Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Asfand Yar Khan and another vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 122, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 673, 2020 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-02
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirysupplementary statementcriminal appealhomicideidentification of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by two brothers, Asfand Yar Khan and Salman Khan, who were implicated as accused in a double homicide case through a supplementary statement filed weeks after the initial First Information Report. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given their absence from the initial crime report and the consistency of witnesses regarding the number of assailants. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners were not named in the original crime report, and all witnesses were unanimous that only five individuals were involved in the incident, which excluded the petitioners. The Court held that this significant omission created a case of further inquiry under the relevant bail provisions. Consequently, the Court converted the criminal petition into an appeal, allowed the bail, and directed the petitioners' release upon furnishing bail bonds. The key principle laid down is that the unexplained omission of an accused from the initial crime report, coupled with consistent witness testimony limiting the number of perpetrators to a number excluding the accused, constitutes sufficient grounds for the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of an accused in a supplementary statement, when they were absent from the initial crime report, constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted when witness testimony consistently limits the number of perpetrators to a count that excludes the petitioners?
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• Asal Janan & others vs Zareef Khan & others2020 SCMR 668, 2020 SCP 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-21
  inheritancelimitationconcurrent findingsadmissibility of documentsmutationcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision against concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petitioners sought to challenge land mutations from 1922 and 1927, claiming inheritance rights through their mother, Mst. Sabardana, whom they alleged was the daughter of Ganj. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners sufficiently proved their lineage to establish inheritance rights and whether the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove their mother was the daughter of Ganj, as the documentary evidence (Exh. PW-3) was inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, due to lack of proper certification. Consequently, the claim of inheritance failed, rendering the suit time-barred. The Court affirmed the principle that while legal heirs become joint owners upon the death of a propositus, the benefit of inheritance-based limitation exceptions only applies if the claimant successfully proves their status as a legal heir. Absent such proof, the bar of limitation applies to challenges against long-standing mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere assertion of an inheritance claim automatically exempt a suit from the bar of limitation?
  • What are the requirements for a certified copy of a public document to be admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Under what circumstances can a legal heir be ousted from property, and what is the effect of such ouster on limitation?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding lineage and inheritance in a civil petition for leave to appeal?
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• Asad Ali and 9 others vs The Bank Of Punjab and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 736, 2021 PSC 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-09
  limitationcondonation of delaylabour lawsoffice objectionsre-filing of appealvested rightindustrial relationsjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from the dismissal of the appellants' grievance petitions by the Labour Court. The appellants initially filed appeals before the Lahore High Court within the 30-day limitation period prescribed by Section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. However, the High Court office returned the appeals for removal of objections within three days. The appellants re-filed the appeals six months later, after the limitation period had expired. During pendency, the matters were transferred to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, which condoned the delay and remanded the case. The High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the Tribunal's order. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that when a file is returned for objections and re-filed after the limitation period without a plausible explanation for each day of delay, the appeal is time-barred. The Court clarified that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to override High Court office objections or condone delay where a vested right had accrued to the respondent due to the expiry of limitation.

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• Arfan Akram vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 158, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 815, 2020 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  criminal petitionmurderocular testimonyforensic evidenceabscondenceleave to appealimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a jail petition assailing the judgment dated 2.11.2015 passed by the High Court, which altered the petitioner's death sentence to imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The 62-year-old deceased was shot dead outside her home allegedly by her son-in-law after she declined his demand to sell her residential property. The core legal question pertained to the appreciation of ocular testimony, prompt reporting, corroborative forensic evidence, and the abscondence of the accused in establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through natural and consistent eyewitness testimony, positive forensic reports matching the weapon recovered pursuant to the petitioner's disclosure, and his prolonged abscondence. Consequently, the petition failed and leave to appeal was declined, maintaining the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that prompt reporting, trustworthy natural witnesses, corroborated forensic evidence, and unexplained abscondence sufficiently establish criminal liability in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a natural witness who is an inmate of the premises can be relied upon without corroboration?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person heavily militate against the position taken by him during trial?
  • Whether a positive forensic match between the crime empty and the recovered weapon corroborates ocular testimony?
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• Arfan Akram vs StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  murdercriminal appealforensic evidenceeyewitness testimonyconvictionabscondenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a conviction for the murder of Irshad Bibi, who was shot dead outside her home. The petitioner, the deceased's son-in-law, was convicted by the trial court under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the sentence subsequently commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented, including eyewitness testimony and forensic reports. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting the prompt reporting of the incident, the reliability of the natural witnesses, and the positive forensic evidence linking the recovered weapon to the crime scene. The Court held that the prosecution had proven its case to the hilt, finding no grounds to interfere with the conviction. The judgment reinforces the principle that consistent, natural eyewitness testimony, corroborated by forensic evidence and the accused's unexplained abscondence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a natural witness who is an inmate of the crime scene sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon wedded with forensic casing provide corroboration for a murder charge?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person militate against their defense during trial?
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• Aqeel Shahzad and others vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 1190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-22
  service regularizationmarket committee employeesfundamental rightspublic servantsservice structurearbitrary terminationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the Peshawar High Court's judgments regarding the regularization of services for employees of the Peshawar Market Committee. The core legal question was whether long-serving employees, appointed between 1994 and 2010 under erstwhile laws, were entitled to regularization or if their services could be terminated due to the absence of a formal service structure at the time of their initial recruitment. The Supreme Court held that the termination of these employees was illegal and oppressive, particularly given their long, unblemished service records and the protection afforded by Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011. The Court emphasized that the appointing authority under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural and Livestock Produce Markets Act, 2007, is the Market Committee, and that long-serving employees cannot be treated as 'rolling stones' or subjected to fresh recruitment processes. The ratio established is that existing employees are entitled to protection and absorption under the new regulatory framework, and arbitrary termination of such employees violates their fundamental rights and the specific protections provided by the governing rules.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of a Market Committee considered public servants under the law?
  • Does Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011, protect existing employees from termination?
  • Can the government terminate long-serving employees on the grounds that their initial appointments lacked a formal service structure?
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• Aqeel Shahzad and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secreatry, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others2020 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-22
  Market Committee employeesregularization of servicetermination of servicepublic servantsstatutory rulesservice structurePeshawar Market Committeefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals arose out of conflicting Peshawar High Court judgments concerning the termination and regularization of long-serving employees of the Peshawar Market Committee appointed between 1994 and 2010. The government and the Market Committee contended that the initial appointments were made without a formal service structure or statutory instructions, justifying their termination and fresh recruitment under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural and Livestock Produce Markets Act, 2007, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011. The Supreme Court held that the employees were lawfully appointed by the competent authority and had rendered unblemished service for decades. Terminating them while initiating fresh recruitment violated their fundamental rights and contravened Rule 71(v) of the Rules 2011, which explicitly protects existing employees by allowing them to continue in service or be absorbed. Consequently, the Court set aside the termination orders and directed the authorities to consider regularizing the appellants' services in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 71(v) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural Produce Markets General Rules, 2011 protect existing employees from termination upon the notification of a new service structure?
  • Can long-serving Market Committee employees appointed by a competent authority be terminated solely on the ground of an absent initial service structure?
  • Whether an order of termination issued in violation of statutory service rules protecting existing staff is legally sustainable?
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• Aqal Khan vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  post-arrest bailmurdercommunity of intentionfurther inquirycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, arises from the refusal of lower courts to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Aqal Khan, who was implicated in a murder case along with his co-accused brother. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, allegedly sharing a community of intention and accused of recovering the deceased's pistol subsequent to the incident, is entitled to post-arrest bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the co-accused singularly targeted the deceased during an unanticipated encounter, and the first information report lacked details regarding the alleged snatching of the deceased's gun. Consequently, the Court ruled that the cumulative circumstances of the case brought the petitioner's matter within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appeal was allowed, and the petitioner was granted bail subject to furnishing requisite security bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-accused without a direct fatal attribution is entitled to post-arrest bail when the case falls within the purview of further inquiry?
  • Does the absence of details in the first information report regarding a recovered weapon constitute grounds for bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Application For Release Of Funds To Be Paid By Bahria Town To The Government Of Sindh Pursuant To Order Dated 21.3.2019_ In the matter of vs N_a2020 SCMR 2122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-20
  fund utilizationBahria Townimplementation benchpublic utility projectssupervisory commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from applications filed by the Advocate General for Sindh, the Attorney General for Pakistan, and the Malir Development Authority regarding the utilization of substantial funds and accrued profit/markup deposited by Bahria Town pursuant to an earlier order of the Supreme Court dated 21.03.2019. The core legal question concerned the mechanism, supervision, and governance framework for the disbursement and utilization of these funds for public utility projects in the Province of Sindh. The Court held that the funds should be disbursed and utilized under the supervision of a high-powered commission composed of voting and non-voting members, headed by a Chairman, with all major decisions and project selections subject to the final approval of the Implementation Bench of the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that large-scale public funds generated through court directives must be administered through a transparent, structured commission subject to continuous judicial oversight and compliance mechanisms.

  Questions settled

  • How should funds deposited by Bahria Town pursuant to the Supreme Court order be utilized and supervised?
  • What is the composition and tenure of the high-powered commission established for the disbursement of funds?
  • Are the decisions of the commission regarding project selection and financial matters subject to the approval of the Supreme Court's Implementation Bench?
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• Anthony Roy (Deceased) through Legal Heirs vs Prime Minister Of Islamic2020 PLJ SC 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-23
  service tribunaldismissal from servicegross negligencepublic procurementdepartmental inquiryrailwaysoverpayment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the deceased appellant, a Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer in Pakistan Railways, against his dismissal from service for alleged fraud, embezzlement, and gross negligence in procuring and verifying bills for Bitumen Tape. The core legal questions involved whether due process was followed during the departmental inquiries and whether the charges of financial embezzlement and negligence were substantiated by the record. The Supreme Court held that while there was no evidence of direct misappropriation, embezzlement, or personal enrichment by the appellant, the charges of gross negligence, carelessness, and failure to perform duties diligently—resulting in a significant financial loss to the public exchequer through open-ended tender quantities and unverified bill approvals—were fully established through three successive inquiries. Consequently, the Court upheld the penalty of dismissal from service and dismissed the appeal, establishing the principle that gross negligence and supervisory failure in public procurement justify the extreme penalty of dismissal even in the absence of direct proof of personal misappropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service can be sustained on the ground of gross negligence and carelessness when direct evidence of embezzlement or personal misappropriation is lacking?
  • Does an open-ended tender quantity in public procurement contracts resulting in overpayment constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action?
  • Whether minor procedural defects in a preliminary fact-finding inquiry vitiate subsequent formal departmental inquiries where the accused was given full opportunity of defense?
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• Anthony Roy (decd) through Legal Heirs vs The Prime Minister of Islamic2020 PLC (C.S.) 959, 2020 P SC 1246, 2020 SCMR 1053, 2020 SCP 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-23
  service tribunaldismissal from servicegross negligenceembezzlementdepartmental inquiryopen-ended tenderPakistan Railways
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the deceased appellant against his dismissal from service for alleged fraud and embezzlement of public funds in connection with the procurement of Bitumen Tape by Pakistan Railways. The core legal question was whether the appellant was rightly found guilty of embezzlement and whether his dismissal was sustainable based on the record. The Supreme Court held that while there was no evidence of direct misappropriation, embezzlement, or personal enrichment by the appellant, the record firmly established gross negligence, carelessness, and failure to perform official duties diligently by leaving tender quantities open-ended and mechanically verifying bills for unsupplied material, resulting in substantial financial loss to the exchequer. The Court ruled that the penalty of dismissal was fully sustainable on the ground of gross negligence and upheld the Tribunal's judgment. The key principle laid down is that a public servant can be legally penalized with dismissal from service for gross negligence and dereliction of duty resulting in financial loss, even in the absence of direct proof of personal embezzlement or misappropriation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant be dismissed from service for gross negligence and financial loss in the absence of direct proof of personal embezzlement?
  • Does keeping tender quantities open-ended and failing to verify utilized materials constitute actionable professional misconduct?
  • Whether the findings of multiple departmental inquiries affirmed by the Service Tribunal warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal or factual error?
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• Anjuman-e-Khuddam-ul-Qur'an, Faisalabad through Dr. Abdul Sami,2020 PLD Supreme Court 390, 2020 P SC 1214, 2020 SCP 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-14
  waqfnamaregistered documentcourt feeburden of proofcontumacious conductspecific reliefregistration manual
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding the validity of a registered waqfnama. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the waqfnama, the admissibility of certified copies of registered documents, and the consequences of the plaintiff's failure to pay court fees. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its assessment of evidence, particularly regarding the comparison of thumb impressions on the original document versus the certified copy, which is a natural consequence of the registration process under the Registration Manual. The Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof to rebut the sanctity of a registered document. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff's contumacious failure to pay the requisite court fees warranted dismissal. The judgment reaffirms that registered documents carry a presumption of validity, requiring strong, cogent evidence to rebut, and that courts must strictly enforce the payment of court fees, as failure to do so, even if initially overlooked by lower courts, is a ground for dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a defendant did not press the issue of deficient court fees at trial relieve the court of its obligation to ensure the correct court fee is paid?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit, appeal, or revision for non-payment of court fees if the plaintiff was not previously granted an opportunity to make up the deficiency?
  • Does the difference in the placement of thumb impressions and endorsements between an original registered document and its certified copy necessarily indicate forgery?
  • Is a suit for cancellation of a document under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the appropriate remedy when a plaintiff alleges that a registered document was executed by an imposter?
  • Does the failure to mention CNIC numbers of the transferor or transferee in a waqfnama render the document invalid?
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• Amjad Khan vs Muhammad Irshad (decd) thr. his LRs2021 P SC 120, 2020 SCMR 2155, 2020 SCP 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  Code of Civil Procedurewitness productionsummoning of witnessesconstitutional jurisdictionappellate discretionOrder XVI Rule 1 CPCwitness listcivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment that reversed an appellate court's order permitting the petitioner to produce witnesses despite a failure to file a timely witness list. The core legal question was whether the embargo under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to witnesses produced voluntarily by a party without invoking the court's summoning power. The Supreme Court held that the embargo in Order XVI Rule 1 CPC is limited to witnesses summoned through the court's process and does not extend to witnesses produced voluntarily by parties on the day of evidence recording. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the rule is to prevent surprise, which is not jeopardized by voluntary production of witnesses related to existing pleadings. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the High Court improperly interfered with the appellate court's valid exercise of discretion. The principle established is that parties may voluntarily produce witnesses without a prior list, provided they do not cause surprise to the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Does the embargo in Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to witnesses produced voluntarily by a party without invoking the court's summoning power?
  • Under what circumstances should a High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by lower courts?
  • Is there a legal distinction between calling a witness through the court and producing a witness voluntarily in civil proceedings?
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• Amjad and another vs The State and another2020 SCMR 2084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-19
  murderbenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesself-defenceocular accountcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while altering the death sentence to imprisonment for life for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully established its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of suppressed injuries sustained by the accused and alternative versions of the incident involving a cross-version plea of self-defense and defense of honour. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that massive suppression of injuries endured by the accused and the screening of material witnesses cast grave doubts on the veracity of the ocular account, rendering the prosecution story improbable. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that the suppression of material facts and injuries on the person of the accused fatally undermines the prosecution case, and the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising therefrom must be extended to the accused, resulting in their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of firearm injuries sustained by the accused on the same occasion fatally undermine the prosecution case?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt should be extended when the prosecution fails to explain injuries on the person of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained when the manner of occurrence is shrouded in doubt?
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• Amjad Ali Khan vs The State, etc2020 KLR Supreme Court 246, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 299, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-13
  superdarinarcoticscase propertyconfiscationvehicle registrationphysical verificationopen transfer letterinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition and its reversal of a trial court's order granting 'superdari' (temporary custody) of a vehicle seized in a narcotics case. The petitioner claimed ownership based on an open transfer letter and subsequent registration after the vehicle's seizure. The Supreme Court addressed whether a vehicle involved in an offence under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) can be released on superdari and whether its title can be transferred during trial. The Court held that under Section 74 of the CNSA, general provisions of the Cr.P.C. regarding custody do not apply. A vehicle may only be released to a lawful owner who is not an accused, associate, or relative, and who had no knowledge of the offence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that once a vehicle becomes case property, there is a freeze on its legal title; any transfer by the Motor Registration Authority during trial is without lawful authority. The petition was dismissed.

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• Ambreen Khatoon and others vs Mumtaz Bibi and others2021 PLJ SC 77, 2020 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  inheritance mutationrevenue recordlegal heirscivil court jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionres judicatalegitimacy of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that directed Revenue authorities to incorporate the names of the respondents as legal heirs of the deceased, Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din Hasan, in the Revenue Record. The core legal question was whether the Revenue authorities could refuse to implement the findings of civil courts of competent jurisdiction which had already established the status of the respondents as the widow and son of the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the Revenue authorities are bound by the decisions of civil courts and cannot ignore established judicial findings regarding inheritance. The Court affirmed that the respondents' status as legal heirs was conclusively proven through evidence, including DNA testing and official records. The key principle laid down is that Revenue authorities lack the legal authority to disregard or refuse to implement final judgments of civil courts of competent jurisdiction, and such attempts to deny the rights of rightful heirs through technicalities constitute an abuse of the legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Are Revenue authorities legally bound to implement the findings of civil courts of competent jurisdiction regarding inheritance?
  • Can Revenue authorities refuse to update inheritance mutations when the status of legal heirs has been conclusively determined by civil courts?
  • Does the failure of Revenue authorities to implement a final civil court judgment regarding heirship constitute an abuse of the legal process?
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• Ambreen Khatoon & Others vs Mumtaz Bibi & Others2020 SCP 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  inheritance mutationlegal heirscivil court decreerevenue authoritiesbinding judicial findingsdna evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition and directed revenue authorities to incorporate respondents No. 1 and 2 as legal heirs of the late Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din in the revenue record. The core legal question revolved around the status of respondents No. 1 and 2 as the lawful widow and son of the deceased, and whether revenue authorities could refuse to implement final judicial findings confirming that status. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact by courts of competent jurisdiction—supported by oral and documentary evidence, birth register entries, DNA test results, and CNICs—conclusively established the respondents as the legal heirs. The Court ruled that decisions of competent civil courts are binding on revenue authorities, and such authorities have no legal justification to refuse implementation of judicial decrees. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order, emphasizing that technicalities cannot be exploited to perpetrate the disinheritance of widows and orphans, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities are bound to implement the final judgments and decrees of civil courts of competent jurisdiction regarding inheritance and legal heirship?
  • Can revenue authorities refuse to correct inheritance mutations when the status of the claimants as legal heirs has been conclusively determined by the civil courts?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding parentage and marriage, supported by DNA evidence and official records, can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Allah Rakha vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2020 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-07
  Criminal Breach of TrustCivil NazirMisappropriation of FundsReduction of SentenceAnti-CorruptionConcurrent Sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a former Civil Nazir seeking reduction of his sentence following convictions under anti-corruption and penal provisions for misappropriating official funds. The petitioner had been convicted under sections 409, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as section 5(2)C of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, receiving a maximum sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment under section 409 alongside coordinate five-year sentences. The High Court maintained the conviction and sentences. Counsel for the petitioner limited the challenge to requesting a reduction of the ten-year sentence under section 409 to five years to match the coordinate charges. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had made partial restitution, had suffered dismissal from service, experienced prolonged proceedings since 2015, and faced severe stigma. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that reducing the sentence under section 409 to five years' rigorous imprisonment, running concurrently with coordinate charges and with benefit of pre-trial custody, was conscionable and appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the maximum sentence of imprisonment under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be reduced to match the quantum of sentences awarded on coordinate charges?
  • Whether factors such as partial restitution of misappropriated funds, dismissal from service, and prolonged trial constitute valid mitigating circumstances for sentence reduction?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a substantive sentence of imprisonment while dismissing a criminal petition against conviction?
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• Allah Rakha (decd) thr. LRs & others vs Additional Commissioner2021 PLJ SC 68, 2020 P SC 673, 2020 SCMR 502, 2020 SCP 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-04
  writ jurisdictionlachesrejection of plaintsettlement authoritiesbar of jurisdictioncivil suit competencyland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition filed by the petitioners. The matter originated from a dispute over land allotments made to Jammu and Kashmir refugees, where the original allottee's entitlement was reduced in 1970. The petitioners, claiming as purchasers, initially filed a civil suit, which resulted in the rejection of the plaint under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a writ petition in 2002 challenging the 1970 order. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable against a settlement authority's order simply because a civil suit was deemed incompetent, and whether the writ petition was barred by laches. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was rightly dismissed. It affirmed that the bar on civil court jurisdiction does not automatically confer writ jurisdiction upon the High Court, especially absent proof of coram non judice or excess of authority. Furthermore, the Court upheld the dismissal based on the principle of laches, noting the 32-year delay in challenging the original order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incompetence of a civil suit automatically grant the High Court jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding the same subject matter?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained against an order passed by settlement authorities after a delay of 32 years?
  • Under what circumstances can the jurisdiction of a civil court be superseded by a special forum under a statute?
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• Allah Dino Khan Bhayo vs Election Commission of Pakistan etc2020 PLD Supreme Court 591, 2021 PLJ SC 33, 2021 P SC 283, 2020 SCP 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-04
  Article 62(1)(f)election disqualificationReturning Officerjudicial declarationdue processreview petitionsummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition concerns whether a 2007 summary finding by a Returning Officer, which disqualified the petitioner from contesting elections due to a fake educational certificate, constitutes a "declaration by a court of law" under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as amended in 2010. The petitioner challenged his subsequent disqualification by the Election Commission of Pakistan, which relied on this earlier finding. The Supreme Court held that a Returning Officer’s summary proceedings, which lack the recording of evidence and the right of cross-examination, do not meet the criteria of a "court of law." Consequently, such a finding cannot trigger the permanent disqualification mandated by Article 62(1)(f). The Court emphasized that a judicial declaration under this Article requires due process, including a fair trial and reasoned judgment. Since the Returning Officer’s finding lacked these essential judicial attributes, it could not operate as a permanent bar to the petitioner's eligibility. The review petition was allowed, and the previous disqualification order was recalled, though the underlying allegation of dishonesty remains open for future adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a summary finding by a Returning Officer during the scrutiny of nomination papers constitute a 'declaration by a court of law' for the purposes of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the doctrine of res judicata be applied to a finding made by a Returning Officer in summary proceedings?
  • What are the essential attributes required for a forum to be considered a 'court of law' for the purpose of issuing a disqualification declaration under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Ali Gohar, etc vs Pervaiz Ahmed, etc2020 PSC (Crl.) 980, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 427, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 30, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-30
  Anti-terrorism court jurisdictionInherent jurisdiction of High CourtCognizance of offenceTransfer of casePrivate vendettaCriminal revisionTerrorism definition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a High Court judgment that reversed an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) order transferring a triple murder case to an ordinary criminal court. The core legal questions concerned the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the scope of "cognizance" under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and whether a tribal dispute constitutes "terrorism." The Supreme Court held that the High Court improperly exercised inherent jurisdiction because an alternative remedy, specifically criminal revision under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was available. The Court further clarified that an ATC may transfer a case under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 after taking cognizance, defined as any step indicating an intent to proceed with the trial. Finally, the Court ruled that the incident, arising from a private tribal vendetta, did not constitute "terrorism" under the Act, as it lacked the requisite design or purpose specified in Section 6, reaffirming the principle that private disputes do not qualify as terrorism regardless of the crime's brutality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to interfere with an order of an Anti-Terrorism Court when an alternative remedy of revision exists?
  • What constitutes 'taking cognizance' of a case by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a crime committed in furtherance of a private tribal dispute be classified as 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Court have the authority to transfer a case to an ordinary criminal court after taking cognizance?
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• Ali Akbar vs The State and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 106, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 1029, 2020 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-24
  statutory baildelay in trialhardened criminalbail on meritscriminal procedureanti-terrorismproviso to section 497
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the Lahore High Court in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having been in custody for over four years without the conclusion of his trial, was entitled to statutory bail under the third proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if he was excluded by the fourth proviso regarding 'hardened, desperate or dangerous' criminals. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court determined that the delay in trial was not solely attributable to the petitioner, as the trial court report cited failures by the complainant and witnesses to appear. Furthermore, the Court established that in the absence of previous convictions and given the specific circumstances of the case, the petitioner did not meet the criteria of a hardened or dangerous criminal. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and bail was granted subject to conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delay in trial caused by the complainant and prosecution witnesses entitle an accused to statutory bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be classified as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the fourth proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in the absence of previous convictions?
  • Is the statutory right to bail under the third proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, applicable when the trial court report does not attribute the delay solely to the accused?
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• Ali Ahmad vs The State and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-14
  grave and sudden provocationburden of proofocular evidencestatement of accusedsection 342 Cr.P.C.honour killingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his sister and her paramour. The trial court convicted the appellant under section 302(c) PPC, but the High Court enhanced the conviction to section 302(b) PPC. The Supreme Court, upon review, found the prosecution's ocular evidence unreliable due to significant contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the presence of witnesses at the crime scene. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court examined the appellant's statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. in its entirety, accepting his plea of grave and sudden provocation as a fact. The Court clarified that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, and the burden under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 only shifts if a prima facie case is established. The Court set aside the High Court's conviction, restored the trial court's conviction under section 302(c) PPC, and modified the sentence to 15 years rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of his statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. if the prosecution evidence is rejected?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, if the prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case?
  • Must a statement of an accused recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C. be accepted in its entirety if the prosecution evidence is disbelieved?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'honour killing' and 'grave and sudden provocation'?
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• Ali Ahmad vs The State & another2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-14
  grave and sudden provocationhonour killingburden of proofocular evidencesection 342 statementcriminal appealappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his sister and her paramour. The trial court convicted the appellant under section 302(c) PPC, but the High Court enhanced the conviction to section 302(b) PPC, rejecting the appellant's plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court, upon review, found the prosecution's ocular evidence unreliable and contradictory, rendering the prosecution's case against the appellant doubtful. The Court held that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the burden shifts to the accused under Article 121, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Where the prosecution fails, the court must consider the accused's statement under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in its entirety. The Court determined that the appellant's statement, accepted as a whole, established that the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation. Consequently, the conviction was modified to section 302(c) PPC, and the sentence was reduced to 15 years rigorous imprisonment, emphasizing that an accused cannot be convicted solely on the failure of their defense plea if the prosecution's own case is deficient.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the failure of their defense plea if the prosecution has failed to prove its case?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, if the prosecution has not established a prima facie case?
  • Must a statement of an accused recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be accepted in its entirety if the prosecution evidence is rejected?
  • What is the distinction between 'honour killing' and 'grave and sudden provocation' in criminal law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad and another vs Ali Ahmad and another2020 PLD Supreme Court 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-14
  grave and sudden provocationhonour killingburden of proofSection 342 Cr.P.C.Article 121 QSOocular accountculpable homicidecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double murder case where the appellant was accused of killing his sister and her paramour. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302(c) PPC, but the High Court enhanced the conviction to Section 302(b) PPC, categorizing it as 'honour killing'. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's ocular evidence was unreliable due to inconsistencies and the doubtful presence of witnesses at the scene. The Court clarified the scope of Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and Section 342 Cr.P.C., holding that when prosecution evidence is rejected, the accused's statement must be accepted in its entirety. It distinguished 'honour killing' (premeditated) from 'grave and sudden provocation' (impulsive). Finding that the appellant acted upon seeing the deceased in a compromising position, the Court held the act fell under grave and sudden provocation. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the conviction under Section 302(c) PPC, and modified the sentence to fifteen years' rigorous imprisonment.

  Read full judgment →
• Alamgir Khan vs The State and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 674, 2020 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-30
  post-arrest bailfreedom of speechseditionreasonable restrictionsconstitutional rightscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Alamgir Khan, sought post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 990 of 2019, registered under sections 124-A, 290, and 291 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order 1960, and section 6 of the Punjab Sound Systems (Regulations) Act 2015. The allegations stemmed from an incendiary speech delivered on Mall Road, Lahore, purportedly inciting hatred against State institutions. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s conduct, characterized by the defense as an emotional outburst by a youth affected by the war on terror, warranted continued incarceration pending trial. The Supreme Court held that while freedom of speech is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution, the determination of whether the petitioner’s specific discourse violated these restrictions is a matter for the trial court to decide after evidence is concluded. Emphasizing that the State should be benign toward citizen dissent, the Court granted bail, noting that the petitioner’s continued incarceration served no useful purpose to the prosecution, and ordered his release upon furnishing a bail bond.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of whether a speech violates reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution is a matter to be settled at the bail stage or by the trial court after evidence?
  • Does the State's obligation to be benign toward citizen dissent affect the court's discretion in granting bail for charges of sedition?
  • Is the continued incarceration of a student accused of sedition justified when the prosecution's case requires further evidentiary trial?
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• Akhtar vs The State2020 SCMR 2020, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-12
  murdercircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessiondelay in FIRsentence commutationlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of a minor boy. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including an extra-judicial confession, medical evidence showing strangulation and semen-stained swabs, and the recovery of the deceased's body and personal belongings on the appellant's pointation. The appellant challenged the conviction, pointing to a delay in reporting the matter to the police. The Supreme Court held that the delay was naturally explained by a father's search for his missing child and did not damage the prosecution's case. The Court found the chain of circumstantial evidence, supported by the extra-judicial confession and medical findings, sufficient to maintain the conviction. However, because the case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment to meet the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution when a father is searching for his missing minor child?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence and an extra-judicial confession?
  • Whether a death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment when the prosecution's case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Ali vs The State2020 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-15
  transfer of casesscandalous litigationjudicial restraintimposition of costsadministration of justicejudicial independence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Akhtar Ali, sought the transfer of criminal cases pending before a Judicial Magistrate in Sheikhupura to a court in Gojra, District Nankana Sahib, following unsuccessful attempts before the District and Sessions Judge and the Lahore High Court. The High Court had dismissed his transfer application, characterizing his conduct as scandalous and frivolous, and imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged this order while expressing remorse for his previous behavior towards the judiciary and local bar members. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the petitioner's conduct and the imposition of costs for scandalous litigation. The Supreme Court held that while the petitioner's conduct was indeed reckless and scandalous, it would exercise judicial restraint regarding the punitive costs. The Court affirmed that the administration of justice requires judges to perform their duties fearlessly and independently, free from obstruction or interference. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal but reduced the imposed cost to a symbolic sum of Rs. 2,000, emphasizing that judicial dignity rests on foundations beyond coercive authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce costs imposed by a High Court for scandalous litigation?
  • Is it permissible for a litigant to cast aspersions on the judiciary and legal practitioners in a transfer application?
  • What is the standard for judicial restraint when dealing with contemptuous or scandalous conduct by a litigant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajmir Shah, Ex-Sepoy vs The Inspector General, Frontier Corps KPK and another2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 250, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 420, 2021 P SC 747, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-19
  departmental appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayFrontier Corpsdismissal from serviceFederal Service Tribunalstatutory procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal as time-barred. The petitioner, a former Sepoy in the Frontier Corps, was dismissed from service under Sections 8(c) and 10 of the Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959. He filed his departmental appeal after more than four years and five months, claiming he waited for the outcome of another colleague's successful service appeal. The Supreme Court considered whether awaiting the outcome of another employee's case constitutes sufficient cause to condone delay and whether deciding a departmental appeal on the merits implies condonation of limitation. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that an employee must pursue their own legal remedy within the prescribed limitation period rather than wait for a colleague's outcome. Furthermore, under Rule 14 of the Frontier Corps Rules, 1961, the power to certify delay and extend limitation lies exclusively with the original punishing authority, not the appellate authority; hence, implied condonation cannot arise.

  Questions settled

  • Does awaiting the outcome of a colleague's service appeal constitute sufficient cause for extending the limitation period for filing a departmental appeal?
  • Can an appellate authority impliedly condone a delay in filing a departmental appeal on the merits when the governing rules place the power to extend limitation solely in the original punishing authority?
  • Under Rule 14 of the Frontier Corps Rules 1961, what is the mandatory procedure to extend the limitation period for filing an appeal?
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• Ahmad Bakhsh (Deceased) through LRs vs Ameer Ali Khan2020 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  pre-emptionTalab-i-Ishhadco-sharercontradictions in evidencecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants against a sale mutation dated 14.9.1999, claiming a superior right as a co-sharer. The trial court and appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the High Court reversed this decision upon finding contradictions and discrepancies in the plaintiff's evidence regarding the mandatory performance of Talabs under pre-emption law. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff had validly and lawfully performed Talab-i-Ishhad and associated statutory requirements. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, holding that the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses were fraught with material contradictions and omissions regarding the time and manner of the Talabs, rendering them unreliable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that failure to establish proper performance of Talabs fatalizes a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses regarding the performance of Talabs are fatal to a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the failure to properly prove Talab-i-Ishhad in accordance with the law warrant the dismissal of a pre-emption claim?
  • Is an appellate court justified in reversing concurrent findings of lower courts when the plaintiff's evidence on essential prerequisites is found to be unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Administrator Municipal Corporation, Peshawar vs Taimoor Hussain Amin2020 PLJ SC 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil revisionburden of prooflimitation periodpublic propertysale mutationnecessary partylocal government
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a property suit filed by respondents seeking ownership and possession of land claimed by the Municipal Corporation, Peshawar. The core legal questions involved whether plaintiffs established valid title without joining necessary parties, and whether the suit was barred by limitation and contrary to the burden of proof. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the lower courts misallocated the burden of proof, ignored the lack of title evidence and non-joinder of necessary parties, and failed to notice that the suit was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act 1908. The Court laid down that plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own case, that anyone alleging ownership of property possessed by another must prove it, and emphasized the mandatory statutory duties of local governments to conduct annual stocktaking of public properties and enforce personal liability for any waste or loss.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the plaintiff to establish ownership and title when the defendant corporation is in actual physical possession and receiving rent from the property?
  • Can a civil court decree a suit that is visibly barred by the period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act 1908 even if limitation is not specifically pleaded as a defense?
  • Whether concurrent findings of subordinate courts can be set aside in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when they suffer from material irregularities and misplacement of the burden of proof?
  • What are the statutory obligations of local governments regarding the annual stocktaking and protection of public properties under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act 2013?
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• Administrator Municipal Corporation Peshawar vs Taimur Hussain Amin2020 SCP 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-18
  local government electionspublic property disclosuretransparencyconstitutional mandateadministrative accountabilitydevolution of power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the failure of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government to comply with statutory mandates regarding the disclosure of public property and the failure to hold local government elections. The core legal questions involve the government's obligation to maintain transparency regarding public assets under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013, and the constitutional duty to hold local government elections. The Court held that the government's submission of voluminous, irrelevant documentation was an inadequate substitute for the required transparency. It directed the Chief Secretary and relevant authorities to ensure digital, public disclosure of immovable properties and valuable assets, warning of potential action under the Act for non-compliance. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the absence of elected local representatives since August 2019 constitutes a grave violation of Article 140A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court reaffirmed that compliance with constitutional and statutory duties regarding local governance is mandatory, not optional, and ordered immediate steps to rectify the democratic deficit and ensure transparency in public property management.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to hold local government elections violate the constitutional mandate under Article 140A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is the government legally obligated to disclose particulars of public properties in an accessible digital format under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Can the government be held accountable for the failure to maintain transparency regarding public assets and the resulting risk of pilferage?
  Read full judgment →
• Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd vs Muhammad Ramzan, etc2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 354, 2020 P C T L R 1377, PLD 2020 Supreme · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  Insurance TribunalConstitutional JurisdictionInterlocutory OrdersStatutory AppealInsurance OrdinanceWrit PetitionRight of Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the right of appeal under Section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, specifically regarding whether interlocutory orders passed by an Insurance Tribunal are subject to statutory appeal. The core legal question is whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 remains available to challenge miscellaneous orders of the Tribunal, given that the Ordinance only provides for appeals against final decisions on claims or penalties. The Supreme Court held that Section 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, is restricted to final adjudications of insurance claims or penalties and does not encompass miscellaneous interlocutory orders. Consequently, such orders are not appealable under the Ordinance, and the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 can be invoked to challenge them. The Court affirmed the principle that sub-constitutional legislation cannot curtail or abridge the jurisdiction of a constitutional court. Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order and allowed the petitioner to file its written statement before the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, provide a right of appeal against miscellaneous interlocutory orders passed by an Insurance Tribunal?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be invoked to challenge interlocutory orders of an Insurance Tribunal?
  • Does sub-constitutional legislation have the authority to curtail or abridge the jurisdiction of a constitutional court?
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• Abdul Rehman Malik vs Synthia D. Ritchie, Americans National and others2020 SCMR 2037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-30
  registration of FIRJustice of Peacecognizable offencefunctional immunityequality before lawpolice investigationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Islamabad High Court remitting a matter to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace for a fresh decision regarding the registration of a criminal case. The respondent, a U.S. blogger, alleged that the petitioner, a former Federal Minister and current Senator, had sexually assaulted her in 2011. The petitioner challenged the High Court's direction, arguing that the police had already conducted a factual inquiry and found the allegations to be dubious and delayed by a decade. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Rule 24.4 of the Police Rules, 1934, and Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. The Court held that the police are generally under a statutory duty to record an FIR when information discloses a cognizable offence. It clarified that Rule 24.4 does not empower an officer to terminate a prosecution before its inception based on subjective belief; rather, investigation should follow registration to discover the truth. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that no public official, regardless of status, enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution for acts outside official functions. The petition was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razaq vs Abdul Ghaffar and others2020 SCMR 202, 2020 P SC 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-20
  suit for declarationregistered power of attorneynecessary partypresumption of registrationlimitationpleadings as evidencespecific relief act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Suit for Declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, filed by Respondent No. 1 seeking to declare a registered General Power of Attorney, subsequent agreement to sell, and transfer of a municipal plot invalid and forged. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the Appellate Court reversed, and the High Court affirmed the decree in civil revision. The core legal questions pertained to the burden of proof, the necessity of parties in challenging registered documents, the presumption attached to registered deeds, and the period of limitation. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, restoring the Trial Court's dismissal. The Court held that pleadings alone do not constitute evidence if a party fails to testify regarding them. Furthermore, challenging a registered deed requires impleading the registering authority and attesting witnesses as necessary parties. Presumptions of genuineness under Section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908 must be properly rebutted, and suits seeking to challenge registered deeds must comply with Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can pleadings be treated as evidence if the plaintiff fails to testify on the specific subject in their oral evidence?
  • Are the registering officer, attesting witnesses, and identifier necessary parties in a suit challenging a registered document?
  • What standard of proof is required to rebut the legal presumption attached to a registered document under Section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908?
  • What is the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for filing a suit to challenge a registered power of attorney?
  • Can a declaratory decree under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 create a new right in favour of the plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khalique vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 189, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 492, 2020 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-22
  leave to appealmurderdelay in FIRocular evidencemedical evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibuslife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case in which petitioner Abdul Khalique and a co-accused were convicted under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the co-accused based on the benefit of doubt but upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence. The petitioner challenged his conviction before the Supreme Court, contending that there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and that the prosecution evidence disbelieved against the acquitted co-accused should not have been relied upon against him. The Supreme Court observed that the delay in lodging the FIR was reasonably explained because the complainant side prioritized saving the victim's life and had promptly approached the police for a medical referral letter. Furthermore, the court held that the ocular account regarding the petitioner's specific role in inflicting dagger blows was consistent, corroborated by medical evidence, and supported by weapon recovery, whereas the acquitted co-accused was empty-handed. Finding the guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution case when the complainant side prioritizes providing medical treatment to the injured victim?
  • Can the testimony of an eye-witness who was declared hostile be relied upon to support the prosecution case against a co-accused?
  • Whether the acquittal of a co-accused who was empty-handed invalidates the conviction of a co-accused assigned specific overt acts of inflicting injuries based on the same set of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim vs Nasir Salim Baig and others2020 P SC 959, 2020 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-22
  amenity plotsmaster planillegal constructionurban planningSBCAcommercial conversionpublic parksencroachment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the unauthorized conversion of amenity plots, parks, and playgrounds in Karachi into commercial sites, including marriage halls, petrol pumps, and shopping plazas. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the failure of the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) to preserve the city's original Master Plan. The Court held that there is a complete, immediate ban on the conversion of any residential or amenity land for commercial use across Karachi, including cantonment areas. The Court directed the DG SBCA to demolish illegal constructions on amenity plots, specifically citing Jam Sadiq Ali Park and KW&SB land, and to restore these sites to their original intended use. Furthermore, the Court ordered a review of all previous conversions and illegal building approvals, mandating that the SBCA identify solutions for demolition and provide compensation or alternate accommodation to affected occupants. The principle laid down is that state authorities are strictly prohibited from deviating from the original Master Plan, and the preservation of public amenities is a mandatory state obligation for the welfare of citizens.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Sindh Building Control Authority or other government bodies authorize the conversion of amenity plots and residential land for commercial use?
  • Is the conversion of land originally designated for parks and playgrounds in the Master Plan permissible?
  • Does the ban on the conversion of land use apply to cantonment areas within Karachi?
  • Are authorities required to demolish illegal constructions on amenity plots and restore the land to its original purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq and others vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 235, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 505, 2020 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-07
  abduction for ransombenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceinherent improbabilitywitness credibilitycriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions challenging the conviction and life imprisonment of the petitioners for the abduction of Abdul Rahim for ransom. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the significant contradictions in the abductee's testimony, the delay in reporting, and the admitted prior animosity between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was inherently improbable and riddled with doubt. The court noted that the abductee's testimony was inconsistent, he had massively improved upon his previous statements, and he failed to explain the delay in reporting or the circumstances of his return. Furthermore, the complainant did not implicate the petitioners, and the medical evidence regarding the abductee's injuries was inconclusive due to the delay in examination. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that a conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of superficial evidence when the prosecution's narrative is inherently improbable and the testimony of the star witness is unreliable and contradictory.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for abduction be sustained when the prosecution's case is inherently improbable and the abductee's testimony is inconsistent?
  • Does a significant delay in medical examination of an abductee render the medical evidence insufficient to prove captivity?
  • Is an identification parade reliable when the abductee admits to prior acquaintance and litigation with the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs Jahangir Khan2021 P SC 266, 2020 SCMR 2107, 2020 SCP 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-09
  specific performanceagreement to sellattestation of instrumentproof of documentLand Reforms Regulationtransfer of propertyconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil dispute concerning the specific performance of an agreement to sell land situated in Dera Ismail Khan, originally granted to the petitioner under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The petitioner denied the execution of the agreement and raised objections regarding defective attestation under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as well as statutory bars on alienation under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, which was modified by the appellate court and subsequently restored by the High Court in civil revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's civil petition and appeal, holding that the respondent had successfully proved the execution and contents of the agreement through consistent oral and documentary evidence, and that attestation and proof of a document are distinct requirements. The Court established that a mere simple denial by a defendant without initiating legal action against an allegedly fabricated document carries no weight, and that a sale in violation of regulatory restrictions is not void ab-initio once such restrictions have elapsed or proprietary rights are fully transferred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether attestation of an instrument under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the formal proof of a document under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 are distinct and independent requirements?
  • Does a simple denial of an agreement to sell in a written statement, without initiating legal proceedings against the alleged forgery, suffice to displace overwhelming affirmative evidence of execution?
  • Whether a sale of land in violation of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is rendered void ab-initio?
  • Can a party who enters into a genuine agreement to sell subsequently take advantage of statutory restrictions on alienation after proprietary rights have vested?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor Gondal vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2020 SCMR 861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-10
  pre-arrest baildishonour of chequemala fideFIR delaycriminal procedurefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving an alleged offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from FIR No. 436/19. The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail, arguing that the complainant's bank witness confirmed the signature on the cheque did not match the petitioner's bank records, and highlighting an inordinate five-year delay in lodging the FIR without explanation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the potential for mala fide intent and the evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court observed that the complainant failed to controvert the petitioner's arguments regarding the signature mismatch and the unexplained delay. Holding that the case warranted further inquiry and acknowledging the risk of undue harassment and humiliation, the Court confirmed the ad interim pre-arrest bail. The judgment reinforces the principle that where an FIR is lodged with significant, unexplained delay and prima facie evidence suggests malicious intent or evidentiary weakness, the accused is entitled to the protection of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR?
  • Does a discrepancy in the signature on a cheque, as noted by a bank witness, constitute grounds for further inquiry in a case under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the complainant fails to controvert the petitioner's claims regarding mala fide intent?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz Memon vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 213, 2020 SCMR 313, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-26
  pre-arrest bailextraordinary remedyfraudforgerycriminal investigationbail refusalmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Abdul Aziz Memon, seeking pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered at Police Station Matyari. The petitioner was accused of defrauding the complainant of Rs.500,000 by providing a fake appointment letter for a Naib Qasid position in the Education Department, which the complainant discovered after serving for two years without pay. The petitioner claimed innocence, asserting the dispute arose from a separate wheat crop transaction, but failed to provide evidence to support this defense. The Supreme Court observed that the incriminating circumstances, specifically the two-year service period and the forged appointment letter, pointed directly to the petitioner's culpability. The Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable remedy intended to protect against the abuse of legal process, not a right to be granted in ordinary criminal cases where it might hinder investigation. Finding the High Court's refusal of bail to be legally sound, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail an absolute right in every criminal case?
  • Can a bald plea of mala fide suffice to grant pre-arrest bail when incriminating evidence exists?
  • Does the grant of pre-arrest bail extend to cases where it would hinder the investigative process?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas Raza vs The State through P.G. Punjab and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 117, 2020 SCMR 1859, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 87, 2020 SCP 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-15
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsprohibitory clausecriminal procedureappreciation of evidenceliberty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order declining post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 1300 grams of opium. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the recovery and the alleged discrepancy between the quantity of contraband and the large sum of cash seized. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s narrative—alleging the sale of narcotics at an odd hour in winter—lacked credibility and did not inspire confidence. Furthermore, the Court noted the petitioner's plausible explanation regarding the seized cash being proceeds from a house sale. Holding that the prosecution's story appeared fabricated and that the petitioner's liberty is a precious constitutional right, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail. The judgment reinforces the principle that bail should not be denied where the prosecution's case is open to serious doubt and lacks the requisite strength to establish guilt without a second thought.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a large sum of cash disproportionate to the quantity of recovered contraband create sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of bail?
  • Can a court grant bail when the prosecution's narrative regarding the circumstances of the arrest appears inherently improbable?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail if the prosecution's case is found to be potentially fabricated?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Siddique vs Additional Inspector General of Police PHP, Lahore and another2020 SCMR 1707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-12
  departmental proceedingsdismissal from servicepolice disciplineunauthorized absencedisciplinary inquiryservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the dismissal of a police officer from service due to unauthorized absence from duty. The core legal question concerns whether the departmental proceedings and subsequent dismissal were justified, particularly regarding the calculation of the period of absence and the inclusion of prior disciplinary records. The Supreme Court examined the inquiry report and noted that the petitioner had deliberately avoided disciplinary proceedings and failed to offer a defense for his absence. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner had a history of 23 previous entries for similar misconduct. The Supreme Court held that as a member of a disciplined force, the petitioner's actions constituted a clear defiance of the code of conduct governing police officers. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment, determining that the disciplinary action was warranted given the petitioner's conduct and service record. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the disciplinary authority's decision to terminate the petitioner's employment for persistent unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police officer's dismissal from service justified when they deliberately avoid disciplinary proceedings for unauthorized absence?
  • Does a history of previous bad entries for similar misconduct justify a harsher penalty in departmental proceedings?
  • Can a member of a disciplined force challenge a dismissal order based on the calculation of the period of absence when they failed to offer a defense during the inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Shahzad and another vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-10
  Drugs Act 1976unregistered drugsDrug Inspector authorityQuality Control Boardadmissibility of evidencesearch and seizurecriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged their conviction and sentences by the Drug Court Islamabad for offences related to the sale of unregistered drugs and operating without a license under the Drugs Act, 1976. The core legal questions were whether the Drug Inspector possessed the legal authority to conduct the search and seizure, whether the prosecution was required to produce members of the Quality Control Board as witnesses, and whether the petitioners' written admissions before the Quality Control Board were admissible despite procedural objections. The Supreme Court held that the Drug Inspector acted within his statutory powers under the Drugs Act, 1976, to search and seize contraband. The Court further held that the Quality Control Board's functions are regulatory, and the prosecution is not obligated to produce its members as witnesses to prove the charge. The Court affirmed that voluntary admissions made by the petitioners before the Board were admissible, rejecting the argument that they required the procedural protections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Drug Inspector have the statutory authority to enter and search premises to seize unregistered drugs under the Drugs Act, 1976?
  • Is the prosecution required to produce members of the Quality Control Board as witnesses to prove an offence under the Drugs Act, 1976?
  • Are admissions made by an accused before the Quality Control Board subject to the procedural requirements of Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Iqbal Gill vs State Life Insurance Corporation Of Pakistan and others2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 404, 2020 P SC 1057, 2020 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-18
  service regulationsstatutory ruleswrit petitionIntra Court AppealabatementState Life Insurance Corporation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decision of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal regarding service grievances against the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's challenge on two grounds: first, that service regulations of the respondent-corporation were non-statutory, and second, that a Federal Service Tribunal decision could only be challenged directly before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions were whether the service regulations of the State Life Insurance Corporation carry statutory effect and whether the petitioner could maintain a writ petition before the High Court after his earlier proceedings abated following precedent. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that both grounds relied upon by the High Court were erroneous. Relying on binding precedent, the Court held that the service regulations possessed statutory effect and that the abatement of proceedings following Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam permitted approaching the competent forum. The matter was remitted for decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Do the service regulations of the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan possess statutory effect?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained in the High Court regarding service terms following the abatement of proceedings under the rule in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Hanif and another vs The State and others2020 SCMR 675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-05
  Qatl-i-amdmurderous assaultappreciation of evidenceindependent witnesscriminal appealconvictionlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of his brother-in-law and murderous assault on an eyewitness. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of evidence, the credibility of the eyewitness, and the appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the lower courts. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the prosecution's case was established through consistent witness testimony, forensic evidence linking the weapon to the crime, and the prompt reporting of the incident. The Court rejected the defense's theory of substitution, noting that the convict had abandoned such pleas during his examination. Consequently, the Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were well-founded and declined to interfere with the conviction or the sentence of life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence is consistent, independent, and supported by forensic findings, and where the defense fails to substantiate claims of substitution, the conviction must be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the defense fails to substantiate a plea of substitution during the examination of the accused?
  • Is the testimony of an injured witness, who is otherwise independent and has no motive to falsely implicate, sufficient to establish guilt?
  • Does the absence of empty casings at the crime scene necessarily undermine the prosecution's case when other forensic evidence, such as blood samples and weapon recovery, is present?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Hanif and another vs State etcPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-05
  Qatl-i-Amdmurderous assaultinjured witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appealleave to appealquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of his brother-in-law and murderous assault upon an eyewitness, while altering the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence, the credibility of the injured eyewitness, and the validity of the conviction based on the prosecution's narrative of the incident. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the prompt reporting of the crime, the consistency of the medical evidence with the recovered weapon, and the reliability of the injured eyewitness. The Court rejected the defense's theory of substitution as unsubstantiated. Consequently, the Court declined to grant leave to appeal, affirming both the conviction and the quantum of sentence imposed by the High Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that where prosecution evidence is consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical and forensic reports, the courts below are justified in maintaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an injured eyewitness who has no motive to falsely implicate the accused can be considered a reliable witness?
  • Does the failure of the defense to substantiate a theory of substitution in cross-examination render the prosecution's case credible?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the medical evidence, including autopsy and injury reports, corroborates the eyewitness testimony and the recovery of the weapon?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali vs Imtiaz, etc2019 SCMR 1315, 2019 SCP 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-03
  Criminal AppealAcquittalBenefit of DoubtQatl-i-AmdAbductionPakistan Penal CodeCode of Criminal ProcedureOcular AccountUnwitnessed OccurrenceMiscarriage of Justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a judgment from the Lahore High Court, which acquitted two respondents, Imtiaz and Jehangir, from charges of Qatl-i-Amd and abduction. The respondents had initially been convicted under Section 302/34 and Section 364/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment and five years rigorous imprisonment, respectively. The High Court acquitted them by extending the benefit of the doubt, concluding that the occurrence was unwitnessed, citing discrepancies such as the absence of medico-legal reports supporting the witnesses' claim of bringing the deceased to the hospital in an injured condition, and the presence of other individuals who first found and transported the deceased. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the view taken by the learned Judge-in-Chamber was a possible view, structured in the evidence available on record, and thus not open to legitimate exception. The Court reiterated the principle that an acquittal, once granted, cannot be recalled merely on the possibility of a contrary view, unless the impugned view is found on the fringes of impossibility, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Zohra Bibi and another vs Haji Sultan Mahmood and others2019 SCP 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-06
  succession certificaterevocation of succession certificateinheritance rightsfraud and misrepresentationlimitation periodprocedural technicalitiesShari shares
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that set aside the revocation of a succession certificate obtained by Respondent No. 1, who had concealed the existence of other legal heirs. The core legal questions concerned whether the revocation application was time-barred and whether procedural technicalities, such as defects in a power of attorney, could defeat the substantive inheritance rights of legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by prioritizing hyper-technicalities over the administration of justice. The Court affirmed that inheritance opens upon death, and legal heirs are entitled to their Shari shares. It ruled that where a succession certificate is obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the limitation period for seeking revocation commences from the date of knowledge, not the date of issuance. Furthermore, the Court established that procedural defects in representation do not disentitle rightful heirs from their legacy. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the trial court's order, emphasizing that courts must avoid technical obstacles when substantive rights are at stake and directed proceedings against the respondent for fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for seeking the revocation of a succession certificate run from the date of its issuance or the date of knowledge of the fraud?
  • Can a court dismiss an application for the revocation of a succession certificate based on procedural technicalities regarding the signing of a power of attorney?
  • Is a legal heir entitled to their share of inheritance if they were not joined in the original application for a succession certificate?
  • Does the concealment of other legal heirs during the application for a succession certificate constitute fraud sufficient to warrant revocation?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahir Shah alias Shat vs The State through Advocate-General, Khuber Pakhtunkhwa2019 SCMR 2004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-02
  Narcotic substancesDrug recoveryChain of custodyForensic evidenceGovernment Analyst reportConviction set asideAppealSafe transmissionSafe custodyControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant for possessing 10 kilograms of charas, registered under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and section 489-B, P.P.C. The core legal question addressed was whether the prosecution had satisfactorily established the safe custody and safe transmission of the recovered drug from the spot of recovery to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The Supreme Court observed that the police constable who delivered the sealed parcel to the laboratory was not produced by the prosecution, a fact conceded by the learned law officer. The Court reiterated its established principle that an unbroken, unsuspicious, safe, and secure chain of custody is fundamental, as the Government Analyst's report constitutes the main evidence for conviction. Any break in this chain impairs and vitiates the conclusiveness and reliability of the report, rendering it insufficient to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were set aside, with an order for immediate release.

  Read full judgment →
• Zahir Shah alias Shat vs State through Advocate General, KPKPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  narcotics recoverychain of custodyforensic science laboratorycriminal appealillegal possession of charas
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and Section 489-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had been upheld by the High Court following a narcotics recovery of 10 kilograms of charas. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a break in the chain of custody regarding the transmission of the recovered narcotics to the forensic laboratory vitiates the conviction based on the Government Analyst's report. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of the drug since the police constable who delivered the sealed parcel to the Forensic Science Laboratory was not produced. The key principle laid down is that an unbroken, unsuspicious, safe, and secure chain of custody is fundamental in narcotics cases, and any break therein impairs the reliability of the Government Analyst's report, rendering it incapable of sustaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unbroken chain of custody is mandatory for sustaining a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Does the failure to produce the official who transmitted the parcel to the forensic laboratory vitiate the Government Analyst's report?
  • What is the legal effect of a break in the safe custody and transmission of recovered narcotics?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqub Ali Khan vs Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman and another2019 PLC (C.S.) 484, 2019 PLJ SC 182, 2019 P.S.C. 1091, 2019 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-19
  leave to appealpublic service commissionrequisite experienceemployment qualificationcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing the petitioner's challenge to the appointment of respondent No. 2 to the post of Divisional Forest Officer (BS-18) by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). The core legal question concerns whether respondent No. 2 possessed the requisite five years of experience in the relevant field for the advertised post. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the High Court and the FPSC regarding the sufficiency and relevance of the respondent's experience were well-founded, noting that the respondent's verified government service, his association with a recognized joint venture project, and the two-year experience credit for holding an M.Phil degree collectively exceeded the required threshold. The court laid down the principle that factual determinations regarding candidate qualifications and experience, verified through proper departmental inquiries and supported by record, do not warrant interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution in the absence of any legal, procedural, or jurisdictional error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Public Service Commission's verification of a candidate's experience through relevant departmental authorities is legally sustainable?
  • Can a candidate claim experience credit for holding an M.Phil degree towards the minimum experience requirement for a public post?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings regarding candidate qualifications under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir vs The State & another2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 416, 2019 SCP 176, 2019 SCMR 1297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  criminal appealconfessional statementabduction for ransommedical evidencebenefit of doubtre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant under anti-terrorism laws for abduction for ransom resulting in murder, where the High Court had altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conviction could be sustained primarily on the basis of an elaborate confessional statement that conflicted with medical evidence and had been disbelieved regarding co-accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that an un-natural and detailed confessional statement contradicted by medical findings and discarded against co-accused cannot form a safe basis for conviction. The key principle laid down is that a tainted or partially disbelieved confessional statement cannot be used piecemeal to sustain the conviction of an accused without independent, reliable corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an elaborate confessional statement that conflicts with medical evidence can be relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Can a confessional statement disbelieved qua the majority of co-accused be used as a basis to convict another co-accused?
  • Whether non-compliance with the procedural requirements of recording confessions under the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiates its voluntariness?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Sanitation Agency, Lahore vs Lotte Akhtar Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore etc2019 SCMR 1160, 2019 SCP 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-02
  water conservationwater cessflow metersNational Bank of Pakistanenvironmental protectionnatural resourcesindustrial water usage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the conservation and regulation of water resources, specifically focusing on the implementation of a uniform water cess, the installation of flow meters at industrial units, and the proper management and investment of collected water cess funds. The core legal question revolves around establishing regulatory mechanisms for groundwater and surface water usage, ensuring accountability through flow meters, and directing the investment of collected funds into secure treasury instruments under judicial oversight. The Court held that provincial governments and the Islamabad Capital Territory must deposit water cess funds into a designated 'Water Conservation Account' at the National Bank of Pakistan for onward investment in treasury bills, install required flow meters and CCTV cameras within stipulated timelines, and draft uniform legislation targeting industrial users initially. The key principles laid down include judicial supervision of environmental and natural resource funds, the necessity of mandatory flow meter installations for industrial water consumers, and the formulation of uniform provincial legislation for water conservation.

  Questions settled

  • How should water cess funds collected by provincial governments and the Islamabad Capital Territory be deposited and invested?
  • What directives can the Court issue regarding the installation of flow meters and monitoring equipment at industrial water consumption units?
  • Can the court mandate the framing of regulations for installing push-button faucets at public and commercial water supply points?
  Read full judgment →
• Water & Sanitation Agency, Lahore through its M.D vs Lottee Akhtar2019 SCMR 1146, 2019 SCP 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-23
  judicial proprietywater tariffjudicial comityparallel proceedingsimplementation benchwater conservationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the water tariff levied by the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) pursuant to a notification issued under the LDA Act, 1975, which was implemented in compliance with Supreme Court directions in SMC No. 26 of 2018 regarding water conservation. The core legal question was whether the High Court could entertain a writ petition challenging a notification issued in direct compliance with Supreme Court orders, while the implementation of those orders remained sub judice before a specialized Implementation Bench of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over a matter already pending before the Supreme Court, thereby violating judicial propriety and comity. The Court suspended the High Court's interim injunctive order, stayed the pending writ petitions, and directed that all objections regarding the water tariff must be filed exclusively before the Supreme Court. The judgment establishes the principle that parties cannot bypass the hierarchy of judicial fora or initiate parallel proceedings to challenge actions taken in compliance with Supreme Court mandates, which must be addressed solely within the established implementation proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court entertain a challenge to a notification issued in compliance with a Supreme Court order while the matter is sub judice before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the filing of a writ petition to challenge actions taken under Supreme Court directions constitute an attempt to undermine the judicial process?
  • Where must objections regarding the implementation of Supreme Court directions on water tariff collection be filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Waqar A. Shamsi vs The State2019 SCP 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-14
  circumstantial evidenceabduction for ransomhomicidecriminal appeallast seen evidenceterrorism chargeconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by convicts against their convictions for abduction for ransom, terrorism, and homicide. The core legal question was whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the charges of abduction for ransom and terrorism, given the circumstantial nature of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution successfully established a chain of circumstances linking the appellants to the homicide—including last-seen evidence, exclusive knowledge of the crime scene, and recovery of incriminating items—it failed to produce concrete evidence linking the appellants to the ransom demand or the specific act of abduction for ransom. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions for homicide under Section 302(b) but acquitted the appellants of charges under Section 365-A and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The key principle laid down is that while convictions may be sustained on circumstantial evidence if a complete chain is established, charges requiring specific proof, such as ransom demands, cannot be sustained on mere suspicion or insufficient data.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for homicide be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence?
  • Is a conviction for abduction for ransom sustainable without proof linking the accused to the specific ransom demand?
  • Does the failure to prove a ransom demand necessitate acquittal for charges under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an appellate court modify sentences and acquit on specific charges while upholding convictions for other offenses in the same trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Waqar A. Shamsi and another vs The State2019 SCMR 2039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-14
  murderabduction for ransomcircumstantial evidencelast seen evidencecriminal appealacquittalSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of the appellants for murder, abduction for ransom, and terrorism in relation to the kidnapping and killing of an eighteen-year-old student whose body was recovered following a disclosure by one of the appellants. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution—including last seen evidence, exclusive knowledge, and recovery of incriminating material—was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the chain of circumstances conclusively established the appellants' guilt for murder, the prosecution failed to provide positive proof linking them to the ransom call or the charge of abduction for ransom, as the calls originated from a public calling booth without subscriber verification. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but acquitted the appellants of the charges under section 365-A of the Code and section 7(e) of the relevant anti-terrorism law. The key principle laid down is that in circumstantial evidence cases, a complete and unbreakable chain pointing directly to the accused is required for murder, and mere suspicion or unverified anonymous communications are insufficient to sustain a charge of abduction for ransom.

  Questions settled

  • Whether circumstantial evidence consisting of last seen and exclusive knowledge is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Can a conviction for abduction for ransom be sustained solely on the basis of an anonymous phone call without proof of the caller's identity?
  • Whether the failure to prove ransom transaction warrants acquittal under section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Wajeeh-Ul-Hassan vs The State2020 PSC (Crl.) 50, 2019 SCMR 1994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-25
  blasphemycapital punishmentextrajudicial confessionhandwriting expertbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealabsconsion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Wajeeh-ul-Hassan, convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge under sections 295-A, 295-C, and 298-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for allegedly sending blasphemous letters to an advocate. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the evidence, including an extrajudicial confession, handwriting expert comparison, and absconsion, to sustain a capital conviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt. The Court held that capital punishment requires the highest degree of caution, that weak pieces of evidence cannot corroborate one another, that extrajudicial confessions are inherently weak, and that a criminal charge must be established on positive proof rather than surmise or perception.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an extrajudicial confession and a handwriting expert's report constitute sufficient corroborative evidence to sustain the death penalty in a blasphemy case?
  • Can one weak piece of prosecution evidence corroborate another weak piece of evidence?
  • Does absconsion alone serve as conclusive proof of guilt?
  • Is a criminal charge to be settled on positive proof rather than perceptional or optical paradigms?
  Read full judgment →
• Wajahat vs Gul Daraz & another2019 SCMR 1451, 2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 419, 2019 SCP 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  murder convictioncircumstantial evidenceabsconsionburden of proofadverse presumptionadversarial trialspousal homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code for the homicidal death of his wife in their home. The trial court's conviction and life sentence were affirmed by the High Court, primarily based on the appellant's failure to explain the circumstances of his wife's death under his roof and his subsequent absconsion. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether such presumptions and failure to explain could legally sustain a conviction in the absence of positive proof. The Court held that the prosecution must prove its case on its own strength and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense. The appellant's failure to explain the incident under Article 121 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, or his absconsion, does not equate to evidentiary certainty or an adverse presumption of guilt. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered the appellant's release.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of murder solely on the basis of presumptions or a failure to explain the circumstances of a death occurring within their household?
  • Does the absconsion of an accused from the law equate to an admission or proof of guilt?
  • Whether an accused's failure to explain how a spouse died under the same roof creates an adverse presumption under Article 121 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Usman Ali Chhachhar vs Moula Buz Chachhar and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 34, 2020 P SC 181, 2019 SCMR 2043, 2019 SCP 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-17
  service tribunaldepartmental appeallimitationcondonation of delaycivil servantscompetency of appealper incuriamlarger bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal concerning a service dispute between employees of the Sindh Assembly Secretariat regarding the re-designation of a post. The core legal question addressed is whether an appeal before a Service Tribunal is ipso facto incompetent and must be dismissed if the underlying departmental appeal or representation was barred by limitation. Upon reviewing a divergent body of case law from the apex court, the two-member bench of the Supreme Court observed that the existing legal position is unsettled, contradictory, and fails to adequately consider the specific terms and ameliorative provisions of various statutory civil servant appeal rules. Holding that it would be inappropriate for a two-member bench to resolve such an important and recurring issue—and noting that foundational precedents may even be per incuriam—the court declined to decide the matter summarily. Consequently, the court ordered that the appeal be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench to settle the law with certainty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before a Service Tribunal is ipso facto incompetent if the underlying departmental appeal was barred by limitation?
  • Does the disposal of a time-barred departmental representation on merits by an authority amount to an implied condonation of delay?
  • Are the statutory provisions governing departmental appeals across the federation and provinces to be treated uniformly regarding the condonability of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• The State/Anti Narcotics Force vs Parvez Hassan Haravi & another2019 SCP 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-04
  narcotics forfeitureControl of Narcotics Substance Actretrospective applicationburden of proofasset tracingconstitutional protectionproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged orders from the Special Court and the High Court of Sindh, which declined the forfeiture of property under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997. The appellant sought to forfeit property held by the respondent’s ex-wife, alleging it was purchased with narcotics proceeds by the respondent, who was convicted by a foreign court. The core legal questions were whether forfeiture is permissible without evidence linking the assets to illicit narcotics trade and whether the Act applies retrospectively to property acquired before its 1997 enactment. The Supreme Court held that forfeiture under the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997 requires a demonstrable nexus between the assets and illicit narcotics activities. As the appellant failed to provide evidence linking the property to drug money and the property was acquired in 1987, the Court ruled that forfeiture was unjustified. Furthermore, the Court established that applying Section 40 to property acquired before the Act's promulgation violates Article 12 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which prohibits retrospective penal laws. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can assets be forfeited under the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997, without evidence linking them to illicit narcotics trade?
  • Does the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997, allow for the retrospective forfeiture of property acquired before its enactment?
  • Is the forfeiture of property under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997, permissible if the conviction occurred in a foreign court?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti2019 KLR Supreme Court 451, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 225, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 960, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-02
  sentence in default of payment of finerecovery of fineforfeiture of assetsNational Accountability Bureauarrears of land revenuedouble jeopardy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals and a petition arising from National Accountability Bureau references wherein convicts challenged the recovery of fines and forfeiture of assets after they had already undergone sentences of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The core legal questions centered on whether serving a default sentence absolves a convict from paying the fine, whether asset forfeiture as a set-off for fine remains permissible, and whether the limitation period under section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applies to fine recoveries under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The Supreme Court held that a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment is a punishment for non-payment rather than a substitute for the fine, meaning the fine remains recoverable and assets can be forfeited if the fine is unpaid. Furthermore, the Court held that fine recovery under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 is governed by section 33-E of that Ordinance and is not controlled by section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appeals were accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine acts as a substitute for the fine or as a punishment for non-payment?
  • Can a fine be recovered from a convict after he has already undergone the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of such fine?
  • Does section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 control the recovery of fines imposed under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Are the assets and properties of a convict liable to forfeiture as a set-off for fine despite the service of a default sentence of imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Imran Nazir2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 411, 2019 SCMR 1227, 2019 SCP 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  narcoticsconscious possessionbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalforfeiture of vehicle
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by the State against the acquittal of respondents by the Peshawar High Court in a narcotics case. The respondents were originally convicted by a Special Court (CNS) for the possession of 2800 kilograms of charas recovered from a truck, resulting in life imprisonment and forfeiture of the vehicle. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondents based on the prosecution's failure to identify the specific driver of the vehicle, thereby failing to establish conscious possession. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, reasoning that when multiple individuals are present in a vehicle cabin, the prosecution must unambiguously identify the specific person in control to establish conscious possession. The Court affirmed that in the face of wavering prosecution evidence, the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the doubt, a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. While the acquittal was maintained, the Court ordered that the forfeiture of the vehicle by the Anti-Narcotics Force remain intact.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution required to identify the specific driver of a vehicle to establish conscious possession of contraband when multiple individuals are present?
  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to clarify the role of occupants in a vehicle entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can the forfeiture of a vehicle remain intact even if the respondents are acquitted of the underlying narcotics charge?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Regional Director ANF Peshawar vs Sohail Khan2019 SCMR 1288, 2019 SCP 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  Control of Narcotic Substances Actenhancement of sentenceSection 9(c) CNSAnarcotics possessionCharas Gardamandatory sentenceimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the State's challenge against the refusal of the Peshawar High Court to enhance the respondent's sentence for possessing 11.400 kilograms of Charas Garda. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, but imposed a sentence of only five years' imprisonment and a fine. The core legal question was whether a sentence lesser than imprisonment for life can lawfully be awarded to a convict found in possession of contraband exceeding ten kilograms in weight. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 9(c) mandatorily prescribes imprisonment for life when the recovered contraband exceeds ten kilograms. Determining that the lower courts' leniency fell outside the remit of the law and that the respondent's deliberate absence could not impede the proceedings, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower judgments regarding quantum of sentence, and enhanced the respondent's punishment to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence lesser than imprisonment for life be awarded to a convict under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 when the recovered contraband exceeds ten kilograms?
  • Does the deliberate absence of a respondent to avoid the process of law prevent the appellate court from deciding an appeal on the merits?
  • Is the appellate court mandated to enhance a sentence if the trial court awarded a punishment below the statutory minimum prescribed under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• The State through Prosecutor-General, Punjab vs Jahangir Akhtar2019 SCP 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-17
  double jeopardydisciplinary proceedingscriminal prosecutioncompulsory retirementpremature acquittalforged documentsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents, police department employees, were compulsorily retired after discovery that they had obtained employment using forged School Leaving Certificates. They were subsequently charged in criminal proceedings. The respondents successfully applied for acquittal under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the trial court, which held that their compulsory retirement precluded criminal prosecution under the doctrine of double jeopardy. The High Court upheld these acquittals. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether departmental disciplinary action (compulsory retirement) bars subsequent or simultaneous criminal prosecution for the same underlying conduct under the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the lower courts' orders. The Court held that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are distinct, serve different purposes, and can proceed simultaneously or sequentially without violating the principle of double jeopardy. The Court clarified that section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is only applicable where a charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction, neither of which applied here. The trial court was directed to proceed with the trials.

  Questions settled

  • Does compulsory retirement from service bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same underlying misconduct?
  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution proceed simultaneously against a public servant?
  • Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to the concurrent operation of departmental disciplinary action and criminal proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court invoke section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• The Secretary Punjab Public Service Commission, Lahore and others vs Aamir Hayat and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 470, 2019 P.S.C. 1052, 2019 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-27
  Leave to appealConstitutional petitionPublic employmentAppointmentMerit listDepartmental discretionRe-advertisementHigh Court jurisdictionTrichotomy of powersSub-Inspector
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that directed the Punjab Public Service Commission to appoint a respondent as Sub-Inspector (BS-14) based on a 2016 merit list, despite the department's decision to re-advertise vacant posts. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could compel such an appointment by interfering with the department's discretion to re-advertise posts for better candidates, especially when no request for a substitute was made and no mala fides was found. The Supreme Court held that the department had valid grounds and lawful justification to re-advertise the posts, and its decision not to request a substitute was not unreasonable or unlawful. The Court ruled that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution by substituting its own decision for that of the department and acting as an appointing authority, thereby transgressing the concept of trichotomy of powers. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

  Read full judgment →
• The Jurists Foundation through its Chairman vs Federal Government through Secretary Ministry of Defence, etc2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 1, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 48, 2019 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-28
  Chief of the Army Staffextension of tenurereappointmentjudicial restraintmilitary commandconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the extension and reappointment of the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Qamar Javed Bajwa. The core legal question was whether the Constitution, the Pakistan Army Act 1952, or the associated rules and regulations contained any valid statutory provisions specifying the tenure, retirement, reappointment, or extension of the COAS. Upon examination, the Court found that no such legislative provisions existed, and that the government's practice of granting extensions was uncodified. Exercising judicial restraint, the Court accepted the Attorney General's undertaking that the Federal Government would initiate necessary legislation to codify these terms. The Court held that the command and terms of service of the COAS must be governed by an Act of Parliament. Consequently, the Court allowed the current appointment of the COAS to continue for a temporary period of six months, subject to the enactment of appropriate legislation by Parliament within that timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 or the Pakistan Army Act 1952 contain provisions specifying the tenure, retirement, reappointment, or extension of the Chief of the Army Staff?
  • Can the terms and conditions of service of the Chief of the Army Staff be regulated by uncodified military practice rather than statutory law?
  • What is the scope of the President's power under Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the appointment and tenure of the Chief of the Army Staff?
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• The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle C-4, Karachi vs M/s2019 P.S.C 1284, PTCL 2019 CL. 520, 2019 PTD 1377, 2019 SCMR 1011, 2019 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  income taxinterest on securitieshybrid system of accountingaccrual basisreceipt basisfinancial institutionspast practiceIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 relate to assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, addressing whether interest earned by financial institutions on Government securities was liable to be taxed on an accrual or a receipt basis. The Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions of sections 17 and 32 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, alongside extensive case law concerning mercantile, receipt, and hybrid systems of accounting. The core legal question was whether an assessee could adopt a hybrid system of accounting and whether past practice accepted by the Department precluded sudden rejection. The Court held that, as a matter of law, an assessee was permitted to use a hybrid system of accounting by combining elements of cash and accrual methods. Furthermore, where an established past practice of accepting interest income on a receipt basis existed and was accepted by the Department, assessments could not be arbitrarily reopened or rejected based merely on a change of view by the Appellate Tribunal. The appeals filed by the Department were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest earned by financial institutions on Government securities is liable to be taxed on accrual or on receipt basis under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can an assessee adopt a hybrid system of accounting mixing accrual and cash methods under section 32 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a consistent past practice of accepting tax returns computed on a receipt basis preclude the Department from abruptly rejecting it for past assessment years?
  • Whether an assessment can be reopened under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 on a mere change of opinion by the tax authorities or Appellate Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax Peshawar vs Director General, NWFP2020 PLC (C.S.) 499, 2019 SCP 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-09
  income taxdefinition of incometax exemptionsocial security contributionsvoluntary contributionsretrospective operation of exemptionstatutory welfare institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned whether statutory contributions collected by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Employees' Social Security Institution under the KP Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 constituted taxable 'income' under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979, and whether such receipts qualified for statutory exemption. The respondent argued that statutory welfare receipts were not income and, alternatively, were exempt as 'voluntary contributions' under Clause 62 of Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1979 Ordinance, or retrospectively exempt under Clause 142 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Department. The Court held that the definition of income is inclusive and of the broadest amplitude, encompassing the mandatory contributions. It held that contributions collected under Section 20 of the 1965 Ordinance were mandatory statutory levies enforceable as arrears of land revenue, not voluntary contributions under Clause 62. Additionally, Clause 142 of the 2001 Ordinance could not be given retrospective effect to exempt assessments under the repealed 1979 Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Do mandatory contributions collected by a statutory social security institution constitute income under Section 2(24) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Can statutory contributions mandated by law be categorized as voluntary contributions for the purpose of tax exemption under Clause 62 of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a tax exemption clause inserted into the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 by a subsequent Finance Act be given retrospective effect to past assessments governed by the repealed Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
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• The Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Peshawar vs M/s Sabrina2019 PCTLR 1114, 2020 P SC 98, 2019 PTD 2001, 2019 SCMR 1639, 2019 SCP 302, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-09
  amended assessmentdefinite informationincome taxbank account statementtax liabilityassessment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from the judgment of the High Court concerning the interpretation of 'definite information' under Section 122(8) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the appellant tax authority possessed definite information to pass an amended assessment order based on bank account statements of the respondent. The Supreme Court held that definite information does not mean a reanalysis of existing information or an analysis of further information that was previously accessible but not taken into account during the original assessment proceedings. The Court established that collecting further information from a source already available, which the authority failed to demand at the relevant time, does not constitute receipt of definite information within the meaning of Section 122(8) of the Ordinance, thereby dismissing the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the collection of further information from a source already available during original assessment proceedings constitutes 'definite information' under Section 122(8) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does a reanalysis of existing information or an analysis of further information that was previously accessible amount to definite information for passing an amended assessment order?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Shah and others vs The State and others2019 S M C R 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealqatl-e-amdbenefit of the doubtacquittalappraisal of evidenceco-accused acquittalsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court challenges a judgment of the High Court affirming the appellants' convictions for qatl-e-amd and murderous assault, while altering their death penalties to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerns the safety of maintaining convictions based on tainted eyewitness testimony and inconsistent forensic evidence, particularly where identically placed co-accused have already been acquitted. The Supreme Court held that where prosecution witnesses have been found unworthy of reliance regarding acquitted co-accused, their evidence cannot be selectively pressed into service against the remaining appellants, especially when forensic evidence indicates a smaller number of assailants than alleged. The Court laid down the principle that wholesale implication of numerous accused using automatic weapons, coupled with an investigative failure to establish individual culpability beyond reasonable doubt, warrants extending the benefit of the doubt and acquitting the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eyewitnesses be relied upon against certain accused when the same evidence has been rejected to acquit identically placed co-accused?
  • Does the recovery of empty cartridge casings from a limited number of weapons cast doubt on the participation of a large number of armed assailants?
  • Is it safe to maintain convictions for capital punishment in the presence of major investigative flaws and doubtful ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Shah and others vs State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtacquittal of co-accusedappreciation of evidencecriminal appealforensic evidencewitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the High Court's judgment affirming the convictions of the appellants for qatl-e-amd and murderous assault, while commuting their death sentences to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the appellants' convictions could be sustained given that several co-accused, who were identically placed and implicated by the same prosecution witnesses, had been acquitted in separate trials. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's case suffered from significant inconsistencies, particularly regarding the number of assailants versus the forensic evidence of weapon casings recovered at the scene. The Court held that the prosecution witnesses, having been found unreliable in the trials of the acquitted co-accused, could not be deemed credible to sustain the convictions of the present appellants. Emphasizing the principle that evidence rejected for one set of accused cannot be selectively applied to others in identical circumstances, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment, acquitted the appellants, and ordered their immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses be relied upon to convict an accused if the same witnesses were found unreliable and rejected in the trial of identically placed co-accused?
  • Does the recovery of a limited number of weapon casings at a crime scene undermine the prosecution's case regarding the participation of a large number of armed assailants?
  • Is it safe to maintain convictions when the prosecution's case suffers from significant investigative and forensic inconsistencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood vs The State, etc2019 SCMR 1170, 2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 429, 2019 SCP 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-09
  qatl-e-amdmurderous assaultabductionocular accountprivate complaintacquittalcriminal appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for qatl-e-amd, murderous assault, and abduction under Sections 302(b) and other provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and co-accused trespassed into a residence, shot the deceased and an eyewitness, and abducted a female relative to avenge a suspected liaison. The trial court convicted the appellant and two others, while acquitting four. The High Court maintained the convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court identified significant improbabilities in the prosecution's narrative, noting that the alleged prime target of the assault was left unharmed while others were attacked. The Court also highlighted contradictions regarding the recovery of the abductee and the role of a hired assassin mentioned by the investigating officer. Furthermore, a delay in the autopsy suggested potential deliberations. Holding the genesis of the case to be inherently suspect and the evidence self-destructive, the Court concluded it was unsafe to maintain the convictions. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ali Shah and another vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 90, 2019 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-24
  qatl-i-amdcriminal appealmedical evidence inconsistencybenefit of the doubtspot arrestacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the High Court's judgment upholding the appellant's conviction for qatl-i-amd with a modification of the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the prosecution's eyewitness accounts, the credibility of the appellant's spot-arrest, and the consistency between the medical evidence and the weapon recovered. The Supreme Court held that numerous discrepancies in the prosecution's case—including unexplained delays in the postmortem examination, inconsistencies between the firearm used and the multiple entry wounds noted in the medical report, and doubts regarding the spot-arrest of the appellant within a heavily guarded police premises—rendered the prosecution's case unsafe for maintaining a conviction. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that where foundational aspects of the prosecution's narrative are riddled with patent discrepancies and medical incompatibility, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, resulting in acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inconsistencies between the firearm recovered and the medical injury report are sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the foundational narrative of the spot-arrest of the accused is surrounded by intriguing delays and lack of independent corroboration?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on similar or linked roles weaken the prosecution's case against the remaining appellant?
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• Tanveer Musharraf and another vs Government of Khyber2019 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-27
  government accommodationpublic office holdercivil servantallotment cancellationretired son quotastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were allotted government accommodations under a retired son quota, challenged the cancellation of these allotments following a directive to vacate unauthorized housing. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as employees of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission and the Employees Social Security Institution, qualified as 'public office holders' eligible for government accommodation under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners did not meet the statutory definition of 'public office holder' because they were not civil servants appointed under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, nor were they federal civil servants posted in Peshawar. The Court affirmed that the benefits of the Act are strictly confined to the specific class of civil servants defined therein. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no legal or jurisdictional error in the High Court's judgment, and refused leave to appeal, thereby upholding the cancellation of the unauthorized allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission qualify as a 'public office holder' for the purpose of government accommodation allotment under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018?
  • Are employees of the Employees Social Security Institution eligible for government accommodation under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018?
  • Does the definition of 'public office holder' in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018 extend to all government employees regardless of their appointment statute?
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• Taj Wali Shah vs Bakhti Zaman2019 P.S.C. 388, 2019 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-22
  possessionejectmentco-ownerAbadi DehSpecific Relief Actdeclaration of titlepossessory rightsmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for possession by ejectment and recovery of rent concerning a house in 'Abadi Deh' (village site). The appellant claimed ownership via a sale deed, while the respondent asserted possessory rights as a legacy. The Trial and Appellate Courts decreed in favor of the appellant, but the High Court reversed this, holding that a suit under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, was not maintainable without a prior declaration of title under Section 42. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, clarifying that Section 8 uses the term 'entitled', which encompasses owners, co-sharers, and others with legal claims to possession. The Court held that a suit under Section 8 contains an inbuilt prayer for declaration of entitlement, making a separate suit under Section 42 unnecessary. Furthermore, it established that a co-owner can maintain a suit for ejectment against a mere possessor for the entire property, with such possession being for the benefit of all co-sharers. The Court modified the decree to recognize the appellant as 'entitled to possession as a co-owner'.

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• Syed Imtiaz Ali vs Chairman, Implementation Tribunal2019 PLC (C.S) 1039, 2019 P.S.C. 856, 2019 SCMR 1034, 2019 SCP 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-09
  Implementation TribunalWage Board Awardnewspaper employeesjurisdictionpartnership agreementmaster and servantcontractual claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgments of the Islamabad High Court upholding a decision of the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, which had granted various pecuniary claims to the private-respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Implementation Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, to adjudicate and award civil claims arising out of a private mutual agreement, particularly when the relationship between the parties constituted a partnership rather than that of master and servant. The Supreme Court held that the Implementation Tribunal's mandate is strictly confined to implementing Wage Board Awards and trying specific offenses under the Act, and it lacks the adjudicatory jurisdiction to determine general civil or contractual claims or disputes between partners. The ratio decidendi is that a special tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction over matters outside its statutory mandate, and contractual disputes requiring factual inquiry or arising from partnership agreements must be adjudicated by a court of competent civil jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Implementation Tribunal constituted under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 have the jurisdiction to adjudicate civil and contractual claims arising out of a mutual agreement?
  • What is the true scope of the adjudicatory powers conferred upon the Implementation Tribunal under Section 13 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Whether an agreement to share profits and jointly manage a publication venture creates a partnership relationship rather than a master and servant relationship?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts be set aside by the Supreme Court when they suffer from a gross jurisdictional error?
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• Syed Azhar Hussain Shah vs The State, etc2019 SCP 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-10
  Section 30 Magistratecriminal jurisdictionDiyat and Arshconcurrent sentencesQisas and Diyat lawssentencing powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentencing of the appellant for offences under sections 324, 334, and 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a trial conducted by a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions concerned the competency of a section 30 Magistrate to try offences involving Diyat and Arsh, and the jurisdictional limits of such Magistrates regarding specific punishments and organ injuries. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 possesses the jurisdiction to try offences not punishable by death, and that the limitation on sentencing powers regulates punishment rather than trial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Diyat is relevant only to cases involving death, rendering it inapplicable to the present case where the victim survived. The Court upheld the convictions and sentences, finding no merit in the appeal, but ordered the sentences to run concurrently and granted the benefit of section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 competent to try offences punishable with Diyat or Arsh?
  • Does the limitation on sentencing powers of a section 30 Magistrate affect their jurisdiction to try an offence?
  • Is the payment of Diyat relevant in cases where the victim has survived the injuries?
  • Do the sentencing limitations of a section 30 Magistrate regulate the punishment or the jurisdiction to try an offence?
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• Syed Azhar Hussain Shah and another vs The State and others2019 PLJ SC (Cr.C) 311, 2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 245, 2019 PLJ SC (Cr.C) 317, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-10
  section 30 magistratejurisdictionqisas and diyat lawshurtconcurrent sentencescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant under sections 324, 334, and 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Session and the High Court. The core legal questions involved the competence of a Section 30 Magistrate to try offences punishable with Diyat or Arsh under Qisas and Diyat laws and related jurisdictional limits. The Supreme Court held that offences not punishable with death are triable by a Section 30 Magistrate and that Diyat is relevant only to cases of death under section 299, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rendering Diyat issues inapplicable to surviving victims of hurt under sections 324, 334, and 336, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The court dismissed the appeal on merits due to consistent ocular and medical evidence, while clarifying that the appellant's sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is competent to try offences punishable with Diyat or Arsh?
  • Does section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 restrict the application of Diyat exclusively to cases involving the death of a victim?
  • Whether limitations on sentences passed by a Magistrate under section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regulate punishment or the jurisdiction to try an offence?
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• Syed Anwar Ali Shah and another vs Irfan Ali and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 104, 2019 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-25
  terrorismacquittalidentification paradecriminal appealburden of proofappreciation of evidencehostile witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a terrorist incident involving a massive blast in Multan that resulted in significant loss of life. The respondent was initially convicted by an Anti-Terrorism Court and sentenced to death, but the High Court subsequently acquitted him, citing insufficient and flawed evidence. The complainant and the State challenged the acquittal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented, specifically the identification parade and witness testimonies. Upon re-evaluating the record, the Supreme Court found the prosecution's case to be inconsistent and logically implausible, particularly regarding the timing of the vehicle snatching and the respondent's alleged stay at a guest house. The Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was based on a prudent and sound assessment of the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the prosecution failed to prove culpability, emphasizing that even in heinous crimes, convictions must rest on sustainable evidence rather than conjecture.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's reasoning is found to be prudent and possible?
  • Does the presence of mutually destructive prosecution evidence justify the rejection of a criminal case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's timeline of events is logically inconsistent?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Case No.8 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No.649-L of 2018_ In the matter of vs N_a2019 PLD Supreme Court 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-17
  dual nationalitydisqualificationSenate electionsArticle 63(1)(c)renunciation of citizenshipnomination papersinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This Suo Motu matter concerned the dual nationality status of several newly elected Senators and the interpretation of Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question was whether the word 'or' in Article 63(1)(c)—which disqualifies a person who 'ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan, or acquires the citizenship of a foreign State'—should be interpreted conjunctively as 'and,' thereby allowing dual nationality for Parliamentarians. The Court held that 'or' is disjunctive, meaning the acquisition of foreign citizenship constitutes a distinct disqualification, regardless of whether Pakistani citizenship is retained. The Court affirmed that this disqualification persists until the foreign citizenship is effectively and completely renounced. Furthermore, the Court established that the critical date for determining a candidate's qualification is the last date for filing nomination papers. Consequently, candidates who had not completed the renunciation process by that deadline were deemed disqualified, and their elections were annulled. This judgment reinforces the strict constitutional prohibition against dual nationality for elected representatives.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'or' in Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, function as a disjunctive or conjunctive operator?
  • Is a candidate who holds dual nationality at the time of filing nomination papers disqualified from contesting elections under Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the mere initiation of the process to renounce foreign citizenship cure the disqualification arising from dual nationality for a candidate for the Senate?
  • What is the critical date for determining whether a candidate is qualified or disqualified regarding dual nationality in Senate elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Case No.7 of 2017 vs N/APLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 190, 2019 SCP 30, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-06
  suo motu jurisdictionfundamental rightsright to protestpeaceful assemblyFaizabad dharnaTehreek-e-Labaik PakistanElection Commission of Pakistanintelligence agencies mandatemedia regulationhate speechpolitical parties fundingrule of lawconstitutional dutiesfreedom of movementfreedom of speech
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu case addressed the 2017 Faizabad Interchange dharna by Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), which severely disrupted public life and infringed citizens' fundamental rights. The Supreme Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, affirming that the matter was of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights such as life, movement, education, fair trial, dignity, work, and property. The Court held that while citizens have a right to peaceful protest, it is not absolute and cannot infringe upon the fundamental rights of others or public order. It found that the State, including law enforcement, the Election Commission, and PEMRA, failed to fulfill their constitutional and statutory duties in managing the protest, ensuring accountability of political parties, and regulating media. The judgment also clarified that intelligence agencies and Armed Forces personnel must operate strictly within their mandates, refrain from political interference, and monitor those inciting violence or hate speech, emphasizing the need for transparency and rule of law.

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• Suo Motu Action Taken by HCJ Regarding Service Structure of Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute (Pkli)_ In the matter of vs N_aPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 501, 2019 SC MR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-28
  suo motuservice structureforeign travel banmanagement committeeAnti-Corruption Establishmentstatutory management
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a suo motu action taken regarding the service structure of the Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute (PKLI) and involved the management of the institute and travel restrictions on Dr. Saeed Akhtar. The core legal questions pertained to the legality of the continued foreign travel ban, the management of PKLI through a court-constituted committee vis-a-vis its governing statute, and the validity of an inquiry initiated by the Anti-Corruption Establishment. The Supreme Court held that the ban on foreign travel imposed by earlier court orders should be recalled, leaving it to relevant authorities to decide in accordance with the law. The Court further held that PKLI must be managed and run strictly in accordance with sections 6 and 8 of the Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute and Research Centre Act, 2014, thereby disbanding the court-constituted management committee. Finally, aggrieved persons were permitted to challenge the Anti-Corruption Establishment's inquiry report before the appropriate forum under the law. The key principle laid down is that statutory bodies must be managed in accordance with their governing legislation rather than court-appointed committees once functioning.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court recall a travel ban previously imposed on an individual during the pendency of proceedings?
  • Should the Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute and Research Centre be managed by a court-constituted committee or in accordance with its governing statute?
  • How should grievances regarding an inquiry report initiated by the Anti-Corruption Establishment be addressed?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto Case vs Govt. of Pakistan thr. Secretary, M_O Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and Others2019 SCP 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-06
  suo moto jurisdictionstatutory auditAuditor General for Pakistanadjournment requestDefence Housing Authorityjudicial procedurelegal representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a Suo Moto Case concerning the audit of various statutory organizations, specifically the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Karachi, by the Auditor General for Pakistan, as previously directed by the Supreme Court. The core legal question involved whether these statutory bodies could resist the court-ordered audit and the procedural handling of adjournment requests by counsel. The Court declined a frivolous adjournment application filed by counsel for the DHA, noting that the counsel's appointment as Attorney General for Pakistan was not recent and did not justify the delay. Regarding the audit, the Court reiterated its previous order directing the Auditor General for Pakistan to conduct the audit of the DHA. The Court further ordered that the criminal matter related to FIR No. 544 of 2015 be delinked from the instant Suo Moto Case for procedural purposes. The Court emphasized that all parties must ensure proper representation, warning that failure to appear would result in the matter being decided on the available record. The principle established is that statutory bodies are subject to audit mandates, and frivolous adjournment requests will be summarily rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory organization resist an audit directed by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the appointment of a counsel as Attorney General for Pakistan automatically justify an adjournment in pending litigation?
  • Can the Supreme Court decide a matter on the available record if parties fail to ensure proper representation after notice?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd2019 SCP 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-21
  land implementationthird-party rightsfinancial offerdefault consequencesallottees protection
  Summary & questions settled

  The lis pertains to the implementation of a previous judgment regarding Bahria Town Limited, Karachi (BTLK) and the protection of third-party rights of over 140,000 allottees. The core question addressed is whether to accept a revised and enhanced financial offer by BTLK to acquire land rights, complete the project, and secure public exchequer interests. The Supreme Court accepted BTLK's final offer of Rs. 460 billion for 16,896 acres of land, payable over seven years with specific security measures, default clauses, and conditions for leasehold transfer. The court held that accepting this structured financial offer best protects the rights of allottees and ensures adequate compensation to the public exchequer while holding off National Accountability Bureau references subject to strict compliance with the payment terms and conditions laid down by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court can accept a financial offer from a developer to resolve land rights and protect third-party allottees?
  • What constitutes a default in payment under the settlement terms established by the court?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau withhold filing a reference upon the acceptance of a financial settlement by the court?
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• State through the Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence &2019 SCP 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-26
  criminal appealacquittal appealmaintainabilitynarcoticsspecial lawright of appealCustoms ActControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed the State's criminal acquittal appeal as not maintainable by relying on provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an appeal against acquittal in a narcotics case is governed by the Customs Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, or specifically by the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal in cases involving the recovery of narcotic substances is squarely and exclusively governed by Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, which places no restriction on the State or the complainant regarding the filing of an appeal. The Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter back for decision on merits, laying down the principle that special legislation on narcotics exclusively regulates appellate remedies for offenses falling under its ambit, rendering general provisions of other statutes inapplicable to the question of maintainability.

  Questions settled

  • Which statutory provision governs the right of appeal in cases involving the recovery of narcotic substances?
  • Does Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 place any restrictions on the State or the complainant regarding the filing of an appeal against acquittal?
  • Were the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relevant to the maintainability of an appeal arising from a narcotics trial?
  • What is the legal effect of an appellate court wrongly applying general statutes instead of special legislation governing narcotics offenses?
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• State through Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation, (Customs and Excises), Karachi vs Haji Nabi Bux and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  narcoticsacquittal appealmaintainabilitystatutory interpretationcriminal appealspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the State's appeal against the acquittal of the respondents in a narcotics case, holding it non-maintainable. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to determine the maintainability of an appeal against acquittal in a narcotics case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by relying on irrelevant statutes, as the right of appeal in cases involving the recovery of narcotic substances is exclusively governed by Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Court clarified that Section 48 places no restrictions on the State or the complainant regarding the filing of an appeal against an acquittal. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits, emphasizing that the specific provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 supersede general procedural laws in such matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 place restrictions on the State or a complainant regarding the filing of an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Are the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 or the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relevant for determining the maintainability of an appeal against an acquittal in a narcotics case?
  • Which statute exclusively governs the right of appeal in cases involving the recovery of narcotic substances?
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• State through Director ANF vs Parvez Khan & another2019 SCP 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  narcotics controlconscious knowledgecriminal appealacquittalforfeiture of vehicleprocedural lacuna
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of the respondents by the Peshawar High Court in a narcotics case involving the recovery of 576 kilograms of opium and charas from a Mazda truck. The respondents were initially convicted by the Special Court (CNS) under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court subsequently acquitted them, citing a lack of conscious knowledge regarding the contraband, noting that the vehicle was registered to a third party who disowned it, and pointing to procedural deficiencies, including the failure to properly exhibit the case property. The State appealed this acquittal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution's case and the findings of the High Court. The Court held that the lacunas identified by the High Court were neither artificial nor imaginary. Consequently, the Court found that the hypothesis regarding the respondent's lack of conscious knowledge could not be refuted without being imprudent. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was upheld, though the order forfeiting the vehicle to the State remained intact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of an accused in a narcotics case can be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove conscious knowledge of the contraband?
  • Does the failure to properly exhibit case property constitute a significant procedural defect warranting acquittal?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal when the prosecution's case contains substantial lacunas?
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• State through Director ANF Peshawar vs Muhammad Ramzan2019 SCMR 1295, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 553, 2019 SCP 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  narcotic contrabandmandatory sentencereduction of sentencejudicial processcriminal appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple criminal appeals filed by the State challenging the reduction of sentences by the Peshawar High Court in cases involving the possession of narcotic contraband exceeding ten kilograms. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentences of respondents convicted under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, given the statutory sentencing requirements. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to adhere to the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Act, which prescribe a minimum punishment of imprisonment for life for the possession of narcotics exceeding ten kilograms. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court, and restored the original sentences awarded by the trial courts. The Court further affirmed the principle that while a party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity of hearing, deliberate absence to obstruct the judicial process does not preclude the court from deciding a case on its merits. Perpetual warrants of arrest were ordered to ensure the respondents serve their original sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of narcotic contraband exceeding ten kilograms mandate a minimum sentence of life imprisonment under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997?
  • Can a court decide a criminal case on its merits if the respondent deliberately avoids the judicial process?
  • Does a High Court have the authority to reduce a sentence below the mandatory minimum prescribed by the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997?
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• State through Director ANF Peshawar vs Fakhar Zaman2019 SCMR 1122, 2019 SCP 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  narcotics controlmandatory minimum sentencereduction of sentencepossession of charascriminal appealabsconding respondent
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court whereby the respondent's conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 was maintained, but his sentence was reduced from imprisonment for life to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court, upon maintaining the conviction for possessing narcotics exceeding ten kilograms, had the legal discretion to reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum of imprisonment for life stipulated in the proviso to Section 9(c). The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where an offender is found guilty of possessing contraband in excess of ten kilograms, the law unambiguously mandates a sentence not less than imprisonment for life, leaving no option to reduce the quantum of sentence once conviction is maintained. The Court laid down the principle that the lowest mandated sentence under the proviso cannot be undercut, and further affirmed that an appellate case can be decided in the absence of a party whose default and absence from the judicial process are deliberate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the power to reduce a sentence below the mandatory minimum prescribed under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 upon maintaining a conviction?
  • Can a criminal appeal or case be decided in the absence of a respondent who deliberately avoids the judicial process?
  • What is the lowest mandated sentence for possessing contraband in excess of ten kilograms under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997?
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• State thr. Deputy Attorney General vs Abdul Ali2019 SCMR 1102, 2019 SCP 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  narcotics possessionacquittalcriminal appealbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceprosecution witnessescontraband
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had acquitted the respondent, Abdul Ali, of charges related to the possession of seventeen kilograms of opium. The respondent had initially been convicted by the Special Court (CNS), Peshawar, after being intercepted at an FC check post. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's acquittal was based on a perverse or artificial appreciation of evidence, given the substantial quantity of contraband recovered. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that the High Court's decision was not perverse. The Court identified significant, unexplained discrepancies between the date of the respondent's arrest and his subsequent remission into police custody for case registration. Furthermore, the Court noted material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, which rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's evidence is inconsistent and the chain of custody or arrest procedure is flawed, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal that represents a possible, reasonable view of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained discrepancy between the date of arrest and the registration of a criminal case create reasonable doubt in narcotics cases?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment that is based on a possible and reasonable view of the evidence?
  • Are material contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses sufficient grounds to uphold an acquittal in a narcotics possession case?
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• State thr. ANF Peshawar vs Olufemi2019 SCP 138, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 588, 2019 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  narcotics controlacquittaldestruction of contrabandcriminal appealabsentee respondentextraditionacademic exercise
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court acquitting the respondent, a Nigerian national, who had been convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the possession of 25 kilograms of heroin and sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court had set aside the conviction primarily due to non-compliance with the procedure for destroying the contraband under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to examine the merits of the arguments or interfere with the acquittal, noting that the respondent had already left Pakistan and was no longer within the realm, rendering any reversal of the judgment an academic exercise that would necessitate a cumbersome and inconvenient extradition process. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will decide an appeal on merits when the respondent has left the country and is no longer within the realm?
  • Does the non-compliance with procedural requirements for destroying contraband under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 warrant interference with an acquittal when the respondent is absent?
  • Whether an appellate court should refrain from undertaking an academic exercise that would lead to a cumbersome extradition process?
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• State thr. Advocate General, KP, Peshawar vs Hassan Jalil & others2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 421, 2019 SCMR 1154, 2019 SCP 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  homicideacquittalcriminal appealburden of proofeyewitness testimonybenefit of doubtabsconsion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State through the Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, challenging the acquittal of the respondent by the Peshawar High Court. The respondent was initially convicted by the Sessions Judge for the homicide of his wife and causing injuries to his minor children. The prosecution case rested on the testimony of the respondent's mother-in-law, who claimed to have seen him fleeing the scene. The State argued that the overwhelming evidence, including the respondent's absconsion and the daylight nature of the occurrence, precluded any hypothesis of mistaken identity. However, the Supreme Court observed that guilt cannot be established based on suspicion, moral satisfaction, or the accused's failure to explain the circumstances in the absence of positive proof. The Court noted the lack of a clear motive and inconsistencies in the eyewitness's arrival at the scene. Finding that the High Court's assessment of the evidence as being fraught with doubt was neither unconscionable nor imprudent, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

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• State thr. Advocate General, KP vs Muhammad Rafiq & othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 552, 2019 SCMR 1150, 2019 SCP 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  criminal appealacquittalqatl-e-amdappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonybenefit of doubtSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondents by the Peshawar High Court for the qatl-e-amd of two persons, which had initially resulted in their conviction by the trial court. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of ocular evidence, specifically the presence and reliability of the primary eyewitness mother at the crime scene and the credibility of corroborating testimonies. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was based on a prudently possible view, noting the improbability of the mother's presence at the public thoroughfare during the fateful hours in a rural Pashtoon setting, compounded by material contradictions and witness deviation. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal judgment premised on a plausible view of the evidence merely because another interpretation is conceivable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal judgment based on a plausible view of the evidence?
  • Does the presence of a close relative eyewitness in a rural setting require strict scrutiny regarding their availability at the crime scene?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions and deviation of witnesses on the prosecution's case in a homicide trial?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Mst.2019 SCMR 1917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-19
  life insurancerepudiation of claimmaterial concealmentincontestability clauselimitation periodinsurance contractfraudulent misrepresentation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the repudiation of a life insurance claim by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan. The deceased insured had obtained a policy in 2005 and passed away in 2008. The insurer declined the claim, alleging fraudulent concealment of material health facts. The core legal question was whether the insurer could avoid the insurance contract after the two-year period stipulated in the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, on the grounds of misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the policy was incontestable after the two-year period prescribed by Section 80 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, unless the insurer could prove that the statement was on a material matter, was fraudulently made, and the policyholder knew it was false at the time. The Court affirmed that Section 80 acts as a special law setting a specific limitation period for repudiation, distinct from general limitation laws. Finding that the insurer failed to substantiate the alleged prior ailments, the Court dismissed the petition and upheld the lower tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an insurer avoid a life insurance contract on the grounds of misrepresentation after the two-year period prescribed by Section 80 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
  • What are the three conditions required to challenge a life insurance policy after the two-year incontestability period under Section 80 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the limitation period for repudiating an insurance policy under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, run from the date of the policy's issuance or the date of discovery of fraud?
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• Space Telecom (Private) Limited, Lahore vs The Pakistan2019 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-22
  earnest money forfeiturebreach of contractreasonable compensationtelecommunication licensebidding processcontractual obligationsliquidated damages
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a member of a consortium, successfully bid for a mobile cellular license from the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). Upon failing to pay the requisite initial installment, the PTA forfeited the consortium's earnest money. The petitioner challenged this forfeiture, arguing that a civil court injunction prevented payment, thereby invoking the doctrine of impossibility under Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the forfeiture was unjustified under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872, as the PTA suffered no actual loss. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it was genuinely prevented from performing its obligations or that it had contested the injunction. Affirming the lower court's decision, the Court ruled that earnest money forfeiture is permissible upon breach of contract, provided the amount is reasonable. Given that the forfeited sum represented less than 3.5% of the total bid, the Court found it neither oppressive nor penal, thus upholding the PTA's decision to retain the earnest money as reasonable compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can earnest money be forfeited by a party upon the other party's breach of contract even if no actual loss is proven?
  • Does a court injunction preventing payment of a contractual installment constitute impossibility of performance under Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Is the forfeiture of earnest money amounting to less than 4% of the total bid price considered an oppressive or penal stipulation under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872?
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• Space Telecom (Private) Limited, Lahore vs Pakistan2019 KLR Supreme Court 8, 2019 PLJ SC 206, 2019 SCP 44, 2019 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-22
  earnest money forfeiturebreach of contractreasonable compensationliquidated damagesbidding processtelecommunication licenseSection 74 Contract Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority's (PTA) forfeiture of earnest money deposited by a consortium for a mobile cellular license. The petitioner, a consortium member, failed to pay the initial 25% of the bid price within the stipulated timeframe, leading to the forfeiture of the earnest money under the bidding terms. The core legal question was whether the forfeiture was valid under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872, particularly when the petitioner alleged the breach was caused by a court injunction and that the PTA suffered no actual loss. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture was lawful, finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate it was prevented from performing its obligations or that the forfeiture was unreasonable. The Court affirmed that under Section 74, a party is entitled to reasonable compensation upon breach, regardless of whether actual loss is proven, provided the amount is not oppressive or penal. The forfeiture of less than 4% of the bid amount was deemed reasonable compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary for an aggrieved party to suffer actual loss to retain or claim earnest money under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Can a party claim frustration of contract under Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872, when it fails to demonstrate that it was ready, able, and willing to perform its obligations?
  • Does the forfeiture of earnest money amounting to less than 4% of the total bid price constitute an oppressive or highly penal stipulation?
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• Somaid vs Ali Gohar Gohar Zaman & another2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 423, 2019 SCP 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  dying declarationbenefit of the doubtmurdercriminal appealconvictioncapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding an incident of murder dated 22.9.2005, which resulted in the conviction of the accused under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, where the High Court had maintained the conviction but altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerns the reliability and evidentiary value of an unverified dying declaration when the identity of the person who actually recorded the deceased's last words remains shrouded in mystery due to contradictory witness testimonies. The Supreme Court held that since the person who records a dying declaration is a crucial witness to verify its veracity, and the prosecution failed to prove who recorded the statement beyond doubt, the dying declaration cannot be relied upon. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a conviction based on a dying declaration is unsafe and liable to be set aside, extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be safely based on a dying declaration when the identity of the person who recorded the deceased's last words remains unverified and shrouded in mystery?
  • What is the evidentiary value and legal requirement for the verification of a dying declaration in a murder trial?
  • Whether the absence of the scribe of a dying declaration as a witness is fatal to the prosecution's case?
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• Sme Bank Ltd through its President Islamabad vs Izhar ul Haq2019 SCP 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-15
  Intra-Court AppealLaw Reforms OrdinanceRes JudicataWrit JurisdictionService RegulationsMaintainability of Writ PetitionExecution of Judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service dispute involving an employee of SME Bank Ltd who challenged disciplinary penalties and sought benefits under a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS). The core legal questions were whether an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) was maintainable against a Single Judge's decision in a writ petition where the underlying service regulations provided for appeal or review, and whether a second writ petition was maintainable to seek implementation or additional relief denied in an earlier, unappealed judgment. The Supreme Court held that under the proviso to Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, if the original proceedings provided for an appeal or review, an ICA is barred, making the direct appeal to the Supreme Court competent. Furthermore, the Court held that a second writ petition seeking relief that was essentially denied or not granted in a previous, final judgment is barred by the principle of res judicata. The Court established that a party cannot initiate fresh litigation to re-litigate claims that were implicitly denied in prior proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against a judgment of a Single Judge in a writ petition if the underlying service regulations provide for an appeal or review?
  • Can a second writ petition be maintained to seek relief that was not granted in a previous, unappealed judgment?
  • Does Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 empower a High Court to execute its own judgments?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to a second writ petition seeking relief that was implicitly denied in an earlier judgment?
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• Sme Bank Limited through President Islamabad and others vs Izhar Ul Haq2020 [M] C L R 22, 2019 PLJ SC 470, 2019 P.S.C. 1431, 2019 SCP 250, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-15
  Intra-Court Appealres judicataconstitutional petitionVoluntary Separation Schememaintainabilitydisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent, an Executive Vice President of the appellant bank, who was penalized by withholding Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) benefits due to gross negligence and irregularities. The respondent challenged the penalty through a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, which allowed the petition only to the extent of directing the payment of VSS benefits, while remaining prayers were unaddressed or implicitly denied. The respondent subsequently filed a second constitutional petition before the Islamabad High Court seeking salaries, allowances, and enhanced VSS benefits, which was accepted. The Supreme Court considered whether an Intra-Court Appeal was barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, due to the availability of an appeal under service regulations, and whether a second constitutional petition for the implementation or expansion of a prior judgment was maintainable. The Court held that the Intra-Court Appeal was barred and the direct appeal before the Supreme Court was competent. Furthermore, the Court held that a second constitutional petition for claims not granted in the first petition is barred by the principle of res judicata, as reliefs not expressly granted are deemed refused. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is barred against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court when the original statutory proceedings provide for a remedy of appeal?
  • Is a second constitutional petition maintainable for claiming reliefs that were sought in a prior constitutional petition but not granted by the court?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to bar a subsequent constitutional petition seeking reliefs that were implicitly denied in an earlier round of litigation?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be utilized for the execution or implementation of a judgment passed in an earlier constitutional petition?
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