Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 1041 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-07Read full judgment →
• NAZAR ARID 4 Others, vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 824 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• NAWAZ ALI SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND Other1973 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-15
  compulsory retirementcompetent authoritynatural justiceofficiating appointmentgovernment serviceappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the compulsory retirement of a police officer, initially promoted to Sub-Inspector and later officiating as Inspector. The petitioner challenged his second compulsory retirement, effective May 1, 1968, which was ordered by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police under the provisions of the 1962 Constitution. The core legal questions were whether the Deputy Inspector-General of Police constituted the competent authority to order the retirement and whether the failure to grant a hearing during the appellate process violated natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was indeed the competent authority, given the petitioner's status as an officiating Inspector appointed by the Additional Inspector-General. Regarding the procedural argument, the Court ruled that the petitioner could not raise the issue of natural justice for the first time before the Supreme Court, as it was not pleaded in the High Court. Furthermore, the Court established that where a government servant lacks a constitutional right to continue in service, the absence of a hearing during an appeal does not invalidate the retirement order.

  Questions settled

  • Who is the competent authority to order the compulsory retirement of an officiating Inspector of Police?
  • Can a petitioner raise a plea regarding the violation of natural justice for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure to grant a hearing during an appeal against compulsory retirement invalidate the order if the servant has no constitutional right to continue in service?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Syed RAUNAQ ALI ETC vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Jagir claimsDisplaced personsEntitlement certificate cancellationJurisdictional errorNullity of orderWrit jurisdictionProperty definitionClaims CommissionerMartial Law RegulationHyderabad Jagirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses fourteen appeals arising from the dismissal of writ petitions concerning the cancellation of entitlement certificates issued to displaced persons for claims related to Jagirs left in Hyderabad (Deccan). The core legal questions revolved around the jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty to cancel such certificates and the validity of the original verification orders by Claims Authorities, particularly whether Jagirs constituted "property" under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the Officer on Special Duty acted in excess of jurisdiction by unilaterally treating verification orders as nullities, as a tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot disregard orders of another tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. However, the Court affirmed the High Court's discretion to refuse intervention if the underlying verification order was itself a nullity. The Court concluded that Jagirs in Hyderabad, generally being rights in personam and not rights in rem, did not fall within the definition of "property" under the 1956 Act, and thus, the Claims Authorities' verification of such claims was without jurisdiction and a nullity. The High Court was therefore justified in refusing to perpetuate this illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Officer on Special Duty, acting under a rehabilitation scheme, unilaterally cancel entitlement certificates based on verification orders of Claims Authorities?
  • Are verification orders issued by Claims Authorities, based on a Claims Commissioner's circulars, a nullity if the circulars direct treatment of claims under a different schedule or after the expiry of the filing date?
  • Do Jagirs in Hyderabad (Deccan) constitute "property" within the meaning of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956?
  • Can a superior court, in its discretionary writ jurisdiction, refuse to intervene against an order made in excess of jurisdiction if the underlying order sought to be protected is itself a nullity?
  • Can a tribunal of limited jurisdiction give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding a preliminary fact upon which its jurisdiction depends?
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• NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN vs SARDAR KHAN AND Other1973 PLD Azad J & K 11 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-02-29Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN vs MUHAMMAD MOBIN SIDDIQUI AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 107 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-06Read full judgment →
• NAJMA SADEQUE RASOOL vs MUNIRA HAMID RASUL AND Anoth3rs1973 P Cr. L J 98 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-19
  habeas corpuschild custodyexclusive jurisdictionfamily courtmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the custody of a child. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to entertain a petition for child custody in light of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The Sindh High Court held that Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, read with its Schedule, vests exclusive jurisdiction over matters of child custody in the Family Courts. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court ruled that since the Family Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction, a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not maintainable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to approach the appropriate Family Court for remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to adjudicate child custody matters after the enactment of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of Family Courts over matters specified in the Schedule of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 is exclusive in nature?
  • What is the proper forum for a petitioner seeking the custody of a child under West Pakistani family law?
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• NAJEEBULLAH AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 737 · Lahore High Court · 1967-10-23Read full judgment →
• NABI BAKHSH AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1052 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-08Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AHMED AND 3 OTHER vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-1973 P Cr. L J 819 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-21Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 715 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-13Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1075 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-04Read full judgment →
• MURAD AND Others vs THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATE, PAKPATTAN AND Another1973 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-13
  leave to appealquashment of proceedingsfurther investigationcriminal proceduredischarge of accusedhabeas corpus
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a leave to appeal petition directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to prohibit further police investigation in a criminal case registered under sections 452, 366, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the propriety of police conducting further investigation after the accused had initially been discharged following a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was misconceived as no formal order by a Magistrate or superior police authority directing further investigation had been placed on the record. The Court established the principle that in the absence of any concrete official order directing further investigation, a challenge against potential police investigation is premature and not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be maintained to prohibit police investigation when no formal order directing further investigation has been passed or placed on record?
  • Whether the police can conduct further investigation in a criminal case after the accused persons have initially been discharged upon a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Munshi ABDUS SALAM vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN.1973 PLC 303 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-21Read full judgment →
• MUMTAZ BEGUM vs ABDUL QAYUM AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Peshawar 173 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-06-25Read full judgment →
• MULAZIM HUSSAIN Sh. MEHAR ALI vs THE STATE BAGGOO AND 2 Other1973 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-12-06Read full judgment →
• MUKHTAR vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 919 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSUF vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 823 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSUF vs Masses PAK. INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 45 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 32 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs THE MANAGER, PUNJINAD TEXTILE MILLS LTD., MULTAN1973 PLC 358 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1972-10-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT1973 PLD Karachi 694 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-16
  preventive detentionhabeas corpusjudicial reviewmaintenance of public ordervague groundsseverability of groundsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging preventive detention orders issued by the Government of Sind against two individuals under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The core legal questions were whether detention orders based on pending criminal charges, vague grounds, and delayed service of grounds are legally sustainable, and whether defective grounds are severable from valid ones. The High Court quashed the detention orders, holding them invalid. The Court established that preventive detention is a significant encroachment on liberty requiring strict compliance with the law. It ruled that if any ground of detention is vague, non-existent, or irrelevant, the entire detention order is vitiated, as it is impossible to determine the extent to which the detaining authority relied on the defective ground. Furthermore, the Court held that using preventive detention for matters already under criminal prosecution is an unreasonable exercise of power, that grounds must be communicated promptly, and that the period of detention cannot be computed from the date of service of the order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a bad or vague ground in a detention order invalidate the entire order of preventive detention?
  • Can the government use preventive detention for matters that are already the subject of a pending criminal trial?
  • Is a detention order valid if the period of detention is computed from the date of service of the order rather than a fixed date?
  • Does a delay of fifteen days in communicating the grounds of detention constitute a violation of the statutory requirement to serve grounds as soon as may be?
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• MUHAMMAD YAQUB BADAR DIN AND 8 Other vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, LAHORE AND 3 Other Mst. JIWAN A Valid Legislation1973 PLD Supreme Court 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-14
  Limited estateCustomary LawShariat Application ActDevolution of propertySuccessionRemoval of Doubts OrdinanceRehabilitation Settlement Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the devolution of property held by Muslim females as limited estates under Customary Law. The core legal question was whether the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 effectively terminated such limited estates and how property allotted in lieu of these estates should devolve upon the death of the female holder. The Court held that the Act, as clarified by the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Doubts) Ordinance 1972, unequivocally terminated all limited estates held by Muslim females effective 31st December 1962. Consequently, such property must devolve upon the heirs of the last full owner, not the heirs of the female holder. The Court overruled previous High Court interpretations that suggested limited estates were saved by subsequent amendments, affirming that the legislative intent was to replace Customary Law with Shariat Law regarding succession. The principle laid down is that a female holding a limited estate under Customary Law never becomes a fresh stock of descent; upon termination of her interest, the estate reverts to the heirs of the last male owner.

  Questions settled

  • Did the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 terminate limited estates held by Muslim females under Customary Law?
  • Upon the death of a female holding a limited estate, does the property devolve upon her own heirs or the heirs of the last full owner?
  • Is the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Doubts) Ordinance 1972 a valid legislative instrument?
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• MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs THE SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY AND Other1973 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-16
  auction purchasepower of attorneydoctrine of ratificationsettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionpendente lite purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal regarding the auction purchase of a shop in Gujranwala. The core legal question concerned whether the power of attorney executed in favour of the auction-purchaser's brother authorized his participation in the auction, and whether the absence of a specific prior authorization rendered the auction void. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's construction of the power of attorney along with subsequent letters and documents was reasonable and proper. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that the procedural requirement for a duly empowered attorney to participate in an auction on behalf of another is directory in nature, and where the principal subsequently ratifies the agent's action—utilizing compensation books for payment and pursuing legal remedies to restore the auction—the doctrine of ratification under Section 196 of the Contract Act 1872 fully applies to cure any initial defect in authority. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power of attorney executed for managing abandoned properties can be construed to cover participation in property auctions in Pakistan?
  • Is the condition requiring a duly empowered attorney for participating in an auction on behalf of another mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Does the doctrine of ratification under Section 196 of the Contract Act 1872 apply when a principal subsequently adopts and confirms an agent's unauthorized auction bid?
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• MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs GHULAM QADIR AND 2 Other1973 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAKOOB vs HEALTH OFFICER, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE HYDERABAD1973 SCMR 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-02
  interim injunctionlicence cancellationmunicipal committeemootnessirreparable injurydeclaratory suitspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Sind-Baluchistan High Court, which had dismissed revision petitions concerning the cancellation of meat and beef stall licences by the Hyderabad Municipal Committee. The petitioners, whose licences were cancelled without notice, sought interim injunctions to restrain the Municipal Committee from revoking their licences, arguing that they had a strong prima facie case. The lower courts and the High Court refused relief, with the High Court noting that the licences had expired by efflux of time. The Supreme Court addressed whether interim relief could be granted after the expiry of the subject licences. The Court held that since the licences had expired, the question of restraining the Municipal Committee from cancelling them became moot. The Court further reasoned that if the petitioners succeeded in their underlying declaratory suits, they could be adequately compensated through damages and potential licence renewal, meaning no irreparable injury existed. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, declining to interfere with the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an interim injunction be granted to restrain the cancellation of a licence that has already expired by efflux of time?
  • Does the potential for monetary compensation for damages preclude the finding of irreparable injury in an application for an interim injunction?
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• MUHAMMAD UMAR KHAN MUHAMMAD UMAR KHAN vs YOUSAF ARAB AND Other THE STATE1973 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-16
  criminal transferjurisdiction of magistratetrial by court of sessionSection 30 powersexpediency of transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions challenging an order passed by the Chief Justice of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which transferred two criminal cases from a Magistrate in Thatta to a Magistrate in Karachi. The petitioner argued that the transferee Magistrate lacked jurisdiction because certain alleged offences were triable only by a Court of Session or a Magistrate exercising enhanced powers under Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court's transfer order was legally flawed due to the transferee court's alleged lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court's order was legally sound. The Court reasoned that if a trial Magistrate concludes they lack jurisdiction over specific offences, they possess the authority to commit those cases to the Court of Session. Furthermore, the Court established that where cases are to be tried together, there is no legal impediment to transferring both to the Court of Session, especially when the High Court determines that trial by ordinary Magistrates is not expedient.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate commit a case to the Court of Session if they determine they lack jurisdiction over the alleged offences?
  • Is there a legal bar to transferring multiple cases to the Court of Session if one of them requires such committal?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to transfer cases away from ordinary Magistrates when it deems trial by them inexpedient?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Drugs ActGovernment Analyst reportconclusive evidenceadmissibility of evidenceprocedural non-compliancedrug adulterationrebuttable evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a drug manufacturer, challenged his conviction for supplying substandard Tincture Benzoin. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Drug Inspector to provide the appellant with a copy of the Government Analyst's report, as required by Section 25(2) of the Drugs Act, 1940, rendered the report inadmissible or invalidated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while Section 25(2) is a procedural requirement, its non-compliance does not render the Analyst's report inadmissible as evidence. The Court clarified that the consequence of failing to supply the report is merely that the report loses its status as 'conclusive evidence' under Section 25(3), but it remains admissible and can be used as evidence subject to rebuttal by the accused. The Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the appellant failed to challenge the report's accuracy or request re-analysis under Section 25(4) during the trial. The principle established is that the statutory requirement to provide a copy of the Analyst's report is intended to ensure fairness; its absence prevents the report from being conclusive but does not preclude its use as evidence of the facts stated therein.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to supply a copy of the Government Analyst's report to an accused under the Drugs Act 1940 render the report inadmissible in evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of non-compliance with the requirement to serve a copy of the Government Analyst's report under Section 25(2) of the Drugs Act 1940?
  • Can a Government Analyst's report be used as evidence if it does not qualify as 'conclusive evidence' under the Drugs Act 1940?
  • Under what circumstances can a court order a re-analysis of a drug sample under the Drugs Act 1940?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, BASIC DEMOCRACIES, SOCIAL WELFARE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND 3 OTHES1973 PLD Supreme Court 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-06
  inter se senioritycontinuous appointmentprobationstatutory rulesinternal regulationsMunicipal Collegewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution regarding inter se seniority and promotion to Senior Scale Class I (Junior) as a Lecturer in the Municipal College, Burewala. The petitioner contended that he held seniority over respondent No. 4 on the basis that he was initially appointed against a substantive post, while the respondent had been appointed on a temporary basis, and further challenged the respondent's promotion for non-compliance with College Governing Council regulations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Rule 14(2) of the West Pakistan Local Council and Municipal Committee Service Rules 1963, inter se seniority among direct recruits is determined by the date of continuous appointment to the post, regardless of whether the initial appointment was temporary or substantive. The Court also held that internal regulations framed by a College Governing Council lack statutory status and cannot be enforced through constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inter se seniority between direct recruits under the West Pakistan Local Council and Municipal Committee Service Rules 1963 is determined by continuous appointment or by substantive versus temporary initial appointment status?
  • Does an extension of a temporary appointment with retrospective probation granted after the initial period expired constitute a break in continuous service?
  • Can internal regulations or promotion criteria framed by a delegated College Governing Council be enforced via constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 as statutory rules?
  • Does a candidate who lacks the requisite service qualifications have locus standi to challenge the promotion of another employee to a higher grade?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE AGRICULTURAL ENGINEER HYDERABAD DIVISION, TANDO JAM1973 PLC 29(2) · Labour Court · 1972-06-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 2Other1973 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-14
  settlement lawagreement of associationprovisional transfer orderpermanent transfer deedestoppeldisplaced personspecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arises out of a dispute over the transfer of a residential property in Lahore under settlement laws. The petitioner, a claimant displaced person, had entered into an agreement of association with respondent No. 3, surrendering his rights in her favour in consideration of her adjusting the entire transfer price against her compensation book, upon which a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) was issued to her. Subsequently, protracted litigation ensued between the petitioner and a third party, Barkat Ali, without impleading respondent No. 3. After various rounds of remand and cancellation of titles, a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) was ultimately issued in favour of respondent No. 3, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge the transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 and the validity of the agreement of association after having induced her to pay the entire price. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was legally bound by the agreement and estopped from challenging her title, as the P.T.O. had attained finality against him and respondent No. 3 was not a party to the prior conflicting proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement of association under settlement laws becomes inchoate without specific approval of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can a party be bound by settlement proceedings conducted in their absence without being impleaded as a party?
  • Whether a petitioner who has caused another person to pay the entire transfer price based on an agreement of association is estopped from challenging that person's title?
  • Does a Provisional Transfer Order attain finality against a party who fails to challenge it through appeal?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF SHAH AND 4 Others vs INSPECTORGENERAL OF POLICE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 3 OTHBRS1973 P Cr. L J 845 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAM AND Another vs MUHAMMAD MUSTAQEEM AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-25
  specific performanceabatement of suitlegal representativefinality of decreecivil revisiondeceased defendant
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a civil revision. The petitioners filed a suit for specific performance of a contract regarding a property sale. During the proceedings, it was discovered that one defendant had died prior to the filing of the suit. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground of abatement. The petitioners subsequently sought to set aside the abatement, but their application and subsequent appeal were dismissed. The High Court, while acknowledging that Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was technically inapplicable because the defendant died before the suit commenced, held that the trial court's dismissal order had attained finality as it was not challenged via appeal. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, ruling that because the petitioners failed to appeal the trial court's decree, it became final and could not be reopened in revision proceedings. The Court affirmed that procedural defects regarding deceased parties must be challenged through appropriate appellate channels rather than collateral revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit dismissed on the ground of abatement be reopened in revision if the original dismissal order was not appealed?
  • Does Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a suit instituted against a person who was already deceased at the time of filing?
  • Is a trial court's order dismissing a suit for abatement final if not challenged through an appeal?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs CHIEF SECRETARY AND Other1973 PLD Azad J & K 27 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-12-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND ANOTHER vs IBRAHIM AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-07
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertycompromisesettlement authoritieswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellants' Letters Patent appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether a compromise and failure to challenge an initial transfer order barred the occupants from subsequently reopening the transfer in their favour pursuant to a subsequent administrative circular. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim to the transfer came to an end when they entered into a compromise before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, accepting the respondent as landlord and agreeing to vacate after one year without filing an appeal or revision against the original transfer order. The Court laid down the principle that administrative circulars cannot reopen matters where a party's entitlement has been finally concluded by their own actions and where no timely legal remedies were pursued against the operative transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise before settlement authorities concluding a party's claim bar them from later seeking the transfer of evacuee property?
  • Can administrative instructions or circulars issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner reopen past final transfer orders?
  • Do occupants who fail to challenge an initial transfer order through appeal or revision retain locus standi to agitate for cancellation of that transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR NASEEM vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 911 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALEEM AKHTAR AND 14 Other vs PUNJAB CIVIL SERVICE1973 PLC 255 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAERD vs Syed MUNAWAR SHAH AND 5 Other S1973 PLD Peshawar 80 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-03-04
  Waqf-ul-auladdeclaratory suitconsequential reliefpossessionintention to dedicatesubsequent conductfraudulent transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for declaration filed by the petitioner claiming that the suit property was part of a Waqf-ul-aulad created by his late father, and that a subsequent sale deed executed by certain respondents was void. The lower courts dismissed the suit, holding it incompetent under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 as the plaintiff was out of possession and failed to seek consequential relief, and further finding that the Waqf deed was executed merely as a shield to defraud creditors and never acted upon. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal, affirming that a suit for a mere declaration without seeking possession is barred where the plaintiff is out of possession. The Court further analyzed the legal principles governing the validity of Waqf deeds, subsequent conduct of the dedicator, and the requirement of a genuine intention to dedicate property, ultimately concluding that the purported Waqf was invalid and never meant to be acted upon.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for a mere declaration maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 when the plaintiff is out of possession and fails to seek consequential relief by way of possession?
  • To what extent can the subsequent conduct of a dedicator be taken into consideration to determine the validity and real intention behind the creation of a Waqf?
  • Does a Waqf deed fail when the ultimate destination of the property includes persons who are not descendants or family members of the waqif?
  • What is the legal effect of executing a Waqf deed without any intention to divest ownership, but merely to utilize it as a shield against potential claims by creditors?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQUE KHAN vs TELEPHONE INDUSTRIES OF PAKTSTAN, KARACHI1973 PLC 37 · Labour Court · 1972-06-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THEWATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT1973 PLC 287 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THE WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 270 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1066 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs MUHAMMAD SHAM AND Another1973 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-15
  bail cancellationinterim ordercommitment proceedingscriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to examine whether the amendment introduced in section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, came into effect immediately without notification by the Provincial Government. Concurrently, the petitioner filed an application for an interim order for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent. The core legal question revolved around the propriety of cancelling bail where commitment proceedings were delayed without the fault of the accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that this was not a fit case for the cancellation of bail by an interim order, noting that the respondent had been kept in jail while proceedings were adjourned through no fault of his own. The petition was accordingly dismissed, and the respondent allowed to remain on bail pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to an accused can be cancelled by means of an interim order when commitment proceedings are delayed without the fault of the accused?
  • Did the amendment sought to be introduced in section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, come into effect immediately without a notification by the Provincial Government?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND Others vs THE COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI DIVISION1973 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-20
  slaughterhouse bye-lawsdelegated legislationlacheswrit jurisdictionMunicipal Administration Ordinancefactual inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, butchers operating in the Rawalpindi area, challenged the validity of slaughterhouse bye-laws sanctioned by the Commissioner, Rawalpindi, which imposed fees for slaughtering and transportation. Before the High Court, the petitioners argued that the management of the slaughterhouse by a Meat Board was illegal and that the Commissioner lacked the authority to sanction the bye-laws under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. The High Court rejected these contentions, noting that the Commissioner had been delegated the necessary powers by the Provincial Government. On appeal, the petitioners raised new arguments regarding the unreasonableness of the bye-laws and alleged discrimination between butchers in the Cantonment area and Rawalpindi Town. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that these new contentions involved factual inquiries that could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court held that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, as the challenge to the bye-laws was filed significantly later than their notification.

  Questions settled

  • Can new contentions involving factual inquiries be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a delay in filing a writ petition challenging notified bye-laws justify dismissal on the ground of laches?
  • Is the Commissioner competent to sanction slaughterhouse bye-laws under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, if powers have been delegated by the Provincial Government?
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• MUHAMMAD RIAZ KHAN AND ANOTHER vs THE TRUSTEE, MUSLIM INSURANCE1973 PLC 132 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-10-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RIAZ AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 120 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN AND 5 Others vs AHMAD ALI KHAN1973 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-10-06
  Rehabilitation Land Settlement Schemesuccessionmutation of inheritancepredeceased daughterright-holderallotment of landwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a dispute regarding succession to the land allotted to Sarfraz Khan, a deceased right-holder under the Rehabilitation (Land) Settlement Scheme. The petitioners, sons of Muhammad Hassan Khan, claimed exclusive inheritance rights, arguing that succession opened and allotment occurred before paragraph 46 of the Scheme was amended on 4th March 1954 to include sons of predeceased daughters as heirs. The core legal question was whether Ahmad Ali Khan, the respondent and son of the deceased right-holder's predeceased daughter, was entitled to a share in the estate under the amended terms of the Scheme. The Supreme Court found that no mutation of inheritance had been attested prior to the amendment, a civil suit filed by the petitioners claiming exclusive inheritance was dismissed, and the relevant mutation was entered long after 4th March 1954. The Court held that paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Scheme stood amended before succession was determined, validating the respondent's share. Consequently, the High Court rightly rejected the petitioners' writ petition, and the Supreme Court dismissed the leave petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amended paragraph 46 of the Rehabilitation (Land) Settlement Scheme apply where succession is determined and mutation entered after the amendment date?
  • Is the son of a predeceased daughter entitled to inherit from a deceased right-holder under the Rehabilitation (Land) Settlement Scheme after its amendment on 4th March 1954?
  • Can a party claim exclusive inheritance of a right-holder's land without an attested mutation or civil court decree in their favour prior to statutory amendments?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAHIM vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 904 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 366 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE DAR vs SARKAR1973 PLD Azad J & K 51 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-05-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE DAR vs IDEAL INSURANCE Co.1973 PLD Azad J & K 21 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-03-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAZIR vs THE S. H. O., POLICE STATION, SHAHPUR AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-22
  habeas corpusillegal detentioncustody of adultjurisdiction of High Courtpersonal libertycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which, in a habeas corpus proceeding, directed that an adult married woman be handed over to the police for investigation. The core legal question was whether a High Court judge, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, possesses the authority to order the custody of a person who is not a party to the proceedings and against whom no criminal case is registered. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that there was no legal basis for the High Court to hand over the custody of an adult, married woman to the police, particularly when no criminal case was registered against her. The Court emphasized that such a procedure is not warranted by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or other applicable laws. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the woman was set at liberty to reside with her husband, affirming the principle that courts cannot arbitrarily deprive an adult citizen of their liberty without due process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court judge have the jurisdiction to order the custody of a person to the police in a habeas corpus proceeding when that person is not a party to the case?
  • Can a court order the custody of an adult married woman to the police for investigation when no criminal case is registered against her?
  • Is the summary handing over of a person to police custody without recording their statement or establishing legal grounds permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs GHULAM KADIR AND 3 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-22
  transfer of casereasonable apprehension of biassection 526 CrPCsection 145 CrPCadministration of justiceimpartiality of magistracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan rejecting an application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the transfer of proceedings under Section 145 thereof from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion on sound judicial principles in refusing the transfer request, given the political rivalries involved, the inaction of local police, and the magistrate's delay in granting interim attachment, which created an apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed that the case be heard by the High Court in its extraordinary original jurisdiction. The Court held that transfer is justified if there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a party that a court cannot act fairly. What constitutes a reasonable apprehension must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person in the applicant's position, ensuring that justice is not only done but seen to be done.

  Questions settled

  • What is the test for determining whether a party has a reasonable apprehension of bias justifying the transfer of a case under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether systemic inaction by local police and magistrates in politically sensitive cases creates a justifiable apprehension of bias warranting transfer of proceedings to a higher court?
  • Can a High Court exercise its extraordinary original jurisdiction to try proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 328 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAB vs MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-15
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicidepremeditated murdermiscarriage of justicesentence commutationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a private complainant, challenged a High Court judgment that reduced the respondent's conviction from murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based on the theory of grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in speculating that the respondent acted under grave and sudden provocation when the respondent’s own statements and the evidence of a premeditated chase and attack did not support such a conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reliance on surmises regarding the respondent's loss of self-control was unjustified and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court affirmed that the evidence, including the nature of the weapon and the pursuit of the victim, established premeditated murder rather than a spontaneous act. Consequently, the Court restored the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but commuted the death sentence to transportation for life, considering the significant time elapsed since the High Court’s order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a stranger in a house cutting jokes with family members constitute grave and sudden provocation under Exception I to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a High Court rely on surmises and speculations to reduce a murder conviction to culpable homicide?
  • Does chasing a victim to a neighbor's house and inflicting multiple injuries indicate premeditated murder rather than a sudden act?
  • Can the Supreme Court restore a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after the High Court has altered it to Section 304?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ vs THE STATE1973 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-18
  capital punishmentmitigating circumstancesyouth as a mitigating factormurderspecial leave to appealdying declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Muhammad Mushtaq, under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Khalid. The core legal question addressed is whether the youth of the petitioner, the alleged absence of premeditation, or vague suggestions of an illicit relation constitute mitigating circumstances sufficient to warrant the substitution of the death sentence with transportation for life. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of additional circumstances—such as acting under a sudden impulse or the influence of elders—youth alone is not a ground for a lesser sentence in a capital offence, especially where the murder was intentional and executed with a firearm. The key principle laid down is that death is the normal sentence for intentional murder, and mitigating circumstances must be concrete and established rather than based on vague hearsay or youth alone.

  Questions settled

  • Does the youth of an offender aged 18 to 20 years warrant a lesser sentence in a capital murder case in the absence of other mitigating factors?
  • Is death the normal penalty for intentional murder under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can vague and hearsay suggestions of motive serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ AND 4 Other vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1973 PLC 102 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-09-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUNAWAR vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 425 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF vs MUHAMMAD FAROOQ AND Another1973 SC M R319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderself-defencebenefit of the doubttrespassacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting the first respondent of murder. The prosecution alleged that the first respondent fatally stabbed the deceased during a second, separate incident hours after an initial altercation over land possession between the accused party and prosecution witnesses. The core legal questions involved determining whether two separate incidents occurred or a single continuous affray, and whether the respondent acted in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established only a single incident wherein the prosecution witnesses and the deceased were aggressors who had criminal-trespassed into the disputed land and inflicted injuries on the accused party, prompting a lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. The appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing that where prosecution witnesses are proved to be aggressors and trespassers and their segregation into two distinct incidents is artificial and unsupported by medical or circumstantial evidence, the accused is entitled to the right of private defence and the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside a conviction for murder on the ground that the incident occurred as a single transaction involving the right of private defence?
  • Does the presence of chyme in the stomach of the deceased conclusively establish the time of death when weighed against other contradictory medical and circumstantial evidence?
  • Can an appellant abandon a criminal appeal by special leave of their own accord without the permission of the court?
  • Whether an accused person is entitled to the right of private defence of person and property when the complainants are proved to be aggressors and trespassers on jointly held land?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHURSHID Alias KHURSHID vs TIE STATE1973 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-29
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyforensic ballisticsabsconsioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave was filed by Muhammad Khurshid against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of death for the murder of his brother Zamurred Khan, which was confirmed by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether the identity of the appellant as the assailant was satisfactorily established by the prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony of the deceased's wife, corroborated by prompt naming of the accused, matching forensic evidence of crime empties with the recovered gun, and the appellant's subsequent absconsion, established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the court held that the calculated and cold-blooded nature of the murder of a brother who had merely admonished the appellant warranted the confirmation of the death penalty, distinguishing precedents involving partial insanity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the identity of an accused in a murder case is sufficiently established by ocular testimony corroborated by forensic firearm matching and absconsion?
  • Does drug addiction and a broken home constitute a mitigating circumstance warranting the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Whether a calculated and cold-blooded murder of a brother for admonishing the assailant justifies the infliction of the death penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs ALAM KHAN AND 4 OTHERS1973 P Cr. L J 559 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 6 AN Others vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 228 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAN vs KHADIWHUSSAIN1973 SCMR 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-20
  evictionrent defaultstriking off defencedeposit of rentbanking hoursnegligenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an eviction proceeding where the Rent Controller directed the tenant (petitioner) to deposit arrears and future monthly rent. The landlord (respondent) subsequently applied to have the tenant's defence struck out due to delayed deposits for two specific months. The Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court concurrently found that the tenant had defaulted. Before the Supreme Court, the tenant argued that the delay was unavoidable because, by the time he obtained the Rent Controller's permission on the due date, banking hours had expired, forcing him to deposit the rent on the following day. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that because the tenant arrived late at court to seek permission despite early court hours, the delay was due to his own negligence and carelessness rather than an unavoidable cause. Consequently, the default did not fall within the protective principle of excusable delay, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in depositing rent is excusable if the tenant fails to obtain the court's deposit permission in a timely manner due to their own late arrival?
  • Does a deposit made on the day following the due date constitute compliance if the delay was caused by the tenant's own avoidable negligence?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default be interfered with if the tenant fails to establish an unavoidable cause for the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 127 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONS AND 4 OTEER1973 PLD Supreme Court 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-09-13
  evacuee propertyallotment orderrent controllerrehabilitation of displaced personspossessiontransfer of propertypreferential right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the transfer of an evacuee house in Karachi, contested between the appellant and respondent No. 5. The core legal question was whether an order passed by a Rent Controller under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947, could be deemed a valid "allotment order" under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether the respondent could claim possession based on such an order. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller’s order was merely an exercise of ordinary rent jurisdiction and not an allotment for the rehabilitation of displaced persons. Consequently, the respondent could not rely on it to establish a preferential right. The Court affirmed that the appellant, holding a valid prior allotment from a competent authority, possessed a superior right to the transfer of the property. The judgment establishes that an order by a Rent Controller does not constitute an "allotment" of evacuee property unless specifically issued for the rehabilitation of displaced persons, and that extended definitions of "possession" cannot override the requirement of a valid order from a competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order passed by a Rent Controller under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947, be treated as a valid allotment order under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does an order of a Rent Controller directing a landlord to let out premises constitute an allotment for the purposes of the rehabilitation of displaced persons?
  • Can a party claim the benefit of an extended definition of possession under government notifications when they hold an allotment order passed by a competent authority on a later date?
  • Does a prior allottee have a preferential right to the transfer of evacuee property over a subsequent claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs Mst. ZUBEIDA KHATOON1973 PLD Karachi 503 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-18
  Family Court appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayguardianshipreasonable diligenceprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a guardianship order passed by a District Judge acting as a Family Court. The core legal question concerns the applicable limitation period for filing an appeal against such orders: whether it is 90 days under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, or 30 days under the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules 1965. The Court held that appeals from Family Courts are governed by the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 and its rules, establishing a 30-day limitation period. Consequently, the appeal was time-barred. The Court further held that an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 requires the appellant to demonstrate reasonable diligence throughout the entire period from the judgment's date until the appeal's filing, rather than merely explaining the days exceeding the limitation period. As the appellant failed to explain the delay or show diligence, the appeal was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for filing an appeal against an order passed by a Family Court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Does the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to appeals from Family Courts?
  • Is an appellant seeking condonation of delay required to explain the entire period of delay or only the period beyond the limitation?
  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 exclude the application of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 regarding the right of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Another1973 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-12-14
  permanent transfer deedcompensation poolsettlement commissioneragreement of associationconstitutional jurisdictiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a disputed shop room under settlement laws, where the petitioner initially obtained a transfer order that was later modified, leading to public auction of the shop and purchase by the petitioner, followed by issuance of a permanent transfer deed and subsequent sale to a second petitioner. Meanwhile, the respondent pursued revision proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner, who set aside the auction purchase and directed the property's transfer to the respondent. The High Court summarily dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition under Article 98, holding that findings of fact by the Settlement Commissioner could not be interfered with. The core legal questions involved whether the issuance of a permanent transfer deed divested settlement authorities of jurisdiction and whether technical irregularities in filing transfer forms should defeat an otherwise valid claim based on an agreement of association. The Supreme Court held that the permanent transfer deed remained subject to pending appeal and revision proceedings, and that substantial justice was done as the claimant was lawfully entitled through association. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a permanent transfer deed deprive settlement authorities of jurisdiction while appeal or revision proceedings are pending?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner in a proceeding under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  • Whether an irregular procedure in filing a C. S. Form defeats a substantive right of transfer based on a valid agreement of association.
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL ALI CHARAN vs PAKPOR CERAMICS LTD.1973 PLD Karachi 491 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-12
  winding upprovisional liquidatorinterim receiveroustershare register rectificationpartnership rulescross-examination on affidavit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a winding-up petition filed by a minority shareholder of a private limited company, who also sought interlocutory relief, including the appointment of an interim receiver or provisional liquidator, and the cross-examination of the company's directors. The petitioner alleged that he was illegally ousted from the management and board of directors, and that he was fraudulently denied the issuance of additional shares to which he was entitled. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's plea of ouster could be sustained in light of President's Order 2 of 1972, whether the word 'held' in Clause 10(a) of the Order refers to disputed shares, and whether the rules governing the appointment of receivers in partnership dissolution suits apply to winding-up petitions of private companies. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the interlocutory applications, holding that under President's Order 2 of 1972, the petitioner stood retired by operation of law and could not claim illegal ouster. The Court ruled that 'held' refers to undisputed shares on the register, and that the partnership rule of appointing a receiver on a plea of exclusion simpliciter cannot be extended to well-run, functioning companies in winding-up proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'held' in Clause 10(a) of President's Order 2 of 1972 include disputed shares that are not entered in the company's register of members?
  • Can the rule from partnership dissolution suits regarding the appointment of an interim receiver on the ground of exclusion be extended to winding-up petitions of private companies?
  • Under what circumstances will a court appoint a provisional liquidator or interim receiver in a winding-up petition of a prosperous, functioning company?
  • Is a party entitled as of right to cross-examine deponents on their affidavits in interlocutory applications under Order XIX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE vs The STATE1973 SCMR 375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-17
  criminal breach of trustpublic servantentrustment of propertyaccomplice testimonyland revenuecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of a judgment by the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioner, a Wasil Baqi Navis (Revenue Accountant), under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code for criminal breach of trust in respect of land revenue collections. The core legal questions involved whether lambardars testifying against the petitioner were accomplices requiring corroboration, and whether an entrustment of funds contrary to the written procedural rules but in line with established departmental practice satisfies the requirement of acting in the capacity of a public servant under section 409. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the lambardars were not accomplices, sufficient corroborative evidence existed to prove entrustment and misappropriation, and the phrase 'in his capacity of a public servant' encompasses entrustments arising from accepted departmental practices associated with the post, not strictly limited to a written charter of duties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether lambardars who hand over collected land revenue to a revenue accountant are to be treated as accomplices whose testimony requires independent corroboration?
  • Does the phrase 'in his capacity of a public servant' under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code relate strictly to a written charter of duties, or does it embrace actions performed in accordance with accepted departmental practices?
  • Can a public servant be held liable for criminal breach of trust under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code when the funds were entrusted to him contrary to the formal written procedure but pursuant to a recognized practice of the office?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 92 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE AND ANOTHER vs Mst. BAKHTAWAR AND Other1973 SCMR 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-08
  civil appealtemporary injunctioninterim arrangementreceiverejectment proceedingsPunjab Tenancy Actrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a revision petition concerning an interim injunction in a property dispute. The underlying dispute relates to agricultural land gifted by the late Khuda Bakhsh to his two sons, the appellants, which gift was challenged by the other excluded heirs in a civil suit on the ground of undue influence. During the pendency of a second appeal in the High Court regarding the validity of the gift, the appellants initiated ejectment proceedings against a tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act. The respondents filed a separate suit challenging the ejectment proceedings and obtained a temporary injunction from the trial Court, which was vacated by the District Judge but restored by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court observed that the core controversy involved interim arrangements for the collection of produce (Batai) during the pending litigation. Holding that the interests of the parties could be equitably protected, the Court disposed of the appeal by allowing the appellants to withdraw their undisputed one-half share of the Batai proceeds, and permitting the respondents to withdraw the remaining half upon furnishing adequate security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure with an order of the District Judge passed with jurisdiction?
  • Can co-owners initiate ejectment proceedings against a tenant without joining other co-owners?
  • What are the principles for making interim arrangements regarding the collection of produce during the pendency of a property suit?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE AND 7 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-1973 P Cr. L J 26 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IKRAM ULLAH vs MUHAMMAD ALAM AND 8 Other1973 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-12
  pre-emptionlimitationfraudregistration of saleagricultural landrevenue records
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the concurrent dismissal of the petitioner's pre-emption suit for possession of agricultural land on the ground of limitation. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act on the ground of alleged fraud preventing knowledge of the sale, and whether mere registration of a sale deed constitutes notice. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by time under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, and that the petitioner failed to plead and establish any particulars of fraud attributable to the vendee regarding the registration or subsequent revenue entries, as the responsibility for updating revenue records rests on official functionaries. The Court ruled that registration operates as notice to all and sundry, and incorrect revenue entries alone do not constitute fraud by the vendee. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether registration of a sale deed operates as notice to all and sundry for the purposes of limitation?
  • Can incorrect entries in revenue records maintained by official functionaries be attributed as fraud on the part of the vendee?
  • Whether a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act without pleading and establishing specific particulars of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IJAZ AHMAD vs THE JOINT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF MINERAL1973 SCMR 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-25
  mining leasecancellation of leasesuspension of mining operationshow-cause noticenatural justiceBaluchistan Mining Concession Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was granted a mining lease for excavating Barytes, which was later extended. Due to local lawlessness, tribal interference, and political conditions, the petitioner suspended mining operations and sought permission to assign the lease. Subsequently, respondent No. 1 issued a show-cause notice accusing the petitioner of suspending operations in violation of rule 47 of the Baluchistan Mining Concession Rules, 1970, and ultimately cancelled the lease without a personal hearing. The petitioner challenged the cancellation before the High Court in a constitutional petition, which was dismissed in limine. Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the only penalty for non-conformance was a fine. The Supreme Court held that under rules 47(a) and 96(1)(iv) of the Baluchistan Mining Concession Rules, 1970, the licensing authority was fully competent to cancel the lease for violation of commencement and operation requirements, and that the authority had acted in accordance with the principles of natural justice by issuing a show-cause notice and considering the explanation provided. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the licensing authority is competent to cancel a mining lease for violating the provisions regarding the commencement of operations under the Baluchistan Mining Concession Rules, 1970?
  • Does the cancellation of a mining lease after issuing a show-cause notice and considering the lessee's explanation satisfy the requirements of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs MESSRS ORGANON (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 57 · Labour Court · 1972-09-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUMAYUN KHAN vs THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 4 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 85 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-02-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HASS AN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-17
  death sentencecommutation of sentencejudicial delaymurderextenuating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged a death sentence for the murder of two sisters, arguing for commutation based on the delay in the disposal of the case by the High Court and alleged mental stress. The petitioner contended that the time elapsed between the occurrence and the confirmation of the death sentence, alongside administrative rules regarding the expedition of sessions cases, warranted leniency. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that administrative rules requiring the expeditious disposal of cases do not authorize the commutation of a death sentence merely due to procedural delays. The Court clarified that there is no general principle of law in Pakistan that mandates the commutation of a death sentence solely on the basis of the time taken for judicial proceedings. The decision to confirm or commute a death sentence must rest on the facts and circumstances of each specific case, and the Court found no extenuating circumstances in this instance to justify reducing the sentence for the deliberate murder of the two victims.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the disposal of a death sentence case by the High Court automatically entitle the condemned person to commutation of the sentence?
  • Are administrative rules requiring the expeditious disposal of sessions cases a valid legal basis for commuting a death sentence?
  • Is there a general principle of law requiring the commutation of a death sentence based solely on the time elapsed during judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 118 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAKIM vs SHER ALAM1973 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-16
  adverse possessionrevenue recordsspecial leave to appealprocedural lawdeclaration of titlehostile possessionEvidence Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for a declaration of title over land, wherein the petitioner claimed ownership through adverse possession. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner had perfected his title by adverse possession and whether the lower courts erred by relying on the petitioner's previous statement without complying with the procedural requirements of Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish adverse possession. The Court affirmed that adverse possession must be open, overt, and hostile to the knowledge of the true owner to perfect title by prescription. Mere entries in revenue records, absent evidence of overt acts of ownership, are insufficient to establish such a claim. Additionally, the Court held that a procedural objection regarding the failure to confront a witness with a previous statement under Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872 cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court if it was not agitated before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a procedural objection regarding Section 145 of the Evidence Act for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  • Is a mere entry in revenue records sufficient to establish adverse possession?
  • What are the essential requirements to establish a claim of adverse possession over land?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAFEEZ CHUGHTAI vs THE STATE AND Another1973 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-01
  territorial jurisdictionquashment of proceedingssecond marriageMuslim Family Laws Ordinancetransfer of casecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which, while quashing proceedings before a Lahore Magistrate due to lack of territorial jurisdiction regarding an alleged second marriage without permission under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, directed that the complaint be forwarded to the competent Magistrate at Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether a complaint instituted in the wrong territorial jurisdiction should be treated as a dead letter or if it could be forwarded to the court of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses ample powers to transfer cases and that the institution of a complaint in an incorrect jurisdiction does not render it a dead letter or invalidate it entirely. The Court laid down the principle that procedural errors regarding territorial jurisdiction do not nullify the complaint itself, and matters of competency and jurisdiction can be raised before the appropriate trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the institution of a criminal complaint in a court lacking territorial jurisdiction render the complaint a dead letter?
  • Can the High Court direct a complaint filed in the wrong jurisdiction to be forwarded to a competent Magistrate for disposal?
  • Can objections regarding the competency of a complaint be raised before the trial Magistrate after transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAFEEZ AND ANOTHER vs Khan SAEED UD DIN KHAN, SETTLEMENT1973 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-18
  Permanent Transfer DeedDisplaced Persons ActSettlement of propertyPendente liteLimitation periodAllottee rightsProperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a property dispute concerning the transfer of a residential portion of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued during the pendency of litigation is immune from challenge, whether an appeal filed against an uncommunicated order is time-barred, and whether an allottee must clear rent arrears to qualify for transfer. The Supreme Court held that a PTD issued while an appeal or revision is pending is subject to the final outcome of those proceedings and is not immune from attack. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an appeal cannot be considered time-barred if the underlying order was never communicated to the affected party. Additionally, the Court clarified that an allottee is not required to clear arrears of rent to be eligible for the transfer of the property. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Settlement Commissioner's decision to transfer the property to the respondent, as the proceedings were conducted according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Permanent Transfer Deed issued during the pendency of an appeal or revision immune from legal challenge?
  • Can an appeal be considered time-barred if the order appealed against was never communicated to the aggrieved party?
  • Is an allottee required to clear arrears of rent to be entitled to the transfer of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• MUHAMMAD FEROZE vs SULTAN BUX AHD Another1973 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-24
  limitationcondonation of delayLetters Patent Appealcertificate of fitnessremand orderspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed with a delay of 199 days, which the petitioner sought to condone citing his physical disability and the engagement of his brother in military service during the 1971 war. The Court found the explanation insufficient, noting a lack of supporting evidence for the alleged disabilities and an unexplained delay in applying for certified copies of the High Court's orders after the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal. On the merits, the petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his Letters Patent Appeal for want of a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The petitioner argued that the appeal before the High Court was a first appeal, not a second appeal, and thus did not require a certificate. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that because the District Judge had allowed the appeal and set aside the lower court's judgment, the subsequent appeal to the High Court was indeed subject to the certificate requirement under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The petition was dismissed on both limitation and merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent required for an appeal against an order of remand where the District Judge has allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's judgment?
  • Does a delay of 199 days in filing a petition for special leave to appeal warrant condonation based solely on the petitioner's uncorroborated assertion of disability and the military engagement of his representative?
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• MUHAMMAD DIN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR DIVISION, PESHAWAR AND Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-11
  displaced personspublic auctioncancellation of auctioncompensation bookdefault in paymentconstitution petitionsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant's constitution petition concerning the transfer of shops in Peshawar Cantonment. The appellant, a displaced person, offered the highest bid at a public auction but failed to deposit the mandatory twenty-five percent of the bid money and subsequent instalments, as his compensation book balance was insufficient. Consequently, the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner cancelled the auction and transferred the property to another party, an action upheld by the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner had the jurisdiction to cancel the auction and whether such action was restricted solely to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the relevant statutory schedule. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner, acting as Chairman of the Auction Committee and under the terms and conditions prescribed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was fully competent to cancel the auction upon the buyer's default. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities possess the inherent power to enforce auction conditions and cancel transfers to defaulting purchasers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner is competent to cancel a property auction for failure to pay the bid money or whether such action can only be taken by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can a successful auction bidder maintain a challenge against the cancellation of a provisional transfer order when they have defaulted on the mandatory deposit requirements?
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• MUHAMMAD BIBI AND 2 Other vs ABDUL GHANI AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 444 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-20
  consent orderadministration suitinherent jurisdictionfraud on the courtcompromise decreeLetters Patent AppealCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application to modify a consent order passed in a Letters Patent Appeal arising from an administration suit. The core legal questions addressed were the circumstances and procedures under which a court may recall, vary, or modify a consent order or compromise decree. The Court held that a consent order is as binding as a judgment on contest and can only be set aside or varied on grounds that would invalidate a contract, such as fraud, mistake, or coercion. A crucial distinction was established: if fraud is played upon the Court, the order may be recalled in the same proceedings via inherent jurisdiction; however, if fraud is played upon a party, the aggrieved party must institute a separate suit. The Court further ruled that mere inconvenience or difficulty in complying with the terms of a consent order does not constitute a valid ground for variation. Consequently, the application for modification was dismissed, save for a minor amendment regarding the scope of the receiver, which was permitted solely because the appellants consented to it.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a court recall or modify a consent order or compromise decree?
  • Is a separate suit required to set aside a consent order obtained by fraud played upon a party?
  • Does mere inconvenience or difficulty in complying with a consent order constitute a valid ground for its variation?
  • Can a court exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to recall a consent order obtained by fraud played upon the Court?
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• MUHAMMAD BEG AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN AND Other1973 PLD Azad J & K 71 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1973-04-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs NIZAM DIN AND 4 Other1973 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-11
  evacuee propertyjoint allotmentconstructive possessionindustrial premisespartnership businessDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order concerning the transfer of an evacuee industrial premises. The petitioner and respondent were joint allottees of the property and partners in a business conducted therein. The core legal question was whether the respondent, having been ousted from the partnership business, had also lost 'possession' of the premises, thereby disqualifying them from a joint transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's ouster from the partnership business did not equate to an abandonment of the joint allotment of the premises. The Court reasoned that the joint allotment remained intact and the business operated as a licensee under both allottees; thus, the respondent maintained constructive possession. The Court affirmed that a partner ousted from a business is not necessarily ousted from the possession of the building itself, and dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the contention that the respondent had abandoned the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ouster from a partnership business conducted on allotted premises constitute an abandonment of the possession of the premises themselves?
  • Can a co-allottee be considered in possession of industrial premises for the purposes of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 if they are excluded from the business conducted therein?
  • Does the term 'possession' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include constructive possession?
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• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 685 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1973 PLC 365 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-12-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others1973 P Cr. L J 379 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs HASHMAT ALI AND 6 OTHERS1973 P Cr. L J 371 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND ANOTHER vs CHAIRMAN, PAKISTAN RAILWAY BOARD, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 26 · Labour Court · 1972-09-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM Alias AUCHHU AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 263 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND 2 Others vs MUHAMMAD USMAN Arm 8 Other1973 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-23
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitionsettlement schemeNCH formtransfer of propertynatural justiceright of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a constitutional petition filed by the respondents as successors-in-interest of Chhotey Khan and remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to properly dispose of an NCH form filed by Chhotey Khan. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly set aside the transfer of a property made in favour of the petitioners' predecessor without deciding Chhotey Khan's pending NCH form or affording him an opportunity of being heard, and whether rent receipts established a landlord-tenant relationship creating an estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded the NCH form had not been disposed of in accordance with law since the rejection order was never communicated to Chhotey Khan, and the alleged rent receipts were unreliable. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an administrative or settlement order adversely affecting a party's rights is legally ineffective if never communicated, and disposal of property rights without affording a hearing violates fundamental principles of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative order rejecting a settlement form is legally effective when it is never communicated to the affected party?
  • Does the failure to afford an opportunity of being heard before transferring a disputed property to another party vitiate the transfer order?
  • Can successors-in-interest be estopped from challenging a property transfer on the basis of alleged rent receipts where the landlord-tenant relationship has been expressly denied?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHIQ vs SUPERINTENDENT. OF DARUL AMAN, LAHORE AND 31973 P Cr. L J 79 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-08
  habeas corpusillegal detentioncustody of wifevalid marriagepubertyDarul Amanabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a habeas corpus application under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 filed by Muhammad Ashiq for the recovery and release of his wife, Mst. Safia Akhtar, from Darul Aman. The petitioner was accused of abducting the detenu under sections 363 and 366 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the detenu maintained before the court that she was sui juris, had attained puberty, had contracted a valid marriage with the petitioner of her own free will, and desired to live with him. The core legal question was whether a magistrate has the lawful authority to detain an adult female witness in Darul Aman against her will when she claims to be validly married and wishes to accompany her husband. The Lahore High Court held that the magistrate's order detaining the detenu in Darul Aman was wholly unwarranted and illegal, as a witness cannot be treated as a chattel or detained without statutory backing. The court established that a Muslim female who has attained puberty and contracted a marriage of her own free will is entitled to the custody of her husband, and a pending criminal investigation does not justify her illegal confinement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a magistrate has the legal authority to send a witness or alleged abductee to Darul Aman for detention against her will?
  • Is a Muslim marriage contracted after attaining puberty valid under Islamic law notwithstanding pending criminal proceedings regarding abduction?
  • Who is entitled to the custody of an adult female who has contracted a valid marriage of her own free will?
  • Can an adult female witness be detained in institutional custody instead of executing a bond for appearance?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-01
  coram non judiceHigh Court RulesSingle JudgeDivision Benchprocedural irregularityjurisdictionmurderself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted of murder for stabbing a victim with a knife during a quarrel originating from political rivalry. He was sentenced to transportation for life. After his initial appeal was heard and dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court, and special leave to appeal was denied by the Supreme Court, the appellant filed a fresh appeal in the High Court contending that under the High Court Rules, appeals involving life imprisonment were required to be heard by a Division Bench. A Division Bench dismissed the appeal, holding the prior judgment was not without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to determine whether a hearing by a Single Judge in breach of High Court practice rules renders the proceedings coram non judice or a nullity. The Supreme Court held that statutory appellate jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court as a institution under Section 410 of the Cr.P.C., not on individual Benches. Procedural rules regulating Bench constitution do not divide or restrict basic statutory jurisdiction; thus, non-compliance constitutes a procedural irregularity rather than a jurisdictional failure. Examining the merits, the Court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the hearing of a criminal appeal by a Single Judge in violation of High Court Rules requiring a Division Bench render the judgment coram non judice and a nullity?
  • Does a litigant have a vested right to have an appeal heard by a Bench consisting of a specific number of judges?
  • Does a failure to observe internal practice rules framed under statutory or constitutional powers divest a High Court of its inherent statutory jurisdiction?
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• MUHAMMAD AQIL vs Messrs PAKISTAN PAPER PRODUCTS LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 59 · Labour Court · 1972-09-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs Sheikh QURBAN ALI AND 3 OTHERSr1973 P Cr. L J 882 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-04
  transfer of criminal casesjudicial inquiryexecutive inquirymagisterial inquirySection 176 CrPCSection 526 CrPCapprehension of bias
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two transfer petitions filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the petitioner, seeking the transfer of a private complaint inquiry under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and an inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 pending before a First Class Magistrate. The respondents raised preliminary objections asserting that proceedings under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were purely executive in nature and that Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not apply to such proceedings. The High Court rejected these arguments, holding that an inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is a judicial proceeding conducted by a subordinate judicial court, making revision and transfer petitions competent under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Finding that the Magistrate's conduct created an impression of non-compliance with law, the High Court directed the District Magistrate to conduct both inquiries himself or transfer them to another Senior Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Is an inquiry conducted by a Magistrate under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a judicial proceeding amenable to the transfer jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of specific procedural provisions under Section 526(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 deprive the High Court of its jurisdiction to transfer an inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court order the transfer of a magisterial inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the Magistrate's conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the proceedings are not being conducted in accordance with law?
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• MUHAMMAD AMIR vs RAFIQ HUSSAIN AND 3 others--1973 P Cr. L J 394 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMINUDDIN vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 5 Other1973 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-17
  displaced personevacuee propertylocus standisettlement operationstransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution, thereby maintaining the cancellation of the transfer of an evacuee house to the appellant and its transfer to the respondents instead. The core legal questions involved were whether the appellant qualified as a displaced person under section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether respondent No. 5 had the locus standi to challenge the transfer in appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, who maintained a permanent home, family, and ties in Lahore while serving in Delhi and failed to prove he was displaced due to the Partition disturbances, was not a 'displaced person' within the meaning of the Act. The Court further held that respondent No. 5, being a claimant displaced person in possession of part of the property who submitted a duly entertained claim form, possessed the requisite locus standi. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government servant who served in Delhi prior to Partition but maintained permanent family ties and a residence in Lahore qualifies as a 'displaced person' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does a claimant in possession who files a claim form pursuant to an order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner have the locus standi to maintain an appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee house?
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• MUHAMMAD YAR vs THB STATE1973 P Cr. L J 13 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-16Read full judgment →