Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Abdul Razzaq vs Noor Muhammad and 2 Other1979 SCMR 292 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-29
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilitymurderprima facie casecriminal investigationbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order granting bail to two co-accused in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents facilitated the crime by fetching a gun and ammunition for the principal accused, who fired the fatal shots. The High Court had granted bail on the basis that the respondents were empty-handed and did not cause direct injury, leaving the question of vicarious liability for trial. The Supreme Court examined the investigation record and noted that while the High Court's reasoning was not entirely proper, the order could be sustained on additional grounds. Specifically, evidence suggested one respondent was a soldier posted in a distant location at the time, casting doubt on his presence and participation. The Court held that while the High Court's observations on the merits should not prejudice the trial, the bail order was sustainable given the circumstances. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the trial court must decide the case based on evidence, uninfluenced by observations made during bail proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail order be sustained on grounds other than those relied upon by the High Court?
  • Does an observation by a superior court regarding the merits of a case during bail proceedings prejudice the trial?
  • Is the presence of a co-accused at the scene of the crime a relevant factor for bail when evidence suggests they were posted elsewhere?
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• Abdul Rashid vs Mushtaq Ali and 3 Other1979 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-21
  post-arrest baildelay in trialdiscretion of High Courtbail cancellationcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents on the ground of delay in the commencement of the trial, despite earlier unsuccessful bail applications on merits, including the rejection of one such petition by the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the accused solely due to prolonged trial delay when their earlier bail pleas on merits had failed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no fundamental error of law or procedure, as the question of bail based on statutory or procedural delay is essentially a matter of judicial discretion, and the trial had not commenced with no reasonable prospect of early conclusion. The key principle laid down is that undue and unconscionable delay in the commencement and conclusion of a trial constitutes a valid ground for the grant of bail, even if earlier bail applications on merits were dismissed, provided the High Court exercises its discretion without committing any fundamental error of law or procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can grant bail on the ground of delay in the trial when an earlier bail petition of the accused has already been dismissed by the Supreme Court?
  • Is undue delay in the commencement of a trial a valid ground for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Does the grant of bail on the basis of delay involve the exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court?
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• Abdul Rashid Alias Sheeda vs The State1979 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-28
  post-arrest bailattempted murdergrievous hurtvital part of bodyspecial leave to appealbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's bail application in limine. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing post-arrest bail to an accused charged under sections 307 and 452/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, where multiple grievous stab wounds were inflicted on a vital part of the victim's body. The Supreme Court held that the nature, locale, and grievousness of the injuries, prima facie falling within the scope of section 320(eighthly) of the Pakistan Penal Code, justified the refusal of bail. The Court laid down the principle that where an accused is prima facie connected with a serious crime involving injuries to vital body parts, appellate interference with concurrent orders denying bail is unwarranted, and the petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be refused when an accused is charged with inflicting multiple stab wounds to vital parts of the victim's body?
  • Does the High Court's dismissal in limine of a bail application warrant interference by the Supreme Court when prima facie evidence exists under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • When can injuries be classified as dangerous to life under section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the purpose of bail adjudication?
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• Abdul Qayum vs Muhammad Aslam1979 PLD Supreme Court 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-12
  pre-emptioncontiguitykhasra numberpre-emption rightcontiguous ownerland pre-emptionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These three petitions for special leave to appeal arose out of three consolidated pre-emption suits filed by the respondent against the petitioner regarding the sale of three lots of land comprised in multiple khasra numbers. While the trial court partially decreed the suits, the District Judge dismissed them in entirety. On civil revision, the Peshawar High Court reversed the appellate decision and decreed the suits in toto. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that because the pre-emptor's property was not directly contiguous to every individual khasra number within the block of land sold, the pre-emption suits should fail. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and affirmed the High Court's ruling. The Court held that where land sold forms a single parcel or block comprised of multiple khasra numbers, a pre-emptor whose property is contiguous to any part of that block possesses the right to pre-empt the entire parcel, as the sale of a contiguous block does not constitute separate sales of each field number.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor must own property contiguous to every individual khasra number in a parcel of land to pre-empt the sale of the entire parcel?
  • Does contiguity to a single khasra number within a block of land sold afford a pre-emptor the right to pre-empt all contiguous khasra numbers comprising that block?
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• Abdul Latif vs Jamal Din1979 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-05
  ex parte decreeres judicataservice of summonssubstituted servicefraud and collusionpartnership accountsrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal. The core legal question was whether a subsequent civil suit filed to set aside an ex parte preliminary decree on the ground of fraud and collusion was barred by the principles of res judicata, given that the earlier application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and subsequent revision had already been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had been duly served through his counsel and via substituted service, and that the earlier rejection of the application to set aside the ex parte decree implicitly and conclusively disposed of the plea of collusion. Consequently, the subsequent separate suit challenging the same decree on identical grounds was barred by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The key principle laid down is that where the issue of proper service and alleged collusion has been raised and adjudicated in proceedings to set aside an ex parte decree, a fresh suit on the same grounds is barred by res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Is a subsequent civil suit to set aside an ex parte decree on the ground of fraud barred by res judicata if the issue of service and collusion was already raised and decided in prior proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the legal effect under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a party's counsel is served with a notice but fails to file a writing showing determination of authority?
  • Does substituted service constitute valid and effectual service under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders?
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• Abdul Hayee vs Mst. Riaz Begum and 9 Other1979 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  ejectmentbona fide requirementlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factsubstitution of legal heirsrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding an ejectment order against a tenant. The original landlord, Muhammad Rafique, had initiated ejectment proceedings against the petitioner on grounds of default in rent payment and the bona fide personal requirement of the shop for his son. Following the landlord's death, his legal heirs were substituted as respondents. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court, which affirmed the finding of bona fide need. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the personal requirement claim lost efficacy upon the original landlord's death and that the requirement was not bona fide. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement were based on evidence and could not be re-examined. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the death of the original landlord did not invalidate the ejectment application, as the remaining joint landlords concurred in the requirement, and the tenant lacked locus standi to challenge the internal arrangements of the landlords.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a landlord during pending ejectment proceedings render the application for personal requirement ineffective?
  • Can a tenant challenge the internal arrangement of joint landlords regarding which specific heir requires the premises for personal use?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a premises by a landlord open to challenge in the Supreme Court?
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• Abdul Haque Others vs State1979 SCM R 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq vs The State1979 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-06
  bail pending appealsuspension of sentenceanti-corruptionappraisal of evidenceSupreme Court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for leave to appeal filed against the refusal of the Lahore High Court to grant bail to the petitioners during the pendency of their criminal appeals. The petitioners were convicted by a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, for corruption-related offenses and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal where contentions require appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the grant or refusal of bail during the pendency of a criminal appeal in the High Court is primarily a matter of discretion, and the apex court will not ordinarily interfere unless the discretion is exercised in a perverse or capricious manner. The Supreme Court laid down that appellate courts are not expected to undertake a detailed appraisal of evidence at the interim bail stage, especially when the questions of knowledge and shared intent require final adjudication at the hearing of the main appeal. Consequently, the petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed with an observation that the High Court should hear the main appeals expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing bail during the pendency of a criminal appeal?
  • Is a court required to appraise evidence at the interim bail stage during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Can petitioners claim bail pending appeal on the ground of lack of mens rea when evidence requires final adjudication?
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• Abdul Hamid Etc. vs Ali Ahmad Khan1979 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-24
  declaration of titlepermanent injunctionprior sale deedconcurrent findingsproperty disputesuperior titlespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had decreed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiff-respondent. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff, claiming ownership through a prior sale deed dated 7-2-1956, held superior title over the defendants, who claimed ownership through a subsequent sale deed dated 14-3-1956 from the same vendor. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the petition in limine. The Court held that since the plaintiff's purchase was prior in time and the identity of the property was established as the same plot, the plaintiff's title was superior. Furthermore, the Court noted that the defendants' attempt to argue that the properties were different was contradicted by their own evidence and prior conduct, including the plaintiff's successful ejectment of a tenant from the same property. The key principle affirmed is that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, supported by evidence, regarding the priority of title in competing sale deeds, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court absent a violation of law or procedural error.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior sale deed confer superior title over a subsequent sale deed for the same property?
  • Can a party challenge concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a petition for special leave to appeal without demonstrating a violation of law or procedural error?
  • Does the establishment of property identity by a defendant's own evidence preclude them from later arguing that the subject matter of competing claims is different?
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• Abdul Hakim vs Abdul Aziz1979 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-07
  eviction applicationexecution proceedingsjoint tenancyinterpretation of pleadingsconcurrent findingsrent controldemised premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of an eviction order regarding commercial premises in Multan Cantonment. The petitioner sought to resist eviction from a portion of the premises (Room No. 579) by arguing that the original eviction application filed by the respondent was limited only to Room No. 579/B. The executing court, affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court, rejected this contention, finding that the original eviction application, when read as a whole, clearly sought eviction from the entire demised premises. The courts below determined that the petitioner held the property under a single joint tenancy, as evidenced by the payment of a consolidated monthly rent and the lack of any lease agreement supporting separate tenancies. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, noting that the petitioner failed to produce evidence to substantiate the claim of separate tenancies and failed to challenge the site plan during the initial proceedings. The Court held that an eviction application must be construed in its entirety, and a minor misdescription or omission in a specific paragraph cannot override the clear intent and scope of the relief sought.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eviction application be interpreted by reading only a specific paragraph, or must it be read as a whole?
  • Does a minor discrepancy in the description of the demised premises in an eviction application limit the scope of the relief granted if the application as a whole clearly identifies the property?
  • Is a judgment-debtor entitled to raise a plea of separate tenancies in execution proceedings if such a plea was not established or supported by evidence during the original eviction proceedings?
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• Abdul Ghaffar vs Tanveer Ismail and Another1979 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-01-07
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationremandtentative observationscriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which cancelled the petitioner's pre-arrest bail in a case involving an alleged offence under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court, when presented with new evidence (a final medical report) not previously considered by the Sessions Court, should have decided the bail cancellation application itself or remanded the matter to the Sessions Court for reconsideration. The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with the principle established in Nazir v. Amir Din and another (1971 SCMR 637), the court that originally granted bail should first be moved on the basis of new grounds for cancellation, as it is seized of the matter. Consequently, the High Court erred by not remanding the case. The Court further clarified that observations made by superior courts during bail proceedings are inherently tentative and should not prejudice the trial court's independent assessment of the case on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Should a High Court decide a bail cancellation application based on new evidence or remand it to the court that originally granted bail?
  • Are observations made by a High Court in a bail order binding on the trial court?
  • Must a court that granted bail be given the first opportunity to consider new grounds for cancellation?
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• Abdul Bari and Others vs Deputy Commissioner (with Powers of Settlement Commissioner), Saihwal and Other1979 SCMR 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-21
  displaced personsland allotmentmukhbari applicationurban land claimwrit jurisdictionnew pleasettlement of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court regarding the cancellation of land allotments. The petitioners, displaced persons, were allotted urban land against rural claims. Following a mukhbari application, authorities determined the petitioners were ineligible for the urban land due to a lack of verified urban units. While one parcel was retained due to long-term possession, the disputed parcel was cancelled and re-allotted to eligible parties. The petitioners challenged these administrative orders through multiple writ petitions and appeals, all of which were dismissed. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to retain urban land despite lacking verified urban claims. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had no right to the disputed land as their claims were not verified for urban units, a fact conceded by counsel during earlier proceedings. Furthermore, the Court declined to entertain a new argument regarding the right to purchase excess land under Martial Law Regulations, as it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and had not been agitated before lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new contention regarding the purchase of excess land under Martial Law Regulations for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a displaced person have a right to retain urban land allotments when their verified claims are restricted to rural units?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the lack of entitlement to urban land based on verified claims subject to interference when conceded by counsel in lower courts?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Assistant Settlement Commissioner, (Lands), Hazara and 3 Other1979 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Abdul Sattar1979 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-09
  condonation of delaylimitationdeficient court-feerejection of plaintnegligence of counselspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner instituted a civil suit for pre-emption, which was rejected by the Civil Judge under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to a deficient court-fee. A Regular First Appeal filed against this rejection in the High Court was also returned due to deficient court-fee. Upon refiling, the appeal was time-barred, and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 for condonation of delay was dismissed by the High Court, holding that the negligence of the counsel's clerk in affixing insufficient court-fee did not warrant condonation. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether negligence of a counsel or their clerk in paying court-fee constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that each day of limitation must be explained, and negligence of a counsel's clerk when funds are already available does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether negligence of a counsel's clerk in affixing insufficient court-fee constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does each day of limitation have to be explained when applying for condonation of delay?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to condone delay where no violation of law is shown?
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• A. K. Niazi Etc. vs Sh. Muhammad Ismail Etc.1979 PLD Supreme Court 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-01
  settlement lawindivisible propertytransfer of propertydirect claimantindirect claimantprior possessionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a residential property in Lahore, initially divided by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions were whether a property deemed indivisible could be transferred in its entirety to a claimant who initially applied for only a portion, and whether an applicant who is an indirect claimant (claiming through a daughter-in-law) can successfully challenge the transfer of the whole property to a direct, prior-possessing claimant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Letters Patent Bench, holding that once a property is determined to be indivisible, the fact that an applicant initially requested only a portion does not preclude the transfer of the entire property to them. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an indirect claimant, lacking the requisite relationship to an allottee, has no standing to demand the division of property or claim preference over a direct claimant with prior possession. The principle established is that in settlement matters, a finding of indivisibility overrides initial application limitations, and direct claimants with prior possession hold superior entitlement over indirect claimants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an applicant initially applied for only a portion of a property bar the transfer of the entire property to them if the property is subsequently declared indivisible?
  • Can an indirect claimant, who is not a parent, spouse, or child of an allottee, claim the division of a property or preferential transfer rights?
  • Is a direct claimant with prior possession entitled to the transfer of an entire property over an indirect claimant?
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• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-08
  constitutional lawjudicial independenceacting chief justicechief election commissionerdoctrine of necessitymartial lawoffice of profitconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the constitution of the Lahore High Court and the validity of the appointment of its Acting Chief Justice, who also served as the Chief Election Commissioner. The appellant contended that the High Court was improperly constituted due to the permanent Chief Justice’s appointment as Acting Governor, and that the Acting Chief Justice’s dual role violated Article 216 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a temporary vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice does not invalidate the High Court’s constitution, as the office remains in existence. Regarding the dual appointment, the Court ruled that the appointment of the Acting Chief Justice as Chief Election Commissioner was a temporary, ad hoc measure under Post-Proclamation Orders for specific elections, rather than a permanent, substantive appointment under the Constitution. Consequently, the prohibition in Article 216 against holding dual offices did not apply. The Court affirmed that measures taken by the Chief Martial Law Administrator to restore democratic institutions are valid under the doctrine of necessity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a temporary vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice invalidate the constitution of a High Court?
  • Can a serving judge simultaneously hold the office of Chief Election Commissioner without violating Article 216 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the doctrine of necessity validate the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice under Post-Proclamation Orders?
  • Is the prohibition against holding an office of profit under Article 216 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable to temporary, ad hoc appointments?
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• Zar Bahadar vs The State1978 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-06
  murder convictionocular evidencegrave and sudden provocationabscondenceinterested witnessesdeath sentenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner contended that the ocular evidence provided by interested witnesses was unreliable due to discrepancies and that the prosecution failed to examine all available witnesses. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation arising from an earlier quarrel, warranting a conviction for culpable homicide rather than murder, and that his youth at the time of the offense should mitigate the sentence. The Court held that minor discrepancies in testimony do not invalidate ocular evidence, especially when corroborated by motive and long-term abscondence. It affirmed that the prosecution is not required to examine every witness if the evidence presented is sufficient to prove guilt. The Court rejected the plea of grave and sudden provocation, noting that a quarrel occurring eight hours prior does not satisfy the legal threshold. Finally, the Court upheld the death sentence, finding no evidence to substantiate the claim of minority at the time of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy in the testimony of eye-witnesses necessitate the rejection of their evidence?
  • Is the prosecution legally required to examine every available eye-witness to a crime?
  • Can a quarrel occurring eight hours prior to a killing constitute 'grave and sudden provocation' to reduce the offense to culpable homicide?
  • Does long-term abscondence serve as valid corroboration for ocular evidence in a murder trial?
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• Zamir Ahmad Khan vs Government of Pakistan and Another1978 SCMR 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-26
  review petitionimport licencevested rightpolicy decisionmandamuscinematograph filmsimport policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition seeks a review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment which had accepted the Government's appeal, set aside the Lahore High Court's Division Bench judgment, and restored the Single Judge's order dismissing the petitioner's writ petition. The original matter concerned the refusal by the Controller, Imports and Exports to issue an import licence for cinematograph films to the petitioner under the Import Policy Order 1972, following an amendment to Item 49 which restricted such imports to official agencies. The core legal question was whether merely applying for an import licence prior to a policy change creates a vested legal right to its issuance, warranting the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court held that a licence simpliciter is a privilege and not a legal right, that policy decisions of the Federal Government regarding import control under the Exports Control Act 1950 prevail, and that no vested right accrues from a mere application before grant. The Court concluded that the grounds raised were merely an attempt to reargue the case, and dismissed the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the making of an application for an import licence creates a vested legal right to its issuance prior to its actual grant?
  • Can a writ of mandamus be issued against the licensing authority to defeat a subsequent import policy change made by the Federal Government?
  • Does the power of review permit a rehearing of the whole case on merits?
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• Wazir Muhammad vs The State1978 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-12
  post-arrest baillalkaraovert actcriminal appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the case of Wazir Muhammad v. The State, wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the propriety of withholding post-arrest bail from the appellant. The core legal question revolved around whether an accused charged solely with making a lalkara (instigatory call), without any attributed overt act, is entitled to bail. The Court held that the appellant deserved to be released on bail given the absence of any overt act ascribed to him. The ratio decidendi established is that where an accused is only charged with a lalkara and no specific overt act is attributed in the commission of the crime, a case for further inquiry is made out, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the appellant directed to be released on furnishing suitable sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused charged only with lalkara entitled to post-arrest bail when no overt act is ascribed to him?
  • Whether the absence of an overt act in a criminal charge warrants the release of the accused on bail?
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• Wali Muhammad and Others vs Raja Muhammad and Other1978 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  refugee claimantstemporary allotmenttransposition of partieslocus standiLetters Patent Appealrehabilitation authoritiesCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal and an application for transposition of parties. The petitioners, refugee claimants, sought to retain land temporarily allotted to them in Rasul Nagar despite having their rural claims satisfied elsewhere. The High Court had previously dismissed their writ petition, noting that satisfaction of claims elsewhere extinguished their rights to the temporary allotments. One petitioner appealed, while others sought to join as appellants eleven years later. The Supreme Court held that the original appellant had no remaining grievance as his claim was satisfied. Regarding the other petitioners, the Court affirmed that their application for transposition was highly belated and lacked merit, as their rights to the temporary allotments had ceased upon the confirmation of land elsewhere. The Court further held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to transpose the parties, as they were neither necessary nor proper parties. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that once a claim is satisfied elsewhere, the right to temporary allotment disappears.

  Questions settled

  • Does the confirmation of land claims elsewhere extinguish a claimant's right to retain land previously held under temporary allotment?
  • Can an appellate court refuse an application for transposition of parties filed after an inordinate delay?
  • Is a party whose claim has been satisfied elsewhere a necessary or proper party to an appeal regarding temporary land allotments?
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• Vali Muhammad vs Bajoo and Other1978 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-18
  criminal appealretracted judicial confessionocular evidencebenefit of doubttransportation for liferecovery of weaponmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The prosecution relied on ocular evidence, motive, recoveries of incriminating items, and a retracted judicial confession. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of the ocular evidence, noting discrepancies between the medical evidence and the testimony of eye-witnesses, and the lack of credible motive. Regarding the respondent Bajoo, the Court found his retracted judicial confession to be voluntary and genuine, establishing his participation in the occurrence, though the plea of self-defence remained unsubstantiated. Conversely, regarding the respondent Alidino, the Court found the evidence of recoveries unreliable due to contradictions between the investigation officer and the witness, and insufficient blood-staining on his clothes. The Court held that while the prosecution failed to prove premeditated murder, the guilt of Bajoo was established beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court upheld the acquittal of Alidino, convicted Bajoo for murder, and sentenced him to transportation for life, noting the absence of evidence for premeditation and the applicability of pre-Law Reforms Ordinance sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession serve as the basis for conviction if found to be voluntary and genuine?
  • Does a discrepancy between the investigation officer's testimony and a recovery witness regarding the discovery of a crime weapon invalidate the recovery evidence?
  • Is a conviction for premeditated murder sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove the initial circumstances of the occurrence and the motive is flimsy?
  • What is the appropriate sentence for murder committed before the enactment of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 when premeditation is not established?
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• Union Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. vs Hafiz Muhammad1978 PLD Supreme Court 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration agreementunstamped instrumentStamp Actadmissibility of evidencepublic revenuearbitration awardappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute between an insurance company and an insured party regarding a fire loss claim. The core legal question was whether an arbitration agreement that was not duly stamped is rendered invalid under the Stamp Act 1899, and whether such an objection could be entertained at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court held that an instrument not duly stamped is not invalid; rather, it is merely subject to the disabilities of inadmissibility in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act 1899, which can be cured by the payment of the requisite duty and penalty. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent of the Stamp Act is to protect public revenue, not to invalidate commercial instruments. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellant could not raise the objection of an unstamped agreement for the first time in appeal, especially when it failed to prove the document was unstamped at the trial stage. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that unstamped instruments are defective but not void.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to duly stamp an arbitration agreement render the agreement invalid?
  • Can an objection regarding the admissibility of an unstamped instrument be raised for the first time in an appeal?
  • Is the purpose of the Stamp Act 1899 to invalidate commercial instruments or to protect public revenue?
  • Can an appellate court entertain an objection to an award on a ground not raised in the application for setting aside the award?
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• Torab Shah vs The State1978 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-11
  post-arrest bailcustoms offencessmugglingrecording of evidencespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was charged under the Customs Act 1969 and the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 for allegedly transporting iron scrap and steel files. The core legal question was whether the lower courts were justified in withholding bail until the recording of prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that postponing the consideration of bail until after recording evidence was unwarranted, especially where the allegedly objectionable goods and the vehicle had already been released to their owners, and the offences charged were not punishable with death or transportation for life. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, and granted bail to the petitioner, establishing the principle that bail matters should be decided on broad facts available without unnecessarily awaiting the commencement or progress of trial evidence where no extraordinary circumstances justify such a postponement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be withheld merely on the ground that no evidence has been recorded by the trial court?
  • Is the postponement of a bail decision justified when the allegedly objectionable goods and vehicle have already been released to their owners?
  • Does the absence of a punishment of death or transportation for life weigh in favour of granting bail in customs-related offences?
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• The State vs Mir Zaman1978 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-13
  post-arrest bailacquittal appealnon-bailable warrantcriminal appealwithdrawal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Mir Zaman, who was previously acquitted by the Peshawar High Court of murder and attempted murder charges. Following the High Court's acquittal, the State filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was granted. Consequently, the Supreme Court issued non-bailable warrants for the arrest of the respondent, leading to his detention in judicial lock-up. While the appeal against his acquittal was pending before the Supreme Court, the respondent filed the instant petition seeking release on bail. Upon the hearing of the petition, the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent expressly stated that he did not wish to press the application for bail. In light of this statement, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for bail. The judgment does not establish new legal principles but serves as a record of the dismissal of the bail application upon the request of the petitioner's counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Can a respondent in an appeal against acquittal, who has been arrested pursuant to a Supreme Court warrant, seek release on bail pending the disposal of the appeal?
  • What is the effect of a counsel's statement not to press a bail petition before the Supreme Court?
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• The Karachi Development Authority, Karachi vs Works Co Operative1978 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-12
  land allotmentexecution of judgmenthousing societystatutory notificationprice fixationdelay in execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from enforcement proceedings under Order XLV, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, following earlier judgments of the Supreme Court concerning a long-standing land allotment dispute between the Karachi Development Authority and the Works Co-operative Housing Society. The core legal questions involved the extent of land the Society was entitled to under a government notification and the applicable price payable for such land. The Supreme Court held that the Society was entitled to the land originally reserved for Police Headquarters in specific blocks, subject to physical impossibilities such as existing constructions, but not to an absolute 350 acres if variations or prior valid allotments precluded it. Furthermore, the Court held that the price payable by the Society must be governed by the rates prevailing at the time of the original notification, as delays were attributable to the Authority's untenable positions. The key principle laid down is that executive commitments regarding land allotments must be honoured in good faith, and a party cannot be burdened with increased costs resulting from the opposing party's administrative delays and defaults.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a housing society is entitled to an absolute area of land or if the allotment is subject to physical limitations and prior authorized constructions?
  • At what rate should the price of land be calculated when the actual delivery of the area has been delayed due to the actions of the development authority?
  • How are previous judgments of the Supreme Court to be enforced in execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad and Another vs Haji Hakim Khan and Other1978 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Syed Yousuf and Another vs Government of Pakistan And Other1978 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-13
  special leave to appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of petitionprocedural compliancereview of court orderwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioners had filed a single petition challenging a common judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan which disposed of two cross-writ petitions. The Supreme Court office had initially objected, requiring two separate petitions. The petitioners, rather than contesting this, sought and were granted one month's time to comply, with the condition that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of the existing petition. Having failed to comply within the stipulated time, the petition stood dismissed. The petitioners subsequently sought restoration, arguing that a single petition was legally sufficient. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had effectively conceded to the office's objection by requesting time to comply, and the subsequent dismissal order had become final. The Court ruled that the application for restoration was, in effect, a belated and meritless attempt to review the earlier order, which had already come into operation. Consequently, the application for restoration was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek restoration of a petition dismissed for non-prosecution after failing to comply with a conditional order of the Court?
  • Is a request for restoration of a dismissed petition considered a review of the original dismissal order?
  • Does a party's failure to contest a procedural objection at the time it is raised preclude them from challenging its validity in a subsequent restoration application?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Hasan Rizvi vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Other1978 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12
  service tribunallimitationcondonation of delayabatement of suitarrears of salaryjudicial discretionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former police officer, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Sind Services Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal regarding arrears of salary as time-barred. Following the abatement of his civil suit due to the enactment of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and Article 212 of the Constitution, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in Masud Ahmad v. Pakistan, held the appeal time-barred. The petitioner argued that the delay should have been condoned under Section 6-A of the Sind Services Tribunal Act, 1973, and cited Syed Faiz Ali Shah v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf Lahore to support his claim. The Supreme Court held that the question of condoning delay is a matter of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It found that the Tribunal had not exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the cited authority, noting that the petitioner had been given a full opportunity to be heard on his application for condonation of delay. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the question of condoning delay in filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal a question of fact within the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Can a party claim that a delay in filing an appeal should be condoned based on the fact that the appeal was initially admitted without objection?
  • Does the principle in Syed Faiz Ali Shah v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf Lahore apply where a party has been given a full opportunity to be heard on an application for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah vs Abdul Baseer Qureshi and 2 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-17
  double jeopardydouble prosecutionautrefois acquitautrefois convictsuspension of fundamental rightstransfer of caseSpecial Military Courtpolice torture
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition challenging an Additional Sessions Judge's order transferring a police torture and murder case from a Magistrate to the Sessions Court. The petitioner contended that undergoing trial across different forums—first before a Special Military Court where trial ended without judgment upon the lifting of Martial Law, then before a Magistrate, and subsequently before the Sessions Court—violated the constitutional guarantee against double prosecution under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It held that Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I, Part II of the Constitution stood suspended pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977. On the merits, the Court held that 'prosecution' under Article 13 implies pursuing proceedings to final judgment. Since neither the military court nor the magisterial proceedings culminated in a final judgment of acquittal or conviction, transferring the case to the Sessions Court did not constitute a second prosecution or violate the principle of double jeopardy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the enforcement of fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 remains competent during the suspension period under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977?
  • What constitutes a 'prosecution' for the purpose of the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the transfer of an unfinished criminal trial from one forum to another without a final judgment of acquittal or conviction violate the protection against double prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintendent of Police, Federal Investigation Agency, Lahore and Another vs Akhtar Hussain Bhutta1978 PLD Supreme Court 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-30
  quashing of criminal proceedingsDrugs Actcorporate liabilityoffences by companiesmanaging director liabilitysubstandard drugscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court quashing criminal proceedings against the respondent, the Managing Director of a private limited company, under section 18 read with section 27 of the Drugs Act, 1940, following the seizure of a substandard drug sample manufactured by the company. The core legal question concerned the validity of the prosecution and the interpretation of liability under the Drugs Act, 1940, particularly regarding corporate offences and the liability of company officers. The Supreme Court held that since the company itself was the manufacturer and a separate legal entity, and no proceedings were drawn up against the company nor was any evidence adduced to show that the respondent acted as a distributor or that the corporate offence was committed with his knowledge and consent under section 38 of the Drugs Act, the allegations in the challan did not disclose any offence against the respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal, laying down that a director or officer of a company cannot be prosecuted under the Drugs Act, 1940, without fulfilling the foundational requirements of establishing the company's guilt and proving that the offence was committed with the officer's knowledge and consent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the criminal proceedings against a company's director can continue under the Drugs Act, 1940, when the company itself has not been prosecuted as the principal accused?
  • Can an officer of a company be held liable for a drug manufacturing offence under the Drugs Act, 1940, without proof that the offence was committed with his knowledge and consent?
  • When is the High Court justified in quashing criminal proceedings under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, Sind vs Qazi Pervez Iqbal Etc.1978 PLD Supreme Court 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-16
  Explosives Substances Actpossession and controlcriminal liabilitylicenseeburden of proofconscious possessionSuppression of Terrorists Activities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions under the Explosives Substances Act, 1908, involving three individuals found in possession of high explosives in a shared hostel room. The core legal question was whether the accused, as mere licensees of the premises, could be held liable for "possession" or "control" of the explosives found therein, absent direct evidence of ownership or conscious knowledge. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsustainable. The Court ruled that "possession" and "control" under the Act require proof of conscious possession and knowledge of the nature of the substance. Mere occupancy or presence in a room where incriminating articles are stored does not automatically establish joint possession or control, particularly for licensees who lack legal interest in the premises or the items. The Court further clarified that the burden of proof under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Court) Ordinance XVIII of 1974 only shifts to the accused once the prosecution has established a prima facie case of possession, which was not achieved in this instance. The appeals were allowed, and the accused were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere presence in a room where explosives are stored constitute 'possession' or 'control' under the Explosives Substances Act, 1908?
  • Can a licensee be held criminally liable for the possession of items belonging to another person found within shared premises?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Court) Ordinance XVIII of 1974 before the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Nawaz vs Allah Nawaz and Other1978 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-29
  leave to appealmurderunlawful assemblyappreciation of evidencepartisan witnessescommon intentionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court concerning a criminal incident involving an unlawful assembly, resulting in multiple murders and injuries in Tehsil and District Mianwali. The trial court had convicted several accused persons under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, imposing varying sentences including the death penalty. Upon appeal, the High Court acquitted some accused, set aside certain convictions, altered other charges, and reduced the sentence for one of the convicts to life imprisonment, while upholding the conviction of Allah Nawaz for murder. Both the convict and the injured complainant challenged the High Court's judgment before the Supreme Court. The core legal question involves the reappraisal of ocular and circumstantial evidence regarding partisan witnesses, common intention, and the sustainability of convictions and acquittals in a cross-fire incident. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions reached by the High Court required a detailed re-appraisal of the evidence on record. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the convictions of certain accused persons under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the testimony of injured and partisan witnesses be solely relied upon to sustain a murder conviction without corroboration?
  • Whether the imposition of a lesser penalty of life imprisonment is warranted when the deceased had an illicit affair with a family member of the accused party?
  Read full judgment →
• Shera and 2 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-13
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnesscorroborationblood feudmedical evidencecommon intentionappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased with spears in broad daylight, motivated by a long-standing blood feud over the murder of the appellants' father. The trial court convicted three appellants and acquitted three co-accused for lack of corroboration, but the Lahore High Court upheld the appellants' convictions and ordered a retrial of the acquitted accused. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the ocular testimony was credible and sufficiently corroborated by motive and medical evidence, and whether distant relationship rendered an eye-witness interested. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was consistent, plausible, and supported by the motive and the nature and number of injuries found on the deceased. The court clarified that distant, indirect village relationships do not render a witness interested without substantial evidence of bias. Consequently, the majority dismissed the appeals, while a dissenting judge favored acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a distant or indirect relationship in a village community automatically render an eye-witness interested or inimical?
  • Can the consistency between the number of injuries on the deceased and the number of alleged assailants serve as corroboration of ocular testimony?
  • Whether ocular testimony from relatives is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction when supported by established motive and medical evidence?
  • Is corroboration of ocular evidence an inflexible requirement in every criminal trial where witnesses are related to the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and Another vs Munir Ahmad and 2 Other1978 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-31
  Evacuee propertyJurisdictionWrit petitionSpecial leave to appealDeputy Settlement CommissionerEstoppelDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The dispute arose over an evacuee plot adjacent to a house transferred to the petitioners. The plot was claimed by another party who served a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioners approached the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for clarification, who determined the plot was separate from their house and they were in illegal possession. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass this order, rendering it a nullity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the petitioners themselves had invoked the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction, they could not subsequently challenge it. The Court found no fault with the High Court's decision not to exercise its writ jurisdiction, concluding that substantial justice had been done.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has invoked the jurisdiction of an authority later challenge that authority's jurisdiction?
  • Is a High Court justified in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction in favour of petitioners who themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the authority they are challenging?
  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to clarify the status of an evacuee plot claimed to be part of a transferred evacuee house?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Muhammad Hussain vs Mst. Hanifa Begum and Other1978 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-19
  settlement lawproperty divisiondiscretionary powerwrit jurisdictionsettlement authoritiespossession rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the division of a property by settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities acted without lawful authority in their mode of dividing the property, specifically regarding the allocation of possession among various claimants. The Supreme Court held that the division of property under settlement laws inherently involves adjustments and shifts in possession. The Court affirmed that as long as the settlement authority's order is not arbitrary, fanciful, or capricious, and aims to accommodate occupants fairly, the court will not interfere with the mode of division. The key principle laid down is that the High Court and the Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary mode of property division by settlement authorities provided the order is just, fair, and based on a reasonable assessment of the facts, even if the resulting allocation does not satisfy every party's individual preferences or claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court or Supreme Court interfere with the mode of property division by settlement authorities if the order is not arbitrary, fanciful, or capricious?
  • Does the fact that a party is dissatisfied with the specific unit allocated to them during a property division render the settlement order without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahbaz Tufail vs The State1978 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-21
  post-arrest bailsecond bail applicationmurderjuvenile offenderself-defencesuppression of FIRtender age
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's second bail application in a murder case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner sought bail on the grounds of being a juvenile (just over 16 years of age at the time of the offence) and acting in self-defence, further arguing that the prosecution suppressed the true version of the occurrence and failed to record a counter First Information Report. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings that the second bail application was not maintainable as no new grounds were made out, the medical evidence estimated the petitioner's age at about 18 years, the birth and matriculation certificates produced were inconsistent, and under the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bail cannot be claimed as of right merely on the ground of tender age. Furthermore, the question of self-defence is a matter for the trial court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second bail application in the High Court is maintainable when it raises no new grounds distinct from the previous unsuccessful application?
  • Can an accused person claim bail as of right under the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely on the ground of being of tender age?
  • Whether the plea of self-defence and the evaluation of suppressed prosecution evidence can be conclusively determined at the bail stage or should be left for the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahab Ud Din vs The State1978 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-10-25
  illegal gratificationanti-corruption raidappreciation of evidencealleged enmity of witnesscriminal appealtrap witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, an officiating Sub-Judge and First Class Magistrate, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, for accepting illegal gratification. The appellant was convicted by a Special Judge and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and a fine, which sentence was subsequently reduced by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court failed to consider material documents demonstrating alleged enmity between the appellant and a key prosecution witness, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, thereby vitiating the conviction, and whether the defense's theory of planted currency notes was tenable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the minor administrative friction between the appellant and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was insufficient to establish fabrication or malice, and that the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below based on credible, independent witness testimonies remained unimpeachable. The key principle laid down is that minor administrative disagreements do not constitute actionable enmity or bias to discredit independent official witnesses in a corruption case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor administrative disagreements between a judicial officer and an official witness are sufficient to establish enmity and discredit the witness's testimony?
  • Does the failure of an accused to establish crucial physical dimensions regarding a defense theory weaken the credibility of that defense?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the reliability of raid witnesses open to interference by the Supreme Court without compelling grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Nawaz and Other vs Member, Board of Revenue1978 PLD Supreme Court 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-05
  excess landallotment cancellationinformant rightsevacuee propertyrepeal actpending proceedingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their application to purchase excess land that had been cancelled from their allotments due to information provided by claimants concerning fraudulent or excessive allotments. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had an unconditional right to purchase the resumed excess land under section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act XIV of 1975, or whether informants possessed a preferential right to such land under pending proceedings saved by the law. The Supreme Court held that the right to purchase under section 3 of Act XIV of 1975 is subject to limitations, qualifications, and pending proceedings saved under section 2 of the said Act, and that informants who successfully supplied information regarding bogus or excessive allotments under section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act XLVII of 1958 have a preferential right to the resumed land. The Court laid down that occupants of excess land cannot claim the purchase option under the repeal law when orders of cancellation and pending informant entitlement proceedings were finalized prior to or saved under the statutory repeal framework.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee of excess land has an unconditional right to purchase the same under section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act XIV of 1975?
  • Do informants who provide information regarding bogus or fraudulent allotments have a preferential right to the resumed land under section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act XLVII of 1958?
  • How do pending proceedings concerning informant entitlements affect the availability of land for purchase under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act XIV of 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Shadi Khan vs Muhammad Saleem and 3 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-17
  post-arrest bailremandadjournment sine diecommittal proceedingsCourt of Sessioncriminal procedurebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a petition filed by Shadi Khan against Muhammad Saleem and others, addresses the legality of a bail order granted by the Lahore High Court under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court had granted bail to the respondents on the erroneous factual assumption that they were detained without an order of remand and that the case stood adjourned sine die. The core legal question was whether an order of remand by a Sessions Judge without specifying a precise date for the next hearing constitutes a violation of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's bail order, holding that given the deletion of committal proceedings, a remand order committing the accused to custody until the case is fixed for hearing amounts to substantial compliance with Section 344, and the interregnum must be regarded as reasonable under the circumstances. The key principle laid down is that the provisions of Section 344, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should not be construed too rigidly so as to cause administrative impossibilities following the direct transmission of cases to the Court of Session.

  Questions settled

  • Does a remand order by a Sessions Judge without specifying a precise future date for hearing violate Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an order of remand be treated as illegal on the ground that the case stands adjourned sine die following the deletion of committal proceedings?
  • What constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of 'for such time as it considers reasonable' under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in trials before the Court of Session?
  Read full judgment →
• Seer Zaman vs Muhammad Azad and Another1978 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdelay in trialstatutory delaymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant Sher Zaman against the grant of bail to the respondent Muhammad Azad by the High Court in a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail on the ground of a protracted period of incarceration and delayed trial. The Supreme Court held that the discretion exercised by the High Court in releasing the accused on bail after prolonged detention and anticipated trial delay was neither illegal nor perverse. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the bail granted to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prolonged incarceration without the prospect of an early trial constitutes sufficient ground for granting post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • When can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Labour Department, N: W. F. P. Government, Peshawar and 21978 PLD Supreme Court 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-02
  gratuityretrospective operationStanding Orders Ordinancestatutory interpretationindustrial relationslabour lawquantum of gratuity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding the retrospective application of an amendment to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. The core legal question was whether the amendment to Standing Order 12, which increased the gratuity rate from 15 to 20 days' wages, applied to the entire period of service for workmen whose services were terminated after the amendment's promulgation. The Supreme Court held that while the amendment is not retrospective in creating new rights for past terminations, it is prospective in operation. Consequently, for any workman whose services are terminated after the amendment, the new rate of 20 days' wages applies to their entire period of completed service. The Court established that a statute is not retrospective merely because it uses past facts, such as years of service, as the basis for calculating a benefit that accrues after the enactment. The presumption against retrospectivity applies to the accrual of the right, not the quantum calculation for rights accruing after the law's commencement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the calculation of gratuity based on past years of service render a statutory amendment retrospective?
  • Is the amendment to Standing Order 12 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 retrospective?
  • Are workmen whose services are terminated after the promulgation of the amending Ordinance entitled to gratuity at the enhanced rate for their entire period of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government (West Pakistan) Now N: W. F. P. Department1978 PLD Supreme Court 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-10
  amendment of plaintconsequential reliefdeclaratory decreeprocedural justicepleadingsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Order XLIX, rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the respondent, seeking leave to amend his plaint to include a prayer for consequential relief in the form of a money decree. The core legal question was whether such an amendment, intended to align the pleadings with the relief already granted by the lower courts, would fundamentally alter the nature or subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court held that while courts should liberally allow amendments to pleadings to ensure complete justice, such amendments must not change the suit's character. The Court permitted the amendment but restricted the claim to the quantity of timber originally pleaded (42,000 units) rather than the higher amount erroneously decreed by the lower courts, noting that a trial court cannot decree an amount exceeding the pleaded claim without a formal amendment. The key principle established is that while procedural flexibility exists to facilitate justice, amendments must remain consistent with the original subject matter and factual claims asserted by the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff amend a plaint to add a prayer for consequential relief if the lower courts have already granted such relief?
  • Does the amendment of a plaint to include a prayer for consequential relief necessarily change the nature or subject matter of the suit?
  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to decree an amount in excess of what was claimed in the original plaint without an amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government (West Pakistan) Now N.-W. F. P. Department1978 PLD Supreme Court 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-23
  declaratory decreeconsequential reliefamendment of pleadingscontractual disputecompetent authorityadmission in pleadingsspecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over a timber contract where the government confiscated the respondent's security and timber after a failure to complete operations within the stipulated time. The respondent sued for a declaration, claiming the government's action was illegal because an extension had been granted. The trial court and High Court decreed the suit, granting a money decree despite the original plaint only seeking a declaration. The core legal questions were whether the Chief Conservator of Forests was the competent authority to grant the extension and whether a money decree could be passed in a suit for mere declaration without amending the plaint. The Supreme Court held that the government was bound by its admission in the written statement regarding the Chief Conservator's authority. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, cannot result in a money decree without a prayer for consequential relief. Consequently, while allowing the amendment of the plaint to include the money claim, the Court restricted the decree to the amount originally claimed, rejecting the excess awarded by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a money decree in a suit filed solely for a declaratory decree without an amendment to the plaint?
  • Is a party permitted to withdraw an admission made in a written statement by amending the pleadings?
  • Does Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow a court to grant a relief larger than that claimed in the plaint?
  • What is the effect of a failure to pray for consequential relief in a suit filed under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  Read full judgment →
• Samin Khan vs Land Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar and Other1978 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-08
  land allotmentland reformab initio voidwrit jurisdictionMartial Law Regulationrevenue record manipulationcancellation of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld an order by the Land Commissioner cancelling the allotment of a plot of land. The core legal question was whether the allotment of land to the petitioner's predecessor-in-title was valid, given that the site had been occupied by a primary school since 1926. The Supreme Court held that the allotment was ab initio illegal and void because the land, being occupied by a school, did not constitute 'land' subject to resumption and allotment under Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The Court affirmed that the Land Commissioner correctly cancelled the allotment upon discovering the manipulation of revenue records. The key principle laid down is that where an allotment is procured through the concealment of material facts—specifically that the property was not subject to land reform regulations—the allotment is void ab initio, and the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction to protect such an illegally obtained title.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land be sustained if the property was not subject to land reform regulations at the time of resumption?
  • Does the existence of a public institution like a school on a plot of land preclude its classification as 'land' under Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order cancelling an allotment that was procured through the manipulation of revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin and Other vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner II, Lahore1978 PLD Supreme Court 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-06
  settlement of propertydisplaced personsbelated claimlachesresumption of propertytransfer of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of residential property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as heirs of a non-claimant displaced person, could reopen a property transfer case finalized in 1960, based on an unaddressed NCH form filed in 1959 and a subsequent, failed attempt to claim the property upon its alleged resumption from the original transferee. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners' failure to pursue their claim for over fifteen years, until 1975, rendered the matter stale and precluded reopening. The Court further held that a previous judicial observation allowing the petitioners to approach authorities was contingent upon the property actually being resumed from the original transferee; since the property was restored to the original transferee, that contingency never materialized. The key principle laid down is that long-standing property transfers, finalized by settlement authorities, cannot be reopened at a highly belated stage due to the claimant's own lack of vigilance and failure to pursue remedies in a timely manner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property transfer finalized by settlement authorities be reopened after a lapse of fifteen years due to a previously unaddressed claim form?
  • Does a conditional observation by a High Court regarding the potential resumption of property create a vested right for a claimant if the condition is not met?
  • Is a lack of vigilance in pursuing a property claim a sufficient ground to deny the reopening of a settled transfer case?
  Read full judgment →
• Saee vs The State1978 SCMR 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-28
  murder convictionocular testimonyhostile witnessescommittal court depositionsFIR delaybenefit of doubtappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern whether a conviction can be sustained based on the ocular testimony of a sole eyewitness when other prosecution witnesses have resiled from their earlier statements, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused based on an extra-judicial oath process necessitates the acquittal of the appellant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The court held that a delay in lodging an FIR does not per se invalidate the prosecution's case if the ocular testimony is credible and corroborated by medical evidence. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the committal court depositions of witnesses who later turn hostile can be relied upon as substantive evidence if they are deemed genuine and corroborated by other evidence. Finally, the court clarified that an unjustified acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically entitle the main accused to an acquittal if the evidence against the latter remains sufficient and reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the testimony of a sole eyewitness when other prosecution witnesses have turned hostile?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused based on an extra-judicial oath process entitle the main accused to an acquittal?
  • Can a court rely on the committal court depositions of witnesses who have resiled from their statements at trial?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Shah vs Qurban Shah and Other1978 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationcommon objectunlawful assemblyfurther inquirydiscretion of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to respondents charged under sections 148, 149, 302, and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rioting, unlawful assembly, and causing injuries resulting in a fatality over a land dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting bail to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion was exercised correctly, noting that the material suggested the respondents' intention was not to commit murder and their specific conduct warranted further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Supreme Court laid down the principle that bail granted by a High Court will not be interfered with where the tentative assessment shows that the common object and murderous intent require further inquiry, and the discretion was judicially sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted by the High Court should be cancelled when the accused's intention requires further inquiry?
  • Does the tentative assessment of evidence regarding common object justify the grant of post-arrest bail in murder cases?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi vs Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and Another1978 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-01
  compulsory retirementvoid vs voidablelachesreview petitionlimitationwrit petitioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had allowed an appeal and dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging his compulsory retirement from service after a delay of twelve years. The core legal questions involved whether the petition for leave to appeal was time-barred and whether an administrative order of compulsory retirement passed without proper statutory backing was void or voidable, and consequently whether the equitable doctrine of laches barred relief. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal was filed within time based on the record of multiple applications for certified copies, and further reaffirmed that even if an order is deemed illegal or void, the discretionary relief of a writ can be validly refused on the ground of gross laches and the accrual of intervening equities. The key principle laid down is that a void administrative order does not automatically entitle a petitioner to discretionary constitutional remedies regardless of delay, and courts may dismiss petitions where gross laches or third-party equities exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition lies on the ground of an alleged error apparent on the face of the record regarding the limitation period of a leave to appeal petition?
  • Whether an administrative order passed by a competent authority under a repealed rule is void ab initio or merely voidable?
  • Can a writ petition challenging a void administrative order be dismissed on the ground of gross laches?
  • Does the existence of a void order necessitate that it must always be struck down regardless of intervening equities and consequences?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Pin Liu vs Mrs. Najma Kazmi1978 PLD Supreme Court 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-23
  stay orderrent restrictionstriking off defencedefault in rentcivil proceduremerger of ordersappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which struck down the tenant's defence and ordered eviction for allegedly defaulting on rent deposit conditions imposed during a stay order in a pending rent appeal. The core legal question was whether the High Court could strike off a tenant's defence and order eviction for breach of an appellate stay condition, and whether a Rent Controller's pre-existing order under section 13(6) survived the final disposal by the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to strike off the defence or order eviction merely for breach of an appellate stay order granted under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908; the only consequence of such a breach could be the dismissal of the stay application itself. Furthermore, the Court held that an order under section 13(6) merges into the final judgment of the Rent Controller and loses its separate identity. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court's judgment set aside, and the matter remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court strike off a tenant's defence and order eviction for the breach of a condition imposed in an interim stay order passed under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does an order passed under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 survive the final disposal of the case by the Rent Controller or does it merge into the final judgment?
  • Whether an appellate court can take into account any alleged default in rent deposit committed prior to the grant of an interim stay order during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Mohsinadeeb vs Shamsuddin and Another1978 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-14
  rent restrictionejectmentreconstruction of propertyrestoration of possessioncantonment areastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging an appellate order regarding the eviction of a tenant from a shop. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller, acting under the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, possesses the authority to direct a landlord to reconstruct a property and subsequently restore possession to the evicted tenant. The petitioner argued that the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 and the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are in pari materia, thereby allowing the application of the latter's provisions to the former. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 contains no provision empowering a Rent Controller to issue such a direction for restoration of possession. Consequently, the Court affirmed that provisions of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 cannot be imported into the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The petition was dismissed as the Rent Controller's direction was found to be without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 empower a Rent Controller to order a landlord to restore possession to a tenant after reconstruction?
  • Can the provisions of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 be applied to proceedings under the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963?
  • Is a Rent Controller authorized to issue directions to a landlord beyond those expressly provided in the Pakistan Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963?
  Read full judgment →
• Roshan Din vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and 10 Other1978 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-20
  land allotmentJammu & Kashmir refugeefraudulent allotmentconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of land allotment made in favor of the petitioner, Roshan Din. The petitioner had been allotted land in Sialkot as a Jammu & Kashmir refugee, but subsequent proceedings initiated by private respondents under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, led to a finding by the Additional Settlement Commissioner that the petitioner had obtained the allotment through fraud, as he was not a genuine refugee. The High Court affirmed this finding. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged these concurrent findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the determination regarding the petitioner's status as a non-refugee was a finding of fact based on the evidence presented before the lower authorities. The Court affirmed the principle that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact where there is sufficient evidence on record to support the conclusions reached by the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a person's refugee status?
  • Does the Additional Settlement Commissioner have the authority to cancel land allotments obtained through fraud?
  • Is a finding of fact based on evidence sufficient to sustain the dismissal of a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Co Operative Society Ltd. vs Custodian of Evacuee Property and Other1978 SCMR 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16
  civil review petitionland acquisitionTown Improvement Acterror apparent on the face of the recordcompromise decreeevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Review Petitions filed against a Supreme Court order that had set aside a land sale by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the previous judgment on four grounds, primarily concerning the exclusion of specific Khasra numbers from acquisition, the validity of a compromise agreement between the Lahore Improvement Trust and the petitioner, and the interpretation of the Town Improvement Act, 1922. The Court held that the review petitions were meritless. It established that new grounds or arguments not raised before the High Court or during the original appeal cannot be entertained in review proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a compromise affecting the Trust's property rights required the concurrence of the Punjab University, which held a manifest legal interest in the land. Regarding statutory interpretation, the Court ruled that even if a court's construction of a statute is erroneous, such an error does not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record sufficient to invoke the Court's review jurisdiction. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can new grounds or arguments not raised during the original appeal be entertained in a review petition?
  • Does an erroneous construction of a statute by a court constitute an error apparent on the face of the record justifying review?
  • Is a compromise agreement regarding trust property valid if it lacks the concurrence of a party with a manifest legal interest in said property?
  Read full judgment →
• Riasat Khan vs The State1978 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-11
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonysolitary witnessappellate reviewcriminal appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant Riasat Khan was convicted of the murder of Mst. Noor Begum and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution's case rested on the ocular testimony of the deceased's daughter, Mst. Anwar Begum, and a relative, Rehmat Khan, alongside alleged recoveries and motive. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant's conviction could safely be sustained on the uncorroborated, solitary testimony of a closely related witness. By majority view, the Supreme Court held that the testimony of Mst. Anwar Begum was natural, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence and internal organ conditions, despite minor delays in the First Information Report and the abandonment of another witness. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction for murder be safely based on the uncorroborated testimony of a solitary witness who is closely related to the deceased?
  • Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report per se lead to the inference that an accused person has been falsely substituted for the real culprit?
  • Whether the absence of independent corroboration for ocular testimony in a murder case warrants the acquittal of the accused on the benefit of doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali vs Hussain and 8 Other1978 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-07
  cross casespost-arrest bailaggressorfurther inquiryjudicial discretioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order granting bail to the respondents in a cross-case scenario involving two FIRs registered at the same police station. The petitioner and respondents were involved in a violent altercation at the respondents' residence during a marriage-related ceremony. The petitioner alleged the respondents were the aggressors, while the High Court noted that the petitioner's FIR failed to explain the injuries sustained by the respondents, who were attacked at their own home. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's grant of bail was an arbitrary exercise of discretion. The Court held that because the incident occurred at the respondents' house and the petitioner's party was armed, the question of which party acted as the aggressor required further inquiry. Finding that the High Court's decision was not perverse or arbitrary, particularly since the petitioner's party had already been granted bail, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the determination of the aggressor remained a matter for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a complainant to explain injuries sustained by the opposite party in a cross-case justify further inquiry into the question of aggression?
  • Is the grant of bail by a High Court considered arbitrary when the petitioner's own party has already been released on bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretion in granting bail if the order is not perverse?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali Etc. vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and Other1978 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-26
  evacuee landallotment cancellationpower of attorneycounsel authorityres judicataconstitutional petitionbona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the cancellation of evacuee land allotments. The petitioners, claiming to be bona fide purchasers of land originally allotted to Mst. Ramzan Begum, contested the Settlement Commissioner's order withdrawing a portion of the land due to excess allotment. The petitioners argued that their previous writ petition had been withdrawn without authorization by a counsel who was not their engaged advocate. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the petitioners' original power of attorney contained a clause permitting the engaged counsel to depute another advocate. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioners had subsequently filed a review petition through the same counsel, which was also not pressed, and failed to provide any affidavit evidence to substantiate their claim of unauthorized representation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused to allow the petitioners to re-agitate the matter. Additionally, the Court found that the Settlement Commissioner's order was based on available evidence, rendering the petition meritless. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a client challenge the withdrawal of a petition by a counsel when the power of attorney explicitly authorizes the engaged counsel to depute another advocate?
  • Does the failure to provide affidavit evidence regarding a counsel's lack of authority preclude a party from claiming unauthorized representation?
  • Is a party permitted to re-agitate a matter in a subsequent writ petition after a previous petition on the same subject has been dismissed as not pressed?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Muhammmad Amin vs The State1978 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-19
  post-arrest bailjurisdictionSpecial Military CourtMartial Law Ordertreasury fraudconspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the refusal of bail by the Lahore High Court to a petitioner accused of participating in a conspiracy to defraud the Government Treasury of Rs. 2.76 crores by establishing a fake Federal Development Authority. The petitioner contended that he was falsely implicated and that the recovered funds were extorted from him by investigating authorities. During the proceedings, the State raised a jurisdictional objection, asserting that the case had been formally transferred to a Special Military Court by the Martial Law Administrator under Martial Law Orders Nos. 36 and 37. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that because the case was competently withdrawn from the ordinary courts of law for trial by a Special Military Court, the ordinary courts, including the Supreme Court, lacked jurisdiction to grant bail. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to approach the relevant Military Court for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Do ordinary courts retain jurisdiction to grant bail to an accused once a case has been competently transferred to a Special Military Court under Martial Law Orders?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a bail petition on merits if the trial of the underlying offense has been lawfully withdrawn from the ordinary criminal courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Multan and Other1978 SC` M R 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-20
  excess land cancellationdisplaced persondelegated powerssettlement authoritiesappeal and revisionretrospective amendmentsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave arising from the summary dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged the cancellation of excess land allotted to a displaced person. The appellant originally contested the jurisdiction of the officer who cancelled the land, but later shifted his stance upon obtaining leave to appeal, arguing that an order passed by a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was not subject to appeal or revision. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent retrospective statutory amendment introduced by subsection (3) to section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, via the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Law (Amendment) Ordinance I of 1972, explicitly made orders passed under delegated powers subject to appeal and revision under Chapter VI. The Court consequently ruled that the appellate and revisional orders were competently passed, dismissed concurrent findings regarding excess land, and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner or delegatee under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is immune from appeal and revision?
  • Does subsection (3) of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 apply retrospectively to orders passed under delegated powers?
  • Can a party be permitted to challenge concurrent findings of fact regarding excess land entitlement in the Supreme Court when conceded before the High Court?
  • Whether an objection regarding the locus standi of informants can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when not urged before the lower forums?
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• Raja Javed Akhtar vs Executive Vice President United Bank Ltd. and Other1978 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-19
  domestic enquirymisconductnatural justicereinstatementbank employeeworkmanindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a bank employee, challenged his dismissal for misconduct, specifically unauthorized absence and the illegal retention of customer funds. Following a domestic enquiry, the petitioner was dismissed, leading him to file an application for reinstatement under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. While the Junior Labour Court upheld the dismissal, the Second Punjab Labour Court set it aside, citing a failure to explicitly ask the petitioner if he wished to produce defense evidence. The Lahore High Court subsequently reversed this decision, finding the enquiry fair and compliant with the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the law, as the petitioner had actively participated, cross-examined witnesses, and signed a statement confirming he had no further evidence to present. The Court affirmed that the principles of natural justice were not violated, noting the petitioner's failure to justify his retention of bank funds. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a domestic enquiry violate the principles of natural justice if the accused employee participates in the proceedings and signs a statement that they have no further evidence to produce?
  • Is a domestic enquiry conducted in accordance with Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, sufficient to justify the dismissal of an employee for misconduct?
  • Can an appellate labour court set aside a domestic enquiry finding solely on the technical ground that the Enquiry Officer did not explicitly ask the accused if they wanted to produce defense, despite the accused having signed a statement to the contrary?
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• Rahim Bakhsh Piracha vs Muhammad Ibrahim1978 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-11
  breach of contractsale of goodsinspection of goodsreasonable opportunitycommercial contractearnest moneydelivery of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a commercial dispute concerning a contract for the sale of rayon yarn. The core legal question was whether the appellant-seller or the respondent-buyer committed a breach of contract, specifically regarding the buyer's right to inspect the goods and the seller's obligation to facilitate such inspection. The respondent had failed to take delivery, citing a lack of inspection opportunity and disputes over expenses, while the appellant contended that the respondent avoided delivery due to falling market prices. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was in breach of contract. The Court determined that the appellant had provided sufficient notice and reasonable opportunities for inspection, which the respondent failed to utilize. The Court emphasized that under Section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930, while a buyer is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to examine goods, this does not imply an unlimited period. The principle laid down is that where a seller provides a reasonable window for inspection in a commercial transaction, the buyer's failure to act constitutes a breach.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes a reasonable opportunity for a buyer to inspect goods under the Sale of Goods Act 1930?
  • Can a buyer who fails to inspect goods within a reasonable time after being offered the opportunity claim a breach of contract by the seller?
  • Is a buyer entitled to a refund of an advance deposit if they are found to be in breach of the contract for the sale of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Rahdar Khan vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Peshawar Ahd 3 Other1978 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-11
  review petitionevacuee propertytransfer of propertypossessionspecial leave to appealerror apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that had previously dismissed a petition for special leave to appeal regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The petitioner sought to challenge the earlier dismissal, which was based on the petitioner's seven-year delay in submitting an L.S. Form, failure to clear rent arrears, and inability to establish possession of the property before the target date of 20-12-1958. The core legal question was whether sufficient grounds existed under the relevant procedural law to justify a review of the previous order. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of fresh evidence, or other sufficient cause as required for a review. The Court reaffirmed that the petitioner lacked the necessary qualifications for the transfer of the shop, specifically noting the failure to pay rent and the inability to prove possession by the target date. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, maintaining that the original decision upholding the transfer to the respondent was legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • What are the permissible grounds for seeking a review of a judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the condonation of delay in submitting an L.S. Form automatically satisfy the qualificatory requirements for the transfer of an evacuee shop?
  • Is the failure to pay rent a valid ground for denying the transfer of an evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sind through Secretary, Government of Sind Health1978 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-17
  service terminationmisconductshow-cause noticelimitation periodabandonment of pleasubstantial justiceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a temporary employee at Chandika Medical College, Larkana, had his services terminated following allegations of misconduct involving the harboring of students during campus disturbances. The respondent challenged this termination before the Sind Service Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on the grounds that the respondent had not been afforded an opportunity to show cause against the termination, despite a dissenting opinion regarding the limitation period. The petitioner, the Province of Sind, sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, primarily arguing that the respondent's appeal before the Tribunal was time-barred. The Supreme Court observed that the issue of limitation had not been pressed before the Service Tribunal and was therefore deemed abandoned. Finding that substantial justice had been done between the parties, the Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's decision. The key principle established is that a party cannot raise a plea of limitation for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal if that point was not pressed or was abandoned before the lower forum.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of limitation for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal if it was not pressed before the lower tribunal?
  • Is a service tribunal's decision to reinstate an employee due to the lack of a show-cause notice subject to interference if substantial justice has been done?
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• Postmaster General, Eastern Circle (E P), Dacca and Another vs Muhammad Hashim1978 PLD Supreme Court 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  officiating payfundamental rulesgovernment servantconstitutional petitionhigher responsibilitiespay fixationservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan in a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, which challenged orders restricting the respondent's pay while he was officiating in higher Class I posts. The core legal question was whether the competent authority had the absolute discretion under Fundamental Rule 35 to entirely deny higher remuneration to a government servant officiating in a post involving greater responsibilities. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while Fundamental Rule 35 permits the fixation of a lesser amount than normally admissible, it does not empower the government to totally deprive an officiating employee of any higher pay when assuming duties of greater importance. The key principle laid down is that service rules capable of bearing a reasonable interpretation favourable to an employee should be so interpreted, and Fundamental Rule 35 does not grant an unguided or wide discretion to deny benefits altogether upon promotion to a higher responsibility.

  Questions settled

  • Does Fundamental Rule 35 give the Government an absolute discretion to deny any higher pay to a government servant officiating in a post of greater responsibility?
  • Whether an employee officiating in a higher post involving assumption of greater duties and responsibilities is entitled to higher remuneration under the Fundamental Rules?
  • How are Fundamental Rule 30, 31, and 35 to be construed harmoniously regarding officiating pay?
  • Can a new point regarding the validity of an appointment, requiring investigation into facts, be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Pirzada Nazir Hassan vs Major (Retd.) Ijaz Ahmad Khan and Another1978 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-05
  specific performanceconfession of judgmentreview applicationerror apparent on the face of the recordsale agreementforfeiture of earnest money
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of a review application by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner had agreed to sell a residential house to the first respondent, who subsequently filed a suit for specific performance when disputes arose. During the trial, the petitioner submitted an application stating he had no objection to a decree being passed in favor of the plaintiff based on the sale agreement. The trial court decreed the suit, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that he had confessed judgment, though it slightly modified the terms. A subsequent petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court was dismissed, with the Court agreeing that the petitioner had confessed judgment. The petitioner then sought a review before the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground that an erroneous judgment is not reviewable under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the prior final order of the Supreme Court upholding the High Court's view precluded the petitioner from challenging the judgment via review, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment can be reviewed under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 merely on the ground that it is erroneous?
  • Does a party who has confessed judgment in the trial court retain the right to challenge the resulting decree through a review application?
  • Whether an order of the Supreme Court upholding a High Court judgment becomes final and precludes subsequent collateral challenges by way of review?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan vs Rashid Akhtar Nadvi1978S C M R409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-04
  contempt of courtunconditional apologyscandalizing the courtattachment of propertysupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt notice issued by the former Chief Justice of Pakistan against the respondent, Rashid Akhtar Nadvi, following the publication of a false and imaginary interview in a London-based weekly newspaper, Weekly Azad, which contained disparaging allegations regarding a conversation between the respondent and the former Chief Justice. The core legal question was whether the publication of such a fabricated and disparaging account concerning the head of the judiciary constituted gross contempt of court and how the court should deal with an unconditional apology. The Supreme Court held that the published statement per se amounted to gross contempt of the Supreme Court. However, because the respondent tendered an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity with real contriteness and published the same in the newspaper, the Court accepted the apology, discharged the contempt notice, and ordered the release of the respondent's attached property. The key principle laid down is that while the publication of false and scurrilous statements against a judge constitutes gross contempt of court, an unconditional apology tendered in good grace and accompanied by genuine remorse may be accepted to discharge the notice without imposing punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether publishing a false and imaginary account of a conversation with the Chief Justice constitutes gross contempt of court?
  • Can a notice for contempt of court be discharged upon the tendering of an unconditional apology showing real contriteness?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan Rawalpindi and Another vs Malik Muhammad Aslam and 5 Other1978 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-15
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensation assessmentquinquennial averagecompulsory acquisitionpost-notification sales
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the enhancement of compensation for land acquired by the Federal Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question was whether the trial court and the High Court erred in determining the market value of the acquired land by allegedly relying on post-notification sale transactions, rather than the quinquennial average price. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly assessed the market value based on the land's potential and location, rather than relying solely on the unreliable quinquennial average. The Court clarified that while the quinquennial average is a relevant piece of evidence, it is not conclusive, especially when it fails to reflect the actual market conditions or when it is based on incomplete data. The ratio established is that the determination of compensation must reflect what a willing purchaser would realistically pay for the land at the time of the notification, and courts may consider surrounding circumstances and evidence beyond just the quinquennial average to ascertain this fair market value.

  Questions settled

  • Is the quinquennial average price the sole determinant for assessing compensation in land acquisition cases?
  • Can a court consider evidence of land value beyond the quinquennial average when determining market value under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the reliance on post-notification sales invalidate a compensation award if the court's valuation is otherwise supported by the land's specific characteristics?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi vs And Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-19
  dismissal from servicemisconductindustrial disputeair-hostessejusdem generisstanding orderssubversive of discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sind which accepted a constitutional petition filed by an air-hostess dismissed from service by the petitioner corporation. The third respondent had left her base of duty without prior permission to attend to family matters after failing to join a scheduled flight. Following an inquiry, she was dismissed for misconduct. The Junior Labour Court ordered her reinstatement with lesser punishment, but the Labour Court restored her dismissal under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court, however, set aside the dismissal, holding that leaving the base without permission constituted a mere disregard of rules punishable under Standing Order 15(1)(ii)(a) rather than misconduct under Standing Order 15(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view, holding that penal provisions must be construed strictly, that leaving the base without permission did not amount to insubordination or an act subversive of discipline, and that the petition lacked substance.

  Questions settled

  • Does leaving a base of duty without prior permission amount to misconduct or a mere disregard of rules under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • How should the expression 'act subversive of discipline' under Standing Order 15(3) be construed?
  • What is the distinction between the violation of a lawful order of a superior and the violation of rules under the Standing Orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Osman and Another vs Hajiani Mariambai1978 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-29
  special leave to appealsecond appealadmissibility of evidencestatutory tenancyconcurrent findings of factdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind which dismissed their second appeal and upheld concurrent findings of fact holding them to be servants rather than tenants of the respondent premises. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of secondary documentary evidence admitted without objection, and the entitlement to claim tenancy status under section 30(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, without pleading it in the lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the High Court did consider the document despite its formal defect and found it lacking in probative value, and because the statutory tenancy claim was neither pleaded nor established below, no interference was warranted. The Court affirmed that a party cannot claim the benefit of statutory tenancy provisions without establishing foundational facts or raising the plea in prior proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim the benefit of section 30(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, without pleading it before the lower courts?
  • Whether an objection to the reception of a document in evidence can invalidate a judgment when the appellate court actually considered the document on its merits?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the status of a person as a servant rather than a tenant open to interference in second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and Another vs Ch. Muhammad Hussain1978 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-14
  temporary injunctionpossessioninterim relieftube-well disputecivil revisionprime facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a civil revision decided by the Lahore High Court concerning the grant of a temporary injunction in a dispute over the ownership and possession of a tube-well. The core legal question addressed is whether the question of possession for issuing a temporary injunction must be evaluated based on the factual position obtaining on the date of the institution of the suit, rather than on subsequent events or alleged ousters brought about by force or deception. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the question of possession for a temporary injunction must indeed be judged from the situation existing on the date of the suit, and that lower courts erred in relying on interpolated police reports and subsequent developments. The key principle laid down is that interim relief in possessory disputes cannot be anchored on subsequent, manipulated acts of dispossession, and trial courts must assess prima facie possession as of the date the suit was filed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of possession for the purpose of issuing a temporary injunction must be decided on the basis of the position obtaining on the date of the institution of the suit?
  • Can subsequent events and alleged acts of dispossession occurring after the filing of a suit form the basis for granting a temporary injunction regarding pre-suit possession?
  • Does an interpolated police report regarding dispossession constitute valid evidence for establishing possession in an application for a temporary injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Alam vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16
  ocular evidencecorroborationforensic ballisticscriminal appealinterested witnessesdeath sentenceblood feud
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant for the murder of three individuals, following a dispute over land. The core legal question was whether ocular testimony, which was admittedly tainted by enmity between the parties, could support a conviction when corroborated by forensic evidence, specifically the recovery of a licensed firearm and matching shell casings. The Supreme Court majority held that while ocular evidence from interested witnesses requires independent corroboration, the recovery of the appellant's licensed gun and the forensic expert's report matching the casings found at the crime scene provided sufficient corroboration to sustain the conviction. The Court rejected arguments regarding the delay in forwarding the weapon for analysis, noting that the absence of cross-examination on the integrity of the sealed parcels rendered the delay insufficient to discard the evidence. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were upheld, establishing that forensic ballistics reports can serve as vital corroborative evidence to validate otherwise suspect ocular testimony in cases involving blood feuds.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular testimony from interested witnesses be accepted as the basis for a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Does a delay in forwarding crime weapons and shell casings to a forensic expert automatically invalidate the forensic report?
  • Is the recovery of a licensed firearm and matching shell casings sufficient to corroborate ocular evidence in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs The State and Another1978 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-19
  bail cancellationconstructive liabilityunlawful assemblypost-arrest bailcommon object
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge in a case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the propriety of cancelling post-arrest bail and the applicability of constructive liability rules at the bail stage where the accused did not directly cause the fatal injury but allegedly participated in an unlawful assembly and injured a prosecution witness. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that courts are fully justified at the bail stage in examining the question of constructive liability based on available material such as the First Information Report and statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject to the rule of caution. The key principle laid down is that the applicability of constructive liability provisions like section 34 or section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code can be examined prima facie by courts when deciding bail in non-bailable offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts examine the question of constructive liability at the bail stage?
  • Whether bail once granted can be interfered with if the High Court finds prima facie involvement in an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life?
  • Does the rule of constructive liability under the Pakistan Penal Code apply when considering bail for an accused who injured a prosecution witness rather than the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• Naqibullah and Anons vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-05
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncorroborationlast seen evidencecircumstantial evidenceSection 342 Cr.P.C.voluntariness of confessionmurderbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the convictions and death sentences of two appellants for murder, primarily based on their retracted judicial confessions. The Supreme Court examined the admissibility and evidentiary value of these confessions, the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, and the impact of procedural irregularities. The Court affirmed that while confessions, even if retracted, can form the sole basis of conviction if found true and voluntary, prudence dictates material corroboration. It reiterated that instructions for magistrates in recording confessions are directory, not mandatory, but emphasize a solemn duty to ensure voluntariness. The Court found the corroboration for Wasal Khan's confession, based on 'last seen' evidence, insufficient, especially as he was not questioned on this circumstance under Section 342, Cr.P.C. Similarly, the medical evidence of injuries on Naqibullah was deemed conjectural and not conclusively linked to the incident. Consequently, the Court granted the benefit of doubt, setting aside the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis for conviction in a criminal case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of 'last seen' evidence in a murder trial?
  • Is non-compliance with Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere irregularity or a fatal flaw?
  • What precautions must a Magistrate take to ensure a confession is voluntary and admissible?
  • How should medical evidence of injuries on an accused be assessed for corroboration in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Naj1b Raza Rehmani vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-06
  retracted confessionprivate defenceunseen crimeexculpatory statementcorroborationhomosexualityattempted sodomysplitting of admission
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The case against the appellant rested entirely on an unseen crime, supported solely by an alleged judicial confession (Exh. P. Z.) and a letter (Exh. 18). The trial court and the Peshawar High Court convicted the appellant, holding that the retracted confession was corroborated by the letter and circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court evaluated whether the statement qualified as a confession and whether a retracted confession could sustain a conviction without independent corroboration in material particulars.

  The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and allowed the appeal. The Court held that a statement containing self-exculpatory facts—specifically, that the appellant fired at the deceased in exercise of the right of private defence under Section 100, PPC to prevent an attempt to commit sodomy—does not constitute a confession. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a confession or admission cannot be split up to accept inculpatory parts while rejecting exculpatory parts, nor can a retracted confession form the sole basis of conviction without material corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement containing self-exculpatory facts that negative the alleged offence can legally constitute a valid confession?
  • Can a court split an accused's admission or confession to accept the inculpatory portion while rejecting the exculpatory portion?
  • Is it prudent to base a criminal conviction solely on an uncorroborated retracted confession?
  Read full judgment →
• Naik Riaz vs Muhammad Khan and Another1978 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-16
  review petitionleave to appealnon-bailable warrantsservice of noticeacquittalmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a review petition filed by the applicant Riaz, seeking review of an order granting leave to appeal against his acquittal for murder and directing the issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest. The core legal question concerned the effect of a defective notice containing an incorrect parentage of the respondent, which allegedly violated Order VI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules and resulted in the respondent being condemned unheard. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that although a clerical mistake occurred in addressing the notice to the wrong parentage, it did not render the leave-granting order coram non judice, particularly as counsel for the applicant did not challenge the leave order itself but rather the issuance of warrants. The Court further held that given the daylight occurrence, the specific attribution of the fatal shot, and the nature of the capital offence, the issuance of non-bailable warrants was entirely appropriate. The key principle laid down is that minor clerical errors in notices that do not invalidate the core proceedings do not warrant setting aside leave to appeal, and non-bailable warrants remain justified in serious capital cases where prima facie a daylight murder is properly attributed to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an incorrect parentage in a notice sent to a respondent render an order granting leave to appeal coram non judice?
  • Whether non-bailable warrants of arrest are justified when granting leave to appeal against an acquittal in a daylight murder case?
  • Can an order granting leave to appeal be reviewed solely on the ground of a clerical error in the notice addressed to the respondent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mustafa Khan and Another vs Hakim Abdul Mughani Ahd 3 Other1978 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-09
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyspecial leave to appealwithdrawal of formsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of evacuee property, specifically whether property No. 24 constituted a separate property or a rear portion of property No. 43 transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The core legal question revolved around the entitlement of the petitioner to the property in dispute and the validity of his withdrawal of his transfer form. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition lacked merit as the petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his L.H. Form, thereby relinquishing any claim to the property, and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's factual findings after spot inspection contained no error of law. The court established the principle that a party who has formally withdrawn their transfer form has no subsisting claim or locus standi for the transfer of the property, and factual determinations made by settlement authorities following spot inspections and supported by record will not be lightly interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant who has withdrawn their L.H. Form retain any right to seek the transfer of evacuee property?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual determinations made by settlement authorities following a spot inspection in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Musaddaq Ahad Shah vs Federal Public Service Commission, Karachi1978 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-14
  CSS examinationcandidature cancellationcompartmentsupplementary examinationprovisional eligibilityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the cancellation of his candidature for the Central Superior Service Examination by the Federal Public Service Commission. The core legal question was whether a candidate who appeared in an LL.B. examination before the application deadline, was placed in a compartment, and subsequently cleared the remaining papers in a subsequent examination before the viva voce test, satisfied the eligibility and provisional application requirements under Note (ii) of Condition No. 5 of the examination rules. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent appearance in the remaining papers was merely a supplementary examination completing the original result, rather than a separate self-contained examination, and that the appellant had fulfilled the requirements by communicating his passed result prior to the viva voce test. The Court declared the cancellation of candidature without lawful authority, establishing that clearing a compartment in a supplementary examination in continuation of an earlier examination satisfies provisional eligibility timelines.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent appearance in remaining papers to clear a compartment constitute a separate self-contained examination or a continuation of the original examination?
  • Whether provisional candidature for a competitive examination remains valid when a candidate clears a compartment and communicates the passing result before the viva voce test?
  Read full judgment →
• Munsif Shah vs The State1978 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mumtazuddin vs The StatePLD 1978. Supreme Court 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-20
  solitary eye-witnesscorroborationcriminal appealmurder convictionprobative valuerecovery evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness and alleged recoveries of incriminating items. The central legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the evidence of a solitary eye-witness whose testimony contained significant discrepancies and infirmities, and whether the corroborative evidence provided was sufficient to support such a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be maintained. The Court observed that while a conviction may theoretically rest on the evidence of a solitary eye-witness, as a rule of prudence, such evidence must be absolutely reliable or corroborated by independent, high-probative evidence. In this case, the eye-witness's testimony was inconsistent, the motive was unproven, and the corroborative evidence, consisting of recoveries proved only by the Investigation Officer, was insufficient to cure the infirmities in the ocular account. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that where the prosecution's case is heavily flawed, the corroborative evidence must be of substantial probative value.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness without independent corroboration?
  • What is the required standard of corroborative evidence when the primary ocular testimony is found to be unreliable?
  • Is the evidence of an Investigation Officer alone sufficient to prove the recovery of incriminating articles in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younis vs The Sate1978 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-30
  criminal appealmurdersolitary eyewitnessabscondencebenefit of doubtacquittalreappraisal of evidencefirst information report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed the appellant's appeal and enhanced his sentence from life imprisonment to death for a murder committed under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the solitary eyewitness was present at the spot and whether his testimony, corroborated only by the appellant's abscondence and the absence of motive for a false charge, was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the solitary eyewitness was not present at the time of the occurrence, given numerous inconsistencies in his statement, the sketchy nature of the First Information Report, the lack of blood or weapon evidence at the spot, and contradictions with the medical evidence. The Court laid down the principle that abscondence is merely a piece of corroborative evidence which by itself proves nothing and cannot substitute for reliable ocular testimony, and that a conviction cannot be sustained on an unsafe and doubtful eyewitness account.

  Questions settled

  • Whether abscondence alone is sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused person in the absence of reliable ocular evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a solitary eyewitness whose presence at the scene is rendered doubtful by material contradictions and attending circumstances?
  • Does the non-existence of motive for a false charge automatically validate the prosecution's case against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs The State1978 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-08
  dying declarationmurdercorroborationbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealocular evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the High Court based solely on a dying declaration after ocular testimony and recoveries were disbelieved. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for murder can be safely based solely on a dying declaration when parts of it are found to be false and tainted by potential tutoring in the presence of interested relatives without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that while a conviction can be based solely on a dying declaration if it is free from taint, a dying declaration found to be partly false and recorded in circumstances allowing for tutoring requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of the doubt, laying down the principle that uncorroborated dying declarations that are partly false or tainted cannot form the sole basis for a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based solely on a dying declaration?
  • Whether a partly false dying declaration requires independent corroboration before it can be relied upon for a conviction?
  • Is it safe to base a murder conviction on an uncorroborated dying declaration recorded in the presence of the deceased's relatives?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob and Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner1978 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  consent orderland allotmentreview applicationleave to appealrehabilitationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the verification of land claims by refugees from India, specifically concerning the 'Ghair Mahfooz' portion of Shamlat land. The petitioners challenged a High Court order that had disposed of their writ petition based on a consent agreement between the parties' counsel. The core legal question was whether a consent order, which resolved a long-standing dispute regarding land allotments based on the principle of priority in time, could be challenged or reviewed after the parties had agreed to its terms in open court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the subsequent review application, as the original order was a consent order dictated in the presence of the petitioners' counsel. The Court affirmed that it is inappropriate to reopen a matter that has been conclusively settled by the mutual agreement of the parties. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, establishing the principle that consent orders, being binding agreements between parties, are not subject to review or appeal on the merits of the underlying dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consent order passed by a High Court be challenged or reviewed?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against a consent order?
  • Does a court have justification to review an order that was dictated in the presence of the parties' counsel and agreed upon by them?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman vs Raban and 4 Other1978 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-16
  post-arrest baildouble murderbail cancellationrejection of leave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court of Sind, Karachi, whereby four respondents accused of double murder under sections 302, 34, and 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code were granted post-arrest bail, while the bail application of their co-accused Rajab was rejected. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail to co-accused where medical evidence and circumstances suggest the fatal injuries on the deceased were inflicted by a single assailant, supporting the High Court's view regarding the motive. The Supreme Court held that the impugned bail order of the High Court was unexceptionable and declined to interfere, noting that observations made in bail orders do not prejudice the trial court, which must decide the case strictly on evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to co-accused when medical evidence indicates fatal injuries were inflicted by a single assailant?
  • Do observations made by a superior court in a bail order prejudice the subsequent trial of the accused?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with an order granting post-arrest bail passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Umar vs Rokhan and Other1978 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman Etc vs Abdul Ghani1978 PLD Supreme Court 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  pre-emptionofficial gazettenotificationrejection of plaintretrospective effectcolony area
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioners against a sale dated 19-2-1973. A preliminary objection was raised that a right of pre-emption did not exist in the colony area where the land was situated, pursuant to a notification under section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913. Although a subsequent notification rescinding the prohibition was issued on 19-2-1973, it was published in the official Gazette on 2-3-1973. The Civil Judge rejected the plaint, a decision reversed by the Additional District Judge, but restored by the Lahore High Court, which held that the notification took effect upon publication in the Gazette. The Supreme Court examined whether a declaration under section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 required publication in the official Gazette to become effective. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the term "notification" under the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 means publication in the official Gazette, and notifications curtailing or extending citizens' rights cannot take retrospective effect prior to such publication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification issued under section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 take effect from the date of its signing or from the date of its publication in the official Gazette?
  • What is the legal definition and requirement of a "notification" under the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956?
  • Can a notification affecting the rights of citizens be given retrospective operation prior to its actual publication in the official Gazette?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Subtain Shah vs The State1978 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  pre-arrest baildiscretionary powerbail refusalfactual inquirycriminal trespasswrongful confinement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of offenses under sections 447, 440, 342, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The allegations involved the petitioner and others trespassing on the complainant's land, destroying crops, and wrongfully confining an individual. The petitioner contended that the case was malicious, arguing that the land was barren, the crop destruction story was fabricated, and that civil disputes regarding land possession were pending. The core legal question was whether the High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail was justified given the petitioner's claims of innocence and malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's arguments required a factual inquiry inappropriate for bail proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the grant of bail is a discretionary matter, and since the High Court had not exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously, there was no ground for interference. The judgment reinforces the principle that factual controversies should not be resolved during bail hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court conduct a detailed inquiry into factual matters while deciding a bail application?
  • Is the grant of bail a discretionary matter that appellate courts will only interfere with if exercised arbitrarily or capriciously?
  • Does the existence of a pending civil dispute regarding land ownership automatically entitle an accused to pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving trespass?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siraj vs Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Welfare, Islamabad and 4 Other1978 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-25
  petition for leave to appealdepartmental inquiryremoval from servicedelegation of powersjurisdictionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court at Dacca dismissing the petitioner's writ petition against his removal from government service for misconduct. The petitioner contended that respondent No. 4, who initiated disciplinary proceedings and removed him, was not his appointing authority and lacked jurisdiction, and that any delegation of such power by the Ministry of Health was ultra vires. The Supreme Court held that the petition was competent despite the creation of Bangladesh since it was filed before its recognition and the respondents were based in Pakistan, and condoned the delay in filing due to abnormal conditions in East Pakistan. On the merits, the Court found that the competent authority had validly delegated disciplinary powers to respondent No. 4 through relevant government notifications issued in consultation with the Establishment Division under the Rules of Business, 1962. The Court further held that the petitioner was afforded a full opportunity to defend himself. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subordinate authority can be validly delegated disciplinary powers to initiate proceedings and remove a civil servant?
  • Whether delay in filing a petition from the former East Pakistan can be condoned in view of abnormal historical conditions?
  • Whether consultation with the Establishment Division under the Rules of Business, 1962 is necessary for the delegation of disciplinary powers concerning government servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahbaz Khan and 2 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-19
  pre-arrest bailmurderous assaultcross-casefurther inquirybail refusalcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court whereby the petitioners were refused pre-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 307, 379, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The allegations against the petitioners were that they made a murderous assault on the complainants, causing multiple firearm and blunt weapon injuries, and robbed a licensed revolver. The core legal question was whether the existence of a cross-case and rival versions of the incident rendered the matter one of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby entitling the accused to pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to pre-arrest bail as the case lacked prosecution mala fides and involved serious allegations of a concerted murderous assault with deadly weapons resulting in numerous injuries. The court laid down the principle that the mere existence of a cross-case does not automatically warrant the grant of pre-arrest bail where the accused are charged with serious overt acts involving deadly weapons and causing multiple injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the existence of a cross-case between parties automatically entitles the accused to pre-arrest bail?
  • Does a case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely because there are rival versions of the prosecution?
  • Are accused persons charged with a murderous assault and causing multiple injuries with deadly weapons entitled to pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Hakam Ali and 7 Other1978 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-16
  post-arrest bailcross-versionsfurther inquirybail cancellationsupreme court reviewaggressor determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to the respondents in a criminal case involving charges under sections 307, 392, 395, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail where both parties sustained injuries in the course of the occurrence and cross-versions existed, making it uncertain which party was the aggressor. The Supreme Court held that where members of both sides received injuries and it cannot be determined with certainty at the pre-trial stage which party initiated the aggression, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the High Court's discretion in granting bail will not be interfered with unless found perverse, arbitrary, or capricious. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted when both parties have sustained injuries and it is uncertain which side was the aggressor?
  • Does the existence of a cross-version or private complaint make a criminal case one of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion of the High Court in granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar Etc. vs Additional Commissioner (Consolidation)1978 SCMR 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-29
  inheritance mutationrefugee right-holderrevisional jurisdictionWest Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Schemeprovisional mutationlimitation and laches
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal concerns a dispute over the inheritance of a deceased refugee right-holder, where mutations were sanctioned in favor of one set of heirs while excluding others. The core legal questions were whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a second revision against an order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, and whether the provisions of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme permitted the re-opening of inheritance mutations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's order that the Settlement Commissioner lacked the authority to hear a second revision. The Court upheld the remand to the Additional Settlement Commissioner, directing a fresh decision that balances the petitioners' arguments regarding limitation and laches against the respondents' claims. The Court held that Paragraph 67 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme provides a mechanism for re-determining inheritance claims, recognizing that initial mutations were often provisional and made without the participation of all potential heirs due to the displacement caused by the partition of the subcontinent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to entertain a second revision against an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner?
  • Are initial mutations of inheritance for refugee right-holders considered provisional under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Can inheritance mutations be re-opened to include heirs who were previously excluded due to the circumstances of partition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Ali and 3 Other1978 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Mir Adam Khan Etc:1978 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-05
  review petitionevacuee propertytransfer of shoppreferential claimjoint businessMuslim Lawadoption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking review of an order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question is whether a joint business partner and nephew of a deceased allottee possesses a preferential right to the transfer of an evacuee property over other legal heirs, and whether an alleged adoption confers such entitlement. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that a partner in a business carried on in the shop does not acquire an independent status of possession as a tenant and stands on an equal footing with other successors under Muslim Law, and that adoption confers no legal right to preference. The key principle laid down is that joint business operation with an allottee does not create a preferential claim to the transfer of evacuee property, and adoption is irrelevant for statutory settlement entitlements where not recognized.

  Questions settled

  • Does a joint business partner of a deceased allottee have a preferential claim to the transfer of an evacuee shop?
  • Can a plea of adoption be raised for the first time in a review petition before the Supreme Court?
  • Does adoption confer any legal right to preference under Muslim Law or settlement laws regarding property transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq Hussain vs Mst. Khurshid Fatima and Another1978 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-07
  dissolution of marriagekhuladowerpre-trial conciliationconstitutional jurisdictionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged a Family Court judgment granting the first respondent a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of khula and recovery of dower amounting to Rs. 10,000. The core legal questions involved whether the Family Court's failure to conduct pre-trial conciliation directly with the petitioner—rather than through his father—rendered the proceedings without lawful authority, whether the failure to frame a separate issue on the quantum of dower vitiated the decree, and whether the claim for khula was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court held that procedural irregularities regarding pre-trial conciliation conducted through an authorized representative did not prejudice the outcome, that the lack of a separate issue on dower caused no injustice where full opportunity to lead evidence was afforded, and that res judicata could not be raised without proper pleading and evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a Family Court to conduct pre-trial conciliation proceedings directly with a party, rather than through their father, renders the judgment without lawful authority?
  • Does the failure to frame a separate issue regarding the quantum of dower vitiate the Family Court decree where full opportunity to produce evidence was given?
  • Can a plea of res judicata be entertained when it was neither pleaded in the written statement nor supported by the production of previous judgments?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim vs The State1978 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-14
  criminal bailattempt to murderdelay in trialabsconding co-accusedpost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the order of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's criminal bail application in a case involving allegations of firing and causing injuries under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions pertain to whether the applicability of Section 307 P.P.C. should be determined at the pre-trial bail stage and whether prolonged incarceration due to absconding co-accused warrants the grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that determining whether the offense falls under Section 307 P.P.C. is premature at the bail stage and must be decided at trial, and further held that delay caused by absconding co-accused does not entitle the petitioner to bail. The Court dismissed the petition while directing the trial court to proceed against the absconding accused under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and expedite the trial. The key principle laid down is that the applicability of specific penal provisions must await trial and delay attributable to absconding co-accused does not automatically furnish a ground for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of whether a case falls under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be determined at the bail stage?
  • Does delay in the commencement of a trial due to absconding co-accused entitle an incarcerated petitioner to be released on bail?
  • What procedure should a trial court adopt against absconding co-accused to expedite the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazir vs Muhammad Sadiq and Other1978 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurdercommon intentionmedical evidencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to the respondent, who was accused of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contended that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion properly, arguing that the First Information Report established reasonable grounds to believe the respondent was guilty of an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment, and that the injuries sustained by the accused were not adequately explained by the complainant's version. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting that the injuries sustained by the accused party were inconsistent with the complainant's claim that they were caused by brickbats, particularly given the high number of injuries (18) sustained by the accused. The Court held that determining the actual aggressor required further investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of unexplained injuries on the accused party justify a grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Is a case suitable for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the medical evidence contradicts the complainant's version of how the accused sustained injuries?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail if the order is based on a reasonable assessment of the need for further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Munir Akbar vs Saddar Din and Othfrs1978 SCMR 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-07
  civil reviewsurplus landtransfer of propertydisplaced personslocus standisettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition arises from an order of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal regarding the transfer of surplus land attached to a bungalow in Sargodha. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, as a transferee of a half portion of the bungalow, had the entitlement or locus standi under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and Settlement Scheme No. 1 to purchase an excess area of surplus land that had already been disposed of by public auction to another party. The Supreme Court held that the review petition lacks merit, ruling that the petitioner failed to establish that the excess land was part of or appurtenant to the portion transferred to him, and noting that the land was disposed of prior to his own transfer. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the petitioner was not eligible to purchase the disputed land.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transferee of a portion of a property has locus standi to obtain surplus land previously disposed of by public auction?
  • Can surplus land be claimed as appurtenant to a transferred property in the absence of a finding by settlement authorities?
  • Whether the provisions of Settlement Scheme No. 1 permit the purchase of surplus land disposed of before the transfer of the main property?
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• Muhammad Munawar vs Ch. Khurshid Alam1978 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-27
  dismissal for defaultrestoration of appealinherent powerssufficient causenegligence of counselrent eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for the restoration of a second appeal and a subsequent review application arising out of eviction proceedings. The petitioner's second appeal before the High Court was dismissed for default when neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared. An application for readmission under Order XLI Rule 19 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was dismissed as time-barred under Article 168 of the Limitation Act, and a review application was subsequently rejected. The core legal question was whether the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code could be invoked to restore a case dismissed for default when a specific remedy is provided under Order XLI Rule 19, and whether sufficient cause was shown for non-appearance. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner and his counsel failed to show sufficient cause for non-appearance as negligence in checking the cause list does not warrant the invocation of inherent powers, and a litigant is not absolved of responsibility merely by engaging counsel. The key principle laid down is that inherent powers under Section 151 cannot be invoked to circumvent specific statutory provisions, and a litigant must exercise due diligence in prosecuting their case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inherent powers under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked to restore an appeal dismissed for default when a specific remedy is provided under Order XLI Rule 19?
  • Does the mere misreading or omission of a case from the cause list by a counsel constitute sufficient cause for setting aside a dismissal for default?
  • Does the engagement of a counsel absolve a litigant from the responsibility of diligently prosecuting their case?
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• Muhammad Mujtaba vs Razia Begum1978 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-14
  temporary injunctioneasement rightsbalance of convenienceprima facie casecivil revisionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had upheld the grant of a temporary injunction in a civil suit. The respondent, Mst. Razia Begum, filed a suit for a permanent injunction against the petitioner, Mohammad Mujtaba, seeking to restrain him from constructing a structure that would block the ventilators of her house, asserting a right of easement acquired through long user. The trial court initially vacated an interim injunction, but the appellate court reversed this, finding a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's revision against that appellate order. The core legal question was whether the appellate court's exercise of discretion in granting a temporary injunction was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court correctly identified a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff. Consequently, the Court found no error in the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the temporary injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted to restrain construction that blocks ventilators based on a claimed easement right?
  • Does the appellate court have the discretion to grant a temporary injunction if it finds a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff?
  • Is a High Court order dismissing a revision petition against a temporary injunction subject to interference if the lower court's reasoning is sound?
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• Muhammad Latif vs Muhammad Farooq and Another1978 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-10
  self-defenseright of private defensetrespassacquittalmurderappreciation of evidenceland disputecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the acquittal of the first respondent by the Lahore High Court in a murder case. The prosecution alleged two separate incidents: an initial altercation over land possession followed by a subsequent attack resulting in the death of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the occurrence of two distinct incidents or if the evidence supported the respondent’s plea of self-defense during a single incident of trespass. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s version was based on unreliable witnesses and conjectures, noting that the medical evidence and circumstances contradicted the theory of two separate incidents. The Court found that the deceased and his companions were trespassers attempting to forcibly take possession of land cultivated by the respondent and his step-father. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s acquittal, ruling that the respondent acted in the exercise of his right of self-defense of person and property. The judgment reaffirms that an appellant cannot unilaterally abandon an appeal and that convictions cannot rest on fabricated prosecution narratives that ignore the realities of the incident.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellant have the right to abandon a criminal appeal at will?
  • Is a conviction sustainable where the prosecution's theory of the occurrence is based on fabricated evidence and surmises?
  • Does the right of self-defense extend to the protection of property against trespassers?
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• Muhammad Latif and 5 Other vs Border Area Committee and 2 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-26
  Border Area Schemeallotment cancellationbona fide purchaserremandMartial Law Regulationstatutory interpretationreview jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute concerning the cancellation of land allotments by the Border Area Committee. The petitioners, as vendees of land originally allotted under the Border Area Scheme, challenged the cancellation of the original allottee's allotment, arguing that they were bona fide purchasers entitled to a hearing. The core legal questions were whether the Border Area Committee retained authority to scrutinize allotments following the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and whether the High Court's order of remand was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation (M.L.R. 9) is an independent enactment distinct from the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and its operation remains unaffected by the latter's repeal. The Court further upheld the High Court's decision to remand the matter to the Border Area Committee, noting that the petitioners would have the opportunity to present their case regarding their status as bona fide purchasers before that forum. The principle established is that the Border Area Committee operates under an independent legal framework, and procedural corrections by a court to its own orders are permissible to prevent injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, affect the authority of the Border Area Committee under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation (M.L.R. 9)?
  • Can a court correct its own judgment or order under the principle embodied in Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a remand order by the High Court appropriate when a party claims they were denied a hearing before an administrative tribunal?
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• Muhammad Khan and Other vs The State and Other1978 PLD SC 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-12
  Summary Military Courtinadmissible evidencewrit jurisdictionconvictionconspiracyextra-judicial confessionMartial Law Regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition against convictions and sentences imposed by a Summary Military Court under Martial Law Regulations. The petitioners contended that their convictions were vitiated by the admission of inadmissible evidence, specifically the confessional statements of third parties not on trial. The Supreme Court addressed whether a conviction can be maintained when some evidence is potentially inadmissible, provided sufficient admissible evidence remains. The Court held that even if the Magistrate's testimony regarding the confessions of outsiders were excluded, the remaining evidence—specifically the testimony of witnesses regarding the conspiracy and an extra-judicial confession—was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Relying on the principle that an appellate court may maintain a conviction after excluding inadmissible evidence if the remaining evidence clearly establishes guilt, the Court affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. The principle established is that a conviction is not automatically invalidated by the presence of inadmissible evidence if the remaining admissible evidence independently supports the finding of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained if some evidence considered by the trial court is found to be inadmissible?
  • Does the presence of inadmissible evidence automatically invalidate a conviction recorded by a Summary Military Court?
  • Is a High Court required to quash a conviction if it finds that inadmissible evidence was admitted during the trial?
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• Muhammad Jamil vs Sh. Muhammad Sharif1978 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-05
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantbona fide personal needrent noteappreciation of evidencestatutory grounds for eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld an ejectment order against a tenant. The core legal questions were whether a contractual stipulation in a rent note prohibiting ejectment overrides statutory grounds for eviction, whether a prior notice is mandatory before filing an ejectment application, and whether the landlord's claim of bona fide personal need was sufficiently established despite the tenant's arguments regarding the sufficiency of existing space. The Supreme Court held that contractual stipulations cannot override statutory rights of a landlord to seek ejectment on recognized legal grounds. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that there is no legal requirement for a prior notice before filing an ejectment application. Regarding the personal need, the Court ruled that the determination of the scope and nature of a landlord's requirement is a subjective matter for the landlord, and findings of fact regarding the adequacy of space are not subject to interference in appeal. The petition was dismissed, though the tenant was granted four months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contractual stipulation in a rent note prohibiting ejectment override the statutory right of a landlord to seek eviction on recognized grounds?
  • Is a prior notice mandatory under the law before a landlord can file an application for the ejectment of a tenant?
  • Is the determination of the scope and nature of a landlord's personal requirement a matter for the landlord to decide?
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