Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Javed Kiian alias Bacha and another vs State and another2017 PLJ SC 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  identification parademurderrobberyforensic science laboratory reportbullet casing matchingchance witnesscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value of delayed and flawed identification parades, the reliability of in-court identifications of fleetingly-seen strangers, and the integrity of forensic ballistics reports where chain of custody and seal markings are doubtful. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted the appellants, holding that identification proceedings conducted over a year after the incident without proper matching of participants or addressing objections of prior showing to witnesses are unreliable, and that in-court identification of strangers who were only seen fleetingly is inconsequential. The Court laid down the principle that unexplained delays in transmitting forensic items to laboratories, coupled with failures to document seal types and marks, render ballistic matching unsafe for sustaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of identification parades conducted more than a year after the incident without descriptions in the FIR?
  • Does the in-court identification of an accused by witnesses who only had a fleeting glimpse of a stranger suffice to maintain a conviction?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a forensic ballistics report when there is unexplained delay in transmitting the weapon and bullet casings to the laboratory and seals are undocumented?
  • Can reliance be placed on identification proceedings where the magistrates failed to address the suspects' objections that they had been shown to the witnesses prior to the parade?
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• Javed Khan alias Bacha. (in Crl. A. 126/2010) Raees Khan. (in Crl. A.2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealidentification paradechance witnessforensic science laboratorymurderrobberybenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal questions involved the reliability of identification parades conducted over a year after the incident without descriptions in the initial report, the evidentiary value of in-court identification of strangers who were only glimpsed fleetingly, and the integrity of forensic evidence regarding the matching of a bullet casing with a recovered weapon given unexplained delays and lack of sealing details. The Supreme Court held that the identification proceedings were deeply flawed, the chance witness's presence was unverified, and the forensic report could not be safely relied upon due to potential tampering and delays. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants of all charges, laying down that identification parades must be conducted promptly and meticulously, and that fleeting glimpses by strangers without prior physical descriptions in the FIR cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of an identification parade held more than a year after the incident when the accused's physical features were omitted from the initial police report?
  • Whether in-court identification of stranger accused persons by witnesses who only had a fleeting glimpse during the crime can substitute for a flawed identification parade?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a recovered weapon and bullet casing to the forensic laboratory, coupled with a failure to prove proper sealing, vitiate the reliability of the forensic report?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a chance witness whose presence at the crime scene remains unexplained and inconsistent with ordinary conduct?
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• (Crl. a 126/2010) Javed Khan alias Bacha(Crl. a 127/2010) Raees Khan vs2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  identification paradeforensic evidencechain of custodycriminal appealmurder convictionreasonable doubtchance witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for murder and robbery. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the identity of the appellants and the integrity of the forensic evidence. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsafe and set them aside. The Court found the identification proceedings unreliable because they occurred over a year after the incident, the witnesses had not provided descriptions in the FIR or statements under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the Magistrates failed to address the appellants' objections that their identities had been revealed beforehand. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the forensic evidence was compromised due to unexplained delays in sending the bullet casing and pistol to the laboratory and the failure to document the specific seals used on the evidence parcels. The key principle laid down is that identification parades must be conducted promptly and fairly, and forensic evidence requires a strict, documented chain of custody to be admissible and reliable. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in conducting an identification parade render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to document the specific seals used on forensic evidence parcels?
  • Can an identification parade be considered valid if the Magistrate fails to address the accused's objection that their identity was previously revealed to witnesses?
  • Does the failure of a witness to provide a description of the assailant in the FIR or initial police statement undermine subsequent identification?
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• Javed Khan alias Bacha and another vs The State and another2017 PLJ SC 260, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 97, 2017 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-20
  MurderRobberyIdentification paradeForensic evidenceChain of custodyAcquittalAppealsChance witnessCriminal Procedure CodePakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned appeals against convictions for murder and robbery, where the Lahore High Court had upheld the convictions for murder and substituted the charge under Section 392 PPC with Section 394 PPC read with Section 34 PPC. The core legal questions addressed the reliability of identification parades and forensic evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether identification proceedings were conducted carefully, noting significant delays, the absence of accused descriptions in the FIR or Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, and the Magistrates' failure to address the appellants' objections about being shown to witnesses prior to the parade. The Court also scrutinized the forensic report, highlighting unexplained delays in sending the pistol and bullet casing to the laboratory and the lack of details regarding seals, which raised concerns about tampering. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that identification evidence must be meticulously conducted with proper safeguards and that doubts regarding the chain of custody for forensic evidence render it unsafe for conviction.

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• Jan Muhammad vs The Member (Colony), etc2017 P.S.C. 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food Schemeproprietary rightstemporary leasealternate land allotmentBoard of Revenueremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute over the allotment of alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' of 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner met the conditions specified in government notifications of 1970 and 1971 to qualify for the grant of proprietary rights or alternate land after the expiration of his original temporary lease in 1962, or whether the land had lawfully reverted to the State and the subsequent allotment was vitiated by fraud. The Supreme Court held that alternate land was strictly contingent upon specific conditions—namely, that the original lessee fulfilled lease terms but was dispossessed due to municipal proximity or the implementation of a permanent government scheme. Because the lower forums and the High Court failed to properly examine the applicability of these notifications to the respective claims of the petitioner and respondent No. 3, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Board of Revenue for a fresh decision in accordance with the governing notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Who is eligible for the grant of alternate state land under the Grow More Food Scheme notifications of 1970 and 1971?
  • What are the precise conditions under which an allottee under a temporary lease is entitled to proprietary rights or alternate land?
  • Does a temporary lease that expires by efflux of time and reverts to the State entitle the lessee to claim alternate land?
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• Jan Muhammad vs The Member (Colony) and others2017 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food Schemestate land allotmentproprietary rightsalternate land grantlease terminationBoard of Revenueadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' initiated by the Board of Revenue in 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose original lease expired in 1962, qualified for the grant of alternate land under the notifications issued in 1970 and 1971. The Board of Revenue had cancelled the petitioner's allotment, alleging fraud and misrepresentation, a decision upheld by the High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly examine whether the parties satisfied the strict criteria established by the 1970 and 1971 notifications, which specifically limited alternate land grants to lessees dispossessed for permanent schemes or whose land fell within restricted zones, such as near municipalities or railway stations. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Board of Revenue to determine, based on the evidence, whether either party met these specific eligibility requirements or if the land had correctly reverted to the State.

  Questions settled

  • Under what specific conditions were allottees under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' entitled to the grant of alternate state land?
  • Does the expiration of a temporary lease under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' automatically entitle a former lessee to the grant of alternate land?
  • Can an allotment of state land be cancelled on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation without a proper determination of the lessee's eligibility under the relevant notifications?
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• Jan Muhammad vs Member (Colony) etc.2017 P.S.C. 245, 2017 SCMR 93, 2017 PLJ SC 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food SchemeState land allotmentAlternate landProprietary rightsRevenue lawAdministrative notificationRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' initiated by the Board of Revenue in 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose original lease expired in 1962, satisfied the eligibility criteria for the grant of alternate land as stipulated in the government notifications dated 01.06.1970 and 26.04.1971. These notifications restricted the grant of alternate land to lessees who had fulfilled lease conditions but were dispossessed due to land proximity to municipalities, towns, or railway stations, or because their land was utilized for permanent government schemes. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly examine whether the petitioner or the contesting respondent met these specific criteria. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Board of Revenue for a fresh determination of eligibility in strict accordance with the conditions prescribed in the 1970 and 1971 notifications. The principle established is that entitlement to alternate land is strictly contingent upon satisfying the specific conditions set forth in the governing administrative notifications.

  Questions settled

  • What are the specific eligibility criteria for the grant of alternate state land under the Grow More Food Scheme notifications of 1970 and 1971?
  • Does a lessee whose lease expired and reverted to the State automatically qualify for the grant of alternate land under the Grow More Food Scheme?
  • Is a revenue authority required to specifically examine compliance with notification conditions before cancelling an allotment of alternate land?
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• Jan Muhammad etc. vs Mst. Samna Bibi etc.2017 PLJ SC 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale-deednew plea at appellate stagepure question of lawcolonization areacomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from pre-emption suits filed against the sale of land executed in 1966. The core legal questions involved whether the period of limitation for pre-emption commences from the date of execution or registration of the sale-deed, and whether an appellant can raise a completely new legal plea requiring factual inquiry before the Supreme Court without leave. The Supreme Court held that limitation begins from the date of the registration of the sale-deed, reaffirming established precedent. Furthermore, the Court held that while it possesses the discretion under Order XIX Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 to allow new pure questions of law to be raised for the first time to do complete justice, a plea requiring foundational factual determination and evidence cannot be raised at the appellate stage without prior pleading and leave. Consequently, the appeals and the review petition were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit starts from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale-deed?
  • Can an appellant raise a new point for the first time before the Supreme Court without obtaining prior leave of the Court?
  • Is a plea regarding the applicability of pre-emption bars in colony areas considered a pure question of law when it requires a foundational factual inquiry?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court permit a party to agitate a point not mentioned in the leave granting order?
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• (1) Jan Muhammad etc (2) Mst. Jiwani etc. (3) Malang Khan (decd)2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale deednew pleaSupreme Court Rules 1980factual foundationappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from pre-emption suits where the appellants challenged the respondents' superior right of pre-emption and the limitation period for filing the suits. The core legal questions were whether the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of execution or registration of the sale deed, and whether the appellants could introduce a new plea regarding the non-pre-emptibility of land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court held that the limitation period for pre-emption suits runs from the date of registration of the sale deed. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the appellants' attempt to raise a new plea, ruling that while the Supreme Court has the discretion to allow new points of law, it will not permit arguments that require a factual foundation not established in the lower courts. The Court emphasized that a party cannot raise a new plea for the first time at the final appellate stage as a matter of right, particularly when it necessitates factual inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale deed?
  • Can an appellant raise a new plea for the first time before the Supreme Court if that plea requires a factual determination not previously addressed?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to allow the raising of a new point of law not specified in the petition of appeal?
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• Jan Muhammad and others vs Mst. Sakina Bibi and others2017 PLJ SC 337, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale deednew plea at appellate stagepure question of lawcolonization areaSupreme Court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, stemming from pre-emption suits filed in 1968 regarding a sale deed executed in 1966 and registered in 1968, address whether limitation starts from the date of execution or registration of a sale deed, and whether a new point not raised below can be urged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit is the date of registration of the sale deed, not its execution. Furthermore, the Court held that a new plea requiring factual foundation and adjudication cannot be raised for the first time at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court as a pure question of law without prior pleadings and evidence. The key principle established is that while the Supreme Court has the discretion to allow pure questions of law to be raised for the first time in exceptional circumstances to do complete justice, points requiring factual inquiry and foundation in the record cannot be entertained for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit commence from the date of execution of the sale deed or from the date of its registration?
  • Can an appellant raise a new legal plea for the first time before the Supreme Court without having pleaded it in the lower courts?
  • Does a plea regarding the applicability of a notification exempting colony areas from pre-emption constitute a pure question of law that can be raised without factual foundation?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court permit a party to rely on grounds not specified in the memo of appeal?
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• Ishtiaq Ahmad. vs The State, etc.2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-21
  polygamyMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceArbitration CouncilIslamic injunctionsconjugal rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, for contracting a second marriage without the requisite permission from the Arbitration Council. The petitioner challenged the conviction on grounds that Section 6 of the Ordinance violated Islamic injunctions regarding polygamy and that the absence of elected local government representatives rendered the Arbitration Council non-functional, thereby excusing his non-compliance. The Court held that Section 6 of the Ordinance does not violate Islamic injunctions, as it merely establishes a procedural mechanism to ensure the Quranic condition of 'adal' (justice) is met. The Court further clarified that the absence of elected representatives does not invalidate the Arbitration Council, as designated officers act as Chairmen, and that the complaint filed by the aggrieved wife was sufficient under the applicable rules. The Court affirmed that the petitioner's failure to seek permission, despite the legal requirement, established the ingredients of the offence, and consequently dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 violate the injunctions of Islam regarding polygamy?
  • Does the absence of elected local government representatives render the Arbitration Council non-functional for the purposes of granting permission for a second marriage?
  • Is a complaint filed by an aggrieved wife sufficient to initiate proceedings under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to establish consent for a second marriage in the absence of evidence under Section 340(2)?
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• Ishtiaq Ahmad vs State etc.2017 PLJ SC 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-21
  polygamyMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceArbitration CouncilIslamic injunctionsmarital rightsleave to appealcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, for contracting a second marriage without the requisite permission from the Arbitration Council. The petitioner challenged the conviction on the grounds that the statutory requirement for permission violated Islamic injunctions and that procedural defects existed due to the absence of an elected Arbitration Council. The Supreme Court held that Section 6 of the Ordinance does not violate Islamic injunctions, as it merely provides a procedural mechanism to ensure the Quranic condition of 'adl' (justice) is satisfied in polygamous marriages. The Court further clarified that the absence of elected representatives does not invalidate the law, as designated administrators perform the functions of the Chairman. The Court affirmed that the petitioner failed to seek permission, and the complaint by the aggrieved wife was validly processed. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and emphasizing that the statutory requirements for polygamy are designed to protect the sanctity of the marital union and prevent injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, violate Islamic injunctions regarding polygamy?
  • Can a husband contract a second marriage without permission from the Arbitration Council if the local government elections have not been held?
  • Is a complaint by an aggrieved wife sufficient to initiate proceedings under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Does the failure to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect a petitioner's defense regarding consent for a second marriage?
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• Ishfaq Ahmad vs The State2017 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  concurrent sentencesimprisonment for lifeSection 382-B Cr.P.C.murdercondonation of delaycriminal appealsentence modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a case involving convictions under Sections 302(b), 324, 337-D, and 337-F(iii) of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) following an incident on 30.08.1994. The trial court had sentenced the appellant to death on two counts of murder, which the High Court subsequently converted to life imprisonment while maintaining the remaining convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court solely to examine whether the High Court should have ordered the multiple sentences of imprisonment passed against the appellant to run concurrently rather than consecutively. Reaffirming and applying the precedent established in Shah Hussain v. The State (PLD 2009 SC 460), the Supreme Court held that ordinarily, multiple sentences of imprisonment for life awarded to a convict are to run concurrently. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed that all sentences of imprisonment passed against the appellant shall run concurrently, with the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) extended to him.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple sentences of imprisonment for life passed against a convict ought ordinarily to run concurrently?
  • Should the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. be extended when multiple sentences of imprisonment are ordered to run concurrently?
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• Irfanullah Khan Marwat vs M. Abdul Rauf Siddiqui and others2017 SCMR 1588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-11
  election petitionmaterially affectedNADRA verificationcorrupt practiceselection tribunalinvalid votesRepresentation of the People Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an Election Tribunal judgment declaring the election of the Appellant to constituency PS-114, Karachi, void. The core legal question was whether the election result was materially affected by corrupt practices and non-compliance with the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Appellant argued that evidence of irregularities was limited to six polling stations and insufficient to void the entire election. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Election Tribunal correctly relied on a NADRA report—procured with the parties' consent—which identified over 18,000 invalid votes due to missing or incorrect NIC numbers, duplicates, and authentication failures. The Court affirmed that under Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, an election can be declared void if the result is materially affected by either the prevalence of corrupt practices or the failure of any person to comply with the Act and rules. Because the number of invalid votes exceeded the Appellant's victory margin, the result was deemed materially affected, justifying the declaration of the election as void.

  Questions settled

  • Can an election be declared void under Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, if the result is materially affected by non-compliance with the Act, even if extensive corrupt practices are not proven across the entire constituency?
  • Does the failure to record valid NIC numbers on ballot counterfoils, as required by Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, constitute a ground for declaring an election void if the number of such invalid votes exceeds the victory margin?
  • Is an Election Tribunal empowered to refer election material to NADRA for verification with the consent of the parties?
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• Iqbal Hussain vs General Manager Southern Telecom Region-II and others2017 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-15
  civil servantPTCL employeesFederal Service Tribunalconstitutional jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicetransfer of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court was directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the restoration of the appellant's service appeal and held that employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) do not enjoy the status of civil servants and cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether former government department employees whose services were transferred to PTCL under statutory provisions retain their status as civil servants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that upon transfer to the Corporation and subsequently to PTCL under the relevant statutory enactments, such employees do not retain the status of civil servants, although their terms and conditions of service are statutorily protected. The key principle laid down is that while the statutory terms and conditions of transferred PTCL employees are fully protected, any violation thereof is amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan rather than the Federal Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Do employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited retain the status of civil servants?
  • Can former government employees transferred to PTCL invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Which forum has jurisdiction to hear grievances regarding the violation of terms and conditions of transferred PTCL employees?
  • Does the protection of terms and conditions under the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication Re-organization Act 1996 confer civil servant status?
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• Intizar Hussain vs Hamza Ameer and others2017 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-06
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailmurdercommon intentionocular accountmedical evidenceplea of alibivicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the order of the High Court, which had granted post-arrest bail to the respondents in a case involving allegations of murder and common intention. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in granting bail despite the respondents being nominated in the First Information Report (FIR) with specific roles attributed to them. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the respondents were directly named in the FIR for actively participating in the assault that led to the deceased's death. The Court noted that the ocular account was supported by medical evidence and that the plea of alibi raised by the respondents was a matter to be determined at trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were speculative and premature. The petition was converted into an appeal, the bail was cancelled, and the respondents were ordered to be taken into custody to face trial.

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• International Centre for Chemical and Biological Science (Iccbs)2017 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-29
  service lawcompulsory retirementsuperannuationcompetent authorityuniversity employeequalifying service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition assailing the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside the retirement of respondent No.1, an employee of the International Centre for Chemical and Biological Science, University of Karachi. The core legal question was whether the competent authority of the university is empowered under the law to retire an employee upon completion of 25 years of service before attaining the age of superannuation. The Supreme Court held that under Section 40-A of the University of Karachi Act, 1972, the competent authority possesses the valid discretion and competence to retire an employee after completing 25 years of qualifying service, irrespective of whether the employee has reached the age of superannuation. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the statutory power of the competent authority to retire an employee after 25 years of service is distinct from retirement based on superannuation and is legally sustainable when exercised in accordance with the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the competent authority of a university can retire an employee after completion of 25 years of service before the age of superannuation?
  • Does Section 40-A of the University of the Karachi Act, 1972 empower the university to direct the retirement of an employee who has completed twenty-five years of service qualifying for pension?
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• (1) Inter Service Intelligence (2) Intelligence Bureau vs Govt Of Punjab2017 SCP 1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-30
  freedom of speechelectronic media regulationincitement to violenceconstitutional obligationspublic ordernational securityhate speech
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the Supreme Court’s review of reports submitted by the Inter-Services Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, and Islamabad Police regarding a violent sit-in protest and the subsequent law enforcement response. The Court addressed the lack of comprehensive data regarding casualties and property damage, directing the Ministries of Interior and Defence to compile a nationwide report on these losses. A central legal question involved the role of electronic media in broadcasting inflammatory content that incited violence. The Court held that while freedom of speech and press are fundamental rights under the Constitution, they are not absolute and are subject to restrictions regarding national security, integrity, and public order. The Court affirmed that media outlets are legally bound by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, to avoid inciting violence or hatred. The key principle laid down is that all citizens, including media personnel and politicians, are constitutionally obligated to uphold the State's integrity, and the propagation of violence or hate speech under the guise of religious or political causes is prohibited and punishable under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Are freedom of speech and freedom of the press absolute rights under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the broadcasting of content that incites violence or promotes hatred constitute a violation of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is every citizen, including media personnel and politicians, constitutionally obligated to maintain loyalty to the State and uphold the Constitution?
  • Can the State restrict media broadcasts that undermine the integrity, security, or defence of Pakistan?
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• Intekhab Ahmad Abbasi Zafar Ali and Others vs The State etc2017 SCP 1067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-30
  anti-terrorismexplosive substancesconfessional statementbenefit of the doubtflawed investigationcriminal conspiracyjudicial remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals against convictions under anti-terrorism, explosive substances, and penal laws arising from an alleged conspiracy and recovery of explosive-laden vehicles intended for high-profile subversive activities. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, the legality and voluntariness of confessional statements recorded by Special Magistrates, and the standards of investigation required in high-profile terrorist cases. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the investigation was severely flawed, primary evidence such as parking logs was unreliable, the recovery procedures were compromised, and the confessional statements lacked judicial efficacy having been obtained under duress while bypassing judicial remand orders. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, and acquitted them of all charges. The key principle laid down is that courts must exercise an extra degree of caution and scrutinize evidence strictly in high-publicity terrorist cases to protect against manipulated investigations and ensure that confessional statements strictly adhere to mandatory legal safeguards.

  Questions settled

  • Whether confessional statements recorded by Special Magistrates lose their judicial efficacy when the accused were previously in prolonged law enforcement custody and denied judicial remand?
  • Can a conviction for criminal conspiracy and terrorism be sustained when primary evidence regarding the recovery of explosive-laden vehicles is discarded as unreliable?
  • Does the failure of the investigating agency to associate independent public witnesses during recovery and arrest proceedings vitiate the evidentiary value of the search?
  • Whether an appellate court is bound to acquit the accused when the prosecution evidence is fraught with serious legal and factual defects and severe procedural irregularities?
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• Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan vs United Bank Limited and others2017 CLD 1707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-13
  first chargesecond chargemortgaged assetsratable distributionexecution proceedingsdecree holdersale proceeds
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the distribution of sale proceeds of mortgaged assets auctioned in execution proceedings. The appellant, Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, held a first charge and a recovery decree over the mortgaged property of the respondent, while the first respondent, United Bank Limited, held a subsequent second charge and a later decree. The core legal question was whether the sale proceeds of the commonly mortgaged assets should be distributed ratably between the two decree holders or applied first toward the full satisfaction of the first charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that unless agreed otherwise, a decree based on a second charge is subject to the prior satisfaction of the first charge, and special laws take precedence over the general provisions of ratable distribution under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the total sale proceeds must first satisfy the appellant's first-charge decree before any residuary amount is applied to the second charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale proceeds of commonly mortgaged assets should be distributed ratably between a first-charge holder and a second-charge holder?
  • Does a decree based on a second charge take effect only after the full satisfaction of a prior first-charge decree?
  • Whether general provisions of ratable distribution under section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 override special statutory provisions?
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• Imtiaz Ahmed vs The State through Special Prosecutor, ANF2017 P.S.C. Crl. 372, 2017 SCMR 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-21
  statutory delaypost-arrest bailnarcoticsspeedy trialfundamental rightsmedical groundsSection 497 Cr.P.C. provisosspecial law vs general law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, accused of transporting 69 kg of heroin under Sections 9(c), 14, and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act (CNSA), 1997, sought bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial. The trial had remained pending for nearly three years due to the consistent absence of prosecution witnesses and the investigating officer being a fugitive in another case. The Supreme Court examined whether the restrictive bail provisions of Section 51 CNSA excluded the beneficial provisos of Section 497 of the Cr.P.C. regarding statutory delay and medical grounds. The Court held that while special laws may displace the main provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they do not eliminate the beneficial provisos unless there is an explicit conflict. Emphasizing the fundamental right to a speedy trial and the protection of liberty under Articles 7 and 9 of the Constitution, the Court ruled that shocking and unreasonable delays in trial entitle an accused to bail. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, granting bail to the petitioner.

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• Imran Ahmed Khan and others., Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed., Siraj-Ul-Haq, a_abc5c4642017 SCP 951, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-07-28
  disqualificationassets beyond meansJoint Investigation Teammoney launderingreceivable assetsfalse declarationpublic office holderaccountability reference
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions were filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan regarding allegations of money laundering, corruption, and assets beyond known means of income against the sitting Prime Minister and his family members. Following an investigation by a court-mandated Joint Investigation Team (JIT), the Supreme Court examined whether the respondents had satisfactorily accounted for their global assets, including the Avenfield apartments and various business entities. The core legal questions involved the disclosure requirements for assets under the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA) and the criteria for disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Court held that un-withdrawn salary from a foreign company (Capital FZE) constituted a 'receivable' and thus a legal asset; failure to disclose it in nomination papers amounted to a false declaration. Consequently, the Court unanimously disqualified the Prime Minister for not being 'honest' (Sadiq and Ameen). The Court further directed the National Accountability Bureau to file multiple criminal references in Accountability Courts against the respondents based on the JIT's findings.

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• Imran Ahmed Khan and others, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed , Ameer Jamat-e-K.L.R. 2017 S.C. 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  disqualificationArticle 62(1)(f)unwithdrawn salaryassets beyond meansAccountability Courtnomination papersconstitutional petitionJoint Investigation Team
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions seeking the disqualification of the Prime Minister of Pakistan and an investigation into allegations of assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Following a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) report, the core legal questions were whether the respondent failed to disclose assets in his nomination papers, thereby violating constitutional requirements of honesty, and whether the material collected warranted further criminal proceedings. The Court held that while the JIT report established a prima facie case requiring a full-fledged trial before an Accountability Court, the Supreme Court could not adjudicate criminal liability under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in a summary proceeding. However, the Court ruled that the respondent’s failure to disclose unwithdrawn salary receivables from a foreign company in his nomination papers constituted a false declaration. Consequently, the Court declared the respondent disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, ordered his removal from office, and directed the National Accountability Bureau to file specific references before the Accountability Court for a trial within six months, establishing the principle that non-disclosure of receivable assets constitutes a disqualifying false declaration.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to disclose unwithdrawn salary receivables in nomination papers constitute a false declaration under the Representation of the People Act 1976?
  • Can the Supreme Court, in proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, adjudicate criminal liability and convict a public office holder for corruption under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Does the non-disclosure of assets in nomination papers render a Member of Parliament 'not honest' under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Is an unwithdrawn salary receivable from a foreign company considered an 'asset' that must be disclosed in nomination papers?
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• Imran Ahmed Khan and others vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime2017 SCP 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-05
  Joint Investigation Teaminvestigative powersjudicial oversightexecutive assistancecriminal investigationinstitutional cooperation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitution and operational framework of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to conduct an investigation pursuant to the Court's earlier order dated 20.04.2017. The core legal question addressed is the selection of competent officers to serve on the JIT and the definition of their investigative powers and logistical support. The Court, after examining lists of officers submitted by various state institutions, selected and nominated specific individuals to serve as members and head of the JIT. The Court held that the JIT is empowered to exercise all investigative authorities granted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, and the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1975. Furthermore, the Court established that the JIT acts under the direction of the Supreme Court, mandating that all executive authorities must assist it. The judgment lays down the principle that the JIT possesses the autonomy to engage experts, secure funding from the Federal Government, and utilize departmental resources, while ensuring that any non-cooperation by individuals is subject to immediate judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • What specific investigative powers are vested in a Joint Investigation Team constituted by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to nominate specific officers from state departments to serve on an investigative body?
  • Are executive authorities in Pakistan legally obligated to assist a Joint Investigation Team acting under the direction of the Supreme Court?
  • What is the procedure for handling non-cooperation by individuals summoned before a court-constituted Joint Investigation Team?
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• (1) Imran Ahmed Khan and others (2) Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed (3) Siraj-ul- Haq, Ameer Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan vs (1) Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan (2) Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Division, etc.2017 SCP 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-07-28
  disqualificationasset disclosureArticle 62(1)(f)Joint Investigation TeamNational Accountability Bureaucorrupt practicesdue processunwithdrawn salary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment regarding allegations of corruption and asset accumulation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and his family, following a report submitted by a Joint Investigation Team (JIT). The core legal questions were whether the material collected by the JIT warranted further criminal proceedings, whether the Prime Minister's failure to disclose unwithdrawn salary receivables from a foreign entity constituted a disqualifying asset under electoral laws, and the extent of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court held that while it could not bypass the due process of a full trial in an Accountability Court for corruption charges, the JIT report provided sufficient grounds to direct the National Accountability Bureau to file references against the respondents. Furthermore, the Court ruled that unwithdrawn salary constitutes an 'asset' that must be disclosed in nomination papers. By failing to disclose this, the Prime Minister furnished a false declaration, rendering him 'dishonest' under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and Section 99(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, thereby disqualifying him from being a Member of Parliament.

  Questions settled

  • Does unwithdrawn salary from a foreign entity constitute an 'asset' that must be disclosed in nomination papers under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Can the Supreme Court, in proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, convict a holder of public office for corruption without a full trial in an Accountability Court?
  • Does the failure to disclose an asset in nomination papers render a Member of Parliament 'dishonest' under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to direct the National Accountability Bureau to file references against individuals based on a report submitted by a Joint Investigation Team?
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• Ijaz Ahmad vs The State2017 SCMR 1941 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-17
  murdercapital punishmentmitigating circumstancesreduction of sentenceimprisonment for lifeocular accountmedical evidenceunproven motive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.). The core legal question before the Court was whether the capital punishment awarded to the appellant should be maintained or commuted to imprisonment for life in light of mitigating circumstances, specifically the rejection of the prosecution's case regarding motive and recovery. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony and corroborating medical evidence, the discrediting of the motive and recovery evidence constituted a mitigating circumstance making the death penalty harsh. The Court laid down the principle that where motive is unproven and recovery is discarded, the sentence of death for murder may be converted to imprisonment for life, while upholding the underlying conviction, compensation amount, and extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the unproven motive and discarded recovery of a weapon can serve as mitigating circumstances for converting a death sentence into imprisonment for life?
  • Does prompt reporting of a crime and timely postmortem examination rule out pre-consultation and deliberation in a murder case?
  • Can an appellate court maintain a murder conviction under Section 302(b) P.P.C. while modifying the capital sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Hussain Nawaz Sharif vs State2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 699, 2017 SCP 937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-22
  police investigationrecording of statementsaudio-video recordingJIT proceedingswitness examinationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous application was filed by Hussain Nawaz Sharif seeking directions for the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to cease video recording during the examination of witnesses and to constitute an independent commission to inquire into the leakage of his image. The core legal question centered on whether the audio-video electronic recording of witness statements during police investigation violates Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court held that the use of audio or video devices to facilitate the recording of police statements is not prohibited by Sections 161 and 162, provided the finished product used in court remains the written statement. The Court reasoned that modern technological advancements should not be hindered by pedantic interpretations of nineteenth-century procedural forms, and while audio-video recordings themselves may not be admissible into evidence without statutory amendment, employing them to assist in recording statements is legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the audio-video electronic recording of witness statements during a police investigation is prohibited under Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can modern technological advancements and audio-video devices be utilized to facilitate the recording of statements during police investigations in the absence of explicit statutory prohibition?
  • Are audio-video recordings of police statements admissible into evidence for the proof of such statements under the current legal framework?
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• Husnain Cotex Limited through, its Chief Executive vs Commissioner Inland2017 P.C.T.L.R. 326, 2017 PLJ SC 516, 2017 PTD 1561, 2017 SCMR 822, 2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-26
  tax exemptionfinal tax regimenormal tax regimeconstruction contractsincome tax refundKhyber PakhtunkhwaFATA and PATAstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal arising from Lahore High Court judgments regarding the interpretation of tax exemptions under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question is whether taxpayers deriving income from execution of construction contracts falling within the 'final tax regime' are entitled to tax exemptions and refunds under Clause 126F, which was introduced to grant fiscal relief to businesses affected by internal strife in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the tax exemption under Clause 126F was exclusively intended for taxpayers under the 'normal tax regime' whose profitability diminished due to adverse external business environments, and not for contractors under the 'final tax regime' who factor their tax liability and profit margins into contract prices upon securing business opportunities in those areas. The key principle laid down is that fiscal exemptions granted to ameliorate financial losses from adverse local conditions do not apply to taxpayers under the final tax regime whose business activities and profit margins are insulated from external strife by contractual pricing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether taxpayers falling under the final tax regime are entitled to tax exemptions under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a taxpayer under the final tax regime claim a refund of tax deducted at source under the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • What is the legal scope and intent of the tax relief granted under Clause 126F of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Husnain Cotex Limited through its Chief Executive and others vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore and 2 others2017 PLJ SC 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income tax exemptionfinal tax regimenormal tax regimeconstruction contractstax refundKhyber PakhtunkhwaFATAPATAstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses whether taxpayers falling within the final tax regime under construction contracts can claim tax exemptions under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners, companies with business establishments outside the affected areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA, executed construction contracts within those areas and sought refunds of tax deducted at source based on the exemption granted for profits and gains derived in those strife-affected regions. The core legal question was whether the exemption extended to contractors in the final tax regime whose profit margins were predetermined, rather than solely to taxpayers in the normal tax regime whose businesses suffered financially from internal strife. The Supreme Court held that the tax exemption under Clause 126F was exclusively intended for taxpayers under the normal tax regime whose profitability was directly diminished by adverse external business environments, and not for contractors in the final tax regime who entered the affected areas purely for pre-secured business opportunities. The petitions for leave to appeal were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether taxpayers falling within the domain of the final tax regime are entitled to tax exemptions granted under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a contractor executing construction contracts in strife-affected areas claim refund of tax deducted at source under the final tax regime on the basis of regional tax exemptions?
  • Does Circular No. 14 of 2011 correctly interpret the scope of tax exemptions provided under Clause 126F of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• (1) Husnain Cotex Limited through its Chief Executive (2) M/s Ghulam2017 SCP 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income tax exemptionfinal tax regimenormal tax regimeconstruction contractstax refundKhyber Pakhtunkhwa tax relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal arising from a dispute over the interpretation of tax exemptions granted under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners, companies with business establishments in Lahore or Multan, derived income from execution of construction contracts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA, falling within the 'final tax regime'. They claimed tax exemption under Clause 126F and sought refunds. The core legal question is whether taxpayers falling under the 'final tax regime' are entitled to claim the benefit of tax exemption on profits and gains under Clause 126F intended for businesses affected by internal strife, or if such exemption is restricted to the 'normal tax regime'. The Supreme Court held that the tax exemption under Clause 126F was exclusively meant for taxpayers under the 'normal tax regime' whose profitability diminished due to adverse external business environments in the specified areas, and does not extend to taxpayers under the 'final tax regime' who entered those areas only upon securing profitable contracts. The key principle laid down is that fiscal exemptions intended to ameliorate the condition of businesses suffering actual losses from regional strife cannot be availed of by contractors whose profit margins are insulated and who fall within the final tax regime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether taxpayers falling within the domain of the final tax regime are entitled to claim exemption under Clause 126F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the tax exemption granted under Clause 126F of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply to businesses located outside the affected areas that execute contracts within those areas?
  • Can a taxpayer under the final tax regime claim a refund of tax deducted at source under Section 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Husnain Cotex Limited through Chief Executive and others vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore and others2017 PTD 1561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-26
  income tax exemptionfinal tax regimenormal tax regimetax refundClause 126Fstatutory interpretationtax relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the eligibility of taxpayers operating under the 'final tax regime' to claim income tax exemptions granted under Clause 126F of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners, who performed construction contracts in strife-affected areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA, sought refunds of tax deducted at source, arguing they were entitled to the exemption. The core legal question was whether the exemption, intended for businesses impacted by internal strife, extended to contractors whose tax liability is determined under the final tax regime. The Supreme Court held that the exemption was exclusively designed for taxpayers under the 'normal tax regime' whose business capacity was diminished by adverse external factors in the affected areas. Conversely, contractors under the final tax regime, whose profit margins are pre-calculated and unaffected by local strife, do not qualify for this relief. The Court established that tax exemptions aimed at ameliorating financial hardship from specific environmental factors cannot be extended to taxpayers whose business activities and tax liabilities operate independently of those factors.

  Questions settled

  • Are taxpayers falling under the 'final tax regime' eligible for tax exemptions granted under Clause 126F of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the tax exemption under Clause 126F apply to contractors whose business activity is independent of the adverse business environment in the affected areas?
  • Can a taxpayer claim a refund of tax deducted at source under the 'final tax regime' if the deduction was made at the prescribed rate?
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• Hashim Qasim vs The State2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessioncapital punishmentbenefit of doubtlast seen evidencejuvenile justicecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellants for murder, kidnapping, and unnatural offenses. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and reliability of circumstantial evidence to sustain a capital conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s case, resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, failed to establish an unbroken chain of events connecting the accused to the crime. The Court emphasized that in capital cases, circumstantial evidence must be narrowly examined and must form a complete, unbroken chain; any missing link renders the evidence unreliable. The Court found the retracted confession of the juvenile appellant to be suspicious and lacking independent corroboration, the motive to be belatedly manufactured, and the last-seen evidence to be infirm. Furthermore, the Court noted that medical evidence is merely confirmatory and cannot identify culprits. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and extended the benefit of the acquittal to the non-appealing co-accused, reiterating that even a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction in a capital case be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence if the chain of events is broken?
  • Is a retracted confession sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Does the benefit of acquittal granted to appealing co-accused extend to non-appealing co-accused in the same case?
  • Is medical evidence regarding unnatural intercourse sufficient to identify the perpetrator of a crime?
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• Hashim Qasim and another vs The State2017 PLJ SC 505, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1040, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 386, 2017 SCP 234, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessionbenefit of doubtcapital punishmentlast seen evidencecriminal appealacquittaljuvenile justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants were convicted by the trial court for murder, kidnapping, and sodomy, with sentences including death and life imprisonment, based on circumstantial evidence. The High Court upheld these convictions. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the prosecution's reliance on a retracted confession, "last seen" evidence, motive, and pointing out of the crime scene. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the crime. It emphasized that circumstantial evidence in capital cases requires stringent scrutiny to prevent reliance on fabricated or manipulated evidence. The Court found the retracted confession unreliable due to procedural flaws and lack of corroboration, the motive to be an afterthought, and the "last seen" evidence to be suspicious. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. Furthermore, invoking the principle that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, the Court also acquitted the non-appealing co-accused. The judgment reaffirms that even a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal, and circumstantial evidence must be inherently consistent to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence if the chain of events is broken?
  • Is a retracted confession sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish a motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Can a non-appealing co-accused be acquitted by the Supreme Court if their case is indistinguishable from that of the acquitted appellants?
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• (1)Hashim Qasim and 1 other (2) Jehangir Elahi vs (1)The State (2) Shoaib2017 SCP 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessionjuvenile justicebenefit of doubtcapital punishmentcriminal appealmedical evidencesniffer dog evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant criminal appeal challenged the convictions for murder, kidnapping, and unnatural intercourse. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution—including a retracted confession, last-seen evidence, and motive—was sufficient to sustain capital convictions. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted all accused, including the non-appealing co-accused. The Court held that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form an unbroken chain linking the accused to the crime; any missing link renders the evidence unreliable. It emphasized that retracted confessions, especially from juveniles, require independent corroboration and strict procedural compliance, which were absent here. Furthermore, the Court ruled that 'sniffer dog' evidence lacks legal admissibility and that motive evidence, if belatedly introduced, is suspect. The Court reiterated that even a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal, and medical evidence alone, without DNA matching, is insufficient to identify perpetrators in sexual assault cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is broken?
  • Is evidence derived from sniffer dogs admissible in criminal proceedings under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does a retracted confession by a juvenile require independent corroboration to support a capital conviction?
  • Can an appellate court extend the benefit of acquittal to a non-appealing co-accused if the prosecution's case is found to be fundamentally flawed?
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• Hashim Qasim & others vs The State & others2017 PLJ SC 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessioncapital punishmentlast seen evidencejuvenile justicebenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for murder, kidnapping, and unnatural intercourse. The core legal question is whether a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence—including a retracted confession, last seen evidence, and sniffer dog identification—can be sustained in a capital case. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances, as required by law. The Court found the retracted confession unreliable due to procedural irregularities and lack of corroboration, particularly concerning the juvenile status of the accused. Furthermore, the last seen evidence was deemed fabricated, the motive was introduced belatedly, and the sniffer dog evidence was found to lack legal admissibility under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Court established that in capital cases resting on circumstantial evidence, all circumstances must be interlinked in an unbroken chain; any missing link or reasonable doubt necessitates acquittal. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted, with the benefit of doubt extended to the non-appealing accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction in a capital case be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is broken?
  • Is evidence derived from sniffer dogs admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What are the essential requirements for a confession to be considered reliable in a criminal trial?
  • Does a retracted confession require independent corroboration to form the basis of a conviction?
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• Hasam-ud-Din and others vs Quetta Metropolitan Corporation through its2017 PSC 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  municipal propertyrent enhancementlocal governmentejectmentstatutory tenancypublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a High Court judgment concerning the enhancement of rent for shops owned by the Quetta Metropolitan Corporation and the potential ejectment of tenants. The core legal questions were whether the Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 applied to these municipal properties, thereby requiring judicial intervention for rent fixation, and whether the Corporation could initiate ejectment proceedings under the Balochistan Autonomous Bodies Immovable Property (Ejectment of Unauthorized Occupants) Ordinance, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the properties in question were specifically excluded from the purview of the Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 by virtue of government notifications. Consequently, the Corporation was not required to seek judicial fixation of fair rent. The Court further rejected a purported compromise agreement between the parties as it contravened the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, directing the petitioners to pay the rent determined by the Corporation's Rent Committee and upheld the applicability of the 1965 Ordinance for ejectment in cases of non-compliance. The principle established is that local body properties excluded from rent control legislation are subject to the Corporation's administrative rent determination and specific ejectment laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 apply to commercial properties owned by a local government body?
  • Can a local government body unilaterally enhance the rent of its properties without seeking judicial intervention under rent control laws?
  • Is a compromise agreement regarding the disposal or alienation of local council property valid if it violates the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010?
  • Are tenants of local government properties who refuse to execute fresh agreements at enhanced rates considered unauthorized occupants under the Balochistan Autonomous Bodies Immovable Property (Ejectment of Unauthorized Occupants) Ordinance, 1965?
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• Haroon-Ur-Rashid vs Lahore Development Authority, Etc2017 NLR Service 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-17
  writ jurisdictionstatutory interventionmaster and servantdisciplinary proceedingsPEEDA 2006judicial reviewservice tribunal jurisdictionreading down
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition filed by an employee of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) against his compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to review disciplinary proceedings conducted against an employee of a statutory body under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), despite the LDA’s internal service regulations being non-statutory. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the petition. The Court established that because the disciplinary action was initiated under the statutory PEEDA, 2006, it constituted a statutory intervention, rendering the action amenable to judicial review under Article 199. Furthermore, the Court clarified that employees of statutory bodies under Section 2(h)(i) of PEEDA, 2006 are not civil servants and cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. By applying the principles of reading down and severance to Section 19 of PEEDA, 2006, the Court held that the remedy before the Service Tribunal is restricted to civil servants, while employees of statutory bodies must seek redress through the High Court. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution maintainable against disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 for employees of a statutory body?
  • Do employees of a statutory corporation or authority fall within the definition of civil servants for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can the provisions of Section 19 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 be read down to exclude employees of statutory bodies from the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the existence of non-statutory service regulations preclude an employee of a statutory body from challenging disciplinary action taken under a statutory enactment like the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
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• Hamood Mehmood vs Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others2017 SCMR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-25
  Specific performanceAgreement enforcementDefiance of court orderDeposit of amountDismissal of suitLeave to appealSpecific Relief Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition seeking the reversal of a High Court of Sindh judgment dated 23.6.2017, pertaining to specific performance of an agreement. The core legal question addressed was whether a petitioner, who had shown complete defiance to court orders and failed to deposit the balance amount for property sought to be acquired through an agreement, was entitled to relief. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner had not complied with the court's order to deposit the balance amount, even after being given an opportunity. The Court held that it is mandatory for any person, whether plaintiff or defendant, seeking enforcement of an agreement under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, to apply to the Court for permission to deposit the balance amount on first appearance or on the date of institution of the suit. Any contumacious omission in this regard would lead to the dismissal of the suit or its decretal if filed by the other side. Finding no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal.

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• Haleem and others vs The State2017 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-19
  acquittalreappraisal of evidencedoubtful FIRdelayed autopsyinconsistent evidenceocular accountmedical evidenceweapon recoveryforensic evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns appeals filed by Haleem and others against a Lahore High Court judgment that converted their convictions from sections 302, 148, 149, and 460 PPC to section 396 PPC, altering some death sentences to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court undertook a reappraisal of the entire evidence. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the prosecution's case, particularly concerning the delayed FIR, inconsistent ocular account with medical evidence regarding the distance of the gunshot, non-recovery of the alleged light source (lantern), and questionable weapon and crime empty recoveries. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to these significant inconsistencies and doubts. Consequently, all appellants were acquitted, and their convictions and sentences were set aside. The judgment emphasizes that unexplained delays in FIR and autopsy, material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, and dishonest investigation render the prosecution's narrative unreliable, benefiting the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can unexplained delay in conducting postmortem examination cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Whether inconsistencies between ocular account and medical evidence can negate the presence of witnesses at the crime scene?
  • Can non-recovery of a crucial light source mentioned by witnesses render identification of assailants doubtful?
  • Does dishonest improvement in witness statements regarding specific roles of accused make their testimony unreliable?
  • When can the recovery of alleged crime empties and weapons be considered inconsequential in a criminal trial?
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• Haji Shahid Hussain and others vs The State and another2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  bail petitionHajj fraudfake travel agencyconstitutional jurisdictionsuo motu directivesstatutory obligationsMinistry of Religious Affairs
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing their pre-arrest bail petition in a case involving charges of fraud and running a fake travel agency that collected millions from citizens under the guise of arranging Hajj pilgrimages. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the gravity and prevalence of widespread Hajj and Umrah frauds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners were prima facie connected to the heinous crime and that courts must treat such religious frauds with strictness. The Court laid down the principle that regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs have a strict constitutional and statutory obligation to proactively prevent unauthorized Hajj tour operations, and issued comprehensive directives under Articles 184(3), 187, and 5(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan to mandate public awareness campaigns, updated official registries, and strict monitoring to curb fraudulent travel scams.

  Questions settled

  • Whether petitioners accused of running a fake Hajj travel agency and defrauding the public are entitled to the concession of bail?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to issue directives to government ministries and law enforcement agencies to curb fraudulent tour operations?
  • What are the statutory and constitutional obligations of state authorities and ministries in preventing widespread public scams relating to religious pilgrimages?
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• Haji Muhammad Nawaz vs Samina Kanwal and others2017 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-08
  Execution of decreeDowry articlesFamily CourtMarket valueGolden ornamentsDelay in executionEquity and justiceCode of Civil ProcedureWest Pakistan Family Courts ActLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from execution proceedings of a Family Court decree for the recovery of dowry articles. The central legal question concerned whether an executing court could direct payment of the market value of golden ornaments at the date of payment, rather than the value fixed in the original decree, especially after a decade-long delay in execution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the executing court was fully justified in ordering payment of the current market value of golden ornaments to ensure the decree's enforcement in its true spirit. It was clarified that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not strictly apply to Family Court proceedings, which are governed by general principles of equity, justice, and fair play. The Court reasoned that the alternative monetary value for dowry articles, fixed at the time of the decree, cannot remain static indefinitely, and directing payment at the prevalent market rate does not constitute going beyond the terms of the decree.

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• Haji Khan Bhatti vs Province of Sindh through Provincial Election2017 PLJ SC 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  local government electionsreserved seatsdistrict councilurban and rural areaselectoral rollsnomination papers rejectionsindh local government act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for a reserved seat for the District Council, Naushero Feroz, under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013. The Returning Officer, Appellate Authority, and High Court concurrently held that the petitioner, being an enrolled voter in an urban area (Municipal Committee, Moro), was ineligible to contest a reserved seat on a District Council constituted exclusively for the rural area. The core legal question was whether a candidate for a reserved seat of a District Council must be an enrolled voter within the rural area of the District or could be drawn from any electoral roll across the entire revenue District, including urban areas. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 35(1)(c) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 requires a candidate for an indirectly elected reserved seat of a Council to be an enrolled voter within the local limits and constituency of that very Council. The key principle laid down is that representation on a reserved seat is restricted to the local limits and specific constituency of the Council, thereby barring voters of urban councils from contesting reserved seats in rural District Councils.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate for a reserved seat of a District Council must be an enrolled voter of the rural area of the District?
  • Does Section 35(1)(c) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 permit an urban voter to contest a reserved seat in a rural District Council?
  • What is the distinction between the terms 'Ward' and 'the Council' under Section 35(1)(c) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013?
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• Haider Abbas vs FPSC through its Chairman2017 PLJ SC 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-24
  CSS Competitive Examinationquota allocationmerit quotawomen's quotaFederal Public Service Commissionrecruitment policyservice vacancy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a candidate in the CSS Competitive Examination-2011 from the Gilgit-Baltistan-FATA region, sought reallocation from the Inland Revenue Service to the Foreign Service. He argued that a vacancy in the Foreign Service, originally allocated to a female candidate under the women's quota who failed to join, should have been offered to him as a merit candidate. Additionally, he contended that a vacancy in the Foreign Service during the 2010 examination was improperly created due to insufficient quota fractions and should have been carried forward to 2011. The Supreme Court held that vacancies allocated to specific quotas, such as the women's quota, must be filled by candidates from that same category and cannot be transferred to merit quota candidates. Furthermore, the Court found that the allocation of vacancies in the 2010 examination was consistent with the established recruitment policy and rules. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Federal Public Service Commission's rejection of the petitioner's claim, noting that the representation was also time-barred, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vacancy reserved for a specific quota, such as the women's quota, be filled by a candidate from the merit quota if the original selectee fails to join?
  • Is the allocation of vacancies based on quota fractions in competitive examinations subject to judicial interference if it complies with the recruitment policy?
  • Does a candidate have a legal right to claim a vacancy that was reserved for a different quota category in a competitive examination?
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• Haider Abbas vs FPSC through Chairman2017 PLJ SC 344, 2017 SCMR 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-24
  CSS competitive examinationquota systemallocation of vacanciesmerit quotawomen quotacivil servicereallocationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by a candidate who appeared in the CSS Competitive Examination-2011 from the Gilgit-Baltistan-FATA region, seeking reallocation from the Inland Revenue Service to the Foreign Service. The core legal questions involve whether a lapsed vacancy originally allocated under a specific quota (women's quota) can be claimed by a candidate belonging to a different quota (merit quota), and whether the calculation and creation of vacancies based on fractions in a prior examination year were legally flawed. The Supreme Court held that vacancies remaining unutilized under a specific quota must be filled by a candidate belonging to the same quota category and cannot be shifted to another category, and that the calculation of fractions and creation of vacancies in the preceding examination were in accordance with the recruitment policy. The court laid down the principle that quota-specific vacancies must strictly adhere to their designated categories upon lapsing or reallocation, and belated representations challenging prior examination allocations are untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate on the merit quota claim a vacancy that originally fell vacant under the women's quota?
  • Whether a vacancy remaining unfilled under a specific quota can be allocated to a candidate from a different quota category?
  • Are representations challenging vacancy allocations made years after the selection process barred by time?
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• Hakeem and others vs The State2017 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-19
  murderidentification paradeevidentiary valuebenefit of doubtPolice Rules 1934criminal appeallife imprisonmentblood feud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a criminal case involving the murder of ten persons and injuries to fifteen others during an armed attack on a residence. The Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 302(b), 307 (now 324), and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing them to life imprisonment, which was subsequently maintained by the High Court. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court concerned the reliability of identification evidence and the procedural validity of the identification parade. The Supreme Court observed that the identification parade violated Rule 26.32(1)(d) of the Police Rules, 1934, as seven accused were mixed with only twenty-two dummies, and witnesses failed to assign specific roles to the accused during the process. The Court held that an identification parade conducted without attributing specific roles to the suspects or mixing multiple accused in a single parade is legally laconic and lacks evidentiary value. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants due to the prosecution's failure to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

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• Habib Bank Limited vs Haider Ladhu Jaffer and others2017 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-18
  dismissal for defaultrestoration of suitleave to appealcivil procedurestay of proceedingslimitationservice of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Habib Bank Limited against the restoration of a suit that had been dismissed for default. The Supreme Court of Pakistan identified several significant legal questions requiring extensive debate, specifically regarding the maintainability of a petition filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against a decree following a dismissal for default. The Court also sought to examine the diligence of the respondents in pursuing their remedy, the issue of limitation regarding the restoration application, the presumption of service of court processes, and the consequences of failing to file a form of address under Order VI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Finding these points to be of serious legal import, the Court granted leave to appeal. Furthermore, to prevent the appeal from becoming infructuous, the Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the trial court proceedings pending the final adjudication of the appeal, rejecting the request to allow the trial to continue up to the point of final judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable against a decree passed after the dismissal of a suit for default?
  • Does the failure to file a form of address under Order VI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 carry adverse legal consequences?
  • Can trial court proceedings be suspended pending the outcome of an appeal to prevent the appeal from becoming infructuous?
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• Habib Ahmad alais Habibi vs State2017 PLJ SC 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-06
  murderreduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesunproved motivedeath sentenceimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from the conviction of the appellant for qatl-i-amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code and his consequent sentence of death, which had been confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant the reduction of the appellant's death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on merits as the appellant did not press the appeal against conviction, noting the admission of firing, matching forensic evidence, and lack of independent proof for the plea of grave and sudden provocation. However, the Court held that the prosecution's failure to establish the asserted motive, coupled with previous conduct by the deceased insulting the appellant a couple of hours prior to the incident, contradictions in medical evidence, and the acquittal of a co-accused creating a dent in the eye-witnesses' veracity, constituted mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the conviction and compensation orders, and extended the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the asserted motive serve as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether inconsistencies in the medical evidence and acquittal of a co-accused can create a dent in eye-witness testimony warranting caution in sentencing?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment when the appellant does not press the appeal on the merits of the conviction?
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• Gulfam and another vs The State2017 SCMR 1189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  murderrobberyjoint identification paradechance witnessesbenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidencecapital punishmentrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to the appellants for murder and robbery under Sections 302(b) and 394 PPC. The prosecution alleged that the appellants murdered two individuals during an attempted robbery at a medical store at night. The Supreme Court, upon reappraising the evidence, identified several fatal flaws in the prosecution's case. Firstly, the source of light at the crime scene was never established, and the court held that criminal convictions cannot rely on mere presumptions of visibility. Secondly, the eye-witnesses were classified as 'chance witnesses' whose presence at the scene was doubtful and contradicted by medical evidence regarding who transported the deceased to the hospital. Thirdly, the court invalidated the joint identification parade, reiterating that holding a single parade for multiple accused persons is legally defective. Finally, the court found the recovery of weapons and a motorcycle to be inconsequential due to the lack of forensic linkage. Consequently, the court allowed the appeals, setting aside the convictions by extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants.

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• GuI Zaman vs Pakistan Rangers Sindh and others2017 P.S.C. 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-30
  condonation of delaylimitationprocedural lawdismissal for non-prosecutionlegal representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The primary legal questions addressed by the Court were whether a petition filed with a delay of one day could be condoned based on an assertion of a technical computer error, and whether the petition could proceed in the absence of instructions from the petitioner. The Court held that the explanation provided for the delay—a technical error of the computer—did not constitute a valid or sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed as misconceived. Furthermore, the Court observed that the learned counsel for the petitioner had no contact with the petitioner for six months and lacked fresh instructions to pursue the matter. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition on the dual grounds of being barred by time and for lack of instructions. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural delays require substantive justification and that legal representation requires active, current instructions from the client to maintain the viability of a petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim of a technical computer error constitute a valid ground for the condonation of a one-day delay in filing a petition?
  • Can a petition be dismissed when the petitioner's counsel lacks instructions to pursue the matter?
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• Govt. of KPK through Secretary Home & Tribal Affairs Department Peshawar2017 SCP 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-17
  Section 382-B Cr.P.C.remission of sentencepre-conviction detentionjudicial dutydiscriminatory treatmentjail manualcriminal justice system
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of KPK sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that granted a prisoner the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, along with general and special remissions, despite the original sentencing judgment being silent on these matters. The petitioner argued that seeking such benefits post-judgment amounted to an impermissible review of the original order and that the prisoner was ineligible for remissions due to the recovery of a mobile phone without a SIM card. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly rectified a technical omission. The Court established that judges have an obligatory duty to apply the law correctly, regardless of whether parties specifically plead it. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B is mandatory unless the sentencing court records cogent reasons for refusal. Regarding remissions, the Court ruled that denying them without proper inquiry into the alleged possession of a non-functional mobile phone constitutes discriminatory treatment, violating Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court permitted to rectify a technical omission regarding the grant of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. benefits after the original sentencing judgment?
  • Does the duty to apply the correct law to a case lie with the judge or the litigant?
  • Can a prisoner be denied general and special remissions solely on the basis of possessing a mobile phone without a SIM card?
  • Is the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B Cr.P.C. mandatory for a sentencing court?
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• Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through Secretary Energy & Power2017 P.S.C. 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  regularization of servicecivil servantcontract employmentproject employeessemi-autonomous bodystatutory interpretationdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether contract employees of the Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO), now the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization (PEDO), are entitled to regularization under Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act 1973. The Peshawar High Court had previously ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering their regularization. The Supreme Court set aside this judgment, holding that Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act 1973 applies exclusively to civil servants of the provincial government, not employees of semi-autonomous bodies like SHYDO/PEDO. The Court emphasized that the statutory definition of "civil servant" excludes contract and project-based employees. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the legislative intent behind the 2005 amendment was to address disparities for government employees on sanctioned posts, not project staff. Consequently, the Court held that project employees in semi-autonomous entities do not qualify for regularization under the cited provision. However, the Court granted the respondents a limited opportunity to present evidence of any similarly situated project employees who were regularized, allowing for potential relief if such discrimination is proven.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act 1973 apply to employees of semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Are project-based employees eligible for regularization under the KPK Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does the definition of 'civil servant' under the KPK Civil Servants Act 1973 include persons employed on a contract or project basis?
  • Does the KPK (Regularisation of Services) Act, 2009 apply to project employees?
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• Govt of KPK through Chief Secretary, Peshawar, Etc vs (in C.A.2017 NLR Service 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service quotadiscriminatory treatmentprovincial management servicerule amendmentcivil servantsequal protectionjudicial review of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of an amendment to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Management Service Rules, 2007, which restricted a 10% reserved quota for BPS-17 posts exclusively to ministerial staff of the Civil Secretariat, thereby excluding employees of attached departments. The respondents, employees of attached departments, challenged this exclusion as discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The High Court struck down the notification, viewing the amendment as discriminatory and mala fide. The core legal questions addressed are whether the government possesses the authority to restrict the quota to Secretariat staff via rule amendment, whether such an amendment constitutes discriminatory treatment under Article 25, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction to strike down such rules. The judgment examines the scope of the rule-making power under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the extent to which the judiciary can interfere with policy-based rule amendments. The court evaluates whether the exclusion of similarly situated employees from a competitive quota, despite performing comparable functions, violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection.

  Questions settled

  • Does the restriction of a 10% reserved quota for BPS-17 posts exclusively to Civil Secretariat staff, excluding attached department employees, constitute discriminatory treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to strike down statutory rules or notifications on the grounds of mala fides or discrimination?
  • Is the government competent to amend the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Management Service Rules 2007 to restrict eligibility for a reserved quota to a specific class of employees?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secy. Agriculture and other_3fb245702017 PLC (C.S) 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-24
  regularization of servicescontract employeesproject employeesProvincial Budgetcivil servantsconstitutional petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment resolves multiple appeals and petitions arising from disputes concerning the regularization of contract and project-based employees by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The core legal question is whether employees appointed on contract or project posts whose projects were subsequently brought under the regular Provincial Budget are entitled to regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009. The Supreme Court held that since the respondents were holding their posts on the cut-off date stipulated in Section 3 of the 2009 Act and their respective projects were transferred to the regular provincial budget and attached departments, their status as project employees ended and they fell squarely within the ambit of the Act. The Court emphasized that the overriding effect of the special enactment entitled them to regularization and that the government could not adopt a discriminatory policy of cherry-picking employees for regularization. Except for one appeal where judgment was reserved, the appeals filed by the government were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contract and project-based employees are entitled to regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009, when their projects are brought under the regular Provincial Budget?
  • Does Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009 cover employees holding contract appointments on the specified cut-off date?
  • Whether the Government can adopt a discriminatory policy of regularizing employees of certain projects while terminating similarly placed employees of other projects?
  • What is the overriding effect of Section 4A of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009 regarding inconsistent laws and rules?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department Peshawar and others vs Mehmood Khan2017 SCMR 2044 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-13
  Section 382-B CrPCremission of sentencepre-conviction detentionjudicial dutydiscriminatory treatmentJail Manualrectification of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa challenged a High Court order that granted a prisoner the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and associated jail remissions, which had been omitted in the original sentencing judgment. The core legal questions were whether such an omission could be rectified post-judgment without violating the prohibition on review, and whether the possession of a SIM-less mobile phone justified the denial of remissions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the application of mandatory statutory provisions like Section 382-B is the obligatory duty of the court, and technical omissions in a judgment can be rectified at any stage. The Court affirmed that jail authorities are bound to grant statutory detention benefits unless expressly refused by a court for cogent reasons. Furthermore, the Court ruled that denying remissions based on the possession of a SIM-less mobile phone, which constitutes a useless article, is discriminatory and violates Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The principle established is that judges bear the primary responsibility for applying correct law, regardless of counsel's submissions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rectify an omission to grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the original judgment has been passed?
  • Is the possession of a mobile phone without a SIM card a valid ground for denying a prisoner's remissions under the Jail Manual?
  • Does the duty to apply the correct law to a case lie with the judge or the litigants?
  • Is the denial of remissions to a prisoner while granting them to co-prisoners a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Energy and Power Department, Peshawar and others vs Ihsan Ullah and others2017 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-05
  regularization of servicescontract employeescivil servantsemi-autonomous bodyproject employeesstatutory interpretationservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that ordered the regularization of contract employees of the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organisation (PEDO), a semi-autonomous body. The core legal question was whether these employees, hired on temporary project posts, qualified for regularization under Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that the Respondents were not "civil servants" as defined by the Act, as they were not members of a provincial service or holding regular sanctioned posts within the provincial government. The Court clarified that Section 19(2) was enacted to address disparities for government employees on sanctioned posts, not to cover project-based employees in semi-autonomous entities. Furthermore, the Court rejected the Respondents' plea of discrimination, noting that they were not similarly situated to regularized employees. The principle established is that statutory regularization provisions for civil servants do not extend to project employees of semi-autonomous bodies, absent specific legislative inclusion. The appeals were partly allowed, with a limited opportunity for the Respondents to provide evidence of disparate treatment.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973 apply to employees of semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Are employees hired on temporary project posts entitled to regularization under the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the definition of 'civil servant' under the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973 include employees of semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Can a plea of discrimination be sustained based on the inadvertent regularization of a single project employee?
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• Ghulam Rasool and others vs Noor Muhammad and others2017 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-07
  bona fide purchaserSection 41 Transfer of Property Actostensible ownerrevenue recordinheritance mutationdeclaration suitco-owners
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for declaration challenging an unauthorized sale of inherited property. The suit land was originally owned by a deceased individual survived by four sons as joint owners, but due to an error or omission by revenue authorities in subsequent records, two brothers were omitted, allowing the other two brothers to sell the entire property via a revenue mutation. The Trial Court dismissed the suit based on the buyers' plea of being bona fide purchasers under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but the Appellate Court and High Court decreed the suit in favour of the omitted co-owners' legal heirs. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that for Section 41 to apply, four essential ingredients must co-exist, including express or implied consent of the real owners. Mere revenue entry omissions do not constitute consent, nor do they deprive true owners of title. Purchasers buying inherited land must examine the genesis of ownership, failing which they cannot claim the protection of being bona fide purchasers.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to claim protection as a bona fide purchaser under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Does the omission of a true owner's name from revenue records by revenue staff constitute implied consent to a transfer under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Does a purchaser of inherited property take reasonable care under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act if they fail to examine the genesis of title and previous inheritance entries in the revenue record?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and another vs The State and another2017 SCMR 2048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-11
  MurderConvictionCriminal AppealSentence AlterationDeath SentenceLife ImprisonmentMotiveMitigating CircumstanceEvidence Re-appraisalQuantum of Sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns criminal appeals and a criminal miscellaneous application stemming from a murder conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 PPC. The Supreme Court undertook a re-appraisal of the entire evidence to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice and to determine the appropriate quantum of sentence. The Court upheld the conviction of Muhammad Aslam under Section 302(b) PPC and his sentence of life imprisonment. For Wazir Ali, the conviction under Section 302(b)/34 PPC was affirmed, but his death sentence was altered to imprisonment for life. The Court held that while the prosecution successfully established guilt, the failure to prove the alleged motive behind the occurrence constituted a mitigating circumstance. It was reiterated that when the prosecution alleges a motive but fails to prove it during trial, this factor can be considered when determining the quantum of sentence, particularly in cases involving capital punishment. The complainant's appeal for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

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• Ghulam Hussain and others vs Administrator Thal Development2017 SC MR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-16
  leave to appealcondonation of delayrestoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutionoffice objectionssufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' applications for the restoration of a regular second appeal and for the condonation of a delay spanning over six years in removing office objections. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone an inordinate delay of six years in re-filing a restoration application and dismissing it for lack of sufficient cause. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to explain the prolonged delay or show sufficient cause, demonstrating a lack of diligence and seriousness in prosecuting their case. The Court affirmed the impugned order, ruling that discretionary relief of condonation of delay cannot be granted in the absence of a plausible explanation, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of six years in removing office objections on a restoration application can be condoned without showing sufficient cause?
  • Is the High Court justified in dismissing an application for restoration of an appeal for lack of prosecution and failure to diligently pursue the matter?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court declining to condone delay where no jurisdictional defect or illegality is pointed out?
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• Ghulam Ali Shah and others vs Muhammad Khalid and others2017 SCMR 1849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-10
  ex parte proceedingsburden of proofpre-emptioncollusive decreecivil revisionconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' Civil Revision. The dispute originated from a suit for declaration, possession, and permanent injunction filed by the petitioners, who alleged that a previous pre-emption decree obtained by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest was collusive and intended to defeat third-party rights, with the petitioners being the actual owners. Despite the respondents failing to appear and being proceeded against ex parte, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioners' suit, finding they failed to prove their case. This dismissal was upheld by the first Appellate Court and subsequently by the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the suit should have been decreed automatically due to the respondents' non-appearance. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that non-appearance does not mandate an automatic decree; the plaintiff must still prove their case. Finding no misreading or non-reading of evidence, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition, declining leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a defendant to appear in a suit mandate an automatic decree in favor of the plaintiff?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit for lack of evidence even if the defendant is proceeded against ex parte?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
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• Ghulam Abbas alias Gaman and others vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-07-12
  post-arrest bailcross-version FIRssudden fightpre-meditationcriminal appealbail bonds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three criminal petitions for post-arrest bail filed by several accused persons involved in cross-version FIRs registered at Police Station Wah Bachran, District Mianwali, arising from a violent incident where multiple individuals were killed or injured. The core legal question was whether the accused, involved in a mutual fight with cross-versions and uncertain culpability, were entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court observed that the incident appeared to be the result of a sudden fight, making it difficult to determine the initial aggressor at the pre-trial stage. Given the existence of two versions and the possibility of an absence of pre-meditation, the Court held that the accused were entitled to bail. The key principle laid down is that in cases of cross-versions involving a sudden fight where it is difficult to ascertain the aggressor at the bail stage, the court may grant bail to the accused parties, particularly when there is a mutual agreement or lack of objection from the opposing sides, as this serves the interests of justice pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can post-arrest bail be granted in cases of cross-versions where it is difficult to determine the aggressor?
  • Does the absence of pre-meditation in a sudden fight justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is the mutual consent of opposing parties a relevant factor for the court when considering bail in cross-case scenarios?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazala Tehsin Zohra vs Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and Another2017 NLR Civil 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-02
  paternity suitlegitimacy of childDNA testQanun-e-Shahadat OrderMuslim Personal Lawconclusive proofdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a declaratory suit filed by a husband seeking to deny the paternity of two children born during the subsistence of his marriage. The core legal question was whether a father can challenge the legitimacy of children born during a valid marriage and compel a DNA test to disprove paternity under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in allowing the DNA test. The Court ruled that Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, read with Section 2 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, establishes a presumption of legitimacy that is conclusive. Under Islamic law, paternity must be denied immediately upon birth; a belated denial is legally ineffective. Consequently, the Court held that the statutory presumption of legitimacy cannot be rebutted by scientific evidence like DNA testing in such circumstances. Furthermore, the Court noted that failing to implead the minor children in a suit challenging their paternity constitutes a fatal procedural flaw. The appeal was allowed, and the respondent's suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 create an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy for children born during a valid marriage?
  • Can a father deny the paternity of a child born during a valid marriage after the expiration of the immediate post-natal period under Muslim Personal Law?
  • Is a DNA test admissible to disprove the legitimacy of a child when the statutory requirements for conclusive proof under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 are met?
  • Is a declaratory suit challenging the paternity of a minor maintainable without impleading the minor as a party?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghania Hassan vs Shahid Hussain Shahid and another2017 PLJ SC 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-22
  dowerexecution proceedingsobjection petitionIslamic lawattachment of propertysummary adjudicationNikahnama
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from execution proceedings where the petitioner, claiming to be the wife of the judgment debtor, filed an objection petition asserting that certain immovable properties were her dower, established via a Nikahnama and a subsequent agreement, and thus immune from attachment. The core legal questions were whether dower can be increased after marriage and whether an executing court must summarily adjudicate such claims. The Supreme Court held that while it is a settled principle of Islamic law that dower may be increased after marriage by mutual consent or by the husband, the executing court correctly declined the objection petition. The Court reasoned that the executing court was not satisfied with the bona fides of the petitioner, particularly as the petitioner had already filed a separate suit to enforce her rights in the property. Consequently, the Court upheld the dismissal of the objection petition, affirming that summary execution proceedings are not the appropriate forum for determining disputed title claims when bona fides are in question.

  Questions settled

  • Can the amount of dower be increased after the marriage has been contracted?
  • Is an executing court required to adjudicate disputed claims of dower in a summary manner during execution proceedings?
  • Does a declaration by a husband regarding an increase in dower constitute sufficient proof under Muslim Law?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain Shah and others vs Government of Sindh and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-16
  contempt petitionoccupational groupre-allocationappointment by transfercivil servantsseniorityPolice Service of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  These three criminal original petitions sought the implementation of previous judgments of this Court regarding merit-based civil service, specifically challenging the re-allocation of the respondents from one occupational group to the Police Service of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the re-allocation or change of an occupational group of a civil servant amounts to an 'appointment by transfer' as declared ultra vires in prior judgments, and whether such re-allocation violates civil service rules. The Court held that allocation and re-allocation of occupational groups are distinct from routine postings and transfers or appointments by transfer governed by the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. Instead, re-allocation is akin to an initial appointment falling within the domain of the government under the relevant statutory provisions and rules, and it does not violate the principles laid down in the cited judgments. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the re-allocation or change of an occupational group of a civil servant is synonymous with an 'appointment by transfer' under civil service laws?
  • Does the re-allocation of a civil servant from one occupational group to another violate the principles laid down in previous judgments concerning civil service appointments?
  • Whether allocation and re-allocation of occupational groups fall within the domain of the Government under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977?
  • Does a delay of over twenty-six years in challenging the re-allocation of an occupational group affect the maintainability of such a challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Fida Hussain Shah (in Crl.O.P.47/2016) (2) Ghulam Haider Jamali (in2017 PLC (C.S.) 1229, 2017 PLJ SC 444, 2017 SCMR 798, 2017 SCP 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-16
  contempt of courtcivil serviceoccupational groupre-allocationappointment by transferlocus standilaches
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal original petitions sought the implementation of the Supreme Court's earlier judgments in Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh and Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh by challenging the re-allocation of the respondents' occupational groups to the Police Service of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the re-allocation of a civil servant's occupational group constitutes an unauthorized transfer or horizontal movement in violation of the court's previous rulings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that no contempt was established because the previous judgments did not address the allocation or re-allocation of occupational groups. The Court clarified that re-allocation is distinct from transfer under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973; instead, it is more akin to an initial appointment governed by Section 7(b)(ii) of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977. The Court also noted that the petitioners lacked locus standi to challenge the re-allocations, which had remained unchallenged by batchmates for over twenty-six years.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the re-allocation of a civil servant's occupational group is synonymous with or equivalent to an appointment by transfer under civil service laws?
  • Does the Supreme Court's prohibition on unauthorized horizontal transfers of civil servants apply to the re-allocation of occupational groups governed by the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the re-allocation of a civil servant's occupational group after a delay of more than twenty-six years without demonstrating locus standi?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain Shah & others vs Govt. of Sindh & others2017 PLJ SC 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil serviceoccupational groupre-allocationcontempt of courtappointment by transferservice structurecadre
  Summary & questions settled

  Through these Criminal Original Petitions, the petitioners sought the implementation of previous Supreme Court judgments, alleging that the re-allocation of certain civil servants to the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) was illegal and constituted contempt of court. The core legal question was whether the re-allocation of an occupational group constitutes an unauthorized "transfer" under the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, as interpreted in prior rulings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the previous judgments relied upon by the petitioners did not address the specific issue of allocation or re-allocation of occupational groups. The Court clarified that "re-allocation" is a distinct process from "transfer" or "appointment by transfer" and falls within the government's domain under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977. The Court established that re-allocation is more akin to an initial appointment rather than a horizontal movement between cadres, and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the re-allocation was arbitrary or that the previous judgments prohibited such administrative actions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the re-allocation of a civil servant from one occupational group to another constitute an 'appointment by transfer' under the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973?
  • Is the allocation and re-allocation of occupational groups for civil servants within the domain of the government under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977?
  • Can a civil servant's re-allocation to a different occupational group be equated to a horizontal transfer between cadres?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan, vs M/s. Sahib Jee etc. Islamabad etc.PTCL 2017 CL. 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanstatutory representationpower of reviewmaintainability of representationmal-administrationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a representation to the President of Pakistan under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in a review petition. The core legal question was whether a representation lies against an order dismissing a review petition filed under Section 14(8) of the Ordinance when the original recommendation remains undisturbed. The Supreme Court held that the remedy of representation under Section 32 is strictly confined to recommendations made under Section 11 of the Ordinance. The Court clarified that while the Ombudsman possesses review powers under Section 14(8), an order dismissing a review petition does not constitute a fresh recommendation and is therefore not subject to representation. However, if the Ombudsman, upon review, sets aside a previous decision and issues a new recommendation, such a recommendation becomes amenable to representation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that representation is not competent against a mere dismissal of a review petition that leaves the original recommendation intact.

  Questions settled

  • Is a representation to the President under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, maintainable against an order dismissing a review petition?
  • Does an order dismissing a review petition by the Federal Tax Ombudsman constitute a recommendation under Section 11 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Under what circumstances does a review order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman become subject to a representation before the President?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M_O Interior vs General (R) Pervez Musharraf and Others2017 NLR Criminal 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Exit Control Listinterim ordermerger of interim ordersconstitutional petitionright to travelfinal disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court of Sindh judgment that struck down a memorandum placing the name of a retired General on the Exit Control List (ECL). The core legal question was whether an interim order directing the placement of a person's name on the ECL survives the final disposal of the main petition, or whether it merges into the final judgment and stands vacated unless specifically protected. The appellant argued that the interim direction remained operative despite the final disposal of the petition, whereas the respondent contended that interim orders merge into the final order and stand vacated unless explicitly protected. The Supreme Court analyzed the operative parts of both the interim order and the final disposal order. It affirmed the principle of merger, holding that upon final disposal of a case, all interim orders merge into the final judgment and stand vacated unless specifically protected by the court, thereby dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interim order directing the placement of a name on the Exit Control List survive the final disposal of the main petition if not explicitly protected?
  • Whether interim orders merge into the final judgment and stand vacated upon the final disposal of the main proceedings?
  • Can the Federal Government maintain a restriction on travel based on an interim order after the main petition has been finally disposed of without any protective clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad and others vs Ali Naseem and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-11
  Civil ServantFederal Service TribunalContractual employmentMissions AbroadJurisdictionTermination of serviceService law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had accepted appeals from locally recruited staff of Pakistani Missions Abroad whose services were terminated. The core legal question was whether such locally recruited employees qualify as "Civil Servants" entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were recruited locally by Heads of Missions on a contract basis, as permitted by the Financial Management at Missions Abroad regulations. Consequently, they fall squarely within the exclusion provided in Section 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, which excludes persons employed on contract from the definition of "Civil Servant." The Court ruled that because the respondents were not Civil Servants, they lacked the standing to approach the Federal Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The key principle laid down is that local staff recruited by Pakistani Missions Abroad under specific employment contracts are not Civil Servants, and therefore, the Federal Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate their service-related grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Are persons locally recruited by Pakistani Missions Abroad considered civil servants under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals filed by locally recruited staff of Pakistani Missions Abroad?
  • Does a contract-based appointment exclude an employee from the definition of a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others2017 SCMR 969, 2017 SCP 187, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-13
  Civil servant promotionCentral Selection Board (CSB)Promotion criteriaDiscretionary marksObjective assessmentService recordDue processFairnessSupersessionDeferment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court dismissed appeals challenging a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which had declared the Central Selection Board's (CSB) criteria for awarding 15 discretionary marks, including an overriding effect of 5 marks for "integrity/general reputation/perception," as illegal and violative of established legal principles. The core legal question concerned the legality and propriety of promotion criteria for civil servants, specifically whether subjective assessments by the CSB, overriding objective service records, were permissible. The Court held that the impugned process lacked a structured, objective criterion, leading to arbitrariness and a whimsical approach. It found that reliance on the personal knowledge of board members, without tangible evidence or disclosed reasons, to supersede officers who met objective thresholds based on their service dossiers, violated principles of fairness, due process, and procedural propriety. The Court directed the Establishment Division to re-evaluate all affected cases by withdrawing the overriding effect of the 5 marks and ensuring promotion decisions are based on objective criteria derived from service dossiers.

  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad, etc.2017 P.S.C. 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentreview powerstatutory remedytax administrationmal-administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the scope of remedies available against orders passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman under the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether a representation to the President of Pakistan lies under Section 32 of the Ordinance against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in a review petition. The court held that a statutory representation under Section 32 is exclusively competent against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman made under Section 11 or a fresh recommendation resulting from a review order that sets aside the earlier decision. Conversely, an order simply dismissing a review petition without altering the original recommendation does not constitute a fresh recommendation and cannot be challenged via a representation to the President. The Supreme Court established the principle that statutory remedies such as a representation must be strictly construed according to the text of the governing enactment, dismissing the appeal and upholding the judgment of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a representation lie to the President of Pakistan under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • What types of decisions can be reviewed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • When does an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman give rise to a competent representation before the President?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PLJ SC 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanstatutory representationpower of reviewmal-administrationRevenue Divisionadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the statutory remedy of representation under the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether a representation to the President of Pakistan is maintainable against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in a review petition, specifically where the original recommendation remains unchanged. The Supreme Court held that while Section 32 of the Ordinance provides a remedy of representation against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman, this remedy is strictly construed. The Court clarified that a representation is only competent against a new recommendation passed pursuant to Section 11(1). If the Federal Tax Ombudsman, while exercising review powers under Section 14(8), dismisses a review petition without setting aside the original recommendation, such an order does not constitute a fresh recommendation and is therefore not subject to a representation before the President. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the statutory remedy is limited to substantive recommendations, not mere orders dismissing review petitions that leave the original recommendation intact.

  Questions settled

  • Is a representation to the President of Pakistan maintainable against an order of the Federal Tax Ombudsman dismissing a review petition where the original recommendation remains unchanged?
  • Does the power of review under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 extend to findings, recommendations, and other orders?
  • Under what circumstances does an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in review proceedings become subject to a representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PTD 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentpower of reviewstatutory remedytax administrationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court which allowed a constitutional petition challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan on a representation. The core legal question was whether the appellant department had the statutory remedy of a representation before the President of Pakistan against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 is competent only against a recommendation made under Section 11 or a new recommendation resulting from a review, but not against an order dismissing a review petition where the original recommendation was not set aside. The key principle laid down is that statutory remedies must be strictly construed according to the specific tenor and scope of the governing provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Revenue Division has the remedy of a representation before the President against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • Against which types of decisions of the Federal Tax Ombudsman is a representation competent under Section 32 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does an order dismissing a review petition by the Federal Tax Ombudsman constitute a fresh recommendation for the purpose of filing a representation?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentpower of reviewtax lawstatutory remedyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a tax dispute where the Federal Tax Ombudsman passed a recommendation in favor of respondent No. 1, which the appellant department sought to review rather than challenging via representation under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. After the review petition was dismissed, the appellant filed a representation to the President, which was accepted. The High Court allowed the respondent's constitutional petition against the President's order, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the appellant had the remedy of representation before the President against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a representation under Section 32 of the Ordinance is only competent against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman made under Section 11, or a new recommendation resulting from a review order that sets aside the earlier decision. An order merely dismissing a review petition without altering the original recommendation does not give rise to a fresh right of representation to the President. The key principle laid down is that statutory remedies must be strictly construed according to the specific tenor and provisions governing them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Revenue Division has the remedy of representation before the President of Pakistan against an order passed in review by the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • What is the scope of the power of review vested in the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 14(8) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the dismissal of a review petition by the Federal Tax Ombudsman constitute a fresh recommendation against which a representation can be filed under Section 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another2017 P.S.C. Crl. 363, 2017 SCMR 965, 2017 SCP 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-18
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementabsconsiondisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalcivil servantcriminal case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had converted the major penalty of compulsory retirement of a civil servant into a minor penalty and ordered his reinstatement. The respondent civil servant remained absent from duty without authorization after being nominated in a murder case and going underground as an absconder. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and he was compulsorily retired. The core legal question was whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absylonsion or being a fugitive from law in a criminal case can be condoned and justified for setting aside departmental disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that absconding from law does not constitute a valid or reasonable ground to justify unauthorized absence from duty, and condoning such absence would amount to rewarding unlawful conduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the major penalty of compulsory retirement, establishing the principle that a civil servant's act of absconding cannot excuse unauthorized absence from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from duty can be justified on the ground that the civil servant went underground as an absconder in a criminal case?
  • Can the act of absconsion or being a fugitive from law be regarded as a reasonable ground to explain absence from government service?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal is justified in converting a major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty based on an employee's involvement in criminal charges and subsequent absconsion?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another2017 P.S.C. Crl. 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsabsconsioncivil servantmajor penaltyservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a civil servant, was absent from duty without authorization following his involvement in a criminal murder case. Despite multiple notices to resume duty, he failed to respond, leading to disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of a major penalty of compulsory retirement. The Service Tribunal subsequently converted this major penalty into a minor penalty, citing his absconsion as justified due to the criminal charges and subsequent acquittal. The Federation of Pakistan appealed this decision. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's voluntary act of going 'underground' to evade law enforcement while facing criminal charges did not constitute a valid or reasonable ground to justify unauthorized absence from service. The Court emphasized that condoning such absence would improperly reward fugitive behavior and demonstrate a lack of trust in the judicial system. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the major penalty of compulsory retirement originally imposed by the department.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absconsion of a civil servant to evade arrest in a criminal case constitute a valid ground for condoning unauthorized absence from duty?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with a departmental major penalty imposed for unauthorized absence when the civil servant admits to being a fugitive from law?
  • Is the act of going underground to avoid criminal prosecution a reasonable explanation for failing to attend official duties?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and 20 others vs Dr. Muhammad Arif and 9 others2017 SCP 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil service promotionCentral Selection Boarddiscretionary marksdue processservice dossierarbitrary administrative actionPerformance Evaluation Reports
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an Islamabad High Court judgment that declared the Central Selection Board's (CSB) promotion criteria for civil servants illegal. The core legal question was whether the Establishment Division could introduce a discretionary formula allocating 15 marks—including 5 overriding marks for integrity and reputation—that allowed the CSB to supersede officers based on members' personal knowledge rather than objective service records. The Supreme Court held that the impugned criteria were arbitrary, vague, and lacked the necessary structured objectivity, thereby violating the principles of fairness and due process. The Court affirmed that promotion decisions must be based on tangible, objective evidence found in an officer's service dossier, such as Performance Evaluation Reports and Training Evaluation Reports, rather than subjective, unrecorded impressions of board members. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, directing the Establishment Division to re-evaluate the affected officers' cases by removing the overriding discretionary marks and ensuring the process adheres to established promotion policies and objective criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Central Selection Board override objective service records for civil servant promotions based on the subjective personal knowledge of its members?
  • Does the allocation of discretionary marks in promotion criteria without a structured, objective basis violate the principles of fairness and due process?
  • Is a civil servant who meets the prescribed eligibility threshold entitled to have their promotion considered based on tangible service records rather than arbitrary assessments?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Public Service Commission through Secretary vs Anwar-Ul-Haq2017 PLC (C.S.) 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-30
  up-gradationpromotionsubstantive gradeselection gradelength of servicejurisdiction of service tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) challenged a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) that had set aside an order declining the respondent's representation for the grant of BPS-19, directing his re-designation as Senior Private Secretary. The respondent originally entered service in 1978 and was eventually promoted to Private Secretary (BPS-17) in 2011, after which his post was upgraded to BPS-18 under an Office Memorandum. The core legal question was whether a civil servant could claim up-gradation to BPS-19 based on length of service computed from lower grades under the Establishment Division O.M. dated June 2, 1983, and whether up-gradation constitutes a promotion under the civil service laws. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that up-gradation is not a promotion and is personal to incumbents of isolated posts to address stagnation rather than a regular promotion governed by section 9(1) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Furthermore, the Court held that the Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction to entertain matters relating solely to up-gradation, and that the respondent's service calculations were flawed as selection grades in lower substantive posts could not be computed as higher grade service for promotion or up-gradation eligibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether up-gradation of a post constitutes a promotion under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain issues relating to the up-gradation of civil servants?
  • How is past service in lower grades and selection grades to be computed for determining eligibility for higher grades under the Establishment Division Office Memorandum dated June 2, 1983?
  • Can a civil servant claim up-gradation to a higher grade as a matter of right based merely on length of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz alias Fiazi vs The State2017 SCMR 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-09
  murdercapital punishmentdeath sentence alterationlife imprisonmentocular evidencemedical corroborationsingle fire shotmitigating circumstanceunproved motive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court, subsequently confirmed by the Lahore High Court, for causing the death of the deceased by a firearm injury. The Supreme Court considered whether the conviction was justified on the evidence and whether the case warranted the imposition of capital punishment. Upon evaluating the ocular testimony of two eyewitnesses, fully corroborated by medical evidence, the Court affirmed that the prosecution had proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court observed that only a single shot was fired without repetition and that the motive alleged by the prosecution suffered from an unreliable improvement. Consequently, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b), PPC, but reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, with compensation under Section 544-A and the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence for an offence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be commuted to life imprisonment where only a single shot was fired without repetition?
  • Does an unreliable or improved motive serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when ocular testimony is corroborated by medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz Ahmad vs The State2017 SCP 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-17
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencecapital punishmentcriminal appealacquittalburden of proofreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, Zafar Iqbal, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically the theory of 'last seen' evidence, alleging the appellant abducted the complainant's child and subsequently lured the deceased to his death. The Supreme Court re-appraised the evidence and found the prosecution's narrative riddled with improbabilities, including unexplained gaps in the chain of custody and contradictory timelines regarding the deceased's death. The Court held that for circumstantial evidence to support a capital conviction, it must form an unbroken chain connecting the accused to the crime, which was absent here. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that 'last seen' evidence requires corroboration from independent, unimpeachable sources, which the prosecution failed to provide. Concluding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, noting a serious miscarriage of justice, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • What are the fundamental principles required to establish a case based on 'last seen' evidence?
  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on uncorroborated circumstantial evidence?
  • What is the standard of scrutiny required for circumstantial evidence in criminal cases?
  • Does the failure to provide an unbroken chain of evidence in a circumstantial case necessitate acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 185, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 484, 2020 SCMR 78, PLJ 2017 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-09
  terrorismprivate enmitycompromiseDiyatAnti-Terrorism Actcriminal appealmens reajurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns a petitioner convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for a murder committed within court premises. Following a valid compromise between the petitioner and the legal heirs of the deceased, the Court addressed whether the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 could be sustained given the motive of private enmity. The Supreme Court held that the compromise effectively resolved the murder charge, warranting acquittal under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Regarding the terrorism charge, the Court ruled that the conviction could not be sustained. It established the principle that while the location of an offense may confer jurisdiction upon Anti-Terrorism Courts, the substantive definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 requires proof that the act was designed to create fear, insecurity, or terror in society. Because the murder was motivated by private revenge rather than an intent to terrorize the public, it did not constitute terrorism, leading to the petitioner's acquittal on all counts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed within court premises automatically constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 based on the consequence of the act or the design of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be sustained if the underlying motive for the crime is private enmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Fancy Foundation vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi2017 PLJ SC 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-13
  adventure in the nature of tradeincome from businesscapital gainstax exemptioncharitable trustburden of proofisolated transactionincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a charitable foundation, challenged the tax assessment on the surplus generated from the sale of immovable property, which the tax department classified as "income from business" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether an isolated transaction of buying and selling property constitutes an "adventure in the nature of trade" under Section 2(11) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the transaction did not constitute an "adventure in the nature of trade." The Court established that "business" generally connotes a continuous, systematic, and organized course of activity. While a single transaction can theoretically be an adventure in the nature of trade, the burden of proof rests on the tax department to provide concrete evidence of trading intent, which was absent here. The Court affirmed that the mere expectation of profit or the intention to resell does not automatically convert a capital investment into a business venture. Consequently, the surplus was not taxable as business income, and the assessment order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single, isolated transaction of buying and selling property constitute an 'adventure in the nature of trade' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that a transaction constitutes an 'adventure in the nature of trade'?
  • Is the mere intention to resell property at a profit sufficient to classify a transaction as a business activity for tax purposes?
  • Does the definition of 'business' in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 require a continuous or systematic course of activity?
  Read full judgment →
• Famia Ijaz and 2 others vs Ijaz Hameed and 2 others2017 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-09
  civil appealfamily maintenanceex parte decreeconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a family maintenance dispute where the appellants filed a suit for maintenance, resulting in an interim order and a subsequent decree under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. Dissatisfied with the quantum, the appellants appealed, and the appellate court enhanced the maintenance ex parte. The private respondent filed an application to set aside the ex parte judgment and concurrently invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court through a writ petition to challenge the execution proceedings. The High Court allowed the writ petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court could competently exercise its constitutional jurisdiction while an application for setting aside the ex parte decree remained pending before the lower forum. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was incompetent as alternative remedies were being pursued and no final order had been passed on the pending setting-aside application. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, revived the pending application for decision on merits, and allowed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction when an application for setting aside an ex parte judgment and decree is still pending before the lower forum?
  • Whether a writ petition challenging execution proceedings is competent while a remedy against the underlying ex parte decree is being pursued?
  Read full judgment →
• Falak Sher---Petitioner vs Province of Punjab and others---2017 SCMR 1882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-25
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factimmovable propertytitle claimleave to appealagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioner regarding a property dispute. The petitioner claimed ownership of half of a piece of land based on an alleged agreement dated 17.12.1989, asserting that he had invested funds to make the land cultivable for the original allottee. Following the allottee's death, the petitioner alleged that the legal heirs agreed to transfer half the land to him. After failing in two successive rounds of litigation in civil courts and within the revenue hierarchy, the petitioner sought relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted concurrent findings of fact against the petitioner across all lower fora. The Court held that title to immovable property cannot be claimed solely on the basis of an agreement. Finding no illegality or irregularity in the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissed the petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can title to immovable property be claimed solely on the basis of an agreement?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in the absence of illegality or irregularity?
  • Is a second suit for declaration and consequential relief maintainable after the failure of a previous suit regarding the same property?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Jalani alias Imran Mama vs The State and others2017 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-08
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirylast-seen evidencecircumstantial evidencemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby post-arrest bail was refused to the petitioner in a murder case registered under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the murder was unwitnessed, the petitioner was not named as a culprit in the FIR, the recovery of mobile telephone sets lacked identification marks connecting them to the deceased, and no connection was established between the recovered handcart and the crime. Holding that the remaining piece of last-seen evidence required deeper scrutiny regarding its proximity, the Court concluded that the case fell within the purview of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the petitioner was admitted to bail, laying down the principle that tentative assessment of weak circumstantial and last-seen evidence can warrant post-arrest bail under the regime of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unwitnessed murder with weak circumstantial evidence qualifies as a case for further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can unverified recoveries of mobile telephone sets and a handcart without identification marks serve as a strong basis to refuse post-arrest bail?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when named in the FIR merely as an acquaintance rather than a direct culprit?
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• Executive District Officer (Revenue) Bahawalpur and others vs Muhammad Attique and another2017 SCMR 399, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-21
  service appealantedated promotionDepartmental Promotion Committeeseniority-cum-fitnessillegal reservationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal with leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, whereby respondent No. 1's service appeal was accepted and he was directed to be considered for antedated promotion as Naib Tehsildar from the date a vacancy was improperly reserved for another candidate. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can be denied promotion and whether an antedated promotion is justified when a vacancy is illegally reserved and the senior candidate is ineligible due to pending inquiries or being posted out of the district. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Departmental Promotion Committee acted with mala fide by illegally reserving a post for an ineligible candidate who was working out of the district, thereby bypassing the next eligible and senior person. The Court upheld the Tribunal's judgment and dismissed the appeal, establishing that manipulation in promotion processes to favour specific candidates through illegal reservation of posts vitiates the departmental action and justifies judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can claim consideration for promotion when a vacancy is illegally reserved for another candidate?
  • Does the reservation of a promotional post for an ineligible candidate working out of the district amount to mala fide?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a Service Tribunal's judgment that corrects an injustice in departmental promotion?
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• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and others vs Federal Government, M_O Defence through Chief of the Army Staff and others2017 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-23
  civil review petitionField General Court MartialPakistan Army Actcode of criminal procedurecompromisejurisdictiondeath sentencearmed forces
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from civil review petitions and a miscellaneous application seeking review of a prior judgment of the Supreme Court and permission to place on record a compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioners, convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, argued that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding compromise are applicable, enabling their acquittal. The core legal question was whether ordinary criminal procedure provisions regarding compromises apply to convictions under special military laws, and whether the Supreme Court in its review jurisdiction can entertain such compromises or assume powers of pardon and remission specifically vested in military and executive authorities. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions and the miscellaneous application, holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to matters governed by special laws like the Army Act unless explicitly provided. The Court established that pardons, remissions, and suspensions are exclusively within the domain of the Federal Government or the Chief of Army Staff under the Army Act, and the Supreme Court cannot assume such jurisdiction, particularly in its limited review jurisdiction under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 applicable to matters governed by a special law such as the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court in its review jurisdiction accept a compromise between a convict and legal heirs to acquit a person tried and sentenced by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who is empowered to grant pardons, remissions, and suspensions under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • What is the scope of review under Article 188 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and others vs Federal Government, M/oK.L.R. 2017 SC 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army Act 1952compromisereview jurisdictionspecial lawSection 345 CrPCcoram non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil review petitions and a civil miscellaneous application were filed seeking review of the Supreme Court's judgment upholding convictions and death sentences passed by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act 1952. The petitioners sought acquittal based on a compromise entered into with the legal heirs of the deceased, arguing that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically Section 345(2), applied by virtue of Section 1(2) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that under Section 1(2) and Section 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Code does not apply to proceedings governed by a special law like the Pakistan Army Act 1952 unless explicitly provided. The power to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions in such cases rests exclusively with the designated military authorities under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act 1952. Furthermore, court intervention regarding armed forces actions is restricted unless the proceedings suffer from mala fides, lack of jurisdiction, or are coram non judice, none of which applied here.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to trials and offences governed by the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court accept a compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in cases tried under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Which authority holds the jurisdiction to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions for sentences passed under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
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• Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and another vs Federal Government2017 PLJ SC 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army ActCode of Criminal ProcedureSpecial LawReview jurisdictionPardon and remissionJurisdictional error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Review Petitions filed by individuals convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The petitioners sought to challenge their convictions by invoking the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically arguing that a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased should be accepted. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and whether the Court could exercise review jurisdiction to accept such a compromise. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, does not apply to matters governed by special laws like the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, unless specifically provided. The Court affirmed that under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, the authority to grant pardons or remissions rests exclusively with the Federal Government or designated military officers. Consequently, the Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to interfere absent proof of mala fide, jurisdictional error, or coram non judice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise review jurisdiction to accept a compromise in a case decided by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who possesses the authority to grant pardons, remissions, and suspensions for convictions under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise jurisdiction over actions taken by the Armed Forces despite the bar in Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• (1) Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain (in CRP 87/15) (2) Ex-Gunner2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army ActCode of Criminal ProcedureSpecial LawReview jurisdictionCompromiseJurisdictional bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil review petitions filed by individuals convicted and sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The petitioners sought to challenge their convictions by invoking the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically arguing that a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased should be accepted under Section 345(2) of the Code. The core legal question was whether the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, applies to proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, allowing for judicial intervention via compromise. The Court held that the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, is a special law, and pursuant to Sections 1(2) and 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Code does not apply to matters governed by special laws unless expressly provided. The Court affirmed that powers regarding pardons and remissions reside exclusively with the Federal Government or the Chief of Army Staff under Section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, ruling it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such compromises or interfere in the special military trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Can a court accept a compromise between a convict and legal heirs in a case tried by a Field General Court Martial?
  • Who possesses the authority to grant pardons, remissions, or suspensions under the Pakistan Army Act 1952?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 available to entertain compromises in military court convictions?
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• Engineers Study Forum (Registered) and another vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 PLJ SC 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil review petitionreview jurisdictionerror apparent on the face of recordaudi alteram partemregulation of court proceedingsre-hearing of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed by the Engineers Study Forum (Regd) seeking review of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioners also filed a miscellaneous application seeking an opportunity for further hearing, alleging that their arguments were not fully heard. The core legal questions were whether the court is obligated to provide indefinite hearing time to counsel and whether the grounds raised by the petitioners satisfied the criteria for review jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the application for further hearing, holding that it is the function of the Court to regulate proceedings and ensure adequate, not infinite, time for arguments. The Court further dismissed the main review petition, ruling that review jurisdiction is limited to errors apparent on the face of the record and does not permit the re-hearing of a decided case. The Court emphasized that review cannot be used to re-argue points already consciously decided or to introduce new grounds not raised during the original proceedings, reaffirming that the power of review is strictly circumscribed by established legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to a fair hearing entitle a counsel to argue a case for an indefinite period or to their heartfelt satisfaction?
  • Is the court required to grant a re-hearing of a case under the guise of a review petition?
  • What are the permissible grounds for exercising review jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Can grounds not urged or raised at the time of the original hearing be introduced in a review proceeding?
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• Ehsan-Ul-Haq alias Shani vs The State and others2017 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryFIRcriminal investigationbail bondChallan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Ehsan-ul-Haq alias Shani, in a case involving murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was not named in the initial FIR but was implicated during the investigation through a replacement of another accused. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was not alleged to have caused the fatal injury to the deceased, and significant confusion existed in the investigation record regarding the attribution of firearm injuries to the co-accused. Furthermore, the investigation was finalized, and the Challan had been submitted, rendering the petitioner's continued physical custody unnecessary for investigative purposes. The Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the petitioner to bail subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of an accused's name during investigation as a replacement for another accused, without direct attribution of the fatal injury, constitute a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the continued physical custody of an accused necessary for investigation purposes after the Challan has been submitted to the trial court?
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• Dr. Muhammad Tariq vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-07
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdishonouring of chequeprohibitory clausedelay in lodging FIRleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the grant of post-arrest bail to respondent No. 2 by the High Court in a case involving an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions relate to whether unexplained delay in lodging a criminal complaint and the non-attraction of the prohibitory clause warrant the cancellation of post-arrest bail already granted by a competent court. The Supreme Court held that where the criminal complaint was instituted after an unexplained delay of over three years, the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the investigation is complete, a civil recovery suit is pending, and there is no allegation of misuse of bail, interference with the High Court's discretion to grant bail is unwarranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused. The key principles laid down include that considerations for grant of bail differ from those for its cancellation, and the court is generally slow to cancel bail after the submission of a challan when no abuse of concession is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained delay in instituting a criminal complaint for an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is a relevant consideration in bail matters?
  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 attract the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting post-arrest bail when the investigation is finalized and no misuse of bail is alleged?
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• Dr. Farhat Abbas and others vs Dr. Mehmood-Ul-Hassan and others2017 PLJ SC 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  medical faculty appointmentservice lawsub-specialty promotionultra viresPMDC regulationsteaching experiencestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside the promotion of Dr. Farhat Abbas as an Associate Professor of Cardiology. The core legal question was whether the appellant, possessing an FCPS in Medicine, was eligible for the sub-specialty promotion under the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan, 2011. The respondents argued that only those with specific cardiology qualifications were eligible. The Supreme Court held that the promotion was valid. The Court interpreted Regulation 19 of the 2011 Regulations, which explicitly allows candidates with general qualifications (FCPS, MD, or MS in General Medicine or Surgery) to be appointed to sub-specialty positions provided they possess the requisite teaching experience. Furthermore, the Court established that once such a candidate attains the post of Assistant Professor in a sub-specialty, they are not subordinate to specific sub-specialty degree holders for subsequent promotions. Finding no basis to declare the regulation ultra vires the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and dismissed the original writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Regulation 19 of the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan 2011 allow candidates with general medical qualifications to be appointed to sub-specialty positions?
  • Can a candidate holding a general medical qualification be promoted to Associate Professor in a sub-specialty if they have the requisite teaching experience?
  • Is Regulation 19 of the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate & Postgraduate Medical & Dental Institutions of Pakistan 2011 ultra vires the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Ordinance 1962?
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• Dr. Faisal Masud and anothers vs Umer Rasool, Director General, Lahore Development Authority, Lahore and another2017 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-02
  right to propertyLDAallotment of plotscompromisecompensationequivalent plotsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of their writ petitions concerning the arbitrary replacement of their residential plots in Johar Town, Lahore, following a judicial compromise between the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and certain housing schemes. The core legal question was whether the LDA could deprive property owners of their acquired plots and compensate them with plots of inferior location without violating the fundamental right to property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that compensation for land acquired and subsequently compromised must satisfy the rule of equivalence in both size and location, meaning a plot on a 9-meter road cannot substitute for a plot on a 40-meter road. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the LDA to allot alternative available plots of equivalent value and location (Plots Nos. 5A and 5B, Block R) to the petitioners within two months. The key principle laid down is that state authorities must strictly fulfill promises of equivalent compensation to protect citizens' fundamental right to property under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Lahore Development Authority is legally bound to provide plots of equivalent size and location when displacing property owners due to a judicial compromise?
  • Does the allotment of a plot on a 9-meter road satisfy the requirement of equivalent compensation for the deprivation of a plot located on a 40-meter road?
  • Does the deprivation of appropriately located property by a state authority violate the fundamental right to property enshrined under Article 23 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Dr. Ehsan-Ul-Haq Khan and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S) 679, 2017 P.S.C. 509, 2017 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-30
  civil service seniorityinter se senioritydirect recruits vs promoteesBPS-18 promotionres judicataCivil Servants Act 1973Federal Service Tribunalindolence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned a dispute over inter se seniority in BPS-18 between directly appointed civil servants and later-promoted officers. The respondents (Nos. 3 and 4) were originally senior to respondent No. 5 in BPS-17 as per the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) merit list. However, an altered 1992 seniority list led to respondent No. 5 being promoted to BPS-18 first in 1996. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 challenged this late and, although the Service Tribunal restored their BPS-17 seniority in 2002, it declined to backdate their promotions. Meanwhile, the appellants were directly recruited to BPS-18 in 2007 after passing an FPSC examination that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 failed. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were only promoted to BPS-18 in 2007 and subsequently claimed seniority over the direct inductees. The Supreme Court held that under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, seniority in a promoted post takes effect from regular appointment. Because respondents Nos. 3 and 4 remained indolent and the earlier unappealed Tribunal decision operated as res judicata, their BPS-18 seniority could not supersede direct recruits appointed years prior.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior unappealed judgment of the Service Tribunal declining retrospective promotion operate as res judicata against subsequent claims for backdated seniority?
  • Can civil servants promoted to a higher post claim seniority over direct recruits appointed years prior to their promotion under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does indolence in challenging an altered seniority list prevent civil servants from unsettling established seniority positions of direct inductees?
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• Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Lahore vs Secretary Co-operatiave2017 P.S.C. 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  co-operative societiesarbitration awardrevisional jurisdictionlimitation periodplot cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing writ petitions filed by the appellants against the dismissal of their appeals by the Secretary, Co-operative Department. The dispute originated when the managing committee of the appellant cooperative housing society cancelled certain residential and commercial plots allotted to a member. The member challenged the cancellations before the Registrar Co-operative Societies, and the matter was referred to arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement. The panel of arbitrators set aside the cancellation orders through unanimous awards. The appellants' appeals against the awards before the Secretary, Co-operative Department were dismissed as time-barred, and subsequent writ petitions were also dismissed. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of appeals and revisions against arbitration awards under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, and whether such awards can be challenged directly without resorting to Section 54-A. The Supreme Court held that an award given by a panel of arbitrators is neither appealable under Section 64 nor subject to revision under Section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, because arbitrators are not subordinate to the Secretary or the Registrar. The Court laid down that an aggrieved party must challenge an arbitration award through an application to the Registrar under Section 54-A of the Act, and appeals cannot be treated as revisions under Section 64-A where the statutory prerequisites and subordination are lacking. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal or revision lies against a unanimous award given by a panel of arbitrators under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Can the Provincial Government treat a time-barred appeal as a revision under Section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, against proceedings of an arbitrator committee?
  • What is the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by an arbitration award under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Are arbitrators appointed under Section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, subordinate officers to the Registrar or the Secretary Co-operatives?
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• Defence Housing Authority (DHA) Lahore vs Secretary Cooperative2017 P.S.C. 1163, 2017 SCMR 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-14
  co-operative societiesarbitration awardrevisional jurisdictionlimitation periodcancellation of plotssubordinate officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing writ petitions filed by the appellants against orders concerning the cancellation of residential and commercial plots. The core legal questions involved whether an appeal or revision under sections 64 and 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 lies against an award given by a panel of arbitrators, and whether such an award is vitiated if issued beyond the two-month period stipulated under Rule 32 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, 1927. The Supreme Court held that a unanimous award given by a panel of arbitrators is neither appealable under section 64 nor subject to revision under section 64-A, because arbitrators are not subordinate officers to the Secretary or the Registrar; instead, the remedy against an award lies through an application to the Registrar under section 54-A. The Court further held that the time limit for arbitration awards under Rule 32 is extensible by the Registrar and cannot be treated as a nullity without substantiating material. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal under section 64 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 lie against an award given by a panel of arbitrators?
  • Can the revisional power under section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 be exercised against an award rendered by an arbitration committee?
  • Whether the time period for rendering an award under Rule 32 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, 1927 is extendable by the Registrar?
  • What is the proper statutory remedy for a party aggrieved by an arbitration award under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
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• Controller of Military Accounts (RC) Education Cell, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Zafar, Assistant Professor and another2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pay protectionad hoc civil servantsurplus employeeservice appealtermination of serviceFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Controller of Military Accounts against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted pay protection to respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 was initially employed on an ad hoc basis in BPS-17 and was subsequently terminated pursuant to a government decision, accepting a lower post in BPS-14. Years later, he was granted pay protection, which the department later sought to recall and recover. The core legal question was whether an ad hoc civil servant, whose services were terminated due to a government decision and who was accommodated in a lower post, is entitled to the benefit of pay protection under Section 11-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that ad hoc employees are regarded as civil servants under the law and that respondent No. 1 was entitled to pay protection as he was rendered surplus due to a government decision and appointed to a lower post without fault of his own. The petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that ad hoc civil servants qualify as civil servants for the purposes of statutory protections, including pay protection when rendered surplus and accommodated in a lower post under Section 11-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc civil servant is entitled to pay protection under Section 11-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 when accommodated in a lower post?
  • Can an ad hoc employee be considered a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the termination of an ad hoc employee pursuant to a government re-organization amount to being rendered surplus for the purposes of pay protection?
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• Controller of Military Accounts (RC) . Education Cell, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Zafar, Assistant Professor and another2017 PLC (C.S.) 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  pay protectionad hoc employeecivil servantsurplus employeeservice appealtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition filed by the department against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the withdrawal of pay protection granted to respondent No. 1. The core legal question is whether an ad hoc civil servant whose services were terminated pursuant to a government decision and who accepted a lower post is entitled to the benefit of pay protection under section 11-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that ad hoc employees are regarded as civil servants under the law and that the termination of respondent No. 1's ad hoc service in pursuance of a government decision effectively rendered him surplus, thereby qualifying him for pay protection upon appointment to a lower post. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the entitlement to pay protection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc civil servant is entitled to the benefit of pay protection when appointed to a lower post pursuant to a government decision?
  • Does an ad hoc employee fall within the definition of a civil servant for the purposes of statutory protections?
  • Whether the termination of ad hoc service due to a general government decision can be treated as rendering an employee surplus under Section 11-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax. vs M/s. Gilani Transport Company.PTCL 2017 CL. 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-21
  Presumptive Tax Regimeadditional taxcharging provisionstrict constructiontax liabilityincome tax appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant's appeal regarding the levy of additional tax. The core legal question was whether additional tax under section 89 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, could be levied and recovered for a delayed tax payment falling under the Presumptive Tax Regime governed by section 80-C(4) of the Ordinance, which falls under Chapter VIII. The Supreme Court held that section 89 empowers the department to levy and recover additional tax only when an assessee fails to pay tax levied under Chapter VII or a penalty levied under Chapter XI. The Court laid down the principle that charging provisions, such as section 89, must be strictly construed in favour of the subject, and their scope cannot be extended beyond the situations explicitly visualized and incorporated therein.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional tax under section 89 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 can be levied for delayed tax payments arising under section 80-C(4) of the Ordinance?
  • Are charging provisions required to be strictly construed in favour of the subject?
  • Does the scope of section 89 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 extend beyond taxes levied under Chapter VII and penalties levied under Chapter XI?
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