Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• FAZAL MUHAMMAD vs TAJ1974 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-06
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyagricultural landtemporary allotteeconfirmed allotteeRehabilitation Settlement Scheme
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This civil appeal addressed whether the sale of evacuee agricultural land by an allottee under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is pre-emptiable under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The appellant filed a suit for possession by pre-emption against the sale of land allotted to the vendor, which was previously dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that the property was evacuee property barred from such suits under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court held that sales by confirmed allottees and permanent transferees of evacuee agricultural land are pre-emptiable because such rights constitute village immovable property and the statutory bar regarding evacuee property ceases to apply after acquisition by the Central Government, whereas sales by temporary allottees are not pre-emptiable. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on merits, permitting an inquiry into the exact nature of the vendor's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale of evacuee agricultural land by an allottee under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is pre-emptiable under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Does the bar on the maintainability of suits under section 16 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, apply to evacuee agricultural lands acquired by the Central Government?
  • Are sales of land by temporary allottees subject to pre-emption?
  • Whether sales of land by confirmed allottees and permanent transferees under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 are pre-emptiable?
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• FAZAL HUSSAIN vs Mst. MUSHARIZAF SULTANA1974 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-06
  pre-emptionevacuee propertydisplaced personsconfirmed allotteecivil court jurisdictioncompensation pool
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal addresses whether the sale of certain evacuee property in 1960, which had ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was pre-emptiable, and whether a suit for pre-emption was barred under section 6 or 25 of the Act. The Supreme Court held, following previous precedent, that once evacuee agricultural land is acquired by the Central Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, it ceases to be evacuee property and sales by confirmed allottees or permanent transferees are subject to pre-emption. Furthermore, section 25 of the Act does not oust civil court jurisdiction regarding pre-emption suits because such matters do not fall within the purview of authorities created under the Act. The Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the vendor's status as a confirmed allottee could not be contested as a new plea at this stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an evacuee property sold after its acquisition under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is pre-emptiable?
  • Whether a suit for pre-emption in respect of land acquired under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is barred under section 6 or section 25 of the said Act?
  • Does section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts with regard to pre-emption suits?
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• FAZAL HUSSAIN AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 161 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-01Read full judgment →
• FAZAL ELAHI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 586 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-10Read full judgment →
• FAZAL DAD vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 452 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• FATQO Alias FATEH MUHAMMAD GADANI vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 195 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-15Read full judgment →
• FARYAD vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LANDS), MULTAN DIVISION, MULTAN AND 3 Other1974 PLD Lahore 110 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-15Read full judgment →
• FAROOK OMAR vs NATIONAL SECURITY INSURANCE Co. LTD., KARACHI, AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 321 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-05
  marine insurancecarriage of goods by seadamage to cargolimitation periodsubrogationclean receiptburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The plaintiff instituted a suit for the recovery of damages for the loss of imported goods consisting of plastic moulding compound, which were insured with defendant No. 1 Insurance Company and carried by defendant No. 2 Shipping Company. The core legal questions involved whether the Insurance Company was absolved of liability due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to preserve rights against the carrier, whether the carrier was liable for the damaged goods, whether the suit against the carrier was barred by limitation, and whether the Karachi Port Trust was a necessary party. The court held that the Insurance Company remained liable under the policy as the survey report was binding and failure to give immediate notice to the carrier did not bar the claim against the insurer. However, the suit against the shipping company was dismissed as it was barred by limitation and the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving that the damage occurred while the goods were in the custody of the carrier. The key principle laid down is that while failure to give notice of apparent damage to a carrier shifts the burden of proof to the consignee and does not extinguish the insurance policy's indemnity, the right to sue the carrier is extinguished after the expiry of the statutory limitation period of one year.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an insured to give immediate notice of damage to a carrier absolve the insurance company of its liability under the policy?
  • Whether an ex parte survey report conducted without notice to the carrier is binding upon the carrier?
  • Is a suit against a shipping company for cargo loss barred if brought after the expiry of one year from the delivery of goods?
  • Is the Karachi Port Trust a necessary party in a suit for cargo loss against a shipping company?
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• FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs STATE1974 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-20
  murdercriminal trespassplea of alibieye-witness testimonycorroborationacquittal of co-accusedfalse medical certificateprosecution of witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by leave arose from the conviction and sentencing of two appellants for murder and criminal trespass under Sections 302 and 449 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted four individuals, but the High Court acquitted two co-accused on appeal due to lack of corroborative evidence regarding their specific role. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was safe to maintain the convictions of the appellants when two co-accused were acquitted on virtually the same prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, holding that the direct testimony of natural eye-witnesses was sufficiently corroborated against the appellants by medical evidence, recovery of weapon empties, and strong motive. The Court distinguished the appellants' role of actual direct firing from that of the acquitted co-accused. Additionally, the Court thoroughly evaluated and rejected the principal appellant's plea of alibi, finding the supporting medical documentation and doctor's testimony to be fabricated, and directed prosecution of the medical officer under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conviction of certain accused be sustained based on eye-witness testimony even if their co-accused were acquitted on the same evidence?
  • How does the court evaluate a plea of alibi supported by fabricated medical documents and questionable witness testimony?
  • Whether failure to raise a plea of alibi at the earliest opportunity during investigation casts doubt on its genuineness?
  • Can a court order proceedings under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against a medical officer who gives false evidence or fabricates medical certificates?
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• FALAK SHER AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 448 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-22Read full judgment →
• FAKIR MOHAMMAD Alias FAKIRO AND 4 Others vs THE STATE-Opponent1974 P Cr. L J 431 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-25Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs THE FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., KARACHI1974 PLC 23 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-20Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs PAKISTAN MACHINE TOOL FACTORY, LANDHI AND 21974 PLC 201 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-19
  Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) ActIndustrial Relations OrdinanceOuster clauseSpecial vs General lawLabour Court jurisdictionIndustrial disputeDismissal from service
  AI summary & questions settled

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  These constitutional petitions challenged orders of the Sind Labour Court, which declined jurisdiction over grievance petitions filed by employees of the Pakistan Machine Tool Factory following their dismissal. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, and its ouster clause in Section 7-A, superseded the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, thereby divesting Labour Courts of jurisdiction. The Court held that the 1952 Act constitutes a special law that overrides general industrial legislation. It determined that the phrase "any other law" in Section 7-A is broad and includes subsequent legislation, rendering the mechanisms under the 1969 and 1968 Ordinances inapplicable to employments governed by the 1952 Act. The Court affirmed that the 1952 Act provides an exclusive, albeit different, procedure for settling industrial disputes, and the Labour Courts correctly declined jurisdiction. The principle established is that special statutes prevail over general laws, and the ouster clause in the 1952 Act effectively excludes conflicting general industrial relations provisions, regardless of their enactment date.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, override the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the phrase 'any other law' in Section 7-A of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, include legislation enacted after the Act?
  • Do Labour Courts have jurisdiction to hear grievance petitions filed by employees of an establishment governed by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952?
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• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS SMITH KLINE & FRENCH OF PAKISTAN1974 PLC 280 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-09-02Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS NATIONAL & GRINDLAYS BANK LTD.1974 PLC 39 · Labour Court · 1973-06-01Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS BURJORJEE COWASJEE & Co., KARACHI1974 PLC 276 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-06-24Read full judgment →
• ELITE TEXTILE MILLS LTD. KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1974 PLC 240 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-03-03Read full judgment →
• DR. MUHAMMAD RAFIQ KHAN AWAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 58 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-18Read full judgment →
• Dr. MUHAMMAD ELIAS DUBASH vs CIVIL SERVICES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND 51974 PLD Lahore 90 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-25Read full judgment →
• DR. MRS. MUNAWAR ZAHEEN vs THE SECRETARY, PUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE1974 PLD Lahore 36 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-27
  public service commissionzonal representationdomicile of married womanrecruitmenteligibility criteriacivil services ruleswrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition arose from the rejection of the petitioner's candidature for the post of Assistant Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology advertised by the Punjab Public Service Commission for Zone 4. The Commission rejected her application on the ground that, by marrying a person belonging to Zone 3, her domicile automatically followed that of her husband under general principles and Appendix 4 of the Civil Service Rules (Punjab), rendering her ineligible for the Zone 4 post despite having entered government service earlier while domiciled in Campbellpur (Zone 4). The High Court held that Appendix 4 applied strictly to overseas recruitments and had no application to zonal representation schemes. Synthesizing relevant government instructions, the Court ruled that while a woman marrying prior to entering government service assumes her husband's domicile, a female employee already in government service retains the domicile she possessed upon entering service. The Commission's rejection was declared unlawful, and the petitioner was held eligible under Zone 4.

  Questions settled

  • Does a female government servant's domicile automatically change to that of her husband upon marriage for the purposes of a zonal recruitment quota?
  • Whether Appendix 4 of the Civil Services Rules (Punjab) applies to determine the zonal domicile of candidates for provincial public service appointments?
  • Is a married woman who was already in government service before marriage entitled to retain her original domicile of entry for subsequent selection within a zonal recruitment scheme?
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• DR. HASSAN DIN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 480 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-20Read full judgment →
• DR. ARSHAD MAHMOOD vs DR. MUMTAZ HUSSAIN1974 PLD Lahore 312 · Lahore High Court · 1974-01-29Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 275 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-29Read full judgment →
• DOSO Alias DOST MUHAMMAD AND Another vs The STATE1974 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-23
  murderfree fightcounter-casecorroborationinjured eyewitnessesrecovery of blood-stained weaponsreduction of sentencegeneral amnesty
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for murder and dismissed their appeal. The case involves an altercation between two rival parties resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to several others on both sides, leading to a primary case and a counter-case. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was the evaluation of eyewitness testimony, the presence of corroborative evidence in the form of blood-stained weapons recovered from the accused, and the effect of a general amnesty granted by the President on the sentence. The Supreme Court held that the incident constituted one continuous transaction and free fight where each participant was responsible for their individual acts, and found that the eyewitness testimonies of injured witnesses, corroborated by blood-stained recoveries, fully justified the convictions under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court laid down the principle that while related and injured eyewitnesses require corroboration, the recovery of blood-stained weapons provides sufficient corroboration to sustain a murder conviction, and further ruled that the appellants were entitled to a reduction of their death sentence to transportation for life in light of the presidential general amnesty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of blood-stained weapons provides sufficient corroboration for the testimony of related and injured eyewitnesses in a murder trial?
  • Does an incident occurring in close proximity of time and place involving rival factions constitute one continuous transaction and free fight?
  • Whether the sentence of death should be reduced to transportation for life in view of a general amnesty granted by the President?
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• DAIM AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 172 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-21Read full judgment →
• DABIR AHMAD AND 10 Others vs RIZWAN KHAN AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  co-operative societiesmanaging committee electionbye-lawswholesale replacementleave to appealwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan which declared the election of eleven petitioners as members of the managing committee of a Co-operative Housing Society for the year 1970-71 to be illegal. The core legal question was whether the wholesale replacement of the managing committee violated bye-law 47 of the Society, which requires the retirement of only one-third of the committee members annually. The Supreme Court held that the election was indeed contrary to the explicit provisions of the bye-law, as the Society cannot invoke powers not conferred upon it and wholesale replacement is precluded unless otherwise provided. The court established the key principle that statutory societies and their internal elections must strictly adhere to their governing bye-laws, and departures cannot be justified by administrative vacuum or prior resignations without proper amendment or compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the wholesale replacement of a managing committee of a co-operative society violates standard retirement bye-laws?
  • Can a co-operative society exercise powers not expressly conferred upon it by statute or its bye-laws?
  • Does the resignation of majority members validate the wholesale replacement of a managing committee contrary to its bye-laws?
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• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX (WEST), KARACHI vs MESSRS KRUDDSONS LTD.1974 PLD Supreme Court 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-29
  sales tax refundretrospective legislationcurative statutepending appealunjust enrichmentcollection of excess taxsub judice
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This certificated appeal arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan on a reference under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding a claim for a refund of sales tax paid by the respondent company under a bona fide mistake on items exempted by notification. The High Court had answered in the affirmative that the assessee was entitled to claim the refund. During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, legislative amendments introduced section 30-A into the Sales Tax Act, 1951, via the Finance Act, 1967 and 1968, with retrospective effect, requiring any person who collected excess or unpayable tax to deposit the same with the Central Government. The core legal question was whether subsequent retrospective legislation affects pending appeals and nullifies claims for refunds of collected unpayable tax. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of the certificated appeal destroyed the finality of the High Court's order, making the matter sub judice, and that retrospective curative legislation governs pending appeals until a final judgment is reached. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the High Court's order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent retrospective legislation enacted during the pendency of an appeal governs the rights of the parties and affects the pending litigation?
  • Does a certificated appeal destroy the finality of a High Court judgment making the matter sub judice before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a licensed manufacturer who mistakenly collected sales tax on exempted goods from customers is entitled to retain or claim a refund of such tax despite subsequent statutory amendments requiring payment of excess collections to the government?
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• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX. (WEST), KARACHI vs MEW NAGEENA TALKIES1974 PLD Karachi 6 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-14
  Income Taxdepreciation allowancewritten down valuefiscal statutestatutory interpretationtax liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference before the Sindh High Court concerned whether the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922 applies to income assessed under Section 12 of the Act. The assessee had leased out properties, including buildings and machinery, and was assessed under Section 12, receiving depreciation allowances under Section 12(4). Upon selling the property for an amount exceeding its written down value, the Assessing Officer sought to tax the excess under the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii). The Court held that the language of Section 12(4) explicitly states that an assessee is 'entitled to allowances' in accordance with the provisions of Section 10(2). The term 'entitled' denotes a benefit, rebate, or deduction, and cannot be construed to impose a liability to tax. Since fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly based on their plain language without reading in implications, the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii), which creates a tax liability, cannot be imported into Section 12.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922 applies to income assessed under Section 12 of the Act?
  • Does the phrase 'entitled to allowances' in Section 12(4) of the Income-tax Act 1922 permit the imposition of a tax liability under the provisos of Section 10(2)?
  • How should fiscal statutes be interpreted when a provision granting an entitlement references another section containing a liability-imposing proviso?
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• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND 2 Others COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI1974 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-09-16Read full judgment →
• CHOTTEY KHAN vs THE SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMIS SIONER, KARACHI AND 2 Other1974 PLD Karachi 226 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-18Read full judgment →
• CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND Another1974 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-11
  condonation of delaylimitationsufficient causegovernment departmentsspecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

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  These two petitions for special leave to appeal arise from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal as barred by limitation, and the petitions themselves are delayed by 67 days. The core legal question concerns whether administrative delays and the mislaying of files in government offices constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under limitation laws. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay and that governmental departments are not exempt from the ordinary rules of limitation. The key principle laid down is that a litigant seeking condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation must explain each day's delay, and routine departmental negligence in public offices does not furnish a sufficient ground to deprive the opposing party of a valuable right accrued through the expiry of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mislaying of a file in a government office constitute sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition?
  • Must a litigant explain each day's delay after the expiry of the normal period of limitation?
  • Are government departments exempt from ordinary rules of limitation in the absence of express statutory provisions?
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• CHAHAT KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 285 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-02Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUMTAZ HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 98 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-04Read full judgment →
• Ch. MAQBOOL AHMAD AND Another vs BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN1974 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-02-20
  Board of Revenueland grantGhulam Muhammad Barrageappellate jurisdictionSind Land Revenue Codewrit petitionmechanization cultivation scheme
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of land measuring 597 acres in Ghulam Muhammad Barrage to the appellants under the Mechanization Cultivation Scheme, part of which was later cancelled by the Member, Board of Revenue in favor of local respondents claiming perpetual cultivation rights. The core legal question concerned whether the Board of Revenue possessed the jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the orders passed by the Director, Colonization Ghulam Muhammad Barrage. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Revenue had the requisite jurisdiction of overall superintendence and control, and that appeals did not lie to the Commissioner, Hyderabad, in light of the relevant statutory notifications issued under the Sind Land Revenue Code and the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition, establishing that land grants made by the Director Colonization were subject to modification or cancellation by the Board of Revenue and that local claimants' rights could not be ignored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue has the jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the orders passed by the Director, Colonization Ghulam Muhammad Barrage?
  • Did an appeal lie from the orders passed by the Director Colonization to the Commissioner, Hyderabad, under the relevant notifications?
  • Whether the Board of Revenue holds overall superintendence and control over matters pertaining to the utilization of land in the barrage?
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• Ch. GHULAM RASUL TARRAR vs THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL, WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1974 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-22
  election petitionrecriminatory petitioninfructuousabatement of proceedingsdissolution of assemblyelection dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal arose from an election dispute involving an election petition and a recriminatory petition. The core legal question was whether these petitions remained maintainable following the dissolution of the assembly and the subsequent repeal of the governing election statute. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings had become infructuous. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that when the assembly to which an election relates is dissolved, any pending election petition—whether original or recriminatory—necessarily abates and comes to an end for all purposes. The Court reasoned that the right to challenge an election is a creature of statute, and once the underlying legislative framework is repealed and the assembly dissolved, the cause of action ceases to exist. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous, establishing the principle that election petitions do not survive the dissolution of the legislative body to which they pertain.

  Questions settled

  • Does an election petition survive the dissolution of the legislative assembly to which it relates?
  • Do pending recriminatory petitions become infructuous upon the dissolution of the assembly?
  • Does the repeal of the governing election statute render pending election petitions infructuous?
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• Ch. ALI MUHAMMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (FORMERLY GOVERNMENT1974 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-07
  compulsory retirementinefficiencypublic conduct scrutinyrailway servantsuper-constitutional law
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil suit challenging his compulsory retirement from service in the Traffic Accounts Branch of the N.-W. Railway, ordered on 27th June 1969 with effect from 30th June 1959. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the suit and subsequent appeals, holding it barred under section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 of 1959. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could be compulsorily retired on the ground of inefficiency after the omission of rule 2(c) of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that inefficiency remained a valid ground for compulsory retirement by virtue of clauses 3, 4, and 5 of Article 6 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959, which constituted a super-constitutional law with an overriding effect. The key principle laid down is that provisions of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959, operate independently and override any inconsistent rules regarding the compulsory retirement of government servants before 1st July 1959.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new contention regarding the competence of the authority be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether inefficiency remains a valid ground for compulsory retirement despite the omission of rule 2(c) of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959?
  • Does the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959 have an overriding effect over other inconsistent laws and rules regarding compulsory retirement?
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• Ch. ABDUR REHMAN AND 7 Others vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LAYALLPUR1974 P Cr. L J 495 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-05Read full judgment →
• CAPT. MUHAMMAD AZHAR vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH THE SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 921 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• CAPS. MUMTAZ-UL-HAQ ABBASY vs DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, MARDAN AND Other1974 PLD Peshawar 38 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-03-18Read full judgment →
• CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ISLAMABAD vs MESSRS HAYDARI1974 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-18
  transfer of civil suitbank guaranteejurisdictioninterim injunctionconstruction contract
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Capital Development Authority seeking the transfer of Civil Suit No. 181 of 1972 pending in the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, Karachi, to the Lahore High Court under Article 9 of President's Order No. 8 of 1970. The dispute relates to a construction contract and the invocation of a bank guarantee following alleged defaults by the contractor, which led to multiple legal proceedings across different courts. The core legal question concerned whether the suit should be transferred between high courts. The Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit one for transfer, noting that the issue of jurisdiction could be properly agitated before the Karachi High Court itself. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit pending in the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan be transferred to the Lahore High Court under Article 9 of President's Order No. 8 of 1970?
  • Where should the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court be agitated when a suit is already pending before it?
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• BUTLA COMPANY vs WORKERS' UNION1974 PLC 257 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-07-11Read full judgment →
• BRAG DIN vs BOOTA AND 4 Other1974 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-08
  private defenceexceeding right of private defenceculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationmurderappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the High Court on charges relating to a fatal assault and beating. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents were entitled to the plea of self-defence, whether the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence regarding injuries, and what offence, if any, was committed. The Supreme Court held that while the possibility of the right of private defence arising from an earlier altercation involving a female family member could not be excluded, respondent Boota clearly exceeded that right by inflicting a fatal spear blow on an unarmed sixteen-year-old boy, though his act fell under grave and sudden provocation amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. However, the other respondents were held to be fully protected by the right of private defence. The key principles laid down relate to the limits of the right of private defence under the Pakistan Penal Code, the requirement of proving excessive harm, and the application of sudden provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence?
  • Does a person who exceeds the right of private defence by inflicting a fatal injury under sudden provocation commit murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Can statements made before a committing Magistrate be used as substantive evidence without being brought on record under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the High Court can rely on inadmissible evidence or facts not supported by the record to establish a plea of self-defence?
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• BHEEM KHAN vs BABOO AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 229 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-20Read full judgment →
• BEGUM TAHIRA MASOOD vs FARID UD DIN MASOOD1974 PLD Lahore 500 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-30Read full judgment →
• BEGUM SHAMIM AFRIDI vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH THE SECRETARY,1974 PLD Lahore 120 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-26
  habeas corpusunlawful manner of detentionmilitary custodysolitary confinementdue process of lawconstitutional jurisdictiontorturefundamental rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses multiple writ petitions challenging the illegal detention and unlawful manner of custody of retired military officers and a civilian. The core legal question revolves around the extent of the High Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 to examine not only whether a person is held without lawful authority, but also whether they are detained in an "unlawful manner," including the treatment of under-trial prisoners in military or civil custody. The court held that the manner in which the detenus were kept—subjected to solitary confinement, blind-folding, manacling, and denial of basic amenities without statutory justification—was unlawful and violated the applicable rules and regulations under the Pakistan Army Act 1952, the Prisons Act 1894, and the Punjab Jail Manual 1955. The court laid down the principle that executive and military authorities must strictly adhere to the due process of law and respect human dignity, and that the High Court possesses full judicial review powers to correct unlawful detention conditions and prevent torture.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 to examine the manner in which a detenu is kept in custody?
  • Does keeping an under-trial prisoner in solitary confinement without express statutory backing constitute detention in an unlawful manner?
  • Are retired military officers subject to the Pakistan Army Act 1952 after their retirement for the purpose of invoking jurisdictional bars in habeas corpus petitions?
  • Whether the use of blind-folding and manacling on an accused person in military custody is permissible under the Pakistan Army Regulations in the absence of unruly behavior?
  Read full judgment →
• BEGUM NAZIR ABDUL HAMID vs PAKISTAN (FEDERAL GOVERNMENT) THROUGH THE ECRETARY, INTERIOR, DIVISION ISLAMABAD .AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 7 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-25
  habeas corpuspreventive detentionaggrieved personmala fideDefence of Pakistan Rulesconstitutional petitionfreedom of movement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife of a retired General challenging a government order restricting his movements to his residence under Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971. The petitioner contended the order was a continuation of previous illegal detention, which had been rescinded following a Review Board report. The core legal questions were whether the restriction order constituted "detention" and whether the petitioner had standing as an "aggrieved person." The Court held that the restriction of movement to a specific house, enforced by potential state power, constitutes detention. It further ruled that the petitioner, as the wife, was an "aggrieved person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The Court found the impugned order was a mala fide attempt to circumvent the Review Board's findings and the constitutional limits on detention. Consequently, the Court declared the restriction order without lawful authority. The principle established is that where the government imposes restrictions on movement that are physically enforceable, such restrictions amount to detention, and successive orders attempting to bypass constitutional safeguards are mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order restricting a person's movements to their residence constitute detention for the purposes of a habeas corpus petition?
  • Is a spouse an 'aggrieved person' entitled to file a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 regarding the detention of their partner?
  • Can the government issue successive detention orders to circumvent a Review Board's finding that a previous detention was illegal?
  • Does the power to restrict movement under Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules 1971 include the power to confine a person to their private residence?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum D. F. HASSAN vs HABIB BANK LTD., LAHORE1974 PLD Lahore 117 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-02
  intra-court appealoriginal civil jurisdictionsupervisory jurisdictionmaintainability of appealLaw Reforms Ordinancewrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court, which dismissed a petition filed under Article 102 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962. The core legal question is whether the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 102, which empowers the Court to supervise and control subordinate courts, constitutes 'original civil jurisdiction' for the purpose of maintaining an intra-court appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972. The Court held that the jurisdiction under Article 102 is supervisory and revisory in nature, not original, as it does not involve the trial of suits by the High Court itself. Consequently, the Court ruled that the order in question was not passed in the exercise of the High Court's 'original civil jurisdiction.' The key principle laid down is that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts is distinct from its original civil jurisdiction, and therefore, orders passed under such supervisory powers are not appealable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 102 of the 1962 Constitution constitute 'original civil jurisdiction'?
  • Is an order passed by a Single Judge under Article 102 of the 1962 Constitution appealable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972?
  • What is the distinction between 'original civil jurisdiction' and 'supervisory jurisdiction' of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR vs THS STATE1974 PLD Peshawar 113 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-05-22Read full judgment →
• BASHIR vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 507 · Lahore High Court · 1974-05-17Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 385 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-01
  murderdeath sentencemedical evidenceocular evidenceconflict of evidencebenefit of doubtinterested witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to the appellants, a father and son, under Section 302/14 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution's case rested on motive, ocular testimony of three relatives, and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court analyzed the evidence and found that the alleged motive was weak and improved upon at trial. The ocular evidence was contradicted by medical evidence; while the eye-witnesses claimed the shot was fired from a distance of 11 to 15 feet, the medical report noted scorching and blackening of the wound, indicating a shot fired from a very close range of a few inches. Applying established jurisprudence, the Court held that where oral evidence is directly contradicted by medical evidence, the latter must be preferred. Furthermore, the presence of the father at the scene and the explanation for his minor scrotal injury were deemed highly doubtful. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, accepted the appeal, and set aside their convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence is to be preferred over oral testimony when there is a direct contradiction between the two regarding the distance of firing?
  • Can the benefit of doubt on a material point in a criminal trial be denied to the accused to accommodate inaccuracies in rustic witnesses' estimates?
  • Is a conviction sustainable solely on the testimony of related witnesses when independent witnesses from the locality were not joined despite the occurrence taking place in broad daylight on a public path?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD AND Another vs ABDUL GHAFOOR AND Other1974 SCMR 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-05
  ejectmentfamily settlementco-ownerbona fide personal useconcurrent findings of factspecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority for the ejectment of the petitioners from a shop. The core legal questions involved whether an ejectment application filed by the heirs of one co-owner without joining the other co-owner was competent, and whether the shop was required for the bona fide personal use of the respondents. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on a family settlement and a subsequent consent decree relinquishing the other co-owner's interest are concurrent findings of fact that cannot be reviewed or re-appreciated by the Supreme Court. The petition was dismissed with a direction to vacate the premises by a specified date subject to payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment application by the heirs of a deceased co-owner is competent without joining the other co-owner?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a family settlement and partition be reviewed by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a consent decree in a declaratory suit constitutes cogent evidence of a family settlement regarding the partition of property?
  Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI vs MESSRS PAKISTAN SANITARY & DRAINAGE WORKS1974 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06
  eviction proceedingstime-barred rentrent defaultstriking off defencestatutory amendmentrent controller jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a landlord's petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order striking off a tenant's defence in an eviction proceeding. The landlord sought eviction based on alleged rental default. During proceedings, the Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent. A dispute arose regarding whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent by the 5th of each month constituted default, given a subsequent statutory amendment extending the deadline to the 15th, and whether the landlord could claim time-barred rent. The High Court, relying on established Supreme Court precedents, held that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction to order the deposit of time-barred rent. Furthermore, it determined that if the time-barred rent already deposited and withdrawn by the landlord was credited against future liabilities, no default existed. The Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning, holding that the High Court correctly applied the principle that time-barred rent cannot be recovered through rent restriction proceedings and that the tenant's compliance must be assessed by accounting for all payments made.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to order the deposit of rent that has become time-barred?
  • Can a landlord claim default against a tenant for failure to pay rent by a specific date if the statute governing the deadline is amended during the proceedings?
  • If a landlord withdraws time-barred rent deposited by a tenant, must that amount be credited toward the tenant's future rental obligations?
  Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI ETC. Haji GHULAM HUSSAIN (DECEASED) ETC. vs THE CUSTODIAN1974 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  evacuee propertyunregistered sale-deedtransfer of propertybona fide purchaserwrit jurisdictioncustodian of evacuee property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against a consolidated order of the High Court, which dismissed writ petitions and a settlement revision concerning evacuee agricultural lands in Rahimyar Khan. The core legal question involves whether the disputed lands could be treated as evacuee property after 1 January 1957 in light of section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957, and whether unregistered sale transactions passed any valid title to the claimant. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of registered sale-deeds as required by law, no title passed to the claimant, rendering his initial declaration void and his possession unauthorized, thereby attracting the exceptions under the evacuee laws. The Court further ruled that subsequent vendees could not claim protection as bona fide purchasers where the vendor lacked valid title. The key principle laid down is that unregistered sale transactions regarding immovable property in the relevant territory fail to pass title, and properties held under such invalid claims remain subject to resumption as evacuee property notwithstanding temporal bars.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unverified and unregistered agreements for sale of land in Bahawalpur State pass valid title without registration under the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Can property be treated as evacuee property after 1 January 1957 notwithstanding the bar contained in section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957?
  • Are subsequent vendees who purchase property from a vendor with a defective title entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers without due diligence?
  Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 473 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-05Read full judgment →
• BAKHIR AND 2 Other vs THE STATE Opponent1974 PLD Karachi 66 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-16Read full judgment →
• BAJOO AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 199 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-28Read full judgment →
• BAHADUR vs REHABILITATION & SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR1974 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-20
  land allotmentrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factcertified copyRehabilitation Settlement Schemeremandrevenue records
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding a Rehabilitation Commissioner's order that reversed concurrent findings of fact regarding land allotment. The core legal question was whether a Settlement Commissioner, exercising revisional jurisdiction, could overturn subordinate findings based solely on a "certified copy" of a fard-i-taqseem produced for the first time, without verifying its authenticity or existence in the original revenue records. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner acted improperly by accepting the document at face value without a proper inquiry, especially given the absence of the original record. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Rehabilitation Commissioner with directions to first determine the genuineness of the document before disposing of the revision. The judgment establishes that a revisional authority must conduct a proper investigation into the authenticity of disputed evidence before relying upon it to disturb established concurrent findings of fact, particularly when the original document is missing from official records.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner in revision overturn concurrent findings of fact based on a document produced for the first time without verifying its authenticity?
  • Is a Rehabilitation Commissioner required to hold a proper inquiry when the genuineness of a document relied upon in revision is challenged?
  • What is the procedure for land allotment when a claimant's status as a sitting allottee is disputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Babu PARVEZ QURESHI vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, MULTAN &1974 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08
  auction purchaserlocus standiwrit jurisdictionsettlement lawsconfirmation of bidvested rightcancellation of auction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the auction of property (shops) which had been previously claimed as part of a larger residential transfer under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether an auction-purchaser, whose bid had not yet been confirmed, possessed a vested right or locus standi to challenge the cancellation of that auction by the Settlement authorities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that a mere bid at an auction, subject to confirmation, does not create a contractual or vested right until such confirmation occurs. Consequently, the auction-purchaser lacks the standing to challenge the cancellation of an auction, particularly when the Departmental Authorities have determined that the property was previously transferred to another party. The principle laid down is that an auction-purchaser whose bid remains unconfirmed cannot be considered an 'aggrieved person' entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction to contest the cancellation of the auction process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bid at an auction, which is subject to confirmation, create a vested contractual right for the bidder?
  • Can an auction-purchaser whose bid has not been confirmed maintain a writ petition to challenge the cancellation of the auction?
  • Is an auction-purchaser considered an aggrieved person when the Settlement authorities cancel an auction on the basis of a prior transfer of the property?
  Read full judgment →
• AZIZULLAH vs THE STATE--Opponent1974 P Cr. L J 187 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-05Read full judgment →
• AZIZ KHAN AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 367 · Lahore High Court · 1972-12-06Read full judgment →
• AZHAR SALEEM vs MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN ETC.S1974 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-15
  second appealfinding of factdemolition and reconstructionejectmentlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a second appeal filed in the High Court against the judgment and order of the first appellate court regarding the ejectment of a tenant, where the landlords sought the premises for demolition and reconstruction. The core legal question is whether a second appeal is maintainable in the High Court against a concurrent finding of fact under the relevant statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that no second appeal lay to the High Court in view of the concurrent findings of fact that the landlords honestly required the demised premises for demolition and reconstruction. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact arrived at by lower appellate courts cannot be reopened in a second appeal, and lack of maintainability under sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars such second appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a second appeal lie to the High Court against a finding of fact regarding the requirement of premises for demolition and reconstruction?
  • Are findings of fact by the first appellate court immune from challenge in a second appeal under sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• AYUB KHAN AND 2 Others vs The STATE1974 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-02
  murdercommon intentionsudden quarrelmitigation of sentencewater disputeclose-range firingcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the murder convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing their sentences from death to transportation for life. The core legal question was whether a sudden quarrel and lack of premeditation during a dispute over water irrigation warranted mitigating the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the death sentences, holding that firing inherently dangerous weapons like guns from close range at vital parts of the body during an altercation without sufficient provocation constitutes deliberate, cold-blooded murder. The key principle laid down is that the mere suddenness of an encounter or an exchange of abuses does not automatically justify a lesser sentence where the offender intentionally fires fatal shots from close quarters without a valid legal excuse or grave provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden quarrel and altercation over a water dispute automatically warrant the reduction of a murder sentence from death to life imprisonment?
  • Can the firing of a firearm from close range at vital organs during a dispute be regarded as a crime committed in hot blood justifying lesser punishment?
  • Does the absence of certainty as to which specific accused's shot proved fatal preclude the imposition of the death penalty when multiple accused fire simultaneously at vital parts?
  Read full judgment →
• AYAZ MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-23
  settlement lawauction saleproperty transfermultiple transferdisplaced personPermanent Transfer Deedremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop/Chaubara in Multan, initially auctioned to the appellants and subsequently transferred to the respondent by the Settlement Commissioner. The appellants, who held a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) for the property, challenged the Settlement Commissioner's order, which had set aside the auction in their favor and transferred the property to the respondent. The High Court dismissed the appellants' Letters Patent Appeal in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the legality of the Settlement Commissioner's order, particularly given that the respondent had already secured the transfer of another property. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner erred by failing to consider whether the respondent was legally entitled to a second property transfer. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, remanding the case for a fresh determination on whether the disputed property is a shop or a house and whether the respondent is eligible for an additional transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner set aside an auction sale without considering the eligibility of the claimant for a second property transfer?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) prevail over a subsequent transfer order in the absence of a valid entitlement order?
  • Is a person entitled to the transfer of multiple properties under the settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• ATTA MUHAMMAD vs TAJ MOHAMMAD AND Another1974 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-02
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyallotment orderpossessionDisplaced Persons Actsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who occupied the shop as a business partner/licensee of the respondent (the original allottee), possessed the requisite legal entitlement to claim the transfer of the property under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the petitioner's occupation, being that of a licensee under the respondent, did not constitute the type of possession required for entitlement to transfer under the governing statute. The key principle laid down is that 'possession' conferring entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property, as defined in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, must be possession obtained in pursuance of an allotment order issued by a competent authority; mere physical occupation as a licensee or partner of an existing allottee does not create an independent right to transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Does physical occupation of an evacuee shop as a business partner of the allottee confer an independent entitlement to the transfer of the property?
  • How is 'possession' defined for the purpose of entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a licensee of an allottee claim a superior right to the transfer of evacuee property over the original allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Assessee vs Department30 TAX 1 · Income Tax Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• ASLAM AND Another vs Mst. KAMALZAI AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-17
  inheritancecustomary lawlimited ownerShariat Application Actlimitationoustersuccession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute over inheritance shares following the death of a female limited owner who held property under customary law. The core legal questions were whether the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, required the reopening of the entire estate of the last male owner upon the termination of a limited interest, and whether the suit for a share in the estate was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not authorize the reopening of inheritance for estates that had already vested absolutely in heirs under custom. Instead, succession under the Act only opens in respect of the specific property held by the female limited owner as a limited estate. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the suit was barred by limitation, as the male heirs had held the property as absolute owners to the exclusion of others, which constituted ouster. The principle established is that Section 4 of the Act applies only to the distribution of limited estates held by females, not to the entire estate of the last male owner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, allow for the reopening of inheritance for estates already vested absolutely in heirs under custom?
  • Upon the termination of a female limited owner's interest, does succession open for the entire estate of the last male owner or only for the property held by the limited owner?
  • Does the possession of property by customary heirs to the exclusion of other potential heirs constitute ouster for the purposes of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• ASGHAR BEG Alias AKRI AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 533 · Lahore High Court · 1974-04-07Read full judgment →
• ASAD MUMTAZ ALI KHAN AND Another vs Mst. NAEEMA KHANUM1974 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-30
  special leave to appealejectmentrestoration of appeallegal representativessufficient causerent restriction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their application for the restoration of an appeal. The underlying matter involved an ejectment application filed against the original tenant, during the pendency of which a rent deposit order was passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Upon the tenant's death, the initial appeal was consigned to the records due to failure to bring legal representatives on record. Subsequent applications for restoration and impleadment were dismissed by the lower appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the contentions regarding the competency of successive restoration applications and the sufficiency of cause for non-appearance. The Court held that since the main ejectment application had meanwhile been decreed and the final order passed without stay of proceedings, the academic contention regarding the competency of the restoration application required no interference. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the argument that the High Court failed to consider sufficient cause, as the High Court had duly examined and resolved that question. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for restoration of a previous application for restoration of an appeal is competent?
  • Does the final decreeing of an ejectment application render academic a challenge concerning the restoration of an intermediate appeal?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with the lower appellate court's finding on sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• ASAD ALI AND 9 Other vs SETTLEMENT & CLAIMS COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 345 · Sindh High Court · 1973-12-14
  constitutional petitionoriginal civil jurisdictionLaw Reforms Ordinancepending proceedingsabatementLetters Patent appealwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals against the dismissal of constitutional petitions by Single Judges of the High Court. The core legal questions were whether constitutional petitions pending before the enforcement of the Interim Constitution abated upon its commencement, and whether an appeal lies against a Single Judge's decision in a constitutional petition under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The Court held that pending constitutional petitions did not abate, as they were saved by Article 295 of the Interim Constitution, which operated to protect legal proceedings upon the repeal of prior laws. Regarding the right of appeal, the Court held that the phrase "original civil jurisdiction" in the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, refers strictly to the Court's power to try suits as a court of first instance, distinct from constitutional writ jurisdiction. Consequently, no appeal lies against a Single Judge's order in a constitutional petition under the Ordinance. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction is not synonymous with original civil jurisdiction, and a right of appeal is not available unless expressly provided by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Do constitutional petitions pending before the enforcement of the Interim Constitution abate upon its commencement?
  • Does the term 'original civil jurisdiction' in the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, encompass the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Is a Single Judge's order in a constitutional petition appealable under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Did the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan re-enact and subsequently repeal the Proclamation of Martial Law of 25th March 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• ARIF UD DIN vs NOOR HUSSAIN AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-05-31
  stamp dutybondagreementpromissory notecontemporaneous transactioninitial obligationnovation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Lahore holding that a document executed concurrently with a promissory note was a composite bond and agreement under the Stamp Act and ordering it to be impounded for deficiency in stamp duty and penalty. The core legal question was whether the said document, which recited a loan taken under a separate promissory note and stipulated conditions for forming a partnership along with a penal clause for failure to do so, constituted a 'bond' or merely an 'agreement'. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the document was an agreement and not a bond, as it did not independently create an obligation to pay the pre-existing debt but merely served as a reference to the liability already secured by the contemporaneous promissory note which was intended to be kept alive. The key principle laid down is that an instrument cannot be classified as a bond unless it itself creates an initial, independent obligation to pay money, and where a document is executed as part of the same transaction as a promissory note and merely references that antecedent liability without intending to create a novation or a fresh monetary obligation, it remains an agreement rather than a bond.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an instrument that recites a pre-existing loan taken under a separate promissory note and provides for damages upon failure to perform a collateral act constitutes a bond under the Stamp Act?
  • Can a document be classified as a bond if it does not independently create an obligation to pay money but merely refers to a liability already secured by a contemporaneous promissory note?
  • Does the execution of a promissory note alongside an agreement in a single transaction preclude the later document from operating as a bond?
  • What constitutes an express obligation to pay money under the statutory definition of a bond?
  Read full judgment →
• ANWAR BEG vs RIAZ HUSSAIN AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-18
  limitation periodgift deedpower of attorneydelivery of possessionremand ordersuit for declaration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the validity of a gift deed executed by an attorney on behalf of a donor, Allah Ditta Qureshi, in favor of the attorney's wife. The respondents challenged the gift, alleging the power of attorney was a forgery and the donor was incapacitated, further contending that possession was never delivered. The trial court initially ruled the suit was within the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Lahore High Court set aside this finding, remanding the case to determine if the power of attorney was genuine and if possession was delivered, noting that the applicable limitation period depends on these factual findings—specifically, whether the suit falls under Article 120 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, arguing the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the question of limitation cannot be determined without first establishing the factual basis regarding the execution of the power of attorney and the delivery of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can the question of limitation be determined before establishing the factual validity of the power of attorney and delivery of possession?
  • Does a suit challenging a gift deed fall under Article 120 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act 1908 depending on the proof of possession?
  • Is it appropriate for a High Court to remand a case for trial on merits when the issue of limitation is inextricably linked to disputed facts?
  Read full judgment →
• ANWAR AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 293 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-09Read full judgment →
• ANSAR HASAN KHAN vs A.R. HUSSAIN AND ANOTHERS1974 PLC 15 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1973-08-18Read full judgment →
• AMIRZADA KHAN, M. N. A. vs THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 178 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-08
  presidential electionnomination papersmaintainability of writ petitionelection disputeconstitutional bar
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court challenging the acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 3 for the election to the office of the President under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The core legal questions involved whether a writ petition is maintainable against the acceptance of a nomination paper given the constitutional bar on calling into question the validity of a presidential election, and whether the challenge to nomination papers constitutes a challenge to the election process itself. The Court held that the writ petition is not maintainable because Article 41(6) of the Constitution explicitly bars any court from calling in question the validity of the presidential election, and an election is a continuous process starting from the issuance of the election programme, including nomination and scrutiny stages. The key principle laid down is that the right to challenge an election is a statutory right strictly regulated by the creating law, and what cannot be challenged directly cannot be challenged indirectly through intermediate stages like nomination papers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the validity of the election of the President can be called in question before any court?
  • Does a challenge to the acceptance or rejection of nomination papers amount to challenging the election process?
  • Is the right to challenge an election a common law right or a right regulated by the statute creating it?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against the decisions of the Chief Election Commissioner regarding presidential nomination papers?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR ZADA KHAN vs CHIEF ELECTIONCOMMISSIONER AND 2 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-01
  presidential electionnomination paperselectoral rollscrutiny of nominationdirectory and mandatory provisionselection petitionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a constitutional petition challenging the validity of the nomination of respondent No. 3 for election to the office of President of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the failure to accompany nomination papers with an attested copy of the electoral roll, as required by the Presidential Election Rules, 1973, constituted a mandatory and substantial defect necessitating the rejection of the nomination papers. The Supreme Court held that the non-filing of the attested copy was not a material defect where the eligibility of the candidate was already established aliunde—being a sitting member and Speaker of the National Assembly—and where the defect was remedied prior to the scrutiny by the Returning Officer. The Court ruled that such a procedural requirement was directory rather than mandatory in the circumstances and that the Returning Officer rightly exercised discretion not to reject the nomination. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to accompany a nomination paper with an attested copy of the electoral roll constitute a mandatory and substantial defect invalidating the nomination under the Presidential Election Rules, 1973?
  • Can a defect in a nomination paper regarding the non-filing of an electoral roll extract be remedied before the time of scrutiny by the Returning Officer?
  • What is the scope of the Returning Officer's discretion under rule 5 of the Presidential Election Rules, 1973, in dealing with technical defects in nomination papers?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR RAWAN vs RAWAN KHAN AND Other1974 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-10
  murderacquittalcorroborationinterested witnessrecovery of weaponsspecial leave to appealcriminal evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's evidence, specifically the testimony of interested witnesses and the alleged recovery of firearms. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was justified. The Court established that the mere arrest of accused persons near the scene of the incident, particularly in a region where carrying firearms is customary, does not serve as sufficient corroborative evidence of guilt. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that without ballistic matching or reliable independent testimony regarding the recovery of weapons, such recoveries cannot sustain a conviction. The Court also noted that the testimony of interested witnesses requires independent corroboration, which was absent here, especially given that a neutral witness contradicted the prosecution's account, thereby casting significant doubt on the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of firearms from accused persons near the scene of a crime, in a region where carrying arms is customary, constitute sufficient corroborative evidence of guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based solely on the testimony of interested witnesses when a neutral witness contradicts their account?
  • Is the testimony of an investigating officer sufficient to prove the recovery of weapons when the only independent witness's presence at the scene is doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR BAKHSH AND Other vs ALLAH YAR AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  customary lawlimited estatelast full ownerancestral propertyshariat application actlimitation periodalienation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning a suit for possession of agricultural lands originally owned by a proprietor governed by custom. The core legal questions involved the determination of the identity of the last full owner for succession under the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, the definition of ancestral property regarding different classes of plaintiffs, and the applicable limitation period for challenging alienations made by a limited female owner. The Supreme Court held that under section 3 of the Shariat Act, succession must be traced to the last actual full owner, which was the issueless son rather than his father, and that property is not ancestral qua collaterals unless held by a common ancestor. The ratio decidendi establishes that the last full owner for statutory succession is the person who actually held the heritable estate, and the special provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 apply only where the property is proven ancestral qua the specific plaintiffs.

  Questions settled

  • Who constitutes the last full owner for the purpose of succession under section 3 of the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948?
  • Does the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 apply to property that is not ancestral qua the plaintiffs?
  • Whether a daughter acts merely as a conduit to pass on property as ancestral property to her sons under customary law?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908 governs a suit for possession filed by reversioners upon the termination of a widowed mother's limited estate?
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• ALYAS BEG vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, SIALKOT AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 349 · Lahore High Court · 1974-02-17Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND Other1974 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-04
  evacuee propertyconstitutional petitionlachessettlement authoritiestransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding residential evacuee properties. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to challenge the transfer of evacuee properties to the respondents after inordinate delay and without availing remedies before the Settlement authorities or properly impleading necessary parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the petition due to the petitioner's gross laches, failure to challenge the transfer of one unit despite notice, lack of possession regarding the other unit, and failure to bring legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record within time. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional relief will be refused to a party guilty of unexplained delay, laches, and failure to pursue statutory remedies or properly implead parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be maintained against the transfer of evacuee property after a lapse of several years?
  • Does failure to challenge a property transfer before Settlement authorities bar relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • What is the effect of failing to bring the legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record within the statutory period in a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA vs HAJIJAN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-24
  evacuee propertyinformer rightsvested rightdisplaced persons compensationsettlement schemebelated application
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave concerns the disposal of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, an enforcement constable, laid information that the house was concealed evacuee property, prompting the Chief Settlement Commissioner to transfer it to him under S.R.O. No. 824(K)/1961 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Subsequently, respondent No. 1's writ petition was partially allowed by the High Court, holding that the repeal of section 10(b) by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 voided the transfer and that the rejection of respondent's belated transfer form was illegal. The core legal questions involve whether an informer acquires a vested right to property upon providing information, the effect of the repeal of section 10(b) on pending informer proceedings, and the validity of entertaining belated transfer forms. The Supreme Court held that an informer does not acquire a vested right or independent locus standi in the property, that pending informer proceedings lapsed with the repeal of section 10(b) without creating vested rights under the General Clauses Act, and that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could entertain belated applications. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer who provides information regarding concealed evacuee property acquire a vested right to obtain the transfer of that property?
  • What is the legal effect of the repeal of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 on pending proceedings initiated by informers?
  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner has the authority to entertain belated C.H. Forms for the transfer of evacuee properties under Settlement Scheme No. I?
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• ALLAH DINO AND 2 Others vs MOHAMMAD UMAR AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-03
  agricultural landco-ownershipburden of proofsecond appealpartitiontitle declarationadverse possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a second appeal judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellants' suit for a declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellants' deceased father, Azizullah, was a joint purchaser and equal co-sharer of the disputed land held in the name of respondent No. 3, Saindad, or merely looked after the property as a manager (Kamdar). The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to establish their ownership, finding their claims of joint purchase, partition, and oral acknowledgment self-contradictory and unsupported by reliable evidence, while contemporary registered documents confirmed exclusive ownership by Saindad. The key principle laid down is that mere physical possession and payment of land revenue or installments, absent credible proof of investment or co-ownership, do not suffice to establish a proprietary share against recorded title and consistent contemporaneous documentary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere physical possession and payment of land revenue are sufficient to establish co-ownership in agricultural land held in another person's name?
  • Does a second appeal lie against findings of fact by the first appellate court when the evidence has been considered?
  • Can oral testimony contradicting prior consistent registered documents and written statements be relied upon to prove a share in property?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DAD- vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 130 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-06Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BUX AND Another vs MUHAMMAD RIAZ1974 PLD Lahore 268 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-04Read full judgment →
• ALI NAWAZ AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 561 · Sindh High Court · 1973-04-19Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD vs ALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-10
  right of private defenceactual physical possessioncriminal liabilityaggressiondisputed landacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted respondents previously convicted by the trial court for murder and related offences. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who were in actual physical possession of disputed land, had the right of private defence of person and property when the complainant party attempted to forcibly retake possession. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that in criminal law, actual physical possession is the material factor. The Court held that since the complainant party attempted to regain possession by force, they were the aggressors, thereby entitling the respondents to exercise their right of private defence. Furthermore, because the respondents sustained injuries on vital body parts during the altercation, they were justified in their actions and did not exceed the right of private defence. The key principle laid down is that a person in actual physical possession of property, even if their title is disputed or subject to pending litigation, is entitled to resist dispossession by force, and such resistance does not constitute a criminal offence if the right of private defence is not exceeded.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person in actual physical possession of land have the right to resist forcible dispossession?
  • Can a party that attempts to retake possession of land by force be considered the aggressor in a criminal altercation?
  • Does the right of private defence of person and property extend to causing death if the defender is attacked on vital parts of the body?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Ch. MUHAMMAD TUFAIL AND Another1974 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  statutory tenancyejectment petitionauction-purchasersettlement departmentrent controllerremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the remand of an ejectment case by the Additional District Judge for a fresh decision on merits by the Rent Controller. The core legal question concerns whether occupants of a property transferred by the Settlement Department become statutory tenants under the auction-purchaser upon receiving notice under Section 30 of the relevant Act, notwithstanding initial allegations of subletting. The Supreme Court held that where occupants in possession of the property at the time of auction receive proper notice from the transferee, a statutory tenancy is duly created in their favour, precluding them from denying such status. The key principle laid down is that notice under Section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958 to persons in possession at the time of property transfer creates a statutory tenancy relationship between the transferee and the occupants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 by occupants in possession at the time of property transfer create a statutory tenancy?
  • Can occupants who acknowledge notice and offer rent to an auction-purchaser deny their status as tenants under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI MAHMOOD vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 249 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-04Read full judgment →
• ALI HUSSAIN JAMALI vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND THROUGH ITS DEPUTY1974 PLD Karachi 283 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-18Read full judgment →
• ALI BUX AND 2 Others vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 305 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-21Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMAD AND Others vs The STATE1974 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-21
  post-arrest bailbenefit of doubtcommitment proceedingsevaluation of evidencespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the Lahore High Court in a case registered under sections 148, 302, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether superior courts, when considering bail during the pendency of commitment proceedings, are bound to review and evaluate the recorded evidence to give an opinion on its reliability and resolve doubts in favor of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that superior courts should not ordinarily undertake the function of evaluating evidence or expressing opinions on its reliability while commitment proceedings before a magistrate are ongoing, as this would embarrass and hamper the magistrate in discharging statutory responsibilities. The key principle laid down is that superior courts must avoid preempting the committal court's evaluation of a prima facie case during ongoing commitment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether superior courts must examine evidence and express an opinion on its reliability during ongoing commitment proceedings when deciding bail?
  • Should the benefit of doubt arising from evidence led before a committing magistrate be resolved at the bail stage by a superior court?
  • Does a superior court's evaluation of evidence for bail embarrass the magistrate conducting commitment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• AL MAHMOOD INDUSTRIES (PAKISTAN) LTD. vs THE TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD. AND Another1974SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  writ jurisdictionalternative remedyarbitration clausecontractual disputeconstitution petitionmaintainability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitution petition as not maintainable. The petitioner challenged an increase in the price of imported pig iron by the Trading Corporation of Pakistan following the devaluation of the rupee. The High Court had dismissed the petition, citing the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement and the availability of alternative remedies, noting the dispute arose from a private contract. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the matter was not suitable for writ jurisdiction. The Court held that when a dispute involves contractual obligations and disputed questions of fact, and where an adequate alternative remedy—such as arbitration or a civil suit—is available, the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is inappropriate. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to directly challenge the underlying government notification, instead focusing on the Corporation's actions. The principle established is that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass contractual arbitration clauses or to resolve factual disputes when other adequate legal remedies exist.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitution petition maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy, such as arbitration, exists for a contractual dispute?
  • Can writ jurisdiction be invoked to resolve disputed questions of fact arising from a contract?
  • Does the existence of an arbitration clause in a commercial agreement preclude the filing of a constitution petition?
  Read full judgment →
• AKHTAR HASSAN KHAN vs The STATE1974 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-16
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionjurisdictionpublic servantsentence enhancementtrap case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and enhancing his sentence. The core legal questions were whether an official can be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code when the illegal act fell outside his direct territorial jurisdiction, and whether offences under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 constitute separate offences that cannot be lumped together. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it is sufficient for the purposes of section 161 that the accused represented himself to be capable of rendering the official service, and that section 161 is a species of offence included within section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, meaning they can be charged together without causing prejudice. The key principle laid down is that criminal liability under anti-corruption laws attaches when a public servant represents they can perform an official service, regardless of strict internal jurisdictional boundaries, and dual charging under overlapping penal provisions is permissible absent demonstrated prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code if the official act in question was outside his specific territorial jurisdiction?
  • Whether offences under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 must be tried separately or can be charged together?
  • Is it necessary for a conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code that the accused actually possessed the formal power to render the promised service?
  Read full judgment →
• AISH BAHADURAND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 362 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-08Read full judgment →
• AIR-MARSHAL (R) M. ASGHAR KHAN vs FARIDUDDIN MASON1974 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-04Read full judgment →
• AHRAR MUHAMMAD AND Other vs THE STATE1974 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-13
  post-arrest baildelay in trialabuse of process of lawcriminal trial delaybail pending trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court refusing to enlarge fourteen appellants on bail. The appellants had been in custody and undergoing protracted trial proceedings since their arrest between May 1968, facing repeated delays spanning over three years during trial. The core legal question was whether inordinate and unjustified delay in the prosecution of a case, amounting to an abuse of the process of law, can constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that while mere delay is not ordinarily a ground for bail, scandalous, shocking, or inordinate delay amounting to an abuse of the process of law can be treated as a sufficient ground for enlarging an accused on bail, particularly where prosecution evidence has concluded and tampering is no longer possible. The key principle laid down is that gross and unjustified judicial and prosecutorial delays entailing an abuse of the court's process warrant granting bail to prevent flagrant injustices.

  Questions settled

  • Can inordinate and unjustified delay in a criminal trial amount to an abuse of the process of law sufficient to grant bail?
  • Is mere delay by itself a sufficient ground for the granting of bail under Pakistani jurisprudence?
  • Does the conclusion of prosecution evidence remove the risk of tampering with evidence when considering bail applications based on delay?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD NAWAZ SHAH vs CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB1974 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-16
  Land Reforms Regulation 1972minor's propertyoral giftMuslim Lawnatural guardianvoid ab initiotransfer of land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the validity of an oral gift of land made by a minor declarant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The petitioner, a minor, purported to gift land to his infant sister, a transaction subsequently declared ineffective by the Chief Land Commissioner and upheld by the Lahore High Court as void ab initio under Muslim Law. The core legal question was whether the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, by defining 'person' to include a minor and providing specific exceptions for gifts, empowered a minor to make a gift otherwise prohibited by Muslim Law. The Supreme Court held that the Regulation is a prohibitory statute intended to invalidate certain transfers, not an enabling provision that validates transactions otherwise void under personal law. The Court affirmed that the Regulation does not override the fundamental incapacity of a minor to gift property under Muslim Law, nor does the status of a natural guardian grant plenary power to transfer a minor's property without strict adherence to legal conditions. The petition was dismissed, confirming the gift was a nullity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'person' in the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 empower a minor to make a gift of land otherwise prohibited by Muslim Law?
  • Is the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 an enabling statute that validates transfers of land otherwise void under personal law?
  • Does the status of a natural guardian under Muslim Law grant plenary power to transfer a minor's property?
  • Can a gift of land made by a minor be considered valid if it does not meet the requirements of Muslim Law, regardless of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 463 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-08Read full judgment →
• AHMAD GHANI vs SETTLEMENT OFFICER, SIALKOT AND Other1974 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-30
  evacuee landlimitationcondonation of delaybogus transactionsettlement authoritiestime-barred petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a revision petition regarding the allotment of evacuee land. The core dispute arose after land was confirmed in the name of a deceased person, Rehmat A.I., followed by subsequent purported sales to Shaukat A.I. and eventually the petitioner. The Chief Settlement Commissioner declared these transactions bogus, a finding upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: the merits of the transaction and the limitation period for filing the petition. The Court found the petitioner's explanation for a 35-day delay in filing—blaming the Copying Section for failing to notify him of the copy's readiness—to be vague and insufficient, noting the petitioner's own negligence in applying for the copy. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred. The Court held that without a satisfactory explanation for delay, condonation cannot be granted. Furthermore, regarding the petitioner's request to retain the land upon payment of market value, the Court clarified that no judicial order was required, as the petitioner could seek relief directly from Settlement Authorities if permitted by the relevant scheme or rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay in filing a petition excusable when the petitioner fails to provide a specific explanation for the initial delay in applying for a certified copy?
  • Can a transaction involving the allotment of land to a deceased person be considered valid?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct Settlement Authorities to allow the retention of land on payment of market price if the relevant rules already provide for such a remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD Alias AEHMI AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 454 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-29Read full judgment →
• Agha MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN vs MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 4 Other1974 PLD Lahore 189 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-10Read full judgment →