Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Shafi vs The State1971 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-18
  death sentencemitigating circumstanceselder influenceeyewitness evidencerelated witnesssystemic delayforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the decision of the High Court of West Pakistan confirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for murder. The primary legal questions raised were whether the testimony of eyewitnesses related to the deceased could sustain conviction, and whether the appellant was entitled to a lesser sentence on the grounds of acting under the influence of his older uncle or due to systemic judicial delay in disposing of the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that mere relationship to the deceased is insufficient to reject eyewitness testimony where it is consistent, detailed, and corroborated by independent witness statements and forensic ballistic evidence. The Court further held that a 26-year-old adult acting with a premeditated design cannot claim to have acted under elder influence to mitigate sentence. Finally, the Court ruled that systemic backlog and procedural delay do not constitute valid legal grounds for reducing a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be rejected solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
  • Can an adult offender aged 26 years claim mitigation of the death sentence on the ground of acting under the influence or instigation of an elder relative?
  • Does judicial delay resulting from systemic backlog constitute a valid ground for mitigating the death sentence for murder?
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• Muhammad Sarwar and Another vs Muhammad Ashraf1971 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-03
  redemption of mortgageregistered sale deedbona fide purchasernecessary partyspecial leave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which affirmed a decree for the redemption of a mortgaged shop. The dispute arose when the respondent, having purchased the shop from the original owner, sought to redeem a mortgage held by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The petitioners contested the redemption, claiming the predecessor had subsequently purchased the property. The trial court and appellate court rejected this claim, finding the respondent's purchase to be a valid, registered transaction and the petitioners' evidence of a prior purchase (an Amanatnama) to be legally ineffective, as it was executed by a third party in favor of another individual. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the document relied upon by the petitioners did not convey any interest in the property. Furthermore, the Court dismissed arguments regarding the non-joinder of necessary parties and the failure to frame a formal issue on bona fide purchase, ruling that the evidence on record sufficiently negated the petitioners' claim of ownership. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Amanatnama executed by a third party in favor of a person other than the mortgagee constitute a valid transfer of property interest?
  • Is a person who holds no interest in the disputed property a necessary party to a suit for redemption of mortgage?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit for lack of a formal issue regarding bona fide purchase if the evidence on record already disproves the underlying claim of ownership?
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• Muhammad Saeed vs Muhammad Anwar and Another1971 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-29
  dispute over possessioncriminal proceduresection 145 CrPCbreach of peaceremand of casespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal stemming from a dispute over the possession of a flour mill, which triggered various civil and criminal proceedings including an action under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal question concerned the propriety of a Magistrate's order sealing a room in the disputed property during proceedings initiated by the respondent, where the petitioner had not sought relief under Section 145 and had denied any apprehension of a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case to the trial Magistrate for proper adjudication after recording evidence. The Court held that partial or unjustified interim measures such as sealing property without proper foundation under Section 145 are erroneous, and directed that observations made by the High Court shall not prejudice the rights of the parties in pending civil or criminal litigations. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can order the sealing of a disputed property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without proper findings on an apprehension of a breach of the peace?
  • Is an order remanding a case to the trial Magistrate for fresh decision after recording evidence liable to interference by the Supreme Court when no legal invalidity is found?
  • Do observations made by a superior court in an interim revision petition prejudice the independent rights of parties in parallel civil and criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs The State and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-22
  counter-casescross-casesstay of judgmentsimultaneous trialinherent powersprocedure in criminal casesSessions trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, challenged an order of the High Court staying the pronouncement of judgment by the Sessions Court in a murder challan case until the conclusion of a pending cross-complaint case arising out of the same occurrence. The core legal question was whether cross-cases or counter-cases arising from the same incident must invariably be tried together and resolved simultaneously by the same court, and whether a Sessions Court judgment must be stayed until the conclusion of a counter-complaint case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's stay order. The Court held that while simultaneous trials of counter-cases by the same court are generally preferable to avoid conflicting findings, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not prescribe an absolute or mandatory rule. The procedure must yield to the specific facts and circumstances of each case to prevent delay and miscarriage of justice. Where the challan case trial was completed without objection and the counter-case was pending before a Magistrate competent to decide it, staying the Sessions judgment was unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a mandatory rule of law that counter-cases arising out of the same occurrence must always be tried side by side by the same court?
  • Can a Sessions Court be directed to stay the delivery of its judgment in a concluded trial pending the outcome of a counter-complaint case before a Magistrate?
  • Should a criminal case triable by a Section 30 Magistrate be committed to the Sessions Court solely to avoid a potential conflict of decisions with a cross-case?
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• Muhammad Rafiq vs The State1971 SCMR 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  special leave to appealgrievous hurtruptured spleenquantum of sentencemedical evidencedying declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a 16/17-year-old boy, sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court altering his conviction from section 304 Part II to section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing him to four years' rigorous imprisonment for causing the death of the deceased by striking him with a brick. The core legal question was whether the offence fell under section 323 or section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence conclusively proved that the blows were struck with sufficient force to fracture the tenth rib and rupture the spleen, an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, thereby justifying the conviction under section 325. Furthermore, the Court held that the sentence of four years was neither illegal nor excessive given the maximum penalty, and the Court does not normally interfere with a legal sentence. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether causing a rib fracture and a ruptured spleen by striking with a brick constitutes an offence under section 323 or section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence of imprisonment passed by a lower court?
  • Whether a conviction under section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code is justified when medical evidence shows injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death?
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• Muhammad Nawaz vs Abdul Khaliq and Other1971 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  acquittalappraisal of evidenceinterested witnessescorroborationfirst information reportplace of occurrencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a complainant, challenged an order of the High Court refusing to set aside the acquittal of the respondents on charges including murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondents attacked the deceased and injured several prosecution witnesses over a motive stemming from previous evidence given by the deceased. The defense contended that they were falsely implicated due to enmity and presented an alternative version supported by injuries on the accused persons. The Supreme Court observed several infirmities in the prosecution case, including interested ocular witnesses lacking reliable corroboration, unexplained injuries on the accused, omissions in the First Information Report regarding a dying statement and injuries, significant discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence, shifting motives, and delay in lodging the FIR. Holding that the matter boiled down to the appraisal of evidence and finding no fault with the High Court's appreciation of the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with an order of acquittal based on the appraisal of evidence when the High Court's appreciation of evidence suffers from no legal flaw?
  • Does the failure to mention injuries sustained by the accused in the First Information Report affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • What is the effect of material discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence between the First Information Report and the evidence led at trial?
  • Whether the testimony of related and interested witnesses requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
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• Muhammad Nawaz and 9 Others vs The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 6 Other1971 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-06
  redemption of mortgagewrit jurisdictionlimitation periodacknowledgment of debtmutation entrydisputed questions of factcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the redemption of mortgaged land, involving complex historical transactions dating back to the late 19th century. The core legal question was whether the application for redemption was time-barred and whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise writ jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition, as the case involved intricate factual disputes regarding the identity of the land and the existence of a subsisting mortgage, which were unsuitable for resolution in writ proceedings. The Court affirmed that an unequivocal acknowledgment of a mortgage in a mutation entry constitutes a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court observed that while the Redemption of Mortgaged Lands Act provides a specific appellate procedure, a civil suit remains a potential remedy if the underlying mortgage is found not to be subsisting, thereby rendering the revenue proceedings without jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the parties to pursue appropriate civil remedies if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acknowledgment of a mortgage in a mutation entry provide a fresh period of limitation under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is a writ petition the appropriate forum for resolving complex factual disputes regarding the identity of mortgaged land?
  • Can a civil suit be maintained if the proceedings under the West Pakistan Redemption of Mortgaged Lands Act 1964 are alleged to be without jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Nawaz Alias Nawaza and Another vs Mst. Sakina and Another1971 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-24
  bail cancellationsubsequent bailjudicial proprietytrial magistrate powercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court cancelling the bail granted to the petitioners by the trial Magistrate. The petitioners were facing trial under section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly cutting the nose and pig-tail of the complainant, Mst. Sakina. The trial Magistrate initially granted bail, which the High Court set aside. Subsequently, after recording some evidence and proceeding on the assumption that the complainant was deliberately avoiding appearance, the trial Magistrate granted bail a second time. The High Court cancelled this second bail order, noting the erroneous assumption regarding the complainant's absence—who was actually hospitalized at the time—and citing judicial propriety. The core legal question concerned the power of the trial Magistrate to regrant bail after a previous cancellation by the High Court and the propriety of such an order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while a Magistrate's statutory power to grant bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not inherently extinguished by a prior cancellation, judicial propriety requires lower courts to refer bail matters back to the High Court under such circumstances unless material circumstances have genuinely changed. The Court also issued directions ensuring the complainant's safe escort by the police to court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial Magistrate has the power to grant bail after the High Court has previously set aside a bail order?
  • Does judicial propriety require a trial Magistrate to refer a bail application to the High Court when bail has been previously cancelled by the superior court?
  • What constitutes a valid ground for the cancellation of bail by the High Court?
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• Muhammad Manzoor Khan vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Another1971 SCMR 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-10
  settlement propertydemarcationlimitation periodcondonation of delaycopying agency noticeremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the appellant's writ petition regarding the transfer of a plot of land. The appellant claimed the plot as part of a property previously transferred to him under settlement laws, while respondent No. 2 also claimed it. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal was within time based on the computation of limitation for obtaining copies of judgments, and whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's order was passed on correct assumptions of fact and proper records. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was within time after accounting for the copying department's notice date and condoning delay, and found that the Settlement Commissioner's order was indeed based on incorrect factual assumptions regarding an alleged transfer order in favor of respondent No. 2. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner to re-examine the facts and decide the dispute. The key principle laid down is that administrative orders passed on fundamentally mistaken assumptions of fact without supporting record cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • How is the limitation period for filing an appeal calculated with reference to the date of notice from the copying department?
  • Whether an order passed by a Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner based on incorrect assumptions of fact and without proper record is sustainable?
  • Can a plot be transferred under the guise of demarcation proceedings if it is found to be an independent property?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Aslam and 3 Other1971 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationjudicial proprietymurdercommitment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan granting bail to respondents charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, notwithstanding the prior refusal of bail by another judge of the same court on similar grounds. The core legal question concerns the propriety and legality of a High Court judge reviewing or granting a subsequent bail application after another judge of coordinate jurisdiction has refused it, absent fresh grounds. The Supreme Court held that a criminal judgment or order is not open to review under the Code, and while fresh bail applications are permissible upon the emergence of new grounds, judicial propriety and institutional harmony require that such subsequent applications be placed before the same judge who dealt with the matter earlier. The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order, allowing the respondents to remain on bail solely until the conclusion of commitment proceedings, upon which their bail would stand cancelled if committed for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is a criminal judgment or order open to review under the Code?
  • Can a judge of the High Court grant bail to an accused person after another judge of the same Court has earlier refused bail on similar grounds?
  • What is the required procedure when a fresh bail application is filed after bail has been previously refused by another judge?
  • What is the effect on bail if an accused is committed to stand trial for an offense punishable with death or transportation for life under the modified order?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs The State1971 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  sentence enhancementdacoityminimum sentencecriminal revisionsubstantive offenceillegal confinement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal and enhancing his sentence from three years' to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under sections 395 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, along with three constables, had been convicted of offences relating to wrongful confinement and dacoity after unlawfully entering a house, seizing cattle, and demanding a bribe. The core legal questions were whether the High Court had jurisdiction to enhance the sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code without an appeal from acquittal, and whether section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code constitutes a separate substantive offence requiring a formal appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court validly exercised its revisionary powers under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to enhance the sentence, and further held that section 397 does not create a distinct substantive offence but merely prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated forms of dacoity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to enhance a sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the absence of an appeal from acquittal?
  • Does section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code constitute a separate substantive offence or merely prescribe a minimum punishment for dacoity?
  • Can a failure by the trial court to apply the minimum sentence under section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code be treated as an order of acquittal requiring an appeal under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Muhammad Saddiq and 7 Other1971 SCMR 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-04
  canal water rightswarabandiaudi alteram partemtemporary injunctionadministrative lawnatural justicerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allocation of canal water for agricultural purposes. The petitioner obtained sanction from the Superintending Engineer for additional water supply, leading to a re-fixing of the warabandi. Respondents challenged this order through a declaratory suit and sought a temporary injunction. The trial court granted the injunction, which was initially set aside by the District Judge but restored by the High Court. The High Court reasoned that the Superintending Engineer failed to provide notice to the respondents, violating the principle of audi alteram partem, and noted that the specific provision relied upon by the petitioner was inapplicable as no orchard existed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's decision to maintain the status quo was based on cogent grounds. The Court affirmed that even where statutory rules are silent, the principle of audi alteram partem applies when administrative actions adversely affect the rights of others, such as reducing water supply to existing shareholders, and that the trial court must decide the merits independently.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to administrative orders regarding water allocation even if the relevant rules are silent on notice?
  • Can an administrative order reducing water supply to existing shareholders be passed without providing them an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does an interim injunction order passed by a High Court in revision constitute a final decision on the merits of the suit?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Mian Muhammad Amaullah1971 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-10
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentleave to appealsymbolic possessionleased landrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the respondent against the petitioner for default in rent payments regarding a building site in Lyallpur. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the District Judge reversed the decision on appeal, finding a default of four consecutive months and ordering ejectment. The High Court dismissed the subsequent second appeal, holding that the factual finding of default was unchallengeable under section 101, C.P.C. Upon a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the appellate authority failed to properly exercise its discretion by not considering the substantial investment made in erecting a building on the land. The Supreme Court held that while the expense of raising the structure is a circumstance that may be considered by the rent authorities, an ejectment order in such cases can only be executed by delivering symbolic possession of the site, leaving the landlord to pursue further legal remedies in a civil court for the removal of structures. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of default in rent by the first appellate court can be challenged in a second appeal?
  • Can the expense incurred by a tenant in erecting a building on leased land be considered by rent authorities when ordering ejectment?
  • How is an order of ejectment executed when a tenant has raised a structure on the leased site?
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• Muhammad Ishaque vs The State1971 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-16
  rash and negligent drivingcriminal negligencecausing death by negligencetraffic accidentpetition for leave to appealspeeding
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which maintained his conviction and sentence under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code for causing death by rash and negligent driving, while setting aside his conviction under Section 338. The prosecution case was that the petitioner was driving a car at an excessive speed of about 70 miles per hour, ignored warnings from a passenger, lost control near a bus stop, and struck a woman carrying an infant child, resulting in the child's fatal injuries. The core legal question was whether driving at a fast speed constituted rash and negligent driving under the law. The Supreme Court held that the question of rashness and negligence is to be determined on the facts of each case, and upon concurrent findings of fact establishing that the petitioner was driving at an excessive speed without control and despite warnings, no interference was warranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that high speed coupled with a failure to control the vehicle under circumstances pedestrians are endangered constitutes rash and negligent driving.

  Questions settled

  • Does driving a motor vehicle at a fast speed amount to rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rash and negligent driving when supported by evidence?
  • Whether the determination of rash and negligent driving depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore1971 PLD Supreme Court 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-09
  evacuee propertystatutory chargeunpaid vendor's lienTransfer of Property Actscaling down of chargessettlement authoritiesDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legality of scaling down a statutory charge held by an unpaid vendor against evacuee property. The appellant, having sold land to an evacuee, sought to enforce a charge for the unpaid balance. The Custodian recognized this as a statutory charge under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Subsequently, the Settlement Authorities applied the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961, to scale down the amount, arguing the charge was subject to their regulatory powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that a charge arising by operation of law under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act is distinct from a charge created by the Custodian. The Court ruled that the power to scale down charges under the 1961 Rules applies only to charges created by the Custodian, not to statutory charges arising independently of the Custodian's actions. Consequently, the Settlement Authorities lacked the jurisdiction to reduce the appellant's claim, and the appellant was entitled to the full unpaid balance.

  Questions settled

  • Is a charge arising under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 considered a charge created by the Custodian under the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961?
  • Do the Settlement Authorities have the power to scale down a statutory charge created by operation of law under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Does a charge created by operation of law under the Transfer of Property Act 1882 possess the same characteristics as a simple mortgage for enforcement purposes?
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• Muhammad Hussain and Others vs Ahmad Khan and Another1971 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-22
  review petitionpre-emptionquestion of factspecial leave to appealsecond appealsub-division of village
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for the review of an order passed by the Supreme Court dismissing a petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question involved the right of pre-emption claimed by the respondents based on their status as co-owners in a specific sub-division of a village, and whether the existence of such a sub-division was a question of fact concurrently determined by the courts below. The Supreme Court held that the existence of a sub-division was a pure question of fact determined concurrently by the lower courts, and a review cannot be granted on the grounds that counsel failed to argue or press a particular point at the original hearing which was available at the time. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be utilized as a means to re-hear a matter merely to make good the failure of counsel to argue points that could have been raised previously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of existence of a sub-division in a village is a question of fact?
  • Can a review be granted on the ground that counsel failed to argue a point available at the original hearing?
  • Whether a finding of fact concurrently determined by lower courts can be challenged in second appeal based on evidence not relied upon below?
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• Muhammad Hayat and 6 Others vs Muhammad Nawaz1971 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-13
  customary lawancestral propertyalienationlegal necessityAwan tribeburden of proofregistered sale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the alienation of ancestral land by an Awan proprietor in Shahpur. The respondent challenged the sale of 1891 kanals of land by his father and step-mother to the appellants, arguing that the land was ancestral and the alienation was made without legal necessity or consent, contrary to prevailing customary law. The core legal questions involved whether the land was ancestral, the extent of the vendors' power of alienation under custom, and whether the transfer was supported by legal necessity and consideration. The Supreme Court held that while the land was ancestral and the vendors possessed restricted powers of alienation in the presence of a son, the alienation of 94 kanals was valid, as legal necessity was established and the burden of proof was mitigated by the lapse of time. However, the transfer of the remaining land was invalid, as it lacked consideration and constituted an impermissible gift under custom. The Court affirmed that registered sales are not void for non-payment of consideration, which merely creates a charge on the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-payment of consideration render a registered sale deed void?
  • Do Awans of Shahpur District possess unrestricted power to alienate ancestral property in the presence of sons?
  • Does the lapse of time affect the burden of proof regarding legal necessity for the alienation of ancestral property?
  • Can a proprietor with sons make a gift of ancestral property to a relative under customary law?
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• Muhammad Ehsan vs The State1971 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-03
  criminal complaintcivil courtsanction for prosecutionprocedural defectcurable irregularitysummoning witnessprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court dismissing a revision application against a Magistrate's order rejecting objections to a criminal complaint filed by a Civil Judge under sections 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the appellant, who was merely a summons-serving witness in a civil suit fraudulently instituted in another's name. The core legal questions involved whether a civil court Presiding Officer could lodge such a complaint against a witness under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and whether the omission to examine the complainant under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not apply to a witness rather than a party, but the complaint was maintainable under the general law as a private complaint. The Court further laid down that the procedural omission to examine the complainant under section 200 was curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of prejudice or timely objection.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court Presiding Officer lodge a complaint against a witness under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code in pursuance of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the omission to examine a private complainant under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the entire criminal proceeding?
  • Is a procedural omission regarding the examination of a complainant curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no prejudice is suffered by the accused?
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• Muhammad Din and Another vs Ch. Fazal Karim and Another1971 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-21
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActTransfer of propertySettlement authoritiesResidential unitsLetters Patent appealCondonation of delayRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner properly exercised his discretion in transferring the entire property to one party without determining if it constituted multiple independent residential units, and whether the High Court correctly condoned the delay in the Letters Patent appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities failed to apply their minds to the factual determination of whether the building comprised independent residential units under Section 2(4) of the Act. If multiple units exist, they may be transferred separately; if not, a local occupant must yield to a refugee claimant. Because the Chief Settlement Commissioner failed to make this determination and did not comply with the High Court's remand order, the Supreme Court upheld the decision to remand the case for fresh disposal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the delay in filing the Letters Patent appeal was correctly condoned given the legislative changes regarding appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 prohibit the transfer of a portion of a house to a local if it constitutes an independent residential unit?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner required to determine whether a building consists of more than one residential unit before ordering the transfer of the entire property?
  • Can the delay in filing a Letters Patent appeal be condoned when the delay is caused by the abolition and subsequent restoration of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Chiragh Ud Din Bhatti vs The Province of West Pakistan1971 SCMR 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-27
  res judicatawrit jurisdictioncivil suittermination of servicemunicipal employeespecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave challenges the dismissal of the petitioner's civil suit by the Lahore High Court in second appeal, which had upheld the lower appellate court's decision. The petitioner, a former Chief Sanitary Inspector, had filed a suit challenging his termination of service ordered by the Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division. Previously, the petitioner had challenged the same termination order through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by a Division Bench holding that the termination was competently covered by statutory provisions and cured by the Provincial Government's rejection of his representation. The core legal question was whether a subsequent civil suit is barred by the principles of res judicata when the matter has already been adjudicated upon by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the general principles of res judicata apply, barring the petitioner from re-agitating the matter through a civil suit after the issue had been finally settled by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a civil court cannot bypass or override orders competently made by the High Court in writ jurisdiction between the same parties on the same subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment passed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent civil suit between the same parties on the same matter?
  • Can a defect in form regarding the statutory authority for dismissing a municipal employee be cured by a subsequent order of the Provincial Government on representation?
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• Muhammad Boota and 12 Others vs Ch. Faiz Muhammad and 8 Others1971 P Cr. L J 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  criminal proceduredispossessionorder 145 CrPCreview of orderjurisdiction of magistrateimplementation of orderpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which accepted a reference made by the Sessions Judge and set aside an order of the Additional District Magistrate. The respondent had originally filed an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, leading to a final order on 27-11-1962 declaring him entitled to possession of the disputed land. When the respondent sought implementation of this order, the Additional District Magistrate dismissed the application, holding that the order was merely declaratory and lacked land identity, effectively reviewing his own prior decision. The core legal question is whether the Additional District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to review or refuse to implement a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the Additional District Magistrate lacked the legal authority to review the final order, and that the order was properly a declaration of entitlement to possession with sufficiently identifiable land. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a magistrate cannot review a final adjudication under section 145.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional District Magistrate have the jurisdiction to review a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether an order declaring a party entitled to possession under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is merely declaratory and unenforceable?
  • Can a magistrate refuse to implement a final order under section 145 on the ground of lack of identity of land when the preliminary order and application fully set it out?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs Muhammad Yusuf and 5 Other1971 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-23
  private defenceself-defenceacquittalleave to appealmedical evidencecriminal liabilityprosecution burden
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of respondents who were originally charged with rioting and murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court and the trial court erred in accepting the plea of private defence, given the injuries sustained by the accused persons during the incident. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the prosecution failed to establish that the injuries on the accused were self-inflicted. The medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries and the physical condition of the deceased, Muhammad Yunus, rendered the prosecution's version of events implausible. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal and the acceptance of the right of private defence. The key principle laid down is that a plea of private defence is substantiated when the prosecution fails to provide a foundation for the theory that the accused's injuries were self-suffered, particularly when medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's narrative regarding the sequence of events and the capacity of the deceased to act as an aggressor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of private defence be accepted when the prosecution fails to prove that the injuries on the accused were self-inflicted?
  • Does the medical condition of a deceased person, indicating an inability to wield a weapon, invalidate the prosecution's version of the incident?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in refusing leave to appeal when the lower courts have concurrently accepted the plea of private defence based on evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and Another vs The State1971 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-30
  post-conviction bailjudicial discretionspecial leave to appealcriminal appealdelay in disposal of appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against an order of the High Court, Lahore, which refused bail to the petitioners following their conviction by a Section 30 Magistrate under sections 326/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a five-year rigorous imprisonment sentence. The petitioners' appeal was admitted for hearing, but bail was denied. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in refusing bail, given the potential for the petitioners to serve a significant portion of their sentence before the appeal is heard due to court congestion. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion improperly, as there was no reason to believe the appeal would not be disposed of within a reasonable timeframe. The Court affirmed that criminal appeals should generally be resolved within one to two years. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on merits, though the Court granted the petitioners liberty to re-apply for bail to the High Court if the appeal remains pending after one year.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere congestion of court work justify the grant of bail to a convict pending appeal?
  • Can a convict re-apply for bail if their appeal remains pending beyond a specified period?
  • Is the refusal of bail by the High Court after admitting an appeal subject to interference if discretion was exercised properly?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1971 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-02
  murdercriminal appealeyewitness testimonysolitary witnessappreciation of evidencetransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal arises from a judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and reduced his sentence from death to transportation for life. The prosecution alleged that the appellant stabbed the deceased to death due to a family enmity arising from the deceased's abduction of the appellant's cousin. Special leave was granted by the Supreme Court to re-examine the evidence. Although the lower courts and the Supreme Court expressed doubts regarding certain prosecution evidence—including the testimony of one eyewitness and the recovery of the weapon—the Supreme Court evaluated the remaining testimony of an independent, natural eyewitness, Riaz Ali. The core legal question centered on the reliability of this solitary eyewitness testimony and whether a conviction could be sustained thereon without corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the solitary testimony of a natural and truthful witness, free from enmity or bias, is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction without corroboration. The key principle laid down is that the uncorroborated testimony of a single reliable and natural eyewitness, if found entirely trustworthy, forms a legally sound basis for upholding a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction for murder be based upon the solitary testimony of an eyewitness?
  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a natural eyewitness requires independent corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the omission of the assailant's name in an initial hospital report affect the credibility of a natural eyewitness to the occurrence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs Administrator, Dow Medical College, Karachi1971 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  medical college admissionrural seatsdefinition of rural areawrit petitionleave to appealequity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had rejected the petitioner's challenge to the admission of respondents 3 and 4 to the Dow Medical College, Karachi, against tagged rural seats. The core legal question was whether Model Colony, having been included in the Malir Cantonment in 1965, ceased to be a rural area under the admission instructions. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an area within cantonment or municipal limits does not automatically strip it of its rural character if its population meets the census criterion and residents pursue agricultural pursuits. Furthermore, the petition was hit by laches and equity as the respondents had already been attending classes since January 1970 without a stay order. The petition was dismissed with observations that the college authorities might consider the petitioner favorably for the next session.

  Questions settled

  • Does an area cease to be a rural area for college admissions merely because it is included within cantonment limits?
  • Can a candidate displace admitted students who have been attending classes without an interim stay order?
  • What constitutes a rural area under the admission instructions based on population and census?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin and Another vs The State1971 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-02
  culpable homicidemurdercumulative injuriescommon intentioncriminal liabilitypremeditated attack
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased, who succumbed to injuries sustained during an ambush. The appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the appellants' actions constituted murder despite the absence of a single fatal injury, and whether the cumulative effect of multiple non-fatal injuries could sustain a conviction under Section 302. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was correct. The Court determined that while no individual injury was sufficient to cause death, the appellants' premeditated, merciless beating—resulting in thirteen injuries, including six fractured ribs—demonstrated an intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the offence fell under the third clause of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The principle laid down is that where multiple injuries cumulatively cause death, the offence may constitute murder under Section 302, even if no single injury is individually fatal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 be sustained when no single injury caused by the accused was individually sufficient to cause death?
  • Does the cumulative effect of multiple non-fatal injuries satisfy the requirements of Section 300, clause thirdly, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a premeditated, merciless beating sufficient to establish the intention to cause bodily injury likely to result in death?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and 8 Others vs Haji Fazal-Ul-Haq and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-18
  pre-emptionequitable set-offdeposit of purchase-moneycosts adjustmentpre-emption decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the West Pakistan High Court dismissing a civil revision petition in a pre-emption matter. The trial court had decreed the respondents' pre-emption suit conditional upon depositing a specific purchase price by a certain date. The respondents deposited an amount that fell short by thirty-four paisas, but claimed entitlement to adjust this minor shortage against the costs awarded to them under the same decree. The core legal question is whether a pre-emptor is entitled to deduct a shortage in the pre-emption money by setting it off against the costs awarded in the same decree. The Supreme Court held that the pre-emptor-decree-holder is entitled to apply the doctrine of equitable set-off, allowing the deduction of costs awarded under the decree from the purchase price to be deposited. The court affirmed that principles of equity, justice, and good conscience apply to pre-emption suits, and cross-demands arising out of the same transaction permit such a set-off.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is entitled to deduct a shortage in the pre-emption money against the costs awarded to him under the same decree?
  • Does the doctrine of equitable set-off apply to pre-emption suits where cross-demands for purchase-price and costs arise out of the same transaction?
  • Whether failure to deposit a nominal fraction of the pre-emption money due to a shortfall covered by awarded costs warrants the dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Muhammad Akbar and Another1971 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-10
  review petitionlimitationcondonation of delaycertificate for leave to appealsufficient causeSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the dismissal of a petition for special leave to appeal, which had been dismissed as time-barred by 115 days without an application for condonation of delay. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate under sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the High Court could be excluded as of right or if each day of delay after refusal must be explained with sufficient cause. The Supreme Court held that the time spent in the High Court can only be excluded as sufficient cause under the relevant rules and does not grant an automatic extension of limitation as a matter of right under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, requiring explanation for every day of delay once limitation has expired. The key principle laid down is that the exclusion of time spent in obtaining a certificate from the High Court is not a matter of right for computing limitation before the Supreme Court, and unexplained delay after the refusal of such a certificate warrants the dismissal of a time-barred petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent in pursuing an application for a certificate in the High Court can be excluded as of right when computing limitation for a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is a petitioner required to explain the delay for each day after the refusal of a certificate by the High Court when the period of limitation has already expired?
  • Does the exclusion of time under the Supreme Court Rules operate in the same manner as section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zuhra Begum vs Syed Sajjad Hussain and 7 Other1971 SCMR 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-25
  evacuee propertydeed of associationsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealquestion of factfraud and misrepresentation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions involved conflicting deeds of association executed regarding the transfer of an evacuee property in Lahore, the competence of the High Court to investigate allegations of fraud not raised before the settlement authorities, and the raising of a mixed question of fact regarding revisional powers for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the execution of the deed of association was rightly concluded by the Settlement Commissioner, that the High Court was not the proper forum to investigate fresh allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and that a question of fact regarding revisional powers not agitated below cannot be urged for the first time. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, laying down that factual inquiries and new pleas not raised before lower forums cannot be entertained by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is the proper forum for investigating into the genuineness of a deed of association tainted with alleged fraud when such evidence was not produced before the settlement authorities?
  • Can a question of fact regarding whether a Settlement Commissioner was competently invested with revisional powers be allowed to be urged for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zardar Begum vs Sultan Mahmood and 5 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-17
  colonization of government landscolony land inheritancecustomary lawlimited estatetenancy rightsoriginal tenantproprietary rightsmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This certificated appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the inheritance of Crown land granted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether grand-daughters of the original tenant inherited a limited estate under customary law terminable upon marriage, or whether they held the land as independent grantees under the statute. The Supreme Court held that succession to colony lands is exclusively governed by the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, rather than customary law. The Court ruled that the appellant acquired the tenancy rights either as a nominee/fresh grant by the Collector or via a valid transfer consented to by the Collector under Section 19, making her a tenant in her own right and subsequently an absolute owner upon acquiring proprietary rights. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the respondents' suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether succession to colony lands granted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 is governed by customary law or the provisions of the Act?
  • Does a female grantee of colony land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 hold a limited estate terminable upon marriage?
  • Can a female holding tenancy rights under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 become an absolute owner upon the acquisition of proprietary rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zamro Jan and 5 Others vs Fateh Khan and 4 Other1971 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-14
  evacuee propertywrit jurisdictionletters patent appealmortgage redemptionnew pleasettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions challenging the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court regarding the redemption of mortgaged lands. The petitioners, successors-in-interest to a sub-mortgagee, contested the jurisdiction of settlement authorities, arguing that the property in dispute was not 'evacuee property' under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, as it had not been treated as such prior to 1st January 1957. The Supreme Court examined whether this specific legal contention regarding the status of the property was properly raised before the lower courts. The Court held that because the petitioners failed to raise the issue of the property's status in their original writ petitions, the Letters Patent Bench was justified in disallowing the argument at the appellate stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that new points of fact or law not pleaded in the initial writ jurisdiction cannot be introduced in Letters Patent Appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new point of law or fact in a Letters Patent Appeal that was not pleaded in the original writ petition?
  • Does the failure to raise a specific contention in a writ petition preclude the appellate court from considering it?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughrabai and 10 Others vs Fida Hussain Mohammadalikerai and Another1971 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-14
  promissory noteillegal considerationpugreegoodwillrecovery of moneyappreciation of evidencesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a suit for the recovery of money based on a promissory note. The original plaintiff alleged the defendant borrowed money, while the defendant contended the promissory note was executed for 'pugree' (a premium for possession of premises), which he argued was illegal consideration. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the High Court reversed this, finding the consideration was indeed for 'pugree' and thus unenforceable. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, specifically noting that while the plaintiff argued the consideration was for the 'goodwill' of a shop, the evidence indicated the amount was for the possession of the premises. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding, concluding that the promissory note was based on illegal consideration (pugree) and that the High Court's appreciation of evidence was correct. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a promissory note executed in consideration of 'pugree' (premium for possession of premises) enforceable in law?
  • Does the definition of 'goodwill' in law require evidence of the use of a firm's name and reputation?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with findings of fact if they are based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Sultana vs Ali Ahmad Khan and 3 Other1971 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-22
  oral giftconcurrent findings of factsecond appealleave to appealinheritanceproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a second appeal concerning a property dispute. The core legal question involves the validity of an alleged oral gift inter vivos of the disputed property by the original owner in favour of the petitioner, versus a registered sale deed executed by the respondent's vendor who claimed as the sole heir of the original owner. The trial Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court concurrently found against the petitioner, holding that the oral gift was not established, that the property was validly sold to respondent No. 1, and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-existence of the oral gift were well-founded based on documentary evidence and that no interference was warranted. The key principle laid down is that a superior court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in second appeal unless jurisdictional defects or perversity are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of an oral gift?
  • Does an oral gift inter vivos require supporting evidence of delivery of possession and attornment of tenants to be valid?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained against concurrent findings of fact established by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Shafi vs Major M. S. Malik1971 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-01
  transfer of caseterritorial jurisdictionguardianshipcivil procedurepending proceeding
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether an application for transfer under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is incompetent when based on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court of institution. The appellant sought the transfer of a guardianship proceeding from Rawalpindi to Lahore, asserting the Rawalpindi court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that an application for transfer is competent only if the court of institution is competent to try the matter. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that before a proceeding can be withdrawn or transferred from a court, it must be validly and duly pending in that court, and a court lacking initial jurisdiction cannot form the basis of a valid transfer under section 24. The Supreme Court affirmed the settled principle established by the Privy Council that a superior court cannot order the transfer of a case unless the court from which the transfer is sought possesses jurisdiction to try it. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application for transfer under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure incompetent if the court in which the proceeding was instituted lacks jurisdiction?
  • Does the word 'pending' in section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure mean duly pending before a court having jurisdiction?
  • Can a case be transferred from a court that has no initial jurisdiction to entertain it?
  • What is the appropriate forum for raising an objection as to the place of suing and territorial jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Qaisar Khatoon and 12 Others vs Maulvi Abdul Khaliq and Another (Both Represented by Heirs)1971 PLD Supreme Court 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  customary lawpersonal lawMuhammadan Lawonus of proofancestral propertyself-acquired propertyWajib-ul-ArzRiwaj-i-Amspecial leave to appealinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal transferred to the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Section 9 of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1949, arose from an inheritance dispute involving the estate of Maulvi Abdul Aziz. The plaintiffs claimed succession under Muhammadan Law, while the respondents contended that the family was governed by custom excluding female heirs, or alternatively under a will. The trial court dismissed the suit under customary law, but after multiple remands, the High Court affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court first overruled a preliminary objection regarding the appeal's competency, holding that it retained full jurisdiction and discretion to grant special leave. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872, the burden of proving a custom displacing personal law rests strictly on the party asserting it. Furthermore, entries in a Wajib-ul-Arz or Riwaj-i-Am recorded in general terms apply presumptively only to ancestral property, not self-acquired property. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, applying personal law to the deceased's self-acquired properties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction under the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1949, to grant special leave to appeal in transferred state matters lacking a formal High Court certificate of fitness?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, when custom is pleaded in derogation of personal law?
  • Do customary rules recorded in a Wajib-ul-Arz or Riwaj-i-Am presumptively apply to non-ancestral or self-acquired property unless specifically stated?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi vs Mst. Rafiq Bano1971 PLD Supreme Court 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  sale deed validityregistration of documentsdirectory vs mandatory provisionstransfer of propertyincome-tax certificateleasehold transferbreach of covenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of a sale deed for a house in Lahore, challenged by the appellant on grounds of non-compliance with income-tax certification requirements, non-payment of the full purchase price, and lack of permission from the Lahore Improvement Trust for the transfer of the leasehold interest. The core legal question was whether the failure to obtain an Income-tax No-Objection Certificate under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Pakistan) Ordinance 1947 renders the registration of a sale deed void. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 3 are directory rather than mandatory. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance does not expressly invalidate registrations made in contravention of Section 3, and that the statute provides alternative mechanisms for tax recovery. Furthermore, the Court held that non-payment of the balance of the purchase price does not render an executed conveyance void, and that an assignment of a lease in breach of a covenant against transfer is valid between the parties, even if it might give the lessor a right of re-entry. The principle established is that statutory requirements for public duties, where non-compliance does not expressly nullify the act, are generally directory.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to obtain an Income-tax No-Objection Certificate under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Pakistan) Ordinance 1947 invalidate the registration of a sale deed?
  • Does the non-payment of the balance of the purchase price render an executed sale deed void?
  • Is a transfer of leasehold interest made in breach of a covenant requiring the lessor's consent void between the parties to the transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khudeja vs Jehangir Khan and 37 Other1971 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-14
  declaratory suitrevenue recordsmutationcustomary lawlimited ownerinheritancesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a second appeal dismissed in limine by the High Court, which had upheld the lower appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's declaratory suit. The plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership in land, claiming that the appellant's father had predeceased his own father, thereby disentitling the appellant to inherit. The core legal question was whether the appellant's father predeceased his father and whether revenue entries and mutation records showing independent succession by the widow could be displaced without proper evidence. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate Court's finding that the father predeceased was based on no evidence, and that the widow had succeeded her husband in her own right as a limited owner under customary law, with the property devolving upon the Shariat law heirs upon her demise. The key principle laid down is that revenue entries carrying a presumption of truth cannot be displaced by mere self-serving oral assertions without documentary proof, and limited estates held by widows devolve upon the last full owner's heirs under the Muslim Personal Law Amendment Act of 1950.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can be permitted to amend a plaint to fundamentally change the nature of the suit regarding the date and fact of a predecessor's death?
  • Do revenue records and mutation entries carry a presumption of truth that requires substantial evidence to displace?
  • How does the Muslim Personal Law Amendment Act of 1950 govern the succession of property held by a limited owner under customary law upon her demise?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haleema Bibi vs The Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation1971 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-20
  evacuee propertyspecific performancesuo motu revisioncustodian of evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order declaring a civil court decree in her favour to be illegal and resuming the disputed evacuee land. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner validly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction within the prescribed limitation period, whether the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner acted within his competence as a Settlement authority, and whether a civil court decree obtained without the mandatory prior permission and subsequent confirmation of the Custodian of Evacuee Property was executable against evacuee property. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's intervention was within the statutory nine-month period, that the officer acted as a competent Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and that the civil court decree was corum non judice and unexecutable as the Custodian had refused permission and the decree lacked confirmation. The Court laid down the principle that evacuee property cannot be subjected to court decrees or alienations without strict compliance with statutory requirements, including prior permission and confirmation by the Custodian of Evacuee Property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner can exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under the Land Settlement Act to declare a civil court decree illegal?
  • Does a civil court decree obtained without the prior permission and subsequent confirmation of the Custodian of Evacuee Property hold any legal sanctity regarding evacuee land?
  • Whether an order passed by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner who also functions as a Deputy Settlement Commissioner is amenable to revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajran Bibi vs Habib and 3 Other1971 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  acquittalleave to appeallimitationdelay in filingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court, which set aside the convictions and sentences awarded under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns whether the delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal can be condoned, thereby placing acquitted persons back in jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by limitation by 29 days and that no satisfactory reason or valid ground was shown for the delay. The Court affirmed the established principle that time will not ordinarily be extended in petitions against acquittal to avoid placing acquitted persons in jeopardy out of time, and noted that the respondents were entitled to raise the limitation objection since they were not heard when leave was initially granted. Consequently, the Supreme Court recalled the leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can time be extended for filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal when the petition is barred by limitation?
  • Are respondents entitled to raise an objection regarding limitation at the hearing stage if they were not heard when leave to appeal was originally granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Fatima vs Syed Mohammad Kazim Hussain and Another1971 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-12
  maintenancejurisdictionfamily courtspending proceedingsprocedural lawnullity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal challenging an order of the High Court which set aside a magistrate's notice for the recovery of arrears of maintenance. The core legal question is whether the enforcement of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, deprived magistrates of jurisdiction over pending maintenance applications under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, rendering subsequent orders null and void. The Supreme Court held that the Family Courts Act, being procedural in nature, altered the forum and stripped the magistrate of jurisdiction in scheduled matters upon its enforcement, making any subsequent orders passed without jurisdiction a nullity in the eye of the law. The key principle laid down is that procedural changes affecting forums apply to pending proceedings, and orders passed by a court lacking jurisdiction are nullities that cannot be executed, leaving the aggrieved party to seek remedies before the proper Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, affect pending proceedings under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does a magistrate lose jurisdiction to entertain or execute maintenance applications under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, once the Family Courts Act becomes applicable to an area?
  • Can an order for arrears of maintenance passed by a magistrate without jurisdiction be challenged as a nullity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ameenabai and Others vs Karachi Municipal Corporation and Other1971 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitionlocus standimunicipal corporationallotment of landeasement rightsquorum
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal by the High Court of a constitutional petition challenging a municipal resolution and an appellate order regarding the allotment of a plot of land by the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had an enforceable legal right to maintain a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution against the municipal grant of land to a third party and the subsequent administrative dismissal of their appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioners possessed no legal right to the grant of the land that could be asserted through such proceedings, noting that any alleged infringement of easement rights must be pursued via a regular civil suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition and laid down the principle that a party lacking a direct legal right to the grant of municipal property cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 to challenge its disposal, and must resort to civil litigation for the protection of easementary rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person have an enforceable legal right to the grant of municipal land so as to maintain a constitutional petition against its allotment?
  • Can the High Court interfere under Article 98 of the Constitution with the discretionary power of an appellate authority regarding the condonation of delay?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party claiming an infringement of light and air easement rights resulting from the disposal of adjacent municipal property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ahmedi Begum., Muhammad Mushtaq Ali Khan vs Muhammad1971 PLD Supreme Court 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-07
  wakf-alal-auladland reformsmutwallinon-heir beneficiariesmartial law regulationinheritance shareswakf abolition
  Summary & questions settled

  This litigation involves cross-appeals concerning the distribution of agricultural lands released from a wakf-alal-aulad following the promulgation of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation No. 64 of 1959. The core legal question centered on the proper interpretation of the wakf deed and Paragraph 10(2)(c) of the Regulation regarding the shares to which the wakif's daughter (sole heir) and maternal grandson (mutwalli and descendant) were entitled upon the abolition of the wakf. The Supreme Court held that the high court rightly determined that the mutwalli was not entitled to a two-third share of the entire property, but rather a double share as a non-heir beneficiary in lieu of services, which ceased upon the abolition of the wakf. The Court laid down that upon the cessation of a wakf under the Regulation, succession opens on the date of the Regulation, with the sole heir taking her share under inheritance law and the remaining lands devolving equally among non-heir beneficiaries per capita. Additionally, unclaimed shares of non-heir beneficiaries do not remain in medio but are distributed pro rata among the remaining beneficiaries.

  Questions settled

  • How are agricultural lands released from a wakf under Paragraph 10 of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation No. 64 of 1959 to be distributed between heirs and non-heir beneficiaries?
  • Whether a mutwalli entitled to a double share for services under a wakf deed retains that enhanced share after the wakf is abolished under the Land Reforms Regulation?
  • What is the governing rule for the distribution of shares among non-heir beneficiaries whose interests are not explicitly defined in the wakf deed?
  • How should unclaimed shares of non-heir beneficiaries be handled upon the distribution of erstwhile wakf lands?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Shamsuddin and 5 Others vs Riasat Ali and Another1971 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-10
  land allotmentsitting allotteerefugee claimsmartial law regulationjurisdiction of high courtletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against an order of a Division Bench of the High Court at Lahore passed in a Letters Patent Appeal concerning the land allotment rights of refugees. The core legal question is whether an original land allotment made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, can be challenged through appeal and revision despite the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, and whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts is barred by paragraphs 12 and 15 of the said Regulation regarding such allotments. The Supreme Court held that the bar to jurisdiction under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 applies only to orders or schemes made thereunder, and does not extinguish accrued rights or prevent challenges to the legality of original allotments made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, where such rights accrued prior to the Regulation. The key principle laid down is that rights already accrued before the promulgation of a Martial Law Regulation are not affected by it in the absence of a clear provision to that effect, and original allotments forming the basis of modified orders remain open to statutory challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an original order of allotment made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, is open to challenge by way of appeal and revision notwithstanding the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 89?
  • Does the bar to the jurisdiction of courts under paragraphs 12 and 15 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89 apply to pre-existing rights and original allotments made prior to the Regulation?
  • Is a sitting allottee entitled to preference in the allotment of available land in a village over refugees transferred from other districts whose initial allotment is found to be illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mozaharul Hosain Alias Maju Darbesh Alias Pirpagla Darbesh vs The State1971 SCMR 735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of processprima facie casecriminal revisionwrongful confinementcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant under Sections 344 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that the proceedings were an abuse of process, citing previous dismissals of complaints and alleging harassment for blackmail. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the pending criminal inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court was justified in its decision. The Court observed that the existence of a child born to the alleged victim and the contested validity of the marriage required a formal judicial investigation. The Court affirmed the principle that where a prima facie case is disclosed, justice requires that the trial proceed to determine the truth. The mere fact that previous complaints were dismissed or that time has elapsed does not automatically warrant the quashing of criminal proceedings, as the accused has a right to be honourably acquitted if innocent, while the law must address potential offences if evidence exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere passage of time or the existence of previous dismissed complaints automatically constitute an abuse of process justifying the quashing of criminal proceedings?
  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed when a prima facie case exists regarding the commission of an offence?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to quash criminal proceedings when the evidence regarding the marriage of the accused and the victim is disputed and requires investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Moula Bux and 3 Others vs The State1971 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-02
  post-arrest baildelay in trialprosecution lachesextended detentionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal involving petitioners who had been detained in jail for eight years without a single prosecution witness being examined following a murder incident on January 15, 1963. The core legal question concerns whether extended and inordinate delay in holding an inquiry and trial, coupled with prosecution laches, constitutes sufficient ground for granting post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the delay and callous disregard by the prosecution in procuring the presence of accused persons warranted release on bail, noting that drawing a distinction against petitioners for failing to appeal an earlier refusal on merits was legally untenable. The Court ultimately refused leave to appeal to avoid causing further inordinate delay, instead directing the petitioners to renew their bail application before the Sessions Judge to be dealt with at par with a co-accused who was already granted bail under similar circumstances. The key principle laid down is that prolonged pre-trial detention resulting from prosecution laches and delay in inquiry/trial provides a valid ground for granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does prolonged pre-trial delay and prosecution laches constitute sufficient ground for releasing an accused on bail?
  • Can a Sessions Judge refuse bail to petitioners on the ground that they failed to appeal an earlier refusal on merits when the fresh petition is based on extended delay?
  • How should a court handle bail applications for accused persons similarly situated when co-accused have already been granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Uris and 5 Others vs The State1971 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-17
  murderprivate defencecommon objecteyewitness testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidencewater dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of six petitioners for murder and causing injuries during a violent altercation over water rights. The petitioners were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge, Larkana, for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, with sentences upheld by the West Pakistan High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the right of private defence of person and property, and whether the prosecution evidence, involving interested witnesses, required further corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were the aggressors, as evidenced by the physical circumstances of the crime scene and the testimony of injured eye-witnesses. The Court rejected the defence's claim of private defence, finding the prosecution's case sufficiently proved. Furthermore, the Court held that minor discrepancies between medical evidence and witness testimony regarding specific weapons used do not necessarily invalidate eyewitness accounts, particularly in the confusion of an attack. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings that the petitioners had made a common cause to commit the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy between medical evidence and witness testimony regarding the weapon used necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can the right of private defence be claimed by an aggressor party in a criminal altercation?
  • Is the testimony of injured eyewitnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction without further corroboration?
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• Mohammad Shafqat vs The State1971 P Cr. L J 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  special leave to appealfirst information reportocular testimonynon-examination of witnesscriminal revisionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his criminal revision by the High Court, which had maintained his conviction and sentence under Section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing injuries with a chhuri. The core legal questions involved whether the absence of a formal First Information Report or confusion surrounding its recording caused prejudice to the accused, and whether the non-examination of the injured victim as a prosecution witness vitiated the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since there were no material contradictions between the ocular testimony and the First Information Report, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. Furthermore, the prosecution is not strictly bound to produce every witness, and a conviction can safely rest on reliable ocular testimony even if the primary victim is not examined, provided no miscarriage of justice is shown. The court laid down that mere academic discrepancies regarding the First Information Report or the non-production of a witness do not warrant leave to appeal where reliable ocular evidence establishes guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a material contradiction between the ocular testimony and the First Information Report prejudice the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on reliable ocular testimony alone when a material witness is not examined by the prosecution?
  • Does the non-production of the injured victim as a prosecution witness automatically vitiate the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Nawaz and 2 Others vs Sh. Abdul Latif and Another1971 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-16
  co-sharerjoint propertypartition suitejectmenttemporary injunctionexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute centers around a godown in Multan City originally belonging to Miran Khan and inherited by his heirs, including his daughter who sold her share to Sh. Abdul Latif. The other co-heirs obtained an ejectment order against the tenant, Muhammad Bashir. Sh. Abdul Latif subsequently filed a partition suit and sought a temporary injunction to restrain the co-heirs from executing the eviction decree against Muhammad Rafiq, alleged to be his tenant and brother. The trial court and District Judge dismissed the injunction application, finding no proof of tenancy between Abdul Latif and Muhammad Rafiq. However, the High Court set aside these orders in revision, holding that Abdul Latif was in possession through his co-sharer status and brother. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, holding that a co-sharer in possession of joint property cannot be evicted without a partition suit, and the High Court validly restrained the execution of the decree against the occupant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer in possession of joint property be evicted without filing a suit for partition?
  • Whether the High Court can restrain the execution of an ejectment decree against a co-sharer or person in possession through a co-sharer?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact regarding tenancy open to interference if the lower courts failed to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Hashim and Others vs DR. Mohammad Asghar (Represented1971 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-11
  review petitionevacuee propertycivil court jurisdictionlocus standispecific performancecustodian of evacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed an appeal regarding the title and possession of a property in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether a civil court possesses jurisdiction to challenge an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property confirming an exchange of property, and whether the petitioners, as claimant displaced persons, had the locus standi to challenge the decree for specific performance obtained by the respondent. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the validity of an exchange confirmed by the Custodian is immune from the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Court further affirmed that allegations of fraud regarding such exchanges must be raised before the Custodian, not in civil proceedings. Additionally, the Court held that the petitioners lacked locus standi because their own transfer of the property had been cancelled by settlement authorities. The key principle laid down is that civil courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of orders passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, and review petitions cannot be used to raise new arguments that were available but not presented during the original appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to challenge an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property confirming an exchange of property?
  • Can a party raise new arguments in a review petition that were within their knowledge but not raised during the original appeal?
  • Is a decree for specific performance obtained by a party regarding evacuee property immune from challenge in a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Din vs Ghulam Farid and 2 Other1971 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28
  special leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitation periodacquittalenhancement of sentenceprivate complainant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had acquitted one respondent and reduced the sentence of another respondent convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petition was filed with a delay of 186 days. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be condoned based on the petitioner's claim of ignorance of the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court held that in cases involving appeals against acquittals or petitions seeking enhancement of sentences, delay will not be condoned unless the applicant demonstrates that they were actively prevented by the acquitted persons themselves from approaching the Court within the statutory limitation period. The Court reaffirmed that a private complainant lacks a sufficient interest to justify condonation of delay in such matters, strictly adhering to established precedents regarding the limitation period for criminal appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned if the petitioner claims ignorance of the judgment?
  • Does the principle requiring proof that the acquitted person prevented the filing of an appeal apply to petitions seeking enhancement of sentence?
  • Is a private complainant entitled to condonation of delay in a petition seeking enhancement of punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Azeem Khan vs Municipal Committee, Mardan1971 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-15
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealLetters Patent appealtime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which was dismissed as time-barred by 164 days. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Letters Patent extends the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period begins to run from the date of the delivery of the judgment, not from the date of the receipt of an order refusing a certificate of fitness. While the time spent pursuing such a certificate and obtaining certified copies may be excluded, the petitioner must still satisfactorily explain each day of delay. Because the petitioner failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the entire period of delay, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The judgment reaffirms that the mere filing of an application for a certificate of fitness does not grant a fresh start to limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an application for a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Letters Patent provide a fresh start to the limitation period for a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • From what date does the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal begin to run?
  • Is a petitioner required to explain each day of delay when seeking condonation for a time-barred petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ashraf vs The State1971 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-21
  post-conviction bailsuspension of sentencepolice challaninvestigating agency opinionde novo trialmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order granting bail to three convicts while refusing bail to three others, including the appellant, pending their appeal against convictions under Sections 302, 148, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that the trial was vitiated because evidence was recorded by different Sessions Judges, and that his role was indistinguishable from those granted bail. The Supreme Court held that merits-based arguments, such as procedural trial defects, cannot be raised at the bail stage while the main appeal is sub judice. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court erred in granting bail to the other convicts based on their placement in the second column of the police challan, as a police challan is merely the opinion of the investigating agency and irrelevant for bail post-conviction. Although the distinction made by the High Court was improper, the refusal of bail to the appellant was held to be correct, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding a procedural defect in a trial, such as different judges recording evidence, be raised to secure bail while the main appeal is sub judice?
  • Is the placement of an accused's name in the second column of a police challan a relevant consideration for granting bail after conviction?
  • Can bail be granted to a convicted person based solely on the opinion of the investigating agency as expressed in the police challan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ashiq vs The State and Another1971 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-23
  transfer of criminal casesjurisdiction of Supreme CourtPresident's Order No. 8 of 1970territorial jurisdictionmaintainability of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions filed by Mohammad Ashiq and Ghauhar Rahman seeking the transfer of criminal cases pending before Magistrates' Courts in Karachi to competent courts in Lahore and Abbottabad, respectively. The petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970, arguing that the Karachi Magistrates lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaints. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possessed the authority under the cited provision to transfer proceedings pending before a Magistrate's Court. Upon examination of Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970, the Court held that its power to transfer proceedings is strictly limited to cases pending before a 'new High Court' to another 'new High Court.' Since the subject cases were pending before Magistrates' Courts and not before any High Court, the Supreme Court determined it lacked the requisite jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions as misconceived and not maintainable under the invoked legal provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970 to transfer cases pending before a Magistrate's Court?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court's power to transfer proceedings under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Mehboob Beg vs The State1971 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-17
  condonation of delaylimitationpetition for leave to appealcriminal mattertime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court in a criminal matter, which was barred by 17 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause was shown for the condonation of delay in instituting the petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred, noting that the petitioner had been duly informed of the High Court judgment by his counsel and that there was no valid explanation for the subsequent delay in filing the petition after receiving direct intimation. The key principle laid down is that negligence or failure to act diligently after receiving intimation of a judgment does not constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under limitation principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a petitioner to act upon intimation given by counsel constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to be dismissed when there is no adequate explanation for the delay in its institution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Abdul Qayyum vs The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-04-09
  contempt of courtscandalising the courtadministrative functionsHigh Courtpreliminary selectionadvocate convictionconstitutional appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal under Article 58(2)(c) of the Constitution against the conviction of the appellant, an Advocate, for contempt of court under Article 123 of the Constitution by a Special Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan. The appellant had sent telegrams to the Chief Justice and the Provincial Public Service Commission strongly protesting against and alleging arbitrary selection of Civil Judge candidates by the High Court. The core legal question was whether criticism of an act of the High Court that is neither strictly judicial nor a mandatory statutory duty—namely, assisting the Public Service Commission with preliminary sifting of candidates—can constitute contempt of court by scandalising the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional provisions regarding contempt of court apply to actions of the High Court in its public capacity, including administrative functions and other acts undertaken as a court. The key principle laid down is that any public attack on the High Court as such, imputing unprincipled or arbitrary conduct, tends to bring the court into hatred, ridicule, or contempt and falls squarely within the mischief of contempt under Article 123 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criticism of an act of the High Court that is neither a judicial act nor a mandatory statutory duty can amount to contempt of court?
  • Does the power of a court to punish for contempt under Article 123 of the Constitution extend to the administrative functions of the High Court?
  • Whether sending a telegram containing derogatory allegations regarding judicial selection to a third party constitutes sufficient publication for contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Rafi-Ud-Din and 6 Others vs The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-25
  evacuee propertycompensation poolvested righttransfer of industrial concerncinema housesubordinate legislationretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants to challenge the transfer of the Regal Cinema, Lahore, to respondent No. 3 by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants had acquired a vested right to the transfer of the cinema upon making their application under paragraph 15(2) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether a subsequent notification issued under paragraph 15-A of the Schedule could retrospectively affect their pending application or constituted excessive delegation of legislative power. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a claimant does not acquire an indefeasible vested right to a specific property merely by applying for its transfer, and that the Central Government retains the statutory power under section 10(b) of the Act and paragraph 15-A of the Schedule to alter the mode of disposal for properties not yet finally transferred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant's entitlement under evacuee legislation remains subject to the Central Government's overriding power to prescribe alternative modes of property disposal until a final transfer order is executed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claimant acquires an indefeasible vested right to the transfer of a specific evacuee property merely by submitting an application under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the Central Government alter the mode of disposal of properties from the compensation pool after transfer applications have already been filed by claimants?
  • Whether a notification issued under paragraph 15-A of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, operates retrospectively on pending proceedings without express statutory backing?
  • Does the power reserved under section 10(b) and paragraph 15-A of the Schedule authorize the Central Government to prescribe new conditions of eligibility for the transfer of industrial concerns and cinema houses?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Abdullah vs Sheikh Nawab Din1971 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-12
  ejectmentdefault in rentinterlocutory ordersecond appealrent controllerstrike off defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan allowing a tenant's second appeal and remanding an ejectment case to the Rent Controller. The landlord had sought the tenant's ejectment on the ground of default in rent payment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Although there was a bona fide dispute regarding the rent due, the Rent Controller ordered the deposit of rent without determining the approximate amount of rent due as mandated by section 13(6) of the Ordinance, subsequently striking off the tenant's defence and ordering eviction. The core legal questions involved whether the Rent Controller was bound to determine the approximate rent in case of a dispute and whether an interlocutory order can be challenged in an appeal from the final decision without having filed a separate appeal against the interlocutory order itself. The Supreme Court held that the failure to determine the approximate rent warranted a remand, and that a party is not legally compelled to appeal from every interlocutory order under penalty of forfeiting the right to challenge it in an appeal from the final decree or decision. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller is required to determine the approximate amount of rent due under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, when a dispute regarding rent exists?
  • Can an aggrieved party challenge the legality of an interlocutory order in an appeal from the final decision without having filed a separate appeal against the interlocutory order itself?
  • Whether prior payments made by a tenant by cheque can be taken into consideration for adjustment despite being paid before the order for deposit was made?
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• Mian Ghulam Kadir vs Dilmurad and Another1971 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  interim injunctionjudicial discretionland allotmentcivil revisionappellate interferencepossession and construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a dispute over a plot of land in Kotri Mohammad Kabir, initially granted to the respondent by the Deputy Commissioner. The petitioner challenged this grant through administrative appeals, eventually leading to a civil suit seeking a declaration that the property belonged to the Government. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner sought an interim injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. While the trial court dismissed the application, the District Judge granted the injunction on appeal. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's revision application against that order. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in maintaining the District Judge's exercise of discretion regarding the grant of an interim injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that because the respondent had been allotted the land and had already raised construction upon it, the District Judge's discretion in granting the injunction was not exercised improperly. The principle established is that appellate courts will not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion regarding interim injunctions where the lower court's decision is supported by the factual circumstances of the case, such as existing possession and construction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower court in granting an interim injunction?
  • Is the existence of construction on disputed land a relevant factor in determining the grant of an interim injunction?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an order maintaining an interim injunction where discretion was exercised properly?
  Read full judgment →
• M. H. Khondkar and Another M. Noman vs The State and Another Dacca1971 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1964-01-15
  special leave to appealsuo motu contempt noticecontempt of courtinherent jurisdictionshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the Dacca High Court dismissing a contempt application and suo motu issuing show-cause notices for contempt to a petitioner and his advocates. The core legal question is whether special leave to appeal can be granted against the mere issuance of a suo motu show-cause notice for contempt by a High Court. The Supreme Court held, following the precedent in Sir Edward Snelson, that a show-cause notice issued by a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of contempt cannot be interfered with at the initial stage, as granting leave would amount to prematurely assuming the High Court's jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal against a mere show-cause notice for contempt issued by a High Court unless a clear legal bar to the issuance of such notice is established.

  Questions settled

  • Can special leave to appeal be granted against the mere issuance of a suo motu show-cause notice for contempt by a High Court?
  • Does the fact that a contempt notice was issued by judges against whom allegations were made constitute a legal bar to the issuance of the notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Limited, Chittagong vs Sales Tax Officer, Chittagong1971 PTD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-19
  sales tax exemptionstatutory interpretationconcrete building componentswrit jurisdictionfiscal statutestax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of East Pakistan, which challenged the refusal of the Sales Tax Officer to grant a tax exemption on glass sheets manufactured by the appellant. The appellant contended that its glass sheets qualified as 'concrete building components' exempt under a Central Government notification issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The core legal question was whether glass sheets fell within the scope of the term 'concrete building components' as used in the exemption notification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of building materials, the term 'concrete' implies a substance formed by a mixture where cement is an essential ingredient. Consequently, glass sheets, lacking this composition, did not qualify for the exemption. The Court affirmed that while statutes should generally be interpreted using the popular meaning of words, technical or trade-specific meanings apply when the statute relates to a particular industry. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction is an appropriate remedy for enforcing fiscal rights derived from statutory instruments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'concrete building components' in a tax exemption notification include glass sheets?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable to challenge a tax demand where a fiscal right based on a statutory instrument is disputed?
  • How should the term 'concrete' be interpreted when used in the context of building materials in a statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Service Medical and General Stores, Karachi vs Haji1971 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-24
  evictionurban rent restrictionexecution of decreeobstruction in executionpartnership businessfraudulent evictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from eviction proceedings initiated by landlords under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, regarding a commercial shop in Karachi. The landlords obtained an eviction order against the recognized tenant, which was upheld through appellate forums. Meanwhile, third parties claiming to be partners in the business operating in the shop sought to intervene, alleging the tenancy proceedings were collusive and fraudulent, and filed applications under Order XXI, rule 99 and rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alongside a civil suit. The High Court dismissed their revision and appeal. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that although the executing court should not have dismissed the stay application summarily, the question had become academic since the petitioners had already been dispossessed. The Court ruled that their proper remedy lay under Order XXI, rule 100, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and through their pending civil suit where allegations of fraud could be examined. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Order XXI rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be dismissed summarily without issuing notice?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a third party dispossessed in execution of an ejectment decree?
  • Can questions of fraud in eviction proceedings be agitated in a separate civil suit and under Order XXI rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs S. M. Ilahi & Company vs The West Pakistan Government1971 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-05-19
  cotton feeretrospective operationvested rightscotton ginning factoryexecutive notificationpast transactionsWest Punjab Cotton Control Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenges the validity of cotton fees imposed by the Provincial Government under the West Punjab Cotton Control Act, 1949. The core legal questions involve whether a factory running on a diesel engine falls within the definition of a cotton ginning factory under the Act, and whether the Government can revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect to affect past transactions. The Supreme Court held that while the appellants failed to prove they ran the factory exclusively on diesel or that they regularized alterations without permission, the Government cannot revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect so as to impair vested rights or past and closed transactions. The Court laid down the principle that courts must lean against giving statutes or executive notifications retrospective operation where they prejudicially affect vested rights or the legality of past transactions, restricting the Government to realizing the fee at the previously fixed rate of annas 4 per maund.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government can revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect so as to affect past and closed transactions?
  • Does a factory originally installed with a steam engine and later run with a diesel engine without statutory permission cease to be a cotton ginning factory under the West Punjab Cotton Control Act, 1949?
  • Can an occupier registered as running a factory avoid liability for cotton fees by claiming a change of occupancy that was never communicated to the Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rivoli Theatres, Karachis vs Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, Karachi and Another1971 SCMR 621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-09-09
  income taxunabsorbed depreciationpartnership dissolutionassessable entitychange in constitutionsuccession of businesspartnership deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court order refusing to interfere with the orders of the Income-tax authorities regarding the assessment year 1961-62. The appellant, a partnership firm, sought to carry forward and set off unabsorbed depreciation from the previous assessment year. During the relevant period, one partner died, another retired, and three new partners were admitted under a newly registered partnership deed. The Income-tax Officer split the accounting year into three periods, treating the firm as an association of persons during the interim period and as a newly succeeded entity after the execution of the new deed, thereby denying the carry-forward of depreciation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 42 of the Partnership Act 1932, subject to contract, a firm is not dissolved by the death of a partner. Since the original agreement allowed continuation, the same assessable entity continued to exist until the execution of the new deed. However, the retirement of a partner coupled with the admission of new partners under a fresh deed created an entirely different assessable entity, breaking the identity of the firm. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, permitting the set-off only for the interim period prior to the execution of the new deed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a partner dissolve a partnership firm if the partnership agreement contains a contract to the contrary?
  • Whether a change in the constitution of a firm by the retirement of a partner and the admission of new partners under a fresh deed creates a new assessable entity for income tax purposes?
  • Can a newly constituted partnership firm claim the unabsorbed depreciation of its predecessor unregistered firm under the Income-tax Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khursheed Industries Corporation and Others vs Messrs1971 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17
  special leave to appealpatents and designsregistered designjurisdictioncounter-claimrevocation of registrationpermanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an appellate judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which affirmed a District Court's decree declaring the respondents as registered proprietors of a tiffin carrier design, granting a permanent injunction, and disallowing damages. The petitioners contended that under Section 54 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911, the jurisdictional provisions of Section 29 relating to patents applied to designs. They argued that because their written statement alleged fraudulent and collusive registration, it constituted a counter-claim for revocation, requiring the suit's transfer to the High Court under the proviso to Section 29(1). They further argued that registration only raises a rebuttable presumption and does not automatically confer an absolute right without verifying if the design was new and original. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that these novel points of law concerning jurisdiction and the scope of design infringement suits required examination in a developing economy. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the legal questions raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911 relating to patents apply to designs by virtue of Section 54 of the same Act?
  • Does a written statement alleging fraudulent and collusive registration of a design constitute a counter-claim for revocation requiring transfer of the suit to the High Court under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the Patents and Designs Act 1911?
  • Is registration under the Patents and Designs Act 1911 sufficient to confer an absolute right to restrain others, or does it merely raise a rebuttable presumption requiring proof of a new and original design?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Jamal Jute Baling & Co., Dacca vs Messrs M. Sarkies & Sons, Dacca1971 PLD Supreme Court 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration awardtrade namecontract validityarbitrator misconductcommercial contractagencyarbitration agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an arbitration award regarding a jute supply contract. The appellant contended that the contract was void because it was signed in a trade name (a department of a parent company) rather than the parent company itself, and that the arbitration reference was invalid. The Supreme Court examined whether a contract signed in a trade name is binding and if an arbitration agreement requires formal signatures. The Court held that a legal person may conduct business under an assumed name, and a contract signed in that name by an authorized agent is valid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an arbitration agreement is binding if its terms are reduced to writing and accepted by the parties, even without formal signatures. Regarding allegations of arbitrator misconduct and improper procurement due to professional associations, the Court found no evidence of bias or undue influence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, establishing that commercial contracts signed in trade names are enforceable and that arbitration awards cannot be set aside based on speculative allegations of misconduct without proof.

  Questions settled

  • Can a legal person carry on business under an assumed trade name?
  • Is a contract signed in a trade name by an authorized agent valid and binding?
  • Does an arbitration agreement require formal signatures to be valid if the terms are reduced to writing and accepted by the parties?
  • Does the mere existence of professional connections between a party and the arbitration chamber constitute proof of improper procurement of an award?
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• Messrs Hirjina & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner of Sales Tax Central, Karachi1971 PTD 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxsale priceprovincial excise dutyretrospective amendmenttaxing statute interpretationfinance act
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a certificated appeal from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the interpretation of the definition of 'sale price' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1957. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal rightly construed that prior to 16th March 1956, Provincial Excise Duty could not be included in the sale price of manufactured and sold liquors for computing sales tax. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Tribunal was correct in concluding that the 1957 amendment was not merely declaratory or retrospective beyond the specific date provided, and that the unamended definition of 'sale price' did not include Provincial Excise Duty. The key principle laid down is that in interpreting taxing statutes, courts must look strictly to the words clearly expressed and cannot imply provisions or extend retrospective operation beyond what the Legislature has expressly stated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the unamended definition of 'sale price' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951 included Provincial Excise Duty prior to the 1957 amendment?
  • Can a statutory amendment to a taxing statute be given a greater retrospective effect than what is expressly provided by the Legislature?
  • Is the Provincial Excise Duty on liquor an incidental expense that forms part of the sale price without explicit statutory inclusion?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Haroon Industries Ltd., Karachis vs Mohammad Rafiq and 21971 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-10
  leave to appealinterim orderconstitutional petitionillegal lock-outlabour disputediscretionary orderretrenchment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a leave petition filed by Messrs Haroon Industries Limited against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan at Karachi, which vacated an earlier interim order and upheld a Labour Court order directing the petitioner to prohibit a lock-out pending a constitutional petition. The core legal question involves the propriety of interfering with interim discretionary orders passed by the High Court when the main constitutional petition is still pending. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the leave petition, holding that it was inexpedient to express an opinion on the merits of the dispute to avoid prejudicing the pending constitutional petition. The Court laid down the principle that discretionary interim orders of the High Court should not be lightly interfered with, and matters involving intertwined stay and main issues should be expedited rather than bifurcated, protecting the petitioner from prosecution under the Industrial Relations Ordinance until the main petition is decided.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a discretionary interim order of the High Court when the main constitutional petition is still pending?
  • Can an employer be prosecuted for failing to reinstate retrenched workers while a labour court's lock-out order and a constitutional petition are sub judice?
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• Messrs Haji Nazimuddin MD. Amanullah and OTHERSs vs The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Dacca Zone, Dacca1971 PTD 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-21
  sales tax assessmenttaxing authoritystatutory interpretationIncome-tax OfficerExamining Officerdelegation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court decision affirming the competence of an Examining Officer to assess sales tax. The core legal question was whether an Examining Officer appointed under the Income-tax Act, 1922, qualifies as an 'Income-tax Officer' for the purposes of exercising powers under Section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, given that the definition of 'Income-tax Officer' was subsequently amended to include Examining Officers. The Supreme Court held that the reference to 'Income-tax Officer' in Section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, refers to the office as it exists for the time being under the Income-tax Act, 1922, rather than being frozen to the definition as it stood in 1951. Consequently, since Examining Officers were included within the definition of Income-tax Officers by subsequent statutory amendments, they are legally competent to exercise the powers of a Sales Tax Officer. The Court affirmed that such officers can be assigned cases and areas by the Commissioner, thereby validating the assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Income-tax Officer' in Section 5 of the Sales Tax Act 1951 refer to the definition as it stood in 1951 or as it exists for the time being under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Is an Examining Officer appointed under the Income-tax Act 1922 competent to exercise the powers of a Sales Tax Officer under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  • Can a Commissioner of Income-tax assign areas or cases to an Examining Officer for the purpose of assessing sales tax?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Haji Nazimuddin MD. Amanullah and Others vs The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Dacca Zone, Dacca1971 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-21
  sales tax assessmentexamining officerincome-tax officertax authoritiesstatutory interpretationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court answering a reference in the affirmative regarding the competence of an Examining Officer to assess sales tax. The core legal question was whether a person appointed as an Examining Officer under the Income-tax Act, 1922, qualifies as a Sales Tax Officer under section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, by virtue of subsequent statutory amendments enlarging the definition of 'Income-tax Officer'. The Supreme Court held that the reference to 'Income-tax Officer' in section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, refers to the Income-tax Officer for the time being under the Income-tax Act, 1922, thereby encompassing Examining Officers included in that definition through later amendments. The Court laid down the principle that statutory references to income-tax authorities incorporated into sales tax legislation apply dynamically to those authorities as constituted from time to time under the governing income-tax law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person appointed as an Examining Officer under the Income-tax Act, 1922 is also a Sales Tax Officer under section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Does the term 'Income-tax Officer' in section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 refer strictly to the definition as it stood in 1951 or as amended from time to time?
  • Can an Examining Officer legally assess and levy sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs G. M. Pfaff A. G. vs Sartaj Engineering Co. Ltd. and 3 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-14
  arbitration clauseArticles of Associationtrademark infringementstay of suitcompany and shareholderindependent transactiontemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the stay of a trademark infringement suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act based on an arbitration clause contained in the Articles of Association of the respondent company. The appellant-company, a shareholder in the respondent company, filed a suit alleging infringement of its registered trademark 'Pfaff' and breach of a separate commercial agreement. The trial court stayed the suit and vacated a temporary injunction, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a dispute regarding trademark infringement between a company and its shareholder, arising from an independent commercial transaction, falls within the arbitration clause of the company's Articles of Association. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the Articles of Association constitute a contract only in respect of the ordinary rights and obligations of members as members, and do not extend to rights or liabilities arising from independent transactions or distinct capacities. Consequently, the dispute was outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration clause in a company's Articles of Association applies to disputes arising from independent commercial transactions between a company and its shareholder in a capacity other than that of a member?
  • Do the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company constitute a contract in respect of rights which a member possesses apart from his membership?
  • Can a suit for trademark infringement brought by a shareholder against a company be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act based on an internal arbitration clause of the company?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Auto Union Co Operative Society Ltd., Karachi and 7 Others vs Messrs National Co Operative Bank Ltd., Karachi and Another1971 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-24
  co-operative societiesarbitration awardexecution of awardnew pleasupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding a loan obtained by the petitioners from the respondents, which was referred to arbitration under section 54 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies Act. An award was rendered based on a compromise between the parties. Upon default by the petitioners, the respondents obtained a certificate under section 59 of the said Act and filed an execution application in the High Court. The petitioners filed objections, which were dismissed by a Single Judge, and subsequent appeals and remands culminated in a dismissal by a Division Bench of the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners could raise new contentions regarding the execution proceedings and the status of the High Court for the first time before the apex court. The Supreme Court held that contentions not urged before the High Court, particularly those not raised before the Single Judge, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new legal objection in the Supreme Court that was never urged before the High Court?
  • Whether an execution application for a co-operative award can be filed in the High Court?
  • Are petitioners entitled to challenge the execution of an award on grounds not taken before the Single Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ansari Brothers (Represented by 6 Heirs) vs Holy Trinity1971 PLD Supreme Court 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  ejectmentRent Controllerdefault in rentstriking off defencedeposit of arrearsextension of timereasonable time rule
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose out of ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller had directed the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future monthly rent before the 5th of each month. The tenant appealed and obtained a stay, but the appeal was dismissed without fixing a new deadline for compliance. The core legal questions were whether the tenant defaulted in depositing rent for March 1960 after the dismissal of the appeal, and whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to extend time for payment after a default occurred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 13(6) of the Ordinance is mandatory. Upon dismissal of the appeal, the original deposit order revived and required compliance within a reasonable time or by the statutory due date. The tenant defaulted in depositing the rent for March 1960 by the 5th of April 1960. Consequently, the Rent Controller had no discretion or authority to extend time or issue a subsequent order condoning default, and was bound to strike off the defence and order summary ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement to strike off defence under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 mandatory upon default in depositing rent?
  • Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to extend time for payment of rent after a default has occurred?
  • How is the time limit for depositing rent determined when an appellate court dismisses an appeal against an interim deposit order without specifying a new deadline?
  Read full judgment →
• Mesal and Another vs The Crown1971 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-02-08
  murderabscondingcorroborationeye-witness testimonycommon intentioncriminal appealspecial leave
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a decision of the Judicial Commissioners, N.-W.F.P., which confirmed the convictions and life sentences under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 of appellants Masal and Abdul Khabir, while acquitting co-accused Multan. The core legal questions involved whether the lower appellate court erred in holding that eye-witness testimony required corroboration against individual accused persons, and whether absconding/surrendering later constitutes valid corroboration of flawed eye-witness evidence. The Supreme Court held, by majority, that the trial court's unreserved acceptance of the eye-witness testimony was sound and no corroboration was required. The majority further ruled that absconding by itself is valueless as independent corroboration to remedy inherent defects in eye-witness evidence, as an innocent person may abscond out of fear in a local feud. Eliminating the lower court's erroneous reasoning, the majority dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conduct of an accused in absconding serve as independent corroboration to cure inherent defects in eye-witness testimony?
  • Whether absconding by an accused person in a murder case arising from a local feud necessarily points to guilt?
  • Is corroboration of direct eye-witness evidence required when the witnesses are deemed credible and disinterested by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sharkat Kalamiya Vatan, Karachi Muhammad Yakoob vs MRS.1971 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ejectmentrent restrictiondefault in payment of rentadditional evidenceappellate stagetenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgments of a learned Single Judge of the Karachi High Court, which affirmed the ejectment of the petitioners from godowns occupied by them as tenants. The ejectment proceedings were initiated by the respondent landlord under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, following the petitioners' failure to deposit rent for October 1963 by the prescribed deadline of the 5th of November 1963. The petitioners contended that their failure to deposit the rent on time was due to administrative difficulties at the Rent Controller's office, a plea they attempted to substantiate with additional evidence introduced at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the additional evidence was improperly admitted as it introduced a new plea inconsistent with the petitioners' earlier affidavits and, upon examination, actually contradicted their claims. Consequently, the Court held that the failure to deposit rent within the stipulated time justified the ejectment order and dismissed the petitions, affirming that procedural defaults in rent payment cannot be excused by unsubstantiated or inconsistent explanations.

  Questions settled

  • Can additional evidence be introduced at the appellate stage to support a new plea inconsistent with previous affidavits?
  • Does a failure to deposit rent by the prescribed deadline under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act 1953 justify an order of ejectment?
  • Is an appellate court justified in rejecting additional evidence that contradicts the party's own earlier pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• MD. Anwarullah Mazumdar vs Tamina Bibi and 5 Other1971 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  specific performancebainapatraconcurrent findings of factbona fide purchaserante-dated documentburden of proofcontract for sale
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, alleging an agreement with the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The defendants contested the suit, claiming to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court concurrently found that the petitioner's agreement (bainapatra) was a fraudulent, collusive, and ante-dated document created to nullify subsequent sales to the defendants. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal, arguing that the courts below erred in their findings regarding the document's date and the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the document were based on evidence that effectively rebutted any presumption of validity. The Court emphasized that once the petitioner's foundational document was proven fraudulent, the suit must fail, regardless of the defendants' position. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case if they fail to establish their own.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance succeed if their own foundational contract document is proven to be fraudulent and ante-dated?
  • Does the presumption that a document was made on the date it bears constitute a conclusive presumption?
  • Can a party succeed in a civil suit by relying solely on the alleged weakness of the defendant's case when their own case is not established?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan vs Mst. Shah Jahan Begum and 2 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-31
  Civil ProcedureOrder XVII Rule 3AdjournmentEvidenceTrial CourtForthwithInterpretation of Statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil suit where the appellant challenged a trial court’s order closing his evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant contended that the trial court acted illegally by failing to decide the suit 'forthwith' on the day the evidence was closed, arguing that the term mandated an immediate decision on the same day. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the interpretation of the word 'forthwith' within the context of Order XVII, Rule 3. The Court held that the term does not require the court to decide the suit on the same day. Instead, it signifies that the court must proceed to decide the suit within a reasonable time, considering the specific circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court ruled that the trial court’s decision to adjourn the proceedings for arguments after closing the evidence was legally sound and did not violate the statutory provision. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that 'forthwith' implies reasonable dispatch rather than instantaneous resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'forthwith' in Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require a court to decide a suit on the same day that evidence is closed?
  • What is the legal meaning of 'forthwith' when used in the context of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a trial court adjourn a case for arguments after closing a party's evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Maula Bakhsh vs Abdul Hamid and 4 Other1971 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-08
  abatement of appealsubstitution of legal representativesrent restrictionlegislation by referenceprocedural lawlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's second appeal due to abatement. The petitioner, a tenant, faced ejectment proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. During the pendency of the second appeal, the original landlord died, and the petitioner failed to substitute the legal representatives within the statutory limitation period. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the abatement of appeals for non-substitution of legal representatives, apply to appeals filed in the High Court under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance explicitly incorporates the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding appeals. Consequently, the Court affirmed that such appeals are subject to the same rules of abatement as civil appeals under the Code. The petition was dismissed, establishing that procedural rules governing abatement apply to rent restriction appeals by statutory reference.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the abatement of appeals apply to appeals filed in the High Court under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the failure to substitute the legal representatives of a deceased party within the prescribed limitation period result in the abatement of an appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Mastakim Ali and 3 Others vs Shafique Uddin Chowdhury and 51971 PLD Supreme Court 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  tenancy by holding overnon-agricultural landlease determinationauction-purchaserent executionadverse possessiontenant possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a title suit for declaration of tenancy right, recovery of khas possession, compensation, and mesne profits regarding non-agricultural land situated within the Sylhet Municipality. The core legal question was whether the original lessee and his heirs acquired a tenancy by holding over or a limited tenancy right by adverse possession following the expiry of a short-term lease, and what title an auction-purchaser acquired in a rent execution sale. The Supreme Court held that the long, undisturbed, and continuous possession of the land by the lessee coupled with municipal records in his name established acquiescence by the landlord and subsequent lessees, constituting a tenancy by holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, or alternatively, a limited tenancy right acquired by over thirty-three years of open possession. Consequently, an auction-purchase in a rent execution proceeding against superior tenure-holders did not affect the subsisting tenancy rights of the plaintiffs. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lessee remaining in possession after the determination of a lease with the lessor's assent constitute a tenancy by holding over?
  • Can a tenant acquire a limited tenancy right through continuous and open possession for over thirty-three years?
  • What is the effect of an auction-purchase in a rent execution case upon the pre-existing tenancy rights of a sub-tenant or original lessee?
  Read full judgment →
• Masoom Beg vs Muhammad Munir and Another1971 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-19
  culpable homicidemurdersudden quarrelheat of passionprivate defencealteration of convictioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, examined whether the High Court was justified in altering the accused's conviction from murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part I of section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case was that following a minor dispute over a game of carom earlier in the day, the accused stabbed the deceased during a subsequent encounter in the evening, resulting in the victim's death. The trial court convicted the accused of murder, but the High Court altered the conviction, holding that the fatal injury was inflicted during a sudden quarrel and grappling following provocation, thereby attracting exceptions to murder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in altering the conviction, as the evidence established that the fatal blow was delivered without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction of the accused from section 302 to Part I of section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code on the materials on record?
  • Does the mere carrying of a knife imply that the accused went with the intention to kill?
  • Whether the fourth exception to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code applies when a fatal injury is inflicted without premeditation in a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion?
  Read full judgment →
• Mashkoor Khan and Others vs Province of Sind and Other1971 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-17
  temporary injunctionservice matterreversionofficiating postbalance of convenienceirreparable injurycivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This order disposes of multiple civil petitions for leave to appeal arising from service disputes. The petitioners, originally holding subordinate posts, were promoted to higher posts on an officiating or ad hoc basis and subsequently reverted to their substantive positions. They filed civil suits challenging their reversion and sought temporary injunctions. The High Court set aside the temporary injunctions granted by the lower appellate court, holding that reversion from an officiating post does not constitute a reduction in rank. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that temporary injunctions in service matters against government departments should not ordinarily be issued as they disrupt administrative arrangements. The Court held that the balance of convenience does not favor such injunctions, and no irreparable injury is caused since any loss can be compensated monetarily if the suits succeed. The petitions were dismissed with directions to the trial courts to expedite the hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reversion of a civil servant from an officiating post to their substantive post constitutes a reduction in rank?
  • Should temporary injunctions against government departments in service matters be ordinarily granted?
  • Can a civil servant claim irreparable injury for reversion when monetary compensation is available upon succeeding in the main suit?
  • Whether the High Court is justified under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in setting aside an injunction where the lower court failed to consider the balance of convenience and irreparable injury?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood vs Ali Muhammad and Another1971 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-08
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailmedical groundsold ageappellate jurisdictionexercise of discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the complainant challenging the order of the High Court of Lahore, which suspended the sentence of the respondent and released him on bail pending his appeal. The respondent, who had been convicted of an offence carrying transportation for life, was granted bail by the High Court under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds of old age and illness, supported by a medical report. The petitioner contended that Section 426 did not permit bail and, alternatively, that the High Court could not suspend the sentence without first calling for and perusing the trial record. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that Section 426 explicitly empowers the appellate court to suspend a sentence and release a convict on bail pending appeal. The Court further ruled that there is no statutory requirement under Section 426 to call for the record before suspending a sentence. Additionally, the Court laid down the principle that the statutory exceptions for sick or infirm persons under Section 497 of the Code serve as appropriate guidelines for exercising judicial discretion under Section 426.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower an appellate court to release a convicted person on bail pending appeal?
  • Is the appellate court required to call for and peruse the trial record before suspending a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the statutory guidelines for granting bail to sick or infirm persons under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be applied to the suspension of sentences under Section 426?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad Maqbool vs The Province of Punjab and 10 Other1971 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-28
  public service commissioninterview by single memberquorum requirementsdelegation of functionswrit petitionestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962). The petitioner challenged the selection process conducted by the West Pakistan Public Service Commission for the post of Extra Assistant Director of Agriculture, contending that an interview conducted by a single member of the Commission was illegal and violated the quorum requirement of two members prescribed under Rules 3 and 9 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between Rules 3, 8, and 9 of the Rules of Procedure. The Court held that Rule 8 expressly empowers the Commission to refer any matter to an individual member for consideration and report, while the final decision rests with the Commission itself. The Court held that the interview conducted by a single member under Rule 8 was lawful. Additionally, the Court noted that having voluntarily participated in the interview without objection, the petitioner could not subsequently challenge its validity after being unsuccessful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single member of the Public Service Commission can lawfully conduct interviews when the quorum for a full meeting is set at two members?
  • What is the legal distinction between the reference of a matter to an individual member under Rule 8 and the delegation of functions to a committee under Rule 9 of the West Pakistan Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure?
  • Can a candidate who voluntarily participates in a selection interview without objection subsequently challenge the competence of the interviewing panel upon failing to be selected?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State1971 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-05
  triple murderspecial leave to appealocular testimonymedical evidencedying declarationfirst information reportappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the triple murder of his step-mother, step-sister, and step-maternal grandmother, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the alleged contradiction between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding gunshot wounds, and the omission of an eyewitness in the first information report. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence was consistent with the oral testimony when accounting for the different types of ammunition used in the double-barreled gun, and that the prompt lodging of the first information report excluded any possibility of concoction or false implication. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence based on reliable eyewitness accounts and a dying declaration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inconsistencies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding gunshot wounds are sufficient to discredit eyewitness accounts?
  • Can an eyewitness whose name is omitted from the first information report still be relied upon?
  • Does the prompt lodging of a first information report exclude the possibility of concoction and false implication in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mantazuddin Alias Mantaj Mea vs The State1971 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-25
  wrongful confinementkidnappingcircumstantial evidenceappreciation of evidencespecial leave to appealcriminal liabilitymens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 368 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement a kidnapped person. The petitioner was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment, a decision upheld by the High Court of East Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in law by inferring the petitioner's knowledge of the boy's kidnapped status based on circumstantial evidence, specifically the petitioner's failure to report the boy's presence despite suspicious circumstances, the boy's dialect, and the petitioner's restrictions on the boy's movement. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances relied upon by the High Court were sufficient to support the inference of knowledge and constituted conduct wholly incompatible with innocence. The Court affirmed that it would not interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts, as that function falls outside its scope. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that circumstantial evidence regarding an accused's conduct can sufficiently prove the requisite knowledge for a conviction under Section 368.

  Questions settled

  • Can circumstantial evidence regarding an accused's conduct be sufficient to prove knowledge that a person was kidnapped?
  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is the failure to report the presence of a suspicious individual to authorities a factor in establishing guilty knowledge under Section 368 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Mansab Ali vs Amir and 3 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-04
  Criminal Law Amendment Actright to be heardjurisdictionvoid proceedingsnatural justicereference to tribunalmandatory condition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a criminal matter involving the abduction and murder of one Rutallon. The Commissioner, Sargodha Division, referred the case to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, without providing the accused an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal convicted the respondents, and the Commissioner subsequently enhanced their sentences in revision. The Home Secretary later set aside these convictions, but the High Court restored them following a Supreme Court precedent. However, the High Court later allowed a writ petition by the respondents, declaring the initial reference to the Tribunal void for lack of notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to provide the accused an opportunity to show cause before the Commissioner exercised the power of reference under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, rendered the entire proceedings ab initio void. The Court affirmed that where a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction is not fulfilled, all subsequent proceedings, including those in appeal or revision, suffer from a fundamental lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide an accused an opportunity to be heard before a reference is made under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, render the subsequent proceedings void?
  • Can proceedings that follow an illegal order of reference be validated by the failure of the accused to raise the issue in earlier revision petitions?
  • What is the legal effect on subsequent proceedings when a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal is not fulfilled?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Hussain vs Haji Muhammad Hayat1971 PLD Supreme Court 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-03
  tentative rentevacuee propertydisplaced personssecond appealLetters Patent Appealspecial leave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, modifying the tentative rent fixed by the Rent Controller in an ejectment petition. The core legal questions involved were whether an appeal to the Supreme Court is competent without first exhausting the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal within the High Court, and whether the High Court was justified in second appeal in interfering with the tentative rent fixed by the authorities below under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that while the practice of the court normally requires parties to exhaust Letters Patent appeals, the court may entertain and decide an appeal where leave has already been granted and pending for a considerable time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the tenant is liable to pay rent on the same terms and conditions as immediately before the transfer, and the Rent Controller's tentative fixation of rent was in accordance with law. The key principle laid down is that under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, a tenant remains bound by the pre-transfer terms and conditions of tenancy, including aggregate payments previously made to co-allottees and authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court without first exhausting the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal?
  • What is the basis for determining the rent payable by a tenant of an evacuee property transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the High Court in second appeal interfere with the tentative rent fixed by the Rent Controller if it was determined in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Syed Walayat Shah vs Muzaffar Khan and 2 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-09
  evacuee propertydisplaced personwrit jurisdictionreview jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesjudicial reviewremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerns the transfer of an evacuee house in Rawalpindi. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly interfered with the Settlement Authorities' findings of fact in its writ jurisdiction, specifically regarding the successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction to review a predecessor's order without permission, and the proper legal criteria for determining the status of a 'displaced person'. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in quashing the successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order, as it was passed without the requisite legal authority to review a predecessor's decision. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner's finding regarding the respondents' status as 'displaced persons' was based on an incorrect legal test—specifically, that mere birth in territory now forming Pakistan is not the sole criterion. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case for a fresh determination, establishing that findings of fact based on irrelevant legal considerations are subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to review an order of his predecessor without prior permission?
  • Is mere birth in territory now forming Pakistan the sole test for determining if a person is a 'displaced person' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact by Settlement Authorities in its writ jurisdiction if those findings are based on irrelevant legal considerations?
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• Majid vs The State1971 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-11
  common intentionmurdervicarious liabilitycriminal appeallathi blowsudden affair
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant, Majid, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mushtaq Ali. The prosecution case was that following a dispute over cattle grazing, the complainant party was confronted by the accused, who were armed with a gun, a pistol, and a dang (lathi). Hafiz Khan fired a fatal gunshot at the deceased, while the appellant struck a complainant with a dang to disarm him. The High Court, while modifying the factual narrative to find that the accused arrived on the spot upon a hue and cry, upheld the appellant's conviction. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held liable under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, given that the fatal shot was fired solely by his co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant and his companion arrived armed with the intention of taking revenge and attacked the complainant party, the appellant shared a common intention with the principal offender and was rightly convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who did not fire the fatal shot can be convicted of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if he shared a common intention with the principal offender?
  • Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be inferred from the conduct of the accused in arriving armed at the scene and actively participating in the attack?
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• Maj. Fazle Aleem Khan vs DR. MRS. A. K. Awan and Another1971 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-01
  settlement of propertydivisibility of housewrit jurisdictiondisplaced personstransfer of propertylegal heirsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a bungalow under settlement laws. The appellant challenged the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's decision to divide the property between the appellant and respondent No. 1, arguing that the respondent had not properly filed for transfer. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court could interfere with the Commissioner's finding of divisibility under writ jurisdiction and the effect of such a declaration on competing claims. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner possesses exclusive authority under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1958) to determine the divisibility of a house. Consequently, such a determination is not subject to judicial interference under Article 98 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court established that once a property is declared divisible, it effectively becomes two separate units, rendering comparisons of the parties' respective entitlements unnecessary. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the respondent, as an heir, had validly succeeded to the rights of her deceased father.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a decision of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the divisibility of a house under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  • Does the declaration of a house as divisible by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner eliminate the need to compare the relative entitlements of competing claimants?
  • Does a legal heir succeed to the rights of a deceased claimant in settlement proceedings regarding the transfer of a property?
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• Mahraj Ganeshpuri Chella vs Gagoomal1971 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-18
  promissory noterecovery suithandwriting expertmixed question of law and factnew pleamoney-lender
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the summary dismissal of a First Appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench. The respondent had filed a suit under Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of a loan amount based on a promissory note executed by the petitioner. The petitioner denied executing the promissory note, claiming he was under police surveillance in a different village during the relevant period. The trial court, relying on handwriting expert evidence, found that the promissory note was executed by the petitioner and was properly stamped, which findings were upheld by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new plea that the respondent was an unlicensed money-lender, making the suit unmaintainable. The Supreme Court held that a new point representing a mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time before it. Finding no error in the concurrent findings of fact supported by reliable evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mixed question of law and fact, which was not raised in the courts below, be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of expert evidence can be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Mahboob Elahi vs Them State1971 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  defamationextra-judicial confessionretracted confessioncircumstantial evidencecorroborationSection 500 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was filed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which maintained the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly writing defamatory statements on school walls. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence—namely motive and the presence of the appellant near the school on the preceding night—and an extra-judicial confession. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the circumstantial evidence was incompatible with the innocence of the appellant and whether a retracted extra-judicial confession could sustain a conviction without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient as it was compatible with innocence, given that other inimical persons were also present or had motive. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a retracted extra-judicial confession made to an unfamiliar person required strong corroboration, which was lacking in this case. Holding that the lower courts misdirected themselves on the law of retracted confessions and circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the appellant's conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether circumstantial evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused can form the basis of a criminal conviction?
  • Whether a retracted extra-judicial confession requires independent corroboration before it can support a conviction?
  • Can evidence of motive and mere presence in the vicinity of the crime scene serve as sufficient corroboration for a retracted extra-judicial confession?
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• Madad Khan vs The State1971 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-12
  discharge of accusedcriminal breach of trustfurther inquiryrevision petitionquashment of remand orderpremature discharge
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed a petition for the quashment of an order of remand passed in revision by the Additional District Magistrate. The petitioner was challaned under sections 406, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in respect of a criminal breach of trust and forgery concerning a taxi car. The trial magistrate had discharged the petitioner prematurely under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after examining only one prosecution witness and without examining the accused, citing a four-year delay in lodging the FIR and a lack of corroboration. The core legal question was whether the trial magistrate's order of discharge based on a single unrebutted witness statement was premature and legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the trial magistrate's discharge order was indeed premature as the unrebutted statement prima facie disclosed offences requiring the accused to provide an explanation, rendering the Additional District Magistrate's order for further inquiry unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial magistrate can discharge an accused under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after examining only a single prosecution witness?
  • Can an order of discharge be set aside in revision and remanded for further inquiry when the sole recorded statement prima facie discloses an offence?
  • Is it incumbent upon the accused to explain the prosecution case made out even on an unrebutted statement before a discharge can be justified?
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• M. Rahman, Income-Tax Officer and 2 Others- vs Narayanganj Company (Private) Ltd.-1971 PTD 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  income taxassociation of personsescaped assessmentdouble assessmentSection 34rectification of mistakejoint venture
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of East Pakistan under Article 98 of the Constitution, setting aside a notice issued under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The respondent-company and two associates entered into a joint venture and earned profits, which each member reported in their individual tax returns, where they were subsequently assessed and taxed. Later, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 34 to assess the joint venture's profits as escaped income of an Association of Persons (AOP). The primary issue was whether income already charged to tax in the hands of individual members could be reassessed as income of an AOP under Section 34. The Supreme Court held that once individual members of an association have been assessed and charged to tax on their share of income, the same income cannot be taxed again in their hands as a separate entity under Section 34 without prior annulment or modification of the initial assessments. Section 35 concerns rectifying errors apparent from the record rather than making fresh assessments. Consequently, repeated proceedings under Section 34 for the same assessed income are unauthorized.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income already assessed and taxed in the hands of individual members of an association can be reassessed under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act as income of the association?
  • Whether Section 35 of the Income-tax Act can be utilized to annul an existing assessment and initiate fresh assessment proceedings for escaped income?
  • Can repeated notices under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act be lawfully issued to an assessee in respect of the exact same income already charged to tax?
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• M. Rahman, Income-Tax Officer and 2 Others vs Narayanganj Company (Private) Ltd_1971 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-03
  income taxescaped assessmentassociation of personsdouble taxationrectification of assessmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court order under Article 98 of the Constitution regarding income-tax assessments. The core legal question was whether income-tax authorities could issue a notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act to assess income as an 'Association of Persons' when that same income had already been assessed and taxed in the hands of the individual members of that association. The Supreme Court held that once income has been declared and charged to tax in the hands of individual members, it cannot be treated as 'escaped assessment' to justify a fresh notice under Section 34 for the same income as an association. The Court emphasized that while Section 3 of the Income-tax Act treats an association and its members as distinct entities, the authorities cannot, due to their own negligence in failing to assess the association initially, initiate repeated proceedings for the same income already taxed. The key principle laid down is that a fresh notice under Section 34 cannot be issued in respect of income that has already been effectively charged to tax, as such income has not 'escaped assessment'.

  Questions settled

  • Can income-tax authorities issue a notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act for income that has already been assessed and taxed in the hands of individual members of an association?
  • Does the Income-tax Act permit repeated notices under Section 34 for the same income?
  • Can an assessment already made be annulled or modified through proceedings under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act?
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• M. R. Qureshi and 9 Others vs Government of West Pakistan and 4 Other1971 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-23
  constitutional jurisdictioncivil servantsseniority disputewar service benefitsterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, working as Section Officers and Superintendents in the Civil Secretariat of the Government of West Pakistan, filed a writ petition under Article 98 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 to challenge a policy letter and consequential orders that granted presumptive seniority to respondents by extending war service benefits under the Punjab Government Service (War) Amendment Rules, 1943. The High Court dismissed the petition on merits. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the writ petition was incompetent ab initio. The Court reiterated that under Article 98 of the late Constitution, the High Court's jurisdiction regarding the terms and conditions of public servants is strictly confined to those terms and conditions specified directly in the Constitution, whereas matters of seniority are governed by rules and do not attract constitutional remedies. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of incompetency, leaving the appellants to pursue remedies before the Service Tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute regarding the fixation of seniority of public servants attract the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Are terms and conditions of public servants relating to matters other than remuneration or superannuation age protected under Article 178 for the purpose of invoking constitutional remedies?
  • Where a public servant's grievance concerning seniority falls outside the scope of constitutional terms and conditions, what is the appropriate forum for redress?
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• LT. Col. Shujauddin Ahmad vs Oil & Gas Development Corporation1971 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-05
  master and servantstatutory corporationcivil servanttemporary injunctiontermination of servicespecific enforcementconstitutional guarantees
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired lieutenant colonel, was employed by the Oil & Gas Development Corporation under a contract of service that was eventually terminated by the Corporation with three months' pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner challenged the termination by filing a civil suit accompanied by an application for a temporary injunction. Although the trial court refused the injunction, the District Judge granted it on appeal. However, the High Court set aside the District Judge's order in revision, relying on established precedents regarding statutory corporations. Seeking special leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that the respondent-Corporation was essentially a government department under executive control, making its employees civil servants protected by constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that employees of statutory corporations do not acquire the status of government servants and are governed by the ordinary law of master and servant. The Court reaffirmed that a contract of service cannot be specifically enforced, and consequently, no temporary injunction can be granted in such matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of statutory corporations acquire the status of Government servants entitled to constitutional guarantees?
  • Can a contract of service be specifically enforced under the law of Master and Servant?
  • Is a temporary injunction maintainable in a suit challenging the termination of service of an employee of a statutory corporation?
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• Local Bus Service Ltd., Lyallpur vs The Punjab Provincial Transport1971 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-26
  stage carriage permitsroute permitsstatutory interpretationsubordinate legislationinfructuous petitionmotor vehicle regulationpermit cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-company, which held route permits for stage carriages under the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1969, challenged the cancellation of its permits following the enactment of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Amendment Ordinance IX of 1970. This amendment mandated that permits for stage carriages operating outside urban areas would cease to be valid 60 days after the Ordinance's enforcement. The petitioner contended that a subsequent notification issued by the Governor of the Punjab under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, exempted them from this cancellation until August 6, 1971. The High Court dismissed the petition, finding the notification only exempted the company from rule 57-A regarding route classification, which presupposed the existence of valid permits. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that the exemption notification could not revive permits already cancelled by the primary legislation. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the extension were valid, the period had expired by the time of the hearing, rendering the petition infructuous. The Court affirmed that subordinate legislation cannot override the clear statutory mandate of the parent Ordinance regarding permit validity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification issued under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, override the statutory cancellation of route permits mandated by the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Amendment Ordinance IX of 1970?
  • Does an exemption from route classification rules under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, imply an extension of the validity of a cancelled route permit?
  • Does the expiration of a contested time-extension period render a petition for special leave to appeal infructuous?
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• Lahore Improvement Trus, Lahore through Its Chairman., University1971 PLD Supreme Court 811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitionevacuee propertytown improvementpublic purposelegal processstatutory interpretationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that invalidated land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Lahore Improvement Trust for a University campus and housing schemes. The core legal questions were whether the Trust's notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act, 1922, required prior Central Government approval under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, and whether such notice constituted a prohibited "legal process" against evacuee property. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition was valid, ruling that the notice was not a "legal process" barred by the Ordinance and that the scheme fell within the Trust's statutory powers. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Trust could lawfully acquire land for a public purpose like a University campus. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, declaring the subsequent sale of the acquired land by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to a private society void. The principle established is that courts must explore all possible explanations for the validity of public acts before declaring them without lawful authority, and that acquisition for public development is within the scope of the Town Improvement Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act 1922 constitute a 'legal process' barred by the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949?
  • Can a statutory body like an Improvement Trust acquire land for the purpose of establishing a university campus?
  • Is prior approval of the Central Government required for a notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act 1922 regarding evacuee property?
  • What is the duty of a court when examining the validity of an order passed by a public authority?
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• Khushi Mohammad vs The State1971 P Cr. L J 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-17
  bailcriminal procedurefoodstuffs controlpaddy and rice controlrefusal of bailsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an appeal against the refusal of bail by the lower courts in a criminal case involving charges under section 6 of the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958 and section 14 of the West Pakistan Paddy and Rice (Control) Order, 1958 for importing six maunds of rice into Lahore. The core legal question was whether the courts below were required to give reasons for refusing bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged offence is not punishable with death or transportation for life. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in refusing bail without proper reasons or on extraneous grounds, and considering that the maximum sentence is three years and no steps towards trial were taken by the prosecution since leave was granted, the appeal was allowed and bail was confirmed. The key principle laid down is that under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, courts must properly evaluate and provide reasons when refusing bail in offences not punishable with death or transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Are courts required to give reasons for refusing bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for offences not punishable with death or transportation for life?
  • Can bail be refused by a Magistrate or Sessions Judge without assigning proper reasons?
  • What is the effect of prolonged delay in bringing the accused to trial on an interim bail granted by the Supreme Court?
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• Khushal and Another vs The State1971 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-16
  murdercommon intentionbenefit of doubtcorroborationdying declarationballistic evidencejoint trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan upholding the murder convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code while commuting their sentences from death to transportation for life. The appellants were charged with the murder of their co-villager over a dispute regarding a village path. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the necessity of corroboration when a portion of the prosecution case is disbelieved, the benefit of doubt in case of multiple reasonable inferences, and the validity of a joint trial under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that while the conviction of one appellant (Kala) was fully supported by ballistic evidence, dying declarations, and ocular testimony, the participation of the other appellant (Khushal) suffered from a lack of independent corroboration, particularly since the robbery charge had failed and the medical evidence was consistent with a single gunshot. The court laid down the principle that where prosecution testimony is disbelieved in a material respect, independent corroboration is required as to the implication of each accused, and where two possibilities exist, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether independent corroboration is required for an accused's implication when the prosecution's testimony is disbelieved in a material respect?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be resolved in favor of the accused when the medical and physical evidence supports two competing possibilities?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused rendered in a joint trial vitiate the legality of the trial under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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