Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• SYED HUSSAIN vs Syed MUHAMMAD HASSAN1973 PLC 29(1) · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• Syed HISAMUDDIN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 683 · Sindh High Court · 1973-07-18Read full judgment →
• Syed GHULAM HUSSAIN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER ETC.1973 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-20
  special leave to appealproperty transfersettlement authoritiesdelay and lachesdeclaration of eligibilityconstitutional petitionlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a constitutional petition concerning the transfer of a property in Multan. The petitioner, a local, claimed possession under a 1960 allotment and sought transfer of the property as a house, but his application was rejected for failing to file a declaration of eligibility. Subsequently, the property was auctioned as a shop to the fourth respondent, and the petitioner later executed rent-notes in favor of the purchasers and faced ejectment proceedings. After more than seven years, the petitioner sought to reopen the matter before the Settlement Authorities, which was dismissed on grounds of limitation and delay, a view upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a stale claim for property transfer could be reopened after prolonged delay and acknowledgment of tenancy. The Supreme Court held that even if the initial rejection order was erroneous, the petitioner could not challenge it after an unexplained delay of seven years during which the property was validly transferred and the petitioner had acknowledged the respondents as landlords. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delayed claim for the transfer of evacuee property be reopened after a lapse of seven years?
  • Does the execution of rent-notes in favor of auction purchasers bar a claimant from subsequently challenging the property transfer?
  • Whether the classification of a property as a shop rather than a house disentitles a local applicant from its transfer?
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• Syed GHOUS MUHAMMAD JILANI AND Another vs PROVINCE OF SIND1973 PLD Karachi 338 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-26Read full judgment →
• Syed ALI AKBAR SHAH vs HUSSAIN BUX AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 45 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-01Read full judgment →
• STATE THROUGH THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL, N.-W. F. P. vs LAL MOHAMMAD AND ANOTHER Accused1973 PLD Peshawar 131 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• STAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs THIRD SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI1973 PLC 376 · Sindh High Court
  illegal strikecollective bargaining agentnoticelabor courtreinstatementtrade unionindustrial relations ordinance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the validity of an order passed by the Sind Labour Court No. III, which reviewed its previous orders and directed the reinstatement of the respondent workers with continuity of service following an illegal strike. The core legal question concerned whether notice under section 46-A(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, must be given to registered trade unions concerned with the dispute other than the Collective Bargaining Agent. The Sindh High Court held that the Labour Court's jurisdiction is founded on the submission of a report and the mandatory issuance of notice to the employer and the trade union concerned with the dispute under section 46-A(2). The Court ruled that where multiple trade unions exist and workers belonging to other unions are involved in an illegal strike, notice must be served to those concerned trade unions to satisfy the principles of natural justice and statutory requirements. Consequently, the failure to issue notice rendered the initial proceedings and subsequent dismissal orders invalid, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether notice under section 46-A(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is mandatory to be served upon all registered trade unions concerned with a dispute in an establishment?
  • Does the exclusive status of a Collective Bargaining Agent deprive other registered trade unions of the right to receive notice under section 46-A(2) when their members are involved in an illegal strike?
  • What is the effect of a failure to issue notice under section 46-A(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on the subsequent proceedings and orders passed by a Labour Court?
  • Can a Labour Court review and recall its earlier orders of dismissal passed against striking workers if the foundational requirement of notice was not fulfilled?
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• STAFF UNION vs PREMIER TOBACCO INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 34 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• SIRAJ AND 6 OTHERS vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 649 · Sindh High Court · 1973-07-25Read full judgment →
• SIND INDUSTRIAL TRADING ESTATES LTD., EMPLOYEES UNION, KARACHI vs THE REGISTRAR TRADE UNIONS, GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 88 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-10Read full judgment →
• SHUKAR ALI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 149 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-12Read full judgment →
• Shri TIKAMDAS HIRANAND AND 3 OTHERS vs DIVISIONAL EVACUEE TRUST1973 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-08
  evacuee trust propertyreligious and charitable endowmentlease deedDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958Fundamental Rightstrust managementultra vires
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which dismissed a writ petition filed against the execution of a 99-year lease deed of evacuee trust property belonging to the Karachi Panjrapore Association in favour of Messrs Hussain D'Silva Enterprisers by the Evacuee Trust Board. The core legal questions involved whether the lease of the trust property violated Fundamental Right No. 10 (or 17) concerning religious institutions and whether such a long-term lease was permissible under the Scheme framed under section 16-A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the 99-year lease was illegal, ultra vires, and without jurisdiction as it neither found support within the provisions of the Scheme nor aligned with the customary meaning of managing such trust property, and furthermore violated the original terms of the government grant. The Court laid down the principle that evacuee trust property must be managed strictly in accordance with the governing statutory schemes and terms of the original grant, and long-term alienation of trust assets outside these parameters is void.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Evacuee Trust Board competent to grant a 99-year lease of evacuee trust property under the Scheme framed pursuant to section 16-A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Whether properties held by an association founded for a public purpose of a religious or charitable nature constitute trust properties under the Hindu Law of Endowments?
  • Does a long-term lease of trust property executed in contravention of the statutory scheme and original terms of grant render the transaction illegal and without jurisdiction?
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• SHER ZAMAN AND 3 Others SARWAR AND Another vs THE STATE THE STATE1973 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-08
  criminal appealmurdercommon intentionspur of the momentevaluation of ocular evidenceinjured witnessesacquittal set aside
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These are two connected criminal appeals arising from a daylight incident that resulted in the deaths of three persons and injuries to several others. The initial trial court acquitted all eleven accused persons. Upon revision and appeal, the High Court summarily dismissed the matter, but the Supreme Court subsequently set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for re-hearing. Upon re-hearing, the High Court convicted several appellants under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, including murder and assault with common intention. The appellants challenged their convictions before the Supreme Court, arguing lack of locus standi of the complainant, improper evaluation of evidence by the High Court compared to the trial court, and the absence of pre-meditation for constructive liability. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly scrutinized the ocular evidence, which was fully corroborated by medical reports and the injuries sustained by several prosecution witnesses. The Court further held that common intention can be formed at the spur of the moment during a sudden clash. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals and upheld the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code can be formed at the spur of the moment during a sudden occurrence?
  • Can the evidence of injured eye-witnesses be discarded merely on the ground of relationship to the deceased and minor inconsistencies?
  • Does the summary dismissal of an appeal against acquittal without scrutinizing the evidence and providing a speaking order constitute a proper exercise of jurisdiction?
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• SHER MUHAMMAD vs SHER ZAMAN AND 11 Other1973 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• SHER DIL Alias SHER GUL AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 802 · Lahore High Court · 1972-10-11
  murder convictioninterested witnessesinimical witnessesappreciation of evidencecriminal appealdeath sentence referencecorroboration of testimonybenefit of doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of two appellants for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with one appellant sentenced to death and the other to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on testimony from interested and inimical witnesses. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case. The court found that the alleged motive was demonstrably false, the eye-witnesses were unreliable and had made significant improvements to their statements to align with medical evidence, and the medical evidence itself contradicted the prosecution's version of the shooting. Furthermore, the court rejected the testimony of a purported independent witness, identifying him as a chance witness with ties to the complainant party. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses are interested and inimical, their testimony requires independent corroboration, and deliberate improvements or contradictions in their statements render their evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses have made significant improvements to their statements to align with medical evidence?
  • Is an accused person under any legal liability to furnish a defense explanation before the prosecution has proven its case?
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• SHER ALI AND 20 Other vs THE MANAGER, P.I.D.C. COLLIERIES, QUETTA AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 399 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sheikh MOHAMMAD YUSUF vs Mst. ZOHRAN BIBI1973 PLD Peshawar 186 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-09-23
  ejectmentrent restrictionreconstructionbona fide requirementsecond rent appealdilapidated premises
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second rent appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the appellant-tenant by the District Judge, affirming the Rent Controller's decision. The respondent-landlord sought the appellant's ejectment from a shop on multiple grounds, including personal need and reconstruction, though the lower courts decided the personal need issue against her. The Rent Controller and District Judge nevertheless ordered ejectment for reconstruction, relying on a Supreme Court precedent regarding building reconstruction. The core legal question was whether the landlord established a genuine, bona fide requirement for reconstruction, particularly when her personal requirement claim failed and the key municipal witness's testimony was uncorroborated. The High Court held that the landlord failed to prove her genuine need for reconstruction, especially as her personal requirement and reconstruction pleas were mutually destructive and the primary witness's testimony was rendered worthless without his subordinate's corroborating evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the lower courts' judgments were set aside, establishing that contradictory pleas of personal use and reconstruction, coupled with insufficient proof, defeat an ejectment petition under rent restriction laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for ejectment on the ground of reconstruction can succeed when the landlord's personal requirement and reconstruction pleas are mutually destructive?
  • Does the failure to produce a subordinate witness whose inspection report forms the basis of a municipal official's testimony render that testimony worthless?
  • Whether the requirement of reconstruction must be reasonable and bona fide under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• SHAUKAT AND 2 OTHERS vs MAHARAJ GANESHPURI AND 8 Other1973 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-27
  interim orderwrit petitiontenant rightsrent recoveryEvacuee Trust Boardlocus standi
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, who are tenants of certain shops, challenged an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karachi in a pending writ petition. The High Court had directed the respondent, Maharaj Ganeshpuri, to furnish security for the rental amount of the shops and submit monthly rental accounts to the Secretary of the Evacuee Trust Board, thereby authorizing the respondent to initiate proceedings for rent recovery. The petitioners contended that they were tenants under the Custodian and feared that the High Court's order would facilitate ejectment and recovery suits against them. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, finding the petitioners' grievance premature and unsubstantiated. The Court held that as tenants, the petitioners were obligated to pay rent, and if they possessed valid legal objections regarding the respondent's entitlement to collect such rent, those objections could be raised and determined on their merits in any subsequent legal proceedings initiated against them. The Court affirmed that interim orders of this nature do not preclude tenants from asserting their legal rights in future litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can tenants challenge an interim order in a writ petition to which they are not the primary parties?
  • Does an interim order allowing a party to initiate rent recovery proceedings preclude tenants from raising legal defenses in subsequent litigation?
  • Is a tenant's apprehension of future ejectment proceedings sufficient ground to challenge an interim order regarding rent collection?
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• SHARIF AND ANOTHER vs The STATE1973 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-30
  criminal appealinterested witnessescorroboration of evidencemurderocular testimonymedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of two appellants for murder. The core legal question was whether the testimony of interested eye-witnesses, lacking independent corroboration, was sufficient to sustain the convictions. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that while the eye-witnesses were partisan and required corroboration, such corroboration was adequately provided by the medical evidence and the circumstances of the case. Specifically, the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased—consistent with the weapons attributed to the appellants—and the fact that the appellants were among those expected to participate in the attack due to a clear motive, sufficiently corroborated the ocular testimony. The Court reaffirmed that corroboration for interested witnesses need not possess the same probative force as that required for accomplices; rather, it requires circumstances that satisfy the judicial mind that the witnesses are speaking the truth. Consequently, the Court found the appellants' involvement established and dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment which had carefully scrutinized the evidence and acquitted the appellants' co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is corroboration required for the testimony of interested eye-witnesses in a criminal trial?
  • What constitutes sufficient corroboration for the testimony of an interested witness in a murder case?
  • Can the nature of injuries on a deceased person serve as corroboration for ocular testimony against an accused?
  • Does the failure of a trial judge to permit cross-examination of a witness under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 necessarily prejudice the accused?
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• SHAMSUDDIN AND 2 Other vs MFSSRS YAQOOB INDUSTRIES, KARACHI1973 PLC 42 · Labour Court · 1972-06-08Read full judgment →
• SHAMSHER AND Another vs THE STATE ETC.S1973 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-12
  murdercommon intentionocular evidencerelated witnessSection 34 PPCcriminal appealreliability of witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the reliability of a solitary, related eye-witness whose testimony was the sole basis for conviction after other witnesses were discarded, and whether Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 could be invoked for spontaneous firing. The Supreme Court, by a majority, upheld the convictions, holding that the eye-witness’s testimony was credible despite his relationship to the deceased, as he lacked personal enmity against the appellants and his presence was corroborated by the prompt lodging of the First Information Report. The Court affirmed that common intention under Section 34 can be formed spontaneously at the spur of the moment, and that the testimony of a related witness is not inherently unreliable provided it is otherwise consistent and free from animosity. The judgment emphasizes that the absence of independent witnesses does not necessarily invalidate a prosecution case where the ocular evidence is otherwise found truthful and consistent with medical findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the sole testimony of a related eye-witness?
  • Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be formed spontaneously at the spur of the moment?
  • Does the absence of independent witnesses in a criminal case necessarily invalidate the prosecution's evidence?
  • Is a related witness inherently unreliable in a criminal trial?
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• SHAMIR vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 321 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-12Read full judgment →
• Shaikh MUHAMMAD YAMIN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-04
  quashment of chargesmugglingcustoms offencerevision petitioninterlocutory orderprima facie case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a revision petition filed under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of a charge framed against the petitioner under the Customs Act. The prosecution alleged the petitioner's involvement in a conspiracy to smuggle cannabis resin (charas) from Karachi to London, based on evidence including records of telephone calls to a convicted co-conspirator. The petitioner contended that the charge should be quashed due to a total lack of credible evidence, noting he was not named in the First Information Report or the judicial confession of a co-accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the framing of a charge merely puts the accused on notice to prepare a defence and does not equate to a conviction. The Court ruled that because some evidence existed tending to connect the petitioner with the incident, it was not a case of total want of evidence, thereby precluding interference at the interlocutory stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal charge can be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is some evidence on record connecting the accused to the offence?
  • Does the formal framing of a charge by a Magistrate amount to a conviction or condemnation of the accused?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere at the interlocutory stage of a trial to quash a charge where it is not a case of total want of evidence?
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• Shaikh MUHAMMAD BASHI R vs THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI1973 PLD Karachi 188 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-22Read full judgment →
• SHAHZAD GUL vs THE STATE1973 PLD Peshawar 8 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-10-16Read full judgment →
• SHAHU Alias SHAH MURAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1069 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• SHAHOO vs The STATE1973 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-19
  special leave to appealmurderocular evidencecorroborationinterested witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from the judgment of the High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and his death sentence for murder. The core legal question concerns whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses, partially disbelieved as to co-accused, can sustain a conviction against the remaining accused without independent corroboration in the presence of previous enmity. The Supreme Court held that where a witness is found to be thoroughly disinterested and independent, their testimony can legitimately form the basis of a conviction and corroborate the testimony of an injured witness, rendering general rules regarding rejected testimony inapplicable. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of a credible and disinterested eye-witness, even if some other witnesses are disbelieved regarding other accused, is sufficient to maintain a conviction without mandatory corroboration if the witness is free from enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses, which has been disbelieved regarding the majority of the accused, be relied upon to convict the remaining accused without independent corroboration?
  • Does the presence of previous enmity between the parties necessitate independent corroboration for the testimony of an otherwise disinterested eye-witness?
  • Is the evidence of an injured witness and a disinterested witness sufficient to sustain a murder conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• SHAHMIR vs MUMTAZ AND 2 Other1973 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-28
  criminal petition for leave to appealacquittalchance witnessespartisan evidencemedical discrepanciescriminal jurisprudence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the acquittal of respondents 1 and 2 by the High Court for attempted murder, having been initially convicted by the Sessions Judge under sections 326, 322, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondents inflicted hatchet injuries on the complainant following a dispute over village factions, supported by two eyewitnesses. The High Court acquitted the respondents, holding that the eyewitnesses were chance witnesses with unconvincing explanations for their presence at the scene, and noting material contradictions between the medical evidence, which showed mostly blunt weapon injuries, and the ocular account of hatchet blows by both assailants. The Supreme Court found that the High Court's judgment was not perverse and that it properly considered the material discrepancies in the partisan evidence to ensure the safe dispensation of criminal justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court when the appraisal of evidence is not perverse?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses belonging to a rival faction be deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction without reliable corroboration?
  • What is the effect of material discrepancies between ocular testimony regarding sharp weapon injuries and medical evidence showing blunt weapon injuries?
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• SHAHID U ZAMAN ABDUL HAYEE vs THE STATE SHAHID U ZAMAN AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-27
  murderlast seen evidencespecial leave to appealabscondencecircumstantial evidencecriminal conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal filed by a convict and the complainant against a High Court judgment upholding a conviction for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of the 'last seen' evidence, the reliability of identification during a lightning flash, the impact of the prosecution giving up a witness, and the appropriateness of the sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that the testimony of witnesses who saw the deceased in the company of the accused shortly before the crime, when corroborated by medical evidence and the accused's subsequent abscondence, is sufficient to establish guilt, even if specific identification details are challenged. Furthermore, the Court established that no adverse inference arises from the prosecution giving up a witness if that witness remains available for cross-examination by the defense. Additionally, the Court held that judicial notice may be taken of common institutional practices, such as hostel door policies, to resolve alleged factual improbabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Is the 'last seen' evidence sufficient to sustain a murder conviction when corroborated by other circumstances?
  • Does the prosecution's decision to give up a witness create an adverse inference if the witness was made available for cross-examination?
  • Can judicial notice be taken regarding the operational practices of college hostels?
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• SHAH WALI vs The STATE1973 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-18
  murder convictiondeath sentenceforensic evidenceeye-witness testimonycriminal appealFIR delayburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of his nephew. The appellant contended that the eye-witnesses were not present at the scene and that the First Information Report (FIR) was lodged with significant delay. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, finding that the FIR was lodged promptly on the day of the occurrence. The Court held that the testimony of the eye-witnesses was credible and amply corroborated by forensic evidence, specifically the recovery of the appellant's licensed gun and the matching of spent cartridges found at the scene. Furthermore, the Court noted that the failure of the defense to produce close relatives of the accused as witnesses, who were present at the scene, was a material circumstance weighing against the appellant. The Court concluded that the murder was committed in cold blood following a trivial verbal dispute, rejecting the plea of provocation. Consequently, the conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an accused to produce available defense witnesses who are close relatives constitute a material circumstance in evaluating the prosecution's case?
  • Can forensic evidence matching spent cartridges to a recovered weapon corroborate eye-witness testimony in a murder trial?
  • Does a trivial verbal dispute constitute sufficient provocation to mitigate a charge of murder?
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• SHAH MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-26
  murderself-defenceballistic evidenceeyewitness testimonycriminal appealfirearm injuries
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was directed against a judgment of the High Court maintaining the convictions and sentences of the appellant, an ex-Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his wife and a murderous assault on a rickshaw driver. The core legal question revolved around whether the possibility of a recovered cartridge wad belonging to someone other than the petitioner or the deceased's brother had been satisfactorily excluded, and whether the appellant acted in self-defence after receiving injuries. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt through independent eyewitness testimony, corroborative medical evidence, and ballistic matching of fired cartridge empties with the appellant's recovered gun that the appellant was the initial aggressor and fired the fatal shots. The Court laid down that a plea of self-defence cannot succeed where the accused was the initial attacker and that independent eyewitness accounts corroborated by material ballistic evidence are sufficient to sustain a murder conviction despite minor police investigative discrepancies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who initiates an attack can claim the right of private defence when injured by retaliatory shots?
  • Can independent eyewitness testimony corroborated by ballistic matching of empty cartridge cases sustain a conviction despite flaws in medical evidence and police investigation?
  • Whether the recovery of a cartridge wad from an unidentified source is sufficient to displace direct ocular testimony and forensic firearm matching?
  • Whether an offence can be reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder where premeditation and direct intent to kill are established?
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• SHAFAQAT HUSSAIN vs GOHAR REHMAN AND ANOTHER!1973 P Cr. L J 148 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-06Read full judgment →
• SHABIR AHMAD Alias GHULAM SHABBIR vs The STATE1973 SCMR 217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-19
  post-arrest bailmurderright of private defencecounter first information reportSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court refusing bail to the petitioner, who was accused along with his brother of murdering their third brother over a land dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a prima facie case for bail based on the right of private defence, given that he had lodged a counter first information report and sustained injuries during the incident. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that although bail is not to be withheld as punishment and courts must examine available data for reasonable grounds, the circumstance that the weapon recovered from the deceased had not been used tended to negative the plea of self-defence at this stage. Consequently, the Court found reasonable grounds for believing the accused was guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that while evaluating post-arrest bail in cases involving counter-reports and pleas of self-defence, courts must weigh material physical circumstances such as the non-utilization of the recovered weapon against the accused's version before granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted on the plea of private defence when counter first information reports exist and the accused has sustained injuries?
  • Does the non-utilization of the weapon recovered from the deceased negate the plea of self-defence at the bail stage?
  • Whether reasonable grounds for believing the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life disentitle him to bail?
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• Sh. MEHER ALI vs BAGGOO AND Another1973 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-08
  criminal appealacquittal appealdacoitymurdertest identification paradecorroborationapprover evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from an acquittal of respondent Baggoo of charges under sections 302/149, 395, and 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code by the West Pakistan High Court, in a case involving dacoity and murder. The core legal question concerns the reliability of ocular evidence, test identification parade, and corroborative recovery of stolen property against the accused. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the eyewitness widow, corroborated by a reliable test identification parade and the recovery of stolen ornaments from the respondent's possession, was fully credible and sufficient to establish guilt. The appellate court set aside the acquittal, allowed the appeal, and convicted the respondent under sections 302/149, 395, and 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that an eyewitness account corroborated by timely recovery of stolen items and a properly conducted test identification parade provides a sound basis for overturning an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an eyewitness testimony corroborated by the recovery of stolen property and a test identification parade is sufficient to overturn an acquittal?
  • Does the failure to raise an objection during a test identification parade regarding prior showing of the accused affect its credibility?
  • Whether uncorroborated defence pleas raised for the first time under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure carry weight?
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• Sh. ALA UD DIN vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LYALLPUR AND Other1973 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-16
  displaced personstransfer of propertyindustrial concernpossessionsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdictionallotment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of property consisting of multiple godowns divided into portions. The core legal question is whether an allottee out of physical possession can claim the benefit of the Central Government Notification dated 9th September 1960 under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to claim transfer of properties converted into industrial concerns, and whether findings of fact regarding separate portions can be upset in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the notification relating to 'possession' applies only to shops and houses and not to industrial concerns, and that no ejectment proceedings were pending at the relevant time. Furthermore, concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding independent portions cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, establishing that allottees of converted industrial properties cannot rely on notifications meant for shops/houses to claim unpossessed portions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification enlarging the definition of possession for shops and houses under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, apply to properties converted into industrial concerns?
  • Can a petitioner claim the benefit of pending ejectment proceedings when such proceedings were filed and not actively pursued or pending on the crucial notification date?
  • Are concurrent factual findings of settlement authorities regarding independent physical portions of a property amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction?
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• Sh. ABDUL RAUF vs ABDUL AZIZ AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-05
  ejectmenthabitual defaulterstatutory tenantrent disputeDisplaced Persons Actleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court directing the ejectment of the petitioner from a house transferred to the respondents under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved the determination of the correct rate of rent payable by the occupant and whether the petitioner’s failure to pay rent regularly constituted default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, thereby forfeiting his statutory protection under Section 30 of the 1958 Act. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was a habitual defaulter for failing to pay rent within the statutory period prescribed by the Ordinance, regardless of the dispute over the quantum of rent. Furthermore, the Court noted that the statutory protection period under Section 30(1)(b) of the 1958 Act had expired, terminating the landlord-tenant relationship. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that no significant question of law of public importance was involved, and dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner three months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to pay rent regularly within the statutory period under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, constitute habitual default?
  • Can a tenant claim the benefit of statutory protection under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, after the expiry of the statutory period?
  • Does a dispute regarding the quantum of rent justify the non-payment of rent within the time prescribed by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. ABDUL HAMID AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 858 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-31
  smugglingSea Customs Actprohibited importsbail application admissionpolice reportcharge-sheetcriminal appealpossession and concealment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal against the judgment of conviction passed by the City and Additional District Magistrate, Karachi, convicting the two appellants under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the seized goods were restricted under the law, whether an admission by an advocate in a bail application can be used against an accused in a criminal trial, and whether a magistrate can take cognizance or try an accused who was initially placed in column 2 or omitted in an interim charge-sheet. The court held that the import of the watches and foreign textiles was legally banned under relevant notifications, that statements or admissions made by an advocate in bail proceedings cannot be used to the detriment of the accused as admissions under the Evidence Act without statutory exception or client consent, and that a magistrate is not bound by police reports and can proceed against persons initially not sent up for trial. The court dismissed the appeals while reducing the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an admission made by an advocate in a bail application can be used as an admission against the accused in a criminal trial?
  • Does a magistrate have the power to try an accused person who was initially not sent up for trial or placed in column 2 of an interim charge-sheet?
  • What constitutes being concerned in the keeping or concealment of contraband goods under the Sea Customs Act?
  • Whether the burden of proving valid import of restricted goods shifts to the accused under the Sea Customs Act once the prohibition is established?
  Read full judgment →
• SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER HYDERABAD DIVISION, KARACHI AND Another vs MANNU KHAN AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-28
  suo motu revisionjurisdiction ab initiopending claimsmartial law regulationdisplaced personsclaim verification
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was brought by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner against a decision of the High Court of West Pakistan in favor of respondent Mannu Khan. The respondent had filed a claim for agricultural land abandoned in Jaipur State, which was initially verified. Subsequently, an Additional Claims Commissioner, Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, set aside the entire claim as bogus. However, the respondent's claim was later re-examined and accepted under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 by Malik Aslam Hayat, Additional Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions involved whether Mr. Moghul possessed valid delegated revisional powers under section 7(3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956 at the commencement of proceedings, and whether a pending revision kept a claim alive under Martial Law Regulation No. 89. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Moghul lacked jurisdiction ab initio as he did not possess the necessary powers when proceedings commenced, and subsequent investiture could not cure the defect. Furthermore, the Court held that pending revisions prevented claims from becoming final, making the subsequent acceptance under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 competent and final. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of a tribunal to initiate proceedings depend on its powers at the commencement or at the conclusion of the inquiry?
  • Can subsequent investiture of judicial powers validate proceedings that were initiated without jurisdiction ab initio?
  • Does a pending revision petition prevent an order regarding the verification of a claim from becoming final under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956?
  • Whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner has the authority to discard an order validly passed by a special officer under Martial Law Regulation No. 89?
  Read full judgment →
• SATTAR MUHAMMAD Atlas DEEDARI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 718 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-06Read full judgment →
• SARDARA vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 867 · Lahore High Court · 1972-10-30Read full judgment →
• SARDARA vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD ETC.S1973 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-05
  habeas corpusillegal detentiondetenu as sui jurisrestitution of conjugal rightscustody of majorsection 491 CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave is directed against the Lahore High Court's order setting a detenu woman at liberty under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns the extent of the High Court's jurisdiction under section 491 regarding an adult detenu, specifically whether a major found not to be illegally confined can be handed over to a husband or guardian against her will. The Supreme Court held that once a detenu is found to be a major and sui juris, the High Court's only jurisdiction is to set her at liberty and it cannot force her custody onto a husband or guardian or restore the status quo ante against her wishes. The key principle laid down is that habeas corpus proceedings cannot be used to enforce custody or restitution of conjugal rights for a major, and a husband seeking to assert marital rights must approach the civil court rather than rely on summary detention remedies.

  Questions settled

  • What is the extent of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when dealing with an adult detenu?
  • Can a High Court restore the custody of an adult detenu to a husband or guardian against her express wishes?
  • Is a decree for restitution of conjugal rights executed by physically handing over the custody of the wife to the husband?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a husband who claims custody of his alleged wife rather than filing a habeas corpus petition?
  Read full judgment →
• SARDAR ALI vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 752 · Lahore High Court · 1972-10-29Read full judgment →
• SANWALDAS vs DHARMUMAL AND Another1973 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-06-06
  ejectment decreeexecution proceedingsrent restrictionstatutory interpretationrepeal and savingslandlord-tenant dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the execution of an ejectment decree obtained by a landlord against a tenant under the repealed Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1952, following the enactment of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957. The core legal question is whether Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957, bars the execution of a decree for ejectment obtained prior to the Act's commencement, necessitating that the landlord instead initiate fresh proceedings before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 13 of the 1957 Act explicitly prohibits the execution of such decrees, regardless of whether they were based on a certificate granted under the previous legislation. The Court established that the 1957 Act created a uniform, self-contained procedure for tenant eviction, effectively superseding previous mechanisms. Consequently, any prior decree for ejectment became inexecutable upon the Act's commencement, and the landlord's sole remedy is to apply for eviction directly to the Rent Controller under the provisions of the new Act, which requires satisfying specific conditions not previously adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957, bar the execution of an ejectment decree obtained under the repealed Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1952?
  • Can a landlord execute a decree for ejectment obtained on the basis of a certificate from a Rent Controller after the commencement of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957?
  • Does Section 21 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957, save decrees obtained under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1952, from the bar on execution imposed by Section 13?
  Read full judgment →
• SAMANO RAJAB ALI vs THE STATE THE STATE1973 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-19
  murderattempted murderocular testimonyidentificationconfessioncorroborationcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants, Samano and Rajab Ali, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the assassination of Allah Ditta and the attempted murder of Abdul Qadir. The core legal questions involved the credibility and reliability of the ocular testimony, the identification of the accused persons, whether the names of the appellants were introduced after their subsequent police interception, and the voluntariness of their judicial confessions. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitnesses fully knew the appellants, that the medical evidence corroborated the manner of the assault, and that the names were disclosed at the earliest opportunity prior to any external communication of their arrest at Thatta. However, the Court ruled the judicial confessions inadmissible due to the lack of voluntariness following complaints of police torture. The ratio is that reliable eyewitness testimony corroborated by immediate naming and surrounding circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction even if judicial confessions are discarded. The key principle laid down is that while expert medical opinion is weighty, direct factual observations at the relevant time govern judicial appreciation, and corroborated ocular accounts can successfully sustain criminal liability in politically or family-motivated vendettas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether eyewitness testimony can be relied upon for conviction when the accused are known prior to the incident?
  • Does the absence of names in initial telephonic police messages vitiate the first information report if names are subsequently disclosed at the earliest opportunity?
  • Are judicial confessions voluntary when the accused complained of police torture to a magistrate shortly before recording the confession?
  • Does the failure to connect a recovered weapon through forensic ballistics necessarily disprove the participation of an accused in a joint criminal assault?
  Read full judgment →
• SAMAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L, J 952 · Sindh High Court · 1972-07-25Read full judgment →
• SALAR ABDUR RAUF vs Mst. BARKAT BIBI1973 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17
  pronoteconsiderationburden of proofstatutory presumptionnegotiable instrumentsspecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court in a second appeal concerning a suit for the recovery of money based on a pronote. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that consideration was not proved. The first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit by invoking the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. However, the High Court restored the trial court's dismissal, finding that the plaintiff had undertaken to prove actual passing of consideration and failed, and thus could not fall back on the statutory presumption. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view, noting that the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the burden of proof, led contradictory evidence, and failed to establish his financial capacity or the passing of consideration under highly suspicious circumstances. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff who undertakes to prove actual consideration for a pronote can subsequently invoke the presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 upon failing to produce credit-worthy evidence?
  • Can a statutory presumption of consideration under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be utilized to make up for deficiencies in the plaintiff's evidence when the plaintiff has already gone to trial on an issue requiring proof of actual borrowing?
  Read full judgment →
• SALAHUDDIN KHAN AND 3 Other vs SULTAN E ROMF, AND 10 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 95 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-03-08
  temporary injunctioncompany lawmanaging directorcumulative votingprima facie casebalance of conveniencePresidential Order 2 of 1972Controller of Capital Issues
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges an order of the Additional District Judge, Peshawar, which rejected the appellants' application for a temporary injunction in a suit regarding the management of a public limited company. The core legal question was whether the appellants, claiming to be the rightful Chief Executive and Directors, were entitled to injunctive relief against the respondents. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case. The court found that the election of the appellants as directors violated the mandatory cumulative voting requirements of the Companies (Managing Agency and Election of Directors) Order, 1972, and their subsequent appointment as Chief Executive lacked the requisite approval from the Controller of Capital Issues. Consequently, the appointment was a nullity. The court affirmed that discretionary injunctive relief requires a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and potential irreparable loss, none of which were satisfied. Furthermore, the court emphasized the statutory bar on jurisdiction under Article 16(2) of the Presidential Order, which precludes courts from granting injunctions against actions taken thereunder.

  Questions settled

  • Does an election of company directors that violates mandatory cumulative voting requirements render the election a nullity?
  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction where the applicant's underlying appointment lacks the required statutory approval from the Controller of Capital Issues?
  • Does Article 16(2) of the Companies (Managing Agency and Election of Directors) Order, 1972, bar courts from granting injunctions regarding actions taken under the Order?
  • Is a party who fails to join necessary parties to an appeal entitled to relief?
  Read full judgment →
• SAKHI MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 397 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-02
  pre-arrest bailold age infirmityfalse implicationenmitybail confirmation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a criminal miscellaneous application filed under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking pre-arrest bail by the petitioner, Sakhi Muhammad, who was accused of offences under sections 148, 302, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail on the grounds of old age, infirmity, and alleged false implication due to prior enmity, where no specific injury was attributed to him. The Lahore High Court held that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was not guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, noting his advanced age and general nature of allegations. The court laid down the principle that old age itself brings infirmity and senility, which can be factored into assessing the case for bail alongside the lack of specific overt acts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed for an elderly accused where no specific injury is attributed to him and allegations are general in nature?
  • Does old age and accompanying infirmity constitute a valid ground for consideration in pre-arrest bail matters?
  • Can bail be confirmed without expressing a definitive view on the merits of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• SAJJAD HUSSAIN ZAIDI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 19 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-13Read full judgment →
• SAJID RAZA AND 3 Other vs THE COMMISSIONER, QUETTA DIVISION. QUETTA1973 PLD Karachi 332 · Sindh High Court
  admission policyvested rightsexecutive instructionsmedical college admissiondiscretionary reliefconstitutional petitionreserved seats
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the admission process for the Dow Medical College, Karachi, for the 1971-72 academic session. The petitioners, candidates from the Quetta Division, sought admission against reserved seats, contending that the selection of candidates from the Kalat Division—who were third-divisioners—violated the Prospectus rules. The core legal question was whether the petitioners possessed a vested right to admission under the original Prospectus that precluded the government from issuing a subsequent executive order relaxing eligibility criteria. The Court held that the petitioners had no vested right to be considered for surplus seats until such seats were formally determined to be available, a process occurring after the issuance of the amending executive order. Consequently, the Court ruled that the government’s modification of admission criteria was valid and applicable. Furthermore, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, noting that the petitioners had secured alternative admissions and that displacing the selected respondents would cause undue hardship. The judgment affirms that executive instructions governing admission to government-controlled institutions are binding and subject to modification by the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does an applicant for a reserved seat in a government institution acquire a vested right to admission upon the submission of an application?
  • Can the government modify admission criteria for state-run educational institutions through executive orders after the application process has commenced?
  • Are the instructions contained in a medical college prospectus legally binding on the administration?
  • Under what circumstances will a court decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in a matter involving admission to an educational institution?
  Read full judgment →
• SAIFUDDIN vs ZAINUDDIN1973 PLD Karachi 210 · Sindh High Court · 1972-04-03Read full judgment →
• SAID REHMAN AND Others vs Mst. BALO AND Other1973 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-20
  land partitionfraudulent misrepresentationlimitation periodcompromise decreeoccupancy tenantmutationcivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, heirs of an occupancy tenant named Walia, challenged a compromise and subsequent land exchange mutations from 1955, alleging they were procured through fraud by the original landowners. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge reversed this decision, finding fraud. On second appeal, the Peshawar High Court restored the trial court's judgment, concluding there was no evidence of fraud and that the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision. The Court held that the allegation of fraud—specifically that Walia was misled regarding the ownership of a residential structure—was unsubstantiated by the record, noting that Walia himself never challenged the mutations during his lifetime. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court also clarified that even if a small portion of land remained undelivered under a compromise, the remedy is to enforce the compromise rather than seek its total annulment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise agreement be set aside on the basis of alleged fraud without evidence of such fraud?
  • Is a suit for declaration of a compromise as void barred by time if the plaintiffs fail to prove when they discovered the alleged fraud?
  • If a party is entitled to land under a compromise agreement that has not been delivered, is the appropriate remedy to set aside the compromise or to enforce it?
  Read full judgment →
• SAI KHAN. vs UMAR HAYAT AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-23
  murdersudden fightalteration of convictionculpable homicidesuppression of factscriminal petitionsupreme court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court, whereby the respondents' murder convictions under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code were altered to section 304-I/34, and one respondent was completely acquitted. The core legal question involved the assessment of culpability and the existence of a sudden fight in a criminal altercation where injuries were sustained by both parties and the prosecution allegedly suppressed material facts regarding the origin of the fight. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, noting that the prosecution suppressed the arming of the deceased party with sharp weapons, rendering the origin of the fight mysterious and pointing towards a sudden fight. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution suppresses the genesis of a fight and injuries are sustained by both sides, the likelihood of a sudden fight warrants altering convictions from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when injuries on the accused indicated a sudden fight whose origin was suppressed by the prosecution?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal or alteration of sentence by the High Court based on concurrent appreciation of evidence regarding suppressed facts?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused persons in a murder trial support the likelihood of a sudden fight?
  Read full judgment →
• SAFDAR vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 402 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-19Read full judgment →
• SAEE vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 675 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-01
  murderdeath sentenceinterested witnessesindependent corroborationbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceinquest reportcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the Lahore High Court wherein the appellant Saee was convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ahmad Yar and sentenced to death. The prosecution case rested on eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence including the recovery of an empty cartridge and a gun. The core legal questions involved the assessment of testimony from closely related and interested witnesses, the requirement and validity of independent corroboration for such testimony, and the evidentiary value of disputed recoveries and inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence. The Court held that the eyewitnesses were interested and partisan, and since the recovery witnesses were the same as the eyewitnesses, no independent corroboration existed in law. Furthermore, significant contradictions between the medical evidence, the inquest report, and the testimonies rendered the prosecution case doubtful. Consequently, the Court established the principle that corroboration of interested witnesses must be independent and cannot be supplied by the same witnesses, and that material contradictions regarding the situs and directional matrix of the crime warrant the extension of the benefit of the doubt. The appeal was allowed and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of closely related and interested eyewitnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Can the recovery of an incriminating article by the same persons who deposed as eyewitnesses constitute independent corroboration in the eye of the law?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery when the foundational recovery of an empty cartridge from the crime scene is unproven?
  • How does a material conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence impact the proof of a criminal charge?
  Read full judgment →
• SADAR UD DIN Alias SADROO vs ABDUL KHALIQ AND Another1973 P Cr. L J 370 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-20Read full judgment →
• SABU MAL vs KIKA RAM Alias HEMAN DA S1973 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-09
  ejectmentlandlord and tenanttransferee landlordnotice under section 13-Apersonal requirementdefault in payment of renturban rent restriction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment application filed against the petitioner in respect of a residential house on grounds of default in payment of rent, subletting, and bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller allowed the ejectment on personal need and subletting, which was upheld on appeal regarding personal need by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the absence of a notice under Section 13(A) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) vitiates the maintainability of an ejectment application on grounds other than default, and whether a landlord possessing multiple houses can exercise discretion regarding which house to occupy for personal need. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the requirement of a notice under Section 13(A) exclusively pertains to defaults in rent payments and does not affect ejectment applications brought on other independent grounds such as personal requirement. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that a landlord's choice regarding which of his properties to inhabit is a matter of personal prerogative and discretion, adequately safeguarded by statutory provisions against misuse.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-service of notice by a transferee-landlord under Section 13(A) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 affect the maintainability of an ejectment application filed on grounds other than default in the payment of rent?
  • Does the relationship of landlord and tenant come into existence upon the transfer of property regardless of the service of notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a tenant or Rent Controller dictate which property a landlord with multiple houses in the same urban area must choose for his personal residence?
  • Does a transferee of property under a sale deed qualify as a landlord under Section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 if the transfer document contains a valid contract to the contrary regarding the right to receive rent?
  Read full judgment →
• SABOO vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 436 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-03Read full judgment →
• S. M. ZAKARIA AND Another vs THE REGISTRAR, CO OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, HYDERABAD AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 433 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ROUNAQ ALI AHD 8 Other vs THE SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1973 PLD Karachi 224 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-18Read full judgment →
• RIZVI TRADERS LTD. vs J. TYLER & Co., LTD. AND 3 Other1973 PLD Karachi 594 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-06
  in forma pauperisjuristic personpauper suitLetters Patent appealCode of Civil Procedurecorporate litigationinterpretation of statutes
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenged a decision holding that a private company could file a suit in forma pauperis. The core legal question was whether a limited company, as a juristic person, falls within the definition of person under Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, despite procedural requirements necessitating personal appearance and examination. The Court held that a company is entitled to sue as a pauper. It reasoned that the term person in Order XXXIII must be interpreted broadly to include juristic persons, consistent with the General Clauses Act 1897. The Court further held that procedural hurdles, such as the inability of a company to present a plaint in person, are overcome by Order XXIX Rule 3, which permits the court to examine a company's Director or officer. The key principle established is that procedural rules must be interpreted to advance the remedy and avoid injustice, and a company's inherent incapacity to perform certain acts personally does not negate its substantive right to sue as a pauper.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private limited company file a suit in forma pauperis under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the term person in Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 include juristic or artificial persons?
  • Can a court examine a Director or officer of a company to satisfy the requirements of Order XXXIII regarding the examination of a pauper applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Risaldar AZIMUDDIN vs DILSHAD HUSSAIN1973 PLD Karachi 284 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-22
  tenant estoppelSection 116 Evidence Acteviction by title paramountlandlord and tenantsymbolic evictiondenial of title
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal concerns the applicability of the rule of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872, in a dispute over land ownership. The appellant, having leased property to the respondent, sought to enforce his title, while the respondent contended that the land belonged to the Karachi Estate Board and that he had received eviction notices from the City Deputy Collector. The core legal question was whether the tenant remains estopped from denying the landlord's title when threatened with eviction by a superior title holder. The Court held that the estoppel created by Section 116 disappears if the landlord's title is extinguished or if there is eviction by title paramount. The Court established that physical dispossession is not required; a threat of eviction from a true owner armed with legal process constitutes symbolic eviction in law. Consequently, once the tenant is threatened with eviction by the true owner, the landlord-tenant relationship terminates, and the tenant is no longer estopped from denying the landlord's title.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 apply when a tenant is threatened with eviction by a true owner holding paramount title?
  • Is physical dispossession necessary to constitute eviction by title paramount for the purpose of terminating a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Does a notice to quit from a true owner armed with legal process constitute symbolic eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• RIAZ BEG vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 111 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-25Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ALI AND OTHERS vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR DIVISION, BAHAWALPUR AND Other1973 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-30
  evacuee propertypartition of joint khatasprivate partitionrehabilitation and settlementhissadari qabzaallotment disputedeficiency in share
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellants' writ petition, which challenged orders passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner and the Deputy Custodian regarding the partition of agricultural lands and the adjustment of shares in villages Bindaur and Kokari. The core legal question concerns the legality of partitioning lands already separately possessed and privately partitioned between Muslim and non-Muslim owners, and whether deficiencies in shares could be satisfied by disturbing settled possessions rather than utilizing available joint or 'Maqbooza Malkan' lands. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court misconstrued the Deputy Custodian's earlier order and that under the relevant settlement laws and partition schemes, partition could only be effected on joint unpartitioned khatas where there was no hissadari qabza, without disturbing existing lawful possessions. The ratio decidendi is that settlement and rehabilitation authorities cannot disturb land already separately held and improved under a valid private partition to make up share deficiencies when sufficient joint unpartitioned land remains available. The appeal was accordingly allowed, restoring the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner's earlier correct order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rehabilitation and settlement authorities can partition lands that are already separately possessed by parties pursuant to a private partition?
  • Can share deficiencies of claimants be made up by disturbing lands lawfully held and improved by allottees when joint unpartitioned lands are still available?
  • Whether the High Court correctly construed the scope of the Deputy Custodian's order regarding the adjustment of land shares?
  • What is the proper manner of partitioning joint khatas of Muslims and non-Muslims under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 and the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ALI AND 2 OTHERS vs THE REVENUE BOARD, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1973 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-23
  State landauction saleconfirmation of auctionhighest bidderdiscretionary powerwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding State land previously leased under the Grow More Food Scheme, which was subsequently resumed and put up for public auction. The petitioners emerged as the highest bidders and deposited the requisite initial payment. However, the auction in their favour was not confirmed and was eventually cancelled by governmental authorities in respect of several lots, leading to fresh auction directions. The petitioners challenged the cancellation via a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed, along with a subsequent review petition. The Supreme Court considered whether the highest bidders acquired any legal title or enforceable right prior to confirmation, and whether the authorities acted arbitrarily in refusing to confirm the auction. The Court held that merely being the highest bidder does not confer legal title or an absolute right, and under the governing auction conditions, the competent authority retains the discretion to confirm or refuse confirmation of a sale. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that the exercise of discretionary power not to confirm the auction was lawful and not arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the highest bidder in a public auction of State land acquire legal title prior to the confirmation of the auction?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained by a highest bidder whose auction has not been confirmed?
  • Is the refusal to confirm an auction sale under auction conditions an arbitrary exercise of discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• REHMAN METAL INDUSTRIES, KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1973 PLC 47 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-27Read full judgment →
• REHM UDDIN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-22
  culpable homicidesentence enhancementguilty intentioncriminal appealvital body partsudden quarrelPakistan Penal Code
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenges a High Court judgment that maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while enhancing the sentence from seven years to transportation for life. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in enhancing the sentence for an offence under Section 304, Part I, in the absence of an appeal against the acquittal of the charge under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court acted legally. The Court reasoned that the trial court’s conviction under Section 304, Part I, inherently implied a finding of guilty intention. Given the brutal nature of the act—stabbing the deceased in a vital area—the enhancement to the maximum sentence allowed under that section was appropriate. The Court established the principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural and inevitable consequences of their acts; where a person uses a lethal weapon on a vital part of the body, the law presumes an intent to cause death or injury likely to cause death.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court infer guilty intention from the external and visible acts of an accused?
  • Is the High Court legally justified in enhancing a sentence under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite the absence of an appeal against an acquittal under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the use of a weapon on a vital part of the body create a presumption of intent to cause death or injury likely to cause death?
  Read full judgment →
• RAMZAN AND Another vs The STATE1973 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-19
  ocular testimonycorroborative evidencemurder convictionrecovery of stolen propertyappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal and upheld their convictions and sentences for the murder of Shamsuddin and the attempted murder of Qamaruddin. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly appreciated the ocular testimony and corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, including the testimony of several eyewitnesses and the recovery of stolen property (a revolver, wrist-watch, and rings) from the petitioners. The Court held that the High Court properly appreciated the evidence and was justified in relying on the ocular testimony, which was further corroborated by the possession of stolen items. The principle laid down is that the conviction of an accused in a murder case is sustainable when based on credible ocular testimony that is corroborated by independent evidence, such as the recovery of stolen property linked to the deceased, thereby establishing the accused's participation in the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of stolen property from the accused?
  • Is the High Court's appreciation of ocular evidence subject to interference by the Supreme Court if the evidence is found to be credible?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja MUHAMMAD YAQOOB KHAN vs SAIF ALI KHAN1973 PLD Azad J & K 17 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-03-10Read full judgment →
• Raja MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN vs NAWAB DIN AND Another1973 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-16
  professional misconductBar Councilinterlocutory orderappellate jurisdictionstatutory appealdisciplinary proceedingssuspension from practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, an advocate suspended from practice for one year by the Tribunal of the Bar Council, sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Pakistan Bar Council. The Committee had refused to stay the operation of the suspension order pending the final disposal of the petitioner's appeal before it. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court against an interim order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council under the Bar Councils Act, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was incompetent and dismissed it. The Court reasoned that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and that Section 42 of the Bar Councils Act, 1965, only provides for appeals against final orders disposing of matters under Sections 40 or 41, not against interlocutory orders. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction regarding Bar Council disciplinary matters is strictly confined to final orders, and no appeal lies against interim or interlocutory orders passed by the Disciplinary Committee.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Pakistan Bar Council?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals from the Bar Council limited to final orders disposing of an appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain an appeal against an order refusing to stay the operation of a suspension order pending appeal before the Disciplinary Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja ALI AK$AR KHAN vs FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Azad J & K 44 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-06-03Read full judgment →
• RAHMATULLAH AND 3 Others vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 373 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-05Read full judgment →
• RAHIM SHAH vs THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  disqualification of membernatural justicewrit jurisdictionquasi-judicial proceedingsbenamdarelection petitionright to fair hearingcertiorari
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court order dismissing a writ petition against the Chief Election Commissioner’s decision to disqualify the appellant from his National Assembly seat for allegedly holding a government contract. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner acted lawfully by disqualifying the appellant based on an "agent or benamdar" theory without providing notice of this specific ground or an opportunity to adduce evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner’s order was vitiated for acting without lawful authority. The Court established that when a tribunal exercises quasi-judicial powers affecting a person’s rights, it must adhere to fundamental principles of natural justice. This includes providing the affected party with notice of the specific allegations and a fair opportunity to defend themselves and lead evidence. Because the appellant was never notified of the "benamdar" allegation and was denied the chance to prove he had no interest in the contract, the proceedings were fundamentally flawed. The Court set aside the disqualification and remanded the matter for a fresh, lawful determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a tribunal to provide notice of the specific grounds for disqualification violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions required to allow parties to adduce evidence on disputed questions of fact?
  • Can a High Court issue a writ of certiorari to correct proceedings of a tribunal that failed to follow fundamental judicial procedures?
  • Does the term 'Government' in the context of disqualification for government contracts under the Legal Framework Order include both Provincial and Central Governments?
  Read full judgment →
• RAHIM BAKHSH vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 23 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-02Read full judgment →
• RAHIM ALI AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE-Opponent1973 P Cr. L J 200 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-28Read full judgment →
• RAFIQ AHMAD KHAN 1.013111 vs ASHIQ HUSSAIN FAROOQI1973 PLC 3 70 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1973-03-23Read full judgment →
• RAFI UD DIN vs ZAHOOR UD DIN AND 5 OTHER1973 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-08
  settlement lawtransfer of propertyshopalmirahevacuee propertyspecial leave appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed a writ petition concerning the transfer of a disputed property in New Anarkali, Lahore, under settlement laws. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether an almirah fixed to a wall can be treated in law as a separate business premises or a separate shop. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact by the Additional Settlement Commissioner—based on spot inspection and evidence demonstrating that the premises in question functioned as a shop—was sustainable and properly transferred to the respondent. The Court concluded that small commercial premises in highly commercialized areas can constitute independent shops based on their actual use on the relevant date, dismissing the appeal without costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an almirah fixed to a wall can be treated in law as a separate business premises or a separate shop?
  • Can a disputed property be transferred as a shop based on its actual use on the relevant date under settlement instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• QASIM ALI vs Mst. SAKINA AND Other1973 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-28
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantcompromisefresh tenancyexecution of orderspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed premises. The core legal question is whether a compromise entered into between a landlord and tenant during the pendency of an appeal against an ejectment order—granting the tenant a fixed period to remain in possession upon certain conditions—creates a fresh tenancy requiring new ejectment proceedings, or merely extends time under the existing order. The Supreme Court held that the compromise did not create a fresh tenancy or a new cause of action, but merely modified the original ejectment order by giving the tenant time to remain in possession subject to fulfillment of conditions. The key principle laid down is that a compromise extending a tenant's stay during appellate proceedings does not extinguish the executable character of the primary ejectment order nor necessitate fresh proceedings before a Rent Controller upon default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise between a landlord and tenant during appellate proceedings creates a fresh tenancy?
  • Does an agreement allowing a tenant to remain in possession for a stipulated period upon payment of rent necessitate fresh ejectment proceedings upon default?
  • Is an ejectment order modified by an appellate-stage compromise capable of being executed directly by the Rent Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE1973 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-14
  dismissal from servicemisconductenquiry reportshow-cause noticenatural justicedomestic inquiryindustrial employment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arose from an employer challenging orders of the Punjab Labour Court, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the Lahore High Court regarding the dismissal of an employee (a Fitter) for alleged misconduct. The primary legal question was whether, under Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and the principles of natural justice, an employer is required to furnish a copy of the domestic inquiry report and serve a written show-cause notice before passing an order of dismissal. The Supreme Court observed that the inquiry officer had relied on extraneous allegations not included in the original charge-sheet and had disregarded mitigating circumstances. The Court held that principles of natural justice and statutory requirements necessitate providing the workman with a copy of the inquiry report and issuing a written show-cause notice prior to dismissal. A subsequent personal hearing without supplying the report cannot cure the defect. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the employer's petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employer legally required to furnish a copy of the domestic inquiry report to a workman before ordering his dismissal under Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does natural justice require the issuance of a written show-cause notice prior to imposing the penalty of dismissal based on an inquiry report?
  • Can a personal hearing granted to a workman substitute the legal requirement of providing him an inquiry report containing adverse extraneous findings?
  Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, REVENUE1973 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-02-27
  land revenue assessmentnet assetsurban propertyagricultural producestatutory interpretationrevenue law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter concerns a challenge to the legality of a land revenue assessment imposed on urban property (Faletti's Hotel, Lahore) by the Provincial Government. The core legal question was whether the 'net assets' of land, as defined in the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887, could be calculated based on the letting value of urban property rather than agricultural produce. The Supreme Court held that the assessment basis was illegal. The Court determined that the definition of 'net assets' in Section 3(18) of the Act, which refers to 'average annual surplus produce' and 'ordinary expenses of cultivation,' is inherently tied to agricultural use. Consequently, the Legislature did not intend for urban property income to be the basis for land revenue assessment, regardless of the land's actual use. The Court ruled that the assessment must be set aside because it was calculated on an incorrect, illegal basis. The key principle laid down is that statutory definitions of 'net assets' in revenue laws cannot be expanded by administrative rules to include urban rental income when the statute restricts the scope to agricultural produce.

  Questions settled

  • Can the 'net assets' of land for the purpose of revenue assessment be calculated based on the letting value of urban property?
  • Does the definition of 'net assets' under the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887 restrict revenue assessment to agricultural income?
  • Can administrative rules under the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887 introduce a basis of assessment inconsistent with the Act itself?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to pass an order in an appeal that should have been passed by the lower court, even if the respondent did not file an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER vs AMANAT ALI1973 PLC 264 · Lahore High Court · 1972-10-24Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, PUNJAB, LAHVRE AND 4 Others vs MRS. AKHTAR MIR1973 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-15
  advance incrementsinitial starting salaryconstitutional petitioncivil servants pay revisionschool teacher
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner Province challenged the validity of a Lahore High Court order that allowed the respondent school teacher's constitutional petition and directed the restoration of three advance increments along with consequential benefits. The core legal question was whether the respondent's higher initial starting salary of Rs. 170 p.m. upon appointment as an M.A., B.T. in 1958 was granted by way of advance increments or as a minimum starting salary under applicable government notifications. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the salary was an initial starting pay rather than advance increments, rendering the restrictive provisions of Note (2) of the subsequent notification inapplicable to her. The Court held that the respondent was consequently entitled to the advance increments upon acquiring subsequent qualifications, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a higher initial starting salary granted on the basis of academic qualifications constitutes advance increments under the civil service pay rules?
  • Are government servants who received a higher starting pay rather than advance increments barred from claiming further increments under Note 2 of the pay revision notifications?
  Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND Another vs TAJAMMAL HUSSAIN1973 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-17
  temporary employeeregularization of servicetermination of serviceshow-cause noticepermanent postservice lawwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside the termination of the respondent's services as a temporary Computor. The core legal question was whether the respondent, initially appointed on a temporary basis, held a permanent post, thereby entitling him to procedural protections against summary termination. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent was indeed a regular employee. This conclusion was based on evidence from the Irrigation Research Institute's annual report, which listed the respondent under the category of 'Computor (Regular),' and the fact that his pay was sanctioned by the Accountant-General rather than the Director of the Institute. The Court affirmed that despite the initial temporary appointment, the nature of the post was permanent and indefinite. Consequently, the respondent was entitled to a show-cause notice before termination, as required under Article 177 of the Constitution. Given the State's concession in the High Court regarding the invalidity of the termination procedure, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on a temporary basis can be considered a regular employee based on the nature of the post and administrative records?
  • Does an employee holding a permanent post, despite an initial temporary appointment, have a right to a show-cause notice before termination?
  • Is the sanctioning authority of an employee's pay a relevant factor in determining their employment status as regular or temporary?
  Read full judgment →
• Present: M. Jamil Asghar, MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT1973 PLC 355 · Unclassified · 1972-11-27Read full judgment →
• Pirzada GHULAM MUHAMMAD SHAH vs MESSRS CHASHLUM CONTRACTORS, CHASHMA BARRAGE, COLONY KUNDIAN, DISTRICT MIANWALI1973 P Cr. L J 548 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-15Read full judgment →
• Pervalz AHMAD AHD Another vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 283 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-27Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. vs PREMIER RUBBER BELTING & MANUFACTURING Co. LTD., KARACHI1973 PLD Karachi 326 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-15
  winding-up petitionstay of proceedingsarbitration clauseinsolvencystatutory noticejurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application was filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 by the respondent company, seeking to stay a winding-up petition filed by the petitioner creditor under Sections 162 and 163 of the Companies Act 1913. The respondent argued that the underlying loan agreement contained an arbitration clause covering any controversy or claim, and thus the matter should be referred to arbitration. The petitioner contended that winding-up proceedings are not legal proceedings in respect of a matter agreed to be referred to arbitration. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the application, holding that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 does not apply to winding-up proceedings under Section 162 of the Companies Act 1913. The Court ruled that a winding-up petition is not a proceeding to enforce a debt or money claim, but rather an action to wind up a company on the ground of insolvency. Since the arbitration clause did not cover the question of winding up, the statutory jurisdiction of the Court could not be stayed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 apply to stay winding-up proceedings initiated under Section 162 of the Companies Act 1913?
  • Can a dispute regarding a company's inability to pay its debts, raised in a winding-up petition, be considered a matter agreed to be referred to arbitration under a standard commercial arbitration clause?
  • Is a winding-up petition under the Companies Act 1913 deemed a legal proceeding to enforce a debt or money claim for the purposes of an arbitration stay?
  Read full judgment →
• P. D. H. LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES & WORKERS' UNION, Petitioner vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, LAHORE REGION, GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Lahore 256 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-27Read full judgment →
• OMAR DIN vs ABDUL KARIM Vendee1973 PLD Azad J & K 14 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-05-09Read full judgment →
• N/A vs N/A1973 PLC 347 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-15Read full judgment →
• N/A vs Messrs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI AND 3 OTHERS1973 PLC 94 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-08
  essential servicesindustrial disputejurisdictionindustrial courtstatutory interpretationancillary proceedingslabour law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged an order of the Industrial Court dismissing the appellant's application under Section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, ousts the jurisdiction of an Industrial Court to adjudicate industrial disputes once the relevant employment is declared an "essential service" under the Act. The Court held that the provisions of the 1952 Act, particularly Section 7-A, override the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, creating a mutually inconsistent method for settling industrial disputes. Consequently, upon the government's notification declaring the bank's employment an essential service, the Industrial Court was divested of jurisdiction. The Court further ruled that an application under Section 31 of the Ordinance is ancillary to the main industrial dispute; therefore, if the Court lacks jurisdiction over the main dispute due to the application of the 1952 Act, it cannot entertain the ancillary application. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the 1952 Act supersedes the Ordinance regarding dispute resolution for declared essential services.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, oust the jurisdiction of an Industrial Court to adjudicate industrial disputes once an employment is declared an essential service?
  • Can an Industrial Court entertain an application under Section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, if it lacks jurisdiction over the main industrial dispute?
  • Does a notification under Section 3 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, supersede the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, regarding the settlement of industrial disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• NOORA AND Another vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-30
  criminal appealsupreme court jurisdictionappraisal of evidencechance witnessbenefit of the doubtmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court upholding the convictions of the appellants for murder and confirming the sentence of death for one. The core legal question concerned the scope and extent of the powers of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in criminal appeals and whether it should continue to follow the restrictive self-imposed practice of the Privy Council and the Federal Court or exercise its full constitutional powers to re-examine evidence. Delivering the opinion, the Court held that since 1956 the Supreme Court has consistently shed the restrictions of the Privy Council practice and possesses the full constitutional power to re-examine evidence in criminal appeals to ensure the safe dispensation of justice and prevent grave injustice. Applying this principle, the Court thoroughly reviewed the evidence, found the testimony of the crucial chance witness to be unreliable and uncorroborated, and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan possess the power to re-examine and reappraise evidence in criminal appeals without being bound by the restrictive self-imposed practice of the Privy Council?
  • Can the solitary testimony of a chance witness serve as a safe basis for a criminal conviction without reliable corroboration?
  • How should the Supreme Court approach concurrent findings of fact by the courts below in a criminal appeal by special leave?
  Read full judgment →
• NOOR SAMAND AND 3 Others vs BASHIR AND 2 OTHERS1973 P Cr. L J 777 · Sindh High Court · 1972-04-02Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD KHAN vs Haji MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN AND 24 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-05
  evictionrented landjurisdiction of civil courtRent Controllersuperstructure removallease expirymesne profits
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a dispute over an open plot of land and five and a half shops leased in 1945 for twenty years. Under the lease, the lessee constructed a cinema building ('Golden Cinema') on the plot. Upon expiry of the lease, the appellant (lessor) sought ejectment and mesne profits in the civil court, offering compensation for the structure or its removal. The trial court decreed possession of the vacant plot subject to compensation, but dismissed the claim regarding the shops, holding that eviction from the shops fell under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. On appeal, the High Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction entirely and that the dispute was triable solely by the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the leased property fell within the definitions of 'building' and 'rented land' under the Ordinance. The Court ruled that Section 13 of the Ordinance impliedly ousts civil court jurisdiction over evictions, and that the Rent Controller's power of 'eviction' includes directing the removal of superstructures.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vacant plot of land leased alongside shops for the construction of a cinema fall within the definition of 'building' or 'rented land' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of eviction from premises covered by the Ordinance?
  • Does the Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to direct a tenant to demolish or remove a superstructure upon eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• NOOR DIN, Pir MAHMOOD ASHRAF Alias MAHMOOD SHAH vs THE CHAIRMAN, MIANI SAHIB GRAVEYARD COMMITTEE, LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, LAHORE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-05
  past and closed transactionMartial Law immunitygraveyard preservationvested rightsjudicial reviewcompulsory acquisitionencroachment removal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two civil appeals challenging the acquisition of land by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, Lahore, for the preservation and maintenance of the Miani Sahib Graveyard. The appellants contested the acquisition, arguing that the land was private property and that the Martial Law Order No. 131 and the Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance No. XLIV of 1962, under which the land was acquired, were incompetently made. The core legal question was whether the actions taken by the authorities, specifically the dispossession of the appellants, constituted a 'past and closed' transaction immune from judicial challenge, notwithstanding the potential invalidity of the legislative instruments used. The Supreme Court held that the actions of taking over the land and ejecting the appellants were completed before the commencement of the 1962 Constitution. Relying on the principle of past and closed transactions and the immunity granted by Martial Law Regulations Nos. 88 and 93, the Court ruled that these completed acts, which created vested rights and obligations, were immune from judicial interference, regardless of the competency of the underlying Martial Law Orders.

  Questions settled

  • Are actions taken under Martial Law Orders immune from judicial challenge if they were completed before the commencement of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does the principle of 'past and closed transactions' protect actions taken by authorities even if the underlying legislative instrument was incompetently made?
  • Do Martial Law Regulations Nos. 88 and 93 provide immunity to acts done by Martial Law authorities regardless of whether the act was within the scope of their jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• NISAR AHMAD vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-23
  evacuee propertyChief Settlement Commissionerjudicial reviewPermanent Transfer Deedadministrative discretiondisplaced personsstatutory procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that set aside the transfer of two evacuee properties by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and remanded the cases for fresh adjudication. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner could bypass established statutory procedures for disposing of evacuee property by issuing administrative orders that effectively denied claimants a hearing on their applications for transfer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court's decision. It held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner acted without lawful authority by bypassing the prescribed legal process and failing to adjudicate the respondents' claims on their merits. The Court established the principle that even where an authority possesses statutory jurisdiction, it must exercise that power judiciously and in accordance with the law, ensuring that claims of occupants are adjudicated upon merits rather than disposed of through arbitrary administrative orders. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed does not oust the High Court's power of judicial review under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed oust the High Court's power of judicial review?
  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner dispose of evacuee property through administrative orders without adjudicating the claims of occupants?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner required to follow established procedures for the disposal of evacuee buildings consisting of multiple residential or commercial units?
  Read full judgment →
• NIAZ vs The STATE1973 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-12
  murderabductionrapeocular evidencecorroborationabscondencemotivecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction and sentences of the appellant Niaz under sections 302, 307, 366, and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, including the death sentence for murder. The prosecution case was that the appellant, desiring to forcibly marry the younger daughter of the deceased, abducted her with the help of accomplices. When the deceased and others pursued them, the appellant fired a shot resulting in the death of the deceased, and another shot injuring a defense witness. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of ocular testimony, corroboration through motive and medical evidence, and the sustainability of conviction despite the acquittal of co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the natural ocular witnesses, corroborated by established motive, medical evidence, and the appellant's abscondence, conclusively proved the guilt of the appellant. The Court laid down that the acquittal of certain co-accused due to distinguishable circumstances or lack of specific corroboration does not falsify the prosecution case against an accused whose participation is independently and firmly established by reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction of an accused can be maintained when several co-accused have been given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted?
  • Does minor discrepancy in the statements of eye-witnesses regarding minor details falsify the entire prosecution case?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by motive, medical evidence, and abscondence is sufficient to sustain a capital sentence?
  • Can the evidence of natural and related witnesses be relied upon in the absence of previous enmity?
  Read full judgment →
• NIAZ ALI vs LEHRASAP KHAN AND Other1973 PLD Azad J & K 38 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · -Read full judgment →
• NAZARALI vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, RAWALPINDI AND 4 Other1973 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-03-05
  evacuee propertycustodian jurisdictiondisplaced persons compensation and rehabilitationpower of attorneywrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition against orders of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Custodian declaring the disputed property in Karachi as evacuee property. The appellant, an Indian national, had purchased the property in 1948 and later sought approval of his power of attorney, which was rejected by the Custodian on the ground that the property had already vested in the Central Government under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of section 3 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 regarding property not treated as evacuee before 1 January 1957, the survival of the Custodian's jurisdiction after a notification of acquisition, and the scope of exclusionary notifications. The Supreme Court held that clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the 1957 Act applies to managed properties whose management authority was not approved by the Custodian regardless of whether the management commenced before 28 February 1947, that the Custodian loses jurisdiction once property vests in the Government under the 1958 Act, and that no pending proceedings exempted the property at the relevant time. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 3(2)(b) of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 apply exclusively to properties managed by an agent on or before the 28th of February 1947?
  • Does the Custodian retain jurisdiction over evacuee property after it has vested in the Government pursuant to a notification under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?
  • Whether subsequent amending notifications under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act can exclude property where no proceedings were pending on the date specified.
  Read full judgment →
• NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-12
  land settlementsubstituted servicenatural justicecondemned unheardcancellation of allotmentdue processwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition filed by landowners against the cancellation of their land allotments. The petitioners, who had purchased land and obtained mutations, were subject to proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. They alleged that their land was cancelled by the Additional Settlement Commissioner without proper notice or inquiry, claiming they were condemned unheard. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were denied due process and the right to be heard during the cancellation proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the record indicated notice was issued to the petitioners and, upon failure of personal service, substituted service was duly effected. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the contention that the petitioners were condemned unheard, as they had failed to appear despite the legal service of notice. The judgment affirms the principle that where substituted service is properly executed, the requirement of notice is satisfied, and a party cannot claim to have been condemned unheard.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a party to appear after substituted service has been effected constitute being condemned unheard?
  • Can an order of land cancellation be challenged on the grounds of lack of notice if the record shows substituted service was performed?
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