarcation disputes, and thus was not hit by section 14. Furthermore, the Court noted that the plea regarding the bar had not been raised in the written statement or urged before the High Court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fresh application for eviction on the ground of default in rent is barred under section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does a continuing default in the payment of rent furnish a fresh cause of action for eviction notwithstanding previous proceedings?
  • Can a plea not raised in the written statement before the Rent Controller or urged in the High Court be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Sharifunnisa and Others vs MRS. Piroja and Other1981 SCMR 1234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-22
  sublettingejectmentrelationship of landlord and tenantsecond appealrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind at Karachi, which allowed a second appeal and set aside concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge dismissing an ejectment application. The core legal question involved whether the deceased sub-tenant had unlawfully sublet or assigned the shop premises without the consent of the tenant, thereby rendering himself liable to eviction under the relevant rent restriction law. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the evidence conclusively established unauthorized subletting, noting that the lower courts had ignored material documents and made findings contrary to the record. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the High Court was legally justified in reversing the perverse findings of the courts below upon a proper re-appraisal of the evidentiary record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in second appeal can interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts when such findings ignore material documents?
  • Does the assignment or subletting of a rented premises without the landlord's consent constitute a ground for eviction?
  • Can a person claiming to be a direct tenant of the superior landlord be held to be a sub-tenant of the original tenant upon evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Samina Shaukat Ayub Khan vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi1981 PLD Supreme Court 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-31
  income taxundisclosed sourceunexplained cashstatutory exemptioncasual receiptburden of prooffinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of Civil Appeals arising from income-tax assessments for the years 1962-63 and 1966-67. The appellant, who filed wealth tax returns showing substantial cash in hand, claimed the funds were received as marriage gifts (salamis) and birth presents. The Income-tax Officer accepted only a portion of these claims as gifts and assessed the remaining unexplained amounts as income from undisclosed sources. The Appellate Tribunal and the Peshawar High Court upheld the assessments. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether unexplained cash in the hands of an assessee with no known source of income can be treated as assessable income, and whether such amounts qualify for exemption as casual and non-recurring receipts under Section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922. The Court held that if an assessee fails to satisfactorily explain the source and nature of cash receipts, the Income-tax Officer may legitimately presume the amount is income from an undisclosed source. Furthermore, the burden of proving an exemption lies on the assessee, which cannot be discharged without disclosing the source of the income.

  Questions settled

  • Can unexplained cash receipts in the hands of an assessee be treated as income from an undisclosed source if the assessee fails to satisfactorily explain their origin?
  • Does the burden of proving that an income qualifies for exemption under Section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922 lie upon the assessee?
  • Can an assessee claim an exemption for casual and non-recurring receipts under Section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922 without disclosing or explaining the source of the income?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Anwar Fatima and 2 Others vs Miss Aziz Begum and 7 Other1981 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-04
  seniority disputeservice lawnatural justicecondemned unheardprovisional seniority listService TribunalCivil Servants Act 1973
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three leave petitions arising from a Service Tribunal judgment regarding seniority disputes among teachers. The petitioners challenged the Tribunal's decision, which granted seniority to the respondent, Miss Aziz Begum, based on a government notification. The petitioners argued that the Civil Servants Act, 1973, should govern their seniority and that the respondent's appeal to the Tribunal was incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Servants Act, 1973, did not apply to seniority disputes already concluded by prior undertakings given by the petitioners upon their transfer. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appeal against a provisional seniority list is competent. However, regarding the petition of Mrs. Asiya Mahmood, the Court found that she was "condemned unheard" because the Tribunal sent notice to an incorrect address, resulting in an ex parte order. The Court established that any order passed without affording a party an opportunity of hearing is without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. Consequently, the Court dismissed the other petitions but allowed Mrs. Asiya Mahmood’s petition, remanding her case to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Civil Servants Act 1973 apply to seniority disputes that were already concluded by an undertaking prior to the Act's commencement?
  • Is an appeal filed before a Service Tribunal against a provisional seniority list competent?
  • Does an order passed by a tribunal without providing a party an opportunity of hearing constitute a violation of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Sadaqat Hamid vs Government of Punjab and Other1981 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-24
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticecompetent authoritycivil servantmisconductadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a college lecturer by the Education Secretary of the Punjab Government for alleged misconduct. The appellant challenged the removal, primarily contending that the show-cause notice provided was vague and lacked necessary particulars, thereby prejudicing her defense. Additionally, she argued that the Education Secretary lacked the legal authority to dismiss her, asserting that such power resided solely with the Governor. The Supreme Court held that the show-cause notice was sufficient in the circumstances, as the nature of the allegations necessitated discretion, and the appellant had been afforded a personal hearing where she failed to raise grievances regarding the notice's clarity. Regarding the authority to dismiss, the Court ruled that under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974, the Education Secretary, as the official head of the department, possessed the requisite authority to take disciplinary action. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the procedural requirements of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, had been satisfied and that the administrative delegation of power was valid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a show-cause notice is rendered invalid if it lacks specific particulars in cases involving sensitive allegations?
  • Does the Education Secretary have the authority to dismiss a Grade 17 lecturer under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974?
  • Is a personal hearing sufficient to cure alleged vagueness in a show-cause notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Razia Sultana vs Government of Punjab1981 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-15
  service lawfixed-term appointmentMartial Law Regulation 118civil servantestoppelleave to appealquantum meruit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a teacher appointed for a fixed term in a privately managed school, sought leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's decision, which denied her claim to be treated as a regular civil servant following the government's takeover of the institution under Martial Law Regulation 118. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to absorption as a civil servant under the said Regulation and whether her continued service, despite the expiry of her initial appointment, created a legal right to regular employment or compensation. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's appointment was temporary and for a fixed period, and had not been renewed by a competent authority, she did not qualify for absorption under Martial Law Regulation 118. The Court further held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply, as no competent authority had authorized her continuation. The petition was dismissed, with the Court noting that while no question of law of public importance existed to justify leave to appeal, the petitioner could seek relief from the government on compassionate grounds for services rendered.

  Questions settled

  • Does a fixed-term appointment in a private institution, subsequently taken over by the government, automatically entitle an employee to absorption as a civil servant under Martial Law Regulation 118?
  • Can the doctrine of estoppel be invoked against the government based on the unauthorized continuation of service by an employee whose fixed-term contract has expired?
  • Is a question of fact regarding the continuation of employment sufficient to justify leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Miskeen and Others vs Commissioner, C. D. A., Islamabad1981 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  land acquisitioncompensation awardwrit jurisdictionappellate proceedingsdiscretionary jurisdictionestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition filed by landowners challenging the compensation awarded for land acquired by the Capital Development Authority (C.D.A.) in the revenue estate of Thatta Gujran. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner, C.D.A., and subsequently the High Court, erred by failing to base the compensation rates on a 1964 award concerning an adjoining village (Chahan), instead relying on a 1972 award for the same village. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was unexceptionable. The Court reasoned that the petitioners had specifically requested the Commissioner to apply the rates from the 1972 award, and the Commissioner had granted that request. Consequently, the petitioners could not later fault the Commissioner for failing to consider the 1964 award, which was neither produced nor relied upon during the appellate proceedings. The principle laid down is that a party cannot introduce new arguments or factual bases in a writ petition that were not raised or substantiated before the lower statutory functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge an administrative order in a writ petition based on evidence or arguments not presented before the original statutory authority?
  • Is a High Court justified in refusing to consider a new plea in writ jurisdiction that was not raised before the lower appellate authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirzajawad Beg vs The State1981 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-10
  local self-governmentsecessionautonomyfreedom of expressioninterpretation of documentsanti-national activitiescriminal intent
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was prosecuted and convicted under section 16 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act 1974 and section 123-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for advocating the creation of an autonomous Metropolitan Government for Karachi through various pamphlets. The Special Court and the High Court upheld his conviction, concluding that his advocacy of self-determination and local autonomy was a camouflage for demanding secession. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the interpretation of the documents and the constitutional framework regarding local government. The core legal question was whether the appellant's writings and political advocacy amounted to advocating secession or disrupting the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the documents, when read as a whole and given their plain meaning, explicitly stated that Karachi would remain an integral part of the Province of Sind and Pakistan, and that the proposed metropolitan government constituted a form of partial self-government rather than secession. The Court established that autonomy and secession are mutually exclusive, and criminal intent cannot be inferred through conjecture or by dismissing explicit controlling provisions as mere camouflage. The appeal was accepted, and the convictions and sentences were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the demand for an autonomous metropolitan government for a city within a province amounts to secession or disruption of the territorial integrity of Pakistan?
  • How should political and theoretical documents be interpreted when determining criminal liability for sedition or anti-national activities?
  • Can criminal intent be inferred by treating explicit disclaimers of secession within published literature as a camouflage without supporting evidence?
  • Does advocacy for local self-government and administrative decentralization fall within the permissible limits of freedom of expression under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Naseem Baig vs Muhammad Iqbal and Another1981 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08
  quashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustabuse of processsection 561-A CrPCinherent powersremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the High Court quashing criminal proceedings initiated against the first respondent under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the first respondent took poultry items worth Rs. 1,700 for a temporary display and failed to return them or pay their value despite written promises. The trial Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons, but the High Court quashed the proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that the case was false and concocted based on the respondent's credentials, without examining the complaint itself. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court's order was legally maintainable. The Court held that while quashment is permissible if proceedings are an abuse of process or brought for improper motives, the High Court cannot declare a case false solely based on the accused's credentials without examining the complaint allegations. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order set aside, and the case remanded for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings under Section 561-A CrPC solely based on the accused's credentials without examining the complaint allegations?
  • What principles govern the exercise of High Court powers under Section 561-A CrPC to quash a criminal complaint?
  • Whether an order quashing proceedings is legally maintainable if based on premature conclusions without supporting material on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Moazam Baig Etc. vs Sardar Ali Etc.S1981 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyauction purchaserremandleave to appealdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent appeal, which in turn upheld the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee Ahata. The core legal question concerned whether the failure to provide a mandatory hearing to the auction purchaser under section 20(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 vitiated the Settlement Commissioner's order of remand, and whether property could be auctioned without disposing of pending transfer applications based on possession and construction. The Supreme Court held that while the lack of a hearing was a procedural irregularity, it was immaterial in the circumstances of the case because the respondents had pending transfer applications that required lawful disposal before any auction could validly take place. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that procedural lapses do not warrant interference where the ultimate outcome would remain unchanged and statutory prerequisites for auction were unmet.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to afford a mandatory hearing under section 20(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 invalidate an order of remand where the final outcome would not have been different?
  • Can an evacuee property be validly put to auction without disposing of a pending transfer application filed by occupants who have raised constructions thereon?
  • Whether an immaterial procedural irregularity by a Settlement Commissioner warrants interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Miro and Others vs The State1981 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-04
  interested witnessocular testimonycorroborationcriminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidencepartisan witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased, Ismail. The appellants challenged the High Court's judgment, contending that the prosecution's case was based on improbable evidence and that the eye-witnesses, being related to the deceased, were unreliable and required independent corroboration. The core legal question was whether the testimony of interested witnesses could be accepted without corroboration and whether alleged improbabilities in the prosecution's narrative necessitated acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the guilt of the appellants was established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that the mere fact that witnesses are related or partisan does not render their testimony inherently unreliable. The reliability of such witnesses depends on the circumstances of each case, and if their testimony is found truthful, it may be accepted without independent corroboration. The Court further held that speculative arguments regarding the assailants' knowledge of the victim's movements, unsupported by evidence, do not invalidate credible ocular testimony. The convictions were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that prosecution witnesses are related to the deceased render their testimony ipso facto unreliable?
  • Is independent corroboration a universal requirement for the testimony of interested or partisan witnesses?
  • Can an appellate court discard credible ocular testimony based on speculative arguments regarding the improbability of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Haji Khan And 11 Other vs Mir Aijaz Ali and 2 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-21
  declaratory suitjagirsanadmukhadimi rightszamindari rightsadverse possessionrevenue recordsproprietary rights in soil
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal through special leave arises from a declaratory suit concerning agricultural land in District Hyderabad, originally part of a Jagir. The plaintiffs-respondents claimed ownership based on inheritance of perpetual mukhadimi (zamindari) rights from their predecessors, asserting recognition of these rights prior to 1892 and alternatively pleading adverse possession. The defendants-appellants contested the claim, maintaining that the Jagir grant conferred full proprietary rights in the soil, that the plaintiffs held no such hereditary rights, and that the plaintiffs' possession was merely that of lessees. The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appellate court and the High Court in second appeal ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, relying partly on an 1892 survey report. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Sanad granting the Jagir in question conferred full proprietary rights in the soil, that the mukhadimi occupants held a status no higher than tenants liable to ejectment under established rules rather than permanent owners, and that the plaintiffs failed to establish inheritance or adverse possession. The appeal was allowed, and the trial court's dismissal of the suit was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Jagir grant and its accompanying Sanad confer proprietary rights in the soil upon the Jagirdar or merely the right to collect land revenue?
  • What is the legal status and tenure of a Mukhadim or Zamindar occupying land within a Jagir under the historical land rules of Sind?
  • Does the abandonment of an objection regarding the form of a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 amount to an admission of ownership or adverse possession by the defendant?
  • Can revenue survey and inquiry reports override the clear terms of a historical Sanad and the established documentary evidence regarding land ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sadaqat Hameed vs Government of Punjab and Other1981 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-06
  review petitionProvisional Constitution Orderoath of officecompetency of judgesannouncement of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court upon a review petition seeking review of the Court's earlier judgment dated 25th March 1981, which had dismissed the petitioner's civil appeal. The core legal question raised was whether a judgment announced on 25th March 1981 was invalid because two members of the bench subsequently ceased to hold office upon not taking the oath under Article 17 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. The Court held that a judge continues to hold office and perform judicial functions until the expiration of the time determined by the President for taking the oath. Since the judgment in question was delivered before the expiry of the time limit fixed for taking the oath, the bench was fully competent to announce it. The review petition was accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that judicial acts performed by judges prior to the expiry of the deadline for taking a new oath under a constitutional order remain valid and lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judge of the Supreme Court can continue to perform judicial functions until the expiry of the time determined for taking an oath under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981?
  • Does the failure of certain judges to take the oath under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 invalidate judgments delivered by them prior to the expiration of the prescribed time limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Hussain Muhammad vs Col. Muhammad Ilyas and 7 Other1981 SCMR 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-14
  special leave to appealdiscretionary jurisdictionsuperdarilacheswrit jurisdictioninterim reliefallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the cancellation of his land allotment by the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh, and the subsequent transfer of possession and crops to respondent 1. While a writ petition regarding the allotment cancellation was pending, the petitioner sought interim relief against dispossession, which the High Court declined, suggesting he seek alternative remedies. Following the rejection of his request by the Deputy Commissioner and the dismissal of a subsequent writ petition by the High Court due to laches and lack of merit, the petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the impugned order regarding the transfer of land on superdari was passed within the discretionary jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, and no illegality in the exercise of that discretion was demonstrated. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for constitutional interference. The petition was dismissed in limine, with the Court noting that the petitioner remained free to pursue any legal remedies available under the law in the pending High Court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by Revenue Authorities absent a showing of illegality?
  • Does a writ petition suffer from laches if filed more than one year after the final appellate order?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Younek Electric Co. vs Muhammad Abdul Hayi Khan1981 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-08
  evictionpersonal requirementbona fidelandlord and tenantappreciation of evidenceconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the eviction of a tenant from a shop. The respondent-landlord sought eviction on the grounds of personal requirement for his unemployed son to run a business. The tenant contested the eviction, alleging that the landlord's claim was not in good faith and was motivated by a desire for higher rent. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction application, but the District Court allowed the landlord's appeal, a decision subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court in second appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the landlord had established the bona fides of his requirement. The Court held that the landlord's desire to establish his unemployed son in business was reasonable and probable. Furthermore, the Court determined that the findings of the lower appellate courts were based on the appreciation of evidence and concurrent findings of fact. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with these findings, holding that no case for special leave was made out, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's claim for personal requirement of a shop for his unemployed son constitutes a bona fide need?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fides of a landlord's personal requirement?
  • Does the existence of a dispute over rent quantum automatically negate the bona fides of a landlord's claim for personal use of a property?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tar Muhammad Janoo & Co. vs Taherali and Other1981 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-21
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenantoral agreementirregular payment of rentsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from an ejectment application filed by the respondent-landlords against the petitioner-tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent for an eleven-month period. The tenant admitted non-payment but contended that an oral agreement existed allowing them to credit the rent to the landlords' account in the tenant's books, to be paid in lump sums at irregular intervals. The tenant further argued that the landlords' past acceptance of rent at irregular intervals established a practice of irregular payment. The Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court all rejected this plea, finding that default was established. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that where premises are rented on a monthly basis, rent is due monthly. A landlord's acceptance of delayed rent at irregular intervals due to indulgence or convenience does not establish a binding practice of irregular payment, nor does it absolve the tenant of the statutory duty to pay or tender rent regularly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's acceptance of rent at irregular intervals establish a binding practice that absolves the tenant from the duty of paying rent monthly?
  • Can a tenant plead that they are not in default because they credited the rent to the landlord's account in their own books under an alleged oral arrangement?
  • What is the statutory timeframe within which a tenant must pay or tender rent to avoid being declared a defaulter when there is no written agreement?
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• Messrs SABIR'silk Mills Ltd. and Another vs Sheikh Muhammad Amin Haider1981 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-09
  ejectmentrent restrictionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factbona fide needtenancy agreementstructural alterations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order against tenants (petitioners) by the Rent Controller, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The respondent-landlord sought eviction based on default in rent payment, unauthorized structural alterations, misuse of the premises, and bona fide personal need. The petitioners contested the respondent's status as landlord, alleging failure to serve notice under Section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and argued that a new tenancy agreement existed, preventing eviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the lower courts erred in their concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's status, the validity of the notice, and the alleged new agreement. The Court held that the findings of fact were supported by the material on record and could not be interfered with. It affirmed that the respondent was the valid landlord, the notice requirements were met, and the petitioners' unilateral acts did not create a binding new agreement. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the eviction order while granting the tenants two months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller adjudicate upon the validity of a registered award or title document?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding tenancy disputes warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a tenant unilaterally create a binding tenancy agreement that overrides the landlord's right to seek eviction?
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• Messrs S. M. Rahman & Co. vs Motabar and Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-07
  payment of wagesrevisional jurisdictionsubordinate courtdistrict courtestoppelcivil procedure codecoal mine workmen
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan which accepted a revision petition and restored the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The respondents, coal mine workmen, claimed unpaid wages, which led to arbitration and a settlement wherein the appellant and the firm accepted liability. Upon non-payment, the workmen filed an application under section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (referred to in context as the Payment of Wages Act), which was allowed. The District Court allowed the employer's appeal holding the claim time-barred and the appellant not liable, but the High Court set this aside in revision. The core legal question was whether an appellate order of the District Court under the Payment of Wages Act is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that the District Court, when hearing an appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, acts as one of the ordinary courts of the country and is subordinate to the High Court, making its appellate orders amenable to revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate order passed by the District Court under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code?
  • Is the District Court hearing an appeal under the Payment of Wages Act regarded as a court subordinate to the High Court?
  • Does the finality attached to the order of the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against the appellate order of the District Court?
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• Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory (Regd.), Bahawalnagar and Messrs Rehman Weaving Factroy (Regd.), Bahawalnagar vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Punjab Small Industries Corporation Lahore Link 11981 PLD SC 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-25
  ex parte decreelimitation periodadjourned hearingservice of summonsnatural justiceresiduary articleprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from a Lahore High Court judgment setting aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question concerned the applicability of Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 to applications for setting aside ex parte decrees, specifically whether the limitation period of thirty days applies to all such decrees or only those passed at the first hearing. The Supreme Court held that Article 164 applies strictly to ex parte decrees passed at the first hearing where the initial summons was served. For decrees passed on adjourned hearings under Order XVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Article 164 is inapplicable; instead, the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies, allowing a three-year limitation period. The Court affirmed that the term "summons" in Article 164 refers exclusively to the initial summons for the first hearing. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, ruling that the High Court correctly allowed the applications for setting aside the ex parte decree as they were filed within the applicable legal framework, ensuring procedural fairness for parties regarding adjourned hearing dates.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term "summons" in Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 refer to the initial summons for the first hearing or subsequent notices for adjourned hearings?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed on an adjourned hearing?
  • Can a court proceed ex parte against a defendant on an adjourned hearing without ensuring the defendant has notice of that specific date?
  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to an application for setting aside an ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Messrs Muhammad Ismail & Bros. vs Malik Muhammad Tahir Etc.1981 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  tenant estoppellandlord-tenant relationshippossession of landwrit jurisdictiontitle disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-firm occupied a plot of land under a lease agreement with the Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala, for over fifteen years. Upon discovering the land was government property, the petitioner ceased lease renewals. Following a notice to vacate, the petitioner faced criminal proceedings under Section 448 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and subsequent eviction by the police. The petitioner challenged the police's interference with possession through a writ petition, which the Lahore High Court dismissed in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter. The Court held that the petitioner, having entered into possession as a tenant of the police and having paid rent for fifteen years, was estopped from challenging the landlord's title. Applying the principle of tenant estoppel, the Court affirmed that the petitioner could not refute the respondent's title while remaining in possession of the property. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant estopped from challenging the title of their landlord while remaining in possession of the property?
  • Does a tenant who has paid rent for fifteen years have the legal standing to refute the title of the lessor?
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• Messrs Moosa Oomer & Co. Ltd_ vs Messrs Haji E. Dossa & Sons and Another1981 SCMR 1211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-17
  breach of contractarbitration awarddamages calculationmarket priceresale of goodscontractual liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a contractual dispute where the appellant repudiated a contract for the purchase of 5,000 maunds of cotton seeds by refusing delivery of a portion of the goods. Following the breach, the respondents sold the remaining goods in the market, incurring a financial loss based on the difference between the contract price and the market price on the date of resale. The dispute was referred to arbitration, resulting in an award in favor of the respondents. After a series of appellate proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court via a petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned the correct methodology for calculating damages in cases of breach of contract, specifically whether the market price on the date of breach or the actual resale price should determine the quantum of damages. The Supreme Court, noting the reasonableness of the damages awarded and the significant passage of time since payment, declined to adjudicate the legal question, recalled the leave to appeal, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the circumstances did not warrant further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Is the market price on the date of breach the sole determinant for calculating damages in a contract for the sale of goods?
  • Can a court decline to adjudicate a legal question regarding the calculation of damages if the damages awarded are reasonable and payment was made long ago?
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• Messrs Mian Muhammad Sharif & Co. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi1981 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  income taxdepreciation deductionassessment yearin pari materiaEnglish case-lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from income tax assessment proceedings concerning the petitioner, a registered firm in the construction business. For the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71, the petitioner claimed statutory depreciation on its machinery and equipment under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act 1922. The Income-tax Officer rejected the returns, raised the assessed profits, and disallowed the claimed depreciation deductions. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeals, and the Lahore High Court subsequently answered references under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act 1922 against the petitioner by relying on English precedents. The petitioner contended that English income tax provisions were not in pari materia with Pakistani law and that Sections 10(2)(v) and 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act 1922 were misread by the High Court. Finding that these contentions required examination and were supported by judicial precedent, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of English authorities and the proper interpretation of the relevant statutory depreciation provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Are English income tax precedents applicable when interpreting depreciation provisions under the Income-tax Act 1922 where statutory provisions are not in pari materia?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to examine the interpretation of Sections 10(2)(v) and 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act 1922 regarding claims for depreciation?
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• Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries1981 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-21
  territorial jurisdictioncorporationcause of actioncivil procedurebranch officeprincipal office
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by special leave arose from suits for damages filed at Mianwali by the respondents against the appellant company, which raised preliminary objections regarding territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and lack of privity of contract. The trial court and the Lahore High Court dismissed the appellant's objections, holding that the Mianwali court had territorial jurisdiction as a part of the cause of action arose there. The core legal question was whether Explanation II to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 controls clause (c) thereof, thereby restricting suits against a corporation solely to its principal office or a place with a subordinate office where a part of the cause of action arose. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that Explanation II relates exclusively to clauses (a) and (b) concerning the carrying on of business, while clause (c) operates independently. The key principle laid down is that clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allows a suit against a corporation to be instituted wherever the cause of action wholly or in part arises, unaffected by the limitations of Explanation II.

  Questions settled

  • Does Explanation II to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 control clause (c) of the said section?
  • Can a corporation be sued under clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 at a place where a part of the cause of action arose, even if it does not maintain a subordinate office there?
  • What is the function of Explanation II to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in relation to a corporation carrying on business?
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• Messrs Booz Allen & Hemilton International (Panama) Inc., U. S. A. vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore1981 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-05
  time-barred petitionscondonation of delaylimitation periodcertificate of fitnessincome tax referencepetitions for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a set of petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court relating to tax references. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of petitions barred by a significant delay of 414 days without any application for condonation of delay or explanation for the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were hopelessly time-barred and liable to dismissal, observing further that adding a prayer against a subsequent order refusing a certificate of fitness under the repealed constitutional provisions regarding appeals does not extend or save the limitation period for the main judgment. The key principle laid down is that petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation without a proper application for condonation explaining each day of delay cannot be entertained, and attempting to link them with subsequent fruitless applications for fitness certificates does not cure the defect of time-bar.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitions for leave to appeal liable to dismissal when they are barred by a substantial period of limitation without any application or ground advanced for condonation of delay?
  • Does the inclusion of a prayer against an order refusing a certificate of fitness extend the period of limitation for filing petitions against the main judgment?
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• Messers Beach Luxury Hotel Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Karachi1981 PLD Supreme Court 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-03
  actual costdepreciation allowancemercantile system of accountingcompensation booksevacuee propertyincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an assessee's appeal challenging the decision of the High Court regarding the determination of the actual cost of a building for depreciation allowance under the Income-tax Act. The core legal question is whether the cost of the building to the assessee for calculating depreciation is the full apportioned nominal price entered under the mercantile system of accounting, or if it should be reduced by the lesser market price paid for compensation books used to discharge the liability. The Supreme Court held that while the mercantile system permits entering the liability incurred, any portion of the liability met by persons other than the assessee—such as through the purchase of compensation books below their nominal value—must be excluded from the actual cost pursuant to Section 10(3-A) of the Income-tax Act. The Court concluded that the cost of the building for depreciation purposes must be reduced by the difference between the nominal value of the compensation books and the lower price actually paid for them, thereby establishing the principle that 'actual cost' is subject to diminution where the burden of cost is lessened by external contributions or discounted instruments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cost of a building for depreciation allowance under the mercantile system of accounting is the full nominal liability incurred or the actual burden of cost borne by the assessee?
  • Can the assessing authority go behind the disclosed price or apportioned cost of an asset to determine the true actual cost to the assessee?
  • Does the utilization of compensation books purchased below their nominal value reduce the actual cost of the asset for depreciation purposes under Section 10(3-A) of the Income-tax Act?
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• Meraj Din vs Muhammad Siddiq and Another1981 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08
  transfer of propertydisplaced personsdivisibility of houseprior possessionremandwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a large house in Gujranwala between two claimant displaced persons, Meraj Din and Muhammad Siddiq. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner had bifurcated the house into two independent portions to accommodate both parties. However, the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Settlement Commissioner set aside this order, ruling that the house was indivisible and transferring the whole property to the respondent. The High Court declared these orders without lawful authority and remanded the case, noting a failure to consider the principle of accommodating maximum displaced persons and the lack of a finding on prior possession under the relevant schedule. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order of remand, ruling that while divisibility is a question of fact, the failure of the authorities to consider all pertinent factors and prior possession justified re-examination, while clarifying that the Settlement authorities must decide the matter uninfluenced by the High Court's observations. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of divisibility of a house is a question of fact that precludes interference in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a case be remanded to settlement authorities when they fail to consider relevant factors and prior possession?
  • What is the dominant consideration in the settlement of displaced persons regarding large properties?
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• Mehtab Ali and Another vs Muhammad Siddiq and Another1981 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-23
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertywrit petitionquestion of factre-appraisal of evidencesettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a long-standing dispute concerning the transfer of an evacuee shop. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had originally been transferred the shop, but subsequent inquiries and remand proceedings directed by the High Court led the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to find that the appellants' predecessor was not in possession of the disputed property prior to the target date, and instead found the respondent to be in continuous possession, thereby entitling the respondent to its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appellants' subsequent writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, upholding the factual findings of the Settlement Authorities. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the lower authority's finding suffered from misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding possession recorded by the statutory authority was reasonable, fair, and based on the overall weight of the evidence, and that the Court will not re-appraise evidence where the statutory authority has performed its function reasonably. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mention of a wrong property number in a transfer application debars an applicant from the transfer of property if possession is otherwise established?
  • Is it the function of the Supreme Court to re-appraise the entire evidence when reviewing findings of fact recorded by statutory settlement authorities?
  • Does the failure of a statutory authority to mention a specific portion of a witness's statement imply that the statement was overlooked?
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