Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Shah Nawaz and 6 Others vs Muhammad Yousaf and 3 Other1972 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-14
  pre-emption suitcourt feesrejection of plaintjudicial discretionbona fide mistakecontumacycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a revision application in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in allowing the plaintiffs to pay deficient court fees rather than rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners argued that the plaintiffs were negligent and that the plaint should have been rejected. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's discretion to allow time for payment of deficient court fees is broad and should be exercised in favor of the litigant unless there is evidence of contumacy or positive mala fides. The Court affirmed that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be read harmoniously. Since the trial court found the initial failure to pay proper fees was a bona fide mistake, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's refusal to disturb that discretionary order.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should a court exercise its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to allow the payment of deficient court fees?
  • Does the failure to pay proper court fees due to a bona fide mistake warrant the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Must the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be read together to ensure harmonious construction?
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• Shah Muhammad and Other vs Muhammad Bakhsh1972 PLD Supreme Court 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-20
  abatementabatement in totolegal representativesevacuee propertyjoint possessionindivisible decreecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which declared a regular second appeal to have abated in toto. The dispute concerned a house claimed by the respondent as his self-constructed property, which the Custodian of Evacuee Property had declared non-evacuee. The appellants, who were refugees settled in the house, resisted the respondent's suit for possession. During the pendency of the appeals, certain appellants died, and their legal representatives were not impleaded within the statutory period. The core legal questions were whether Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 could prevent the abatement of an appeal under Order XXII, and whether the decree for joint possession was indivisible. The Supreme Court held that Order XLI Rule 4 is merely an enabling provision and does not nullify the abatement provisions of Order XXII. Since the appellants were in joint possession and the decree was indivisible, the failure to implead the legal representatives of the deceased appellants resulted in the total abatement of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prevent the abatement of an appeal under Order XXII when a necessary party dies and their legal representatives are not substituted?
  • Can an appellate court proceed to hear an appeal under Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if necessary parties are not before it?
  • What is the effect of the death of one of the co-defendants on an appeal where the decree for possession is joint and indivisible?
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• Shabbir Hussain vs Muhammad Afzal and Other1972 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-14
  writ jurisdictionconstitutional petitiondisputed questions of factremandevacuee propertysettlement lawsappellate power
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a double-storied evacuee house under the settlement laws. The appellant and respondent occupied different portions of the property, and both claimed prior allotment and possession. The Settlement Commissioner, in a review order, held that the appellant was the prior allottee. The respondent challenged this order in the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The High Court, acting as an appellate court, went into the disputed questions of fact and reversed the finding of the Settlement Commissioner. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the High Court could properly decide a disputed question of fact in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that a court exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction does not sit as a court of appeal. Where an inferior tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction acts contrary to law, the proper course is to set aside the order and remand the case for a fresh decision rather than deciding disputed factual questions. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, while exercising its constitutional writ jurisdiction, decide disputed questions of fact as if it were a court of appeal?
  • What is the proper course of action for the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 when an inferior tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction has acted contrary to law?
  • Can findings of fact arrived at by Settlement Authorities be reversed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
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• Sh. Safdar Rashid vs Mst. Ruqayya Begum and 11 Other1972 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  review petitionleave to appealdisplaced persons propertyCentral Government powerspublic interesttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's leave petition regarding the transfer of a disputed property. The core legal question concerns the validity of the transfer of property by the Central Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether grounds for review exist against the dismissal of the leave petition. The Supreme Court held that the review petition lacks merit because the property in dispute had been validly transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and subsequently approved by the Central Government in the public interest pursuant to section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, at a time when no property was available for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Court laid down the principle that a transfer of property approved by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, in the public interest with retrospective effect is valid, and a review petition cannot succeed on a factual premise not challenged during the initial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Government has the power under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to approve a property transfer in the public interest with retrospective effect?
  • Can a review petition be maintained on a statement of fact that was not challenged when the original impugned order was passed?
  • Does a claimant under Settlement Scheme No. VIII have a valid claim when the property was already transferred and no property was available on the date of the original transfer?
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• Sh. Barkat Ali vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and 2 Other1972 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-27
  cancellation of allotmentprior noticedisplaced personlocus standiSettlement Scheme No. VIIIwrit jurisdictionLetters Patent Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential bungalow under settlement law. The Settlement Commissioner had transferred the property to the respondent as an allottee in possession and a displaced person. The petitioner challenged this transfer based on a subsequent allotment in his favour and a notification dated 9th September 1960. The High Court, in Letters Patent Appeal, dismissed the petitioner's claim and upheld the transfer to the respondent. The core legal questions pertained to the validity of an allotment issued without prior cancellation of an existing allotment, the petitioner's eligibility under the relevant notification, and his standing to challenge the respondent's transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Letters Patent Bench's decision, holding that an allotment made without cancelling a prior existing allotment and without notice is void. The Court further affirmed that a person found to have no entitlement to property lacks locus standi to challenge its transfer to another.

  Questions settled

  • Is an allotment of evacuee property valid if made without prior cancellation of an existing allotment and without notice under Section 7(2)(b) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act 1959?
  • Does a person who is found to have no lawful entitlement to property have locus standi to challenge its transfer to another party?
  • Can a finding of fact by the Settlement Commissioner regarding status as a displaced person be interfered with in writ jurisdiction if supported by evidence?
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• Sh. Ala Ud Din vs The Official Liquidator, the Central Exchange Bank1972 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-15
  winding upcontributory liabilitycompany liquidationunpaid call moneyshare transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from winding-up proceedings of the Central Exchange Bank Limited, Lahore, wherein the Official Liquidator found the petitioner liable as a contributory for unpaid call money, uncalled liability, and interest on shares. The petitioner challenged his liability under section 184/38 of the Companies Act, disputing the transfer of certain shares and claiming credit for payments allegedly made. The High Court dismissed the application after recording evidence on all factual issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's liability as a contributory could be set aside based on disputed questions of fact regarding share transfers and uncredited payments. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the High Court regarding the delivery of share scrips, registration in company books, and the lack of credible evidence for the alleged payments were rightly decided, and found no ground for interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in company liquidation proceedings regarding contributory liability unless a substantial legal error is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding contributory liability in company winding-up proceedings?
  • Does the absence of a formal executed instrument of transfer invalidate shareholding when share scrips are delivered and the holder is registered in the company books?
  • Can a receipt issued by a dismissed employee of a bank without proof of authorization establish a valid payment against uncalled liability?
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• Seth Essabhoy vs Saboor Ahmad1972 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-23
  specific performancebreach of contracttime is not of the essenceimmovable propertyreadiness and willingnesscriminal complaintfraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a plot of land, or alternatively for damages. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant or the respondent committed the breach of the agreement, whether time was of the essence in contracts for immovable property, and whether the filing of a criminal complaint for cheating precluded the plaintiff from seeking specific performance. The Supreme Court held that the appellant committed the breach by failing to fulfill his obligation to convert the land into residential or Sakni status as agreed, and that time is not ordinarily of the essence in contracts relating to immovable property. The Court further held that a plaintiff is absolved from proving continuous readiness and willingness to perform where the defendant has already repudiated or breached the contract, and that alleging fraud in a criminal complaint does not vitiate the contract at the option of the innocent party seeking enforcement. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time is of the essence in contracts relating to immovable property?
  • Does the filing of a criminal complaint for cheating by the purchaser indicate an unwillingness to perform the contract disentitling them to specific performance?
  • Is a plaintiff absolved from showing continuous readiness and willingness to perform where the defendant has repudiated or breached the contract?
  • Does an allegation of fraud by an aggrieved party vitiate a contract so as to preclude that party from seeking its specific performance?
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• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Basic Democracies Social1972 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  termination of servicelegal advisermunicipal corporationlocus standirepeal of ordinanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the termination of the respondents' services as Legal Advisers to the Lahore Municipal Corporation. The core legal questions were whether the Government of Punjab had the statutory authority to terminate the services of the Municipal Corporation's Legal Advisers after the repeal of the enabling Ordinance, and whether the Government had the locus standi to challenge the High Court's judgment when the termination was purportedly executed by the Municipal Corporation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any surviving statutory provision empowering the Government to terminate the respondents' services following the repeal of Ordinance XXXII of 1965 by Ordinance XLIX of 1969. Furthermore, the Court established that if the services were terminated by the Lahore Municipal Corporation, the Government lacked the locus standi to challenge the High Court's decision on the Corporation's behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government have the authority to terminate the services of a Municipal Corporation's Legal Adviser after the repeal of the authorizing Ordinance?
  • Can the Government challenge a High Court judgment on behalf of a Municipal Corporation if the Corporation itself does not appeal?
  • Does the Government possess locus standi to file an appeal against the reinstatement of municipal employees whose termination was executed by the Municipal Corporation?
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• Sayyed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari vs Tim Chief Administrator of Auqaf Punjab, Lahore and 3Other1972 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-11
  Waqf propertiesaudi alteram partemshow-cause noticenatural justiceChief Administrator of Auqafwrit jurisdictionstatutory remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's writ petition against the takeover of the Dargah of Syed Muhammad Ismail Shah by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf via a notification issued under Section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961. The petitioner argued that the notification violated the principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem because no show-cause notice was served prior to taking over the property. The Supreme Court considered whether Section 6 requires a prior show-cause notice before assumption of control by the Chief Administrator. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court, holding that the statutory scheme of the Ordinance deliberately dispenses with prior notice before action under Section 6. The Court held that Section 7 provides an adequate comprehensive statutory remedy before the District Court, and that the explicit statutory bar on temporary injunctions demonstrates legislative intent that management by Auqaf remain uninterrupted pending final adjudication of title.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 require a prior show-cause notice before the Chief Administrator assumes control of a property?
  • Is the rule of audi alteram partem excluded where a statute provides an ex post facto statutory remedy before a civil court?
  • Does the statutory scheme of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 permit courts to grant an injunction restraining the Chief Administrator from taking over property under Section 6?
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• Sarghan Shah and Others vs Jaffar Khan and Other1972 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-20
  dispute likely to cause breach of peacepreliminary orderjurisdictionprocedural non-compliancepossession disputeleave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 concerning a disputed hillock, where a Magistrate held the land to be in possession of the respondents and restrained the petitioners from interfering. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate's failure to state the grounds of satisfaction in the preliminary order renders the entire proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the omission to state grounds in the preliminary order is a mere procedural non-compliance rather than a jurisdictional defect, provided the essential elements founding jurisdiction—namely, a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning land within the territorial limits—are fulfilled. The key principle laid down is that while statutory provisions requiring a Magistrate to state grounds of satisfaction must be followed, a failure to do so does not vitiate the entire proceedings if the foundational elements of jurisdiction exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission to state grounds in a preliminary order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 renders the entire proceedings without jurisdiction?
  • What are the essential elements necessary for the foundation of jurisdiction under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere non-compliance with a rule of procedure vitiate the entire proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Sardar Abdul Majid Khan Lashari vs The Asio African Co. Ltd.1972 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  execution of decreelimitation periodresiduary articleexecuting courtcivil revisiondismissal in default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from execution proceedings initiated by the respondent pursuant to a decree obtained from the Chief Court of Sind in 1955 and transferred to Lahore. The petitioner judgment-debtor filed objections and subsequently an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the authority of the attorney and the legality of the decree's transfer. The executing court dismissed the application as barred by time, a decision upheld by the High Court in civil revision. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether any period of limitation applies to an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether notice is required for restoring an execution application dismissed in the absence of both parties. The Supreme Court held that the residuary Article 181 applies to applications under Section 47 for which no specific period of limitation is provided, rendering the application time-barred, and that no notice is necessary to restore an execution application dismissed in the absence of both parties. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the limitation bar.

  Questions settled

  • Does a period of limitation apply to an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Whether Article 181 of the limitation framework applies to applications under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is notice required to restore an execution application that was dismissed in the absence of both parties?
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• Sanobar Talkies vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Excise1972 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29
  entertainment dutycinema classificationnatural justiceadministrative reviewspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged the classification of the petitioner's cinema house under the West Pakistan Entertainment Duty Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Provincial Government to grant a personal hearing during a second review representation constitutes a violation of natural justice, and whether the classification was based on extraneous considerations. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had received adequate opportunity of being heard at prior stages, including a full hearing before the Member, Board of Revenue, and that natural justice does not require a personal hearing at every successive stage of administrative proceedings. The Court established the principle that in administrative review proceedings, a party cannot expect an oral hearing at each stage provided the grounds are fully set out in writing and considered by the authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the Provincial Government to grant a personal hearing during a second review representation violates natural justice?
  • Can a party in administrative proceedings claim a right to be heard at each and every stage of review?
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• Salehon and Muhammad Khan and 2 OthersMUHAMMAD Khan and 21972 SCMR 310, 1977 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03
  ocular evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalextra-judicial confessionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals arising from a multiple murder case involving six victims. The appellants, Salehon and his three sons (Muhammad, Bashir, and Ashraf), were convicted for the murders. The trial court acquitted Salehon but convicted his sons. On appeal, the High Court maintained the convictions of the sons but, due to a split decision regarding Salehon, referred his case to a third judge who convicted him. The Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of all four appellants. Regarding the sons, the Court found the ocular evidence of two witnesses, corroborated by medical evidence, recoveries of blood-stained articles, and an extra-judicial confession, sufficient to sustain their convictions. Regarding Salehon, the Court held that the ocular evidence alone was insufficient for conviction because the same witnesses had falsely implicated four other co-accused who were acquitted. Furthermore, the Court found the corroborative evidence relied upon by the third judge, specifically the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet, unreliable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals of the three sons but allowed the appeal of Salehon, setting aside his conviction and acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the ocular evidence of witnesses be relied upon for conviction if those same witnesses have been found to have falsely implicated other co-accused in the same incident?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction based solely on ocular evidence when the corroborative evidence relied upon by the lower court has been rejected by other judges in the same proceedings?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the origin of blood on recovered articles render the recovery evidence unreliable for corroboration purposes?
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• Saindad and 2 Others vs The State1972 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-08
  criminal appealmurderinterested witnessesmedical evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan maintaining the conviction and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with convictions under Section 13-D of the Arms Act. The core legal question was whether the testimony of interested eye-witnesses could be accepted without satisfactory corroboration, particularly when it conflicted with the medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence, digestion state, and injuries. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence was inconsistent with the ocular account regarding the presence of food in the stomach and the number of hatchet wounds, and that the eye-witnesses were interested and uncorroborated, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. The Court laid down the principle that material inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, coupled with the absence of independent corroboration for interested witnesses, entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt in criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence of interested eye-witnesses can be accepted without satisfactory corroboration when it is inconsistent with medical evidence?
  • Does conflict between the time of death determined by medical evidence and the prosecution's stated time of occurrence warrant the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  • Whether inconsistencies regarding the nature and number of injuries between ocular testimony and medical reports are sufficient to set aside a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Said Kamal vs The State1972 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-13
  jail appealmurderdying declarationFirst Information Reportappellant agesentence of deathocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a jail appeal arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Said Kamal, for the murder of Ambar Shah. The core legal question involved the evaluation of the dying declarations—both verbal and written—and the determination of the appellant's age for the purpose of sentencing. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and held that the written dying declaration (treated as the First Information Report) and the verbal dying declaration made to natural witnesses were genuine, reliable, and sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court further held that the belatedly produced school leaving certificate regarding the appellant's age was rightly rejected by the High Court in favor of medical and judicial record assessments indicating an age of 20 years. Finding no mitigating circumstances or valid grounds for interference, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of death under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a written dying declaration incorporated in the First Information Report can form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • Can a belatedly produced school leaving certificate override medical and judicial assessments of an accused person's age for sentencing?
  • Whether verbal dying declarations made to natural witnesses immediately after the occurrence are admissible and reliable?
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• Said Jalal and 2 Others vs The State and Another1972 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-07
  police investigationpreliminary inquirymagisterial powerscognizable casecriminal procedurequashmentstatutory duties of police
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a revisional application and holding that a District Magistrate's order directing a subordinate Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while the police were actively investigating a cognizable case was bad in law. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is competent to direct a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a cognizable case while police investigation is still underway. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where the police are carrying on an investigation and have not acted under subsection (2) of section 157 of the Code, a Magistrate cannot stop the police investigation or hold a preliminary inquiry himself or depute a subordinate Magistrate to do so. The Court laid down the principle that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary rather than overlapping, and a Magistrate cannot interfere with the statutory duty of the police to investigate cognizable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is competent to direct a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while a police investigation is ongoing?
  • Can the judiciary interfere with the statutory right and duty of the police to investigate a cognizable offence?
  • What is the scope of a Magistrate's power under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure upon receiving a report under section 157?
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• Said Akbar and Another vs The State And 2 Other1972 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  criminal referencecouncil of eldersnighttime identificationwrit jurisdictioncriminal law amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from criminal proceedings registered under sections 307 and 436 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the appellants for attempting to murder the complainants and setting fire to their chhappar. The Commissioner, Peshawar Division, referred the case to a council of elders under the relevant legal framework, noting doubts about the reliability of nighttime identification evidence in an ordinary court of law. The appellants challenged the reference unsuccessfully before the Home Secretary and subsequently via a writ petition in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner's apprehension regarding the sufficiency of identification evidence at night constituted a valid ground for making a reference to a tribunal under the applicable law. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner acted with lawful authority as the circumstances attracted rule 3(a) and rule 3(j) of the West Pakistan Criminal (Amendments) Rules, 1963, and that the ends of justice justified the reference. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's refusal to interfere.

  Questions settled

  • Whether apprehension regarding nighttime identification evidence constitutes a valid ground for referring a case to a council of elders?
  • Did the Commissioner act with lawful authority in making the reference under the West Pakistan Criminal (Amendments) Rules, 1963?
  • Was the High Court justified in declining to interfere with the reference order in writ jurisdiction?
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• Sahib Dad vs Muhammad Ajaib and Another1972 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-04
  Muslim LawGiftDoctrine of MushaaUndivided PropertyLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the validity of a gift of undivided property, specifically raising the doctrine of mushaa under Muslim Law. The petitioner argued that the gift of an undivided share in property was invalid. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether the doctrine of mushaa renders a gift of an undivided share in property invalid under Muslim Law. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention regarding the invalidity of the gift of mushaa lacked merit. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that a gift of a share of undivided property is valid under Muslim Law. The Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine relating to the invalidity of a gift of mushaa is unadapted to a progressive state of society and must be confined within the strictest rules. Consequently, the Court found no force in the petitioner's argument and upheld the validity of the gift, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a gift of a share of undivided property valid under Muslim Law?
  • Does the doctrine of mushaa render a gift of undivided property invalid in a progressive state of society?
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• Saeedur Rehman and 10 Others vs Government of Punjab, Lahore and 3 Other1972 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land resumptiondefault in instalmentswrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of the resumption of land purchased by the petitioners in 1950 due to default in payment of instalments. Following various administrative proceedings, the Governor of West Pakistan ordered the restoration of the land subject to conditions, which the petitioners repeatedly failed to fulfill, leading to fresh resumption orders and notices under the Colonization of the Government Lands Act. The petitioners challenged these proceedings through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed in limine on the grounds that the Governor's order was not challenged in time and that subsequent valid resumption orders stood unchallenged. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no fault in the impugned order, and dismissed the petition. The core legal question involved the validity of land resumption upon default and the challenge to long-standing administrative orders. The court held that failure to comply with conditional restoration orders and failure to timely challenge administrative or judicial decisions precludes relief under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be maintained to challenge an administrative order after a lapse of twelve years?
  • Can land be legally resumed upon default in payment of instalments under the Colonization of the Government Lands Act?
  • Does a failure to challenge a foundational administrative order bar subsequent challenges to consequential judicial orders?
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• Saeed Zakaria vs The State and Another1972 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-21
  criminal breach of trustsentencingrestitutionmitigation of sentencemisappropriationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order that had convicted the appellant under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal breach of trust, reversing an initial acquittal by the trial court. The core legal question concerned the appropriate sentencing in light of the appellant's offer to make full restitution for the misappropriated funds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan maintained the conviction but exercised its discretion to modify the sentence. Holding that the appellant's commitment to repay the entire misappropriated amount warranted leniency, the Court reduced the term of imprisonment to simple imprisonment until the rising of the Court. The Court further imposed a fine of Rs. 17,000, directing that Rs. 16,600 be paid as compensation to the complainant department and the remaining Rs. 400 be paid to the State Treasury. This judgment establishes the principle that in cases of criminal breach of trust, full restitution of misappropriated funds by the accused may be considered a mitigating factor for the reduction of a custodial sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence for criminal breach of trust be reduced if the accused makes full restitution of the misappropriated funds?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to modify a sentence imposed by the High Court in a criminal appeal?
  • Is simple imprisonment until the rising of the court a permissible sentence for an offence under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• S. Shabbir Hussain and 2 Others vs Additional Settlement1972 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  inheritance disputefindings of factsettlement authoritiesallotmentreversionerMartial Law Regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a revision petition challenging a decision by the delegate Chief Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Mst. Bashiran, was the daughter of Mohar Singh and thus entitled to inherit the disputed property, and whether the claim of a reversioner, Moti, was valid. The Supreme Court held that the determination of Mst. Bashiran's status as the daughter of Mohar Singh and the status of Moti as a reversioner were pure questions of fact, which the High Court correctly declined to interfere with, as they were based on evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the allotment to the vendors under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 was invalid because the information provided by the informer was incorrect, confirming Mst. Bashiran as the sole heir. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower forums when those findings are supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by settlement authorities when those findings are based on evidence?
  • Does an allotment made under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 remain valid if the information provided by the informer is found to be incorrect?
  • Is a person who has not made a claim entitled to be considered a reversioner in property disputes before settlement authorities?
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• S. Muhammad Jaffar Shah and Another vs The State1972 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-24
  misjoinder of chargesjoint trialacquittal appealrecovery of charasunlicensed armsprejudicecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, who were the driver and cleaner of a truck, were tried jointly for offences under section 4 of the Prohibition Act and section 19 of the Arms Act, and were acquitted by the trial Magistrate. The High Court, on an appeal by the State, set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for retrial on the ground that the offences were distinct and not part of the same transaction, thereby vitiating the joint trial due to misjoinder of charges. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the joint trial for the recovery of charas and an unlicensed weapon was illegal and vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal, noting that the recoveries occurred during the same search sequence, no objection regarding misjoinder was raised at the trial, and no prejudice was caused to either party. The Court further observed that under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a trial is not vitiated by misjoinder of charges unless prejudice is shown, thereby laying down the principle that procedural irregularities without ensuing prejudice do not invalidate a trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of charas and an unlicensed revolver from the same vehicle constitutes distinct transactions requiring separate trials?
  • Does a misjoinder of charges automatically vitiate a trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is proof of prejudice mandatory before setting aside a trial on the ground of misjoinder of charges?
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• S. M. Yousuf vs The Collector of Customs, Karachi and 3 Other1972 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  search and seizurecustoms authoritiesillegal seizurerestoration of goodswrit petitionconditional release
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which accepted the appellant's writ petition regarding the search and seizure of foreign-made textile goods by the Customs authorities, but imposed certain conditions for their release. The core legal question concerned the legality of imposing conditions upon the restoration of goods seized unlawfully by the Customs authorities. The Supreme Court held, following its previous precedent, that there was no warrant in law for the conditions imposed by the High Court upon the restoration of the seized goods. The key principle laid down is that when a search and seizure by Customs authorities is declared illegal, the seized goods must be restored to the person from whom they were taken without the imposition of extraneous conditions regarding inventory, marking, or restraint on disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court impose conditions on the restoration of goods when their seizure by the Customs authorities is held to be illegal?
  • Whether goods seized unlawfully under the Sea Customs Act can be retained by the authorities after the search and seizure is declared illegal?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs to proceed under the Sea Customs Act survive an illegal search and seizure?
  Read full judgment →
• Rustam Khan and Others vs The State1972 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  death sentencecommutation of sentencecriminal appealinterested witnessesmedical evidencemurderappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentences imposed on the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The appellants challenged the convictions, arguing that the prosecution's case relied on interested witnesses and conflicted with medical evidence and other testimony. The Supreme Court, having granted leave to appeal solely on the question of sentence, declined to revisit the merits of the conviction, noting that the trial and appellate courts had already found the evidence reliable. Regarding the sentence, the Court examined whether the delay in proceedings or the nature of the motive warranted commutation of the death penalty. The Court held that the murder was a cold-blooded, unprovoked act involving lethal weapons, with no extenuating circumstances. It reaffirmed the principle that it will not interfere with a legal sentence unless a significant question of principle is involved, which was absent here. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the appellants to seek clemency from the Provincial Government regarding the delay in the conclusion of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence in the absence of a question of principle?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted solely on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to revisit the merits of a conviction when leave to appeal was granted on a limited question of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ross Masood Khan and Another vs Major Riaz Ahmad and Other1972 SCMR 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-17
  special leave to appealinterlocutory orderinspection of documentscompanies actreview petitioninterim constitutionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a matter arising under section 76 of the Companies Act. The impugned order directed the company to grant the respondents inspection of certain documents to prepare their rejoinder. During the proceedings, questions arose regarding the maintainability of the petition in light of statutory bars on intra-court appeals against interlocutory orders, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution to entertain special leave petitions against such orders. The Supreme Court observed that while it possesses jurisdiction under Article 186 of the Interim Constitution to entertain special leave petitions against interlocutory orders in cases of manifest perversity, grave miscarriage of justice, or lack of jurisdiction, it generally refrains from doing so as a matter of practice. Noting that a review petition was already pending before the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition while directing the High Court to consider the validity of the petitioners' specific objections regarding the scope of inspection under the Companies Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for special leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of a High Court?
  • Are shareholders entitled to a roving inspection of the entire books of account of a company under the Companies Act?
  • Whether an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case is appealable within the High Court under the Law Reforms Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Robert Cotton Associates Ltd, Khanewal- vs Khan Karam Hussain Khan and 2 Othsrss1972 PLD Supreme Court 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-07
  Limitation ActMutual open and current accountRecovery suitSurety liabilityDebit and credit entriesArticle 85 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a suit for the recovery of money advanced by a firm to an individual, secured by a surety. The lower courts dismissed the suit as time-barred, ruling that Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable because the account between the parties was not mutual, open and current, as it lacked independent obligations on both sides. The core legal question was whether the account qualified as a mutual, open and current account under Article 85. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the account was indeed mutual, open and current. The Court established that for Article 85 to apply, it is sufficient that there is an open, current account consisting of mutual items of debit and credit in the course of dealings, without requiring that the balance must shift from one side to the other or that independent obligations must arise. Consequently, the suit was deemed within the limitation period, and the matter was remanded for a decision on merits regarding the surety's liability.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes a mutual, open and current account for the purposes of Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the application of Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908 require that transactions create independent obligations on both sides?
  • Must the balance in an account shift from one side to the other for it to be considered a mutual, open and current account under Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ullah vs The State1972 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29
  murderresiled witnessescriminal procedureappreciation of evidenceblood-stained recoveriesspecial leave appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan maintaining the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of transportation for life for the murder of his daughter. The core legal question involved the assessment of evidence where principal prosecution eye-witnesses resiled from their earlier statements at trial and attempted to shift blame, and the admissibility and reliability of previous statements brought on record under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly relied upon the former statements of the witnesses admitted under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as they were fully supported by medical evidence, prompt first information reports, and incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons and clothing. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous statements of witnesses who resile at the trial can be admitted and used as substantive evidence under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained primarily on former statements of witnesses corroborated by medical evidence and recoveries?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ullah and Another vs The Secretary, Evacuee Property Trust Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore and 2 Other1972 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-10
  evacuee property trust boardlease cancellationwrit petitionunilateral cancellationalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition in limine. The appellants challenged an order of the Secretary, Evacuee Property Trust Board, cancelling a lease of evacuee trust lands previously granted to them. The cancellation was purportedly made to re-auction the land in smaller lots for higher rent without notice to the appellants. The High Court had dismissed the petition assuming an alternative remedy of appeal existed. During the appeal, the Evacuee Trust Board conceded that the cancellation order should be deemed withdrawn and the appellants permitted to remain in possession for the remainder of the lease period up to Rabi 1973. The Supreme Court recorded the statement of the Board's counsel and disposed of the appeal without making any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Evacuee Property Trust Board has jurisdiction to unilaterally cancel a lease after its execution?
  • Does an alternative remedy by way of appeal lie against an order of cancellation passed by the Evacuee Property Trust Board itself?
  • Can a lease of evacuee trust land be cancelled merely to enable the Board to obtain a higher income by re-auctioning the plot in smaller lots?
  Read full judgment →
• Redi Gul vs Mian Gul and Another1972 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-11Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmed Ansari vs The Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 Other1972 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11
  property resumptionsettlement schemetransfer priceauctionlocus standimisrepresentationfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the cancellation of a property transfer order and subsequent auction of a bungalow due to the petitioner's failure to pay the transfer price. The petitioner was transferred half of a bungalow in Lahore but failed to pay the balance price within the prescribed time despite receiving multiple demand notices under Settlement Scheme No. 8. Consequently, the property was resumed, and the resumption order became final under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as the petitioner failed to challenge it. The petitioner subsequently sought extensions through misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, including the prior resumption of the property. The property was eventually auctioned to a third party. The petitioner's appeals and subsequent writ petitions were dismissed due to lack of locus standi and the finality of the resumption order. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the petitioner's failure to comply with payment obligations and his subsequent concealment of facts precluded any relief, as the property had been validly resumed and auctioned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to pay the transfer price within the prescribed time under Settlement Scheme No. 8 render a property liable to resumption?
  • Can a petitioner who has failed to challenge a resumption order under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, later seek relief after the property has been auctioned?
  • Does the concealment of material facts in an application to a Settlement Commissioner disentitle a party to relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmad vs The State1972 PLD SC 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-10
  criminal jurisdictionsanction for prosecutionpublic servantcoram non judicedefalcationmandatory statutory conditionCantonment Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the appellant's conviction for defalcation while employed as a Cashier at the Wah Cantonment Board. The core legal question was whether the Special Judge could validly take cognizance of the case without the mandatory sanction required under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. The Supreme Court held that the sanction obtained from the Executive Officer was invalid as the appropriate authority was the Central Government. The Court established that where a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction—such as a valid sanction—is not fulfilled, the entire proceedings are rendered illegal and coram non judice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that jurisdictional defects may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal. Regarding the appellant's status, the Court determined that because his appeal against dismissal was still pending, he remained a public servant for the purposes of the sanction requirement. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded for trial following the procurement of proper legal sanction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take cognizance of a criminal case against a public servant without the mandatory sanction required by the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
  • Is a trial conducted without the required statutory sanction for prosecution illegal and void?
  • Can an objection regarding the lack of mandatory sanction for prosecution be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
  • Does a public servant whose appeal against dismissal is pending remain a public servant for the purpose of requiring sanction for prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan and 24 Others vs Mst. Tobi and 9 Other1972 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-13
  leave to appealremandsettlement commissionerconstitutional petitionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from an order of the Settlement Commissioner remanding a property dispute case to the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner for a fresh decision regarding the parties' claims and the exact date of death of the original property holder, Mst. Naji. A Lahore High Court Single Judge dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition, declining to interfere with the remand order because it allowed the petitioners to establish their claims lawfully and prevented them from retaining excess shares. The Supreme Court evaluated the contentions that the High Court should have exercised its discretion upon finding parts of the proceedings flawed or out of time. The Supreme Court held that no fault lay with the High Court's refusal to interfere since the matter remained pending on remand and the petitioners could still advance their case in the fresh inquiry. Consequently, the leave petition was dismissed, with the clarification that prior observations shall not prejudice the petitioners' claims during the remand proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction against a remand order when the matter has not yet been finally decided?
  • Does an order of remand passed by a Settlement Commissioner warrant interference if it affords both parties full opportunity to establish their claims?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Habib Ahmad Khan vs The Income Tax Officer1972 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  income-tax assessmentex parte assessmentsubstituted servicealternative remedywrit jurisdictionservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which challenged ex parte income-tax assessments. The petitioner contended that the ex parte proceedings were unlawful due to improper service of notices and that the assessment was invalid because the notification reconstituting the charges of Commissioners of Income-tax was signed by a 'second Secretary' instead of a Member or the Secretary to the Board. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's representative had previously accepted service and subsequently avoided it, justifying substituted service by affixation. On the administrative challenge, the Court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that a 'second Secretary' did not fall within the description of 'Secretary to the Board' under the relevant rules. Furthermore, the Court held that the writ petition was maintainable as the petitioner had already elected to pursue an alternative statutory appeal, and simultaneous remedies should not be permitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte income-tax assessment is valid if service of notice is effected by affixation after the assessee's representative avoids service?
  • Does a notification signed by a 'second Secretary' satisfy a rule requiring the signature of 'the Secretary to the Board' in the absence of evidence to the contrary?
  • Can a petitioner simultaneously pursue a constitutional writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 while a statutory appeal on the same matter is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Habib Ahmad Khan vs The Income Tax Officer, Hazara Circle, Abbottabad1972 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  ex parte assessmentsubstituted serviceincome taxconstitutional petitionspecial remedyjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court arising from a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which challenged an ex parte income-tax assessment order. The core legal question was whether the Income-tax Officer validly effected substituted service and had jurisdiction to pass an ex parte assessment after the assessee's authorized representative returned a notice with an endorsement that the assessee was away for Haj. The Supreme Court held that the return of the notice with such an endorsement amounted to a refusal to accept service, thereby justifying substituted service under the relevant procedural rules. The Court laid down the key principle that where a statute creates a special right or liability along with a special remedy, that specific remedy must be exhausted, and constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 cannot be invoked as a substitute for statutory appeals or revisions where an order is merely irregular rather than wholly without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the return of a notice with an endorsement that the assessee has gone for Haj amount to a refusal to accept service justifying substituted service?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 be treated as a substitute for statutory appeal or revision?
  • Does an irregularity in procedural service render an income-tax assessment order wholly without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Raj Khan and 5 Others vs Fazal Hussain and 5 Other1972 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-12
  limited ownerrefugee land allotmentreversionary rightsgift validitymutationcivil court jurisdictionShariat law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerns the nature of the estate held by a female refugee widow who received land allotments in Pakistan in lieu of property inherited from her husband in India. The core legal question was whether such a widow acquired an absolute interest in the allotted land or held it as a limited owner, thereby restricting her power to alienate the property. The Supreme Court, following its precedent in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Mohammad Shaffi, held that the widow did not acquire an absolute interest. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision, which had erroneously relied on a now-overruled Full Bench judgment. The Court further rejected the respondents' argument regarding the civil court's lack of jurisdiction, noting that the gift was only completed upon the attestation of mutation in 1959. The Court held that the gift was valid only to the extent of the widow's legal share under Shariat law, as she held the property as a limited owner, and restored the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a female refugee widow acquire an absolute interest in land allotted to her in Pakistan in lieu of property inherited from her husband in India?
  • When is a gift of land considered complete under Mohammadan Law for the purpose of determining civil court jurisdiction?
  • Can a respondent raise a new plea regarding the lack of jurisdiction of civil courts for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • To what extent is a gift of land made by a limited owner valid after her demise?
  Read full judgment →
• Qazi Asadulhaq vs Miss R. A. Money and 7 Other1972 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-02-21
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyCentral Government approvalcustodian of evacuee propertysettlement commissionerdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the status of property in Abbottabad, initially occupied by the appellant, which was claimed as evacuee property. The central legal question involved the determination of the property's status and the validity of its transfer to the respondents. The Deputy Custodian initially declared the property evacuee property, but the Custodian, Lahore, later modified this, holding that only the shares belonging to the sons of the original owner (who resided in India) constituted evacuee property, while the daughters' shares did not. During the appeal, the Government of Pakistan produced a letter confirming that the Central Government had exercised its powers to approve the transfer of the property to the respondent, Miss R. A. Money. The Supreme Court held that the Central Government possesses the authority under the relevant statute to approve such transfers and direct the Chief Settlement Commissioner to execute necessary sale documents. The principle laid down is that the Central Government holds the statutory power to approve the disposal of evacuee property otherwise than under the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Central Government have the power to approve the transfer of evacuee property otherwise than under the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner be authorized to execute sale documents for evacuee property upon approval by the Central Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadir Khan vs Board of Revenue, West Pakistan Lahore and 13 Other1972 S CM R 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  public auctionauction publicityrevenue authoritieswrit petitiondiscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over a plot of land auctioned by the Revenue authorities and purchased by the appellant. The auction was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, but subsequently set aside by the Additional Commissioner upon an appeal by a third party on the ground of lack of due publicity under the rules. The Board of Revenue upheld this decision, and the High Court summarily dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The core legal question was whether the revenue authorities and the High Court properly evaluated the validity of the auction and the sufficiency of its publicity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the revenue authorities were justified in setting aside the auction upon finding it was not properly conducted, and that the High Court rightly declined to interfere with a fair and reasonable order under its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that concurrent administrative determinations regarding procedural irregularities in public auctions warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under constitutional jurisdiction with an order of revenue authorities setting aside a defective public auction?
  • Did the revenue authorities properly evaluate the sufficiency of publicity for the auction of the disputed plot?
  • Whether an auction conducted without complying with the requirements regarding notice and publicity under the relevant rules is liable to be set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Prince Ghulam Muhammad Khan vs Settlement & Rehabilitation1972 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-09-13
  urban garden allotmentrehabilitation schemeproduce index unitsacreage entitlementtemporary urban schemedisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the cancellation of an urban garden allotment known as "Dholandas Garden" in Hyderabad. The core legal question was whether the allotment and entitlement of urban garden lands should be determined on the basis of produce index units or on an acreage basis under the relevant rehabilitation schemes and Supplementary Scheme No. 2. The Supreme Court held that urban lands and gardens are excluded from the main Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and that under Supplementary Scheme No. 2 read with the Temporary Urban Scheme, allotments in municipal towns like Hyderabad are governed by acreage equivalents corresponding to the class of area left behind in India, rather than produce index units. The Court laid down that courts must apply the correct governing law regardless of whether it is expressly cited by the litigants, and that urban garden entitlements must be assessed on an acreage basis according to prescribed scales rather than produce index units.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allotment of urban garden lands is governed by produce index units or by verified acreage under the rehabilitation laws?
  • Does the main Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme apply to urban lands and urban gardens?
  • Whether it is the duty of the court to apply the correct statutory law even if not specifically drawn to its attention by the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Premier Cloth Mills Ltd., Lyallpur vs The Sales Tax Officer, Investigation Circle II, Lahore and Another1972 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-07
  sales tax assessmentlegislative competenceretrospective operationwrit jurisdictionlimitation periodimposition of penaltyremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This certificated appeal challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant-company's writ petition in limine regarding a sales tax assessment and penalty for the assessment year 1955-56. The core legal questions involved the constitutional validity and continued force of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, the limitation period for framing assessments, and the legality of imposing a penalty without a hearing. The Supreme Court held, following precedent, that the Federal Legislature's temporary power to enact laws on a subject does not limit the prospective or retrospective operation of laws enacted within that timeframe, thereby upholding the validity of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. However, because the High Court declined to address the remaining issues concerning limitation and the imposition of penalties, the Supreme Court set aside the order and remanded the case back to the High Court to determine whether the assessment was barred by time under Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and whether the penalty was lawfully imposed without affording an opportunity of being heard.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sales Tax Act 1951 lapsed after 31st March 1952 due to the time-limited power of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act 1935?
  • Can a legislature with a time-limited power enact laws with prospective or retrospective operation beyond that specified time period?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction on issues going to the root of the assessment authority's jurisdiction, such as limitation and lack of notice?
  • Is an assessment framed after the lapse of the prescribed statutory period legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Phulail Khan Shah Wall Shah Wall vs The State This State1972 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murder convictionocular evidenceacquittal appealretrialmedical evidencecriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction and death sentence of appellant Phulail Khan for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while simultaneously setting aside the acquittal of co-appellant Shah Wali and ordering his retrial. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of ocular evidence despite alleged inconsistencies with medical reports regarding firing distances, and the propriety of the High Court's interference with an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Phulail Khan, finding the ocular testimony credible and corroborated by motive and physical evidence, including recovered bullet casings. Regarding Shah Wali, while the Court acknowledged the High Court's authority to review acquittals, it held that ordering a retrial after a significant lapse of time—nearly four years since the occurrence and subsequent acquittal—would be an exercise in futility and unjust. Consequently, the Court dismissed Phulail Khan's appeal but set aside the order for Shah Wali's retrial, effectively acquitting him due to the passage of time and potential unavailability of witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal based on conjecture or unreasonable grounds?
  • Does the passage of a significant period of time between the occurrence of an offense and a proposed retrial justify setting aside an order for retrial?
  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses rendered unreliable solely because medical evidence does not explicitly confirm the firing distance alleged by the witnesses?
  • Can statements made before a committing court be relied upon as substantive evidence if not brought on record under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Waheed vs Punjab Province through Collector, District1972 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  civil revisioninterim injunctionrevisional jurisdictionTakavi loanjudicial discretionrecovery proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court in civil revision proceedings, which modified a trial court's grant of an interim injunction. The petitioner challenged recovery proceedings initiated by revenue authorities regarding a Takavi loan. The High Court had maintained the injunction but imposed conditions requiring the early disposal of the suit and the furnishing of security for the disputed amount. The core legal question was whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, possessed the authority to vary the terms of an interim injunction granted by a trial court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court acted within its legal authority. The Court affirmed that under revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has full powers to correct errors committed by lower courts and to ensure that judicial discretion is exercised in accordance with sound legal principles. Consequently, the imposition of conditions, such as requiring security and directing the expedited disposal of a suit, was deemed reasonable and within the High Court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to vary the terms of an interim injunction granted by a trial court while exercising revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a High Court impose conditions, such as the furnishing of security, when maintaining an interim injunction in revision?
  • Is the imposition of a condition for the early disposal of a suit by a revisional court considered a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Muhammad vs The State And 2 Other1972 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  condonation of delaylimitationpetition against acquittalmurder casetime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the petitioner against a judgment of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court acquitting two respondents of a murder charge. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was barred by time by three days. Considering the issue of limitation in petitions challenging acquittals, the Court held that delay cannot be condoned unless it is demonstrated that the petitioner was prevented from filing the petition within time due to some specific act of the acquitted respondents. Finding that no such act by the acquitted respondents was alleged in the petitioner's application for condonation of delay, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition against acquittal can be condoned without proving an act of the acquitted respondent that precluded timely filing?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court condone delay in a petition challenging an acquittal judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Muhammad and 13 Others vs Abad Muhammad Khan and 5 Other1972 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-04
  rehabilitation schemeFard-e-Haqiatland allotmentdue processex parte orderreview petitiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for special leave against a Lahore High Court order that invalidated an Officer on Special Duty's decision to reduce the respondents' verified land entitlement. The respondents, displaced persons, had their land entitlement verified at 4,236 units. Following an ex parte reduction of this entitlement by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, the Officer on Special Duty initially restored the original verification. However, upon a third review petition filed by the petitioners years later, the Officer reduced the entitlement to 2,968 units without notice to the respondents. The High Court set aside this reduction, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the reduction of verified entitlement without notice to the affected parties was legally invalid. The Court held that the Rehabilitation Scheme mandates specific procedures for verifying objections to Fard-e-Haqiats, and any grievance regarding excess land allotment must be pursued through the competent Settlement authorities under section 11 of the relevant Act, rather than through arbitrary review orders lacking due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Officer on Special Duty reduce a verified land entitlement without providing notice to the affected party?
  • What is the proper procedure for challenging an alleged excess land allotment under the Rehabilitation Scheme?
  • Does a third review petition filed years later without notice to the respondent constitute a valid exercise of authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Noorali Bana and 9 Others vs The Province of Sind through the Chief1972 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-09
  temporary injunctionstatutory review powerbalance of convenienceirreparable injurycivil suitadministrative proceedingsland records
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an intra-court appeal by the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan. The petitioners sought a temporary injunction to restrain the Deputy Commissioner, Karachi, from exercising his statutory power to review a predecessor's order regarding land ownership entries in the register of Haq Qabza, while a civil suit for declaration and injunction concerning the same land was pending. The core legal question was whether the court should grant an injunction to halt administrative proceedings when the subject matter is also under civil litigation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing the injunction. The Court reasoned that the Deputy Commissioner possessed a statutory right of review and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents. Furthermore, the Court established that no irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners, as they retained the right to challenge any adverse administrative order in a civil court, thereby precluding the necessity for judicial interference at the interlocutory stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain a Deputy Commissioner from exercising statutory review powers over land records while a related civil suit is pending?
  • Is a temporary injunction appropriate when the applicant has an alternative remedy to challenge an adverse administrative order in a civil suit?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit automatically bar administrative authorities from exercising statutory powers of review?
  Read full judgment →
• Nook Mohammad vs Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Lyallpur and 2 Other1972 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-13
  land settlementproduce index unitsfindings of factspecial leave to appealstatutory amendmentretroactivitydisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a petition filed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner sought an enhancement of Produce Index Units, claiming that the initial description of his allotted land as 'Ghair Mumkin' was incorrect and should have been 'Ghair Mumkin Reg'. The High Court declined to interfere, holding that the matter involved findings of fact, and that the petitioner suffered no actual loss, as the Fard-e-Haqiat remained unamended. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner further argued that a 1972 amendment to Section 30 of the Act entitled him to pursue appellate or revisional remedies. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the High Court correctly refused to re-examine findings of fact. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on the 1972 amendment, noting that the High Court proceedings had concluded well before the amendment was enacted. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with factual determinations and that statutory amendments do not apply retroactively to concluded litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact in a petition under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does a statutory amendment enacted after the conclusion of legal proceedings apply to those proceedings?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to an enhancement of Produce Index Units if the Fard-e-Haqiat has not been amended?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizamuddin vs The State1972 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  death sentencemitigating circumstancesextreme youthpremeditated murdercriminal appealsentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a conviction for murder and the subsequent confirmation of a death sentence by the Lahore High Court. The appellant challenged the propriety of the death sentence, arguing that he was a youth of 17 years at the time of the incident and had acted under provocation, citing extreme youth as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the Investigating Magistrate had assessed the appellant's age as 20 years, thereby rejecting the claim of extreme youth. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of provocation, characterizing the attack as a brutal and premeditated act involving five fatal knife blows. The Court held that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the death sentence was appropriate. Regarding the appellant's plea for sentence reduction based on the passage of three years since the prosecution, the Court clarified that such considerations fall within the purview of executive authorities rather than the judiciary. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the passage of time since the commencement of prosecution constitute a valid legal ground for an appellate court to reduce a death sentence?
  • Is the claim of extreme youth a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence when the accused is assessed to be 20 years old?
  • Can an appellate court consider a plea for sentence reduction based on the passage of time, or is this a matter for the executive authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muttali vs The State1972 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-02
  murderdying statementbenefit of the doubtocular testimonycriminal appealuncorroborated evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Muttali, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Nazir Ahmad, handed down by the trial court and upheld by the High Court, while four co-accused were acquitted. The core legal question was whether a criminal conviction can be safely sustained solely upon an uncorroborated oral dying statement deposed by a court witness, particularly when the primary ocular testimony has been discarded and the recovery evidence is rendered unreliable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The ratio laid down is that where eye-witnesses are disbelieved, recoveries are doubtful, and the circumstances surrounding an alleged oral dying statement—such as the severity of injuries precluding speech and the absence of corroboration—fail to satisfy the test of probability, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction on solitary, uncorroborated testimony, thereby giving the accused the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an oral dying statement when eye-witnesses have been rejected?
  • Whether the recovery of blood-stained articles in the absence of respectable local witnesses can serve as valid corroboration?
  • Is a conviction safe under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when medical evidence casts doubt on the injured person's ability to speak?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad and Another vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab1972 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  evacuee propertylife estateCustodian of Evacuee Propertypartitionland revenueejectmentdeclaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition dismissed by the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, concerning the status of land as evacuee property. The petitioners' late father had obtained land under an agreement executed in 1942 by a life-estate holder, a non-Muslim who later migrated to India upon Partition and died in 1949. The petitioners sought a declaration under evacuee property laws that the land was not evacuee property and that they could not be ejected. The core legal questions were whether property treated as evacuee property by Rehabilitation authorities could be declared non-evacuee property based on a life tenant's pre-Partition agreement, and whether such agreement survived the life tenant's death. The Supreme Court held that the property was rightly treated as evacuee property and that any agreement entered into by the life-estate holder became ineffective upon her death in 1949, requiring restoration of possession to the Custodian Department. The Court dismissed the petition, noting that any independent succession claims as collaterals could be adjudicated before the Custodian.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement creating a tenancy or right to remain in possession granted by a life-estate holder survive the death of the life-estate holder?
  • Does property belonging to a non-Muslim who migrated to India after Partition automatically become evacuee property upon her death in India?
  • Can a occupant retain possession of evacuee property against the Custodian Department based on a pre-Partition agreement executed by a deceased life-tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukha and Others vs Rifat Pasha Sheikh, C. S. P., Member, Board of Revenue and Other1972 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-28
  abatementlegal representativeswrit petitionconsolidation proceedingslimitationdeceased partynullity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging consolidation proceedings on the ground that the writ petition had abated as a whole due to the failure to bring the legal representatives of several deceased parties on record within time. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition as abated and whether delay in bringing legal representatives on record could be condoned without a proper and timely application under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the petition, as proceedings against dead persons are a nullity and applications for substitution were excessively delayed without sufficient cause. The key principle laid down is that the penal provisions regarding abatement and limitation apply when legal heirs of deceased parties are not brought on record within the prescribed period, rendering a petition against dead persons a nullity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a writ petition abate when the legal representatives of deceased parties are not brought on record within time?
  • Whether filing a writ petition against dead persons renders the proceedings a nullity?
  • Is the High Court justified in disregarding a belated oral or written application under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad /Murad and Another vs The State1972 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyinterested witnessesballistic reportcorroborative evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which affirmed the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as their sentence under Section 13(d) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The petitioners challenged the convictions on the ground that the prosecution relied on interested oral testimony of relatives and doubtful recoveries of a gun and empty cartridge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular evidence was reliable, supported by disinterested testimony, and corroborated by independent evidence, including ballistic expert report matching the empty cartridge to the petitioner's recovered gun, fitting shoes, and abscondence. The Court reaffirmed that testimony of related witnesses can be relied upon where no prior enmity exists and independent corroboration is present.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses related to the deceased be relied upon to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of prior enmity?
  • Is corroborative evidence, such as a matching ballistic expert report and recovery of belongings from the crime scene, sufficient to uphold a murder conviction based on oral testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousuf vs The Additional Deputy Commissioner1972 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  Constitution petitionLand reformsJoint holdingsManagement of agricultural landSuppression of material factsSub judiceDelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order dismissing a Constitution petition concerning the management of joint agricultural land holdings. The core legal question was whether a Land Commission letter, directing that joint holdings be leased to the highest bidder, constituted a valid amendment to the Land Reforms (Appointment of Managers of Impartible Joint Holdings) Rules, 1964, or a valid order under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation. The Supreme Court held that while the letter failed to qualify as a valid rule amendment under paragraph 6 of the Regulation due to the absence of government sanction, the Land Commission possessed broad residual powers under paragraph 4(5) of the Regulation to address unforeseen difficulties. However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant failed to disclose material facts, specifically that the underlying dispute was sub judice and that he had previously withdrawn revisional applications following a compromise. The judgment affirms that constitutional relief is discretionary and may be denied where a petitioner suppresses material facts or where the underlying matter remains sub judice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Land Commission letter directing the leasing of joint holdings be considered a valid amendment to the Land Reforms (Appointment of Managers of Impartible Joint Holdings) Rules, 1964, without government sanction?
  • Does the Land Commission possess the power under paragraph 4(5) of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation to issue orders for matters not explicitly provided for in the Regulation?
  • Is a Constitution petition liable to be dismissed if the petitioner fails to disclose that the underlying dispute is sub judice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Khan and Others vs Pakistan Western Railway1972 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  review petitiondeclaratory decreeexecution of decreewrit jurisdictionseniority disputecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for the review of an order passed by the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioners, railway guards, sought a review arguing that the court was under a misconception regarding the dates of certain judicial decisions concerning their seniority. The core legal question was whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 is an appropriate legal remedy for enforcing a declaratory decree or resolving a seniority dispute, and whether an alleged error of date in the previous judgment warranted a review. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the writ jurisdiction was indeed misconceived for enforcing a declaratory decree or determining service seniority, and that the chronological error pointed out by the petitioners had no material bearing on the core decision. The principle laid down is that a party cannot use constitutional writ jurisdiction as a substitute for execution proceedings to enforce a declaratory decree or to settle service seniority disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of a declaratory decree?
  • Can service seniority disputes be resolved through constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a minor chronological error in a judgment that has no material bearing on the outcome warrant the review of the order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Warrayam vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore1972 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03
  Lambardari appointmentRevenue estateWrit jurisdictionAdministrative discretionHereditary officeWest Pakistan Land Revenue RulesFinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the appointment of a Lambardar for Chak No. 124/9-L, Sahiwal. The petitioner, the eldest son of the deceased Lambardar, challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4, arguing that the office should have been hereditary. The core legal questions were whether the revenue estate was owned chiefly by the State, thereby invoking Rule 19(1) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, and whether the High Court could interfere with the Revenue authorities' discretion in selecting a Lambardar under its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the estate's ownership by the Government was conclusive and not subject to interference in writ proceedings. Consequently, the appointment was governed by Rule 19, which does not mandate hereditary succession. The Court affirmed that the selection of a Lambardar lies within the discretion of Revenue authorities, and such administrative decisions are not amenable to interference under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of a Lambardar in an estate owned chiefly by the Government subject to hereditary succession?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the ownership of a revenue estate be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with the discretionary selection of a Lambardar by Revenue authorities under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad vs Ghaus and 4 Other1972 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-01
  acquittalcriminal appealright of private defencesuppression of injuriesaggressionprosecution evidencetwo versions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the High Court's acquittal of respondents who had been convicted by the trial court for murder and causing injuries. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in overturning the convictions based on the prosecution's failure to prove aggression and the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution evidence itself indicated the complainant party had confronted the accused as they passed by, seeking an encounter. The Court held that the mere fact that the complainant party sustained more injuries does not automatically establish them as the victims of aggression, especially when the prosecution suppressed the injuries sustained by the accused in the initial report. The Court affirmed the High Court's view that the defence version could not be ruled out and that the prosecution's case was undermined by its own evidence and the suppression of material facts. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, ruling that the High Court's decision was based on a valid assessment of the evidence and did not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a complainant party sustained more injuries than the accused automatically establish the accused as the aggressor?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution suppressing injuries sustained by the accused in the First Information Report?
  • Can an appellate court uphold an acquittal when the prosecution's own evidence supports the possibility of the defence version?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman vs Mst. Amna and 4 Other1972 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-17
  maintenancechild custodyfamily courtrestitution of conjugal rightsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a maintenance decree granted by a Family Court in favor of his wife and children, arguing that the decree should be set aside because he had obtained a separate order for the custody of the children from a Guardian Court. The Additional District Judge had initially set aside the maintenance decree, reasoning that enforcing it would encourage the wife to disobey the custody order. The High Court subsequently quashed the Additional District Judge's order, upholding the maintenance decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that proceedings for maintenance are distinct and separate from proceedings regarding child custody. The Court affirmed that a father remains liable to maintain his children under a valid Family Court order until custody is actually transferred. Furthermore, the Court noted that the custody order itself was currently being challenged on grounds of fraud. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in restoring the maintenance decree, as the maintenance obligation exists independently of the custody dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Are proceedings for child maintenance in a Family Court separate and distinct from proceedings regarding the custody of children?
  • Does a father's liability to maintain his children under a Family Court order persist while a custody dispute is ongoing?
  • Can a maintenance decree be set aside solely on the grounds that a separate custody order has been issued in favor of the father?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman Khan vs Pakistan through the Sec`Retary, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division), Governmentof Pakistan Islamabad and 10 Other1972 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-16
  special leave to appealpromotionvested rightterms and conditions of servicequalifying examinationsenioritywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court. The petitioner, an Inspector in the office of the Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, had successfully passed a qualifying examination for promotion to a Class II Post of Deputy Superintendent under a 1957 directive of the Central Board of Revenue. Subsequently, in October 1970, the Central Board of Revenue abolished the qualifying examination system, allowing senior officers who had not passed the examination to be placed senior in the eligibility list for promotion. The core legal question is whether passing a qualifying examination for promotion creates a vested right or alters the terms and conditions of service when the promotion channel is subsequently abolished by the competent authority. The Supreme Court held that passing the examination did not create any vested right to promotion, and the alteration of the promotion channel by the department did not infringe any legal right or the terms and conditions of service. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that an employee acquires no vested right to promotion or seniority merely by passing a qualifying examination under a superseded departmental policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing a qualifying examination for promotion create a vested right in an employee?
  • Can an administrative authority alter the channel of promotion without infringing the terms and conditions of service?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable to challenge the abolition of a departmental qualifying examination system for promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Tahirur Rehman and 3 Other1972 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-02
  criminal appealmurder convictioninterested witnessesbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceacquittalcross-caseinherent improbability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the Peshawar High Court's order setting aside the convictions of the respondents for murder and attempted murder. The prosecution alleged that the respondents ambushed the complainant party, killing two individuals and injuring others. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on interested witnesses and the presence of significant inconsistencies in the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, noting that all eye-witnesses were inimical toward the accused and lacked independent corroboration. Furthermore, the court highlighted glaring improbabilities, such as the absence of blood at the alleged initial crime scene, the unexplained death of one of the accused, and the failure to present disinterested witnesses despite the occurrence happening in a populated area. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal, reiterating the principle that where prosecution evidence is inherently improbable and witnesses are biased, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by an accused person in a cross-case undermine the credibility of the prosecution's version of events?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution's narrative is contradicted by physical evidence, such as the absence of blood at the alleged scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Sharifuddin and 3 Other1972 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-11
  suo motu revisionlocus standidisplaced persons propertysettlement proceedingswrit jurisdictionauction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan in a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, concerning the transfer of a composite property under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner validly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction, and whether the appellant, a local in possession of a shop who had not filed a transfer application, possessed the locus standi to maintain an appeal against an order refusing review. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner did not exercise independent suo motu jurisdiction, and that a local possessing only a right to bid at an auction has no locus standi to challenge transfer proceedings regarding other portions of the property. The Court laid down the principle that a mere right to bid at an auction does not confer locus standi to intervene in transfer proceedings or maintain an appeal where the person never claimed the property or challenged the original transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a settlement authority can be deemed to have exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction without applying its independent mind to the record?
  • Does a person possessing only a right to bid at a future auction have the locus standi to maintain an appeal against transfer orders of property?
  • Can an appellant who failed to file a transfer application or challenge the original transfer order maintain a challenge against settlement proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Saddar Din and 2 Other1972 SCMR 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-14
  culpable homicideintention to killcommon intentionvictim compensationcriminal appealmedical evidencesentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that modified the respondents' convictions from murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who attacked the deceased with sticks, possessed the specific intention to kill, necessitating a murder conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, reasoning that the use of ordinary sticks and the distribution of injuries—primarily on the legs with only one head injury—demonstrated an absence of intent to kill, although the attackers possessed the knowledge that death was a likely consequence. The Court affirmed that Section 304, Part II is the correct classification when such knowledge exists without specific intent. Furthermore, the Court invoked Section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, ruling that the trial court’s failure to award compensation to the heirs of the deceased was a legal error, and subsequently imposed a mandatory fine as compensation upon the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of ordinary sticks in an assault negate the specific intention to kill required for a murder conviction?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 appropriate when the accused has the knowledge that death is a likely result of their actions?
  • Is the provision for awarding compensation to heirs under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for the courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafqat vs THP State1972 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  raperobberycriminal appealreappraisal of evidenceextra-judicial confessionmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under sections 376/114 and 392/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while modifying the sentence. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and appreciation of ocular and forensic evidence in establishing the charges of rape and robbery. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below were well-founded, supported by credible ocular testimony corroborated by medical and chemical examiner reports, and further reinforced by extra-judicial confessions. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that no grounds were made out for reappraisal of evidence by this Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction for rape can be sustained on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix corroborated by forensic and medical evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappreciate evidence concurrently believed by the courts below in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether an extra-judicial confession coupled with ocular testimony is sufficient to establish guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shaffi vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 Other1972 SCMR 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-16
  Lambardar appointmentadministrative measurewrit jurisdictionjusticiabilityappointment of Lambardar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the appointment of a Lambardar. The petitioner challenged the Collector's decision to appoint a rival candidate, respondent No. 3, as Lambardar, which was upheld through the administrative hierarchy and subsequently challenged via a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, prompting the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a Lambardar creates a vested right that is justiciable through a writ petition. The Supreme Court, relying on its precedent in Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and another (1971 SCMR 719), held that the office of a Lambardar is essentially an administrative measure rather than a post to which a candidate can lay a claim as a matter of right. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition, establishing the principle that appointments to the office of Lambardar are administrative in nature and not subject to judicial interference as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of a Lambardar a matter of right that can be enforced through a writ petition?
  • Does the office of a Lambardar constitute an administrative measure?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleh vs Tim Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 21972 PLD Supreme Court 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-29
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. 1converted propertypress noteauctionhotel transferdiscretionary powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave challenged the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition, which upheld an order of the Settlement Commissioner setting aside the transfer of a converted hotel property to the appellant. The appellant's father had converted the allotted residential first floor into a hotel and built an additional floor prior to 20 December 1958. Pursuant to a press note issued under Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 with Central Government approval, converted properties could be transferred to occupants. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner auctioned the premises before deciding the appellant's timely application, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner set aside the auction and transferred the property to the appellant. The Settlement Commissioner subsequently reversed this order, holding the press note to be merely recommendatory and ineligible for locals.

  The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, holding that the press note had statutory backing under Section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and created an enforceable right. The Court restored the Additional Settlement Commissioner’s transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a press note issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner with Central Government approval under Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 creates enforceable legal rights for occupants of converted evacuee properties?
  • Can an evacuee property be treated as already disposed of when an unconfirmed auction took place without deciding a timely transfer application pending before the Settlement authorities?
  • Does the statutory limitation restricting transfers of evacuee property valued over Rs. 10,000 to locals apply to transfers authorized under Section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 pursuant to approved schemes?
  • Whether the use of the word 'may' in a statutory scheme's directive precludes an applicant who satisfies all prescribed conditions from being entitled to transfer of the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem Alias Naseem Alias Cheema vs The State1972 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-18
  murderdeath sentencelesser sentencesudden quarreltransportation for lifecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the confirmation of his death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Yunis. The core legal question was whether the extreme penalty of death was proper given the circumstances of the case, specifically the sudden quarrel, exchange of abuses, and fist blows preceding the stabbing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the conviction for murder must be maintained, the lesser sentence of transportation for life should be imposed. The key principle laid down is that where a murder is committed during a sudden quarrel preceded by an exchange of abuses and fist blows, the mitigating circumstances warrant the substitution of the death sentence with transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the extreme penalty of death is proper in a murder case arising from a sudden quarrel involving an exchange of abuses and fist blows?
  • Can the sentence of death be altered to transportation for life under mitigating circumstances involving a sudden brawl?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed vs Syed Niaz Ali Shah1972 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-03
  rent restrictionejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in rentrent controllertenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a leave petition challenging an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller acted legally in ordering the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and subsequently directing eviction due to default, despite the tenant's dispute regarding the agreed-upon rent rate. The Supreme Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was clearly established, as the petitioner admitted to executing the rent deed in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the Rent Controller was justified in ordering the deposit of rent under the relevant statutory provisions. Upon the petitioner's failure to comply with the rent deposit order, the Rent Controller had no alternative but to direct the tenant to surrender possession of the disputed property. The Supreme Court affirmed the ejectment order, dismissing the petition while granting the petitioner a two-month grace period to vacate the premises voluntarily, provided rent for that period was paid. The judgment reinforces the Rent Controller's authority to enforce rent deposit orders and ejectment upon default in established tenancies.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the authority to order ejectment when a tenant fails to comply with a direction to deposit arrears of rent?
  • Is a tenant's admission of a rent deed sufficient to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant for the purposes of rent restriction proceedings?
  • Can a tenant challenge an ejectment order based on a dispute over the rent rate after admitting to the execution of a rent deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs The State1972 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  murder convictionocular testimonyforensic evidenceF.I.R. delaycriminal appealdeath sentencepolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the death sentence of the appellant, Muhammad Sadiq, for the murder of Said Muhammad. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sahiwal. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony, the validity of police investigation procedures, and the impact of discrepancies in the timing of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) on the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that despite the Investigating Officer's error in recording the F.I.R. time, the ocular testimony remained credible and was corroborated by medical evidence and forensic reports regarding the recovered weapon. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that procedural irregularities by the police do not automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case if the substantive evidence, including eye-witness accounts and forensic findings, remains reliable and consistent. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an error by the police in recording the time of the First Information Report automatically render the ocular testimony in a murder case false?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular testimony when the police investigation is found to be flawed or bungled?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon and forensic matching of an empty cartridge corroborate eye-witness testimony in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashid vs Mst. Niazan Bibi and 2 Other1972 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  quashment of proceedingsforgerycheatingcriminal complaintdishonest intentioninherent powers of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the respondents under Sections 419 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging forgery regarding the purchase of a stamp paper for a sale deed. The respondents moved the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of proceedings. The High Court quashed the proceedings, reasoning that even if the allegations were accepted as true, no offence under Sections 419 or 468 was disclosed, as the essential element of dishonesty was absent. The Supreme Court upheld this decision. The Court held that where the purchase of a stamp paper in the complainant's name was intended to facilitate the finalization of a legitimate sale transaction for which the price had largely been paid, and where the deed could not be registered without the complainant's actual consent and signature, no criminal offence of cheating or forgery was established. The petition was dismissed, affirming that proceedings should be quashed when the alleged facts do not constitute the ingredients of the charged offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of a stamp paper in the name of a vendor by a vendee for the purpose of executing a sale deed, without the vendor's signature, constitute the offence of forgery?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the allegations, even if true, do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offences charged?
  • Is the element of dishonesty a necessary ingredient for offences under Sections 419 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashad Hayat Khan vs Malik Khair Din and Another1972 PLD Supreme Court 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-14
  preventive detentionbailable offencebail as of rightbreach of peaceillegal confinement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal raises the question of whether the provisions of section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, relating to bail for bailable offences, apply to a person against whom preventive action is taken by the police under sections 107 and 151 of the same Code. The appellant was arrested under sections 107 and 151, and the police station house officer refused to accept surety bonds for his release, leading to a private complaint for illegal confinement which was dismissed by the magistrate and subsequently upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a person subjected to preventive action is not a person accused of an offence within the meaning of section 496. The Court established the principle that the general bail provisions under section 496 are inapplicable to preventive detentions under sections 107 and 151, as the Code provides specific procedures for interim release and custody under section 117(3) and related provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 available to a person against whom preventive action is taken under sections 107 and 151?
  • Does a person against whom preventive action is taken fall within the expression 'person accused of an offence'?
  • Do the general bail provisions under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings under section 107/151?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Muhammad Khan and Another1972 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  pre-emptionexchange of landletters patent appealwithdrawal of pre-emption moneyestoppellocus standileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from an order of a Division Bench of the High Court at Lahore which allowed a Letters Patent Appeal and dismissed the plaintiff-pre-emptor's suit for pre-emption. The petitioner had filed the pre-emption suit claiming that a transaction of exchange between the respondents was in fact a sale and a cloak to defeat his right of pre-emption. While the trial court and the first two appellate forums ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Letters Patent Bench found the transaction to be a genuine exchange involving no cash consideration. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the respondent's withdrawal of the pre-emption price during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal caused the appeal to fail on the ground of estoppel. The Supreme Court held that since no stay order regarding the withdrawal of the money was in place and the withdrawal occurred after the filing of the appeal, the respondent was not estopped from prosecuting his appeal and did not lose his locus standi. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the leave petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of pre-emption money by a vendee during the pendency of an appeal estop the vendee from prosecuting the appeal?
  • Whether an exchange of land purported to defeat a right of pre-emption constitutes a sale when no cash consideration passes?
  • Does a party lose locus standi to pursue an appeal by withdrawing deposited decretal money in the absence of a stay order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan and 5 Others vs Muhammad Boota and 3 Other1972 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11
  evacuee propertysettlement commissionertransfer of propertywrit petitionletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, concerning the transfer and division of a disputed evacuee property among claimant displaced persons under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner's division of the property and subsequent transfer of a portion to respondent Mohammad Boota was lawful and sustainable, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the division. The Supreme Court held that the property had been validly divided by the Settlement Authorities into separate houses and that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the division, as the authorities acted within their lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not interfere with the factual division and transfer of evacuee properties by competent settlement authorities acting within their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with the division of a property made by settlement authorities acting within their lawful authority?
  • Whether an order of division passed by a Settlement Commissioner creating separate houses from a single evacuee property is open to judicial review?
  • Is a claimant entitled to the transfer of a portion of a divided property in their possession upon its reconfiguration by settlement authorities?
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• Muhammad Rafique vs Muhammad Ghafoor1972 PLD Supreme Court 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-03
  habeas corpuspersonal libertycustody of womanrestitution of conjugal rightsSection 491 CrPCwrongful confinement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order issued under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which directed that Mst. Surraya Begum be placed in the custody of the respondent, who claimed to be her husband. The core legal question was whether the High Court, when exercising jurisdiction under Section 491, has the authority to order the custody of a major woman to be handed over to another person against her express will. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The Court held that under Section 491, if the person produced is a major, the Court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to setting that person at liberty. The Court cannot force custody or restore the status quo ante against the person's wishes, as such actions lack legal warrant and infringe upon personal liberty. Furthermore, the Court established that even a civil decree for the restitution of conjugal rights cannot be enforced by forcibly handing over a wife to her husband, as the law provides no mechanism for such physical coercion.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the authority under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to hand over the custody of a major woman to a person claiming to be her husband against her will?
  • Can a court enforce a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by forcibly handing over the custody of a wife to her husband?
  • What is the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding a major person produced before it?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Mst. Khurshid Begum and 3 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-21
  past maintenanceArbitration CouncilMuslim Family Laws Ordinancemaintenance allowanceex parte orderlimitation periodrevision to Collectorfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  An appeal was filed by special leave against the High Court's dismissal of a constitutional writ petition challenging an Arbitration Council's maintenance order under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The Arbitration Council had awarded the wife maintenance for both past and current periods, which was later upheld by the Collector. The husband contended that past maintenance could not be granted under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, that the claim was time-barred, that the ex parte proceedings violated principles of natural justice, and that two separate orders could not be issued. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that unlike Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 does not restrict maintenance awards to future periods or the date of application; thus, past maintenance can be awarded subject to the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, ex parte proceedings were justified as the husband avoided service, and issuing separate orders for distinct periods was valid.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Arbitration Council have jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 to award past maintenance to a neglected wife?
  • Which provision of the Limitation Act 1908 governs claims for past maintenance under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can an Arbitration Council proceed ex parte where a party deliberately avoids the service of notices?
  • Is an Arbitration Council permitted to issue separate maintenance certificates for different periods of time?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and Another vs Dost Muhammad1972 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  pre-emptionlimitationoral salephysical possessionappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit concerning Sufaida land measuring 10 marlas with a Kothri situated in village Bajar, Tehsil Khushab, District Sargodha. The core legal question involves the determination of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit in respect of an oral sale where time runs from the taking of physical possession under Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court and the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence regarding physical possession and that the petitioner failed to discharge the onus of proving the date on which physical possession was taken. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that the question of physical possession in oral sales is a matter of evidence and findings of fact concurred by two courts will not be disturbed lightly by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • When does time begin to run for filing a pre-emption suit in respect of an oral sale under Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act?
  • Upon whom lies the onus of proving the date on which physical possession of the land in dispute was taken in an oral sale?
  • Will the Supreme Court re-appreciate evidence regarding the date of physical possession concurrently decided by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad Khan and Another vs Muhammad Ashraf1972 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  acquittalspecial leave to appealforensic evidencebenefit of doubtmurdercriminal appealeyewitness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder charges under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on perverse or insubstantial reasoning, particularly concerning the credibility of eyewitness accounts, the validity of the FIR, and the reliability of forensic evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s reasons for acquittal were cogent and valid. The Court affirmed that the forensic matching of an empty cartridge to a weapon recovered from the respondent did not, in isolation, implicate him in the crime or establish his presence at the scene, particularly when the prosecution's primary evidence was discredited. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning is based on a sound evaluation of evidence and raises reasonable doubts regarding the prosecution's case, even if forensic evidence exists, provided that evidence does not independently establish the accused's presence or participation in the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forensic matching of a recovered weapon to an empty cartridge, in isolation, establish the presence of an accused at the scene of a crime?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning is found to be cogent and valid?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution's primary evidence, including the FIR and eyewitness testimony, is disbelieved by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islam Khan vs Mst. Ruri and Other1972 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  transfer of propertydisplaced personsdemarcationabuse of processleave to appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the writ petition challenging the decisions of the Settlement authorities regarding the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Initially, the Settlement authorities divided and transferred the house to the contesting parties based on their respective possessions, an arrangement previously upheld by the High Court and left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. The petitioner subsequently approached the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to obtain a demarcation report declaring the house impartible, which the higher Settlement authorities and the High Court viewed as an improper attempt to reopen a finalized matter. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's actions constituted an abuse of the process of the court under the guise of demarcation. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party reopen a final settlement regarding the transfer of a property through a subsequent application for demarcation?
  • Whether attempting to relitigate a settled property dispute under the guise of demarcation constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq and Another vs Muhammad Rafique1972 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal usedefault in payment of rentsub-lettingconcurrent findings of factsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenants and sub-tenants under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting, and personal use. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment on sub-letting and personal use. On appeal, the District Judge maintained ejectment on personal use and default, reversing findings on sub-letting. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' second appeal due to concurrent findings of fact regarding personal use. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that three statutory essentials under section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance were required for ejectment based on personal use. The Supreme Court held that since the lower courts considered and satisfied the first two essentials—that the landlord in good faith requires the property and does not occupy another suitable building—and the third essential was never raised before the High Court or lower forums, the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requirements under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal use?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding personal use justify the dismissal of a second appeal?
  • Can a legal plea regarding statutory essentials that was never raised before the High Court be entertained by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and Another vs The State1972 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  interested witnesscorroboration of evidencemurder convictioncriminal appealappreciation of evidenceriotingrecovery of incriminating articles
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellants for murder and rioting under sections 148, 302, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had acquitted three co-accused but maintained the appellants' convictions. The core legal question was whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses, deemed "interested" and partially unreliable regarding the acquitted co-accused, necessitated corroboration to sustain the appellants' convictions, and if such corroboration was adequate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while corroboration is a matter of prudence for interested witnesses, it is not required on every material particular. The Court clarified that witnesses are not rendered "false" or "accomplices" merely because some co-accused are acquitted. The Court found that the recoveries of incriminating items, including weapons and blood-stained articles, alongside the appellants' own injuries, provided sufficient corroboration to establish their guilt. The principle laid down is that the partial rejection of testimony regarding some accused does not automatically invalidate the entire evidence against others, provided sufficient independent corroboration exists to satisfy the court of the witnesses' truthfulness.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partial rejection of testimony against some co-accused render the entire evidence of interested witnesses unreliable?
  • Is corroboration required on every material particular when relying on the testimony of interested witnesses?
  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused based on lack of evidence necessitate the acquittal of all remaining accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs Government of Pakistan1972 PLD Supreme Court 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-09-05
  officiating appointmentpro forma promotionreduction in rankshow-cause noticecivil servicereversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a writ petition challenging an order directing the appellant to take over charge as an Assistant Director, which he contended amounted to an unlawful reduction in rank from his post as Deputy Director without a show-cause notice. The appellant argued that his appointment as Deputy Director, although temporary, was for an indefinite period and thus substantive in character. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the departmental record and affirmed the High Court's finding that the appellant's appointment was in a pro forma officiating capacity, as approved by the competent authority, notwithstanding the omission of the word 'officiating' in the gazette notification. The Court held that the government has the legal authority to terminate an officiating appointment at any time for service exigencies without a show-cause notice. A show-cause notice is only mandatory if the reversion is intended as a penalty or is made mala fide, neither of which was established in this case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the word 'officiating' in a gazette notification convert an officiating appointment into a substantive one when the competent authority only approved an officiating promotion?
  • Is a show-cause notice mandatory under the Constitution before reverting a civil servant from an officiating post to their substantive post?
  • Under what circumstances does the reversion of a civil servant from an officiating superior post to a lower substantive post amount to a reduction in rank requiring a show-cause notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and Others vs Maulvi Behram (through His1972 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  arbitration agreementreference to arbitrationall parties interestedwaiver by conductspecial leave to appealsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court in a regular second appeal concerning a property dispute. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration of ownership and possession, which the parties subsequently referred to arbitration during proceedings. Although the reference to arbitration was signed by only one of the plaintiffs, the co-plaintiffs actively participated in the arbitration proceedings without objection and failed to raise the issue before the trial court or in the first appeal before the District Judge. The core legal question was whether a reference to arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act is invalid ab initio if signed by only one of the co-plaintiffs, notwithstanding subsequent participation and conduct. The Supreme Court held that Section 21 does not require the agreement of all parties to be in writing, and that consent or agreement can be presumed or inferred from the conduct of the parties. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that active participation in arbitration proceedings waives formal written signing requirements by all co-parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference to arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act is void if signed by only one of the co-plaintiffs?
  • Can consent to an arbitration agreement under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act be inferred from the conduct and active participation of the parties?
  • Does Section 21 of the Arbitration Act require the agreement of all interested parties to be reduced to writing?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Bashir and 5 Other1972 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  acquittalappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonysite plancapital chargeleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by a private complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's acquittal, based on a detailed re-evaluation of evidence, warrants interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the grounds raised by the petitioner merely sought a re-appreciation of evidence, which does not fall within the scope of Article 58 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's findings that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. Specifically, the Court noted that the site plan contradicted the eye-witnesses' claims, as physical obstructions such as a culvert, a canal distributory bank, and sugarcane fields rendered it impossible for the witnesses to have observed the alleged occurrence. Consequently, the Court established the principle that where eye-witness testimony is physically contradicted by the site plan and material evidence, such testimony is unreliable for sustaining a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition seeking mere re-appreciation of evidence fall within the ambit of Article 58 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can eye-witness testimony be relied upon when the site plan demonstrates that physical obstructions prevented the witnesses from observing the occurrence?
  • Is a conviction on a capital charge sustainable when the prosecution fails to reconcile material contradictions in the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Humayun Khan vs Akber Jan1972 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  special power of attorneypre-emption suitcompromiseRazinamawithdrawal of suitdeclaratory suitfraud and collusiondamages against attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court arose out of a declaratory suit seeking cancellation of a compromise decree. The petitioner had originally filed a pre-emption suit and appointed an attorney through a special power of attorney to conduct the suit. The attorney subsequently submitted a compromise deed (Razinama) and withdrew the suit, resulting in its dismissal. The petitioner challenged the compromise and dismissal by filing a declaratory suit alleging fraud and collusion by his attorney. While the trial court decreed the suit, the District Judge reversed the decree, and subsequent appeals before the Single Bench and Letters Patent Bench of the High Court were dismissed. The Supreme Court examined the original power of attorney and held that it explicitly empowered the attorney to compromise the suit and make necessary applications. Consequently, the attorney acted within his authority, and the dismissal of the suit was valid. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's remedy for alleged fraud lay in an action for damages against the attorney, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise and withdrawal of a suit effected by an attorney is binding on the principal when the power of attorney expressly confers the authority to compromise?
  • Can a principal challenge a court decree based on a compromise entered into by his authorized attorney on grounds of fraud without seeking damages directly against the attorney?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a litigant who claims to have been defrauded through a collusive compromise entered into by his authorized attorney acting within the scope of his power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ghaus vs Muhammad Ibrahim and Another1972 SCMR 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-26
  ancestral propertycustomary lawlegal necessityreversionersale deedconsiderationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a second appeal regarding a suit for declaration. The suit concerned the validity of a registered sale deed of ancestral land, which the plaintiff, a reversioner, claimed was void due to lack of consideration and legal necessity, asserting that the vendor was governed by custom. The lower courts concurrently held that the property was ancestral, the parties were governed by custom, the sale lacked legal necessity, and only partial consideration was proven. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their findings regarding legal necessity and the sufficiency of consideration, given the vendor's physical and mental capacity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the vendor's physical and mental infirmity were sound. The Court established that when a vendor is proven to be a physical wreck with limited mental capacity, the burden of proof regarding the actual receipt of consideration and the prudence of the transaction—specifically regarding legal necessity—is heightened, and mere endorsement by a Sub-Registrar does not automatically validate the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the endorsement of a Sub-Registrar on a sale deed conclusively prove the passing of consideration when the vendor's mental and physical capacity is in question?
  • Can a sale of ancestral land by a person governed by custom be set aside if the vendor is found to be a physical wreck and the transaction lacks legal necessity?
  • Is the sale of ancestral land for the purpose of purchasing distant property considered an act of good management when the vendor is physically infirm?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Another1972 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  contempt of courtsettlement propertytime-barred claimwrit jurisdictionadministrative discretionpremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 206 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan (1972) seeking to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, and another respondent. The petitioner alleged that the respondents acted improperly by allowing a third party to file a time-barred claim form regarding a property dispute, despite a previous Supreme Court judgment directing the examination of other claimants' rights. The core legal question was whether the actions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in permitting the filing of a time-barred form constituted contempt of court. The Supreme Court held that the petition was misconceived and premature. The Court observed that the rights of the other claimants were still under inquiry pursuant to its earlier directions and that the petitioner had already challenged the Commissioner's order through a writ petition in the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that the allegations did not disclose any grounds for contempt proceedings, emphasizing that contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass or preempt ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings regarding the same subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can contempt proceedings be initiated while the underlying administrative issue is still being adjudicated by the relevant authority?
  • Is a petition for contempt of court maintainable when the petitioner has already invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court regarding the same subject matter?
  • Does the allowance of a time-barred claim form by a Settlement Commissioner constitute contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota and 4 Others vs Noor Ahmad and Other1972 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  leave petitionconstitution petitionremandsettlement proceedingsinformer rightspremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a leave petition challenging an order of the High Court that dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition as premature, holding that their contentions could be raised before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner pursuant to a remand order. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court rightly declined to interfere with settlement proceedings that had not yet reached final determination. The Supreme Court held that since the matter was validly remanded to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the only final determination was regarding the identity of the first informer, the High Court's refusal to interfere was correct. The key principle laid down is that constitutional petitions against intermediate remand orders in settlement proceedings are premature when the parties retain the opportunity to agitate their claims before the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Constitution petition against an intermediate remand order in settlement proceedings is premature?
  • Can parties raise their substantive contentions before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner upon remand?
  • Does an informer have a recognized standing in settlement property allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Khan and 3 Others vs The Chief Settlement1972 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-27
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958transfer of propertyplinth areaallotmentsettlement of claimsdefinition of house
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The petitioners, successors of an original allottee, challenged the transfer of excess land surrounding a bungalow to a respondent, arguing they were entitled to the adjoining plot as a garden. The core legal question was whether a displaced person is entitled to receive, as part of a house transfer, land exceeding three times the plinth area of the structure. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petition. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to the excess land, as the definition of a 'house' under the relevant statute does not permit the transfer of land exceeding three times the plinth area. The principle laid down is that the statutory definition of a house strictly limits the extent of land that can be transferred alongside a residential structure, precluding claims for additional surrounding plots beyond the prescribed three-times plinth area threshold.

  Questions settled

  • Is a displaced person entitled to the transfer of land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the definition of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 allow for the inclusion of adjoining garden plots beyond the three-times plinth area limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and 5 Others vs The State1972 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-29
  benefit of doubtmurderattempt to murderdelayed FIRcriminal appealappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of the appellants under sections 302/149, 307/149, and 143 of the Pakistan Penal Code, resulting in sentences ranging from imprisonment to death as confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the place of occurrence, the improbability of night-long heavy firing without physical evidence like pellets or empties, unexplained delay in lodging the first information report, suppression of material facts by the complainant, and plausible alibi and injury evidence favoring the defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences of all appellants including an absconding appellant, and acquitted them by giving them the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution version suffers from major improbabilities, lack of corroborative physical evidence such as recovered pellets or bullet empties, suppression of material facts, and inconsistent timelines, the accused are entitled to the benefit of the doubt resulting in an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to recover pellets or empties from the place of an alleged night-long firing creates reasonable doubt regarding the place and manner of the occurrence?
  • Can an unexplained and considerable delay in lodging the first information report, coupled with a fabricated explanation of night-long firing, form the basis for acquitting the accused?
  • Whether the benefit of an acquittal granted to appearing appellants should also be extended to an absconding co-appellant to ensure complete justice?
  • Does the suppression of material facts by the complainant regarding injuries inflicted on the opposite party discredit the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asadullah Khan Niazi, Sub Divisional Officer, Bahawalpur1972 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-04
  temporary injunctionreversionservice lawirreparable losscivil suitofficiating post
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Overseer promoted to officiating Sub-Divisional Officer, challenged his reversion to the post of Overseer by filing a civil suit for declaration and injunction. The lower courts refused to grant a temporary injunction against the reversion. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that he held a permanent position as a Sub-Divisional Officer and could not be reverted without a show-cause notice. The Supreme Court examined the dispute regarding the petitioner's status as a permanent Sub-Divisional Officer. The Court held that the lower courts were justified in refusing the temporary injunction because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable loss, as any potential grievance could be addressed through monetary compensation. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the lower courts' orders and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that temporary injunctions are not appropriate where the alleged injury is purely financial and compensable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a temporary injunction appropriate when the alleged injury is purely monetary and compensable?
  • Can an officiating employee claim a right to a permanent position without establishing the permanency of that status?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ala vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and 5 Other1972 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-07
  lacheswrit petitionsettlement schemetransfer of propertyexhaustion of remediescondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a portion of a building site under settlement laws, where the appellant's application for transfer was rejected without notice by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The appellant actively pursued departmental remedies through various authorities, culminating in a final dismissal by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The appellant subsequently challenged these orders through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of laches due to a supposed delay in seeking judicial review. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief on the ground of laches when the appellant was diligently pursuing statutory remedies within the department. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not be held guilty of laches as he was continuously pursuing his remedies before the Settlement authorities and approached the High Court promptly after the final order. The key principle laid down is that a party actively and continuously prosecuting administrative and statutory remedies cannot be non-suited in writ jurisdiction on the ground of laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can be charged with laches when continuously pursuing statutory remedies before administrative authorities?
  • Does an appellate authority have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after a permanent transfer deed has been issued?
  • Whether the High Court can dismiss a writ petition on the ground of delay when the final departmental order was challenged promptly?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Khoso vs The State1972 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-09
  murder convictionocular testimonyinterested witnessesdeath sentencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which confirmed the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who were related to the deceased, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when challenged as interested and unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, finding the testimony of the eye-witnesses to be coherent, consistent, and trustworthy. The Court rejected arguments that the witnesses were 'chance witnesses' or that their relationship to the deceased necessitated automatic rejection of their testimony without independent corroboration. The Court affirmed that where prosecution evidence is credible and unshaken during cross-examination, it provides a sufficient basis for conviction, even in capital cases. The principle laid down is that the testimony of related witnesses is not inherently inadmissible or unreliable, provided it withstands scrutiny and is consistent with the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the ocular testimony of related witnesses inherently unreliable in a murder trial?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of consistent and coherent ocular testimony?
  • Does the failure to mention a witness in the First Information Report automatically render their testimony inadmissible?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Khan vs Mst. Shahzada Begum1972 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  partition suitpreliminary decreedismissal in defaultOrder IX Rule 8civil procedurerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a partition suit wherein the respondent obtained a preliminary decree for her share in ancestral property, which was unsuccessfully agitated up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, when the case returned for a final decree, the trial court dismissed the suit in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court later restored the suit upon an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, holding that Order IX provisions are inapplicable after a preliminary decree. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision and subsequent review. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the dismissal and the non-applicability of Order IX, Rule 8. The Supreme Court held that once a preliminary decree has been passed in a suit, the suit cannot be dismissed for default under Order IX, Rule 8, as the parties acquire fixed rights and liabilities unless the decree is varied or set aside. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that dismissal in default is without jurisdiction post-preliminary decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit be dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after a preliminary decree has already been passed?
  • Whether the provisions of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be invoked after the passing of a preliminary decree in a partition suit?
  • Does the passing of a preliminary decree create fixed rights and liabilities between the parties that subsist unless varied or set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1972 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  culpable homicidesudden fightheat of passionright of private defenceexceeding self-defencemurder conviction altered
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had altered his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to one under section 304, Part II, of the same Code, reducing his sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner struck the deceased on the head with a zinc pipe following a sudden verbal altercation over a cut bamboo stick, resulting in the deceased's death. The petitioner pleaded self-defence, claiming the deceased had first struck him with a bamboo stick. The High Court applied Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code, finding the incident occurred during a sudden fight in the heat of passion, but rejected the full plea of self-defence as the petitioner had exceeded his right under section 99 by inflicting more harm than necessary. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner indeed exceeded his right of private defence by using a zinc pipe in retaliation to minor injuries, and declined to interfere with the High Court's judgment. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden fight in the heat of passion attract Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can an accused claim the right of private defence if they inflict more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence under section 99 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's alteration of a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the circumstances of a sudden altercation.
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdul Manna N vs The Municipal Committee, Larkana1972 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-15
  permanent injunctionpublic roadeasementinfructuous suitnecessary partymunicipal property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a suit for a permanent injunction filed by the appellant to restrain the Municipal Committee, Larkana, from constructing shops on a plot adjacent to the appellant's property, which the appellant claimed was a public road providing access to his premises. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge granted partial relief, ordering the demolition of one shop. The High Court subsequently set aside this order, restoring the trial court's dismissal on the grounds that the plot was the Municipality's property and the appellant failed to establish an easement. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued a common law right of passage over the plot. The Supreme Court observed that the suit suffered from fundamental defects, including the failure to implead the Provincial Government, which claimed ownership of the land, and ambiguity regarding the legal status of the plot. Furthermore, as the construction was already completed, the Court held the suit for injunction had become infructuous. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for injunction against construction on a public road require the Provincial Government to be impleaded if the Municipality claims ownership of the land?
  • Does a suit for permanent injunction against construction become infructuous once the construction is already completed?
  • Whether a private citizen can claim a right of passage over a public road without establishing a statutory easement?
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• Muhammad Alam and 89 Others the Secretary, Irrigation and Power1972 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-14
  occupier's ratecanal waterreclamation feeagricultural landstatutory notificationenhancement of rates
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, owners of agricultural lands in the SCARP-I area in the Punjab, challenged through four petitions the imposition of an enhanced occupier's rate under a Government of West Pakistan notification dated April 11, 1966, and a Reclamation Fee under a notification dated February 5, 1966. The core legal questions involved the legality of enhancing the occupier's rate despite reduced or closed tubewell water supply, and the validity of levying a Reclamation Fee under the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners continued to accept the canal water, they were legally liable to pay the enhanced occupier's rate under section 36 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873. Furthermore, the Court held that the Reclamation Fee was validly levied under section 38 of the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952, read with the relevant rules, as the value of the lands was expected to increase and had in fact immensely increased. Consequently, all petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an occupier liable to pay an enhanced occupier's rate for canal water under section 36 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 if they continue to accept the water?
  • Can a Reclamation Fee be levied under section 38 of the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act 1952 when the value of the land is merely expected to increase?
  • Do rules framed under the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 require publication in the official Gazette to have the force of law?
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• Muhammad Shakil Aamir Government of Pakistan Government of1972 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  medical college admissionreserved seatsdefence forces personnelconstitutional petitionmerit preference
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arise from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan regarding the admission of candidates to the First Year M.B., B.S. Course in the Dow Medical College, Karachi, for the academic year 1971-72 against seats reserved for children of Defence Forces Personnel. The core legal question concerned whether the instructions and procedures laid down by the Commander-in-Chief could override the substantive merit and preference provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the prospectus instructions of Dow Medical College. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals on the basis of a mutually agreeable formula proposed by the Chief of the Naval Staff, whereby the rival candidate, Miss Naseem Kausar Arbab, was nominated for admission to the Naval seat for the subsequent academic year 1972-73, while preserving the existing admission of the appellant Muhammad Shakil Aamir for the year 1971-72. The key principle established relates to the resolution of conflicting criteria governing reserved institutional admissions through administrative accommodation without disturbing settled admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether instructions framed by military authorities can override substantive provisions of a college prospectus regarding reserved seats?
  • Can an admission dispute for an academic year be resolved by nominating the aggrieved candidate for a reserved seat in the subsequent academic year?
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• Mst. Zohran and 4 Others vs Abdus Sattar and Another1972 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  quashment of proceedingsprivate complaintpolice investigationcriminal proceduremala fidedischarge of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated via a private complaint. The petitioners were initially investigated by the police for offences under sections 364 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but were found innocent and the case was cancelled. Subsequently, the respondent filed a private complaint regarding the same allegations. The Magistrate, after recording preliminary evidence, issued summonses to the petitioners. The petitioners sought quashment under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that the police investigation report exonerating them precluded further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that a private complaint is not barred simply because the police previously discharged the accused or cancelled the case. The Court affirmed that unless the petitioners demonstrate that the complaint is mala fide or the charges are demonstrably false, the Magistrate is entitled to proceed based on the preliminary evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no legal defect or sufficient grounds to warrant the quashment of the ongoing criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police report finding the accused innocent and cancelling a case legally bar the filing of a private complaint for the same offence?
  • Under what circumstances can a Magistrate proceed with a private complaint after the police have submitted a report of innocence?
  • Is the quashment of criminal proceedings justified solely on the ground that the police previously investigated and discharged the accused?
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• Mst. Sherina vs Haji Ghawar Khan and 12 Other1972 SCMR 646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  second appealinheritancesurvivorshipadmissionestateleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan in a second appeal, which had accepted the plaintiffs' claim for a share in the estate of their predecessor Mahmood. The core legal question concerned whether the findings of the High Court regarding the survivorship of the plaintiffs' predecessor, Mst. Zaujan, were properly based on the evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were indeed supported by evidence, including clear admissions made in written statements, testimonies, and concessions by counsel and parties at the bar. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact regarding survivorship based on admissions in written statements and evidence are sustainable in second appeal?
  • Can admissions made by parties and their counsel at the bar be relied upon to determine inheritance shares?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in restoring the trial court's decree based on the available material on record?
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• Mst. Shaftqan vs Hashim Ali and Another1972 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-26
  bailmurdercancellation of bailjudicial discretioncounter-versionscommitting magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the mother of a murder victim against an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to one of the accused, Hashim Ali. The petitioner challenged the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail in a murder case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court properly exercised its judicial discretion under the circumstances. The Court observed that there were counter-versions of the incident, making it a matter of trial to determine which party was the aggressor and whether the respondent committed an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had exercised its discretion properly and dismissed the petition. However, the Court laid down the principle that the complainant/petitioner remains at liberty to move the committing Magistrate for cancellation of bail once sufficient evidence has been recorded during the inquiry or trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted in a murder case where there are counter-versions of the incident and the aggressor is yet to be determined?
  • Can a complainant apply for the cancellation of bail before a committing Magistrate after evidence has been recorded, even if the High Court previously granted bail?
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• Mst. Sardar Begum vs Mst. Hussain Bibi and Another1972 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  transfer of propertysettlement lawslocus standibelated appealspecial leave to appealestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential house in Lahore under settlement laws. The primary legal question concerns the locus standi of the petitioner to challenge a transfer order passed in favor of the respondent when the petitioner had not filed her transfer application until after the original transfer order was made and after appeals by her children against that order had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi and was estopped from challenging the transfer order, as the matter had already attained finality upon the rejection of her children's appeal, and her belated application and subsequent appeal were entirely time-barred and incompetent. The key principle laid down is that a party who was not an applicant at the time of the original transfer order and whose belated claim was filed long after the transfer attained finality lacks the requisite locus standi to challenge the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who filed a belated transfer form after the initial transfer order have the locus standi to challenge that order?
  • Can a belated appeal against a property transfer order be entertained after the original transfer has attained finality through the dismissal of prior appeals?
  • Is a party estopped from challenging a settlement transfer order when they had full knowledge of prior proceedings and failed to file a timely application?
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• Mst. Sakhira vs Rozi Khan and Another1972 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-13
  acquittalbenefit of doubtchild witnessmurdercorroborative evidencedelay in FIRspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, who had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of a young boy and sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established its case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on a single child eye-witness who was not examined during commitment proceedings and whose trial testimony materially departed from his police statement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the acquittal, holding that the child witness's testimony lacked conviction and was unreliable. The Court observed that the corroborative evidence could not salvage the prosecution's case when the primary eye-witness testimony was unsatisfactory, and further noted that the First Information Report was delayed and no clear motive was established. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the respondent was rightly given the benefit of doubt and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a child witness whose statement materially departs from their previous police statement?
  • Does corroborative evidence advance the prosecution's case if the primary eye-witness testimony is found to be unsatisfactory and unreliable?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in lodging a First Information Report on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Mst. Razia Begum and 4 Others vs Mst. Arash Jan and 2 Other1972 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  Marzul Mautdeath-bed giftIslamic lawconcurrent findings of factadmissibility of medical recordsgift deedspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which declared a gift deed executed by the deceased, Muhammad Ismail, in favor of his second wife, Mst. Razia Begum, invalid. The core legal question was whether the gift was executed during 'Marzul Maut' (death-bed illness), thereby rendering it subject to the restrictions applicable to death-bed gifts under Islamic law. The trial court, affirmed by the District Judge and the High Court, found as a matter of fact that the deceased was suffering from a terminal heart condition at the time of the gift, which occurred only twenty days prior to his death. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, rejecting arguments that the medical evidence was inadmissible or insufficient. The Court held that the medical history-chart prepared by a doctor in the course of professional duty was admissible under the Evidence Act, especially when produced without objection. The principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of 'Marzul Maut' based on credible medical and oral evidence are not subject to interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a medical history-chart prepared by a doctor in the course of professional duty admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of 'Marzul Maut'?
  • Does a gift executed by a person suffering from an advanced heart condition shortly before death constitute a gift made during 'Marzul Maut'?
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• Mst. Rabia Bibi and 7 Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha1972 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-06
  special leave to appealallotment of landcongested areawrit jurisdictionejectmentsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, legal heirs of the original allottee Abdul Ghani Shah, sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Letters Patent appeal by the Lahore High Court. The original allotment of agricultural land in a congested area was found to be based on a fraudulent claim of parentage, though subsequent administrative orders permitted the allottee to retain possession until alternative land in a non-congested area could be allotted. The core legal question concerned whether the Settlement Commissioner's subsequent order adversely modified the protection against immediate ejectment granted to the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's order expressly protected the petitioners' possession until alternative land was provided, meaning they were not aggrieved by the order, and that the High Court rightly refused to interfere in its writ jurisdiction to enforce administrative orders. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not exercise writ jurisdiction merely to implement subsisting administrative orders when the administrative authorities themselves have not violated the substantive protections granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court be approached in writ jurisdiction merely to implement orders passed by settlement authorities?
  • Whether an allottee is considered an aggrieved party when an administrative order explicitly protects their possession until alternative land is provided?
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