Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Ghulam Muhammad and 6 Others vs Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Sargodha and Another1973 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners challenged a High Court order dismissing their writ petition against the Commissioner of Sargodha Division, who had set aside a District Council resolution granting them a five-year lease to operate a cattle market. The District Council had initially granted the lease for Rs. 10,000, but later rejected a significantly higher offer of Rs. 60,000 from third parties. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction under the Basic Democracies Order to set aside the Council's resolution. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, affirming that the Commissioner possessed the authority to quash proceedings that were not in conformity with the law or were contrary to public interest. The Court held that the Council's resolution, which ignored a vastly superior financial offer, disregarded public funds and was against public interest. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction, noting that if the petitioners suffered losses due to the cancellation of the lease, their appropriate remedy lay in seeking damages through civil proceedings rather than constitutional intervention.
Questions settled- Does the Commissioner have the authority under the Basic Democracies Order to quash proceedings of a Local Council that are contrary to public interest?
- Is a writ petition the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by the cancellation of a lease contract by a local authority?
- Can a Local Council's resolution be set aside if it disregards public interest and financial benefit to the public exchequer?
- Ghulam Muhammad and 3 Other vs Khushi Muhammad and Another1973 PLD Supreme Court 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had decreed a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved were whether the pre-emptor had a superior right of pre-emption based on oral evidence of relationship through a female, and whether the suit suffered from the fatal defect of partial pre-emption due to the relinquishment of a portion of the suit property (Khasra No. 620). The Supreme Court held that while the superior right of pre-emption was correctly established through unrebutted oral testimony, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of partial pre-emption. The Court ruled that a pre-emptor must take over the whole bargain and seek pre-emption of the entire subject-matter of the sale while paying the full price, unless an exception applies by necessity. Relinquishing a part of the property merely to avoid litigation or due to a perceived defect in the vendor's title does not constitute a legal necessity. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the suit was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a pre-emptor can relinquish a part of the property sold and maintain a suit for partial pre-emption on payment of the full price?
- Does a pre-emptor's relinquishment of a portion of the suit land to avoid litigation constitute a legal necessity permitting partial pre-emption?
- How can a pre-emptor prove a relationship through a woman where revenue records are unavailable?
- Is the right of pre-emption under statute law one of substitution requiring the pre-emptor to take over the whole bargain?
- Ghulam Mohyuddin vs The State1973 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, a cashier at a sugar mill, under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner impersonated a contractor, opened a bank account under that false name, deposited a forged cheque drawn on the mill, and withdrew the funds. While the High Court discarded the conflicting handwriting expert evidence regarding the forgery, it sustained the conviction based on identification evidence and the petitioner's fraudulent actions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the failure to prove forgery invalidated the charge of criminal misappropriation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave, holding that even if the forgery itself was not conclusively proved, the established facts that the petitioner impersonated another person, deposited the cheque, and withdrew the funds for his own use were sufficient to constitute criminal misappropriation under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for criminal misappropriation under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be sustained if the allegation of forgery is not proved but the unauthorized withdrawal of funds through impersonation is established?
- Does a conflict between two forensic handwriting experts automatically invalidate other credible oral and identification evidence establishing the accused's fraudulent conduct?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent appreciation of oral and identification evidence by the lower courts in a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Ghulam Ahmed vs Bashir Ahmed and Other1973 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant challenging the refusal of the High Court to grant an interim order for the cancellation of bail previously granted to the respondents facing prosecution for murder. The respondents were originally allowed bail by the Sessions Judge based on an interpretation of an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which interpretation was subsequently suspended by the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether bail granted on a legal basis that has since been suspended or disappeared must be cancelled automatically without hearing the accused. The Supreme Court held that the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail requires that the accused be given a right of being heard, and the High Court acted rightly in issuing a show-cause notice rather than hastily cancelling bail. The key principle laid down is that the cancellation of bail entails the curtailment of personal liberty, necessitating an opportunity of being heard for the accused regardless of the validity of the initial grounds for bail.
Questions settled- Whether bail can be cancelled automatically upon the disappearance of the legal basis on which it was granted without hearing the accused?
- Is it obligatory for a court to pass an interim order for the cancellation of bail pending a full hearing?
- Does the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail necessitate affording the accused a right of being heard?
- Fazal Waheed vs The State1973 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the murder of his first cousin in a mosque during a religious gathering. At trial, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, claiming he suffered from periodic epileptic fits and had no memory of committing the crime or making a subsequent confessional statement. During trial proceedings in the Sessions Court, he experienced a fit and was temporarily declared of unsound mind before trial resumed upon his recovery. The High Court of Peshawar dismissed his appeal, holding that no evidence indicated he was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the conviction, holding that an episode or fit of insanity occurring subsequent to the crime does not create a presumption that the accused was insane or incapable of understanding his actions at the time of committing the offense. In the absence of prior or contemporaneous evidence of mental abnormality, the conviction and sentence were upheld.
Questions settled- Does a fit of mental illness or insanity occurring subsequent to an offense create a legal presumption of insanity at the time the crime was committed?
- Can an accused person successfully claim the defence of insanity without evidence showing unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the act?
- Fazal Muhammad vs The State1973 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and confirming the sentence of death. The core legal questions involve the assessment of ocular testimony, the effect of discarding a dying declaration due to potential tutoring, the impact of non-production of an alleged earlier statement, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding motive and delay in lodging the first information report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the rejection of a dying declaration or the non-production of an earlier statement does not automatically demolish the entire prosecution case when corroborated by reliable eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and recovery of blood-stained earth. The court laid down that natural eyewitnesses whose presence is supported by medical evidence and circumstantial facts are sufficient to sustain a conviction in a single-accused murder case.
Questions settled- Does the rejection of a dying declaration due to tutoring automatically demolish the entire prosecution case?
- What is the legal effect of the non-production of an earlier statement made by a deceased victim?
- Can ocular testimony of related witnesses sustain a conviction for murder when corroborated by medical evidence?
- Fazal Karim and Another vs Inayat Hussain and Other1973 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning municipal properties in Quetta, originally belonging to Fazal Dad. The core legal question is whether the High Court correctly relied on independent oral and documentary evidence, including admissions, powers of attorney, and revenue records, to establish exclusive ownership of the property by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of an unregistered and unstamped family arrangement document. The Supreme Court held that while the unregistered partition document itself was inadmissible to prove partition, other reliable evidence—such as admissions in a power of attorney, corrected mutation records, and exclusive possession—sufficiently established the plaintiff's exclusive ownership. The key principle laid down is that although an unregistered partition document cannot be used to prove the partition, it may be used to corroborate exclusive possession, and subsequent conduct, admissions, and independent documents can validly prove sole ownership.
Questions settled- Can an unregistered and unstamped family arrangement document be relied on to prove partition?
- Whether an unregistered partition document can be used to lend support to a claim of exclusive possession?
- Can admissions and independent documentary evidence establish exclusive ownership in the absence of a valid registered partition deed?
- Fazal Diyan vs The State1973 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of a solitary, interested eye-witness in a case involving blood-feud, the evidentiary weight of the deceased’s dying declaration, and whether the deceased’s death occurred during a separate, unrelated incident involving the murder of the appellant’s cousin. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the eye-witness was natural and trustworthy, and that the dying declaration, characterized by its brevity and voluntary nature, was genuine and corroborated the eye-witness testimony. The Court rejected the appellant’s defense theory as fanciful, noting that the incident involving the cousin was a separate, subsequent event. The Court affirmed that the credibility of evidence is a matter of human judgment rather than a strict question of law, and that a fugitive from justice cannot claim leniency based on delays in judicial proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Is the testimony of a solitary, interested eye-witness sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case?
- Does the brevity of a dying declaration affect its evidentiary value and credibility?
- Can a fugitive from justice claim relief based on the delay in judicial proceedings?
- Is the credibility of a witness a question of law or a matter of human judgment?
- Fatah Uddin vs Zarshad and Another1973 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment in a suit for declaration, which sought to invalidate a gift deed executed in 1957. The respondent alleged the deed was obtained through fraud and undue influence by the petitioner, who posed as a Pir. Evidence indicated the respondent was a lunatic at the time of execution, and the petitioner failed to rebut claims regarding the respondent's mental state or the fraudulent nature of the transaction. The petitioner argued the suit was time-barred, calculating limitation from the date of the deed's execution. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the right to sue accrues upon the discovery of fraud. Since the fraud was discovered in 1969 and the suit was filed in 1970, the action was within the limitation period. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the suit was timely and the evidence of fraud remained unrebutted, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
Questions settled- When does the limitation period for a suit challenging a gift deed on the grounds of fraud begin to run?
- Does the right to sue for a declaration regarding a fraudulent transaction accrue from the date of execution or the date of discovery of the fraud?
- Is a suit filed within the limitation period after the discovery of fraud maintainable despite the lapse of time since the execution of the impugned deed?
- Faqira vs The State1973 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the appropriateness of the death sentence given the mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence, comprising the last-seen testimony, the recovery of the deceased’s clothing and shoes at the appellant’s instance, and the established motive of ghairat (honor) due to the deceased’s intimacy with the appellant’s wife, was sufficient to sustain the conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. While affirming the conviction, the Court reduced the death sentence to transportation for life. The Court established the principle that while criminal antecedents do not disentitle an individual from preserving family honor, the motive of ghairat arising from the seduction of a spouse constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the necessity of maintaining parity in sentencing between co-accused who are held to have participated equally in the commission of the offense.
Questions settled- Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when it includes last-seen testimony and the recovery of the deceased's belongings at the instance of the accused?
- Can the motive of ghairat (honor) arising from the seduction of a spouse be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing for murder?
- Should parity of sentencing be maintained between co-accused who are found to have participated equally in the commission of a crime?
- Does the fact that an accused has a criminal record disentitle them from claiming mitigation based on family honor?
- Faqir Muhammad Khan vs Mir Akbar Shah1973 PLD Supreme Court 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a refusal by a High Court Single Judge to review a judgment in a pre-emption suit. The appellant argued that the Single Judge erred by failing to notice a binding Full Bench decision of the same High Court, which should have constituted an "error apparent on the face of the record" under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the failure to notice an authoritative, binding decision, such as a Full Bench judgment, indeed constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. However, the Court clarified that the granting of a review remains a matter of judicial discretion. Upon examining the merits, the Court found the Full Bench decision in question to be based on an incorrect interpretation of Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Single Judge's refusal to review the judgment, upholding the dismissal of the pre-emption suit on substantive grounds.
Questions settled- Does the failure of a court to notice a binding Full Bench decision constitute an error apparent on the face of the record for the purposes of a review petition?
- Is the granting of a review petition mandatory once an error apparent on the face of the record is established?
- Does the phrase 'measuring more than one kanal' in Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, qualify both 'house' and 'vacant site'?
- Fakhre Alam Yousaf Lodhi vs The State and Another the State the State and Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns criminal appeals and petitions arising from contempt proceedings initiated by the Peshawar High Court regarding an article titled "Imagine" published in the weekly newspaper 'Frontier Guardian'. The High Court convicted Yousaf Lodhi, the author, editor, printer, and publisher, sentencing him to six months imprisonment and a fine. Additionally, the High Court directed the Provincial Government to initiate proceedings against Lodhi for alleged violations of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, specifically regarding his academic qualifications. Simultaneously, the High Court made adverse observations against the then Advocate-General of N.W.F.P., Sardar Fakhre Alam, criticizing his conduct and hesitancy during the examination of the Chief Secretary. Fakhre Alam subsequently filed an appeal seeking the expunction of these disparaging remarks. The Supreme Court addressed the validity of the contempt conviction and the propriety of the adverse judicial observations made against the Advocate-General. The judgment highlights the necessity for judicial restraint and the requirement that judicial observations concerning the conduct of legal officers must be strictly relevant to the proceedings and supported by the record, rather than based on personal perceptions of embarrassment.
Questions settled- Can adverse judicial observations against a law officer be expunged if they are not supported by the record?
- Does the publication of an article in a newspaper constitute contempt of court if it scandalizes the court?
- Is the High Court empowered to direct the government to initiate proceedings under the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963?
- Faiz Alam vs The State1973 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a Police Head Constable, was convicted by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, for demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 500 from the complainant to avoid initiating proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The conviction was upheld by the High Court, which reduced the sentence of imprisonment. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the conviction on grounds that the bribe money was not recovered from his person, that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable, and that the sanction for prosecution was granted without due application of mind. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had correctly appreciated the evidence. The Court affirmed that the prosecution had successfully established the demand and acceptance of the bribe, noting that the sanctioning authority had consciously considered the facts, circumstances, and the accused's explanation before granting sanction. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt.
Questions settled- Does the failure to recover bribe money directly from the person of the accused invalidate a conviction for bribery?
- What is the standard for determining whether a sanctioning authority has applied its mind in granting sanction for prosecution?
- Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of witnesses who witnessed the passing of bribe money even if the money was recovered from the ground?
- DR. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi and 2 Other Mohammad Mukhtar Rana vs The State and Another the State and 2 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These are two review petitions filed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court disposing of multiple criminal appeals concerning convictions under Martial Law Regulations. The core legal questions involve whether the findings of the Court regarding the validity of Military Court proceedings and the presence of mala fides or lack of jurisdiction warranted a review, and whether separate proceedings stood on the same footing regarding undertakings given to the Court. The Supreme Court held that review cannot be granted on the ground of a party's misconception of arguments or failure to fully argue, and that distinct proceedings involving different facts and different dates cannot claim parity with cases vitiated by a breach of an undertaking given to the Court. The key principle laid down is that review is not maintainable merely due to a party's self-perceived lack of full argumentation when the core issues were duly considered, and distinct factual matrices determine the validity of separate military court convictions.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be entertained on the ground that counsel failed to advance full arguments due to a misconception?
- Does the validity given by the Interim Constitution to acts done under Martial Law Regulations protect actions that are coram non judice, without jurisdiction, or mala fide?
- Are separate proceedings before a military court governed by the same considerations when only one set of proceedings involves the violation of an undertaking given to the Supreme Court?
- DR. Habibur Rahman vs The West Pakistan Public Service Commis Sion, Lahore and 4 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against the Lahore High Court’s dismissal of writ petitions challenging the recruitment process for Professors of Surgery conducted by the West Pakistan Public Service Commission. The appellant alleged that the Commission violated government instructions regarding the evaluation of "high technical posts" and questioned the eligibility of a non-citizen respondent. The Supreme Court held that while departmental instructions can operate as statutory rules under Articles 178 and 186 of the 1962 Constitution if they possess sufficient precision and general application, the Commission did not materially breach them. The Court further ruled that Article 175(2) permits non-citizens already in the service of Pakistan to continue their service, regardless of specific post changes. Crucially, the Court determined that the Commission’s recommendations are advisory and inchoate, generally rendering them non-justiciable until an appointment is finalized. Additionally, the Court found the appellant’s claims barred by laches and waiver due to his participation in subsequent selection processes without protest. The appeals were dismissed, though the Court expressed hope for the appellant’s future absorption into a professorial rank.
Questions settled- Can departmental instructions issued by the government be considered statutory rules binding on the Public Service Commission?
- Does Article 175(2) of the 1962 Constitution allow a non-citizen already in the service of Pakistan to be appointed to a different post?
- Are recommendations made by the Public Service Commission to the government subject to judicial review before an appointment is finalized?
- Does participation in a subsequent selection process without protest constitute a waiver of grievances regarding an earlier selection?
- Divisional Superintendent, P. W. R., Karachi Vice-Chairman, West Pakistan Railway Board and Anothhrs vs Bashir Ahmad Mohammad Taj Sher Mohammad1973 PLD Supreme Court 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three appeals by the Railway Administration challenging the payment of full back wages to reinstated employees who had previously been removed from service. The core legal question was whether the Railway Administration could rely on Rule 2044 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code to deduct portions of salary from employees reinstated following civil court decrees declaring their removal unlawful, notwithstanding the strict provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Supreme Court held that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a remedial statute that strictly limits deductions from wages to those explicitly authorized by the Act itself. The Court determined that Rule 2044 of the Railway Code applies exclusively to departmental revisional or appellate proceedings and cannot be invoked to justify deductions following a civil court judgment. Consequently, the Railway Administration lacked the authority to make such deductions. The principle laid down is that where a civil court declares an employee's removal unlawful, the employer cannot rely on internal departmental rules to withhold wages, as the Payment of Wages Act mandates payment without unauthorized deductions.
Questions settled- Can the Railway Administration rely on Rule 2044 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code to deduct wages of an employee reinstated following a civil court decree?
- Does the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 permit deductions from wages that are not explicitly authorized by the Act itself?
- Is a civil suit for the recovery of arrears of salary competent for a civil servant wrongfully removed from service?
- Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore vs Ch.1973 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police challenging the judgment of the High Court, which had allowed a Constitution petition filed by a Sub-Inspector of Police. An inquiry for misconduct had been initiated against the respondent under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, resulting in an exoneration report accepted by the Superintendent of Police. However, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police disagreed, issued a show cause notice, and reduced the respondent in rank without conducting further investigation. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Inspector-General of Police could lawfully impose a penalty under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules without conducting or directing further investigation. The Supreme Court held that Rule 16.28 empowers superior police officers to call for records and inflict or modify punishments, but explicitly requires them to make or direct further investigation before passing orders of punishment if no prior punishment was inflicted. The key principle laid down is that the exercise of revisional or supervisory penal powers under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules necessitates conducting or directing further investigation before imposing a penalty in cases where the subordinate authority has exonerated the official.
Questions settled- Can a Deputy Inspector-General of Police impose a punishment under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules without making or directing further investigation?
- Does the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 provide for an appeal or revision from an order of a competent authority accepting an inquiry officer's report of exoneration?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax, East, Karachi vs Messrs Reyaz O Khalid1973 PLD Supreme Court 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This certificated appeal arises from a reference answered by the High Court regarding whether an assessment under the Business Profits Tax Act made on 31st March 1958 for the period ending 31st March 1953 was within limitation. The respondent firm disputed the assessment, arguing it was barred by section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, which prescribed a four-year limitation period. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that section 34 of the Income-tax Act had replaced section 14. The High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that section 14 remained in force until 31st March 1957, creating a vested right. The Supreme Court examined the Finance Act, 1957, and held that the Act came into force immediately upon receiving the President's assent on 4th March 1957, thereby repealing section 14 and incorporating section 34 of the Income-tax Act with immediate effect. The Supreme Court concluded that the assessment completed on 31st March 1958 was well within time, allowed the appeal, and answered the reference in the affirmative.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of the Finance Act 1957 came into force immediately on receiving the President's assent or on the first day of the financial year?
- Does the repeal of section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act and its replacement by section 34 of the Income-tax Act take effect immediately upon the commencement of the Finance Act 1957?
- Whether an assessee acquires a vested right under a repealed limitation provision before the expiry of the limitation period?
- What is the correct method for computing the period of limitation for completing an assessment on escaped profits under section 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Ch. Sardar Ali vs The Administrator, Town Committee, Pasrur and Other1973 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a challenge to a District Magistrate's directive to relocate a bus stand in Pasrur under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the delegation of powers from the Central Government to the Provincial Government and subsequently to the District Magistrate, the scope of Rule 79 regarding emergency measures, and the authority of a Town Committee to operate facilities outside its municipal limits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 3(5) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971, explicitly authorizes the Provincial Government to delegate such powers to local officers. The Court affirmed that the necessity of emergency measures, such as relocating infrastructure for protection against hostile attack, falls within the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority, not the judiciary. Furthermore, the Court ruled that emergency orders are not invalidated merely by having permanent effects, provided the underlying purpose relates to the emergency, and that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge the Town Committee's administrative jurisdiction over property outside its limits.
Questions settled- Can a Provincial Government delegate powers conferred upon it under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971 to a District Magistrate?
- Is the necessity of an emergency measure taken under Rule 79 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971, subject to judicial substitution of opinion?
- Does an order issued under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971, become invalid solely because it has a permanent effect after the emergency concludes?
- Does a private individual have the locus standi to challenge a Town Committee's authority to operate property outside its municipal limits?
- Ch. Khuda Bakhsh vs Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Another1973 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order, which had upheld a decision to remand a property dispute to Settlement Authorities. The dispute involved the transfer of a house, where the Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the entire property to the petitioner (a claimant), but an Additional Settlement Commissioner later divided the property, transferring a portion to respondent No. 2 (a non-claimant). The High Court set aside the Settlement Commissioner's revisional order, which had restored the original transfer, on the grounds that the Commissioner failed to consider the divisibility of the property. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the respondent's initial appeal to the Additional Settlement Commissioner was time-barred and should not have been entertained. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to challenge the High Court's ratio regarding the necessity of considering property divisibility. However, the Court clarified that its dismissal did not preclude the petitioner from raising the plea of limitation during the remanded proceedings before the Settlement Authorities.
Questions settled- Does a failure by a Settlement Commissioner to consider the divisibility of a property amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction?
- Can a party raise the plea of limitation in remanded proceedings if the issue was not previously decided by the High Court?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if the petitioner fails to challenge the core ratio of the High Court's remand order?
- Ch. Bashir Ahmad and Others vs West Pakistan WAPDA, Lahore1973 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the refusal of lower courts to grant a temporary injunction in a suit challenging the enhancement of electricity tariff rates for agricultural tube-wells by the West Pakistan WAPDA. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners established a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction against the revised electricity charges levied under Section 25 of the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to make out a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience was not in their favour, declining to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissing the petition while directing the trial court to expedite the disposal of the main suit. The key principle laid down is that interim injunctive relief against statutory tariff revisions requires a clear prima facie case and balance of convenience, and appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent refusals of temporary injunctions where these elements are lacking.
Questions settled- Whether the petitioners made out a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction against enhanced electricity charges?
- Is WAPDA competent to raise the rate of electricity charges under Section 25 of Act XXXI of 1958?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts refusing a temporary injunction where the balance of convenience is not in favour of the petitioners?
- Begum Syed Hashim Raza vs President of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Transport (Railways)1973 PLD Supreme Court 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had set aside the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the appellant's suit for compensation against the Railway. The appellant's luggage, containing household silk clothes and silver articles, was booked from Kotri to Lahore. During transit, the trunks were stolen from the luggage van due to the gross negligence of the railway guard. The core legal questions involved were whether the burden of proving that the lost goods were excepted articles under section 75 of the Railways Act lay upon the Railway administration, and whether the necessary declaration of value and contents had been made. The Supreme Court held that the onus of proof regarding the application of section 75 rests squarely on the Railway to establish that the goods are excepted goods exceeding three hundred rupees in value. The Court further held that the Railway failed to discharge this onus, and that the un-rebutted evidence established that a proper declaration had been made. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree in favor of the appellant was restored.
Questions settled- Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that lost goods are excepted articles under section 75 of the Railways Act?
- Does a loose description of items as silk or silver in a plaint suffice to discharge the Railway's onus under section 75 of the Railways Act without affirmative proof?
- What are the legal consequences under the Railways Act when a railway administration fails to prove that stolen goods fall within the category of excepted goods?
- Begum N. J. Khan vs Waheeduzzaman1973 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-02-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Dacca, which had set aside an order of a Second Class Magistrate discharging the appellant, Begum N. J. Khan, under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The first respondent had filed a criminal complaint against 'N. J. Khan for Meher Industries Limited', alleging various offences including mischief, wrongful obstruction, and theft under sections 432, 291, 379, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial magistrate discharged the appellant on the ground that the complaint and initial statement clearly referred to a male accused, using masculine pronouns, whereas the appellant was a woman. The High Court in revision reversed this discharge, holding that the magistrate's reasoning was flawed. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the High Court failed to exercise its revisional discretion judicially under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the complaint and sworn statement consistently indicated a male accused and the appellant was not properly identified as the intended target. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the magistrate's order discharging the appellant.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court's revisional discretion under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was judicially exercised when setting aside an order of discharge based on the identity of the accused?
- Does a complaint and initial statement referring to a male accused through masculine pronouns justify the discharge of a female appellant erroneously hauled into court?
- When should the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court passed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
- Bashir Ahmad vs Mst. Aziz Begum and Another1973 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the custody of a minor girl, Tahira Parveen, between her father, the petitioner, and her maternal grandmother. The petitioner initially sought custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, against the mother, subsequently impleading the grandmother. The Guardian Judge originally granted custody to the father, finding the mother unsuitable due to remarriage. However, the High Court reversed this decision, determining that the minor was in the actual custody of the grandmother and that her welfare was best served by remaining with her. The core legal question was whether the father's right to custody overrides the grandmother's right under Muslim law, given the minor's age and welfare. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the grandmother holds a superior right to custody under Muslim law in the absence of evidence against her suitability. The Court also ensured the father's right to visitation, emphasizing that the father retains the right to meet the child and is legally obligated to maintain her, despite the denial of physical custody.
Questions settled- Does a father have an absolute right to the custody of a minor daughter over the maternal grandmother under Muslim law?
- Can a court grant visitation rights to a father even when custody is awarded to another party?
- Is the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration in determining custody disputes under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
- Bashir Ahmad Khan vs Qaiser Ali Khan and 2 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two petitions for special leave to appeal stemming from a civil suit concerning title to agricultural land acquired by the Thal Development Authority. The defendant initially raised preliminary objections under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 regarding maintainability without consequential relief, and for non-joinder of the Authority. After leave to appeal was granted to address these issues, the plaintiffs sought to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to claim compensation received by the defendant and to implead the Authority under Order I Rule 10. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's revisional order allowing the amendments and joinder. The Court held that an order rejecting an application for amendment of a plaint constitutes a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, amendments introducing consequential reliefs to cure maintainability defects are permissible even if delayed or contested on limitation grounds under special circumstances.
Questions settled- Does an order rejecting an application for amendment of a plaint constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a court allow an amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add consequential relief after the period of limitation under special circumstances?
- Can a co-defendant object to the non-service of a statutory notice required to be served on a newly impleaded public body under the Thal Development Authority Act 1949?
- Bagh Ali and 4 Other vs The State1973 PLD Supreme Court 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which dismissed the appeal of the five appellants and confirmed their death sentences for murder under section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside convictions under section 13(d) of the Arms Act. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the uncorroborated ocular testimony of three closely related and partisan eye-witnesses could be safely relied upon in a capital case characterized by a background of previous retaliatory murders, inherent improbabilities, and material contradictions with the medical evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and death sentences, and ordered the immediate release of the appellants. The Court held that where eye-witnesses are partisan and inimical, and their testimony suffers from serious infirmities and irreconcilable conflicts with medical evidence, such evidence cannot form the basis of a capital conviction without strong, independent corroboration from an unimpeachable source.
Questions settled- Can the uncorroborated ocular testimony of partisan and inimical eye-witnesses be relied upon to sustain a capital conviction?
- Whether material contradictions between oral testimony and medical evidence render the prosecution case unsafe for reliance?
- Is independent corroboration from an unimpeachable source required when eye-witnesses are interested and there is a background of retaliatory enmity?
- Bachal and 6 Others vs The State1973 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the cancellation of pre-trial bail granted to the appellants, who were challaned under Section 395 and Section 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core allegation was that the appellants, being haris, forcibly took away cotton pods from land under the receivership of the Mukhtiarkar. The appellants were initially granted bail by a Magistrate, but the Sessions Court cancelled the bail, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent bail application. The Supreme Court considered whether the bail granted by the Magistrate was rightly cancelled in a case where the offences charged are not punishable with death or transportation for life. Holding that the Magistrate was fully justified in granting bail for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and Sessions Court and restored the bail granted to the appellants, laying down the principle that bail should normally not be withheld or arbitrarily cancelled in non- prohibitory offences.
Questions settled- Whether bail can be cancelled when the offence charged is not punishable with death or transportation for life?
- Was the Magistrate justified in granting bail to the appellants charged under Sections 395 and 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- Did the High Court and Sessions Court err in cancelling the bail granted by the Magistrate?
- Azam Khan and 2 Others vs The State1973 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 302, read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the admissibility and proof of an alleged dying declaration, and whether the ocular evidence could be relied upon given material inconsistencies with medical evidence and the site plan. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the dying declaration, as the original record was never produced and oral testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Evidence Act 1872. Furthermore, the Court found significant discrepancies between the ocular evidence and medical findings regarding the position of the assailants and the number of shots fired. The Court established that where the prosecution's case rests on a dying declaration that is not properly proved, and where ocular evidence is inconsistent with medical findings and the witnesses are interested, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused. Consequently, the convictions were set aside.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained based on a dying declaration that was never produced in court and not proved according to the Evidence Act 1872?
- Does a material discrepancy between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the position of the assailants entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
- Is it permissible for a court to rely on ocular evidence that contradicts medical findings without resolving the inconsistency?
- What is the legal requirement for proving the contents of a document when the original is not produced in court?
- Ayoob vs The State1973 PLD Supreme Court 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against his conviction for murder, challenging the admissibility of dying declarations. The core legal question was whether a dying declaration is inadmissible to prove a "fact in issue" under the Evidence Act 1872, based on the argument that Section 32 only permits secondary evidence for "relevant facts." The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that "facts in issue" are not mutually exclusive from "relevant facts" and that the Evidence Act 1872 does not preclude the use of secondary evidence, such as dying declarations, to prove facts in issue. The Court clarified that facts in issue are a specific category of relevant facts, and interpreting Section 32 to exclude them would lead to disastrous results. Consequently, the Court affirmed that dying declarations are admissible to prove facts in issue, and finding no merit in the petitioner's argument, dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Are facts in issue and relevant facts mutually exclusive categories under the Evidence Act 1872?
- Can a dying declaration be admitted in evidence to prove a fact in issue?
- Does Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872 exclude the admissibility of secondary evidence regarding facts in issue?
- Ayoob and Another vs Masjid E Noman1973 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the appellants' second appeal by the High Court, which affirmed the lower courts' decrees for possession and mesne profits in favor of the respondent mosque. The core legal question was whether an open building site transferred to the mosque, upon which the appellants subsequently ran a fodder business, qualified as a 'shop' and entitled the appellants to statutory tenancy protection under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the disputed premises was an open building site transferred as such by the Settlement Department, and since it was not an evacuee business premises at the relevant time and the appellants lacked authorized possession under Section 2(6) of the Act, they were not statutory tenants under Section 30. The key principle laid down is that an open plot of land cannot be classified as a 'shop' merely because an occupant subsequently erects a structure for business purposes, and statutory protection under Section 30 is strictly contingent upon authorized possession of an evacuee house or shop as defined by the statute.
Questions settled- Does an open building site upon which a structure is subsequently erected qualify as a 'shop' under Section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Can a person claiming possession of an open plot without an allotment order from a rehabilitation authority claim the protection of a statutory tenant under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Does the term 'shop' under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, carry a different meaning than the definition provided in Section 2(12) of the said Act?
- Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh vs The State1973 SCMR 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition seeks to review a decision of the Supreme Court refusing to interfere with an order punishing the petitioner for contempt of court, though the sentence was previously reduced. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doubt based on a cited precedent and whether the punishment awarded was excessively harsh. The Supreme Court held that neither ground is available for review, distinguishing the facts of the cited precedent from the present case where a deliberate and serious act of contempt was committed, and noting that the sentence had already been considerably reduced keeping in view the petitioner's standing as a junior pleader. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether grounds for review are made out when a petitioner claims the benefit of a previously reported precedent?
- Does an act of deliberate contempt disentitle a contemnor to the benefit of doubt regarding good faith?
- Whether a sentence already mitigated on the grounds of youth and inexperience can be further reduced in review?
- Amirali Ebrahimji Sheikha and Others vs Sadruddin and Another1973 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan vacating an ad interim injunction that had restrained respondents from altering or dealing with disputed premises. The premises, part of a building owned by the petitioners, were tenancy rights of an enemy-firm vested in the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property and subsequently purchased by the respondents. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in vacating the ad interim injunction given that alterations had been completed and a banking business commenced. The Supreme Court held that no justification existed for interference because the balance of convenience lay with the respondents, as halting an operational banking business would cause irreparable loss, while any ultimate success by the petitioners could be remedied by restoration or compensation. The principle laid down is that where interim mandatory or prohibitory changes have been executed and a commercial enterprise commenced, the balance of convenience shifts against disrupting the ongoing activity if alternative remedies or compensation remain available upon final adjudication.
Questions settled- Whether an ad interim injunction should be vacated when the restrained party has already completed alterations and commenced business operations?
- Does the balance of convenience lie in favor of closing an operational banking business during the pendency of a property suit?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in vacating an interim injunction when no legal error or lack of jurisdiction is shown?
- Aminuddin vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1973 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of specific evacuee property C.S. numbers following the issuance of Permanent Transfer Documents (P.T.D.). The petitioner, having obtained an evacuee house, sought to correct the P.T.D. records because certain C.S. numbers were erroneously included in the P.T.D. issued to respondent No. 4. While the Additional Settlement Commissioner initially granted relief to the petitioner, the High Court overturned this decision, holding that the Settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction to modify a P.T.D. once issued, particularly following the repeal of Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that after the repeal of the relevant rules, Settlement authorities possess no power to correct even clerical mistakes in a P.T.D. once issued. The Court held that the petitioner's remedy, if any, lies in a civil suit in a competent court to seek a declaration regarding the correct ownership of the disputed property numbers, rather than through the Settlement authorities.
Questions settled- Do Settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to modify a Permanent Transfer Document after it has been issued?
- Can Settlement authorities correct clerical mistakes in a Permanent Transfer Document after the repeal of Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party seeking to challenge the inclusion of specific property numbers in a Permanent Transfer Document issued to another party?
- Allah Rakha Sajid vs The Settlement Commissioner, Lyallpur Ahd Other1973 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a godown located in portion 'A' of property No. 208, Lyallpur, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner sought the transfer of the entire property, claiming status as an allottee operating an industrial concern. Settlement authorities determined that portion 'A' was an industrial concern, while the disputed godown was treated as a shop. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, finding he lacked possession of the godown on the target date of December 20, 1958, and thus had no entitlement to its transfer. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that the petitioner lacked locus standi to claim the godown because he was not in possession of it. The Court held that paragraph 15(3) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, regarding the transfer of industrial concerns, did not apply to the petitioner's claim for the godown, as the property was distinct from the industrial concern he operated.
Questions settled- Does a claimant have locus standi to challenge the transfer of a property if they cannot prove possession on the target date?
- Can a property treated as a shop by settlement authorities be claimed under provisions governing the transfer of industrial concerns?
- Does the High Court have the authority to remand a case to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision regarding possession?
- Ahmad Din and Another vs The State1973 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences of two brothers, Ahmad Din and Muhammad Sharif, for the murder of Ghulam Rasul under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The incident arose from a dispute regarding voter registration. The prosecution alleged that Ahmad Din struck the deceased with a gun butt, followed by Muhammad Sharif firing a fatal shot. The Supreme Court evaluated the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, noting that while some were related to the deceased, an independent witness corroborated their presence. Regarding Muhammad Sharif, the Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, finding the murder resulted from a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel rather than a planned act. Conversely, the Court acquitted Ahmad Din, granting him the benefit of doubt because the medical evidence failed to corroborate the prosecution's claim that he had struck the deceased with a gun butt, as no blunt force injuries were present on the victim's head. The appeal was thus partially allowed.
Questions settled- Whether a death sentence is appropriate when a murder occurs during a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel?
- Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence contradicts the specific allegations of assault made by prosecution witnesses?
- Is the testimony of interested witnesses admissible if corroborated by independent evidence?
- Does the absence of medical evidence regarding a specific injury attributed to an accused warrant the benefit of doubt?
- Agha Shaukat Ali vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and Another1973 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing writ petitions relating to the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically bungalow No. 2, Lahore. The core legal questions involved whether a claimant in direct possession has an absolute preferential right over an indirect claimant relying on a relative's constructive possession, and whether the division of the property into separate residential units by settlement authorities was lawful. The Supreme Court held that while a direct claimant generally has a preferential right in cases of active competition under the Schedule, the settlement authorities lawfully exercised their discretion in dividing the property based on its structural characteristics and independent units. The Court laid down that divisibility of an evacuee house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act depends on whether the premises consist of multiple residential units in the occupation of several persons, and such administrative decisions regarding structural division, if neither capricious nor whimsical, should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a claimant displaced person out of possession rely on the constructive possession of a relative to claim transfer of evacuee property?
- When does the question of divisibility of an evacuee house arise under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with the settlement authorities' decision regarding the divisibility of a house under constitutional jurisdiction?
- Collector of Customs and Others Collector of Customs Collector1973 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from nineteen civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Collector of Customs against orders of the High Court, which had declared the search and seizure of foreign cloth from the respondents' premises to be without lawful authority and directed the return of the goods. The core legal question was whether Customs Officers could circumvent the High Court's writs and the mandatory safeguards of Section 172-A of the Sea Customs Act by reseizing the goods under Section 178 of the same Act upon asserting they were liable to confiscation, without any prior determination of such liability. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that goods whose liability to confiscation has not yet been determined in proper proceedings cannot be seized under Section 178, as doing so would render the statutory safeguards in Sections 172 and 172-A nugatory. The Court laid down the principle that the phrase 'liable to confiscation' under Section 178 presupposes that the liability to confiscation has already been determined or is no longer in dispute.
Questions settled- Whether goods whose liability to confiscation has not yet been determined in proper proceedings are liable to seizure under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act?
- Can the statutory safeguards provided under sections 172 and 172-A of the Sea Customs Act be bypassed by resorting to section 178 of the said Act?
- Does the phrase 'liable to confiscation' in section 178 of the Sea Customs Act require that the liability to confiscation has already been determined or is no longer in dispute?
- Abid Hussain vs Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum and Another1973 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave addresses the jurisdiction of a Single Judge of a High Court to dismiss a regular first appeal in limine. The appellant challenged the judgment of a High Court which summarily dismissed his first appeal against a trial court decree declaring respondents' title and right to possession of certain plots. The core legal question was whether a Single Judge, empowered to hear motions for admission of first appeals under specific High Court rules, possesses the authority to dismiss a first appeal in limine, or whether such dismissal requires a Division Bench pursuant to consistent court practice. The Supreme Court held that in light of the consistent practice of the High Court restricting a Single Judge's disposal of first appeal admission motions to either admission or reference to a Division Bench, a Single Judge should not depart from such practice to dismiss a first appeal in limine. Furthermore, on the merits of the case, the factual disputes precluded a summary dismissal. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the matter remanded for hearing by a Division Bench.
Questions settled- Whether a Single Judge of a High Court has the power to dismiss a regular first appeal in limine under the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders?
- Can a Single Judge depart from the consistent practice of the High Court regarding the hearing of first appeals without referring the matter to the Chief Justice or Full Court?
- Is the summary dismissal of a first appeal under Order XLI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure appropriate when the case involves complex factual and legal disputes?
- Abdus Samad vs The State1973 SCMR 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court at Peshawar, which had maintained the petitioner Abdus Samad's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased Yusuf, while acquitting his co-accused brother. The core legal question concerns whether the ocular testimony of injured, close-relative witnesses, which was partially disbelieved regarding another co-accused, could sustain the petitioner's conviction, and whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court properly separated the grain from the chaff, reaffirming that the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not accepted, and that mere arguments regarding the appreciation of evidence do not warrant granting leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that partial disbelief of witness testimony does not automatically render the remainder unreliable.
Questions settled- Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is applicable in the appreciation of evidence in criminal trials in Pakistan?
- Can the conviction of an accused be sustained upon the testimony of injured eye-witnesses who have been partially disbelieved with regard to a co-accused?
- Does re-agitation of pure questions of fact and the appreciation of evidence constitute a sufficient ground for granting special leave to appeal?
- Abdul Wahid vs Haji Abdur Rahim and Another1973 PLD Supreme Court 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arose from a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan (Karachi) dismissing in limine a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge. The dispute concerned rectification proceedings under Sections 37, 38, and 46 of the Trade Marks Act 1940, filed by the respondents (proprietors of the trade mark 'Saigon') to expunge the appellants' registered trade mark 'Daigon' on the ground of deceptive visual and phonetic similarity causing market confusion. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks had rejected the rectification application, but the High Court's Single Judge reversed that order regarding 'Daigon'. The Supreme Court held that the first syllables ('Dai' and 'Sai') were distinct, and under established trade mark law principles, where words share a common suffix, the initial syllable serves as the primary mark of distinction. The Court further affirmed that an appellate court should not lightly interfere with the Registrar's statutory discretion unless it is patently erroneous. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Assistant Registrar's decision.
Questions settled- Where two trade marks share a common suffix, does the dissimilarity in their initial syllables suffice to distinguish them from causing deceptive similarity?
- Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with the statutory discretion exercised by the Registrar of Trade Marks?
- Is the mark 'Daigon' deceptively similar visually or phonetically to the mark 'Saigon' under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
- Abdul Rehman Etc. Ismail vs The State the State1973 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction and death sentences of the petitioners under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions pertained to whether alleged delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR) vitiated the prosecution case and whether non-reliance on recovery evidence and a dying statement compromised the credibility of ocular evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the convictions. The Court held that the delay was adequately explained by the immediate priority given to hospitalizing the victim and that there was no deliberate concoction. The Court established that reliable and consistent ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and statements transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, the non-reliance on recovery evidence or a dying declaration does not inherently undermine otherwise credible ocular evidence where such evidence independently proves the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Does an alleged delay in lodging an FIR affect the prosecution case when the delay is adequately explained by the hospitalization of the victim?
- Can a statement of a witness recorded by a committing court and transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be relied upon to corroborate ocular evidence?
- Does the non-reliance on recovery evidence or a dying declaration invalidate a conviction supported by reliable ocular testimony?
- Abdul Rashid and Others vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation1973SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of Letters Patent Appeals by the High Court, which had earlier dismissed constitutional petitions under Article 98 of the Constitution filed against the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners were descendants of an Indian Muslim property owner who did not migrate to Pakistan, but were initially allotted land under paragraph 47 of the Rehabilitation Scheme. Upon the deletion of paragraph 47 in 1959, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a memorandum in January 1960 allowing such allottees to purchase land within certain limits, a concession later curtailed in June 1961 to land under self-cultivation. The core legal question was whether the option to purchase was restricted to allottees in self-cultivating possession as of the initial 1960 memorandum or extended to those in possession at the time of the subsequent 1961 memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent memorandum was in continuation and amplification of the first, and the use of the word 'is' in the 1961 memorandum was descriptive rather than prescriptive, thereby upholding the departmental interpretation and dismissing the petitions.
Questions settled- Whether the option to purchase allotted land under the Rehabilitation Scheme was restricted to allottees who were in self-cultivating possession as of the date of the first memorandum in January 1960?
- Whether a subsequent administrative memorandum issued in continuation of a previous one supersedes the earlier conditions or merely amplifies them?
- Abdul Rahim vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Com Missioner, Hyderabad and 4 Other1973SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a property dispute over house No. F/67-1199/1, where the appellant, a displaced person, claimed entitlement based on possession and a submitted C.H. Form. The Settlement Commissioner had transferred both the disputed house and an adjacent property to respondent No. 5, treating them as a single unit. The Additional Settlement Commissioner had previously found the properties to be distinct and that the disputed house was not included in the earmarking list, yet the Settlement Commissioner reversed this without proper justification or notice to the appellant in the revision proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's decision was based on a misconception of facts, as evidence from the Excise and Taxation Department clearly established the two properties as separate and distinct entities with different assessments and tenures. Furthermore, the Court found the transfer of both properties for the price of one to be improper. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, allowing the appellant to retain the disputed house upon payment of its valuation price.
Questions settled- Can a Settlement Commissioner reverse a finding of fact regarding the distinct nature of two properties without evidence?
- Is it permissible for a Settlement Commissioner to pass an adverse order against a party in a revision proceeding without making that party a respondent?
- Does the High Court have the authority under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution to interfere when a lower authority's finding is based on a misconception of facts?
- Abdul Munaf (Deceased) through His Legal Representatives and Another vs The Province of N. W.F.P., through the Secretary, Irrigation and Powers and B & R, Peshawar and 3 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan modifying a trial court decree in a suit for declaration, recovery of money, and permanent injunction relating to a public works contract. The core legal question was whether the appellants-contractors were entitled to receive payment for work executed pursuant to their contract at the original schedule of rates of 1950 or on the basis of the amended rate of 1954. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were bound by the amended rates prevalent at the time of entering into the contract, as the 1954 amendment constituted a corrected schedule correcting a double payment anomaly. However, the Court further held that for any additional work executed by the plaintiffs after 9 March 1959—when the 1954 schedule was repealed by the Provincial Government—they were entitled to payment in accordance with the un-amended 1950 schedule of rates based on Government decisions. The appeal was accordingly allowed in part.
Questions settled- Are contractors entitled to payment based on the schedule of rates prevalent at the time of entering into the contract?
- Does a subsequent repeal of an amended schedule of rates entitle contractors to un-amended rates for additional work executed after the repeal?
- Can gratuitous administrative concessions or policy decisions made after contract execution be legally enforced in a court of law?
- Abdul Majid vs The State1973 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant, a police constable, under Sections 393 and 398 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempted robbery. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and his companion entered a brothel armed with a knife and a revolver, ordered the inmates to stand up, and demanded they surrender their belongings for search, but fled when the inmates raised an alarm. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the actions and utterances of the accused constituted an attempt to commit robbery. The Court reiterated that a criminal attempt requires intent, an act toward commission, and failure due to circumstances beyond the offender's control. It held that the raising of an alarm by the victims was not an uncontrollable circumstance that defeated the design, and the accused took no practical steps to execute a search or robbery. Applying the principle that the interpretation more favorable to the accused must be preferred, the Court altered the conviction to criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.
Questions settled- What are the essential legal ingredients required to constitute a criminal attempt under penal law?
- Can a conviction for attempted robbery be sustained if the accused took no practical steps to execute the robbery beyond demanding a search?
- Is the raising of an alarm by victims considered a circumstance beyond the control of the offender for the purposes of establishing a criminal attempt?
- Which interpretation must be preferred when the facts of an incident yield two equally possible versions?
- Abdul Majid vs Nawab Din1973 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which quashed criminal proceedings initiated by the petitioner against his uncle under sections 406 and 418 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had determined that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and that the criminal complaint was a tactical maneuver to exert pressure on the respondent, following an interim order passed in the respondent's favor in pending civil litigation. The Supreme Court examined the timeline of the alleged misappropriation, noting that the incident occurred in 1965, yet the complaint was only filed in 1971, shortly after the respondent secured a status quo order in a Regular Second Appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of the court intended to settle civil disputes. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that criminal law should not be weaponized to coerce parties in ongoing civil litigation.
Questions settled- Can criminal proceedings be quashed if they are initiated to exert pressure in a pending civil dispute?
- Does a significant delay in filing a criminal complaint, following an adverse civil court order, justify the quashing of criminal proceedings?
- Is a dispute regarding the misappropriation of compensation funds essentially civil in nature when linked to broader property litigation?
- Abdul Majid Nizami vs The State1973 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the legality of a default sentence of imprisonment awarded in lieu of a fine under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The appellant was convicted of criminal breach of trust by a public servant and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 24,000, with four years rigorous imprisonment in default. Leave to appeal was granted solely to examine whether the default sentence exceeded one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment provided for the offence. The core legal question turned on the calculation of fractions of punishment under section 65 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically how transportation for life is reckoned under section 57. The Court held that transportation for life is equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years, making one-fourth thereof five years. Consequently, the default sentence of four years was within legal limits. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether transportation for life is reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years when calculating fractions of terms of punishment under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Does a default sentence of four years imprisonment in lieu of a fine for an offence under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exceed one-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment?
- How is the maximum term of imprisonment calculated under section 65 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the substantive offence is punishable with transportation for life?
- Abdul Majid and Another vs The State1973 PLD Supreme Court 595 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the convictions of the appellants under sections 302 and 460 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, along with sentences of death and transportation for life. Leave was granted to examine whether the convictions based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver were sustainable in accordance with established legal principles for the appraisal of accomplice evidence. The Supreme Court evaluated the requirements of corroboration for approver testimony, reiterating that while an accomplice's evidence can form the basis of a conviction, rule of prudence demands independent corroboration on material particulars linking the accused to the crime. The Court held that the approver's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by independent and reliable evidence, including the recovery of a rifle at the instance of an appellant that matched cartridge empties from the crime scene, eyewitness accounts, and medical evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.
Questions settled- Can an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice form the basis of a criminal conviction under Pakistani law?
- What is the extent and nature of corroboration required from independent sources to rely upon an approver's testimony?
- Whether an accused can be convicted for murder in addition to an offence under section 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code arising from the same transaction?
- Does the rejection of an approver's testimony regarding some co-accused persons necessitate its total rejection against other co-accused whose roles are supported by independent corroboration?
- Abdul Karim vs Muhammad Sham and Another1973 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave challenged a High Court order affirming specific performance of a property sale contract. The core legal questions concerned whether specific performance could be enforced despite a contractual penalty clause for non-performance, and if time was of the essence, precluding the vendee from enforcing the contract due to alleged delay in payment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that specific performance is enforceable even if a contract names a sum to be paid upon breach, as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court reiterated the presumption under Section 12, Explanation, that monetary compensation is inadequate for breach of a contract to transfer immovable property. It was also held that the vendor, having failed to obtain requisite permissions and certificates, could not take advantage of his own default to argue that the vendee had failed to perform his part of the contract.
Questions settled- Can specific performance of a contract be enforced even if the contract names a sum to be paid in case of its breach?
- Is monetary compensation generally presumed to be adequate relief for the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property?
- Can a party to a contract take advantage of their own default to argue against the enforcement of the contract?
- Is the jurisdiction to decree specific performance discretionary, and if so, what principles guide this discretion?
- Abdul Karim Moosa vs Mohini Bai and Other1973 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a review petition filed against the order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether the acquisition of the property in dispute by the Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act, 1958) renders it non-evacuee property, and whether the petition warrants reconsideration and satisfies the grounds for review under Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that the legal point stands authoritatively settled by an earlier precedent of the Court and that the grounds urged do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record. The ratio decidendi is that a review petition cannot be entertained where the legal proposition has already been authoritatively determined and no apparent error exists on the record. The key principle laid down is that settled questions of law adjudicated by authoritative precedents do not furnish a ground for review.
Questions settled- Whether the acquisition of property by the Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act, 1958) makes it non-evacuee property?
- Does a previously settled authoritative decision on a point of law warrant reconsideration in review proceedings?
- What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record for the purposes of maintaining a review petition under Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Abdul Haque and Others vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner and Other1973 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee house. The core dispute involved competing claims between the petitioners (non-claimants/locals) and respondent No. 3 (a claimant displaced person) over an evacuee property. The primary legal questions were whether the Settlement Commissioner could reverse findings on the divisibility of the property without a site inspection and whether the petitioners were entitled to transfer based on alleged application forms not found on the record. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in revision to determine the property's indivisibility based on the property plan, noting that the presence of a single exit rendered it indivisible. The Court affirmed that a claimant displaced person holds preference over non-claimants for indivisible properties. Consequently, the Court upheld the transfer of the entire house to the claimant, ruling that the Settlement Commissioner’s reliance on the property plan rather than a physical inspection was sufficient to establish indivisibility.
Questions settled- Can a Settlement Commissioner determine the divisibility of an evacuee property based on a property plan without a personal site inspection?
- Does a claimant displaced person have preference over non-claimants regarding the transfer of an indivisible evacuee house?
- Is a Settlement Commissioner empowered to correct findings on property divisibility made by lower settlement authorities in revision?
- Abdul Hamid vs Aziz Bakhsh1973 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the finality of administrative orders under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether an order passed by an Additional Deputy Commissioner, acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which remained unchallenged, attained finality, thereby barring subsequent proceedings regarding the same land allotment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the officer in question was duly empowered under the Act and the relevant notifications. Consequently, the Court held that because the initial order had not been challenged through the prescribed appellate or revisional hierarchy, it attained finality and could not be reopened or challenged through independent, subsequent proceedings. The key principle laid down is that once an order is passed by a competent authority exercising delegated powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and such order is not challenged within the statutory framework, it becomes final and is immune to collateral attack in subsequent proceedings.
Questions settled- Does an order passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 attain finality if not challenged in appeal or revision?
- Can an allotment of land be challenged in subsequent proceedings if a prior order regarding the same allotment has already attained finality?
- Are proceedings initiated after an unappealed order of a competent settlement authority legally competent?
- Abdul Hamid Khan vs Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and Other1973 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for review of an order previously passed by the Supreme Court regarding the transfer of a property described as a guest house. The petitioner challenged the Court's earlier finding that the property constituted a single residential unit, arguing that a Settlement Commissioner had previously determined it consisted of multiple units. The Supreme Court examined the procedural history, noting that an Additional Settlement Commissioner had originally determined the property was a single unit, a decision affirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner following a spot inspection. The Court observed that the subsequent order by a Settlement Commissioner, which the petitioner relied upon, was passed in a revision petition that was time-barred and improperly interfered with a final adjudication already settled by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had previously attorned to the transferees, invoking the principle of estoppel. Finding no valid grounds for review under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court dismissed the petition, reaffirming the finality of the earlier administrative determinations.
Questions settled- Does a review petition lie under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the petitioner merely re-argues the merits of the original decision?
- Can a Settlement Commissioner interfere with an order that has already been adjudicated up to the level of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
- Does the principle of estoppel apply to a petitioner who has attorned to the transferees of a property?
- Abdul Haleem Khan vs Messrs Sind Observer & Mercantile Steam Press1973 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case concerns a property dispute over premises on Bunder Road, Karachi. The respondents purchased the property in 1946. Following the Hindu owners' migration, the petitioner occupied the premises in 1948 without authorization. The property was declared evacuee property in 1953, and the petitioner applied for its transfer, receiving a P.T.O. in 1960 and a P.T.D. in 1963, having paid rent to the Settlement Authorities. Subsequently, the Custodian declared the property non-evacuee in 1967, leading to the cancellation of the petitioner's P.T.D. The respondents then filed an eviction suit, where the petitioner raised a claim of adverse possession. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had perfected title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decision that the adverse possession claim failed. The court held that the period during which the property was treated as evacuee property and the petitioner occupied it permissively as a licensee of the Custodian, having applied for its transfer and paid rent, interrupted the continuity required for adverse possession. Consequently, the 12-year period for perfecting title was not completed.
Questions settled- Does the treatment of a property as evacuee property interrupt a claim of adverse possession?
- Can a person claim adverse possession if they have applied for the transfer of the property as evacuee property and paid rent to the Custodian Authorities?
- Is occupation of a property declared evacuee property considered permissive when the occupant applies for its transfer?
- Does the period during which property is in the lawful possession of the Custodian count towards perfecting title by adverse possession?
- Abdul Hakim vs The Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Rehabilitation Etc.S1973 SCMR 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a quarter attached to a bungalow under settlement laws. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to entertain a second revision petition under amending laws, whether appurtenant quarters must be specifically named in claim forms, and the application of revised settlement schemes. The Supreme Court held that pending revision proceedings were duly saved by Ordinance XIII of 1962, that a house under the statute includes appurtenant quarters even if occupied by others without separate mention in the form, and that subsequent settlement schemes cannot override transfers finalized prior to their enforcement. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the settlement authorities and the High Court.
Questions settled- Whether pending revision proceedings before the Chief Settlement Commissioner were saved by Ordinance XIII of 1962?
- Does an application for the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 require the specific mention of appurtenant quarters occupied by others?
- Can a revised settlement scheme affect property transfers that were finalized prior to its enforcement?
- Abdul Ghaffar vs This State1973 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the appellant's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Faqir Khan under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to a lesser sentence of transportation for life on the ground that he committed the murder to avenge the killing of his father, relying on the precedent in Ajun Shah v. The State. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance, particularly where the accused killed the brother of the person responsible for his father's murder rather than the actual killer, and where the attack was carried out in a premeditated manner. The key principle laid down is that while the environment and background of an offender may be considered, private revenge is not a mitigating circumstance for commuting the death penalty, and the appellate court will not interfere with the sentencing discretion exercised by the lower courts unless proper grounds are shown.
Questions settled- Is private revenge considered a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence in a murder case?
- Whether an accused who avenges his father's murder by killing the murderer's brother is entitled to a lesser punishment?
- When should an appellate court interfere with the sentencing discretion exercised by the trial court and the High Court?
- Zia Ud Din vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and Another1972 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal in limine regarding the transfer of a small house in Lahore. The dispute over the house was between Zia-ud-Din, a local allottee, and Ahmad Bakhsh, a claimant displaced person. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the house to Ahmad Bakhsh, holding it indivisible and preferring a claimant over a local. Successive revisions and a writ petition by the appellant were dismissed. The core legal question was whether Ahmad Bakhsh was in undisputed possession of the property and whether statutory hearing provisions under Settlement Scheme No. 1 were mandatory. The Supreme Court held that Ahmad Bakhsh was in undisputed possession and, being a claimant, was rightly preferred over the local appellant. The Court further held that paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 are directory rather than mandatory. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a claimant displaced person is to be preferred over a local allottee in the transfer of an indivisible property?
- Whether paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 are mandatory or directory provisions requiring notice?
- Whether the possession of a displaced person sharing a disputed property can be deemed disputed without clear evidence of a licensee relationship?
- Zarshad vs Bahadur Khan and Other1972 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court acquitting three respondents who had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case rested on the dying statement of the deceased and the ocular testimony of a single witness, corroborated by the alleged abscondence of the accused. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary value of the prosecution's case, noting significant infirmities: the ocular testimony was inconsistent with medical evidence regarding the firing range, and critical evidence, including a separate dying statement, was not produced during the trial. Furthermore, the court noted the failure to bring the evidence of a deceased witness onto the record under the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was not unreasonable given these material contradictions and evidentiary gaps. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal order and dismissed the petition, affirming that appellate courts will not disturb an acquittal where the prosecution's case suffers from substantial and unexplained infirmities.
Questions settled- Does a discrepancy between ocular evidence regarding firing distance and medical evidence regarding tattooing and blackening marks undermine the credibility of an eyewitness?
- Can a court rely on a dying statement that was not produced during the committal proceedings or the trial?
- Is the failure to bring the evidence of a deceased witness on record under Section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872 a material defect in the prosecution's case?
- Zarid Khan vs Gulsher and Another1972 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a leave to appeal petition directed against an order of the Peshawar High Court which accepted respondent Gulsher's appeal and set aside his conviction and sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his aunt. The dispute arose from a minor altercation over missing onions in a field, during which the respondent allegedly threw a blow with a chhuri meant for his uncle, but it accidentally struck and killed his aunt who had intervened. The core legal question involved the evaluation of witness testimony, the burden of proof regarding the right of private defence, and whether the accused was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding that the respondent acted in the exercise of his right of private defence was not unreasonable, and reaffirmed that the onus remains on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and if a defense plea raises a reasonable possibility of its truth, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the entire evidence of a hostile witness should be taken into consideration to see if any part of it is worthy of belief?
- Does the burden of proof placed on an accused under section 105 of the Evidence Act require the same heavy standard as the burden resting on the prosecution?
- Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt if the defense plea creates a reasonable possibility that the accused acted in the exercise of the right of private defence?
- Zaman Khan vs The State1972 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant, Zaman Khan, was sentenced to transportation for life for the murder of Ahmad Riaz, while his co-accused brothers were acquitted. The prosecution's case rested solely on a dying declaration made by the deceased, as the ocular evidence provided by three witnesses was rejected by the lower courts. The core legal question was whether a conviction for murder could be safely sustained based on a dying declaration that contained material contradictions regarding the weapons used and the specific roles attributed to the three accused persons. The Supreme Court observed that the deceased's dying declaration inconsistently attributed different weapons and roles to the appellant and his co-accused. Given these discrepancies, the Court held that it was impossible to determine with certainty which assailant inflicted the fatal injury. Consequently, the Court applied the principle of benefit of doubt, ruling that since the other accused were acquitted and the dying declaration was unreliable, the appellant was also entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The conviction was set aside.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a dying declaration that contains material contradictions regarding the weapons used and the roles of the accused?
- Does the acquittal of co-accused persons based on the same evidence necessitate the acquittal of the remaining accused when the evidence is found unreliable?
- Is a dying declaration reliable when it attributes different weapons and roles to the accused in different parts of the statement?
- Yasin Khan vs The Additional District Judge and Ex Officio Settlement1972 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee property whose building had collapsed, leaving an open plot. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities properly followed government directions and determined the rights, possession, and divisibility of the property among contesting claimants. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities failed to apply their minds to the essential questions of fact regarding whether the original building constituted one house or multiple houses, who was in lawful possession, and who held preferential rights under the law and government directives. The Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with law, ensuring notice is given to all interested parties.
Questions settled- Whether the direction of the Government to treat an evacuee property notionally as a house is binding on the Settlement Authority when dealing with a collapsed building site?
- Can settlement authorities transfer property to claimants on compassionate grounds without determining actual possession and statutory eligibility?
- Whether the power of the Central Government under section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 includes the selection of the person to whom property is to be transferred?
- Yaqub Khan vs Muhammad Khan and 6 Other1972 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder and related charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal was perverse or unreasonable, thereby necessitating Supreme Court interference. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court erred in its finding regarding the recovery of blood-stained earth, the acquittal was supported by other plausible grounds, including doubts concerning the medical evidence, the time of the occurrence, and the absence of disinterested eyewitnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court's decision, as the findings were not considered perverse or unreasonable. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not exercise its appellate jurisdiction to interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning, taken as a whole, is plausible and not so irrational that no reasonable person could have reached it, even if specific evidentiary findings are contested.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court?
- Does a factual error regarding the recovery of blood-stained earth automatically invalidate an acquittal judgment?
- Is the testimony of an injured witness sufficient to sustain a conviction if the High Court finds the medical evidence and time of occurrence doubtful?
- West Pakistan WAPDA Mst. Hiran Begum vs Mst. Hiran Begum West1972 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding land acquisition compensation for 5 kanals and 19 marlas of land in village Sobra, Hazara, acquired for the Tarbela Dam Project. The core legal questions were whether the failure to frame a specific issue regarding the nature of the land vitiated the proceedings and whether the High Court correctly determined the market value of the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the issue framed by the High Court—regarding the objector's entitlement to a specific sum as the cost of land—was sufficiently broad to allow parties to lead evidence on the land's nature and potential. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's methodology in calculating market price by referencing comparable sales in an adjoining village while excluding agricultural land types. The Court established that the determination of market price is primarily a question of fact, and where the High Court applies sound judicial principles in its assessment, the Supreme Court will not interfere with such findings.
Questions settled- Does the failure to frame a specific issue regarding the nature of land invalidate compensation proceedings if a broader issue covering the entitlement to cost is present?
- Is the determination of the market price of acquired land considered a question of fact that precludes interference by the Supreme Court?
- Can the market value of acquired land be determined based on comparable sales data from an adjoining village?
- Wali Muhammad Rehman-Ud-Din vs The State through the Collector, Land Acquisition,Dera Ismail Khan and AnotherTHE State through Collector, Land Acquisitionand Another1972 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two civil petitions arising from land acquisition proceedings for the establishment of a rice factory in Dera Ismail Khan. The petitioners challenged the compensation awarded for their lands, specifically arguing that the courts below erred in disregarding a sale deed of contiguous land which indicated a higher market value. They contended that the courts improperly accepted the oral testimony of the respondent, who claimed the sale deed figure was inflated to defeat pre-emption rights. Additionally, the petitioners sought a direction for the payment of interest on the compensation differential under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court held that the valuation of land based on oral evidence is a question of fact, and the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. Regarding the interest claim, the Court held that since the statute imposes a mandatory duty on the Collector to pay interest, the petitioners' remedy lies in approaching the appropriate forum for enforcement of that statutory duty rather than seeking special leave to appeal. The petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Is the valuation of land based on oral evidence regarding the true sale price a question of fact that precludes interference by the Supreme Court?
- Does the Supreme Court grant special leave to appeal for the enforcement of a statutory duty to pay interest on compensation when the law already mandates such payment?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a landowner when the Collector fails to pay interest on the difference between the Collector's award and the court-determined compensation?
- Umar Bakhsh Mazari vs The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and 3 Other1972 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The core legal question concerned whether an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner in revision, affecting the property rights of co-sharers and the Court of Wards without impleading them or affording them an opportunity of being heard, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that orders passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the express mandatory provisions of the relevant land reform rules cannot be maintained. The key principles laid down are that no person's rights can be adversely affected by a revisional authority without notice and a proper opportunity of hearing, and that failure to implead necessary parties renders such proceedings and resulting orders legally infirm.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner without impleading necessary parties violates the principles of natural justice?
- Does Rule 12(3) of the West Pakistan Land Reform Rules 1959 prohibit modifying an order affecting any person without affording them an opportunity of being heard?
- Can a revisional order passed behind the back of interested parties and the Court of Wards be sustained in law?
- Toor Gul vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum1972 PLD Supreme Court 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from eviction proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. On the hearing date, a pleader filed a vakalatnama bearing the tenant's thumb-impression and the pleader's signed acceptance, but the pleader's name was accidentally omitted from the body of the vakalatnama. The Rent Controller treated the vakalatnama as invalid, refused to allow the pleader to act, and passed an ex parte eviction order, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal including by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that procedural rules in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are enabling provisions designed to advance justice and substantial compliance is sufficient. The accidental omission of a pleader's name from the body of a vakalatnama is a mere curable irregularity rather than an invalidating defect when the intention to appoint the pleader is clear. Remanding the case, the Court set aside the ex parte order subject to the tenant depositing arrear rents.
Questions settled- Does the accidental omission of a pleader's name from the body of a vakalatnama render it invalid?
- Is the execution of a vakalatnama required to take place in the physical presence of the client and the pleader under Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a court proceed ex parte without giving a pleader an opportunity to rectify a formal defect in a vakalatnama?
- The West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal, Lahore vs MR. Yusuf Ali Khan, Bar at Law1972 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the Lahore High Court's order declaring the interim suspension of the respondent advocate's licence by the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal to be without lawful authority. The Supreme Court examined whether the dissolution of the West Pakistan Province affected the validity of the Tribunal and whether Rule 51 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969, empowering ad interim suspension, was ultra vires the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the dissolution order preserved existing laws and tribunals, including the Act and its constituted bodies, under Article 19 read with Articles 15 and 17(4) of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970. However, the Court further held that the Act only authorized suspension after a finding of guilt under Section 36, and the Bar Council, being a creature of statute with no inherent powers, could not frame rules permitting ad interim suspension. Consequently, Rule 51 was declared ultra vires the parent Act, and the appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan under President's Order No. 1 of 1970 affected the continuity and validity of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965 and tribunals constituted thereunder?
- Does the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965 empower the Bar Council Tribunal to order an ad interim suspension of an advocate's licence pending an inquiry?
- Is Rule 51 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969 ultra vires the parent Act in so far as it authorizes the interim suspension of an advocate before a finding of guilt?
- Can a statutory body like the Bar Council claim inherent powers to pass ad interim orders of suspension similar to those possessed by a High Court?
- The State of Pakistan through the Secretary Education Department, Islamabad and 3 Others vs Abdul Qayum Khan1972 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court order that quashed the compulsory retirement of a government servant and directed his reinstatement with arrears. The core legal question is whether a writ petition filed three years after the impugned retirement order should be dismissed on the grounds of laches and acquiescence, particularly when the petitioner had accepted pension benefits and sought re-employment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in condoning the three-year delay, as the petitioner failed to provide a valid explanation and had actively sought and accepted retirement benefits, thereby acquiescing to the order. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of laches applies when a petitioner sleeps on their rights for an unreasonable period, causing prejudice to administrative arrangements made in the interim. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and dismissed the writ petition, establishing that acceptance of retirement benefits and a significant, unexplained delay in seeking judicial redress preclude a petitioner from challenging the legality of their compulsory retirement.
Questions settled- Does the acceptance of pension benefits and commutation after a compulsory retirement order constitute acquiescence that bars a subsequent challenge to that order?
- Can a writ petition be maintained when it is filed after a significant delay of three years without a reasonable explanation?
- Does the doctrine of laches apply to a writ petition where the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that they were actively agitating the matter through departmental proceedings during the delay?
- The State Bank of Pakistan the State Bank of Pakistan vs Ismail1972 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-03-08Read full judgment →
- The Salman Corporation (Regd.), Lyallpur vs The Sutlej Cotton Mills1972 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant-firm filed a civil suit seeking a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondent from encashing a bank guarantee furnished as security for an agency agreement. The trial court granted a temporary injunction conditional upon the appellant providing a fresh bank guarantee. The respondent appealed this order, and the appellate court set aside the injunction after an ex parte hearing. The appellant's revision petition to the High Court was dismissed in limine, with the High Court noting the appellant failed to exhaust the remedy of seeking a rehearing under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the validity of the service of notice and the merits of the injunction. The Court held that the High Court correctly identified the failure to exhaust alternative remedies. Furthermore, the Court determined that the terms of the agency agreement explicitly authorized the respondent to call upon the bank guarantee for sums due. The Court also clarified that the specific service provisions under Order XXX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding suits by or against firms were inapplicable to the present matter. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does Order XXX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to all suits involving firms?
- Is it appropriate to approach the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before seeking a rehearing of an ex parte appellate order under Order XLI, Rule 21?
- Can a principal invoke a bank guarantee if the agency agreement explicitly permits appropriation of deposit money for sums due?
- The Province of West Pakistan (Now Punjab Province) through Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan (Now Punjab Province) Irrigation and Power Department, Lahore and Others vs Mangla Dam Contractor through General Manager1972 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the rate of canal water supplied by the Irrigation and Power Department to a contractor for public works construction. The core legal question was whether a contract for water supply, signed by the Divisional Canal Officer after receiving sanction conveyed by the Irrigation Secretary, was binding upon the Provincial Government, despite later claims that proper sanction was lacking. The Supreme Court upheld the Lahore High Court's decision, which found that the agreement was validly executed. The Court held that the parties had acted on the assumption of valid sanction, the agreement had been performed by both sides for nearly two years, and the government could not reopen the matter after such a duration. Furthermore, the Court noted that the government's assertion of a lack of sanction was unsupported by any affidavit from the Irrigation Secretary. The key principle laid down is that where a government contract is acted upon by both parties for a significant period, the government is estopped from challenging the validity of the contract based on alleged procedural irregularities in the sanctioning process, especially when the claim is unsubstantiated by evidence.
Questions settled- Can the Provincial Government reopen a contract after it has been acted upon by both parties for a significant period?
- Is a contract for canal water supply valid if signed by the Divisional Canal Officer following sanction conveyed by the Irrigation Secretary?
- Does an unsubstantiated assertion in a written statement suffice to challenge the validity of a government contract?
- The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd vs Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 Others1972 PLD Supreme Court 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court decision dismissing a writ petition against the acquisition of property by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. The core legal questions revolved around the CDA's jurisdiction, the legality of the acquisition process, and allegations of mala fide. The Supreme Court held that a writ petition is maintainable even if a statutory appeal is pending, particularly when challenging the very jurisdiction of the authority or alleging mala fide. The Court found that the acquisition was not for the purpose of the Ordinance, was in flagrant violation of its provisions, and was mala fide in law due to inconsistent reasons for acquisition, lack of a proper scheme, and the property's designation in the Master Plan as 'Open Space' rather than for the stated purpose. The Court emphasized that statutory powers of acquisition are not unlimited and must have a reasonable nexus with the Ordinance's purpose, strictly adhering to its procedural requirements. Consequently, the acquisition was declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
Questions settled- Can a writ petition be entertained by the High Court when an appeal under the relevant statute is pending, if the challenge is to the authority's jurisdiction or alleges mala fide?
- Does the Capital Development Authority possess unlimited and undefined power to acquire land within Specified Areas without a reasonable reference to the purpose of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960?
- Must an acquisition under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, be preceded by and made in pursuance of a scheme approved by the Central Government?
- Can an acquisition be deemed mala fide in law if different reasons are given for it at different times, or if it is not in line with the Master Plan or a properly framed scheme?
- Is strict adherence to the procedural provisions of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, required for a lawful acquisition of land?
- The Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Home and Kashmir, Affairs (Home Affairs Division), Islamabad vs Ghulam Muhammad1972 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention of the respondent under the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. The High Court had declared the detention illegal, ruling that under Section 6-A of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, the government could not detain a person beyond three months without referring the matter to an advisory board, despite arguments that Section 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, rendered such requirements ineffective. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it was brought to the Court's attention that the respondent had fled to Afghanistan following his release, rendering the matter moot. Furthermore, the Court noted that the legal landscape regarding preventive detention had been altered by the Interim Constitution of 1972, which re-introduced the requirement for advisory board references. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to engage in an academic interpretation of the conflicting provisions of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, and the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, dismissing the appeal as infructuous.
Questions settled- Does the flight of a respondent to a foreign jurisdiction render a pending appeal against a habeas corpus order infructuous?
- Does the enactment of new constitutional provisions regarding preventive detention render the interpretation of repealed or superseded detention laws academic?
- The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore vs Messrs Mir1972 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the imposition of a penalty under the Income-tax Act. The assessee, a registered firm, failed to pay advance tax under Section 18-A(1) of the Income-tax Act, leading the Income-tax Officer to propose a penalty of Rs. 1,000. Under Section 28(6) of the Act, such a penalty requires the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Instead of approving or disapproving the proposed amount, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner unilaterally imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000. The core legal question was whether the statutory power to approve a proposed penalty includes the authority to alter, amend, or enhance that penalty. The High Court held that the power to approve does not encompass the power to amend the proposed penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, finding that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exceeded their authority by enhancing the penalty rather than merely exercising the power of approval. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the principle that a statutory power of approval is limited to the scope of the proposal submitted for review.
Questions settled- Does the statutory power to approve a penalty proposed by an Income-tax Officer include the power to enhance that penalty?
- Can an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner unilaterally increase a penalty proposed under the Income-tax Act without the power to amend?
- Is the power to approve a proposed penalty limited to the scope of the original proposal?
- The Commissioner and Another vs Mian Sher Muhammad1972 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the selection of the respondent for the post of Naib-Tehsildar. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction to overturn a finding of fact regarding the respondent's eligibility, specifically whether he had completed the mandatory two-year service period as a Field Kanungo under the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court may interfere with findings of fact if they are based on a misreading of evidence, the High Court in this instance had itself misread the certificate provided by the Consolidation Officer, which showed the respondent performed Field Kanungo duties only as an additional task. However, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, exercising judicial discretion due to the significant lapse of time since the respondent's initial selection and his continued service. The key principle established is that while writ jurisdiction allows for the correction of misread evidence, such interference must be based on an accurate interpretation of the evidence.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
- Does the performance of duties in addition to a primary appointment satisfy a service requirement prescribed for a specific post?
- Can the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal despite finding an error in the High Court's judgment due to the passage of time?
- The Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Lahore vs The Lahore Municipal1972 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the assessment of the annual value of Faletti's Hotel, Lahore, by the Lahore Municipal Corporation for the years 1955-1959. The core legal question was whether an appeal lay to the District Judge under Section 118 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act regarding the quantum of tax, specifically concerning the basis or principle of assessment. The High Court had previously held that no appeal lay because the dispute related only to the quantum of tax rather than the principles of assessment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Assessor's determination of annual value based on 'Trade Earnings' was contrary to Section 107 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act, which mandates that annual value be based on the gross annual rent the building might reasonably be expected to let for. Consequently, the Court ruled that an appeal was maintainable under Section 118. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remanded to the Assessor for re-assessment in accordance with the law, specifically noting that the value of furniture must be included in the annual value calculation.
Questions settled- Does an appeal lie under Section 118 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act when the dispute concerns the basis or principle of assessment rather than just the quantum of tax?
- Is the determination of annual value based on 'Trade Earnings' consistent with the requirements of Section 107 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act?
- Must the value of furniture be included in the annual value assessment under the City of Lahore Corporation Act?
- Tehmash vs Aftab Gul and 2 Other1972 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the son of the deceased against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the conviction and sentences of death and transportation for life awarded to the respondents under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot the deceased in broad daylight in the presence of police officials and eyewitnesses, following which they were apprehended with their shotguns and four empty cartridges were recovered from the scene. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal of the respondents was perverse or unreasonable so as to justify interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Fire-arm Expert's report, establishing that none of the recovered empty cartridges were fired from the seized shotguns, constituted an inherent weakness going to the root of the prosecution case. The High Court was fully justified in granting the benefit of doubt to the respondents, and as the judgment was neither perverse nor unreasonable, no interference was warranted. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a contradiction between ballistic evidence and eyewitness accounts regarding recovered cartridges constitute a fatal weakness justifying the grant of benefit of doubt to the accused?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment of acquittal that is neither perverse nor unreasonable?
- Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada Tae State vs Sohbat Khan and 3 Other Sohbat1972 PLD Supreme Court 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These criminal appeals by special leave were directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan acquitting the respondents of charges relating to a dacoity, murder, and murderous assault committed at the residence of Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondents had been acquitted on principles consistent with the safe dispensation of justice and whether the High Court misread the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had indeed acquitted the respondents on artificial and superficial grounds and misread the material evidence, including judicial confessions, extra-judicial confessions, eyewitness testimony, fingerprint evidence, and the testimony of the approver. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal of respondent Sohbat Khan, convicted him under sections 396 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and sentenced him to transportation for life, taking into account the prolonged delay since his acquittal by the High Court. The key principles laid down include that minor omissions or discrepancies do not discredit an approver's testimony when materially corroborated, and that procedural irregularities in recording judicial confessions of a directory nature do not vitiate their voluntariness.
Questions settled- Whether an irregularity in complying with police custody formalities during a judicial confession vitiates its voluntariness?
- Does a minor omission in an approver's statement compared to their confessional statement discredit their entire testimony?
- Can an appellate court's acquittal based on a misreading of evidence be set aside by the Supreme Court?
- Whether extra-judicial confessions corroborated by material particulars can form the basis of a conviction?
- Syed Riaz Ahmad Shah and Another vs Dayal.Singh College Trust1972 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition seeking to challenge the execution of an ex parte decree for arrears of rent and ejectment passed on 7-12-1960. The core legal question is whether third-party objectors in execution proceedings can challenge the competence of the original decree-holder on the ground that management of the property vested in the Evacuee Trust Board, and whether an executing court can go behind the decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an executing court cannot go behind the decree, and third-party tenants cannot obstruct execution by raising technical objections regarding the competency of the original suit after a decree has attained finality. The court laid down the principle that executing courts are strictly barred from going behind the decree, and execution proceedings cannot be thwarted by raising extraneous or technical challenges to the original plaintiff's locus standi.
Questions settled- Can an executing court go behind the decree?
- Whether third-party objectors can challenge the competence of the original decree-holder during execution proceedings?
- Can execution of a decree be obstructed on technical objections raised by tenants inducted subsequent to the suit?
- Syed Muhammad Munir (Represented by 10 Heirs) and Anothbrs vs Abu1972 PLD Supreme Court 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave arose from the dismissal in limine of a writ petition challenging mutation proceedings concerning agricultural land allotted in lieu of property left behind in India. The dispute concerned whether a childless widow governed by Shia law (Ithna'ashari) could inherit any share in her deceased husband's immovable landed property, and whether 'childless widow' refers to a woman having no child surviving the deceased at the time of succession. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under well-settled Shia law, a childless widow—defined as a widow who has no living child surviving her deceased husband when succession opens—is excluded from inheriting any share in the landed property (immovable property) of her deceased husband. The Court held that settled rules of succession founded on authoritative jurisprudential texts of Shia jurists having universal acceptance and Ijma cannot be altered by judicial reinterpretation of Quranic texts; such changes pertain strictly to the legislative domain. Consequently, her life estate terminated upon death and her bequest of the land was invalid.
Questions settled- Whether under Shia law a childless widow is excluded from inheriting a share in the immovable landed property of her deceased husband?
- What is the legal definition of a 'childless widow' for the purposes of succession under Shia law?
- Can the courts alter or depart from an established rule of Shia succession founded on ancient authority and consensus (Ijma) by interpreting Quranic texts anew?
- Syed Israil Shah and Another vs Sh. Amanullah and Other1972 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of land. The core legal question was whether a civil court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance concerning land allotted to the petitioners in lieu of unsatisfied Produce Index Units, particularly when the petitioners argued the land was not permanently settled and remained within the compensation pool. The Supreme Court held that the civil court indeed had jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the land had been validly transferred to the petitioners by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, acting as a Settlement Authority under the relevant statute. Consequently, the transfer constituted a permanent settlement, thereby removing the bar on civil court jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that where land has been permanently transferred to an allottee by a competent Settlement Authority, the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding the specific performance of contracts related to such land, as it is no longer excluded by the provisions of the Land Settlement Act.
Questions settled- Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance regarding land transferred to an allottee by a Rehabilitation Authority?
- Is a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner considered a 'Settlement Authority' for the purpose of land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
- Does the transfer of land by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner constitute a permanent transfer sufficient to vest jurisdiction in a civil court?
- Syed Ghulam Shah Bukhari vs Muhammad Saeed Akhtar1972 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a tenant's appeal by special leave against the confirmation of his ejectment order from a shop by the High Court, which upheld the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller is competent under the relevant rent restriction law to grant an extension of time for depositing rent ordered to be paid. The Supreme Court held, following its earlier precedent, that the Rent Controller has no power under the statute to extend the period fixed by him for depositing rent. The Court laid down the principle that upon the dismissal of an appeal challenging a rent deposit order, the original order of the Rent Controller stands revived, and the tenant is required to comply with it within a reasonable time without claiming a fresh statutory period for deposit.
Questions settled- Does a Rent Controller have the power under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to extend the period fixed by him for depositing rent?
- What is the effect of the dismissal of an appeal on an interim stay order regarding the deposit of rent?
- Can a tenant claim a fresh starting point for depositing rent upon the dismissal of his appeal against a rent deposit order?
- Syed Aziz-Ur-Rahman vs Mst. Habib Bang and 5 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which had set aside orders of Settlement Authorities transferring an evacuee house to the appellant. The core legal question concerned whether the filing of an 'E' Form to participate in an earmarking scheme under Settlement Scheme No. V operated as an automatic withdrawal or cancellation of a previously filed 'CH' Form. The Supreme Court held that the making of an application in Form 'E' to join the lottery of earmarked houses operates by itself as a cancellation or withdrawal of any application made in Form 'CH', and the choice made is irrevocable. However, because lower Settlement Authorities failed to properly apply their minds to the question of whether the house was divisible, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner to determine the divisibility of the house in accordance with law and applicable regulations.
Questions settled- Does the filing of an application in Form 'E' to participate in an earmarking scheme operate as an automatic withdrawal of a previously filed 'CH' Form?
- Can a non-claimant displaced person in occupation of a portion of a house be transferred the entire house if it is found to be indivisible and competing claims fail?
- Whether settlement authorities are required to independently apply their minds to the question of the divisibility of an evacuee property rather than relying solely on the assertions of the parties?
- Syed Abdul Qadir Shah vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Basic Democracies, Social Welfare and Local Bodies Department, Lahore and Another1972 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the initial recruitment to senior Class II posts in the local council service and his reversion to a substantive post following temporary promotion. The petitioner, an Accountant in the junior Class II scale, claimed eligibility for promotion to senior Class II posts on the administrative side under the relevant rules and challenged the filling of vacancies by initial recruitment. The High Court rejected his claim regarding promotion but partially set aside the order refixing his pay without notice. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that prospects of promotion do not constitute terms and conditions of service and cannot be enforced through a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. It further held that a temporary promotion subject to government approval for rule relaxation creates no vested right. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Are prospects of promotion part of the terms and conditions of service enforceable under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
- Can a temporary promotion made subject to relaxation of rules by the government confer a vested right to the promoted post?
- Superiniendent of Police, Special Branch, Karachi and Others vs Abubakar and Another1972 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal was filed by the Government against a High Court judgment declaring the confiscation and cancellation of the respondents' passports illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the principles of natural justice apply to the cancellation or confiscation of a passport issued to a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that the cancellation was invalid for failure to issue a show-cause notice or afford a hearing. The Court established that while the initial grant of a privilege or licence like a passport may lie within the State's discretion, once granted, it cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or confiscated without adhering to principles of natural justice. The grantee acquires a right to enjoy the privilege during its term, and even administrative acts affecting citizens' rights require notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.
Questions settled- Do principles of natural justice apply to the cancellation or confiscation of a passport once it has been issued by the State?
- Can the State arbitrarily revoke a privilege or licence without giving the grantee a show-cause notice and an opportunity to be heard?
- Does an administrative act that deprives a citizen of a privilege require adherence to the rule of audi alteram partem?
- Sultan and 2 Others vs Mst. Bibi1972 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose out of a suit filed by collaterals against Mst. Bibi for possession of half share of the land left by deceased Maulu, alleging that Mst. Bibi was not the daughter of Maulu's predeceased son, Khushi. The core issue before the court was whether Mst. Bibi was the legitimate daughter of Khushi. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Mst. Bibi was Khushi's daughter, but the Additional District Judge and a Single Judge of the High Court reversed this finding. On Letters Patent Appeal, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment upon re-appraising the evidence. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the Letters Patent Bench erred in disturbing a finding of fact. The Supreme Court held that since the lower appellate court discarded evidence on fanciful grounds without proper appreciation, the Letters Patent Bench was fully justified in re-evaluating the record. Finding that the judgment rested on evidence, the Supreme Court refused to re-appreciate factual evidence and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Is a Letters Patent Bench competent to interfere with findings of fact where lower courts failed to appreciate the evidence properly?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact supported by documentary and oral evidence solely on the ground of appreciation of evidence?
- State vs Fateh Mohammad1972 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Lahore High Court directing that the respondent, who had surrendered before a Magistrate, be transferred from police custody to judicial custody. A case under section 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code had been registered against the respondent, who initially avoided police arrest and later surrendered before a Magistrate, who remanded him to police custody for the recovery of the weapon of offence. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is empowered to send an accused person who surrenders before him into police custody under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate is legally competent to accept the surrender of an accused and authorize his detention in police custody during a police investigation, and that an accused cannot circumvent the statutory right of the police to investigate by surrendering before a Magistrate. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, establishing that Magistrates possess the discretion to hand over an accused to police custody for investigation purposes even upon surrender.
Questions settled- Whether a Magistrate is empowered to send an accused person who surrenders before him into police custody?
- Can an accused circumvent the statutory right of the police to investigate by surrendering before a Magistrate?
- Does a Magistrate have the discretion to authorize detention in police custody during a police investigation upon receiving a surrendered accused?
- Sodagar vs The State1972 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a criminal appeal where the appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of his father following a financial dispute and a subsequent altercation. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to a reduction in sentence from death to life imprisonment on the ground of grave and sudden provocation allegedly caused by abuses and rebukes from the deceased father, and whether the prolonged delay in the execution of the sentence constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Court held that the appellant's act of leaving the scene, arming himself with a pistol, and returning to shoot the deceased negated any claim of a fit of rage or sudden provocation, and that delay in execution is a matter for executive clemency rather than judicial sentence reduction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the death sentence.
Questions settled- Whether verbal rebukes or abuses by a father constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to mitigate the sentence for murder to life imprisonment?
- Does the time spent by a condemned prisoner awaiting execution of the death sentence constitute a valid legal ground for appellate reduction of sentence?
- Whether an accused who leaves the scene of a dispute and returns armed with a firearm can claim the benefit of sudden and grave provocation?
- Sher Bahadur and Another vs The State1972 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the appellants' appeal and confirmed the death sentence of appellant Sher Bahadur while commuting that of appellant Shamaraz Khan to transportation for life under sections 302/34 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case rested on the solitary ocular testimony of P.W. 2 Badiuz Zaman and the dying statement of the deceased Gul Baz Khan, both of whom were interested witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the trial and appellate courts had discarded the testimony of this witness regarding three co-accused who were acquitted. The Court held that prudence required independent corroboration of the witness's testimony regarding the appellants, which was lacking, and that the belated motive and abscondence could not serve as valid corroboration. Furthermore, the dying statement was recorded in circumstances that did not exclude the possibility of prompting, and evidence suggested the suppression of an earlier statement made on the spot. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants.
Questions settled- Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness, partly disbelieved regarding co-accused, can form the basis of conviction for other co-accused?
- Can a dying statement recorded in the presence of interested persons without precautionary exclusion operate as reliable evidence without independent corroboration?
- Whether the suppression of an initial statement made to the police on the spot entitles the defense to an adverse inference?
- Does abscondence constitute valid corroboration of guilt under criminal law?
- Sher Azam vs Fazle Azim Shah1972 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed a second appeal arising from the dismissal of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner sought pre-emption of a specific Khasra number, claiming that an ostensible transaction of exchange was actually a sale for cash consideration. The core legal question is whether the transaction in question constituted a sale subject to pre-emption or a genuine exchange. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence proving the payment of a cash price, and given that inequality of area and quality or joint possession do not conclusively establish a sale, the transaction must be regarded as an exchange and is therefore not pre-emptiable. The key principle laid down is that for a transaction to qualify as a sale for pre-emption purposes, there must be a proven transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid in cash, and mere circumstantial disparities or subsequent transactions cannot convert an exchange into a sale.
Questions settled- Whether an ostensible transaction of exchange can be treated as a sale for the purpose of pre-emption without direct evidence of cash consideration?
- Does a disparity in the area and quality of exchanged lands give rise to an irresistible inference of a sale?
- Can a subsequent transaction documented in a Jamabandi be utilized to determine the nature of a prior exchange transaction when not produced before the lower courts?
- Sher and 4 Others Shera and 3 Others vs The State the State1972 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentences of the appellants under sections 302/149, 148, and 324/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and related offenses. The core legal question concerns the reliability of related and interested eyewitness testimony, the necessity of corroboration as to the identity of each individual accused, and whether discrepancies in weapon recoveries vitiate the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the testimony of natural and injured eyewitnesses, corroborated by medical evidence and established motive, is fully sufficient to sustain convictions even where minor recovery evidence against a specific accused is discarded. The key legal principle laid down is that related eyewitnesses need not be corroborated on the identity of every individual accused by independent material, provided there is sufficient general guarantee of truthfulness, such as clear motive and natural presence at the scene, distinguishing them from tainted accomplices.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of related and interested eyewitnesses requires corroboration specifically as to the identity of each individual accused?
- Does the rejection of weapon recovery evidence against one co-accused necessarily affect the credibility of consistent eyewitness accounts implicating that accused?
- Whether a delay in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when the informant is injured and the police station is located at a considerable distance?
- Sheikh Taj Ali vs Syed Abdul Haq Shah1972 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of an ejectment order against a tenant. The respondent landlord initiated proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, leading to a compromise order requiring the petitioner tenant to vacate the premises by a specific date. Upon failing to vacate, the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging a new tenancy agreement. While the petitioner simultaneously sought a temporary injunction to restrain execution, the lower courts dismissed this request. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the temporary injunction, viewing it as superfluous. However, the Court clarified that the petitioner's pending application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which asserts a novation of tenancy, requires a formal inquiry and evidence. The Court held that the executing court must adjudicate this pending application on its own merits before proceeding with the actual ejectment. Any prior observations by the High Court regarding the validity of the alleged new rent note shall not prejudice the final determination of the Section 47 application.
Questions settled- Must an executing court decide a pending application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before proceeding with an ejectment order?
- Does an allegation of a new tenancy agreement based on a disputed rent note require a formal inquiry and evidence before an ejectment order can be executed?
- Shaukat Hussain Shah and Another vs The Commissioner, Lahore1972 SC M R32 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from an order of reference made by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, referring a case registered against the appellants under the Sea/Land Customs Act for trial by a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, without affording the appellants an opportunity of being heard. The appellants challenged the reference via a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. Upon special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the reference was vitiated due to the lack of a pre-reference hearing and whether the Provincial Act was repugnant to the Central Sea Customs Act. The Supreme Court held, following its precedent in Home Secretary v. Jan Muhammad, that a reference of a case to a tribunal under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963 without granting the accused an opportunity to show cause is illegal. The Court accepted the appeal and directed that the case be laid before the trial Magistrate for trial in ordinary criminal jurisdiction, leaving other contentions open for the Magistrate's consideration.
Questions settled- Whether a reference of a case to a tribunal under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963 is illegal if made without giving the accused an opportunity to show cause?
- Does a Provincial Act providing a different forum for trial of offences under a Central enactment give way to the Central Act to the extent of repugnancy?
- Shaukat Ali vs The State1972 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, Shaukat Ali, sought special leave to appeal against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Janas Khan, where section 301 of the Pakistan Penal Code was applied as the fatal shot was intended for another person, Mehrdil. The petitioner argued that the evidence lacked strict scrutiny for a section 301 case and that the circumstances attracted Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Exception 4 was inapplicable because the act involved premeditation, was a one-sided affair without a sudden fight or quarrel, and the petitioner used a deadly weapon with the intention to cause death. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of transfer of malice under section 301 applies where a person intends to kill one individual but accidentally kills another, and Exception 4 to section 300 cannot be invoked in the absence of a sudden fight and premeditation.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code are attracted where a murder is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight?
- How does section 301 of the Pakistan Penal Code apply when an act intended to kill one person results in the death of another?
- Does the absence of a sudden quarrel preclude the application of Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- Shaukat Ali vs Altaf Hussain Qureshi and Another1972 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the custody of a woman the petitioner claimed was his lawfully wedded wife. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to restore custody where the woman was not physically present, had provided conflicting statements regarding her marriage and desire to live with the petitioner, and where the petitioner faced pending criminal charges for kidnapping. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition. The ratio is that where a woman's whereabouts are unknown and her statements are contradictory, the court cannot ascertain her free will, and it is appropriate to refuse summary relief under Section 491. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 491 proceedings should not be abused to facilitate illicit relationships or to evade criminal prosecution, and courts must consider the broader social context when exercising their discretionary jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a High Court refuse to restore custody under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged wife is not present before the court?
- Does the pendency of a criminal case for kidnapping under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justify the refusal of a habeas corpus petition?
- Should courts consider the potential abuse of Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for illicit purposes when deciding whether to grant relief?
- Shaukat Ali Khan and Another vs Settlement Commissioner, Karachi1972 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the cancellation of an allotment of a house to the petitioners. The petitioners, who were in occupation of certain outhouses attached to the property in question, had initially been allotted the house based on their possession and the filing of C.H. Forms. The allotment was subsequently cancelled on the ground that possession of outhouses did not entitle them to the transfer of the main house. The core legal question was whether the definition of 'House' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read with the Schedule to the Act, allows for the transfer of a main house based solely on the possession of its outhouses. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that possession of an outhouse does not equate to possession of the main house for transfer purposes. The Court relied on established precedents, specifically Fazlun Nisa Begum v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and Abdul Hamid Khan v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, to confirm that such possession does not confer a right to transfer.
Questions settled- Does the possession of an outhouse entitle a claimant to the transfer of the main house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Is there a legal distinction between the possession of a portion of a main house and the possession of an outhouse for the purpose of property transfer?
- Sharaf and 8 Others vs Sardar Bibi and 10 Other1972 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions arise out of an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court allowing amendments to a plaint sought by the respondents in a pre-emption suit. The predecessor of the respondents had instituted a pre-emption suit in November 1959. Subsequently, the respondents filed applications under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend the plaint by substituting and adding certain Khasra numbers, which were initially rejected by the trial court. The High Court, however, allowed the revision petitions and permitted the amendments. The core legal question concerns the propriety of allowing amendments to pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include or substitute property details in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that the Code grants wide powers to courts to allow amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the High Court exercised its discretion unreasonably. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the principle that discretionary orders permitting amendments to pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 will not be interfered with unless shown to be unreasonable.
Questions settled- Whether the court has the power to allow amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add or substitute Khasra numbers in a pre-emption suit?
- When can an appellate or revisional court interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court regarding the amendment of pleadings?
- Shamsuddin Ahmed Siddiqui vs Muhammad Akbar and Another1972 PLD Supreme Court 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court in a Letters Patent appeal concerning the refusal of settlement authorities to transfer an evacuee house in Hyderabad to the appellant on the ground that its valuation exceeded Rs. 10,000, rendering the appellant ineligible as a local. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities and the High Court correctly applied the prescribed statutory formulae and special instructions for determining the evaluation price of urban evacuee property or whether valuations were enhanced arbitrarily. The Supreme Court held that the subordinate settlement authorities and the High Court failed to consider and apply the binding special instructions and specific formulae issued by the competent settlement authorities for Hyderabad town, which properly calculated the valuation to be below the statutory threshold. The Court established the principle that settlement authorities must strictly adhere to specific and binding instructions governing the evaluation of evacuee properties in preference to general or arbitrary methods, and any valuation arrived at in disregard of such special instructions is without lawful authority and cannot be sustained.
Questions settled- Whether settlement authorities can arbitrarily enhance the valuation of an evacuee house without following the prescribed statutory formulae and special instructions?
- Did the subordinate settlement authorities fail to apply the binding special instructions regarding the assessment of evacuee houses in Hyderabad town?
- Whether the High Court and settlement authorities erred in determining the evaluation price of the disputed property above the statutory limit for locals?
- Shaikh Muhammad Yaqub vs The State1972 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, Muhammad Yaqub, sought leave to appeal against his conviction under sections 323, 504, and 342/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, handed down by the Lahore High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction and upheld on appeal, for assaulting and wrongfully restraining a retired High Court judge after the latter's dog attacked the petitioner's pet deer. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner's actions fell under a lesser offence due to grave and sudden provocation, and whether the matter ought to have been referred to a conciliation court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner acted out of anger rather than provocation, and that under Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961, the trial court had the discretion to retain and try the case rather than refer it to a conciliation court since the police had investigated cognisable offences. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does an attack by a dog on a pet deer, despite the owner's attempts to restrain it, constitute grave and sudden provocation to reduce an assault to a lesser offence?
- Does Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 deprive a criminal court of jurisdiction to try a case investigated by the police for cognisable offences?
- Is the trial court vested with discretion under Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 to either refer a cognisable case to a conciliation court or try it itself?
- Shah Nawaz vs Lal Khan and 2 Other1972 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court erred in its assessment of eye-witness testimony, the reliability of recovery evidence, and the impact of the prosecution's failure to examine a named witness. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, holding that the High Court's findings were neither perverse nor unreasonable. The Court affirmed that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt, and discrepancies between medical evidence and witness accounts, alongside dubious recovery circumstances, justified the acquittal. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the prosecution has discretion in calling witnesses, the non-examination of a material witness can warrant an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1872. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with findings of fact unless they are shocking to the judicial conscience or based on a misapplication of evidentiary principles.
Questions settled- Can an adverse inference be drawn against the prosecution for the non-examination of a material witness?
- Does the prosecution have absolute discretion to choose which witnesses to examine without consequence?
- Is an appellate court justified in interfering with an acquittal if the findings of fact are not perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience?