Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MUHAMMAD AMIN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 661 · Sindh High Court · 1973-06-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This bail application under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was moved by the applicant seeking anticipatory bail before arrest in respect of a criminal complaint filed against him at Lahore under sections 363 and 366 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to a person residing within its territorial jurisdiction against whom warrants of arrest have been issued by a court located in a different province. The court held that the High Court possesses jurisdiction under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant interim bail and protection to an applicant residing within its territorial limits before the execution of warrants issued by an external court. The key principle laid down is that the general powers of the High Court to grant bail and protect personal liberty remain intact unless specifically curtailed by the legislature, and the High Court can examine the validity or propriety of warrants and grant relief to prevent harassment and abuse of process.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to a person residing within its territorial limits against whom warrants of arrest have been issued by a court in another province?
- Can the High Court examine the validity of a warrant of arrest issued by a court outside its provincial jurisdiction?
- Do the provisions of section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower the High Court to grant interim protection before the execution of an external warrant?
- MUHAMMAD AMIN vs GUJRANWALA CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK1973 PLC 164 · Labour Court · 1975-11-27Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ALLAHWARAYO PANHWAR vs The STATE1973 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioner, a Junior Store Keeper, was convicted by the Special Judge under section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for the misappropriation of petrol, and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, raising a new contention for the first time that the investigation was conducted by an Inspector instead of a D.S.P., thereby vitiating the trial. The Supreme Court held that an objection to the validity of the investigation must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity before the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time before the apex court, particularly when no prejudice has been shown by the petitioner. Consequently, the Court found no sufficient ground to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can an objection regarding the validity of an investigation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Does an investigation conducted by an Inspector instead of a D.S.P. automatically vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice?
- What is the effect of failing to object to the mode of investigation at the earliest possible opportunity during trial?
- MUHAMMAD Alias MAMMI vs PUNJAB PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH ADDITIONAL HOME SECRETARY AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition against the petitioner's conviction for murder under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963. The petitioner, convicted by a Tribunal and sentenced to 14 years rigorous imprisonment, argued that his conviction was unsustainable because he was not named in the First Information Report and the circumstantial evidence was inconclusive. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere in the conviction when there was some evidence connecting the petitioner to the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted properly in dismissing the writ petition. The Court reasoned that it was not sitting as an appellate court to re-weigh the sufficiency of evidence; rather, it only needed to determine if there was some evidence to support the conviction. Since the Tribunal had evidence of an extra-judicial confession and incriminating recoveries, the conviction was upheld. The key principle established is that in writ jurisdiction, the court does not re-evaluate evidence but merely ensures there is some evidence to connect the accused to the crime.
Questions settled- Does the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, have the authority to re-evaluate the sufficiency of evidence used to convict an accused in proceedings under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963?
- Is a conviction sustainable if there is some evidence connecting the accused to the crime, even if the accused was not named in the First Information Report?
- Can a Tribunal constituted under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963, act upon joint confessional statements and circumstantial evidence?
- MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 63 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ALI vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI AND Another1973 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns the conviction of the appellant under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 1947 for depositing funds into the bank account of an individual allegedly residing outside Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established that the recipient was a 'person resident outside Pakistan' as defined by the Act and the relevant State Bank of Pakistan notification. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to provide evidence that the recipient had established residence abroad, noting that a mere casual visit does not constitute residence. The Court emphasized that 'residence' requires an animus manendi—an intention to stay for a period. Furthermore, the Court ruled that as a penal statute, the Act must be interpreted strictly, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. Because the prosecution relied on assumptions rather than proving the essential ingredients of the offense, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, with the Court affirming that administrative notifications cannot expand the scope of penal provisions beyond the statute's authority.
Questions settled- What constitutes 'residence' for the purposes of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 1947?
- Must the prosecution prove the essential ingredients of an offense under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 1947 rather than relying on assumptions?
- How should penal statutes be interpreted when there is ambiguity regarding the scope of an offense?
- Can an administrative notification issued by the State Bank of Pakistan expand the scope of a penal statute beyond its original authority?
- MUHAMMAD ALI AND 3 Others vs AMIR HASAN SIDDIQUI AND ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 132 · Sindh High Court · 1973-08-08Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ALI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1973 P Cr. L J 529 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-27Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD AKBAR vs THE STATE1973 PLD Azad J & K 7 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-02-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1973 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arises out of a dispute over the auction of two adjacent garages, initially purchased separately by the deceased respondent and the appellant at an open auction. After concurrent findings by the Settlement authorities and the High Court against the appellant, leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case, as a preliminary objection was raised establishing that the respondent had passed away during the pendency of the proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner, and his legal representatives were not brought on record in a timely manner. The Court held that all proceedings conducted against a deceased party without bringing their legal representatives on record are null and void. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this preliminary ground.
Questions settled- Are proceedings conducted against a dead person without bringing legal representatives on record null and void?
- Whether an appeal can be dismissed on a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of proceedings against a deceased party?
- MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA1973 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-06-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court regarding the transfer of two shops under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner sought the transfer of a shop based on an allotment order, claiming possession. Settlement authorities, however, found that neither the petitioner nor his son were in possession of the property immediately before the prescribed date of 20th December 1958, leading to the cancellation of the transfer. The petitioner contended that possession under the Act included constructive possession through a tenant and that the authorities failed to properly assess the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities had reached a clear, evidence-based finding of fact regarding the lack of possession. The Court affirmed that 'possession' under Section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, does not include constructive possession through a tenant. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower authorities.
Questions settled- Does the definition of 'possession' under Section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include constructive possession through a tenant?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by Settlement authorities regarding possession of property?
- Does a notice issued under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 establish entitlement to the transfer of a property?
- MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH vs MUHAMMAD SAPDAR KHAN AND Another1973 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-01-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had acquitted the respondents of murder and rioting charges under Sections 148, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents had ambushed and shot the deceased following political rivalry and a physical altercation. The High Court, however, found the prosecution's version improbable, noting that the accused side had sustained far more numerous and serious injuries than the complainant party, and concluded that the accused acted in self-defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, while disagreeing with some of the High Court's findings regarding the investigation and the recovery of the weapon, held that an incomplete dying declaration is inadmissible in evidence. It further ruled that where both parties suppress the truth, the court must carefully sift the evidence. Given the extensive injuries on the accused, the Supreme Court affirmed that the respondent had a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt and acted within his right of private defence. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a dying declaration that is incomplete on its face admissible in evidence?
- How should a court approach a criminal case where both the prosecution and the defence have suppressed the truth regarding the origin of the fight?
- Can the right of private defence be successfully pleaded if the accused fired a lethal weapon resulting in death, where the accused party sustained far more numerous and serious injuries than the complainant party?
- MUHAMMAD ABBAS vs The STATE1973 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-05Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had reduced the appellant's sentence from two years' rigorous imprisonment to six months' rigorous imprisonment under section 5 (2) of Act II of 1947 (Prevention of Corruption Act). The core legal question was whether there was any connection between the incident of the preceding day regarding the alleged bribery and the subsequent trap incident on the next day, and whether the joint trial vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the two incidents constituted separate transactions, that the case was not covered by section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or section 6 of the Evidence Act 1872, and that the joint trial seriously prejudiced the appellant, which irregularity was incurable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the proceedings were quashed and the conviction set aside, while leaving it open for a separate trial or disciplinary action.
Questions settled- Whether two separate incidents occurring on different days can be treated as part of the same transaction for the purpose of a joint trial?
- Does a misjoinder of accused persons cause serious prejudice not curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Are distinct transactions involving separate demands of bribe covered under section 6 of the Evidence Act 1872?
- MUBARIK ALI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 240 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-11Read full judgment →
- Mst. ZOHRA BAI Alias FATMA SUGHRA vs THE STATE AHD ANOTHERs1973 P Cr. L J 317 · Sindh High Court · 1972-07-25Read full judgment →
- Mst. THARI vs MOHAMMAD AND 2 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan acquitting the first two respondents of an offence under Section 419 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with a fraudulent land mutation. The core legal question concerns whether procuring personation before a revenue officer in mutation proceedings constitutes the offence of cheating under Section 415 and 419 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the revenue officer suffers no personal harm or loss. The Supreme Court held that since no direct deception was practiced on the true owner and the revenue officer suffered no bodily, mental, pecuniary, or reputational harm, the offence of cheating is not made out under the restrictive wording of Section 415. However, invoking the overriding powers under Section 6(4) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958, the Court altered the conviction to one for fabricating false evidence under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that where an accused brings into existence false circumstances before a public servant in non-judicial proceedings to influence an erroneous opinion, it amounts to fabricating false evidence, though legislative amendment is urgently required to cure the narrow definition of cheating under Section 415.
Questions settled- Does procuring personation before a revenue officer during mutation proceedings constitute cheating under Section 415 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the revenue officer suffers no personal harm?
- Can a Special Judge convict an accused of an offence not specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958?
- Whether the provisions of Sections 237 and 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 restrict the powers of a Special Judge under Section 6(4) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958?
- Is a complaint in writing from a revenue officer required under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for taking cognizance of fabricating false evidence committed in mutation proceedings?
- Mst. SHAFIQAN vs SUBA KHAN AND 2 Other1973 SCMR 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-07Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Lahore High Court confirming pre-arrest bail granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were accused of the murder of the appellant's husband. The core legal question was whether bail was granted to the respondents on sound judicial principles. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to apply its mind properly to the facts and issued a non-speaking order that provided no reasons for confirming the bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. The key principle laid down is that an order granting or confirming bail must be a speaking order supported by proper judicial reasoning addressing the facts of the case.
Questions settled- Whether an order granting or confirming bail must be a speaking order containing reasons?
- Can an appellate court set aside a bail order that fails to apply judicial mind to the facts of the case?
- Mst. SAHI BI vs KHALID HUSSAIN AND 6 Other1973 SCMR 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the High Court passed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the High Court handed over the custody of an adult woman (sui juris) to her husband against her express wishes and provided police assistance for that purpose. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a court exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can compel an adult woman to accompany or live with her husband contrary to her desires. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under Islamic law and Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a sui juris woman cannot be forced to live with her husband against her will. The Court ruled that when an adult detenu is unwilling to go with her husband, the only jurisdiction the court possesses is to set her at liberty and allow her to move freely.
Questions settled- Can a court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 compel an adult sui juris woman to live with or accompany her husband against her wishes?
- What is the extent of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an adult detenu is produced before it?
- Whether allegations that an adult woman might lead an immoral life justify denying her liberty under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Mst. REHMAT BIBI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 246 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. RAFIA SULTANA AND 2 Other -- vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 3 Other1973 PLD Karachi 198 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. RAFIA SAJJAD HUSSAIN vs FAYYAZ KHAN AND 4 OTHERS1973 P Cr. L J 75 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-02Read full judgment →
- Mst. QUDSIA BEGUM vs YOUNUS KHAN AND 4 Other Opponents1973 PLD Karachi 636 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-30Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a running down action filed under the Fatal Accidents Act by the widow of a deceased pedestrian/passenger who died following a road accident. The deceased was standing on the foot-board of a stationary tram-car when a bus, driven rashly and negligently by the second defendant and owned by the first defendant, struck him while attempting to overtake and turn. The defendants contended that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence by standing on the foot-board. The High Court of Sindh held that because the tram-car was stationary and the bus came from behind, the bus driver had the last opportunity to avoid the accident, thereby defeating the defense of contributory negligence. Applying established principles of pecuniary loss, the Court determined the deceased's age, income, and a conservative life expectancy of 60 years in Pakistan. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff and her minor children, apportioning liability between the owner, driver, and the insurer up to its statutory limit.
Questions settled- Whether the defense of contributory negligence is available to a defendant if they had the last opportunity to avoid the accident?
- What is the judicially accepted normal life expectancy in Pakistan for calculating compensation in fatal accident cases?
- Can a statutory insurer's liability be limited to a specific statutory amount in a third-party fatal accident claim?
- Mst. QAMAR SULTANA vs Mian QHULAM YAQOOB BANDAI AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Peshawar 116 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-04-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. NAJABUN NISA AND Others vs MUHAMMAD YASIN AND Other1973 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural lands allotted to Mst. Janatun Nisa as an evacuee property owner, who passed away on 12th January 1963. The core legal question concerned whether Mst. Janatun Nisa held the lands as a full owner or a limited owner, and whether mutation proceedings could be examined by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which relied on the precedent in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi and others, holding that the deceased's interest in the confirmed lands remained that of a limited owner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the restoration of the Assistant Commissioner's mutation order treating her as a limited owner, and noting that mutations that attained finality without appeal or revision could not be challenged for the first time in the High Court.
Questions settled- Whether a female allottee of evacuee land holds the property as a full owner or a limited owner?
- Can a mutation order that attained finality without appeal or revision be challenged for the first time in the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction?
- Mst. MEHRUN NISA BEGUM vs SECRETARY, EVACUEE TRUST BOARD AND Other1973 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the legal status of an urban property in Hyderabad claimed to be evacuee trust property. The core legal question is whether a charitable trust created by a will dated September 6, 1909, validly came into existence despite the failure to execute a conditional direction to sell a portion of the property. The Supreme Court held that the trust was validly established and not contingent upon the partial sale of the property, thus confirming the property's status as evacuee trust property outside the compensation pool. The key principle laid down is that the failure to fulfill a subsidiary directive in a testamentary trust does not invalidate the primary charitable trust once it has legally come into existence.
Questions settled- Whether a charitable trust created by a will fails if a subsidiary direction concerning a portion of the property is not executed?
- Does evacuee trust property form part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Mst. MARYAM BIBI vs MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM AND ANOTHER1973SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-05-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of evacuee property between a non-claimant displaced person and a claimant. The property was initially transferred to the appellant by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, but through successive appellate and revisional proceedings, the Settlement Commissioner eventually transferred the whole house to the respondent on the ground that it was too small to divide and the respondent had a preferential right as a claimant. A writ petition and subsequent Letters Patent Appeal challenging this order were dismissed by the High Court. Leave was granted to examine whether the Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to revise an order regarding the divisibility of premises passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner exercising delegated powers. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the amendment of section 31(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 by the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1965, and the validating provisions therein, orders passed under delegated powers were subject to appeal and revision, rendering the Settlement Commissioner's revision competent. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by a Settlement Authority in exercise of delegated powers from the Chief Settlement Commissioner is subject to appeal and revision?
- What is the effect of the amendment introduced by the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1965 on orders passed under delegated powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Mst. MAHMOODA BEGUM vs Mst. MAHMOODA JAN1973 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent against the petitioner under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the ground of personal requirement. The Rent Controller directed the petitioner-tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future monthly rent under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, though this order was passed after the framing of issues. The tenant challenged the order through an appeal and a second appeal, both of which were dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the deposit provision applies to ejectment petitions based on personal requirement rather than default, and whether the Rent Controller loses jurisdiction to order the deposit of rent if not done before framing issues. The Court held that section 13(6) applies to all proceedings under section 13, including those for personal requirement, and that the Rent Controller's omission to pass the order before framing issues does not divest him of jurisdiction to rectify the procedural defect subsequently, as the provision is intended for the landlord's benefit. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 regarding the deposit of rent apply to ejectment proceedings initiated on the ground of personal requirement?
- Does a Rent Controller lose jurisdiction to direct a tenant to deposit arrears and future rent under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 if the order is not passed before the framing of issues?
- Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LANDS), SARGODHA1973 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a writ petition against an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute relates to agricultural land allotments following the death of the original refugee right-holder, Mst. Rashidan, prior to allotment. Her successors, including the appellant Mst. Khurshid Begum, obtained separate allotments based on mutation of inheritance. A respondent applied to cancel the allotments and later sought revision against an order permitting the appellant to retain an excess area upon payment of price. The Settlement Commissioner reopened past allotments made years prior, holding they should have been made jointly in the name of the deceased right-holder first. The core legal questions concern the legality of reopening final allotment orders through suo motu revision beyond limitation and the proper procedure for allocating land to successors of a deceased refugee right-holder. The Supreme Court held that final allotments cannot be reopened beyond the statutory limitation period and that the Rehabilitation Scheme contemplates allotments directly to successors individually according to their shares rather than to a deceased person. The appeal is allowed and the case remanded.
Questions settled- Whether past allotment orders that have attained finality under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 can be reopened in suo motu revision beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
- Does the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme contemplate making land allotments in the name of a deceased right-holder prior to mutation in favour of successors?
- Can a revisional authority set aside previous final allotments when the revision petition is strictly confined to challenging a subsequent order regarding the retention of an excess area?
- Mst. KHAIRUN NISA vs Sayed ABDUR RAHIM1973 PLD Karachi 237 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-24Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an application filed by a wife seeking the transfer of a family suit for conjugal rights from Karachi to Shahdadpur, alongside a pending custody suit involving their minor child. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to transfer a case from a Family Court in light of Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, whether supervisory constitutional jurisdiction permits such a transfer, and the proper determination of territorial jurisdiction under Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules. The court held that Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act excludes the application of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, expressed doubt regarding whether supervisory jurisdiction includes the power of transfer, and found that the Karachi court possessed proper territorial jurisdiction since the cause of action arose and the parties last resided there, rejecting the argument that a wife's subsequent independent residence shifts jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed on merits without orders as to costs.
Questions settled- Does Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act exclude the application of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to family court proceedings?
- Whether the High Court has the power to transfer a case pending before a Family Court under its constitutional supervisory jurisdiction?
- Does the territorial jurisdiction of a Family Court under Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules shift based on the subsequent residence of the wife?
- Mst. KANEEZ FATIMA vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (WITH THE POWERS OF CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD DIVISION) AND 4 Other'1973 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises out of a property dispute concerning the transfer of an evacuee house under settlement laws. The core legal questions involve determining the exact portion of the disputed building transferred to the respondent via settlement documents, whether the appellant was legally precluded from seeking transfer of the portion in her possession due to prior participation in an earmarking scheme, and the validity of the transfer of the appellant's portion to another party without notice. The Supreme Court held that the portion in the appellant's possession was never legally transferred to the respondent, that the appellant had validly abandoned her application under the earmarking scheme before participating in the draw, and that the administrative orders transferring her portion were issued without legal authority. The Court laid down that a claimant's choice to abandon an earmarking application in favor of a settlement form is permissible where no drawing of lots has occurred, and that the arbitrary denial of a divisible residential unit to a long-standing occupant is contrary to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958.
Questions settled- Whether filing an application under the earmarking scheme irrevocably precludes a claimant from subsequently filing a C H form for the property in their possession?
- Does a settlement authority have the legal authority to include a portion of a building in a P.T.O. issued to another party without notice to the actual occupant in possession?
- What constitutes a separate residential unit capable of division under section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Mst. IRSHAD BEGUM vs NAZIR AHMAD AHD ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 122 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. HAMIDA vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Karachi 478 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to quash criminal proceedings pending before the City Magistrate, Nawabshah. The complainant (husband) had filed a complaint against his wife (the petitioner) and her relatives, alleging theft, wrongful confinement, and enticement, instituted over three years after the wife had left him and initiated divorce proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A to quash criminal proceedings where the allegations, though technically constituting an offence on their face, are transparently dishonest, groundless, and designed to harass. The High Court held that Section 561-A is not restricted to cases where the allegations fail to disclose an offence; it extends to preventing an abuse of the process of the court and securing the ends of justice where a prosecution cannot possibly succeed. Finding the complaint to be a retaliatory, stereotyped concoction, the Court quashed the entire proceedings against both the petitioner and her co-accused.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise its inherent power under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings even if the allegations on their face constitute an offence?
- Does a highly delayed and apparently concocted criminal complaint filed by a husband against his estranged wife and her relatives constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
- Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings against non-party co-accused under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the case against them is inseparable from that of the petitioner?
- Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs ABDUL GHANI AND Another1973SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property between two claimants, the petitioner (wife of an allottee) and the respondent. The core legal questions were whether an allotment order relates back to the date of original possession for the purpose of determining seniority, and whether the wife of an allottee qualifies as a direct claimant or an indirect claimant under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that where a claim is based on an allotment order, the date of that order determines seniority, and it does not relate back to the date of original possession. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a wife occupying premises through her husband is not in occupation in her own right but as a licensee; thus, she is an indirect claimant. The Court concluded that the Central Government notification granting rights to spouses applies only to spouses of 'authorised occupants' (allottees). Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that seniority for direct claimants is fixed by the date of the allotment order, not the date of initial possession.
Questions settled- Does an allotment order for evacuee property relate back to the date of original possession for the purpose of determining seniority?
- Is the wife of an allottee considered a direct claimant or an indirect claimant under settlement laws?
- Does the Central Government notification regarding spouses of authorised occupants apply to spouses of persons in unauthorised possession?
- Mst. FARHAT FATIMAH SHAH vs NADEEM ASLAM SHAH AND 2 OTHERS1973 P Cr. L J 61 · Sindh High Court · 1972-04-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. EIDUN NISA BEGUM vs MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST1973 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-07-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This writ petition challenged an order by the Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, which cancelled several gift mutations of land in favor of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the administrative permission granted by the Deputy Land Commissioner to gift land under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, constituted a completed gift, and whether mutations attested after the donor's death were valid. The Court held that the petition was meritless. It ruled that administrative permission to gift land under the Regulation does not equate to a completed gift. Under Mahomedan Law, a valid gift requires three essentials: an unequivocal declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee, and the delivery of possession, all of which must occur during the donor's lifetime. The Court emphasized that the donor's conduct, including previous refusals to gift, indicated no intention to complete the gift. Consequently, mutations attested after the donor's death could not validate an incomplete gift. The Court affirmed that delivery of possession remains a necessary condition for a valid gift, even between spouses.
Questions settled- Does administrative permission to gift land under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation constitute a completed gift?
- Are the three essentials of a gift under Mahomedan Law—declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession—required even when the donor and donee are husband and wife?
- Can a gift mutation be validly attested after the death of the donor if the gift was not completed during the donor's lifetime?
- Does a mere proposal to gift land in a declaration form under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation amount to an unequivocal declaration of gift?
- Mst. BIBI FATIMA AND Ormas vs SAADULLAH KHAN AND Other1973 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment modifying the inheritance shares of the petitioners, Mst. Bibi Fatima and Mst. Anwar Bibi, in the estate of one Akbar Khan, who died in 1911. The dispute involved complex historical mutations of property among the deceased's widows, daughters, and brother, governed by custom. The core legal question was whether the determination of shares in a previous declaratory suit (Suit No. 96 of 1953) between the same parties regarding the same subject matter precluded the re-litigation of those shares in the present proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that counsel for the petitioners had conceded that the judgment in the 1953 suit operated as res judicata. Consequently, the Court held that the parties were bound by the previous adjudication of their respective shares. The Court affirmed that where parties have previously litigated the same issue of inheritance shares, the principle of res judicata applies, barring further dispute on the matter. Finding no question of law of general public importance, the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a previous judgment in a declaratory suit regarding inheritance shares operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation between the same parties?
- Can a party challenge the determination of inheritance shares on appeal when their counsel has conceded that the issue was settled by a prior judgment between the same parties?
- Mst. BEGUM BIBI AND Another vs Mst. GOHRAN AND Another1973 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition arises from a civil dispute regarding the alienation of land by a widow who inherited a life estate under custom. Shera died in 1946 leaving property mutated in the names of his widows as a life estate. One widow gifted the land to her eldest daughter, excluding her other two daughters, who subsequently filed a declaratory suit challenging the alienation. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate and revisional courts affirmed the decision. The core legal question was whether the widow was competent under Customary Law to make the disputed gift. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under the relevant Customary Law of Gujrat District, a widow holding a life estate cannot alienate the property by gift unless she is advanced in years with no likelihood of remarriage and the transfer is made to eligible persons, conditions which were not met in this case. The key principle laid down is that a widow's power to alienate her husband's property by gift under custom is strictly circumscribed by specific conditions regarding her age and the identity of the transferee.
Questions settled- Whether a widow holding a life estate under customary law is competent to alienate her husband's property by deed of gift?
- What are the conditions under which a widow can alienate property by gift according to the Riwaj-i-Am of Gujrat District?
- Can a widow transfer property by gift to any of her daughters when the custom restricts such transfers to specific persons?
- Mst. BASHIR BIBI vs AMINUDDIN AND 9 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arises out of an order passed in a pending administration suit regarding the production of evidence by the appellant. The trial court directed the appellant to serve two witnesses on her own responsibility as a last opportunity, and subsequently refused to summon them through court process when service failed. The appellant's revision petition was dismissed by the High Court, though it granted a final opportunity for self-production. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether there is any sanction in law for directing a party to produce its evidence on its own responsibility under pain of having it shut out. The Supreme Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize forcing a party to produce witnesses at its own peril or refusing court processes for summoning witnesses, especially when a witness had been previously bound down by the court. The Court ruled that the trial court must utilize its coercive machinery to procure the attendance of material witnesses, and allowed the appeal accordingly.
Questions settled- Is there any sanction in law under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for placing the responsibility on a party to produce its evidence on pain of shutting it out?
- Can a trial court refuse to issue court processes for summoning witnesses merely because a party failed to effect service through dasti summons?
- What is the legal duty of a court when a witness who was previously bound down by the court fails to attend the hearing?
- Mst. BABARA AND OTHERS vs ABDUL AKBAR AND Other1973 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed a decree for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey land. The core legal question was whether the first appellate court erred in refusing to allow the petitioners to introduce expert evidence for the comparison of thumb impressions on a disputed document, after failing to raise such a request during the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that the petitioners failed to seek the comparison of thumb impressions during the trial stage and did not file a formal application for such evidence in the first appellate court. Consequently, they could not claim a right to introduce expert evidence at the appellate stage. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower appellate court and the High Court, establishing the principle that a party cannot seek to introduce new evidence or expert opinion on appeal when they failed to pursue such opportunities during the trial, especially in the absence of a formal application.
Questions settled- Can a party introduce expert evidence for the comparison of thumb impressions at the appellate stage if they failed to request such evidence during the trial?
- Does the failure to file a formal application for expert evidence in the first appellate court preclude a party from challenging the refusal of such evidence in a higher court?
- Is a concurrent finding of fact by the first appellate court and the High Court sufficient to deny leave to appeal in a civil suit?
- Mst. AYESHA BAI vs Mst. MOMIN BAI1973 PLD Karachi 419 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. ALAM KHATOON AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 757 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-29Read full judgment →
- Mrs. SHIREEN GARDEZI vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMIS SIONER, LAHORE DIVISION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Lahore 224 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-25Read full judgment →
- Mrs. NUSRAT AZIZ vs THE MEDICAL. SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., QUETTA AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 142 · Labour Court · 1972-08-10Read full judgment →
- Mrs. KEAYS BYRNE vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1963-03-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of a writ petition and subsequent Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, which upheld the refusal of settlement authorities to transfer certain evacuee premises in Rawalpindi to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner qualified as a "displaced person" under Section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, given that she had operated a seasonal hotel business in Kashmir before partitioning and claimed displacement due to circumstances arising from partition and military requisitioning in India. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower authorities and the High Court established that she was a permanent resident of Rawalpindi and did not leave her residence in Kashmir on account of civil disturbances, nor was she unable to manage her affairs in India as contemplated by the law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding status under statutory definitions are not to be disturbed unless shown to be legally flawed.
Questions settled- Whether a person who leaves a seasonal business premises in Kashmir under normal circumstances rather than due to civil disturbances qualifies as a displaced person?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a person's status as a displaced person be assailed in writ jurisdiction?
- Whether the holder of a British Passport with unrestricted travel to India can claim inability to manage property in India for the purposes of qualifying as a displaced person?
- MOOR MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 891 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-16Read full judgment →
- MOHIUDDIN vs MESSRS FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS1973 PLC 282 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-12Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD YAQUB vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 5 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal concerns the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, specifically regarding the rights to the roofs of shops in a composite building. The core legal question was whether, in a case of horizontal division of a composite property, the rights of a transferee of a lower tenement (ground floor shops) extend beyond the line of division to the roofs, or if such rights are strictly limited by the demarcation specified by the Settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that in composite buildings, Settlement authorities possess the power to specify parts as residential or business units, and rights of transferees are strictly confined to the specific division or demarcation ordered. The Court ruled that the appellate and revisional authorities acted arbitrarily by ignoring the initial valid division, which included the roofs as part of the residential portion. The key principle laid down is that in horizontal divisions, the rights of a transferee do not extend beyond the line or level of division specified by the competent authority, and any such division must be exercised judiciously rather than arbitrarily.
Questions settled- Does the right of a transferee of a lower tenement in a composite building extend beyond the line of division specified by the Settlement authorities?
- Do Settlement authorities have the power to divide a composite building horizontally into residential and business units?
- Can Settlement authorities arbitrarily alter a valid division of property without proper justification or finding?
- MOHAMMAD SHARIF AND OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD AMIN AND Other1973 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition in limine on the grounds of laches and conduct. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Custodian of Evacuee Property to determine the question of possession while deciding a reference made by a civil court under Section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, regarding evacuee interest in the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that there was no substance in the contention that the Custodian lacked jurisdiction to go into the question of possession, particularly when the petitioners failed to raise any grievance before the Custodian and the civil court was yet to adjudicate the matter upon return of the reference. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition, noting the inordinate delay and conduct of the petitioners, while clarifying that the petitioners remained at liberty to urge the point of possession before the civil court.
Questions settled- Whether the Custodian of Evacuee Property has jurisdiction to go into the question of possession while deciding a reference under Section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?
- Can a constitutional petition be dismissed by the High Court on the ground of inordinate delay and laches?
- Whether a party can challenge the findings of the Custodian regarding possession before the civil court when the reference is returned?
- MOHAMMAD ASLAM vs The STATE1973 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Mohammad Aslam, under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of related and chance witnesses, and the corroborative value of recovery evidence in a murder trial. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of an interested or related eye-witness, when natural and reliable, combined with independent recovery evidence, is sufficient to sustain a capital conviction even if other witnesses are discarded. The key principle laid down is that the presence of related witnesses at the scene can be safely relied upon when corroborated by independent material evidence such as recoveries, warranting no interference with concurrent findings of the lower courts.
Questions settled- Can the testimony of a related eye-witness alone sustain a conviction for murder when properly corroborated?
- Whether the evidence of chance witnesses can be discarded without affecting the reliability of other natural eye-witnesses?
- Does the corroboration of recovery evidence suffice to uphold a death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- MOHAMMAD ALAM vs NOOR MOHAMMAD1973 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from an eviction application filed by the respondent landlord against the appellant tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, alleging default in rent payment. The tenant admitted the default but argued that a practice of periodic rent payment had been established, supported by a single receipt showing a cumulative payment. While the Rent Controller and the District Judge initially accepted this plea, the High Court reversed these concurrent findings, holding that a solitary instance of delayed payment did not constitute a binding practice to vary the statutory time limits for rent payment. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the question of default was a mixed question of law and fact, allowing for interference with concurrent findings. The Court held that a tenant must prove a consistent practice to deviate from the contractual rent payment schedule. As the appellant failed to establish such a practice, the admitted default rendered him liable for eviction. The Court emphasized that while a landlord may condone a specific default, such condonation does not create a permanent waiver of future contractual obligations.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge regarding rent default?
- Does a single instance of delayed rent payment constitute a 'practice' sufficient to override the statutory or contractual time for payment?
- Can a landlord's acceptance of delayed rent on one occasion be construed as a permanent waiver of the contractual payment schedule?
- Is the question of whether a default occurred under the Rent Restriction Ordinance a mixed question of law and fact?
- MOHAMMAD AFZAL vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 221 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-19Read full judgment →
- MOHAMED ALIMULLAH vs ZIAUL ISLAM1973 PLD Karachi 56 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This second appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance arises from eviction proceedings initiated by the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenant for non-payment of rent for a prolonged period. The core legal question concerns whether a tenant's admitted and prolonged default in paying rent can be condoned under section 13 of the Ordinance merely because the landlord previously accepted rent in lump sums at long intervals. The High Court held that the First Appellate Court acted arbitrarily and illegally in exercising its discretion to condone the default on the grounds of estoppel or alleged practice, as the tenant failed to prove any binding agreement modifying the statutory obligation to pay rent regularly, nor did mere indulgence by the landlord create an estoppel. The court laid down the principle that the statutory obligation to pay rent as it accrues rests firmly on the tenant, and judicial discretion to condone default under section 13 must be exercised in accordance with the objects of the Ordinance, meaning a tenant cannot claim indulgence as a right or escape liability without establishing valid preventing circumstances.
Questions settled- Whether a landlord's acceptance of rent in lump sums at long intervals creates an estoppel against seeking ejectment for subsequent default?
- Can a tenant's prolonged default in the payment of rent be condoned under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance merely on the ground of past indulgence by the landlord?
- Whether the burden of proving an agreement to modify the statutory obligation to pay monthly rent lies heavily upon the tenant?
- MITHOO AND Another vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 510 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-24Read full judgment →
- Mistry AMEEN vs MUSTAQEEM AHMED KHAN AND ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 626 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-25Read full judgment →
- Mirza MAJEED BAIG AND 3 Other vs MESSRS FUTEHALLY CHEMICALS LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 297 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter involves petitions challenging orders of the Industrial Court and the West Pakistan Industrial Appellate Tribunal, which granted permission to the respondent company to discharge the petitioning union office-bearers under Standing Order 12(1) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960 during the pendency of industrial disputes. The core legal question is whether an Industrial Court can grant permission for discharge under section 30(2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 when it finds that no misconduct has been established, and whether the Industrial Court itself can hold an enquiry to establish a prima facie case of misconduct where the employer failed to hold a domestic enquiry or issue a charge-sheet. The court held that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 30(2) is limited to granting or refusing permission for discharge or dismissal specifically for misconduct, and it is not the function of the Industrial Court to hold an original enquiry to establish misconduct. However, the petition was dismissed because the petitioners had unconditionally accepted their terminal dues and executed a full and final settlement, thereby losing their status as aggrieved persons under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The key principle laid down is that an employer must first ascertain misconduct through framing charges and a domestic enquiry before approaching the Industrial Tribunal for permission to dismiss, and an Industrial Court cannot repeat or conduct an enquiry to supply evidence for the employer.
Questions settled- Whether the Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to grant permission for discharge under section 30(2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 when it finds that no misconduct has been committed?
- Is it open to the Industrial Court to hold an enquiry to establish a prima facie case of misconduct when the employer has failed to issue a charge-sheet or conduct a domestic enquiry?
- Does the unconditional acceptance of terminal dues and execution of a full and final settlement preclude a petitioner from maintaining a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
- Whether the framing of charges and holding of a domestic enquiry are conditions precedent before approaching the Industrial Tribunal for permission to dismiss a workman?
- MIR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 293 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-20Read full judgment →
- MIAN MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 901 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-22Read full judgment →
- MIAN KHAN AND Others MAHMOOD AKHTAR GHUMMAN AND Another vs THE STATE MIAN KHAN ETC.S1973 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-19Read full judgment →
- MIAN KHAN AND 11 OTHER vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 164 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Mian BASHIR vs Syed FAKIR AYAZUDDIN And 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 392 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1973-05-02Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ZAKARIA KASBATI & CO. AND 8 Other- Creditorss vs MESSRS H. A.1973 PLD Karachi 40 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-16Read full judgment →
- MESSRS T. K. BROTHERS & Co. vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, KARACHI AND Another1973 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-01-31Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the eviction of the appellants from plots of land in Karachi, which became 'evacuee' property following the migration of the original lessee. The appellants, who had constructed a factory on the premises, sought protection against eviction by invoking the Sind Rent Restriction Act. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Sind Rent Restriction Act could be invoked to prevent the eviction of occupants from property designated as 'evacuee' property. The Supreme Court held that the Sind Rent Restriction Act is inapplicable to evacuee property, as the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance and the Rehabilitation Ordinance, being central and later legislation, prevail over provincial rent control laws. The Court affirmed that the Custodian of Evacuee Property possesses the authority to evict unauthorized occupants. However, noting that the appellants had constructed a factory on the land, the Court remanded the matter to the Custodian to determine the appellants' potential entitlement to compensation for these constructions, while maintaining the eviction order.
Questions settled- Does the Sind Rent Restriction Act apply to evacuee property?
- Does the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance prevail over the Sind Rent Restriction Act in cases of conflict?
- Can the Custodian of Evacuee Property evict an occupant from evacuee property without regard to rent control laws?
- Is an occupant of evacuee property entitled to compensation for constructions made on the land upon eviction?
- MESSRS T. K. BROTHERS & Co. vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, KARACHI AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-05-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal concerns the legality of the Custodian of Evacuee Property’s order declaring a share in a partnership firm as evacuee property and subsequently allotting it to refugees. The appellants challenged the order, arguing the partnership had dissolved and that a partnership is a personal relationship, not property subject to unilateral substitution of partners. The High Court dismissed the petition, directing the appellants to a civil court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred because statutory provisions explicitly ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts to determine whether property is evacuee property. Consequently, the High Court was obligated to adjudicate the merits. The Court held that while a partner's interest in a firm constitutes property, the Custodian cannot simply substitute himself as a partner without assuming the attendant liabilities, such as capital contributions and losses. The case was remanded to the Custodian to determine the existence of the partnership at the relevant time and to reconsider the allotment in light of the legal liabilities inherent in partnership status.
Questions settled- Does the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to determine whether property is evacuee property?
- Can the Custodian of Evacuee Property substitute himself as a partner in a firm without assuming the liabilities of that partnership?
- Is a partner's interest in a partnership firm considered property for the purposes of evacuee property laws?
- Should a High Court dismiss a constitutional petition on the ground of an alternative remedy when the civil court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter?
- MESSRS SOUVENIR TOBACCO Co. LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1973 PLC 149 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-08-31Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SALEEMSONS LTD. vs THE SECOND SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI1973 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-30Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, which had directed the reinstatement of a workman (respondent No. 2) under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The petitioner-employer contended that the workman's application was incompetent as he failed to comply with the strict timelines prescribed under the grievance procedure, and that the termination did not fall within the scope of the proviso to Standing Order No. 18. The High Court examined whether the procedural timelines in Standing Order No. 18 were directory or mandatory. Applying the principles of statutory construction, the Court held that where a special statute creates new rights and obligations and prescribes a specific mode of enforcement, such provisions are mandatory. Since the workman failed to notify the employer of his grievances within the prescribed fifteen-day period, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The petition was allowed, and the reinstatement order was set aside.
Questions settled- Are the timelines prescribed for bringing a grievance to the notice of an employer under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 directory or mandatory?
- Does a Labour Court have jurisdiction to entertain an application under Standing Order No. 18 if the workman fails to strictly comply with the prescribed grievance procedure timelines?
- Can a workman challenge a termination order under Standing Order No. 18 without demonstrating that they are an officer of a registered Trade Union or have been deprived of benefits accruing under the Ordinance?
- Messrs S. I. T. E. LTD. KARACHI vs FIVE ELECRED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKMEN OF S. I. T. E. LTD1973 PLC 1 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-01-04Read full judgment →
- MESSRS RAFIQ AHMAD vs THE PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH THE SECRETARY, HOUSING, PLANNING & LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, SIND AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which set aside the decision of a Controlling Authority to award a municipal contract to the petitioner. The Karachi Municipal Corporation had invited tenders for construction work, and respondent No. 4 submitted the lowest bid, which was recommended by the Corporation. However, the Controlling Authority bypassed this recommendation and awarded the contract to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the Controlling Authority possessed the power to unilaterally approve a tender that had not been recommended by the Municipal Corporation under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Controlling Authority lacked the competence to bypass the Municipal Corporation's recommendation process. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that a Controlling Authority must adhere to the procedural requirements of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Contracts) Rules, 1960, and cannot arbitrarily override the recommendations of the Municipal Corporation regarding the awarding of contracts.
Questions settled- Does a Controlling Authority have the power to unilaterally approve a tender that has not been recommended by the Municipal Corporation?
- Is a contractor who submitted the lowest bid an aggrieved party entitled to challenge the award of a contract to another party?
- Can a Controlling Authority bypass the established procedural rules for awarding municipal contracts?
- MESSRS PAKISTAN KHOPRA MILLS, KARACHI vs ABDUL RAHIM KHAN AND 111973 PLD Karachi 195 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-10Read full judgment →
- MESSRS NATIONAL CARRIERS LTD vs MESSRS PESTONJI BHICANJEE, KARACHI1973 PLD Karachi 309 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-22Read full judgment →
- MESSRS NABI BAKHSHI& SONS vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES AND NATURAL RESOURCES (INDUSTRIES DIVISION), ISLAMABAD1973 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which dismissed appeals arising from an arbitration award regarding the cancellation of a government contract for the supply of helicopters. The core legal questions involved the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal after pursuing a certificate under the Civil Procedure Code, and whether damages for cancellation of foreign agencies could form the subject-matter of reference to arbitration and be sustained without supporting evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time as the time spent seeking a certificate to appeal was unnecessary, and the delay from December 1972 to January 1973 remained unexplained. Furthermore, the Court held on merits that there was no evidence supporting the claim for damages for cancellation of agencies, and such claims could not be the subject-matter of reference to the umpire. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether time taken in applying for a certificate to file an appeal to the Supreme Court under the Code of Civil Procedure can be excluded when computing the period of limitation for a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Can a claim for damages regarding the cancellation of foreign agencies be the subject-matter of reference to arbitration under a government supply contract?
- Whether an arbitration award granting damages without supporting evidence can be maintained?
- MESSRS MUHAMMAD AMIN MUHAMMAD BASHIR LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS1973 PLD Karachi 409 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from proceedings on an arbitration award given under the Bye-Laws of the Karachi Cotton Association regarding a dispute over cotton supply contracts. The core legal questions involve whether the pendency of a separate suit barred the arbitration proceedings under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act, whether the contracts constituted factory selection contracts referable to arbitration, and whether a subsequent letter effected a novation of the contract under Section 62 of the Contract Act. The court held that the award was valid and made it a rule of the court, dismissing the defendants' objections. The key principles laid down are that for Section 35 of the Arbitration Act to bar arbitration, actual knowledge of the pending suit by the arbitrators—rather than merely the parties—must be affirmatively proven; that the essential ingredient of a factory selection contract is the buyer's selection of cotton at the seller's factory rather than strict adherence to a prescribed form; and that mere amendments to terms such as delivery do not constitute novation under Section 62 of the Contract Act unless an entirely new contract is substituted.
Questions settled- Does the filing and pendency of a suit operate as a bar to arbitration proceedings under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act without proof that the arbitrators had knowledge of it?
- What are the essential ingredients of a factory selection contract under the Bye-Laws of the Karachi Cotton Association?
- Does a subsequent agreement amending the place of delivery amount to a novation of contract under Section 62 of the Contract Act?
- MESSRS KHALID RIFAT TRANSPORT Co., AND 2 Others vs COMMERCE BANK1973 SCMR 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which granted them conditional leave to defend a summary suit for the recovery of a balance amount due on a promissory note under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring them to furnish security for the entire claimed amount. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting conditional leave to defend rather than unconditional leave, given that the petitioners had filed a cross-suit for damages and accounts against the respondent-Bank and its nominee for alleged mismanagement. The Supreme Court held that since the execution and consideration of the promissory note were admitted, the petitioners could not claim a set-off based on their separate damages suit, and the trial court's discretion to impose conditions for leave to defend was properly exercised. The key principle laid down is that the grant of conditional or unconditional leave to defend a summary suit falls within the discretionary domain of the court, and mere pendency of a cross-suit for damages does not automatically entitle a defendant to unconditional leave where the execution and consideration of the instrument are undisputed.
Questions settled- Whether a defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend a summary suit when a cross-suit for damages against the plaintiff is pending?
- Is the grant of conditional or unconditional leave to defend under summary procedure a matter of discretion for the trial court?
- Can a defendant claim a set-off against an admitted promissory note on the basis of alleged mismanagement by the plaintiff's nominee?
- MESSRS JOHNSON AND PHILLIPS (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI vs JALEEL AHMED1973 PLC 244 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HUSSAIN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED, KARACHI vs MESSRS DADA SONS1973 PLD Karachi 413 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil appeal arises from a judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge making an arbitration award the rule of the court. A dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration and an umpire gave an award, which was later remitted to the umpire to calculate damages. The appellants subsequently filed applications to set aside the award and raise objections, which were dismissed as time-barred under Article 158 of the Limitation Act, since they were filed well beyond thirty days from the service of notice of the award. The core legal questions involved the timeliness of objections to an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act and Limitation Act, the scope of an arbitrator's authority upon remission of an award, and the finality of an arbitrator's assessment of damages. The Sindh High Court held that applications to set aside an award must be filed within thirty days of notice under Article 158 of the Limitation Act, that an arbitrator upon remission is functus officio regarding matters already decided, and that courts will not interfere with an arbitrator's calculation of damages absent an apparent error on the record. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Whether an application to set aside an arbitration award is governed by the thirty-day limitation period under Article 158 of the Limitation Act from the date of service of notice?
- Does an arbitrator whose award has been remitted to calculate damages retain the power to re-determine matters already decided in the original award?
- Can an arbitration award be challenged solely on the ground of an error in the calculation of damages when no apparent error appears on the face of the record?
- MESSRS HOTEL COLUMBUS LTD., KARACHI vs KARACHI HOTEL WORKERS' UNION1973 PLD Karachi 7 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
- MESSRS GUL AHMAD TEXTILE MILL LTD., KARACHI vs PAKISTAN IHROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND SOCIAL WELFARE, KARACHI AND 2 Other1973 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-06-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenged a decision of the High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi in a writ matter concerning an industrial tribunal's award of a bonus to workers for the year 1955. The core legal question was whether the Industrial Tribunal was competent to award a bonus despite the company's claimed financial loss and substantial depreciation deductions. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the Tribunal's award was vitiated by a clear error on the face of the record, as a proper calculation—accounting for minimum allowable depreciation and shareholders' minimum entitlements—revealed that the company had no net profits remaining out of which a bonus could lawfully be awarded. The key principle laid down is that an industrial tribunal cannot arbitrarily disallow legitimate depreciation and minimum returns when determining the availability of surplus profits for the distribution of a bonus to workers.
Questions settled- Whether an Industrial Tribunal can award a bonus to workers without first determining if there are surplus net profits available after legitimate deductions for depreciation and shareholders' entitlements?
- Does an award of a bonus by an Industrial Tribunal based on an arbitrary rejection of a company's depreciation calculations constitute an error apparent on the face of the record?
- Is it necessary to account for minimum depreciation and shareholders' returns when calculating profits available for the distribution of a bonus in an industrial dispute?
- MESSRS GUEST KEEN & NETTLEFOLDS IN PAKISTAN Ltd., KARACHI vs WORKERS1973 PLC 44 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-16Read full judgment →
- MESSRS GHAFFUR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs WORKERS UNION (REPRESENTED BY KARACHI TEXTILE LABOUR UNION)1973 SCMR 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-06-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between Messrs Ghaffur Textile Mills Ltd. and its Workers' Union regarding bonus payments, house rent allowances, and the reinstatement of 64 discharged workers. The Industrial Tribunal had awarded increased bonuses, house rent allowances, and reinstatement with back wages. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in calculating the bonus by failing to deduct income tax and dividends as prior charges from the gross profit. Regarding house rent, the Court found the Tribunal's award unjustified as the Union failed to rebut the Management's evidence that workers lived within one mile of the mill. Concerning the discharged workers, the Court ruled that the Tribunal improperly ignored a binding arbitration award concerning 32 workers and failed to apply the general law of master and servant to the others. The Court established that in industrial disputes, net profit calculations for bonus purposes must account for statutory liabilities like income tax, and that reinstatement is not the automatic remedy for wrongful dismissal where termination is otherwise permissible under contract law.
Questions settled- Must income tax and dividends be deducted from gross profit when calculating available surplus for worker bonuses?
- Does an Industrial Tribunal have the authority to award house rent allowance without evidence of necessity or that such allowance is not already included in basic wages?
- Is reinstatement the appropriate remedy for workers dismissed without proper procedure if their employment was otherwise terminable on notice?
- Can an Industrial Tribunal ignore a prior binding arbitration award regarding the dismissal of workers?
- MESSRS FISHERY PRODUCTS LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1973 PLC 54 · Labour Court · 1972-09-14Read full judgment →
- Messrs FARHAT INDUS I RIBS, KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1973 PLC 136 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-06-25Read full judgment →
- MESSRS CORNING GLASS (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1973 PLC 140 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-05-18Read full judgment →
- MESSRS Chaudhry ALLAH BUX MOULA Buxs vs MESSRS AIJAZ MOULA BUX AND ANOTHER 'S1973 PLD Karachi 468 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS CAFE MILLAT vs KARACHI HOTEL WORKERS' UNION1973 PLC 104 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-08-24Read full judgment →
- MESSRS AMIN AGENCIES LTD., KARACHI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FOOD1973 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-03-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from an arbitration award dispute between the Federation of Pakistan and Messrs Amin Agencies Limited. The central legal question was whether a party, having expressly waived objections to the validity of an arbitration agreement and submitted to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, could subsequently challenge the contract's validity during proceedings to enforce the award. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not "blow hot and cold" by taking inconsistent positions. Having explicitly renounced their right to challenge the arbitration agreement under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940, and having participated in the arbitration, the appellant was precluded from raising the plea that the underlying contract was void at the enforcement stage. The Court emphasized that once a party submits to an arbitrator's jurisdiction and waives objections, they are bound by that stance throughout the proceedings. The principle established is that the doctrine of "approbation and reprobation" bars a party from challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement in court if they have previously and unequivocally waived such objections during the arbitration process.
Questions settled- Can a party challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement after expressly waiving such objections and submitting to the arbitrator's jurisdiction?
- Does the doctrine of approbation and reprobation prevent a party from raising inconsistent pleas during arbitration enforcement proceedings?
- Are the powers of a court under sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Arbitration Act 1940 limited to the enforcement of an award rather than determining the initial validity of the arbitration agreement?
- MESSRS AMEEJEE VALEEJEE & SONS--S vs MESSRS AMERICAN PRESIDENTS1973 PLD Karachi 49 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-14Read full judgment →
- MESSRS AJ BAG CORPORATION vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ISLAMABAD AND 3 Other1973 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan revoking the authority of an arbitrator appointed under an agreement between the parties. The High Court had acted upon an application under sections 5 and 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940, filed on behalf of Pakistan, seeking the removal of the arbitrator on the ground that the Pakistan State was a necessary party but had not been impleaded either before the court or the arbitrator. During the hearing, the petitioner's counsel conceded that the Government was a necessary party and sought time to implead it. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely correct in its view, as arbitration proceedings conducted in the absence of a necessary party lack legal sanction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the termination of the arbitrator's authority.
Questions settled- Whether arbitration proceedings conducted in the absence of a necessary party lack legal sanction?
- Can the authority of an arbitrator be revoked if a necessary party was not impleaded in the dispute?
- MESSRS AHSAN CORPORATION KARACHI- vs THE CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST1973 PLD Karachi 403 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These four connected appeals under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 arose from an order of the Settlement Commissioner (acting as Chief Settlement Commissioner) refusing to implead the appellants as parties to proceedings under Section 4(3) of the Act for determining whether certain properties were evacuee trust properties. The appellants held 99-year leases over the plots in question and sought to defend their leasehold interests. The primary legal issue was whether an appeal lies under Section 4(4) against an interlocutory order refusing to implead a party under Section 4(3). The High Court held that Section 4(3) contemplates a single final order determining the status of the property after hearing interested persons, and Section 4(4) provides an appeal only against such a final determination, not against interlocutory procedural orders such as a refusal to implead a party. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals as non-maintainable.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal lies under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 against an interlocutory order refusing to implead a party under Section 4(3) of the Act?
- Does Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 contemplate two distinct orders—one on impleadment and one on property status—or only a single order determining property status?
- Does the doctrine of lis pendens apply to render void an alienation of property made during the pendency of proceedings for determining property status under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- MESSRS A. Z. COMPANY, KARACHI vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHHR S1973 PLD Supreme Court 311 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had set aside an arbitration award made a rule of the court in a dispute concerning the cancellation of contracts for the supply of lubricant oil. The core legal questions involved whether a valid and concluded contract existed between the parties, whether the government committed a breach, and the appropriate measure of damages under Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872. The Supreme Court held that valid and binding contracts did exist, that the government had committed the breach, and that the loss of profits claimed by the appellant was a direct and natural consequence of the breach recoverable under Section 73, whereas speculative damages for goodwill were remote. The court laid down the principle that in commercial contracts involving foreign imports, loss of profits reasonably expected to be earned represents a fair measure of compensation for breach, and that an umpire appointed upon disagreement between arbitrators before a partial award has jurisdiction to decide the entire reference.
Questions settled- Whether the acceptance of a tender with a specific delivery date varying from the original tender period constitutes a valid and concluded contract?
- Is loss of profits considered a direct and natural consequence of a breach of contract under Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872 in commercial import transactions?
- What is the scope of jurisdiction of an umpire when arbitrators refer a matter to him upon a disagreement without making a partial award?
- Can damages for injury to goodwill and general business reputation be awarded as a consequence of withholding payments on unrelated contracts?
- MESSERS MONTGOMERY FLOUR AND GENERAL MILLS LTD. vs REGISTRAR, TRADE1973 PLD Karachi 567 · Sindh High Court · 1973-06-18Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an appeal under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 against the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks refusing the registration of the trade mark '7 Up' in Class 30 for hard boiled sweets, candies, and drops, which was opposed by the Seven-Up Company. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's goods were of the same description as the respondent's registered goods under section 10(1), whether the mark was likely to cause deception or confusion under section 8(a), and whether the appellant established honest concurrent use. The Sindh High Court held that the appellant's candies and the respondent's soft drinks were goods of the same description as they moved through the same trade channels and served as refreshment, and that the adoption of the identical mark indicated an intention to capitalize on the respondent's reputation, precluding honest concurrent use. The court laid down that determination of 'goods of the same description' requires considering nature, uses, and trade channels from a business perspective, and that likelihood of deception under section 8(a) and bar under section 10(1) properly defeat registration where a party adopts an invented mark to trade upon another's established reputation.
Questions settled- Whether hard boiled sweets and candies are goods of the same description as non-alcoholic carbonated soft drinks under section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1940?
- Can an applicant rely on evidence of user produced solely at the pre-trial stage before the Registrar of Trade Marks without notice to the opposing party?
- Does the registration of a trade mark in a different class under the Trade Marks Rules preclude a finding that goods are of the same description under section 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1940?
- Whether the adoption of an invented mark identical to a well-known foreign trade mark constitutes honest concurrent use under section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1940?
- MERAJ DIN Alias MAJAH vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 829 · Lahore High Court · 1972-09-26Read full judgment →
- MEHRAJ DIN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 414 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-09Read full judgment →
- MEHAR KHAN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 984 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-07Read full judgment →
- MBHAR SHAH AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 973 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-05Read full judgment →
- MAQSUD AHMAD vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 313 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-06Read full judgment →
- MAQSOOD AHMED CROHAN vs Messrs FIRDOUS RUBBER INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 165 · Labour Court · 1972-12-08Read full judgment →
- MAQBOOL ILAHI vs Mst. FARRAKHUN NISA1973 PLD Karachi 485 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-25Read full judgment →
- MAQBOOL HUSSAIN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of a 16-year-old appellant for the offence of kidnapping a minor under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellant's actions, specifically luring a six-year-old girl from her father's custody to a deserted house for sexual purposes, satisfied the ingredients of the offence under section 364-A, and whether the conviction could be sustained despite the delay in reporting the incident to the police. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, rejecting the argument that the evidence was unreliable due to the delay in reporting or the alleged enmity of witnesses. The Court affirmed that the girl remained in the lawful custody of her father while playing, and that custody was terminated the moment she was induced to accompany the appellant for the purpose of satisfying his lust. The principle laid down is that luring a minor from the lawful custody of a guardian for the purpose of sexual abuse constitutes the offence of kidnapping under section 364-A, regardless of whether the sexual act was successfully completed.
Questions settled- Does luring a minor from the custody of a guardian for the purpose of sexual gratification constitute an offence under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can a conviction for kidnapping be sustained where there is a delay in reporting the incident to the police?
- Is the testimony of a child witness who is deemed incompetent under section 118 of the Evidence Act 1872 necessary for a conviction if other evidence is sufficient?
- Malik SARWAR KHAN vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 41973 PLD Supreme Court 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The appellant, a local and an authorized allottee in possession of a portion of the house, had his transfer form rejected by the Settlement authorities on the grounds that he had not cleared outstanding rent arrears and that the total valuation of the undivided house exceeded Rs. 10,000. The High Court dismissed the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory condition requiring the clearance of rent arrears prior to transfer applies only to occupants who are not in possession under an order of a competent authority, whereas authorized allottees are exempt from such pre-conditions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that while properties generally cannot be divided to bring them under the statutory valuation limit for locals, an exception applies where a division into independent units existed prior to Partition. The Court directed the transfer of the appellant's portion to him.
Questions settled- Are authorized allottees in possession of evacuee property required to clear outstanding rent arrears as a pre-condition for the transfer of the property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Can an evacuee house valued at more than Rs. 10,000 be divided for the purpose of transferring a portion to a local if the division into independent units existed prior to Partition?
- Malik RASHID AKHTAR AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-16Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave challenged a Lahore High Court order that remanded a property dispute to the Settlement Commissioner for fresh determination. The core legal question concerned the validity of an order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, which set aside a property transfer in favor of the petitioners via a miscellaneous application without notice, despite a pending appeal that was subsequently withdrawn. The High Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter through such an application after the appeal’s withdrawal and that the initial transfer was procedurally flawed due to a failure to properly examine competing agreements of association. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, finding no point of law of public importance to warrant interference. The holding establishes that administrative authorities must provide notice and adhere to due process when adjudicating property rights; they cannot circumvent formal appellate procedures by deciding substantive disputes through miscellaneous applications, and a remand is necessary where authorities fail to properly examine competing claims or evidence.
Questions settled- Can an Additional Settlement Commissioner decide a property dispute through a miscellaneous application after the relevant appeal has been withdrawn?
- Is a property transfer order valid if the authority failed to examine and confront parties with competing agreements of association?
- Does the withdrawal of an appeal divest an administrative authority of jurisdiction to pass orders on the subject matter of that appeal?
- Malik MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE (REPRESENTED BY 9 HEIRS) AND 11 Other vs MESSRS EROSE THEATRE, KARACHI AND 26 Other1973 PLD Karachi 522 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This Letters Patent Appeal concerned a long-standing dispute over the ownership, management, and partnership rights in the Eros Theatre cinema business and property located in Karachi. The High Court considered whether secondary evidence of an unproduced original 1948 partnership deed was admissible; whether non-registration and alleged improper stamping of the deed barred its admissibility; whether the 1948 firm was a fake or abandoned transaction due to subsequent sub-partnerships and assignments; whether deeds of assignment executed by pardanasheen widows were void for fraud; and whether the partnership exceeded the statutory cap on members under section 4 of the Companies Act 1913 due to the inclusion of minor heirs. The High Court affirmed that secondary evidence was admissible under Section 65 of the Evidence Act 1872; rejected unpleaded objections regarding stamp duty and registration; upheld the setting aside of fraudulent assignment deeds; and ruled that minors admitted to the benefits of partnership under Section 30 of the Partnership Act 1932 are not 'persons' for calculating the statutory limit under Section 4 of the Companies Act 1913.
Questions settled- Is secondary evidence of a partnership deed admissible when the original document is shown to be in the possession of the opposing party who fails to produce it after notice?
- Does an objection regarding under-stamping or non-registration of a document require specific pleading and evidence before it can be entertained as a question of law on appeal?
- Can managing partners enter into a new partnership with third parties after the death of a co-partner without the consent of the deceased partner's heirs or remaining partners?
- Are minor children who are admitted to the benefits of a partnership counted as 'persons' for computing the maximum limit of partners under Section 4 of the Companies Act 1913?
- Does a minor automatically become a full partner in a firm upon attaining majority without giving public notice under Section 30(5) of the Partnership Act 1932?