Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• KAMIR vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 65 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-17Read full judgment →
• KALANDAR BUX vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 425 · Sindh High Court · 1974-05-28Read full judgment →
• KALA vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 537 · Lahore High Court · 1974-06-25Read full judgment →
• K. F. SHAIFTA vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1974 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  evacuee propertyrevisional jurisdictionSettlement Commissionerstatutory interpretationdelegation of powersDisplaced Persons Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court concerning the transfer of an evacuee house. The core legal question was whether an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner by the Central Government under Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, could be deemed a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes, including the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that once the Central Government invested an officer with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner under Section 9(1), that officer must be deemed to have been appointed as a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes under the Act. Consequently, such an officer is competent to exercise revisional powers if specially empowered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the Act prescribes no special mode of appointment, and departmental practice supports this interpretation. The petition was dismissed as the officer was duly empowered to hear the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner under Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 qualify as a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes under the Act?
  • Can an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is a specific mode of appointment required for a Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• JUMO AND 4 Others vs THE STATE--Opponent1974 P Cr. L J 383 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-28Read full judgment →
• JHANGREZ MUSA KHAN (REPRESENTED BY HARIS) vs FAIZULLAH KHAN AND Other FAIZULLAH KHAN AND Other1974 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
• JAVED AKBAR vs Rai MUHAMMAD SHAFI-1974 P Cr. L J 491 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-09Read full judgment →
• JAN MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 351 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-17Read full judgment →
• JAMILUR REHMAN vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN-1974 P Cr. L J 601 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-30Read full judgment →
• JAMIL AHMED- vs Mst. SULTANA JEHAN BEGUM1974 PLD Karachi 319 · Sindh High Court · 1974-02-18
  evictionpersonal requirementnon-residential buildingresidential buildingbona fide needrent controllandlord-tenant dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant occupying a shop in Karachi. The landlord sought eviction on the grounds of personal residential requirement for her son. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge allowed the eviction, finding the landlord's need bona fide. The core legal question was whether a landlord can evict a tenant from a non-residential premises to satisfy residential needs. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme of the Rent Ordinance creates distinct, mutually exclusive categories for residential and non-residential buildings. The court ruled that a non-residential building cannot be recovered for residential purposes, regardless of the bona fides of the landlord's requirement. The precedent relied upon by the lower court was distinguished as it involved a composite-use building. Consequently, the court established that eviction for personal use must strictly align with the nature of the building as defined by the statute, prohibiting the conversion of non-residential premises for residential occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord evict a tenant from a non-residential building to fulfill residential needs?
  • Does the Rent Ordinance permit the recovery of a non-residential building for the residential occupation of the landlord or their children?
  • Is the statutory right to seek eviction for personal use mutually exclusive between residential and non-residential building categories?
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• JALAL DIN vs The STATE1974 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  criminal liabilityplea of insanityschizophreniaburden of proofpremeditationmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises from the conviction of the petitioner Jalal Din under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of one Yusuf, alongside convictions under sections 307, 326, and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts were justified in rejecting the accused's plea of insanity based on his medical history as a chronic patient of schizophrenia. The Supreme Court held that under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, the crucial point of time for establishing unsoundness of mind is when the offence is committed, and the burden of proof rests on the accused, which the petitioner failed to discharge. The Court reasoned that the petitioner targeted specific individuals he considered enemies, indicating premeditation rather than a crime committed during a sudden fit of insanity. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with an observation that the State should provide medical treatment for schizophrenia during imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • At what point in time must unsoundness of mind be established under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proving that an accused is entitled to the exemption of insanity?
  • Does targeting specific perceived enemies during an attack negate a plea of insanity based on schizophrenia?
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• ISMAIL AND Another vs The STATE1974 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-02
  special leave to appealtest identification paradeeyewitness identificationmurderappreciation of evidenceunlawful assembly
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning charges of murder and assault. The petitioners were initially tried along with others for murder and rioting. The trial court convicted the accused under sections 302/149, 148, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court acquitted some co-accused, set aside the conviction under section 149, and held the petitioners individually liable for their specific acts, convicting them under sections 302, 326, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the admissibility and reliability of an eyewitness's testimony regarding identification and whether a test identification parade was legally necessary when a witness recognized the assailants by face rather than by name. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a test identification parade is unnecessary where a witness is already familiar with the accused by face at the time of the incident, and declined to interfere with the High Court's concurrent appreciation of evidence. The key principle laid down is that test identification parades are required only when an accused is seen for the first time during the incident, not when the witness recognizes the accused's face but merely learns their name later.

  Questions settled

  • Is a test identification parade necessary when an eyewitness recognizes the accused by face at the time of the incident but learns their name only later?
  • Whether the evidence of an eyewitness can be discarded solely because the witness did not know the names of the accused persons at the time of the occurrence?
  • When does an accused person require a test identification parade during a criminal trial?
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• ISLAMUL HAQ AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 6 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-15
  murdercommon intentionocular testimonymedical evidencerecoveriescriminal appealdeath sentence confirmation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 and Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Ghulam Farid and murderous assault on prosecution witnesses following a petty dispute. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular testimony was consistent with the medical evidence, whether recoveries could be proved by the solitary statement of the investigating officer, whether the sequence of discussion in the trial judgment vitiated it, and whether common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was properly invoked. The Lahore High Court held that the eyewitness testimony of injured witnesses was reliable and sufficient for conviction despite minor discrepancies, that an investigating officer's solitary statement can prove recoveries if otherwise credible, that a judgment's order of discussion does not invalidate it if all requirements are met, and that common intention was established by the concerted nature of the attack. The court dismissed the appeal, confirmed the death sentence of the main appellant, and upheld the remaining convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured eyewitnesses alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction without corroboration?
  • Whether the recovery of a weapon can be proved by the solitary statement of an investigating officer?
  • Does the failure of a trial judge to follow a specific sequence of discussing defense and prosecution evidence render a judgment illegal?
  • When can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be legitimately inferred in a murderous assault?
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• ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF.PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR AND Another1974 SCMR 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-14
  condonation of delaylimitationtime-barred petitioncertificate of fitnessignorance of lawinterim constitution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which was submitted with a delay of 108 days. The petitioner sought condonation of this delay, arguing that the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness before the Peshawar High Court—which was ultimately dismissed—should be excluded. The core legal question was whether the time wasted in pursuing a legally misconceived and incompetent application for a certificate of fitness before the High Court constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the law. The Supreme Court held that the application for a certificate was entirely misconceived, as the High Court lacked the authority to grant such a certificate under the Interim Constitution except for substantial questions regarding constitutional interpretation. The Court ruled that ignorance of the law does not excuse a party from the consequences of delay, particularly when it infringes upon the valuable rights accrued to the opposing party through the lapse of time. Consequently, the request for condonation was rejected, and the petition was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent pursuing a legally misconceived application for a certificate of fitness constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Can ignorance of the law be accepted as a valid ground to condone delay and defeat a valuable right accrued to the opposing party?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court grant a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
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• IQBALUR RAHMAN AND MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs THE STATE ILTAFUR RAHMAN1974 PLD Supreme Court 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-29
  bail cancellationmurder caseplea of alibipre-trial bailcriminal proceduredying statementprosecution evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a criminal case involving charges of murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail to one accused, Iltafur Rehman, based on a plea of alibi, while refusing it to another, Iqbalur Rehman. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition of Iqbalur Rehman, upholding the refusal of bail given the prima facie evidence in the F.I.R. and dying statement. Regarding Iltafur Rehman, the Court cancelled his bail, holding that the High Court erred by conducting a final adjudication on the alibi evidence at the bail stage. The Supreme Court established the principle that during bail proceedings, courts must not undertake an elaborate sifting of evidence or pre-empt the trial court’s functions. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe an accused is guilty of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, and prosecution evidence exists, bail should not be granted based on disputed alibi claims that require detailed examination at trial.

  Questions settled

  • Should a court conduct a final adjudication on a plea of alibi during bail proceedings?
  • Does the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding an accused's innocence justify the grant of bail?
  • Is it permissible for a court to perform an elaborate sifting of evidence at the bail stage?
  • Can bail be granted when there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment?
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• INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, WEST PAKISTAN LAHORE AND Other vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD, SUB INSPECTOR1974 PLD Supreme Court 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-13
  compulsory retirementsuperannuationconstitutional amendmentautomatic retirementgovernment servicestatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The respondent, a police officer, was compulsorily retired after twenty-five years of service under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963. The High Court set aside this retirement, relying on precedent declaring those rules ultra vires. During the pendency of the appeal, the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1966, was enacted, amending Article 178 of the Constitution of 1962 to regulate superannuation. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Article 178(4)(b) regarding whether a government servant attaining the age of fifty-five within six months of the amendment's commencement retires automatically without a specific order. The Supreme Court held that under Article 178(4)(b), if no direction is issued by the competent authority, a government servant who reaches the age of fifty-five within the specified six-month period automatically retires upon the expiry of that period, or upon reaching the age of sixty, whichever occurs first. The Court clarified that no separate order is necessary for such automatic retirement, establishing that the constitutional provision operates independently of administrative directives in the absence of contrary instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 178(4)(b) of the Constitution of 1962 require a specific order from a competent authority to effect the retirement of a government servant?
  • When does a government servant automatically retire under the provisions of the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1966?
  • Does the expiry of the six-month period mentioned in Article 178(4)(b) of the Constitution of 1962 trigger automatic retirement for a government servant who has reached the age of fifty-five?
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• INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE AND Other vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD1974 PLD Supreme Court 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-20
  compulsory retirementterms and conditions of serviceultra viresconstitutional amendmentgovernment servantsuperannuation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan setting aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent Sub-Inspector of Police, which had been ordered under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963. The core legal question concerned whether the proviso to Rule 4 of the said Rules was ultra vires the 1962 Constitution. Following this Court's earlier precedent in Government of West Pakistan v. Karamatullah Khan, the appellant conceded the correctness of the High Court's decision on this point. However, the appellant sought clarification regarding whether a specific order of retirement was necessary under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution for a government servant reaching the age of 55 years. The Court held that prima facie the language of Clause (b) of sub-Article (4) of Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution, as substituted by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1966, does not require a specific order for compulsory retirement upon attaining the age of 55, and directed the matter to be placed before the Full Court for authoritative consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the proviso to Rule 4 of the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963, violates the terms and conditions of service guaranteed under the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does Clause (b) of sub-Article (4) of Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution, as substituted by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1966, require the making of a specific order for the compulsory retirement of a government servant upon reaching the age of 55 years?
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• INAYATULLAH vs MUHAMMAD SHAFT AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-17
  criminal appealacquittaleye-witness reliabilitybenefit of doubtvicarious liabilitylalkaraappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment acquitting two respondents of murder charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents, a father and son, attacked the deceased following a dispute over a debt. The High Court acquitted the accused, finding the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses unreliable, their presence at the scene doubtful, and noting significant contradictions in their accounts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the acquittal was based on sound principles of criminal justice. During the appeal, the principal accused died, causing the appeal to abate against him. Regarding the remaining respondent, who was only 15 at the time and accused of merely exhorting his father, the Court upheld the acquittal. It held that the High Court correctly assessed the evidence, noting the lack of independent witnesses, the suspicious absence of blood at the scene, and the implausibility of the prosecution's narrative. The Court affirmed that an acquittal based on a reasonable assessment of evidence and the benefit of doubt should not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court justified in acquitting an accused when the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of the crime is found to be doubtful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of a 'lalkara' (exhortation) when the principal accused has died and the evidence against the alleged abettor is inconsistent?
  • Does the absence of blood at the scene of a violent crime in a busy market place undermine the credibility of the prosecution's version of events?
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• INAMUL HAQ AND Another vs THE PAKISTAN REFUGEES REHABILITATION1974 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-10
  interim injunctiondiscretionary jurisdictionrefugee rehabilitationutility chargesappellate jurisdictiontemporary injunction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against an appellate order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which set aside an interlocutory injunction granted by the District Judge, Dadu. The petitioners, representing residents of Bholari Camp, had filed a civil suit challenging the legality of decisions taken at a meeting chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, Dadu, regarding enhanced electricity and water charges and the recovery of mounting arrears owed to respondent No. 1, a statutory corporation established for refugee rehabilitation. The core legal question concerned the propriety of granting an interim injunction against the enforcement of rates agreed upon in a representative meeting where arrears had accumulated. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its appellate discretion in refusing the interlocutory injunction, noting that the residents had defaulted on even the original rates and that the case raised no question of law of general importance. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside an interlocutory injunction where arrears of utility charges are mounting and plaintiffs failed to pay even at originally agreed rates?
  • Does a meeting convened by a Deputy Commissioner to address utility arrears of a statutory corporation render decisions ultra vires when representatives of residents participated without immediate objection?
  • Can an interlocutory injunction be granted in a representative suit without satisfying procedural requirements for representative actions?
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• In Re: MESSRS ANWAR H. PIR BHAI & Co vs NOT1974 PLD Karachi 42 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-07Read full judgment →
• In Re : MESSRS K. S. B. PUMPS Co. LTD., LAHORE vs NOT1974 PLD Lahore 362 · Lahore High Court · 1974-01-29Read full judgment →
• IMDAD HUSSAIN vs NOOR HASSAN AND 5 Other Opponents1974 PLD Karachi 485 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-25
  habeas corpuswrongful confinementlocus standiabuse of processabductiondiscretionary jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the production and release of a woman allegedly wrongfully confined by private respondents. The petitioner, along with his relatives, was already facing trial under Section 364/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged abduction of the same woman. During the proceedings, the petitioner shifted his allegations, requesting searches at a new address based on undisclosed sources. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the application, holding that while Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not contain express statutory restrictions on who may apply, a mere stranger or an interested party with doubtful credentials facing criminal charges regarding the detenu should not be permitted to abuse the court's extraordinary jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that habeas corpus petitions should normally be filed by close relatives or friends, and where alternative remedies under Section 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 exist, the discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction should not be exercised to interfere with ongoing criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stranger or an accused person facing trial for abducting a woman has the locus standi to maintain a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for her production?
  • Under what circumstances should a High Court decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in favor of alternative statutory remedies?
  • Can the extraordinary process of habeas corpus be utilized to interfere with or bypass an ongoing criminal trial where the alleged detenu is a crucial witness?
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• IMAM UD DIN AND Another vs THE DEPUTY SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1974 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-27
  Evacuee propertyShop transferWrit petitionSpecial leave petitionConsequential orderRemand orderSettlement AuthoritiesAuction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case concerns the transfer of an evacuee shop, initially contested between a claimant allottee and an unauthorized occupant. After various decisions by Settlement Authorities, including a remand and subsequent auction to the petitioners, a new order was passed transferring the shop to respondent No. 2. The petitioners filed two writ petitions: one challenging a remand order (pending) and another challenging the subsequent transfer order (dismissed in limine by the High Court). The Supreme Court, on a petition for special leave, upheld the High Court's dismissal of the second writ petition. The Court held that the second writ petition was unnecessary because the impugned transfer order was wholly consequential to the remand order already under challenge in the first, pending writ petition. If the first writ petition succeeds, all subsequent consequential orders would automatically be nullified.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary to file a separate writ petition to challenge an order that is wholly consequential to a primary order already under challenge in a pending writ petition?
  • Do consequential orders stand nullified if the primary order from which they stem is set aside?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition in limine if the impugned order is subject to appeal and revision to higher authorities?
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• IMAM ALI SHAH vs CLAIMS COMMISSIONER/SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1974 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-04
  displaced personregistration of claimsland claimswrit jurisdictionleave to appealclaims commissioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition challenging orders relating to the verification and entitlement of a land claim of a displaced person. The core legal question concerns whether the authorities under the Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1949 possessed verification powers for agreed areas, and whether the respondent qualified as a 'displaced person' under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the 1949 Act and its rules did not confer verification powers and that such claims fell under the 1956 Act, while findings of fact regarding identity and the filing of claims could not be disturbed in writ jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the question of whether the respondent fell within the definition of a 'displaced person' under Section 2(1) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 required further examination. The key principle laid down is that the claims organization derived its powers from the 1956 Act rather than the 1949 Act, and leave to appeal was granted to examine the interpretation of a 'displaced person' who resided abroad or failed to manage Indian properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1949 provided powers of verification for claims relating to agreed areas?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the identity of a claimant be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a person who resided in Iraq and did not manage properties in India qualifies as a 'displaced person' under Section 2(1) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956?
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• ILLAHI BUX AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 410 · Sindh High Court · 1972-07-19Read full judgment →
• IJAZ AHMAD vs The STATE1974 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationrevisional jurisdictiondying statementcause of deathcriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the cancellation of pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court in a murder case registered under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the cancellation on three grounds: his name was absent from the First Information Report; the High Court lacked jurisdiction to cancel bail granted under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898; and the deceased's death resulted from pneumonia rather than the injuries sustained. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the identity of the accused was sufficiently established by the deceased's dying statement, and that the cause of death is a matter for trial determination, noting the relevance of the second explanation to section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Crucially, the Court affirmed that the High Court possesses inherent revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to cancel bail orders passed by subordinate criminal courts. The petition was dismissed as the arguments lacked merit at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to cancel bail granted by a Sessions Judge under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the identity of an accused established by a dying statement sufficient for the purpose of deciding a bail application?
  • Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to review orders of subordinate criminal courts?
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• IFTIKHARUL HAQ. vs THE WEST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOP MENT1974 PLD Lahore 82 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-22Read full judgment →
• IDREES FATIMA AND 4 Other vs ASRAR AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 46 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1973-06-12Read full judgment →
• IBRAR vs STATE1974 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-17
  murderdeath sentencecommutation of sentencepresidential amnestyidentification paradeocular evidencetransportation for life
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The incident arose from an altercation at a cinema booking office, following which the appellant chased the deceased and shot him fatally with a pistol. On appeal, the Supreme Court evaluated the reliability of ocular testimony from co-villagers and co-workers, the procedural validity of the identification parade, and the sentence awarded. The Court upheld the conviction, finding the eye-witness evidence credible and the identification parade valid, while noting that the killing was deliberate. However, regarding the sentence, the Court considered the general amnesty granted by the President of Pakistan commuting death sentences to transportation for life, noting that the appellant had been unable to reap its benefit solely due to his pending appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of eye-witnesses who are co-villagers and co-workers of the deceased can be relied upon in the absence of private enmity?
  • Whether an identification parade can be held valid if the accused did not protest at the time of the parade and was not shown to witnesses prior to it?
  • Whether a pending appeal in the Supreme Court deprives a convict of the benefit of a general presidential commutation of death sentences to transportation for life?
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• IBRAHIM AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 22 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• IBRAHIM AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 119 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-30Read full judgment →
• HUZOOR ALAM AND 2 Other vs NATIONAL: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS1974 PLC 161 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-16Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 329 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-17Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN BUX AND Another vs THE STATE-- Respondent1974 P Cr. L. J 302 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-04Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN BUX Alias MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 591 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-17Read full judgment →
• HAYAT MUHAMMAD AND Another vs MEMBER, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, RAWALPINDI AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 456 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-27
  land reformsvoid transfersdowergiftfederal land commissionremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition arises from orders passed by land revenue authorities and the Federal Land Commission rejecting a land transfer made by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower prior to the enforcement of Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) of 1972. The core legal question was whether the authorities properly evaluated the existence and bona fides of the transfer under Paragraph 7(1)(b) of the Regulation, particularly regarding transactions in favour of heirs. The Lahore High Court held that the Federal Land Commission failed to render a categorical finding on whether the transaction actually took place or whether it lacked bona fides, and overlooked the legal distinction regarding transactions in favour of heirs under the Second Proviso to Paragraph 7(1)(b). Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Federal Land Commission for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Land Commission must record a categorical finding on the actual existence of a transfer of land made prior to the enforcement of Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) of 1972?
  • Are the bona fides of a land transaction in favour of an heir required to be examined under the Second Proviso to Paragraph 7(1)(b) of Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) of 1972?
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• HASSAN BAKIISH AND Others vs Syed AFZAL SHAH AND Other1974 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-02
  court-fee deficiencypre-emption suitappellate jurisdictiondiscretionary powerdue diligencedismissal of appealvaluation of suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an appeal by the Additional District Judge due to insufficient court-fee payment in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the appellate court was justified in refusing to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee under the Court Fees Act, 1870, after the appellants had failed to rectify the shortfall despite multiple opportunities and clear knowledge of the correct valuation established by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was proper, noting that the appellants failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the correct court-fee payable, despite having access to the trial court record. The Court affirmed that while discretionary powers exist to allow the making up of deficiencies, such discretion is not absolute and should not be exercised to deprive the opposing party of a valuable right accrued through the appellants' negligence. The principle laid down is that a party seeking the court's indulgence to rectify a court-fee deficiency must demonstrate bona fide conduct and due diligence, especially when the correct valuation is readily ascertainable from the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court refuse to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee if the appellant has failed to show due diligence?
  • Does the court have an absolute obligation to grant time to make up a deficiency in court-fee under the Court Fees Act 1870?
  • Is a party entitled to an extension of time to pay court-fees if the correct valuation was readily available in the trial court record?
  Read full judgment →
• HASSAN AKHTAR vs GHULAM HUSSAIN AND Another1974 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-26
  Horse Breeding TenancyBoard of RevenueRevision PetitionMartial Law RegulationColonization of Government LandsLand Revenue ActFinality of Order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over a Horse Breeding Tenancy in the District of Sahiwal. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 were rival applicants for the tenancy, which was initially granted to the petitioner by the Collector. Following an appeal by the respondent, the Commissioner upheld the Collector's decision, but the Board of Revenue subsequently accepted a revision petition filed by the respondent, cancelling the petitioner's grant and awarding the tenancy to the respondent. The petitioner challenged this in the Lahore High Court, arguing that Martial Law Regulation No. 115 had resumed such lands, rendering the grant invalid. The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent's rights had matured prior to the regulation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Board of Revenue lacked jurisdiction to entertain a revision due to the finality of the Commissioner's decision under the Statement of Conditions, and that the revision was barred by the Land Revenue Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the High Court correctly rejected the arguments regarding the applicability of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 and the jurisdictional challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Does Condition No. 27 of the Statement of Conditions regarding Horse Breeding Tenancies preclude the Board of Revenue from exercising revisional jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Does the finality of an arbitrator's decision under the Statement of Conditions bar a revision petition before the Board of Revenue?
  • Does the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 automatically invalidate a tenancy grant that had already matured in favor of a party prior to the regulation's enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• HASHMAT vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 158 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-22Read full judgment →
• HASAN BAKHSH AND Another vs GHULAM MUSTAFA KHAN NIAZI AND ANOTHER1974 P Cr. L J 116 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-21Read full judgment →
• HASAN ALI KARABHAI vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX1974 PLD Karachi 473 · Sindh High Court · 1974-02-21Read full judgment →
• HAMID KHAN vs MUSA KHAN AND Another1974 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-11
  power of attorneyrevocationsale-deed cancellationregistrationfictitious transactionconsideration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court reversing lower appellate and trial court decisions and decreeing the cancellation of a sale-deed in its entirety. The respondent had executed powers of attorney in favour of another respondent to sell a portion of land, but subsequently cancelled them via a registered affidavit and public notices before the sale-deed was presented for registration. The core legal questions involved whether an affidavit was sufficient to revoke a registered power of attorney and whether revocation after execution but before presentation for registration invalidated the deed. The Supreme Court held that the transaction of sale was fictitious, collusive, and without consideration, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the cancellation of the sale-deed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an affidavit is sufficient to revoke a registered power of attorney?
  • Whether the revocation of a power of attorney after the execution of a deed of sale but before the presentation thereof for registration is sufficient to invalidate the deed in toto?
  Read full judgment →
• HAMID HUSAIN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND Other1974 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-23
  civil court jurisdictionspecial tribunalDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actagricultural landsikni landallotment validityrehabilitation scheme
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the limits of civil court jurisdiction to determine the validity of land transfers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The appellant, having been allotted land for agricultural purposes, sought possession of specific survey numbers which were occupied by school buildings. The lower courts concurrently found that the disputed area was 'sikni' (residential) land, not agricultural land, and thus not available for transfer under the Rehabilitation Scheme. The core legal question was whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to scrutinize the validity of an allotment made by Settlement Authorities, despite statutory bars on jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the disputed land was not 'land' as defined by the Act, as it was not used for purposes subservient to agriculture. Consequently, the allotment was void. The Court affirmed that civil courts of plenary jurisdiction retain the authority to examine whether special tribunals acted within their legal jurisdiction, particularly regarding the existence of facts upon which their authority depends. The appeal was dismissed, confirming that Settlement Authorities cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves by mischaracterizing property.

  Questions settled

  • Do civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a transfer of land made by Settlement Authorities under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can a special tribunal assume jurisdiction by making a binding determination on facts that are outside its statutory scope?
  • Does the definition of 'land' under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 include residential property not used for purposes subservient to agriculture?
  • Are civil courts empowered to scrutinize the acts of special tribunals to determine if they are in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim MUHAMMAD ANWAR BABRI vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY TO THE1974 PLD Lahore 33 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-26Read full judgment →
• Haji QABOOL MUHAMMAD SHAH vs Pir SARFRAZ AHMAD1974 PLD Karachi 334 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-18Read full judgment →
• Haji MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs LAL MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other1974 PLD Karachi 248 · Sindh High Court · 1973-08-09Read full judgment →
• Haji GHULAM QADIR vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 228 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-10Read full judgment →
• Haji BAHAWOOD-DEEN vs B. G. DE'souza1974 PLD Quetta 36 · Balochistan High Court · 1973-12-18
  specific performancetime of the essencesale of immovable propertybreach of contractdamagesearnest moneyvacant possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Quetta, awarding damages of Rs. 20,000 to the respondent in lieu of specific performance for an agreement of sale of a shop. The core legal questions involved whether time was of the essence of the contract for the sale of immovable property coupled with vacant possession, whether the appellant committed a breach, and the assessment of damages under section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872. The Balochistan High Court held that while the general presumption in sales of immovable property is that time is not of the essence, this presumption is rebuttable and stands excluded where commercial premises are sold with vacant possession for immediate use by the buyer, or where a subsequent reasonable notice makes time of the essence. The Court found the appellant in breach for failing to deliver vacant possession and clear title documents within the stipulated time, and upheld the award of damages, adjusting the earnest money refund. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Is time of the essence in a contract for the sale of commercial premises with vacant possession?
  • Can a subsequent reasonable notice make time of the essence when it was not originally so stipulated in a contract for the sale of land?
  • What is the effect of an unjustified demand for litigation costs attached to an offer of performance by a vendor?
  • How are damages assessed under section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 in the absence of proof of special damages?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji ALI BUX KHAN AND 3 Others vs THE CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 2 Other1974 SC M R98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionmartial law regulationland commissionzamindari rightscivil court decreenatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants. The appellants claimed to be the absolute Zamindari owners of disputed agricultural land whose rights were recognized by civil court decrees against the heirs of a former Jagirdar prior to the surrender of the land to the Land Commission by the said heirs. The core legal questions involved whether the constitutional bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 applied only to orders made in strict compliance with the Regulation after the promulgation of the Constitution, and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 98 to declare orders of the Land Commission passed without lawful authority as void. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional ouster under paragraph 27 is limited to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation, and that the High Court maintains jurisdiction under Article 98 to review orders not made in accordance therewith. The key principle laid down is that orders of executive authorities failing to comply with statutory regulations or violating natural justice are open to judicial review under constitutional jurisdiction notwithstanding general ouster clauses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 is limited to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to declare an order of the Land Commission made without lawful authority to be of no effect?
  • Is a civil court decree establishing Zamindari rights binding upon the Land Commission when evaluating surrendered land?
  Read full judgment →
• HAJI ABDUL RAZZAK vs PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  customs confiscationcontraband goodsjudicial discretionnatural justicestatutory interpretationliability of ownerwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court order dismissing a writ petition against the confiscation of a vehicle by Customs authorities. The vehicle was seized while transporting contraband goods, and the owner, who had reported the vehicle stolen, sought its release. The core legal question was whether the phrase "liable to confiscation" under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act mandates automatic confiscation of a vehicle used to transport contraband, regardless of the owner's knowledge or complicity. The Supreme Court held that the provision does not imply automatic confiscation but vests authorities with judicial discretion. This discretion must be exercised in accordance with principles of natural justice, requiring that the owner be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court established the principle that no person should be deprived of their property by way of penalty unless they are, in some measure, responsible for assisting or furthering the commission of the offence. As the authorities failed to prove the owner's involvement or knowledge, the confiscation was deemed unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase "liable to confiscation" under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act mandate the automatic forfeiture of a vehicle used to transport contraband?
  • Is proof of an owner's knowledge or complicity required before a vehicle can be confiscated under the Sea Customs Act?
  • Must Customs authorities exercise judicial discretion when determining whether to confiscate a vehicle used for smuggling?
  Read full judgment →
• HABIB KHAN vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 450 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-26Read full judgment →
• HABIB AHMED QURESHI vs WEST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT1974 PLC 271 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-07-12Read full judgment →
• HABIB AHMAD KHAN (REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS) vs The SETTLEMENT1974 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyreview jurisdictionsingle unitdisplaced personsspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from protracted litigation concerning the disposal and transfer of evacuee residential premises in Rawalpindi Cantonment under settlement laws. The petitioners' predecessor-in-interest challenged the division of the property into separate units by settlement authorities and the subsequent dismissal of their writ petition by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved whether a review order passed by a Settlement Commissioner was without jurisdiction due to a pending revision petition under Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether independent premises separated by a public road could be treated as a single unit. The Supreme Court held that the review proceedings were validly participated in and that the settlement authorities rightly treated the physically separated blocks as distinct units, as the Settlement Commissioner had no power to combine entirely independent residential premises into one unit. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order against which a revision petition has been preferred can be reviewed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can independent residential premises separated by a public road be combined into a single unit for transfer to one applicant?
  • Does participation in review proceedings without objection preclude a party from later challenging the jurisdiction to review?
  Read full judgment →
• H. NIAMATULLAH KHAN vs Mst. SHABNAMA AND Other1974 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-14
  pre-emptionco-sharerunregistered sale deedlimitationresiduary articleshariat actlimited owner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent, Mst. Shabnama, against the petitioner-vendee. The respondent claimed ownership of a share in the suit house and, in the alternative, sought pre-emption of the entire house based on her status as a co-sharer. Although her claim based on an unregistered dower deed was rejected, the appellate court and the High Court decreed her pre-emption claim, finding that her late husband was a co-sharer whose share devolved upon her under Muslim law, and that her suit was within time. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed that upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the respondent's limited estate converted into full ownership. On the question of limitation, the Court held that since the sale deeds were unregistered, no mutation was sanctioned, and physical possession was not proved to have been taken under the sale, neither Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 nor Section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act applied. Consequently, the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908, prescribing a six-year limitation period, governed the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Which limitation provision applies to a pre-emption suit where the sale deeds are unregistered, no mutation is sanctioned, and physical possession is not proven to have been taken by the vendee?
  • Does a Muslim widow's limited estate convert into full ownership upon the commencement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  • Can a pre-emptor establish their status as a co-sharer through inheritance under Muslim law even if their claim based on an unregistered dower deed is rejected?
  Read full judgment →
• GULZAR MASIH vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 530 · Lahore High Court · 1967-06-25Read full judgment →
• GULZAR KHAN vs Mst. SHAHZAD BIBI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-10
  pre-emptiongift in lieu of dowerconstruction of documentquestion of lawsecond appealnature of transaction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land transferred by a husband to his wife in lieu of prompt dower. The core legal question was whether such a transaction constitutes a sale subject to the right of pre-emption or a gift exempt from it, and whether the High Court could interfere with findings regarding the nature of the transaction in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that a transfer of property in lieu of dower is essentially a gift and not a sale, and therefore, not subject to the right of pre-emption. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while inferences from evidence are findings of fact, the proper construction of a legal document is a question of law. Consequently, the High Court was competent to interpret the deed and determine the nature of the transaction. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the transaction was not pre-emptible.

  Questions settled

  • Is a transfer of property by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower considered a sale subject to pre-emption?
  • Is the construction of a legal document a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a lower court's finding regarding the nature of a transaction if it involves the construction of a document?
  Read full judgment →
• GULISTAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 608 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-31Read full judgment →
• GULAB vs Tim STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 74 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-28
  criminal appealidentification paradeocular testimonyreasonable doubtmurderattempted murderacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of death imposed by the trial court for triple murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established the identity of the appellant as the third assailant beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the identification parade and ocular testimony. The Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. The ratio of the decision is that where an identification parade is conducted after witnesses have already been exposed to the accused at the police station, the evidentiary value of such identification is completely nullified. Furthermore, ocular testimony that fails to provide a specific description of an unknown assailant in the initial report, combined with the absence of credible corroborative evidence, is insufficient to support a conviction. The Court established the principle that the prosecution must prove identity beyond reasonable doubt, and where identification procedures are compromised by prior exposure, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prior exposure of an accused to witnesses at a police station invalidate a subsequent identification parade?
  • Is ocular testimony sufficient to sustain a conviction when the identity of the assailant was not established in the initial report?
  • What is the effect of an identification parade conducted after a significant delay and prior witness exposure on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• GUL MUHAMMAD Alias GULLO AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 400 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-15
  murderocular testimonydelayed reportingsilence of eye-witnessesweapon recoverybenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased Hussain Bux. The core legal question revolves around the reliability of ocular testimony where alleged eye-witnesses remained silent and failed to report the crime to the police or authorities promptly, despite having access to means of communication in an urban setting. The Sindh High Court held that the testimony of urban eye-witnesses who inexplicably keep silent and fail to report a murder for hours does not inspire confidence and must be discarded, and that the mere recovery of a blood-stained weapon, standing alone without reliable ocular or corroborative evidence, is insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court laid down the principle that unexplained silence and delayed reporting by urban eye-witnesses renders their testimony untrustworthy, and an uncorroborated weapon recovery cannot sustain a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the unexplained silence and delayed reporting of an incident by urban eye-witnesses renders their testimony unreliable?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of the recovery of a blood-stained weapon when ocular evidence has been discarded?
  • What is the evidentiary value of eye-witness testimony where witnesses fail to report a cognizable offense to the police despite easy access to communication facilities?
  Read full judgment →
• GUFTAR SHAH vs SIND LABOUR COURT No. 3, KARACHI And Another1974 PLC 205 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-12
  industrial relationsmisconductnatural justiceservice of noticedismissal from serviceabsence without leaveenquiry reportlimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These constitutional petitions concern the termination of employees for "absence without leave for more than 10 days," a misconduct defined under the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal questions involve whether such absence constitutes misconduct regardless of intent, the adequacy of service by notice board when postal service fails, and the necessity of providing an enquiry report and a second show-cause notice. The Court held that the statutory definition of misconduct for absence exceeding ten days does not require proof of wilful intent. However, the Court ruled that employers must make reasonable efforts to serve notices; mere return of postal mail does not validate service by notice board. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that principles of natural justice mandate that an employee be furnished with the enquiry report and granted a second show-cause opportunity before dismissal. Finally, it was held that the limitation period for filing a grievance under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, only commences upon the actual communication of the dismissal order to the employee.

  Questions settled

  • Does 'absence without leave for more than 10 days' constitute misconduct under the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 regardless of the employee's intent?
  • Is the affixation of notices on a company notice board sufficient service when registered mail is returned unserved?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require an employer to furnish an enquiry report and provide a second show-cause notice to an employee before dismissal?
  • Does the limitation period for filing a grievance under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 begin to run if the dismissal order is never communicated to the employee?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERN~41974 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-03
  import and export tradeWest Pakistan Finance Actfiscal statutestrict interpretationtax liabilitymachinery import
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These three appeals by the Province of Sind addressed the core legal question of whether respondents who imported machinery, plants, and raw materials for their own use or the manufacture of finished goods qualified as "persons engaged in the import and export trade" under the West Pakistan Finance Acts of 1962 and 1963. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the respondents were not persons engaged in such trade because the statutes levied tax on persons whose main and regular business was imports and exports, rather than on the imported goods themselves. The Court laid down the key principles that incidental imports for personal use or manufacturing do not constitute engaging in import trade, and that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the citizen where multiple interpretations exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether persons who import machinery, plants, or raw materials for their own use or manufacturing are "persons engaged in the import and export trade" under the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963?
  • Does the tax under the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963, apply to the imported goods or to the person engaged in the trade?
  • How should fiscal statutes be construed by the courts when more than one interpretation is open?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB AND Another AND C. A. No. 40 Of 1973 LT: Coc.. J. D.1974 PLD Supreme Court 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-21
  service contractterms and conditions of serviceautonomous corporationsremuneration and allowancesexecutive instructionsstatutory powerco-operative development board
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These connected civil appeals concern the fixation of terms and conditions of service of Lt. Col. (Rtd.) J. D. Malik as a Member of the Pakistan Co-operative Board, established under section 3 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Development Board Ordinance (XIV of 1962). The core legal question revolves around whether a valid binding contract regarding the officer's remuneration came into existence upon his appointment and whether subsequent executive instructions or general government orders could unilaterally vary its terms. The Supreme Court held that a valid and binding contract had indeed come into existence between the Provincial Government and the respondent, determining his remuneration under section 4(3) of the Ordinance, and that neither the Provincial Government nor central executive memoranda could unilaterally alter or override those contractual terms. The key principle laid down is that terms and conditions of service determined through a specific contract freely entered into pursuant to statutory powers cannot be varied by subsequent omnibus executive orders or external memoranda unless permitted by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a binding contract regarding remuneration comes into existence when an appointment is offered and accepted under statutory powers?
  • Can the Provincial Government unilaterally vary the terms and conditions of service of a board member after they have been determined by a valid contract?
  • Do central executive memoranda and instructions override statutory powers conferred on the appropriate authority by an Ordinance?
  • Are the terms of a written service contract precluded from being varied by extraneous evidence under the Evidence Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN vs A. M. KHAN LEGHARI, C. S. P., MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1974 SCM R 535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  compulsory retirementcivil servicepublic serviceconstitutional amendmentspecial leave to appealretrospective application of lawpublic service commission consultation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the Government of Pakistan against a High Court judgment declaring a notice of compulsory retirement issued to the respondent, a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan, as illegal and of no legal effect. The respondent had challenged the notice, arguing that Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations was inapplicable to former Indian Civil Service members and had been abrogated by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. The High Court ruled that the respondent could only be retired under the Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1962, which were inapplicable due to the expiry of relevant time periods. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, contending that subsequent constitutional amendments via the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1965, validated the action. The Supreme Court held that even if the change in law were considered, it did not validate the impugned action because the mandatory consultation with the Central Public Service Commission, required under the amended Article 178 of the Constitution, had not occurred. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the new law did not assist the petitioner's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take into account a change in law that occurs during the pendency of proceedings?
  • Does a retrospective change in constitutional law automatically validate administrative actions taken prior to the amendment?
  • Is consultation with the Central Public Service Commission a mandatory requirement for the compulsory retirement of members of All-Pakistan Services under Article 178 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT JALLO ROSIN & TURPENTINE FACTORY, LAHORE vs COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE1974 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-09
  sales taxrecovery of taxstay of recoveryreference to high courtprovincial government enterpriseconstitutional immunity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These three petitions arise from orders of the Lahore High Court refusing to stay the recovery of sales tax assessed on the petitioner, a commercial enterprise of the Provincial Government manufacturing rosin and turpentine, under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner challenged the tax assessment on constitutional grounds and filed references before the High Court, subsequently seeking a stay of recovery of the tax demand pending the outcome of the references. The High Court dismissed the stay applications, holding that the Interim Constitution provision invoked had no application and that subsection (7) of section 17 of the Sales Tax Act explicitly mandates that tax shall be payable in accordance with the assessment notwithstanding any reference to the High Court. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether the recovery of assessed tax should be stayed pending reference disposal. The Court held that the clear and mandatory provisions of subsection (7) of section 17 preclude granting a stay against tax recovery despite any potential financial hardship to the enterprise. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can stay the recovery of sales tax pending a reference under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Does subsection (7) of section 17 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 mandate the payment of tax in accordance with the assessment notwithstanding a pending reference?
  • Can financial hardship justify the stay of tax recovery contrary to express statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• GIRDHARILAL AND Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1974 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-31
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedfunctus officiosettlement authoritiescustodiancompensation poolspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a consolidated order of the Sind and Baluchistan High Court, which set aside orders of the Settlement Authorities cancelling Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.Ds.) issued in favor of displaced persons. The core legal questions involve whether the Settlement Authorities have the jurisdiction to cancel P.T.Ds. once issued, and whether properties allegedly held as non-evacuee can be addressed by settlement authorities without a proper declaration from the Custodian. The Supreme Court held that once a P.T.D. is issued and the property leaves the compensation pool, the Settlement Authorities become functus officio and lack jurisdiction to cancel the P.T.D. or deal with the property unless specifically authorized by rules. Furthermore, settlement authorities cannot determine the non-evacuee status of a property, which falls exclusively within the domain of the Custodian. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Authorities have jurisdiction to cancel Permanent Transfer Deeds after they have been issued?
  • Can the Settlement Authorities declare a property to be non-evacuee once it has been treated as evacuee property and brought into the compensation pool?
  • What is the proper forum for seeking a declaration that a property is non-evacuee after it has been managed by the Custodian?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SHABBIR Alias SHABBU vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 405 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-29Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SABIR SABRI vs THE CONTROLLER OF EXAMINATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 233 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-26Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SABIR vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 228 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-13Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RAZA AND 2 Others vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 95 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-09Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASUL vs COLLECTOR, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 495 · Lahore High Court · 1974-04-17Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASUL AND 10 Others vs GHULAM HUSSAIN AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-08
  temporary injunctioncanal authoritiesservice of noticeconcurrent findingsbalance of convenienceirreparable lossleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent refusal of the lower courts and the High Court to grant a temporary injunction in a civil suit challenging an order of the Canal authorities. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting a temporary injunction where the Divisional Canal Officer transferred land to a new watercourse and the petitioners alleged lack of statutory notices. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the due service of notices on the petitioners could not be interfered with in leave proceedings, and that the transfer fell within the permissible margin under the Revenue Manual, negating any prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of convenience in favor of the petitioners. The petition was consequently dismissed. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding service of notice and the absence of a prima facie case will not be disturbed by the apex court in petitions for leave to appeal against the refusal of interim injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the service of notices in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the transfer of an additional area within the permissible margin under the Revenue Manual constitute a prima facie case for granting a temporary injunction?
  • Whether the refusal of lower courts to grant a temporary injunction can be set aside when no irreparable loss is shown.
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASOOL AND Others vs ALI AKBAR AND Other1974 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08
  writ jurisdictiondiscretionary powersubstantial justiceland allotmentres judicatasettlement proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged the cancellation of their land allotment, which had been granted in lieu of 182 P.I. Units in village Koreki, Tehsil Daska. Following an appeal by respondent No. 1, the allotment was cancelled, and subsequent revisions were dismissed. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' writ petition, reasoning that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had relied on a prior, final order dated 23rd February 1967, which had already determined the classification of the lands in question. Consequently, the High Court declined to interfere, despite arguments regarding the timeliness of the respondent's appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the High Court possesses discretion under its writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the High Court is not obligated to interfere in proceedings where substantial justice has been achieved, even if those proceedings were initiated irregularly or were subject to valid legal objections. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court bound to interfere in writ jurisdiction when substantial justice has been done despite procedural irregularities?
  • Can a High Court refuse to interfere in a writ petition where a prior order on the same issue has attained finality?
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• GHULAM NABI vs Syed MUQARAB HUSSAIN AND 3 Other1974 PLD Karachi 408 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-20
  pecuniary jurisdictioncivil procedurerevision applicationjurisdiction of courtsinstitution of suitlowest grade court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application challenges an order of the 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi, who dismissed the petitioner's application to return a plaint for presentation before the proper court. The petitioner argued that under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the suit, valued at Rs. 25,000, should have been filed in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it—specifically a Civil Judge 1st Class—rather than the District Court, due to an alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge. The core legal question was whether Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deprives a court of higher grade of jurisdiction when a court of lower grade is also competent to try the suit. The court dismissed the revision application, holding that Section 15 is a procedural provision directing the choice of forum among competent courts, not a provision that ousts the jurisdiction of higher courts. The principle laid down is that Section 15 does not deprive a court of higher grade of its inherent jurisdiction; it merely regulates the institution of suits among courts of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deprive a court of higher grade of jurisdiction when a court of lower grade is also competent to try the suit?
  • Is Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a provision that ousts the jurisdiction of courts or merely a procedural rule for the institution of suits?
  • Can a suit be validly instituted in a District Court if a Civil Judge of the appropriate class is unavailable?
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• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 486 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-13Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MEHR vs CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 520 · Lahore High Court
  subsistence holdingalienation of landfamily settlementantecedent titleseverability of transferland reformsvoid transactionrevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenges the orders of the Chief Land Commissioner declaring a family settlement and court decree regarding land transfers as void under paragraph 25 of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 64) of 1959. The core legal questions involved the severability of a co-transferee's share, the true import of restrictions on alienations reducing holdings below a subsistence holding, whether a transaction in recognition of antecedent title constitutes an alienation, and the scope of revisional powers. The Lahore High Court held that the prohibition against alienation under paragraph 25 of M.L.R. 64 is not absolute and only renders void that specific portion of a transfer which reduces the balance holding below a subsistence holding, rather than vitiating the entire transaction. Furthermore, the court held that the Chief Land Commissioner failed to consider vital aspects such as the severability of transfers, the nature of antecedent family settlements, and mutual cross-transfers. The impugned orders were declared without lawful authority and quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alienation that reduces a landholder's property below a subsistence holding render the entire transaction void or only the specific portion causing the deficiency?
  • Whether a transfer of land made in recognition of a prior antecedent title or family settlement constitutes an alienation under paragraph 25 of M.L.R. 64 of 1959?
  • Can a co-transferee's abandonment of their share affect the validity of a separate transfer made to another co-transferee under land reform laws?
  • Whether an application filed to invoke the suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the Chief Land Commissioner constitutes a pending proceeding saved under the repeal provisions of M.L.R. 115 of 1972?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN- vs The STATE1974 PLD Karachi 91 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-20
  retracted judicial confessionpolice diarySection 162 CrPCSection 25 Evidence Actdying declarationocular evidenceadmissibility of police statementscriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death. The prosecution relied on ocular evidence, a dying declaration, and a retracted judicial confession. The High Court, upon review, found the ocular evidence insufficient to prove the appellant struck the fatal blow, as the witnesses did not testify to a head injury and the victim had walked away unaided. The court further held that the dying declaration was unreliable due to the potential influence of relatives. Crucially, the court examined whether a statement made by an accused to the police, recorded in a police diary, could be used by the accused to challenge the voluntariness of a subsequent judicial confession. The court held that while Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prohibits using police statements against an accused, it does not bar the accused from using such statements in their favor. Finding the judicial confession was a verbatim copy of the police statement, the court rejected the confession, set aside the murder conviction, and convicted the appellant under Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person rely on their own statement made to the police during an investigation to challenge the voluntariness of a subsequent judicial confession?
  • Does Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar an accused from using their own statement to the police in their favor?
  • Is a judicial confession that is a verbatim copy of a prior statement made to the police voluntary and genuine?
  • Can a High Court use its powers under Section 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to admit additional evidence to ensure justice?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs The STATE1974 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-03
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular testimonyinjured witnessballistic evidencecorroborationcommon intention
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder and causing hurt. The petitioner and three co-accused were tried by the Sessions Judge for the murder of Miran and causing hurt to Allah Ditta. The trial court convicted the petitioner under sections 302/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to death. On appeal, the Lahore High Court maintained the conviction under section 302/34 but reduced the sentence to transportation for life, while setting aside the conviction under section 323/34. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, challenging the reliability of related prosecution witnesses and the validity of the recovery of a crime empty. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular testimony of related witnesses, who were not on inimical terms with the petitioner, was credible. The Court emphasized that the testimony of an injured witness carries significant weight and that the forensic evidence matching the crime empty to the petitioner's gun provided sufficient corroboration to sustain the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an injured witness carry weight in a criminal trial?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained based on ocular testimony corroborated by forensic evidence?
  • Are the statements of related prosecution witnesses inadmissible without independent corroboration if no enmity exists?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN SHAH vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD1974 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-10
  limitationleave to appealexclusion of timecertified copycivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Bahawalpur Circuit, which dismissed the appellant's application for a certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of limitation. The High Court had refused to exclude the time spent by the appellant in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree, relying on local practice and precedent holding that Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply where rules do not mandate filing such copies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 explicitly applies to applications for leave to appeal, making the exclusion of time spent obtaining the decree or order a positive statutory direction. The Court clarified that while Section 12(3) does not apply to applications for leave to appeal, Section 12(2) does, and the terms 'judgment' and 'order' are interchangeable in this context.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for leave to appeal?
  • Can the time spent obtaining a copy of the decree or order be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 if the High Court rules do not require such copies to be filed?
  • Are the terms 'judgment' and 'order' interchangeable for the purposes of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN AND 3 Others vs KHAN MUKARAB KHAN AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  settlement lawindustrial concernagricultural landdisplaced personsremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises out of conflicting orders passed by settlement authorities regarding a piece of land measuring 24 kanals and 10 marlas, which was transferred to the appellants as an industrial concern (tannery) under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, but earlier confirmed in favour of respondents as agricultural land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The appellants challenged the subsequent adverse orders through writ proceedings in the High Court, which dismissed their petition, affirming the character of the land as agricultural. The core legal question was whether the disputed land was agricultural land or an industrial concern at the relevant time for the purposes of proper transfer under the respective settlement statutes. The Supreme Court held that given the conflicting orders passed by two Additional Settlement Commissioners of co-ordinate jurisdiction regarding the same property, the matter must be remanded to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision after hearing both parties on the factual and legal aspects of the land's character.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land used as a tannery prior to partition constitutes agricultural land or an industrial concern under the settlement laws?
  • How should a conflict between two competing transfer orders made by authorities of co-ordinate jurisdiction be resolved under settlement statutes?
  • What is the determinative test for establishing the character of a property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
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• GHULAM HASSAN KHAN, B.A., LL.B. vs MR. JUSTICE MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN,1974 SCMR 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-04
  enrolmenttoutlegal practitionersprofessional misconductbar councilcontempt of courtreform of erring person
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition concerning the implementation of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court and the refusal of the Bar Council's Enrolment Committee to enrol the petitioner as an advocate. The core legal question was whether the respondents disregarded or disobeyed the Supreme Court's order by rejecting the petitioner's fresh application for enrolment. The Supreme Court held that the respondents did not disobey the order, as the Court had merely directed that the petitioner's application be considered afresh, which was duly done. The Court laid down the principle that while it is desirable to afford an erring person a chance to reform, the competent committee retains full jurisdiction to evaluate the petitioner's conduct, pending complaints, and professional history to grant or refuse a law license accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court's direction to consider an application for enrolment afresh obligates the Bar Council to grant the licence?
  • Does a person declared a tout continue to be so for all time to come under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1879?
  • Does the Enrolment Committee act within its jurisdiction by keeping an application for enrolment pending due to pending complaints of professional misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HASSAN AND Another vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 258 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-20Read full judgment →
• GHULAM FARID MAZARI AND 5 Other vs KHURRAM CHEMICAL COMPANY, RAWALPINDI1974 PLC 33 · Labour Court · 1973-02-25Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AKBAR AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1974 P Cr. L J 300 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-29Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AHMAD AND Another vs ATTA MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other S1974 PLD Lahore 248 · Lahore High Court · 1973-04-23Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AHMAD Alias GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR AND Other1974 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-21
  writ jurisdictionlachessettlement of propertyindustrial concernauction purchaserwaiver of rightstransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition regarding the transfer of a water-mill. The petitioner, who had been in occupation of the property since Partition, failed to seek its transfer or allotment, instead accepting the status of a tenant under a previous transferee. When the property was subsequently auctioned, the petitioner failed to participate in the bidding process and allowed the sale to be confirmed in favour of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge the transfer of the water-mill after failing to bid at auction and after significant delay. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the water-mill was correctly classified as an industrial concern under the relevant Settlement Scheme. The Court held that the petitioner’s claim was barred by laches due to his failure to pursue his rights diligently and his acquiescence in the transfer process. The judgment reinforces the principle that a party cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge property transfers after failing to participate in established administrative procedures and allowing substantial time to lapse.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge a property transfer after failing to participate in the auction process?
  • Does a significant delay in filing a petition for the transfer of property constitute laches?
  • Is a water-mill considered an industrial concern under the relevant Settlement Schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ABBAS vs UNITED BANK LTD.1974 PLC 1 · Labour Court · 1973-11-11Read full judgment →
• GHAUS MUHAMMAD AND Others vs Syed IKRAMUL HASSAN AND Other1974 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-08
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertystatutory tenantunauthorized occupantallotmentspecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the transfer of an evacuee shop in favor of the respondents. The core legal question concerns the validity of the transfer of the evacuee property to an allottee who had not secured physical possession, and the locus standi of unauthorized occupants who subsequently acquired possession through successive illegal transfers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly upheld the transfer in favor of the respondents, noting that the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest had categorically admitted his status as a tenant under the transferee in prior ejectment proceedings and could not subsequently set up a hostile title. Furthermore, neither the petitioners nor their predecessors had built the property at their own expense or applied for its transfer under Scheme No. VI prior to the official transfer. The key principle laid down is that an unauthorized occupant who admits tenancy under the lawful transferee of evacuee property is estopped from subsequently denying that title or challenging the transfer without having pursued independent statutory remedies in time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an occupant who admits tenancy under a lawful transferee of evacuee property can subsequently set up a hostile title?
  • Does an allottee of an evacuee shop who failed to secure physical possession lose the right to transfer under settlement operations?
  • Whether unauthorized occupants through successive illegal transfers are eligible for the transfer of evacuee property without prior application under Scheme No. VI?
  Read full judgment →
• GHARIB ALAM AND 3 Other vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 306 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-11Read full judgment →
• GHALIB PERVEZ Alias GHALIBA AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 420 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-09Read full judgment →
• GEHNA AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 531 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1968-12-12Read full judgment →
• GEHLO vs REHMATULLAH AND ANOTHERs1974 P Cr. L J 345 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-28Read full judgment →
• GAMMON (PAKISTAN) LTD., RAWALPINDI vs MUZAFFAR KHAN AND 7 OTHERS1974 PLC 10 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-10-14Read full judgment →
• FOUR FRIENDS CONSTRUCTION Co. vs DOMEZ BORIE, CHASHMA BARRAGE, CONTRACTORS AND Another1974 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-11-21
  forma pauperistemporary injunctionno-demand certificateprima facie casesub-contractor recoverycivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner-Company filed an application before a Civil Judge seeking permission to sue in forma pauperis for the recovery of money as a sub-contractor, alongside an application under the Code of Civil Procedure for a temporary injunction to restrain the Water and Power Development Authority from finalizing bills payable to respondent No. 1. The trial Court dismissed the temporary injunction application, and a revision petition before the High Court was likewise dismissed. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a temporary injunction can be granted before permission to sue as a pauper is granted and whether the petitioner established a prima facie case in light of a previously signed no-demand certificate. The Supreme Court held that until permission to sue in forma pauperis is granted, there is no pending suit or plaint to warrant the invocation of temporary injunction provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that a signed no-demand certificate constitutes prima facie evidence defeating the petitioner's claim at this stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted under the Code of Civil Procedure before an application to sue in forma pauperis is granted?
  • Does the execution of a no-demand certificate negate a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction in a recovery suit?
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• FIRDOUS TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1974 PLD Karachi 149 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-22Read full judgment →
• FEROZE MUSHKE vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 567 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-17Read full judgment →
• FEROZE KHAN AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 71974 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-10
  settlement operationsindustrial concernunauthorized occupationletters patent appealdeemed possessiontransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition against an order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a Single Judge's decision and restored the Settlement Commissioner's order transferring the disputed property to respondents Nos. 2 to 8. The core legal question was whether Notification No. F. 3(3)/60-SI dated 11 August 1960, which deems allottees unable to obtain physical possession as being in possession for the purposes of the statute, applied to industrial concerns or was restricted to houses and shops. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench rightly concluded the notification applied only to the transfer of houses and shops to allottees in possession, and not to industrial concerns, which the petitioners had admitted the property to be. Furthermore, petitioner Feroze Khan had already been transferred a house, barring him from receiving another. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Notification No. F. 3(3)/60-SI dated 11 August 1960 apply to industrial concerns under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can an allottee obtain a transfer of a property as an industrial concern when the notification relied upon governs only houses and shops?
  Read full judgment →
• FAZULULLAH vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 467 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-06Read full judgment →
• FAZALUR REHMAN vs The STATE1974 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-05
  murderocular evidenceidentificationretracted confessioncriminal appealdeath sentencemotive
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which upheld the appellant's conviction and death sentence for the murder of his cousin and a murderous assault on his aunt. The appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the grounds of identity, contending that the nighttime occurrence rendered identification by the prosecution witnesses unreliable. The Supreme Court examined whether the eyewitnesses, who were related to the appellant, could have accurately identified him given the circumstances of the incident. The Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the witnesses had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant, and their testimony regarding recognition remained unchallenged. Furthermore, the Court found that the ocular evidence was corroborated by the appellant's own retracted confessional statement and evidence of motive. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence. The judgment reinforces the principle that where ocular testimony is credible, consistent with the circumstances, and corroborated by independent evidence such as a confession and motive, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction despite the darkness of the occurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession be relied upon to sustain a conviction if corroborated by other evidence?
  • Is ocular testimony regarding the identity of an assailant sufficient for conviction in a nighttime occurrence if the witnesses had no motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does the presence of a motive for the crime strengthen the reliability of eyewitness identification?
  Read full judgment →
• FAZAL RAHIM vs THE STATE AND Another1974 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-06
  enhancement of sentencerevisional jurisdictionright of hearingshow cause against convictionunrepresented accusedmiscarriage of justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court which enhanced the appellant's sentence from two years' rigorous imprisonment to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court's failure to properly apprise the unrepresented appellant of his right to oppose the reference and show cause against his conviction violated the statutory mandate of Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's failure to afford the appellant a proper hearing and inform him of his rights constituted a serious procedural irregularity resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and set aside the enhancement order. The Court laid down the principle that Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 strictly enjoins that no prejudicial order in revision can be passed without affording the affected person a proper hearing, which includes informing an unrepresented accused of their right to show cause against both the enhancement and the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the High Court to inform an unrepresented accused of their right to show cause against conviction during a sentence enhancement reference violate Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence in its revisional jurisdiction without affording the accused a proper and meaningful hearing?
  • What is the legal effect of a procedural omission by the High Court to apprise an accused of the nature of enhancement proceedings conducted in a language they may not understand?
  Read full judgment →
• FAZAL MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 596 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-25Read full judgment →