Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Hussain Sanghar Khan vs The State the State and Another1978 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon vs Ghulam Mustafa1978 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-05
  ejectmentreasonable and bona fide requirementreconstructionamalgamation of propertiesleave to appealconcurrent findingsurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's second appeal against concurrent orders of ejectment from a commercial shop. The core legal question concerns whether the landlord's requirement for the demolition and reconstruction of the shop by amalgamating it with an adjoining property was reasonable and bona fide, or merely a device to extract higher rent. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord were unexceptionable, noting that subsequent developments—namely, the vacation of the adjoining shop—corroborated the landlord's genuine intention to reconstruct, and that statutory safeguards under the relevant rent restriction law adequately protect tenants against dishonest devices. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent judgments of ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's requirement for demolition and reconstruction of a rented premises is reasonable and bona fide when involving amalgamation with an adjoining property?
  • Do subsections (5) and (5-A) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 provide sufficient safeguards against dishonest ejectment devices by landlords?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the District Judge regarding a landlord's bona fide requirement be interfered with in second appeal?
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• Muhammad Hanif vs The State1978 SCMR 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-07
  post-arrest bailleave to appealattempt to murdergrievous injuryovert actcriminal assaultbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his post-arrest bail application in a criminal case registered under Sections 307, 426, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when specifically charged with an overt act of causing a grievous injury on the abdomen of the injured with a knife during an armed attack. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there was no justification to interfere with the High Court's order as reasonable grounds existed to believe the petitioner was guilty of an offense punishable with imprisonment extending to ten years. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the observation that the petitioner could approach the appropriate court for bail after some evidence is recorded during the trial. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is prima facie connected with an overt act of causing grievous injury in a heinous crime, post-arrest bail is rightly refused at the pre-trial stage, subject to renewal after recording of trial evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused charged with causing a grievous injury with a knife during a criminal assault entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail be entertained when reasonable grounds exist connecting the accused to an offense punishable with imprisonment up to ten years?
  • Can an accused renew an application for bail before the trial court after some evidence has been recorded during the trial?
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• Muhammad Hanif Alias Billa vs The State1978 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-15
  murderrelated eyewitnessinjured witnessappreciation of evidencesubstitution of accusedcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and confirming his death sentence for murder. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony from related and injured witnesses, the necessity of medical proof for establishing an injured witness's presence, and the reliability of identification in daylight. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the testimony of related eyewitnesses is not inherently unreliable, that the presence of the injured eyewitness stood established even without formal medical evidence where his injuries were uncontroverted in cross-examination, and that substitution of an accused in a daylight crime is extremely rare. The key principle laid down is that related and injured eyewitness testimony remains credible and sufficient for conviction when natural, consistent, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances, even if minor procedural evidentiary gaps exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses who are real brothers of the deceased can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the victim?
  • Does the failure to formally prove medical evidence regarding an injured witness's injuries negate their status as an injured witness when their testimony is unchallenged in cross-examination?
  • Whether substitution of an actual culprit by an innocent person is a common occurrence in daylight crimes?
  • Is objective physical intervention required by a natural witness to establish their presence at the scene of a sudden attack?
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• Muhammad Gulshan and Others vs Muhammad Inayat and Another1978 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-22
  quashment of proceedingscriminal trespassF.I.R.civil disputespecial leave to appealprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a petition for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners. The petitioners, accused of offences including criminal trespass and assault, argued that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, concerning the title and possession of land transferred by settlement authorities. They further contended that the allegations in the First Information Report (F.I.R.) did not disclose criminal offences and that they had no knowledge of a High Court stay order regarding the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core question of whether criminal proceedings should be quashed when the underlying dispute involves property rights. The Court held that the criminal court is not concerned with the title to the property and that the allegations in the F.I.R. and the challan prima facie disclosed the commission of criminal offences. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the prosecution should not be stifled at the initial stage, and the petitioners' defences must be raised during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed solely on the ground that the underlying dispute is of a civil nature regarding property title?
  • Should a High Court quash criminal proceedings if the F.I.R. and challan prima facie disclose the commission of criminal offences?
  • Is the criminal court the appropriate forum to determine the title to property in a criminal prosecution?
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• Muhammad Aslam and Another vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-18
  Summary & questions settled

  The provided judgment text is extremely brief, consisting only of the phrase "ORDER OF THE COURT S. A. H." It does not contain any details regarding the nature of the matter, the core legal questions addressed, the court's decision or holding (ratio decidendi), or any legal principles laid down. Consequently, it is not possible to construct a factual headnote of the requested length or content based solely on the information provided in the judgment text.

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• Muhammad Ashiq vs Muhammad Nazir Alias Billa and Ahother1978 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-14
  murderacquittalresiled witnessestransferred evidencecriminal revisionretrialleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the acquittal of the respondent for murder by the Additional Sessions Judge. The prosecution case rested on an eyewitness account where witnesses initially supported the prosecution under Section 164 and during commitment proceedings, but resiled at the trial and were declared hostile, leading to their earlier statements being transferred to the sessions file under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether such transferred statements could serve as the basis for conviction in light of attendant circumstances, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the acquittal or order a retrial. The Supreme Court held that while transferred statements can form the basis of a conviction if evaluated with care and caution, ordering a retrial at this stage would be an exercise in futility because amendments introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1971 and subsequent ordinances omitted the provision corresponding to Section 288, meaning the prior statements could no longer be treated as substantive evidence in a fresh trial. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of statements transferred to the sessions file under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when eyewitnesses resile at trial?
  • Whether the superior courts should interfere with an acquittal order in revision when the trial court's view of the evidence is not perverse or whimsical?
  • Is it appropriate to order a retrial when subsequent legislative amendments have omitted the statutory provision under which the previous evidence was admitted?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs Muhammad Tahir1978 SC M R 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-10
  evictionwilful defaultrent arrearspublic auctiondisplaced personsleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's second appeal against an eviction order. The respondent, having purchased the disputed property through a public auction, sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, damage to the property, and personal bona fide need. The petitioner contended that the eviction application was incompetent for failing to specify the rent amount and argued that his non-payment of rent was not wilful due to the pendency of a separate constitutional petition challenging the respondent's title. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions. It held that the eviction application sufficiently specified the rent arrears. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner’s long-standing indifference and failure to pay rent for thirteen years, despite having full knowledge of the auction and the cancellation of his own claim, constituted wilful default. Consequently, the Court affirmed the eviction order, ruling that the petitioner could not rely on the pendency of collateral litigation to justify prolonged non-payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a constitutional petition regarding property title justify a tenant's failure to pay rent?
  • Is an eviction application incompetent if it fails to specify the exact quantum of rent?
  • Does a tenant's long-standing indifference regarding property title disputes constitute wilful default in rent payment?
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• Muhammad Anwar Etc. vs Qadir Etc.S1978 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-14
  petition for leave to appeallimitationcondonation of delayreview applicationabatementlegal representatives
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition and a subsequent order dismissing a review application. The core legal question concerned whether a writ petition could be decided in the absence of the petitioners and whether a review application could be treated as an application under Order XXII, Rule 9(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petition against the main judgment was hopelessly barred by 432 days with no sufficient cause shown for condonation of delay. Furthermore, the Court held that a point not urged before the High Court could not be permitted to be taken up for the first time before the Supreme Court, and the review application was rightly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that new legal grounds or points not raised before the lower court cannot be urged for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal, and a time-barred challenge without sufficient cause cannot be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal barred by a long delay can be entertained without showing sufficient cause for condonation?
  • Can a party raise a new legal point for the first time before the Supreme Court that was not urged before the High Court?
  • Whether a review application can be treated as an application under Order XXII, Rule 9(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when it was not urged as such before the lower court?
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• Muhammad Amin and 3 Others vs Ch. Muhammad Anwar and Another1978 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-19
  ejectmentdefault in rentservice of noticeDisplaced Persons Actsecond appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ejectment of tenants from a property transferred by the Settlement Department. The respondents, having acquired the property, issued a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to the petitioners, who subsequently defaulted on rent payments for two years. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The petitioners challenged the service of the statutory notice, alleging the recipient was illiterate and unable to sign the acknowledgment, and contested the High Court's view regarding the necessity of Section 30 notice following the repeal of the 1958 Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the factual findings regarding the service of notice were concurrently decided against the petitioners by the lower courts and could not be re-agitated. Furthermore, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the legal question regarding the necessity of notice post-repeal, as the evidence confirmed the notice was duly served and the default was established, justifying the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact regarding the service of a notice be agitated in a second appeal?
  • Does the failure to produce a witness to testify on the authenticity of a signature on an acknowledgment due card preclude a finding of valid service?
  • Is an eviction order justified where a tenant defaults on rent payments after receiving a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• Muhammad Akram Alias Ikram vs The State1978 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-22
  special leave to appealprivate defensevicarious liabilitycommon intentiondying declarationculpable homicidecredibility of witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that convicted the petitioner under Section 304, Part I, read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The High Court had rejected the prosecution's primary evidence, including the dying declaration and eye-witness accounts, due to the suppression of material facts regarding injuries sustained by the accused. Consequently, the High Court accepted the defense's plea of private defense but ruled that the accused had exceeded this right. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the petitioner can be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for facilitating the offense, given that the specific evidence attributing the act of holding the deceased to the petitioner was derived from eye-witness testimony previously deemed unreliable by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to further examine the petitioner's culpability and the propriety of applying Section 34 in the absence of reliable corroborative evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the primary evidence supporting the specific act of facilitation is deemed unreliable?
  • Does the suppression of material facts by the prosecution regarding injuries sustained by the accused render the entire prosecution case unreliable?
  • Is an accused entitled to the right of private defense if the prosecution suppresses material facts regarding the initial aggression?
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• Muhammad Akbar and 4 Others vs The State and Another1978 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-16
  cancellation of bailvicarious liabilityunlawful assemblycommon objectpost-arrest bailcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order cancelling the bail of five petitioners accused of murder under sections 302, 334, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly cancelled bail for all petitioners, given that some were alleged to have caused specific injuries to the deceased while others were only alleged to have caused simple injuries to the complainant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in cancelling bail for the three petitioners who allegedly caused injuries to the deceased, as their case fell under the prohibition of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. However, the Court distinguished the cases of two petitioners who were not alleged to have injured the deceased, finding their bail cancellation unjustified. The principle laid down is that vicarious liability under sections 148 and 149 does not automatically preclude bail for co-accused who did not inflict injuries on the deceased, particularly when their specific roles are distinguishable from those who caused the fatal injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be cancelled for co-accused who are not alleged to have inflicted injuries on the deceased in a murder case?
  • Does the existence of vicarious liability under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 automatically bar the grant of bail?
  • Is the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail subject to interference if the roles of individual co-accused are distinguishable?
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• Muhammad Afzal Alias Kala vs The State1978 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-05
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealappellate discretioncriminal convictionSection 426 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the petitioner, Muhammad Afzal, who was convicted under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner challenged the conviction on merits, arguing that medical evidence contradicted ocular testimony, the recovery of the weapon was doubtful, and the trial court drew improper inferences regarding his conduct. The core legal question was whether the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentence and grant bail under Section 426(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's exercise of discretion was not arbitrary. The Court emphasized that while Section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 provides a mechanism for bail for specific sentences, the appellate court retains discretion. The Court further declined to issue directions for the early disposal of the appeal, noting that such requests should be directed to the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's refusal to suspend a sentence and grant bail pending appeal constitutes an arbitrary exercise of discretion?
  • Does the appellate court have the authority to deny bail to a convict sentenced to imprisonment between three and seven years under Section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue directions to the High Court regarding the day-to-day management or early disposal of a pending appeal?
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• Mst. Zarina Butt And 4 Others vs Malik Azim Ahmad and 2 Other1978 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-22
  settlement of claimsdisplaced personsleave to appealtransfer of propertycancellation of auctionstatutory interpretationSettlement Scheme No. VIII
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court order that set aside a Settlement Commissioner's decision to extend the time for payment of a transfer price regarding a property. The core legal question is whether the time restriction for payment imposed by paragraph 3-A of Settlement Scheme No. VIII can override the broader powers of restoration granted to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under paragraph 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that while the High Court relied on paragraph 3-A to invalidate the extension, paragraph 24 of the Schedule to the Act appears to confer wider discretion for restoration without such specific time constraints. The Court held that the conflict between the statutory provisions of the Act and the subordinate legislation of the Settlement Scheme requires authoritative determination, as the rights of the parties are governed by the Act. Consequently, the Court stayed further proceedings before the Settlement Authorities pending the final adjudication of this legal conflict.

  Questions settled

  • Does paragraph 3-A of Settlement Scheme No. VIII restrict the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to restore property under paragraph 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a subordinate Settlement Scheme impose time limitations on the restoration of property that are not present in the parent Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Is the cancellation of a property transfer valid when based on a compensation book later declared bogus without providing the transferee an opportunity to be heard?
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• Mst. Tilawatunnisa and Others vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1978 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-14
  settlement schemeevacuee propertyauction bidpower of attorneytransfer of propertywrit petitionunclean hands
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the auction and transfer of a big mansion known as Laxmichand Building in Karachi, originally auctioned under Settlement Scheme No. III to 42 purchasers represented by an attorney. The core legal question concerns whether the attorney could lawfully substitute himself and his family members as the purchasers after the original 42 purchasers had withdrawn from the agreement, and whether the Settlement Department's cancellation of the transfer was justified. The Supreme Court held that the contract of purchase was made with the 42 original purchasers through the attorney and did not confer any personal right of transfer upon the attorney or his family members. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the writ petition, ruling that the substitution of transferees was illegal and that the petitioners had approached the court with unclean hands through a subterfuge to enforce the attorney's private claims. The key principle laid down is that an attorney bidding on behalf of principals acquires no personal rights to the property upon the principals' withdrawal, and unauthorized substitution of purchasers in settlement proceedings is void.

  Questions settled

  • Does an attorney who places a bid on behalf of multiple purchasers acquire any personal right to the property if the principals withdraw from the agreement?
  • Can the Settlement Department legally transfer a big mansion to persons other than those whose bid was originally accepted under Settlement Scheme No. III?
  • Whether a writ petition filed as a subterfuge by unauthorized persons can be dismissed on the ground of coming with unclean hands?
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• Mst. Sardar Begum and Another vs Malik Mohammad Ishaq and 7 Other1978 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-04
  land acquisitionreference to civil courtapportionment of compensationremand of caseshamlat dehcourt-fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which remanded a land acquisition compensation case to the civil court. The Punjab Government acquired land for the New Ravi Bridge, Lahore, leading to an award by the Collector. Due to difficulties in apportionment because the land was shamlat deh, the Collector made a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the civil court to establish title and entitlement. The Reference Court made an award, which was challenged in a regular first appeal before the High Court. The High Court found that the civil court failed to issue notices to all persons entitled to compensation, thereby acting outside the terms of reference, and remanded the matter for fresh disposal while ordering the surrender of compensation previously received and sharing of court fees. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court was justified in examining the entire case and ordering the refund of compensation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly remanded the matter and ordered the refund of compensation as the entire award was in question. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act requires the civil court to issue notices to all persons entitled to compensation?
  • Can an appellate court order the refund of compensation received under a flawed reference court award upon remanding the matter?
  • Whether an appeal before the High Court against a compensation award opens up all aspects of the matter for consideration?
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• Mst. Sallan vs Lal and Other1978 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-11
  habeas corpuscustodyremanddetenuprocedural irregularityevidenceabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order disposing of a habeas corpus petition regarding the custody of a woman. The core legal question was whether the High Court could summarily dismiss the petition and determine custody without recording the evidence of the detenu, despite conflicting claims by the parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by failing to record the detenu's evidence, relying instead on unrecorded statements and assertions made by supporters of the parties during hearings. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision after recording the necessary evidence. The key principle laid down is that in habeas corpus proceedings involving disputed facts, the court is mandated to record the evidence of the detenu to reach a just and lawful conclusion, and cannot rely on informal or unrecorded statements to supplement pleadings or determine the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court decide a habeas corpus petition without recording the evidence of the detenu?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on unrecorded statements made by persons present in court to supplement pleadings in a habeas corpus case?
  • What is the proper procedure for a High Court when faced with conflicting claims regarding the custody of a detenu in a habeas corpus petition?
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• Mst. Said Begum and Other vs Nur Ahmad and Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-04
  pre-emptionabatementlegal representativespartial abatementabatement in totocivil procedureco-sharer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a pre-emption suit instituted by multiple plaintiffs under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. During the pendency of the second appeal, two of the pre-emptor appellants passed away, and their legal representatives were not brought on record. The vendee-appellant contended that the failure to substitute the legal representatives resulted in the total abatement of the appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the death of some pre-emptors causes the suit or appeal to abate in toto or only in part. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a personal statutory right, and when multiple pre-emptors join in a single suit, their individual rights do not merge into a joint right. Applying the test of whether the surviving plaintiffs could have originally instituted the suit alone, the Court concluded that the death or withdrawal of one pre-emptor merely eliminates that individual from the proceedings. Consequently, the appeal abated only partially (qua the deceased appellants) and the surviving pre-emptors remained entitled to prosecute the appeal to pre-empt the entire suit land.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one of several pre-emptors who joined as plaintiffs in a single pre-emption suit cause the suit or appeal to abate in toto?
  • What is the legal test to determine whether a suit or appeal abates as a whole or only in part upon the death of a party?
  • Does the joining of multiple pre-emptors with equal rights in a single suit convert their individual rights into a joint right?
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• Mst. Perveen Akhtar and Another vs Ghulam Rabbani1978 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-13
  custody of minorsinterim custodysurety bondforfeiture of bondcompromise decreeguardianship
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a custody dispute under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The respondent filed a petition for custody of his two minor children, alongside an interlocutory application for their interim protection. Under a court-approved compromise, the petitioner mother was permitted to take one minor child to Canada on the condition that she return and produce the child in court after six months, backed by a surety bond executed by the co-petitioner. Upon the mother's failure to produce the child within the stipulated period, the Guardian Judge rejected her application for an extension and forfeited the surety bond due to the lack of reasonable justification. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' revision petition in limine. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the lower courts' decisions, holding that because the compromise and the execution of the bond were undisputed, and the child had still not been produced, the surety bond was rightly forfeited. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a surety bond executed to secure the temporary removal of a minor child from the court's jurisdiction can be legally forfeited if the child is not returned within the agreed timeframe?
  • Does the failure of a mother to produce a minor child in court pursuant to a compromise agreement justify the forfeiture of the surety bond executed on her behalf?
  • Can a revision petition challenging the forfeiture of a guardianship surety bond be dismissed in limine if the breach of the bond's conditions is undisputed?
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• Mst. Ismat Khanum Toor vs Rao Riaz Ali Khan and 2 Other1978 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-04
  dissolution of marriageex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreesubstituted serviceconstitutional jurisdictionreappraisal of evidenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge, which had refused to set aside an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage obtained by the appellant. The core legal question was whether the High Court appropriately exercised its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to reappraise evidence and set aside concurrent factual determinations regarding service of process under Section 8 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the High Court erred by reappraising evidence and acting as an appellate forum. Furthermore, minor typographical errors in a substituted service publication do not invalidate service where the respondent had actual knowledge of the proceedings and deliberately avoided service. The Court established that constitutional relief is discretionary and should not be exercised to prolong litigation where concurrent findings establish actual notice and deliberate avoidance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence under its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside concurrent factual findings of lower courts?
  • Whether technical non-compliance with statutory notice requirements invalidates service when the defendant had actual knowledge of the suit?
  • Does a typographical error in the body of a published newspaper notice invalidate substituted service if the title of the suit contains the correct name?
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• Mst. Iqbal Begum and 4 Others vs Mian Manzoorul Islam1978 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-13
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentstatutory grace periodsecond appealdismissal for non-prosecutionlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a second appeal regarding an ejectment order against the petitioners. The petitioners, tenants, faced eviction proceedings initiated by the landlord on grounds of default, personal requirement, and property damage. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge, and subsequently by the High Court. The petitioners argued that the High Court erred by deciding the appeal on merits rather than dismissing it for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, when their counsel failed to appear. They also contested the finding of default, arguing the landlord amended the default period without permission. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that the High Court correctly decided the matter on merits. Crucially, the Court affirmed the finding of default, noting that the rent was tendered after the statutory sixty-day grace period stipulated in the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Court held that late tender of rent, regardless of the specific start date of default, constitutes a valid ground for ejectment under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court decide an appeal on merits when the appellant's counsel fails to appear, rather than dismissing it for non-prosecution?
  • Does the tender of rent after the expiry of sixty days from the due date constitute default under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Is an amendment to an ejectment petition regarding the date of default permissible if the tenant fails to controvert the amended allegation?
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• Mst. Gulzar Begum Alias Gulzari vs Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Home Secretary, Islamabad and 2 Other1978 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Qamar Hussain and 5 Other1978 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-05
  ex parte decreeservice of noticesufficient serviceHigh Court Rules and Orderscondonation of delayappellate procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application to set aside an ex parte decree passed in a Regular Second Appeal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had been properly served with notice of the appeal proceedings, thereby justifying the ex parte order, and whether sufficient cause existed to set aside said order and condone the delay in filing the application. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the petitioner had been duly served through her husband during the pendency of the appeal. Furthermore, a notice sent via registered post for the actual date of hearing was deemed sufficient intimation under the High Court Rules and Orders. The Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in refusing to set aside the ex parte order, as the petitioner failed to appear despite receiving proper notice. The principle laid down is that the posting of a notice card, in accordance with the High Court Rules and Orders, constitutes sufficient service of the date fixed for hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the posting of a notice card in accordance with the High Court Rules and Orders constitute sufficient service of the date fixed for a hearing?
  • Can an ex parte decree be set aside if the party was duly served with notice of the proceedings?
  • Is a High Court's refusal to set aside an ex parte order justifiable when the record demonstrates that the party had received timely notice of the appeal?
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• Mst. Feroze Begum vs LT. Col. Muhammad Hussain1978 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-25
  custody of minorsguardianshipwelfare of the minorhizanatGuardians and Wards Actpoverty of motherpreference of minors
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed an order of the Family Judge/Guardian Judge delivering custody of two minor children to their father under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The father sought custody after the mother obtained a maintenance order under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The lower courts granted custody primarily based on the father's superior financial status and literary capacity compared to the mother's relative poverty and illiteracy. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments. The Court held that the lower courts erred by ignoring the evidence on record and failing to evaluate the actual welfare of the minors. It laid down that under Section 25, the welfare of the minor—encompassing material, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being—is the overriding and paramount consideration, and a father's financial advantage or natural guardianship does not automatically entitle him to custody if uprooting the children from an environment where they are thriving does not serve their welfare.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mother's inability to maintain her children a valid ground for depriving her of their custody under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Whether the superior financial status of a father overrides the paramount consideration of the welfare of the minor in custody proceedings?
  • Does a father's status as natural guardian compel the court to grant him custody under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 without proof that it serves the welfare of the ward?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dani Etc. and Abdul Ghani vs The Settlement Commissioner (L), Multan Division Multan. Etc.S THS Settlement Commissioner, Multan Division Multan Etc1978 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-05
  allotment of landrehabilitation and settlementspecial leave to appealgeneral revisiontemporary allotteeres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two connected petitions for special leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions challenging the cancellation of land allotments. The petitioners, who migrated to Pakistan in 1947, had their land allotments in Chak No. 133/EB confirmed in 1951 and 1952. Subsequently, the Rehabilitation and Settlement Commissioner ordered a general revision of allotments in 1956. Although the High Court initially quashed this revisional order, the Supreme Court of Pakistan later restored it in a reported judgment (PLD 1972 SC 307). Under the criteria established by the revisional order, only specific categories of temporary allottees with claims pending on the prescribed date were eligible. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners did not meet these criteria, as their claims were not pending in the estate on the target date. The Court also rejected the petitioners' argument regarding the finality of the High Court's judgment inter se, noting that the parties were represented in the earlier Supreme Court appeal and were bound by its decision. Consequently, the petitions for special leave to appeal were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party represented in an earlier Supreme Court appeal is bound by its decision despite a prior favorable High Court judgment?
  • Can a claimant assert temporary allottee status in two different estates simultaneously for the purpose of land allotment?
  • Does the transfer of a land claim back to an estate after the prescribed target date satisfy the eligibility criteria for a general revision of allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Choori vs Ghulam Hussain1978 SC M R404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-21
  second appealfinding of factvarying findingsappraisal of evidenceleave to appealsale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal concerning a land dispute. The core legal question involved whether the High Court was bound to examine and reappraise the evidence when the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court were at variance. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court should have examined the basis of the varying findings of the courts below in light of established precedent, the first appellate court was ultimately justified in reversing the trial court's finding as it was based on proper materials on record. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to examine the basis of varying findings arrived at by the trial court and the first appellate court in a second appeal?
  • Can a finding of fact by the first appellate court be interfered with in second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal when the first appellate court's reversal of the trial court's finding is based on proper materials on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Rabia vs Haji Abdul Khaliq1978 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-13
  Jirga awardInheritance rightsShariat lawCause of actionLimitation ActRetrospective legislationEstoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a claim to ancestral property in the former Kalat State, originally adjudicated by a 1923 Jirga award. The core legal question was whether the appellant could challenge the 1923 award and assert inheritance rights under Shariat law, despite having accepted a gift under the award and the significant lapse of time. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant possessed no valid cause of action. The Court found that the 1923 Jirga award, which denied her inheritance rights, was final and that she had accepted a benefit under it, thereby precluding her challenge. Furthermore, the 1948 Farman promulgating Shariat in Kalat explicitly barred the reopening of cases decided before 1948. The Court affirmed the principle that a party who accepts a benefit under an award cannot subsequently challenge the validity of that award, and that the retrospective application of new laws does not revive claims already settled by final adjudication unless expressly provided by the enacting authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has accepted a benefit under an award subsequently challenge the validity of that award?
  • Does the promulgation of Shariat law in the State of Kalat permit the reopening of inheritance cases decided prior to 1948?
  • Does the acceptance of a gift recommended by a Jirga award preclude a party from later challenging the award?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Khatoon and 7 Other vs Abdul Jalil1978 PLD Supreme Court 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-24
  specific performancelimitation perioddate fixed for performanceP.T.D.Settlement Departmentcontingent agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a second appeal and upheld a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell shops. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had agreed in writing to sell shops to his brother after obtaining Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.D.s) from the Settlement Department. The respondent filed a suit for specific performance years after the issuance of the P.T.D., leading the petitioners to contest the claim as time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, arguing that the date of the P.T.D. constituted a fixed date for performance under the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest. The Supreme Court examined comparative case law and Privy Council authorities, holding that an agreement contingent upon an uncertain future event—such as the discretionary issuance of a P.T.D. by the Settlement Department—does not fall under the first part of Article 113 as having a "date fixed for the performance". Instead, limitation begins when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. The concurrent findings of fact regarding notice and lack of laches were upheld, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell contingent upon the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed by the Settlement Department fall under the first part of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Can the maxim 'id certum est quod certum reddi potest' be applied to determine a 'date fixed for performance' under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when performance depends on a discretionary future event?
  • When does time begin to run for filing a suit for specific performance of a contract where no specific date for performance is fixed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina Begum and Other vs Mehar Ghulam Dastgir1978 PLD Supreme Court 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-03
  ejectment petitionstatutory protectionevacuee propertysubsequent eventsmultiplicity of litigationtransferee landlordpremature suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court affirming the ejectment of tenants from an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether an ejectment petition filed by a transferee landlord under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is ab initio incompetent if initiated during the six-year statutory protection period provided by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, even if that protection period expires during the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ejectment application was not ab initio incompetent, particularly as it alleged default, which forfeits statutory protection. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of litigation, courts possess the discretion to take notice of subsequent events, such as the expiry of the protection period, and mould the decree according to the circumstances existing at the time of the final decision. The judgment establishes that premature litigation may be maintained if the cause of action matures during the pendency of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court take notice of events occurring after the institution of a suit to grant relief?
  • Does the expiry of the statutory protection period under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, during the pendency of ejectment proceedings, validate a previously premature petition?
  • Is an ejectment petition filed by a transferee landlord ab initio incompetent if filed during the period of statutory protection?
  Read full judgment →
• Mss. Khatua Bat and Another Maw vs Muslim Commercial Banks1978 PLD Supreme Court 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-23
  summary procedurepromissory noteguarantororiginating summonsshort causelong causeleave to defend
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal regarding the mode of trial of a recovery suit filed by a bank on the basis of a promissory note and guarantee. The core legal questions involved the propriety of procedures under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the distinction between suits on promissory notes and suits on originating summons, and whether a party can challenge an order obtained upon their own application through suppression of material facts. The Supreme Court held that suits on promissory notes under Order XXXVII are distinct from suits on originating summons, that the practice of serving defendants in Order XXXVII suits via originating summons is incorrect and must be discontinued, and that a party cannot object to an order that was granted on their own application. The court laid down the principle that holders of bills of exchange or promissory notes are entitled to speedy resolution, and condemned dilatory tactics and the suppression of facts in judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether suits under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be initiated or served through an originating summons?
  • Can a party be permitted to challenge an order of the court that was procured upon their own application through the suppression of material facts?
  • Whether a suit based on a promissory note is distinct in nature and procedure from a suit instituted on an originating summons?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrt. Fatima Begum vs Hussain Muhammad and 4 Other1978 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-12
  review petitionallotment of landsitting allotteesagricultural landrehabilitation policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by Mst. Fatima Begum seeking review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dismissing her petition for special leave to appeal. The core dispute involves the competing allotment of agricultural land in Faisalabad District originally allotted to the respondents in 1947 as sitting allottees and confirmed in 1953, versus a subsequent allotment made to the petitioner as garden area in 1959 by the Garden Committee without notice to the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the review petition is devoid of force as it merely re-argued the case without establishing any ground such as discovery of fresh evidence or an error apparent on the face of the record. The Court affirmed that disturbing the respondents after continuous possession of thirty years would be unjust and contrary to rehabilitation policy, while observing that the petitioner, being a widow, should receive priority in the satisfaction of her claim through other available means of compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be entertained when it merely re-argues the case without showing an error apparent on the face of the record or discovery of fresh evidence?
  • Is it just to disturb sitting allottees in continuous possession of land for thirty years?
  • Whether an ex-parte allotment made without notice to the prior confirmed allottees is sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• MR. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-19
  judicial biasrecusal of judgebench formationChief Justice powersreal likelihood of biasappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the appellant, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, requesting the Chief Justice of Pakistan to recuse himself from the Bench hearing his appeal and to refrain from nominating the Bench, citing alleged bias. The core legal questions were whether the Chief Justice was disqualified due to perceived partiality and whether a litigant possesses the right to demand a specific Bench composition. The Court rejected the application, holding that the objections were misconceived, factually incorrect, and highly belated. The Chief Justice ruled that the allegations failed to establish any real likelihood of bias, which is the requisite legal standard for disqualification. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under the Constitution and law, it is the duty and obligation of the Chief Justice to personally preside over important cases and to nominate Benches. The judgment established that a party cannot demand a Bench of their own choice, and that mere suspicion of bias, without demonstrating a real likelihood, is insufficient to render a judicial decision void or disqualify a judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does a litigant have the right to demand a Bench of their own choice in the Supreme Court?
  • Is mere suspicion of bias sufficient to disqualify a judge from hearing a case?
  • What is the legal test to determine if a judge is disqualified from acting in a judicial capacity due to interest or bias?
  • Does the Chief Justice of Pakistan have the constitutional duty to preside over important cases and nominate Benches?
  Read full judgment →
• Mokha vs Zulfiqar and 9 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-12
  criminal appealmurderacquittalocular testimonyinterested witnessprivate revengeexpectancy of lifecompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a petition to assail the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partially set aside the convictions and sentences handed down by the trial court in a double murder case stemming from a historical family blood feud. Fourteen persons were originally tried, and several were convicted under sections 148, 302, 201, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with death sentences and life imprisonments awarded. On appeal, the High Court acquitted several respondents and substituted the capital sentences of others with transportation for life, relying on grounds of interested witnesses and private revenge. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondents and altering the sentences based on a misreading and erroneous appraisal of the ocular and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was founded on a misreading of evidence and a failure to consider material, disinterested testimony, leading to a grave miscarriage of justice. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the acquittals of the respondents were set aside, their convictions under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were restored, and compensation was ordered under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondents based on a finding that the prosecution witnesses were interested?
  • Does private revenge constitute a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser penalty in a murder case?
  • Can the omission of names in a First Information Report be used to completely destroy the credibility of eye-witnesses?
  • Does the doctrine of expectancy of life apply in appeals against acquittal involving inordinate delays?
  Read full judgment →
• Mitho vs The State1978 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-13
  post-arrest bailright of private defencemurdercross-casesfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against an order of the Sind High Court which dismissed the bail application of the petitioner, who was challaned for the murder of the deceased during a sudden fight over a water turn dispute. The core legal question is whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on the plea of the right of private defence and whether the question of exceeding such right warranted further inquiry under the law. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and accepted it, holding that prima facie the petitioner's side had a right of private defence and the question of whether that right was exceeded required further inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that where cross-versions and circumstances at the preliminary stage prima facie establish a right of private defence and the extent of its exercise is debatable, the accused is entitled to the concession of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when a prima facie case of private defence is established?
  • Does the question of whether an accused exceeded the right of private defence warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Naseem Akhtar and 2 Other vs Government of Pakistan, States and Frontier Regions Division, Islamabad and 8 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-08
  reserved seatsmedical college admissionFederally Administered Tribal Areaseducational quotaconstitutional lawbackward classes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a leave petition impugning a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed a writ petition filed by female students against the nomination of certain respondents for admission to Fatima Jinnah Medical College, Lahore, against reserved seats for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core legal question is whether the policy of allocating reserved medical seats agency-wise on population basis with merit restricted inter se within each agency violates constitutional provisions or merit principles. The Supreme Court held that the policy of reserving seats for specific agencies and restricting merit within each respective agency is valid and designed to ensure uniform and balanced educational progress among backward areas. The key principle laid down is that public authorities may make special provisions for the advancement of socially or educationally backward classes or areas under the Constitution, and allocation of reserved seats to specific territorial units without inter-agency merit shifting is lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reservation of medical college seats for specific agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on a population basis is lawful?
  • Does restricting the criterion of merit inter se among candidates of a particular agency violate fundamental rights?
  • Can a reserved seat for an agency with no eligible female candidates be allocated to a candidate from a nearby agency within the same division?
  • Whether public authorities can make special provisions for the advancement of socially or educationally backward classes under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Mehrun Nisa Baloch vs Appellate Committee and Other1978 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  Permanent Residence CertificateSind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules 1971Domicile CertificateQuota SystemAdministrative DiscretionWrit JurisdictionMedical College Admission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her writ petition by the Sind High Court, which upheld the cancellation of her Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) by the Appellate Committee. The core legal question was whether a minor is entitled to a PRC for a specific district solely based on the father's domicile certificate, and whether Rule 6 of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971, provides an exhaustive list of criteria for issuing PRCs or merely acts as a restriction on the District Magistrate's powers under Rule 4. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that Rule 6 does not confer independent power but restricts the District Magistrate's discretion under Rule 4. The Court held that a PRC is not automatically granted based on parental domicile; the District Magistrate retains discretion under Rule 4, subject to the restrictive criteria in Rule 6. Consequently, the Committee's factual determination regarding the petitioner's residence was supported by evidence and thus lawful, as the Court found no error in the High Court's refusal to interfere with the Committee's discretionary decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 6 of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971, confer independent power on the District Magistrate to issue a Permanent Residence Certificate?
  • Is a minor entitled to a Permanent Residence Certificate for a district solely because their father holds a domicile certificate for that district?
  • Does the District Magistrate have the authority to issue a certificate of domicile for a specific district under Section 17 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951?
  • Can a High Court interfere with the factual findings of the Appellate Committee regarding the grant of a Permanent Residence Certificate if such findings are supported by material on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Akbar vs Kala Etc.S1978 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-09
  post-arrest baildelay in trialcancellation of bailjudicial discretionmiscarriage of justicecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant against an order of the Lahore High Court, which granted post-arrest bail to two accused persons charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail primarily on the ground of prolonged delay in the commencement of the trial, despite the seriousness of the offense. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the lower court properly exercised its discretion given the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that where the state cannot provide a proximate estimate for the commencement of a trial, and where the accused has already suffered incarceration for a significant period without substantial progress in the proceedings, the delay constitutes a valid ground for bail to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The judgment reinforces the principle that bail decisions must depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and that indefinite detention without trial is not justified.

  Questions settled

  • Does prolonged delay in the commencement of a trial constitute a valid ground for granting bail in a capital case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting bail if the decision is based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case?
  • Is the failure of the state to provide a proximate estimate for the commencement of a trial a relevant factor in bail adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Manzar Bashir and Other vs M. A. Asghar & Co.1978 PLD SC 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-27
  rent restrictionejectmentex parte orderright of appealinterlocutory orderappellate authorityrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing their second appeal regarding an ejectment application. The core legal questions were whether an order by a Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte ejectment order is appealable, and whether a direct appeal lies to the High Court under Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Supreme Court held that an order setting aside an ex parte ejectment order is merely interlocutory, as it does not finally decide the controversy, and is therefore not appealable. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 15(4) does not authorize a direct appeal to the High Court, as the appellate authority is now statutorily designated under Section 15(1). The Court affirmed that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be assumed; only orders that embrace the whole gamut of the dispute are appealable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the lower courts correctly found the appeal incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order by a Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte ejectment order appealable?
  • Does Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 provide for a direct appeal to the High Court?
  • What is the test for determining whether an order made by a Rent Controller is appealable?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oil & Gas Development Corporation vs Messrs Karachi1978 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-02
  arbitration agreementarbitrator appointmentcontractual interpretationarbitral awarddesignation of arbitratorarbitration act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute arising from a construction contract between Messrs Oil & Gas Development Corporation and Messrs Karachi Builders, which contained an arbitration clause designating the 'Production Manager' of the Corporation as the arbitrator. Following a contractual dispute, the contractor sought the appointment of an independent arbitrator, but the High Court directed the Production Manager to conduct the proceedings. Subsequently, the Deputy Chief Engineer, who was also acting as the Production Manager, conducted the arbitration and issued an award. The contractor challenged the award, arguing that the Deputy Chief Engineer lacked the authority to act as the designated arbitrator. The High Court set aside the award, holding that the parties intended for the specific office of the Production Manager to arbitrate, not an officer merely performing those duties in addition to their own. The Supreme Court dismissed the Corporation's petition for leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's finding that the arbitration clause required the designated officer to act, and no other official could substitute for that specific role.

  Questions settled

  • Can an officer performing the duties of a designated arbitrator in an additional capacity validly act as the arbitrator under an arbitration agreement?
  • Does an arbitration award become invalid if the person issuing it does not hold the specific designation required by the arbitration clause?
  • Is a court justified in setting aside an arbitration award where the arbitrator lacked the requisite authority defined by the contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Khan vs Allah Diyaya1978 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-07
  evictiontentative rent defaultdefinition of buildinghotel premisesstriking off defencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant who ran a hotel in the demised premises. The Rent Controller struck off the petitioner's defence for twice defaulting on the deposit of tentative rent and ordered eviction, which was upheld in appeal by the District Court and subsequently by the High Court. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised contentions regarding the property being evacuee property, that a building let for running a hotel falls outside the definition of 'building' under the rent restriction law, and that the default in depositing rent was merely inadvertent rather than wilful. The Supreme Court held that the property was not evacuee, that premises let for running a hotel fall within the definition of a building under the relevant rent ordinance, and that the concurrent findings regarding default in rent deposit were supported by evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, with a brief extension of time granted to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a building let for the purpose of running a hotel falls within the definition of a building under Section 2(a) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  • Does default in the deposit of tentative rent warrant the striking off of a tenant's defence under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs Pakistan through the Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Range, Lahore and 7 Other1978 PLD Supreme Court 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-08
  alien enemyenemy propertycustodian of enemy propertylocus standiconstitutional petitiondefence of pakistan rulestrading with the enemy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant company's writ petitions on the ground that being an 'alien enemy' residing in enemy territory, it lacked locus standi to seek relief against income tax assessment orders. The core legal questions involved whether an alien enemy can prosecute a constitutional petition during hostilities, whether the Custodian of Enemy Property had the exclusive authority to represent the company, and whether the Defence of Pakistan Rules and Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order override general procedural laws and constitutional remedies. The Supreme Court held that upon the vesting of an enemy firm's property in the Custodian of Enemy Property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, the Custodian entirely supplanted the company, possessing extensive powers including the right to defend, compromise, and pay taxes out of the property. The Court concluded that the appellant company, being an alien enemy residing in enemy territory during wartime, was legally barred from maintaining independent actions or writ petitions, as its rights and representation were vested solely in the Custodian. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an alien enemy residing in enemy territory has the locus standi to independently institute or prosecute a writ petition in Pakistani courts during a state of war?
  • Does the appointment of the Custodian of Enemy Property and the vesting of enemy assets in him exclude the enemy firm from maintaining legal proceedings in its own name?
  • Do the provisions of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance and the rules and orders framed thereunder override inconsistent provisions of general enactments and ordinary laws?
  • What are the statutory powers of the Custodian of Enemy Property regarding the management, defense, and settlement of liabilities and tax obligations of an enemy firm?
  Read full judgment →
• Member, Federal Land Commission Rawalpindi vs Sardar Muhammad1978 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-20
  Martial Law Regulation 115produce index unitsbeneficial ownershipFederal Land Commissionjudicial reviewfinding of facttractor ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning a claim for produce index units under Martial Law Regulation 115, 1972. The respondent, Sardar Muhammad Ashraf, claimed ownership of a tractor to justify his entitlement under paragraph 8(2) of the Regulation. The Federal Land Commission had disallowed the claim, relying solely on the fact that the tractor was registered in the name of a third party, the respondent's son. The High Court, however, overturned this decision, finding that the respondent and two others had jointly purchased the tractor, provided a power of attorney to the son for delivery, and mortgaged their land to secure the tractor's purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the Federal Land Commission's finding was based on a misconceived premise by focusing exclusively on registration while ignoring substantial evidence of beneficial ownership. The Court established that administrative findings of fact are not conclusive when they are reached by ignoring material evidence on record, thereby justifying judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Land Commission disregard material evidence of beneficial ownership in favor of mere registration records?
  • Is a finding of fact by the Federal Land Commission conclusive if it is based on a misconceived premise?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to review findings of fact by the Federal Land Commission when material evidence was ignored?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan and Wahjuddin and Another vs Mst. Razia Begum Etc. Mst.1978 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-15Read full judgment →
• Matloob Hussain vs Muhammad Azam and Other1978 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-28
  post-arrest bailcross casemurdercommon objectdiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the first four respondents, who were facing trial along with other accused under sections 302, 148, 149, and 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously in granting bail to the respondents despite a fatal injury occurring during the incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion was properly exercised, noting that the weapons used were lathis, significant injuries were sustained by the respondents' party, and a cross-case was pending. The court established the principle that where mutual injuries and cross-cases exist along with use of non-firearm weapons, the appellate court's grant of bail constitutes a valid exercise of judicial discretion that warrants no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's grant of bail to accused persons in a murder case involving mutual injuries and lathi blows is an arbitrary exercise of discretion?
  • Does the existence of a cross-case and injuries sustained by the accused party justify the grant of post-arrest bail under section 302 read with section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Mar. Inayat Bibi and 8 Others vs Umar Din and 3 Other1978 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-07
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesreview petitionjurisdictiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves a review petition arising from a long-standing property dispute over an evacuee house in Gujranwala, initially occupied by Hakam Din, the predecessor of the petitioners. The core legal question concerned whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner and subordinate settlement authorities had the jurisdiction to reopen a finalized matter and transfer the property to the occupant after multiple rounds of litigation had concluded against him up to the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction to reopen the concluded matter and order the transfer of the house or issue a Provisional Transfer Order to the occupant after he had exhausted his remedies and lost his case up to the High Court. The key principle laid down is that administrative or settlement authorities cannot reopen past-closed transactions or exercise review powers without lawful authority once the judicial and quasi-judicial hierarchy's final pronouncements have attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to reopen a concluded matter after a party has lost their case up to the High Court?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner possess the power to direct a subordinate authority to reconsider the genuineness of an allotment after final adjudication?
  • Can a party obtain the transfer of an evacuee house through settlement proceedings after failing in all prior legal challenges?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Retd. Col. Faiz Ahmad and 3 Other1978 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-03
  criminal trespassright of private defencesettled possessionland disputefirearm injuriesleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal case concerning a land dispute over Khasra No. 733 in Rawalpindi Cantonment, which culminated in an armed clash and firearm injuries to four prosecution witnesses. The trial magistrate convicted the respondents under section 307/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the Lahore High Court allowed their appeal and set aside their convictions and sentences. The petitioner argued that the High Court misread the evidence and wrongly relied on an unexhibited written complaint, and that the defence plea of private defence was improbable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the respondents established exclusive possession of the disputed land through authentic revenue records and oral testimony, whereas the prosecution witnesses were committing criminal trespass. The Court affirmed that persons in settled possession of property are entitled to exercise the right of private defence against aggressors under section 97 and section 101, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, provided they do not cause more harm than necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person in settled possession of immovable property has the right of private defence of property against a trespasser?
  • Can the owner of property take the law into their own hands to evict someone instead of resorting to due process of law?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's conviction based on revenue records and defence evidence establishing exclusive possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Saleem and Another vs Mst. Ruqaya Begum and 2 Other1978 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-16
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal use and occupationbona fide requirementbenami transactionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal against the ejectment of the petitioners-tenants from the disputed house. The respondent-landlady sought ejectment under Section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the District Judge reversed the decision and ordered ejectment on both grounds. On second appeal, the High Court set aside the finding on default but affirmed the finding that the premises were required in good faith for the landlady's personal use and occupation. The Supreme Court heard the petition and evaluated the contention that another property purchased in the name of the landlady's minor son made her the beneficial owner. The Supreme Court held that no evidence was adduced to establish benami ownership, noting that the husband could afford the purchase. Consequently, the concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide personal requirement were upheld and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord seeking ejectment on the ground of personal use must be denied relief if another property is purchased in the name of a minor son during the proceedings?
  • Can a presumption of benami ownership be raised without evidence when a property is purchased in the name of a minor child?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts on the issue of bona fide personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Bashir vs Ghulam Rasul and Another1978 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementmisreading of evidencesecond appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the order of the Additional District Judge and restored the Rent Controller's order directing the petitioner-tenant to vacate the disputed shop. The core legal question involved whether the landlords established a bona fide personal requirement for the shop, given that one landlord was occupying a rented shop and was asked to vacate it by his own landlord. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the first appellate court's finding of fact, as that finding was based on a clear misreading of a material witness's evidence. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that a finding of fact by an appellate court based on a misreading of evidence is not sacrosanct and may be legitimately set aside in second appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact by a first appellate court be set aside in second appeal if it is based on a misreading of evidence?
  • Does the occupation of a rented shop by a landlord preclude him from seeking the ejectment of his own tenant for bona fide personal use?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in re-evaluating oral testimony when the lower appellate court has misread the statement of a witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Jilani vs MR. Justice Muhammad Gul, Judgh, Supreme Court Op Pakistan1978 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-10
  judicial appointmenteligibility criteriaoffice of profitconstitutional interpretationtenure of judgesservice of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition that challenged the appointment of Mr. Justice Muhammad Gul as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner contended that the respondent did not meet the eligibility criteria under Article 178(2)(a) of the Interim Constitution, arguing that the requirement of having been a Judge of a High Court for five years necessitated actual judicial functioning, rather than merely holding the office while serving in other government roles. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision requires only that a person has held the office of a Judge for the requisite period, not that they must have actively performed judicial duties throughout that time. The Court affirmed that holding an office of profit in the Service of Pakistan, provided remuneration is not increased, does not terminate a Judge's tenure. Consequently, the Court ruled that the respondent remained a Judge of the High Court during his tenure as Secretary, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and thus satisfied the eligibility criteria for elevation to the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement of having been a Judge of a High Court for five years under the Interim Constitution necessitate actual judicial functioning or merely holding the office?
  • Does the appointment of a High Court Judge to an office of profit in the Service of Pakistan result in the termination of their judicial office?
  • Can a Judge of a High Court or Supreme Court hold an office of profit in the Service of Pakistan if their remuneration is not increased?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Ch. Muhammad Shafi and Another1978 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  superdaricustody of propertytheft caseinterim custodyleave to appealcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the custody (superdari) of a tractor. The petitioner claimed ownership, alleging that the respondent had manipulated registration documents due to political enmity and had filed false theft reports. The tractor had been initially entrusted to the respondent on superdari following the first theft case. Although a subsequent theft case filed by the respondent was declared false by the police and the discharge report was accepted by the Magistrate, the original theft case remained pending. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his revision petition, which had upheld the Magistrate's order granting superdari to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that since the initial theft case had never been cancelled and the original order of superdari in favor of the respondent had not been withdrawn or recalled, the respondent remained entitled to the possession of the tractor. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the petition, affirming that the tractor should remain in the respondent's custody.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of an original theft case entitle the initial superdar to retain custody of the property despite a subsequent false case report?
  • Can a court interfere with an order of superdari when the underlying criminal case has not been cancelled or the order recalled?
  Read full judgment →
• Kunwar Imam Din vs Liaqat Ali and Another1978 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-02
  suspension of sentencemurder trialdying declarationocular evidencecriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the interim order of the Lahore High Court suspending the life imprisonment sentence of the first respondent, who was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's discretion in suspending the sentence pending appeal based on discrepancies in the dying declaration and trial court observations regarding ocular testimony. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the view taken by the High Court in re-examining the appraisal of evidence was both reasonable and within its judicial discretion. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts possess valid discretion to suspend sentences pending appeal when the trial court's appraisal of evidence presents arguable doubts or requires re-examination, warranting no interference by the apex court at the leave stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the discretion to suspend a sentence of imprisonment pending the hearing of an appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's order suspending a sentence when the view taken is reasonable and within its discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad Etc. vs The State1978 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquirypolice investigation reporteye-witness testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their pre-trial bail application by the Lahore High Court in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail given that eyewitnesses allegedly did not support the prosecution case and conflicting police investigation reports existed regarding their implication. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the case presented scope for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as eye-witnesses did not support the case against certain petitioners and conflicting police reports cleared them. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it for two of the petitioners (Khushi Muhammad and Akbar), and granted them bail, while dismissing the petition of the third petitioner (Taj Din) against whom incriminating material was found during investigation. The key principle laid down is that where eyewitnesses do not support the prosecution and investigation reports present controversial versions favoring innocence, the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when eye-witnesses do not support the prosecution case?
  • Does a conflict in police investigation reports regarding the implication of an accused create a case for further inquiry under criminal procedure?
  • Whether specific overt acts attributed to an accused via sota blows preclude the grant of bail when investigation findings are contradictory?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh vs Syed Muhammad Habib Shah Hashmi1978 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-11
  evictionpersonal requirementbona fidelandlord and tenantsublettingrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order issued under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959. The respondent landlord sought the eviction of the petitioner tenant on grounds of personal requirement and unauthorized subletting. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based on the landlord's bona fide personal requirement, despite rejecting the subletting claim. This decision was upheld by the District Judge, who additionally affirmed the subletting allegation, and subsequently by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the landlord sufficiently established the requirement for the premises in good faith, particularly when the landlord had not definitively decided which family members would occupy the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement were sound. The Court established that under Section 13(3) of the Ordinance, a landlord need only prove the premises are required in good faith for their own occupation or that of their children; it is immaterial which specific family member occupies the property, provided the requirement is genuine.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord need to specify which family member will occupy the premises to satisfy the requirement of 'personal use' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  • Can a tenant challenge a landlord's claim of personal requirement based on the landlord's failure to decide which specific family member will reside in the property?
  • Is a landlord's requirement for additional space considered bona fide if they already own another house?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Javed Gillani vs The State1978 PLD SC 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-17
  post-arrest bailplea of alibitentative assessment of evidencemurder trialnon-bailable offenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's application for pre-trial bail in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether courts are precluded from making a tentative assessment of evidence, particularly concerning a plea of alibi supported by defense material, when deciding a bail application under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or whether prosecution allegations must be treated as sacrosanct. The Supreme Court held that courts are under a legal obligation to make a tentative assessment of the material produced by both the prosecution and the defense—including the F.I.R., police statements, and defense evidence such as an alibi—to determine if reasonable grounds exist for believing the accused is guilty, without conducting an elaborate sifting of evidence or prejudging the case. The Court laid down the principle that the power to withhold bail in non-bailable offences is not arbitrary and requires a balanced, tentative evaluation of all surrounding circumstances and evidence rather than treating the prosecution case as incontrovertible at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is required to make a tentative assessment of evidence produced by both the prosecution and the defense when deciding a bail application under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely by treating the statements in the First Information Report as sacrosanct without examining the surrounding circumstances and defense material?
  • Does an elaborate sifting of evidence permissible at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  • Whether the discretion to refuse bail in cases punishable with death or imprisonment for life is wrested away only when the investigating agency satisfies the court prima facie of reasonable grounds of guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs Tee State and Another1978 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-23
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilitycommon intentionmurdersimple injuriesfirst information report
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondent No. 2 in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contended that the High Court's order was vitiated by factual errors and misreading of the record, particularly regarding the presence of an explanation for the accused's injuries in the First Information Report (FIR). The petitioner further argued that because the case involved common intention under Section 34, the respondent was vicariously liable for the murder and his case could not be distinguished. The Supreme Court, while noting that some observations of the High Court were indeed contrary to the record, independently evaluated the facts. The Court observed that the respondent was only attributed with causing simple injuries to the complainant, and the fatal head injury to the deceased was attributed solely to a co-accused. The Court held that, prima facie, it was too early to hold the respondent vicariously liable for murder in the absence of evidence showing a shared common intention to cause death. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be granted bail if the specific role attributed to him is limited to causing simple injuries and there is no prima facie evidence of sharing a common intention to cause death?
  • Does a factual error or misreading of the record by the High Court automatically vitiate a bail order if the Supreme Court, upon independent evaluation of the facts, finds the accused otherwise entitled to bail?
  • Is vicarious liability for murder under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to be assumed at the bail stage when the individual act of the accused is distinct and non-fatal?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad vs The State and Another1978 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderabscondingacquittal of co-accusedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Jan Muhammad against the cancellation of his post-arrest bail by the High Court. The petitioner and his father were named in a First Information Report registered on September 17, 1974, for the murder of Mumtaz Ali. The petitioner absconded until March 1976, while his father was tried and acquitted by the Sessions Court. Subsequently, the Additional Sessions Judge granted bail to the petitioner primarily based on the co-accused's acquittal. Upon a challenge by the complainant, the High Court cancelled the bail. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail to an accused on the ground that a co-accused has been acquitted in a separate trial arising from the same incident. The Supreme Court held that the findings of the Sessions Court in the trial of the co-accused father are not relevant to the petitioner's independent trial, and since the fatal shot was attributed to the petitioner, reasonable grounds exist to believe he committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of a co-accused is a relevant ground for granting bail to an absconding accused?
  • Does the evaluation of evidence in a previous trial of a co-accused bind the assessment of evidence in a separate trial of the remaining accused?
  • When can the High Court interfere with and cancel bail granted by a lower court?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamil Ahmed vs The State and Another1978 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-04
  baillimitation periodtime-barredpetition for leave to appealcriminal proceduredelay in filing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of a learned Single Judge of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which had granted bail to the second respondent in a criminal case involving charges under Section 302/307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the grant of bail, arguing that the charge involved murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petition was filed with a delay of more than one hundred days. The petitioner attempted to justify this significant delay by claiming he was a minor and lacked understanding of the legal implications of the bail order. The Court found this explanation unsatisfactory, particularly because the petition failed to disclose when the petitioner became aware of the legal implications of the impugned order. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition primarily on the grounds of being time-barred, without addressing the merits of the bail grant itself. The decision reinforces the principle that a petition for leave to appeal must be filed within the prescribed limitation period and that inadequate explanations for substantial delays will not be accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of being time-barred?
  • Is a claim of minority and lack of legal understanding a sufficient ground to condone a delay of over one hundred days in filing a petition?
  • Does a failure to disclose when a petitioner became aware of the legal implications of an impugned order affect the court's consideration of a delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamal Khan vs Ghulam Muhammad and 2 Other1978 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-28
  specific performanceappreciation of evidenceregistered sale deedforged documentsconcurrent findingsrecovery of moneycontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for specific performance or, alternatively, for the recovery of money, filed by the respondent, Ghulam Muhammad, against the petitioner, Jamal Khan, and others, following the petitioner's failure to transfer land despite a registered agreement to sell. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence regarding the payment of consideration, specifically concerning an affidavit and a promissory note alleged to negate the receipt of the sale price. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, which concluded that the sale price had indeed been paid as recited in the registered sale deed. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any flaw in the lower courts' assessment of evidence, particularly the finding that the impugned documents were forged and that there was no valid basis for the promissory note executed months after the sale. The Court affirmed the decree for the recovery of the sale price, emphasizing the evidentiary weight of registered instruments over subsequent, suspicious documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a registered sale deed's recital of consideration be effectively rebutted by subsequent documents alleged to be forged?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  • Is a suit for recovery of money maintainable when a contract for the sale of land cannot be specifically performed due to statutory restrictions?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamal Din and 2 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-26
  special leave to appealself-defencemedical evidenceocular evidencecriminal revisionconcurrent findingsassault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the convictions of the petitioners for offences involving assault and grievous hurt. The core legal questions were whether the courts below failed to properly consider the defence version of self-defence and whether the conviction of one petitioner, who denied participation, lacked sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had correctly evaluated the evidence, including the defence plea, which was found to be meritless. The Court further held that the medical evidence, which confirmed injuries consistent with the specific weapons attributed to the three assailants, provided sufficient corroboration for the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that where concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are supported by ocular testimony and medical evidence consistent with the prosecution's narrative, and where the defence version has been duly thrashed out and rejected, the Supreme Court will not interfere in the absence of a legal or factual error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of lower courts to explicitly discuss defence evidence in their judgments necessarily vitiate the conviction?
  • Can medical evidence regarding the type of weapons used serve as sufficient corroboration for the participation of an accused who denies involvement?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in criminal matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad vs Qazi Abdul Karim, Deputy Accountant General, N. W. F. P., Peshawar and Another1978 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-07
  civil serviceofficiating promotionhigher pay scaleFundamental RulesServices Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner (the Government of Pakistan) sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Services Tribunal, Islamabad, which had accepted the appeal of respondent No. 1, an Assistant Accounts Officer. The respondent had been appointed to officiate in the higher post of Deputy Comptroller (later re-designated as Deputy Accountant General) but was denied the pay of that higher post based on a notification stating he would draw the pay of his own grade. The core legal question was whether a civil servant appointed to officiate in a higher post involving higher responsibilities is entitled to the minimum pay of that higher grade despite a restrictive condition in the appointment order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that when an employee is promoted to officiate in a higher post involving higher responsibility, they must be held entitled to the minimum pay of the grade of that higher office. The Court reaffirmed that restrictive riders in appointment orders cannot deprive an employee of the minimum pay admissible to the higher post they actually served in.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant who is appointed to officiate in a higher post involving higher responsibilities entitled to the minimum pay of that higher grade?
  • Can a condition in an appointment order restricting an officiating officer to the pay of their lower substantive grade deprive them of the pay of the higher post they actually work in?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Badshah vs The State1978 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-16
  post-arrest bailmurderLalkaraaged accuseddelay in trialbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application by the Peshawar High Court in a murder case. The petitioner, an aged man, was accused of murder, with the prosecution alleging he was armed with a firearm at the time of the occurrence, though no specific overt act beyond a 'Lalkara' was attributed to him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given his age, the nature of the allegation, and the delay in the trial process. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's role was limited to a 'Lalkara' and that no weapon had been recovered from him. Furthermore, the Additional Advocate-General conceded that the petitioner was elderly and that the trial was unlikely to conclude within one year, as the final challan had not yet been submitted. Relying on the precedent of Abdul Aziz v. Bashir Ahmad, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The appeal was allowed, and bail was granted subject to the furnishing of a surety bond.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to bail when the only role attributed to them is that of a Lalkara?
  • Does the advanced age of an accused, combined with the lack of a recovered weapon and delay in trial, constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Imam Din vs Settlement Authority through Settlement Commissioner1978 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-04-08
  settlement of propertydisplaced personstransfer of housesettlement authoritiespossessiondivision of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a house in Village Piplan, District Mianwali, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, initially granted the entire house, faced claims from the second and third respondents, who were later granted portions of the property by the Additional Settlement Commissioner based on their possession. The appellant challenged this division in the High Court, which upheld the Settlement Authorities' decision. The core legal questions were whether the Settlement Authorities possessed the jurisdiction to divide the property under the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII, and whether the High Court erred in its factual findings regarding the respondents' occupation. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities acted within their jurisdiction, as the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII permitted the division of property among multiple occupants by incorporating general principles from the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Court affirmed that the authorities had the power to divide the house based on possession, and dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant failed to raise certain arguments during the administrative proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement Authorities have the power to divide a house among multiple occupants under the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Can a party raise a new legal contention regarding the authority of the Settlement Commissioner for the first time in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a compromise agreement between parties binding on the Settlement Authorities if it was not pressed during the revision proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Akhtar vs The State1978 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-04
  pre-trial bailembezzlementbail discretionevidence tamperingcriminal procedurenon-bailable offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant bail to the petitioner, who faced charges under sections 419, 420, 468, 471, and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had previously been denied bail by the Sessions Court and the High Court, and a prior petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed with directions to expedite the trial. The core legal question was whether bail should be denied solely due to the large amount of money involved in the alleged embezzlement or unsubstantiated fears of evidence tampering. The Supreme Court held that the magnitude of the amount involved, while significant, does not by itself constitute sufficient grounds for refusing bail. Furthermore, the Court ruled that in the absence of concrete evidence supporting allegations of potential tampering with prosecution evidence, bail cannot be denied on such speculative grounds. Consequently, the Court granted the petition, converted it into an appeal, and admitted the petitioner to bail, noting that the State retains the remedy of seeking cancellation of bail if the petitioner abuses the liberty granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the large amount of money involved in an alleged offence constitute sufficient grounds for refusing bail?
  • Can bail be denied based on unsubstantiated allegations that an accused might tamper with evidence?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for the State if an accused person abuses the bail granted to them?
  Read full judgment →
• Hasan Din vs Mhhamniad Mushtaq and 2 Other1978 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-14
  petition for leave to appealbenefit of doubtvicarious liabilitycommon intentioncommutation of sentencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby one respondent was acquitted by giving him the benefit of the doubt and another respondent's death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life for murder. The core legal questions involved whether vicarious liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code was correctly applied and whether the High Court was justified in commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is insufficient to attract vicarious liability without strong circumstances showing a common intention, and that the commutation of the sentence was justified given that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment without a directly proved motive. The key principle laid down is that section 34 cannot be applied lightly to establish vicarious liability based solely on presence at the crime scene, and benefit of the doubt should be upheld where common intention is lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of an accused person at the spot of the crime attract vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in commuting the death sentence to imprisonment for life when the immediate cause of the occurrence remained shrouded in mystery?
  • Can vicarious liability be visited without strong circumstances showing a common intention between co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Ali Baig vs The State And 2 Other1978 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-18
  writ jurisdictioncriminal investigationFirst Information ReportSummary Military Courtpremature interferenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which challenged the registration of a criminal case against the petitioner for illegal storage of kerosene oil. The petitioner contended that the First Information Report (F.I.R.) failed to disclose an offence under Martial Law Regulation No. 30, arguing that the alleged violation was merely a breach of fiscal law rather than a criminal offence. The core legal question was whether the High Court should interfere with the registration of a criminal case and the subsequent investigation at an intermediary stage. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the writ petition was rightly dismissed because the investigation had been completed and a formal challan submitted to the Summary Military Court. The Court established the principle that where a case has reached the trial stage before a competent forum, the accused should raise their legal objections, including the validity of the charges, before that trial court rather than seeking premature intervention through writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with the registration of a criminal case or investigation at an intermediary stage?
  • Should an accused challenge the validity of an F.I.R. through a writ petition when the case has already proceeded to the trial stage?
  • Is a writ petition competent when the investigation is complete and a challan has been submitted to a trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Qamar Ali vs THS State1978 SCMR 217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-12
  murder convictionplea of alibiappreciation of evidenceocular evidenceabscondenceinterested witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Peshawar High Court, which had relied on ocular evidence and the petitioner's subsequent abscondence to sustain the conviction, while rejecting the petitioner's plea of alibi. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of eyewitnesses and the rejection of the alibi defense supported by hospital records. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was credible, noting that the witnesses were not shown to be inimical and that the defense failed to establish the alibi, as the hospital records appeared interpolated and the petitioner could have reached the hospital after the crime. The Court affirmed that the appreciation of evidence by the High Court was sound and that the plea of alibi was rightly rejected. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be rejected if the accused had sufficient time to travel to the location of the alibi after committing the crime?
  • Does the mere existence of a family relationship between witnesses and the accused automatically render them interested or unreliable witnesses?
  • Is the appreciation of evidence by the High Court subject to interference by the Supreme Court when the findings are based on a reasonable assessment of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Malik Aman vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Peshawarand 31978 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-18
  limitationcondonation of delaysupreme court vacationtime-barred petitionsupreme court rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition filed against a judgment delivered on 7-6-1974, which was presented on 2-10-1974, resulting in a delay of thirty-six days. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's mistaken impression that limitation did not run during the long vacation of the Court constitutes a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay. Holding that the petition is barred by time, the Court decided that since petitions are received during the vacation on working days under the Supreme Court Rules and Orders, no ambiguity or bona fide excuse existed to justify the delay. The key principle laid down is that a misunderstanding regarding the running of limitation during court vacations, in the face of clear rules providing for the receipt of petitions during such periods, does not furnish a valid basis for condonation of delay under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation run during the long vacation of the Supreme Court?
  • Can a mistaken impression regarding the running of limitation during court vacations serve as a bona fide excuse for condoning delay?
  • Are petitions and other proceedings received by the Supreme Court during its vacation on working days?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Malik Aman vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands) Peshawar and 31978 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-18
  limitationcondonation of delaytime-barred petitionSupreme Court Ruleslong vacationprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was found to be barred by time by thirty-six days. The judgment challenged was delivered on 7-6-1974, and the petition was filed on 2-10-1974. The petitioner sought condonation of the delay, arguing under the impression that limitation periods did not run during the long vacation of the Court. The Supreme Court rejected this plea, holding that the practice of the Court, as established under the Supreme Court Rules, allows for the filing of petitions and proceedings during the vacation on all working days (excluding Saturdays). The Court found no ambiguity regarding this rule and concluded that the petitioner's misunderstanding did not constitute a bona fide excuse for the delay. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition on the ground of limitation, reaffirming that ignorance of the Court's established practice regarding filing during vacations does not justify condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing petitions in the Supreme Court of Pakistan cease to run during the Court's long vacation?
  • Are petitions and other proceedings received by the Supreme Court of Pakistan during the long vacation?
  • Does a mistaken belief that limitation does not run during the Court's vacation constitute a bona fide excuse for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Shabbir Imdadullah Shahnawaz vs The State the State and the State1978 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-10Read full judgment →
• Habibul Wahhab Elkheiri and Muhammad Shaft Muhammadi vs Khan1978 PLD Supreme Court 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contempt of courtscandalizing the judiciaryapologyfreedom of speechpolitical parties actsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved two criminal original petitions seeking contempt of court action against Khan Abdul Wali Khan for allegedly making derogatory remarks against the Supreme Court and its judges during speeches at Bar Associations and in a magazine interview. Upon notice, the respondent appeared and tendered an oral explanation, stating that his remarks were made in the heat of the moment under provocation, without any intent to malign the judiciary, and expressed regret while reiterating his respect for the court. Written apologies were also submitted by the editors and publishers of the newspapers that published the statements. The Attorney-General submitted that while the statements prima facie amounted to contempt, the explanation and expression of regret were satisfactory. The Court held that since the respondent had unambiguously expressed regret, affirmed his respect for the judiciary, and promised not to repeat such remarks—supported by an earlier explanatory press statement—the dignity and authority of the court had been duly vindicated. The notices issued to the respondent and the newspapers were accordingly discharged.

  Questions settled

  • Whether remarks made against a judicial decision under political provocation constitute contempt of court?
  • Does a determination rendered by the Supreme Court under Section 6 of the Political Parties Act, 1962, constitute a final judicial determination rather than an advisory opinion?
  • Can unconditional apologies and subsequent explanatory press statements absolve respondents from contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulsher vs The State1978 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  post-arrest bailmurderovert actself-defencediscretionary powercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a bail application by the Lahore High Court in a case involving a murder charge under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, Gulsher, sought bail while his co-accused had already been granted bail by the High Court. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, armed with a Kassi, participated in an attack on the deceased, Abdul Majid, and a witness, Muhammad Hanif, with the petitioner specifically attributed with causing the fatal head injury to the deceased. The petitioner argued self-defence and noted that he had sustained simple injuries during the incident. The Supreme Court examined the allegations and the specific overt act attributed to the petitioner in the First Information Report. The Court held that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion in refusing bail, as the specific overt act attributed to the petitioner distinguished his case from that of his co-accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the attribution of a specific overt act in an FIR justify the refusal of bail in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in bail matters when the High Court has properly exercised such discretion?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail solely because co-accused persons have been granted bail, despite a specific overt act being attributed to the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Bostan vs Chaman Badshah and 2 Other1978 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-04
  cancellation of bailage determinationmedical examinationovert actleave to appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application seeking the cancellation of bail granted to two respondents by the trial court. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court erred in upholding the bail granted to the accused, specifically regarding the age determination of one respondent and the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence regarding the age of the accused, Chaman Badshah, noting that subsequent medical examinations, including X-rays, established his age as 16-17 years, justifying the trial court's discretion. Regarding the second respondent, the Court found that the trial court's decision to grant bail was based on the absence of any attributed overt act, which remained unchallenged by the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, as it was based on proper material and careful judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that the trial court acted properly in its assessment of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court's decision to order a second medical examination for age determination considered a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
  • Does the absence of an attributed overt act provide sufficient grounds for the grant of bail to an accused?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding an accused's age, based on consistent medical evidence including X-rays, be challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan and Anoteer vs DR. Muhammad Nawaz1978 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-03
  damages for tortFrontier Constabularylimitation periodnew legal pleaspecial leave to appealtortious liability of government
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld a decree for damages in favor of the respondent doctor. In December 1971, the Frontier Constabulary unjustifiably fired at the respondent's car, severely injuring him. The respondent filed a civil suit for damages, which was decreed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the Deputy Attorney-General pressed the petition solely on technical legal objections, including limitation under the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915, non-joinder of parties, and the alleged immunity of the Government from liability for the tortious acts of its employees. The Supreme Court held that these legal objections had either not been raised in the lower courts or had been expressly dropped, and it would not be just or equitable to grant leave to examine them for the first time. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal to examine a legal objection raised for the first time before it when such objection was neither pleaded nor raised in the courts below?
  • Can a party raise the bar of limitation under section 17 of the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915 for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Government is liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed during the course of duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam vs The State1978 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquiryage and infirmitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application by the Lahore High Court concerning a murder charge. A complaint was lodged alleging that the deceased was beaten to death after entering a house to meet a woman. The petitioner, a 75-year-old man with extremely weak eyesight, was alleged to have been armed with a sota and to have attacked the deceased, though the fatal injuries were contended not to have been caused by him. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail pending trial given his age, physical infirmity, and the nature of the specific allegations against him. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the question of the petitioner's participation in the crime at night time required further inquiry under the circumstances. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail upon furnishing sureties. The key principle laid down is that advanced age, physical infirmity such as weak eyesight, and the arguable nature of participation in a nocturnal crime constitute grounds for further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the advanced age and physical infirmity of an accused warrant further inquiry into his participation in a crime for the purpose of bail?
  • Does a general allegation of participation with a non-fatal weapon in a nocturnal incident justify granting post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal for final disposal in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar vs The State1978 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-27
  dying declarationcriminal appealmurder convictionevidentiary valuesifting chaff from graincorroborative evidencenatural witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment maintaining the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, while commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value of dying declarations containing discrepancies and the reliability of an eyewitness whose statement was recorded with delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in a dying declaration, such as the number of injuries, do not render the entire statement unreliable, as a dying declarant is often in extreme pain. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle of sifting the chaff from the grain, allowing courts to rely on parts of a dying declaration that consistently implicate an accused, even if other parts are found unreliable. The judgment reinforces that natural witnesses, such as local shopkeepers, remain credible despite delays in police recording their statements, provided there is no motive for false implication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy in the number of injuries mentioned in a dying declaration render the entire statement unreliable?
  • Can a court rely on a dying declaration that is partially false regarding the involvement of other co-accused?
  • Does a delay in the police recording the statement of a natural witness necessarily invalidate their testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sabir vs Nook Ghani Etcs1978 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-17Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mohyuddin vs Azhar Hussain and Another1978 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-03
  contempt of courtdemarcationSettlement authoritiesrepeal of evacuee lawsjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for contempt of court was filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din against a Deputy Settlement Commissioner and another respondent. The petitioner alleged contempt on the basis that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner passed an order declaring the petitioner's occupation of a roof and latrine illegal following an application for demarcation submitted by the respondent pursuant to earlier observations of the High Court and Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the respondents committed contempt of court by pursuing and adjudicating the demarcation matter before the Settlement authorities, and whether an alleged lack of statutory jurisdiction due to the repeal of Evacuee Laws constituted contempt. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the respondents had not violated any order issued by the High Court or Supreme Court. The Court laid down that initiating or conducting proceedings before an authority does not constitute contempt where no judicial order has been disobeyed, and jurisdictional objections must be raised before the relevant forum or through appropriate constitutional remedies rather than a contempt petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an authority commit contempt of court by acting on observations made in prior judicial orders permitting a party to approach it?
  • Can a party file a contempt petition under Article 204 of the Constitution when no order or direction of the court has been violated?
  • Is a challenge to the statutory jurisdiction of an administrative or settlement officer properly raised in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Alias Zair vs Ch. Muhammad Afzal Etc.S1978 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-29
  EvictionStatutory tenantDemand noticeRent arrearsDisplaced personsTransfer of propertyRent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a statutory tenant regarding an evacuee house transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The core legal question was whether a demand notice for rent is legally defective and invalid if it fails to specify the precise rate of rent, thereby preventing the landlord from seeking eviction for non-payment. The Supreme Court held that the notice was valid. The Court determined that under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, a statutory tenant is deemed to hold the property on the same terms and conditions as existed immediately before the transfer. Consequently, a demand notice that does not specify a rate implies a demand for the existing rent. The Court ruled that a tenant cannot escape liability for eviction on the technical ground that the rate was not specified in the notice, especially where the tenant was aware of the existing rent. A contumacious refusal to pay rent justifies eviction under the governing law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a demand notice for rent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 become invalid if it fails to specify the precise rate of rent?
  • Is a statutory tenant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 liable for eviction if they fail to pay rent despite receiving a notice of transfer?
  • What are the terms and conditions of tenancy for a person in possession of an evacuee house transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid vs Member, Board of Revenue Punjab1978 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-12
  ejected tenants schemecancellation of allotmentdefault of rentspecial leave to appealcolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Ghulam Farid against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of his State land allotment. The petitioner was allotted land under the Ejected Tenants Scheme in 1956 but defaulted on rent payments from Kharif 1957 to Rabi 1973, failed to cultivate the land, and did not reside in the village. The Collector cancelled the allotment, an action upheld through successive appeals by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. The core legal question concerned the validity of the cancellation of land allotment without notice. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was admittedly a defaulter and that notice under section 24 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 was not required pursuant to section 27 of the Act, though notice had nevertheless been served. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a defaulter has no valid grievance against cancellation when afforded due opportunity of being heard.

  Questions settled

  • Whether notice under section 24 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 is required to be served when section 27 of the Act dispenses with it?
  • Does a tenant who is admittedly a defaulter in the payment of rent have grounds to challenge the cancellation of a land allotment?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed in limine against the concurrent findings of revenue authorities regarding non-payment of rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and Others vs Messrs Charsadda Sugar Mills1978 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-15
  excise dutyproduction capacityabatement of dutyquasi-judicial discretionspeaking orderadministrative lawnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a sugar mill, challenged an order by the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) regarding the abatement of excise duty under the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972. The respondent had sought abatement due to production shortfalls caused by external factors like strikes, frost, and raw material shortages. The CBR, applying a self-evolved policy formula that disregarded shortfalls up to 10% of production capacity as being within management control, granted only partial abatement. The High Court quashed this order, prompting the Federation to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the CBR acted mechanically by applying a rigid formula rather than exercising its quasi-judicial discretion under Rule 4 of the Rules. The Court emphasized that when a statute vests discretion in an authority to grant relief based on circumstances beyond a manufacturer's control, the authority must fairly and reasonably examine the specific facts presented, rather than relying on arbitrary, pre-determined policies. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the remand of the matter for a fresh, reasoned decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Board of Revenue can apply a rigid formula to deny excise duty abatement without considering the specific facts of a case?
  • Does the failure of the Central Board of Revenue to provide reasons for its decision constitute a failure to exercise quasi-judicial discretion?
  • Is the Central Board of Revenue required to consider specific evidence of production shortfalls when exercising its discretion under Rule 4 of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and Others vs Meesers Charsadda Sugar Mills1978 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-15
  excise dutyabatement of dutyproduction capacityquasi-judicial discretionadministrative lawspeaking ordernatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a sugar mill, sought abatement of excise duty under the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972, citing production shortfalls due to factors beyond its control, such as strikes, raw material shortages, and adverse weather. The Central Board of Revenue (CBR) granted only partial abatement, applying a rigid internal formula that arbitrarily excluded a percentage of the shortfall from consideration. The respondent challenged this in the High Court, which quashed the CBR's order and remanded the matter. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The core legal question was whether the CBR could mechanically apply a general formula to deny abatement without considering the specific merits of the manufacturer's claim. The Court held that the CBR's failure to examine the specific facts and circumstances of the case constituted a failure to exercise its quasi-judicial discretion. The principle laid down is that when a statute vests discretion in an authority to grant relief based on specific conditions, that authority must act justly, fairly, and reasonably by evaluating the individual merits of each case rather than relying on arbitrary, pre-determined formulas.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory authority deny a claim for duty abatement by applying a rigid, pre-determined formula without considering the specific facts of the case?
  • Does the failure of an authority to provide reasons for its decision in a quasi-judicial matter constitute a failure to exercise discretion?
  • Is the Central Board of Revenue required to independently evaluate the merits of a manufacturer's claim for abatement under the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission and Another and Federal Land Commission1978 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-03Read full judgment →
• Fazal Ilahi Bhatti and Another and Muhammad Aslam Bajwa vs Muhammad Aslam Bajwa and Another Settlement Commissioner and Ahother1978 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-07
  settlement schemeevacuee propertytransfer of propertyconsent orderpossessionsettlement commissionerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two petitions for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer and entitlement to portions of an evacuee residential property under settlement law. A series of appeals, revisions, and writ proceedings had led to a High Court remand to the Settlement Commissioner for fresh decision. Following remand, the Settlement Commissioner passed an order transferring one portion of the property to Muhammad Aslam Bajwa and the remaining portion to the legal heirs of Sher Muhammad Bhatti. The legal heirs challenged the transfer to Bajwa on the ground that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to transfer a portion to Bajwa without notice during pending proceedings, asserting that any recorded concession before the Settlement Commissioner was incorrect. Bajwa separately claimed an additional shop room underneath his portion. The High Court dismissed both challenges, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. The Court held that factual findings regarding consent given before the revisional authority could not be re-agitated, and that Bajwa had no right to the additional room as he was never in possession of it.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-agitate on appeal or in higher judicial proceedings a factual assertion regarding whether consent was given before a revisional Settlement authority?
  • Whether an occupant of evacuee property who was never in physical possession of a specific unit or room is entitled to its transfer under settlement schemes?
  • Whether a consent order passed by a Settlement Commissioner partitioning evacuee property among competing claimants can be set aside absent grounds justifying interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad Etc. vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and Other1978 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-05
  status quointerim reliefwrit petitionstate land allotmentpossessionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the refusal of the High Court to grant an interim order for the maintenance of status quo regarding the allotment of certain State lands in Bahawalpur District during the pendency of a constitutional writ petition. The petitioners claimed to be lessees in possession of the disputed lands, while the Collector's report indicated the lands had been re-allotted to ejected tenants who were already in possession. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing the status quo order in the absence of satisfactory documentary evidence proving the petitioners' continuous possession at the time of filing the constitutional petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to discharge their duty of proving possession through relevant revenue records, and that the discretionary refusal of an interim status quo order by the High Court was justified. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking an interim status quo order regarding property possession must affirmatively establish its current possession through reliable documentary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party seeking an interim order for the maintenance of status quo in a writ petition is required to establish its possession through relevant revenue records?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary refusal of an interim status quo order by the High Court when the petitioner fails to prove possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs Akbar Etc.S1978 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-20
  suspension of sentenceself-defencejudicial discretionleave to appealbail pending appealappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had suspended the sentences of life imprisonment awarded to the respondents by an Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court granted this relief primarily because the plea of self-defence required further examination, given that the prosecution failed to explain the significant number of injuries sustained by the accused. The petitioner contended that the recovery of bloodstained earth from the deceased's land indicated the accused were the aggressors and that the trial court's conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code was sound. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the High Court's order. The Court held that it was not appropriate to conduct a detailed re-examination of the evidence at the leave-to-appeal stage, particularly when the High Court had exercised its discretion in a manner that did not appear improper given the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that appellate courts should be cautious in disturbing the exercise of judicial discretion regarding bail suspension unless clearly erroneous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretion in suspending a sentence pending appeal?
  • Is the plea of self-defence a valid ground for suspending a sentence if the prosecution fails to explain injuries on the accused?
  • Does the recovery of bloodstained earth from the deceased's land conclusively negate a plea of self-defence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Muhammad vs Gul Khan and Other1978 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-04
  bail cancellationmurder caseFirst Information Reportprima facie casecriminal liabilityfirearm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court which cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioner by an Additional Sessions Judge in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in cancelling bail when the petitioner was directly charged in the First Information Report with causing a firearm injury, despite the petitioner's argument regarding the improbability of his participation due to alleged enmity between him and his co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion. The Court reasoned that the complainant directly attributed the injury to the petitioner in a broad-daylight occurrence, and there was no evidence suggesting the complainant had a motive to falsely implicate the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is directly charged with a serious offence punishable by imprisonment for life, and there is no apparent reason for false implication, the court is justified in refusing bail, as the case does not warrant further inquiry at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in cancelling bail when an accused is directly charged with a serious offence in the First Information Report?
  • Does the existence of enmity between co-accused parties automatically render the complainant's allegation of joint participation improbable for the purpose of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when there is no evidence of enmity between the complainant and the accused to suggest false implication?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ahmad vs Munir and Another1978 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-22
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilityself-defencemurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the informant Faiz Ahmad against the Lahore High Court's order allowing bail to the respondent Munir, who was accused along with another under section 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Briefly, the incident arose from a scuffle outside a mosque resulting in the death of the deceased Nawab and injuries to Sajwara P.W. and the respondent Munir, who sustained nine injuries including a grievous head injury. The High Court granted bail to the respondent holding that his vicarious liability fell within the scope of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, considering the numerous injuries sustained by him and the statement of the mosque's Imam supporting his plea. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion lawfully based on the circumstances of the case, and consequently dismissed the petition for lack of merit, declining to interfere with the impugned bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the question of vicarious liability requires further inquiry?
  • Does the receipt of multiple injuries by an accused, including a grievous head injury, constitute reasonable grounds for exercising discretion to grant bail in a murder case?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary order of the High Court granting bail when the conclusions are based on facts and circumstances prima facie supporting further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Alyas Hashmi vs Masood Khan and 5 Other1978 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-12
  discharge of accusedprivate complaintwrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncriminal proceduredelayed complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the discharge of private respondents under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the concurrent orders of the lower forums discharging the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, noting that the petitioner had delayed filing his complaint by a week after his release on bail and over two months after the alleged occurrence, and that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below suffered from no illegality. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court will not be exercised to interfere with concurrent orders of discharge where no jurisdictional defect or illegality is shown in the appreciation of the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition against an order of discharge under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a delay of over two months in filing a private complaint after the alleged occurrence affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Can concurrent findings regarding the discharge of accused persons be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction without showing a material illegality?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Hussain Ullah Khan vs Haji Abdullah Jan1978 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-26
  leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitationex parte orderevictionrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a second appeal against an order of eviction. The respondent filed an eviction application against the petitioner before the Rent Controller on the ground of default in rent payment. During the proceedings, the Rent Controller adjourned the matter subject to costs. The petitioner subsequently filed a transfer application before the District Judge and failed to appear before the Rent Controller on the fixed date, resulting in an ex parte eviction order. The petitioner's applications to set aside the ex parte order, along with subsequent appeals before the District Judge and the High Court, were dismissed, largely on grounds of limitation and delay. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner had sufficiently explained the seven-day delay in filing the leave petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court held that the petitioner failed to explain the delay of each day satisfactorily and showed a lack of diligence throughout the proceedings. Consequently, the leave petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must explain the delay of every single day after the expiry of the prescribed period?
  • Does the failure to diligently pursue proceedings at various stages disentitle a party to discretionary relief from the court?
  • Whether an appeal or petition filed beyond the period of limitation without a satisfactory explanation is liable to be dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad vs Syed Maqsood Shah Etc.S1978 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-20
  civil petition for special leavereview petitiontransfer of propertysettlement authoritieswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for review of an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had previously dismissed a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner had successfully deposited the full transfer price of a disputed property within the stipulated time, thereby justifying the setting aside of the cancellation of its transfer. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner failed to deposit the entire outstanding amount as calculated from the assessed rent and surcharge, the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition, and no ground for review was made out. The Court further held that a new plea regarding an additional deposit, not raised before the High Court, cannot be entertained for the first time in review proceedings, leaving the petitioner to seek relief through a review application before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be entertained on a new plea not raised before the High Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the dismissal of a writ petition where the petitioner failed to deposit the complete transfer price of a property?
  Read full judgment →
• Dildar Hussain vs Muhammad Ashraf and 3 Other1978 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-14
  special leave to appealacquittaldying declarationbenefit of the doubteyewitness testimonydelay in reportingmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the respondents were acquitted of murder and related charges by giving them the benefit of the doubt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the testimony of an eyewitness and discarding the dying declaration of the deceased due to delayed reporting and potential tutoring. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, noting material discrepancies and improvements in the testimony of the eyewitness as well as an unexplained inordinate delay in recording the dying declaration despite the failure of compromise talks. Consequently, the Court upheld the acquittal and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that where an eyewitness's presence is doubtful and a dying declaration is subject to a suspicious delay providing opportunity for tutoring, the accused are entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in discarding a dying declaration recorded after a significant delay when relatives had opportunity to tutor the deceased?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of an eyewitness whose presence at the spot is found to be doubtful and fraught with material discrepancies?
  • Does the failure of compromise talks between parties adequately explain a major delay in reporting a crime to the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala vs Muhammad Yaqub Etc.1978 PLD Supreme Court 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-27
  industrial relationslabour court jurisdictionwrongful dismissaldomestic inquirygrievance petitionreinstatementback-benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the reinstatement of an employee dismissed by his employer. The core legal question was whether a Labour Court, when adjudicating a grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is restricted to reviewing the procedural legality of a domestic inquiry or possesses the jurisdiction to re-examine the factual merits of the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court has the authority to go behind a dismissal order and assess the facts of the case independently. The Court affirmed that the Labour Court is not merely a reviewing authority but a tribunal of facts, empowered to determine whether a dismissal is justified on both legal and factual grounds. The key principle laid down is that the statutory mandate requiring the Labour Court to 'go into all the facts of the case' provides a necessary check against arbitrary or capricious dismissals, necessitating that employers justify their actions on merits before the Labour Court when challenged.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Labour Court have the jurisdiction to examine the factual merits of a dismissal order under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  • Is a Labour Court restricted to reviewing only the procedural formalities of a domestic inquiry conducted by an employer?
  • Can a party raise a plea regarding the absence of a 'grievance notice' for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the statutory requirement to 'go into all the facts of the case' empower a Labour Court to act as a tribunal of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Chotu vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 6 Other1978 SCMR 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-09
  land settlementfraudulent allotmentexcess entitlementdisplaced personmisrepresentationadministrative error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a challenge to an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The petitioner, a displaced person, had obtained an allotment of land in excess of his actual entitlement, purportedly due to an inadvertent error by the Central Record Office. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had secured this excess allotment through fraud and misrepresentation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had knowingly taken advantage of a departmental mistake regarding his verified claim. The Court held that the findings of the Settlement Commissioner—which were based on evidence, including testimony from revenue officials and records—were proper and that the High Court correctly upheld them. The Court affirmed the principle that a claimant who knowingly exploits an administrative error in their favor to obtain an allotment exceeding their actual entitlement acts fraudulently, and such an allotment is subject to cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant act fraudulently by knowingly taking advantage of an inadvertent departmental error in the verification of their land claim?
  • Can an allotment of land obtained in excess of a claimant's actual entitlement be cancelled upon proof of misrepresentation?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner regarding land entitlement, when supported by evidence and upheld by the High Court, liable to be set aside by the Supreme Court?
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• Chinar Gul vs Cantonment Board of Peshawar through Its Executive1978 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-16
  substitution of legal representativescondonation of delayabatement of appealSupreme Court Ruleslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died, and his legal representatives failed to file an application to be brought on record within the ninety-day period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, 1956. Subsequently, an application for substitution along with a request for condonation of delay was filed, which was opposed by the respondents. The core legal question was whether sufficient cause had been shown for condoning the delay in substituting the legal representatives of the deceased appellant. The Supreme Court held that the legal representatives failed to provide any explanation for their failure to timely notify their Advocate-on-Record or file the substitution application within the limitation period. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appeal had become defective and incompetent due to the absence of a timely substitution application, dismissing the appeal without an order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings in the Supreme Court under its rules?
  • What is the prescribed time limitation for filing an application to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased party in the Supreme Court?
  • Does failure to provide an explanation for delay in filing a substitution application constitute sufficient cause for extending time?
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• Ch. Shafqat Ali Khan vs Rao Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan1978 SCMR 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  non-prosecutionAdvocate-on-Recordservice of noticeconstructive noticeprofessional negligencerecall of orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application to recall an order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal for non-prosecution. The petitioner sought to recall the dismissal, alleging that the Advocate-on-Record (AOR) never received the show-cause notice regarding the rescission of leave. The Court examined evidence, including postal records and the AOR's own conflicting testimony, and concluded that the AOR had been duly served. The core legal question was whether service on an AOR constitutes effective service on the party and whether the Court should recall an order based on the alleged negligence of the AOR. The Court held that, under its rules, service on an AOR is legally equivalent to service on the party. Furthermore, the Court found the AOR’s denial of receipt to be dishonest and his performance a gross dereliction of duty. Consequently, the Court refused to recall the dismissal order, establishing that a party cannot avoid the consequences of their legal representative's gross negligence or dishonesty, and that service on an AOR is binding on the client.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of notice on an Advocate-on-Record constitute effective service on the party represented?
  • Can a party seek the recall of an order dismissing a petition for non-prosecution based on the alleged negligence of their Advocate-on-Record?
  • Is an Advocate-on-Record responsible for the completion of the record in proceedings before the Supreme Court?
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• Budh Khan and 2 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-26
  remand of casedefective judgmentpost-arrest bailappellate powersillegal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners were convicted by a Section 30 Magistrate under sections 307 and 148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Upon appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge set aside the convictions and remanded the case to the trial court to rewrite the judgment due to procedural defects. Pursuant thereto, the magistrate reheard the matter, convicted the petitioners again, and enhanced sentences. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent bail application. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether an appellate court possesses the power to remand a case solely for the rewriting of a defective judgment. The Supreme Court held that the remand order passed by the Sessions Court was indefensible and illegal, rendering the subsequent trial and enhanced convictions legally flawed. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioners pending final disposal of their appeal, laying down that appellate courts cannot remand cases merely to have trial judgments rewritten.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court have the power to remand a case to the trial court merely on the ground that the trial court's judgment is defective and needs to be rewritten?
  • Can a trial court lawfully pass a fresh judgment and enhance sentences pursuant to an illegal remand order by an appellate court?
  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the second conviction and sentence by the trial court following an illegal remand are prima facie unsustainable?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Mst. Rehana1978 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-30
  custody of minorHizanatHanafi Lawreview petitionpubertyGuardians and Wards Actwelfare of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition concerns the custody of a minor daughter, where the petitioner sought to challenge a previous Supreme Court order upholding the High Court’s decision to grant custody to the maternal grandmother. The core legal questions were whether the minor had attained puberty at age thirteen, thereby entitling the father to custody under Muslim Law, and whether the failure to consult the minor’s wishes or the father's financial contributions for her education necessitated a review of the custody arrangement. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Hanafi Law, a girl is presumed to attain puberty at age fifteen, not thirteen, and the maternal grandmother retains the right of Hizanat until that age. The Court further ruled that the omission to consult the minor’s wishes did not warrant a review after two and a half years of stable custody, and that the father's financial support for the minor's education did not override the grandmother's right to custody. The key principle established is that the right of Hizanat for a minor girl remains with the maternal grandmother until she attains puberty, which is legally presumed at age fifteen.

  Questions settled

  • At what age is a Muslim girl under Hanafi Law presumed to have attained puberty for the purpose of custody?
  • Does the father's financial responsibility for a minor's education automatically entitle him to custody?
  • Is the failure to consult a minor's wishes sufficient ground to review a long-standing custody order?
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• Bashir Ahmad and Others vs The State1978 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-10
  review of orderclerical errorimprisonment for lifetransportation for lifecriminal appealsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application filed by the Superintendent of Jail for the review of a previous order of the Supreme Court dated 29-11-1974, due to a clerical error in the narration of facts regarding the sentences of convicted persons. The core legal question concerned the correction of a clerical mistake in a court order and the correct sentencing terminology under the law applicable to the date of the offense. The Supreme Court held that it has the power to review and correct clerical errors in its orders, and further noted that for murders committed on 3-7-1969, the correct sentence is transportation for life rather than imprisonment for life, following precedent. The key principle laid down is that the court may correct clerical errors in its orders suo motu or upon application, and sentencing must strictly accord with the law applicable at the time of the commission of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court review its order to correct a clerical error?
  • Whether the sentence of imprisonment for life should be converted to transportation for life for offenses committed on 3-7-1969?
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• Bashir Ahmad and Others vs Manzoor Ahmad and Another1978 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-02
  civil court jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factsecond appealadministrative reviewfraudleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of Ihata No. 21, which was initially granted to the respondent by the Collector but subsequently cancelled following allegations of fraud regarding the lack of required publicity. The respondent filed a civil suit for a declaration of ownership, which was initially dismissed by the trial court and the District Judge, who held that the Collector’s findings on fraud were binding and not subject to civil court interference. However, the High Court, in second appeal, reappraised the evidence, rejected the findings of fraud, and decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court erred in reappraising evidence to overturn concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud, and whether the Collector possessed the jurisdiction to review the grant of the Ihata. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the issues regarding the scope of civil court jurisdiction and the finality of administrative findings on fraud are of significant legal importance requiring further consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in second appeal reappraise evidence to overturn concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud?
  • Does a Collector have the jurisdiction to review an order granting land if the sale process was incomplete?
  • To what extent can a civil court interfere with findings of fraud recorded by revenue authorities?
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• Basharat Hussain vs Ghulam Hussain Etc.S.1978 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  bail cancellationmurdercommon intentionjudicial discretionfurther inquirycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a bail cancellation application by the Lahore High Court. The respondent, Ghulam Hussain, was accused of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically for allegedly holding the deceased while his co-accused delivered a fatal blow. The Sessions Judge had initially granted bail to the respondent, and the High Court subsequently refused to cancel it, finding that the respondent's specific role in facilitating the murder required further inquiry. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to cancel the bail granted to the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the discretion was exercised properly and that the case did not warrant interference. The key principle laid down is that where the role attributed to an accused in a murder case—such as holding the deceased while another strikes the fatal blow—requires further inquiry, the grant of bail by a lower court is a proper exercise of discretion that should not be disturbed by an appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allegation of holding a deceased person while a co-accused strikes a fatal blow warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Is the refusal of a High Court to cancel bail a proper exercise of discretion when the role of the accused requires further investigation?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing to cancel bail?
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