Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• GHULAM MUSTAFA vs TAB STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 389 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-27Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 6 Others vs COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA DIVISION, SARGODHA AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-01
  Basic Democracies OrderCommissioner's powerspublic interestwrit jurisdictionadministrative lawcattle market leasefinancial loss
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged a High Court order dismissing their writ petition against the Commissioner of Sargodha Division, who had set aside a District Council resolution granting them a five-year lease to operate a cattle market. The District Council had initially granted the lease for Rs. 10,000, but later rejected a significantly higher offer of Rs. 60,000 from third parties. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction under the Basic Democracies Order to set aside the Council's resolution. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, affirming that the Commissioner possessed the authority to quash proceedings that were not in conformity with the law or were contrary to public interest. The Court held that the Council's resolution, which ignored a vastly superior financial offer, disregarded public funds and was against public interest. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction, noting that if the petitioners suffered losses due to the cancellation of the lease, their appropriate remedy lay in seeking damages through civil proceedings rather than constitutional intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Commissioner have the authority under the Basic Democracies Order to quash proceedings of a Local Council that are contrary to public interest?
  • Is a writ petition the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by the cancellation of a lease contract by a local authority?
  • Can a Local Council's resolution be set aside if it disregards public interest and financial benefit to the public exchequer?
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• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-08
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionsubstitutionsale of land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had decreed a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved were whether the pre-emptor had a superior right of pre-emption based on oral evidence of relationship through a female, and whether the suit suffered from the fatal defect of partial pre-emption due to the relinquishment of a portion of the suit property (Khasra No. 620). The Supreme Court held that while the superior right of pre-emption was correctly established through unrebutted oral testimony, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of partial pre-emption. The Court ruled that a pre-emptor must take over the whole bargain and seek pre-emption of the entire subject-matter of the sale while paying the full price, unless an exception applies by necessity. Relinquishing a part of the property merely to avoid litigation or due to a perceived defect in the vendor's title does not constitute a legal necessity. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor can relinquish a part of the property sold and maintain a suit for partial pre-emption on payment of the full price?
  • Does a pre-emptor's relinquishment of a portion of the suit land to avoid litigation constitute a legal necessity permitting partial pre-emption?
  • How can a pre-emptor prove a relationship through a woman where revenue records are unavailable?
  • Is the right of pre-emption under statute law one of substitution requiring the pre-emptor to take over the whole bargain?
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• GHULAM MUHAMMAD Alias KHAN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 327 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-25Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MOHYUDDIN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17
  Prevention of CorruptionCriminal MisappropriationImpersonationExpert EvidenceIdentification ParadeSpecial Leave to Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, a cashier at a sugar mill, under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner impersonated a contractor, opened a bank account under that false name, deposited a forged cheque drawn on the mill, and withdrew the funds. While the High Court discarded the conflicting handwriting expert evidence regarding the forgery, it sustained the conviction based on identification evidence and the petitioner's fraudulent actions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the failure to prove forgery invalidated the charge of criminal misappropriation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave, holding that even if the forgery itself was not conclusively proved, the established facts that the petitioner impersonated another person, deposited the cheque, and withdrew the funds for his own use were sufficient to constitute criminal misappropriation under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for criminal misappropriation under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be sustained if the allegation of forgery is not proved but the unauthorized withdrawal of funds through impersonation is established?
  • Does a conflict between two forensic handwriting experts automatically invalidate other credible oral and identification evidence establishing the accused's fraudulent conduct?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent appreciation of oral and identification evidence by the lower courts in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• GHULAM MOHAMMAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 656 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-13Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MASEIH Alias GAMAN AND Another vs Ch. ABDUR REHMAN AND 31973 P Cr. L J 439 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-10Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THS STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1027 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-06Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HAIDER vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 763 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-05Read full judgment →
• GHULAM DASTGIR AND 6 Other vs THE COMMISSIONER, LAHORE DIVISION, LAHORE AND 5 Other1973 PLD Lahore 220 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-18
  writ jurisdictionaudi alteram partemnatural justiceadministrative authoritystatutory interpretationKanungo selectionCollector's powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition challenges an order passed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, which set aside the Collector's selection of Patwaris as Kanungo candidates. The core legal questions were whether the Commissioner had the appellate or revisional authority to interfere with the Collector's selection made under the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964, and whether the Commissioner's order violated the principle of natural justice by failing to implead affected parties. The Court held that the selection process was a specific duty conferred upon the Collector by the Rules, and in the absence of a statutory provision for appeal or revision, the Commissioner lacked the legal authority to interfere or introduce new criteria like seniority-cum-fitness. Furthermore, the Court found the Commissioner's order violated the maxim audi alteram partem as several petitioners were not impleaded. The Court declared the Commissioner's order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, affirming that statutory powers of selection cannot be usurped by superior officers absent express legal authorization, and that administrative control does not override specific statutory duties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Divisional Commissioner have the authority to set aside a selection made by a Collector under the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964, in the absence of an express statutory provision for appeal?
  • Can a superior revenue officer introduce new selection criteria, such as seniority-cum-fitness, when the governing rules do not provide for such criteria?
  • Is an administrative order passed without impleading affected parties violative of the principle of natural justice?
  • Does the general administrative control of a superior officer under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, empower them to interfere with specific statutory duties assigned to a subordinate officer?
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• GHULAM AHMED vs BASHIR AHMED AND Other1973 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-11
  bail cancellationinterim bailmurder trialright of being heardstatutory interpretationcriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant challenging the refusal of the High Court to grant an interim order for the cancellation of bail previously granted to the respondents facing prosecution for murder. The respondents were originally allowed bail by the Sessions Judge based on an interpretation of an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which interpretation was subsequently suspended by the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether bail granted on a legal basis that has since been suspended or disappeared must be cancelled automatically without hearing the accused. The Supreme Court held that the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail requires that the accused be given a right of being heard, and the High Court acted rightly in issuing a show-cause notice rather than hastily cancelling bail. The key principle laid down is that the cancellation of bail entails the curtailment of personal liberty, necessitating an opportunity of being heard for the accused regardless of the validity of the initial grounds for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be cancelled automatically upon the disappearance of the legal basis on which it was granted without hearing the accused?
  • Is it obligatory for a court to pass an interim order for the cancellation of bail pending a full hearing?
  • Does the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail necessitate affording the accused a right of being heard?
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• GHUFRANULLAH SIDDIQI vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI AND OTHERS1973 PLC 31 · Labour Court · 1972-06-15Read full judgment →
• GHAZI KHAN vs REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF REFUGEE AND REHABILITATION RAWAL PINDI AND Other1973 PLD Karachi 624 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-22Read full judgment →
• GHAYASUDDIN AND 8 Other vs Mst. FATIMA AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Karachi 213 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-23Read full judgment →
• GEHNA vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 212 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-24Read full judgment →
• FIDA MUIIAMMAD vs PROVINCE OF N. W. F. P. THROUGH ITS HOME SECRETARY, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Peshawar 156 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
• FAZAL WAHEED vs The STATE1973 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-28
  defence of insanityunsoundness of mindepileptic fitsmurder trialhomicidal tendenciespresumption of sanityconfessional statement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the murder of his first cousin in a mosque during a religious gathering. At trial, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, claiming he suffered from periodic epileptic fits and had no memory of committing the crime or making a subsequent confessional statement. During trial proceedings in the Sessions Court, he experienced a fit and was temporarily declared of unsound mind before trial resumed upon his recovery. The High Court of Peshawar dismissed his appeal, holding that no evidence indicated he was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the conviction, holding that an episode or fit of insanity occurring subsequent to the crime does not create a presumption that the accused was insane or incapable of understanding his actions at the time of committing the offense. In the absence of prior or contemporaneous evidence of mental abnormality, the conviction and sentence were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does a fit of mental illness or insanity occurring subsequent to an offense create a legal presumption of insanity at the time the crime was committed?
  • Can an accused person successfully claim the defence of insanity without evidence showing unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the act?
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• FAZAL MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1973 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-16
  murderdeath sentencedying declarationeyewitness testimonyfirst information reportcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and confirming the sentence of death. The core legal questions involve the assessment of ocular testimony, the effect of discarding a dying declaration due to potential tutoring, the impact of non-production of an alleged earlier statement, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding motive and delay in lodging the first information report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the rejection of a dying declaration or the non-production of an earlier statement does not automatically demolish the entire prosecution case when corroborated by reliable eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and recovery of blood-stained earth. The court laid down that natural eyewitnesses whose presence is supported by medical evidence and circumstantial facts are sufficient to sustain a conviction in a single-accused murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rejection of a dying declaration due to tutoring automatically demolish the entire prosecution case?
  • What is the legal effect of the non-production of an earlier statement made by a deceased victim?
  • Can ocular testimony of related witnesses sustain a conviction for murder when corroborated by medical evidence?
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• FAZAL KARIM AND Another vs INAYAT HUSSAIN AND Other1973 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-08
  exclusive ownershipfamily arrangementunregistered partitionadmissibility of evidencepetition for leave to appealrevenue recordsadmission
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning municipal properties in Quetta, originally belonging to Fazal Dad. The core legal question is whether the High Court correctly relied on independent oral and documentary evidence, including admissions, powers of attorney, and revenue records, to establish exclusive ownership of the property by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of an unregistered and unstamped family arrangement document. The Supreme Court held that while the unregistered partition document itself was inadmissible to prove partition, other reliable evidence—such as admissions in a power of attorney, corrected mutation records, and exclusive possession—sufficiently established the plaintiff's exclusive ownership. The key principle laid down is that although an unregistered partition document cannot be used to prove the partition, it may be used to corroborate exclusive possession, and subsequent conduct, admissions, and independent documents can validly prove sole ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Can an unregistered and unstamped family arrangement document be relied on to prove partition?
  • Whether an unregistered partition document can be used to lend support to a claim of exclusive possession?
  • Can admissions and independent documentary evidence establish exclusive ownership in the absence of a valid registered partition deed?
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• FAZAL GUL vs Mst. FAROSHA AND 35 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-05-23Read full judgment →
• FAZAL DIYAN vs The STATE1973 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  murderdying declarationsolitary eye-witnessappellate jurisdictioncriminal appealblood-feudfugitive from justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of a solitary, interested eye-witness in a case involving blood-feud, the evidentiary weight of the deceased’s dying declaration, and whether the deceased’s death occurred during a separate, unrelated incident involving the murder of the appellant’s cousin. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the eye-witness was natural and trustworthy, and that the dying declaration, characterized by its brevity and voluntary nature, was genuine and corroborated the eye-witness testimony. The Court rejected the appellant’s defense theory as fanciful, noting that the incident involving the cousin was a separate, subsequent event. The Court affirmed that the credibility of evidence is a matter of human judgment rather than a strict question of law, and that a fugitive from justice cannot claim leniency based on delays in judicial proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a solitary, interested eye-witness sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case?
  • Does the brevity of a dying declaration affect its evidentiary value and credibility?
  • Can a fugitive from justice claim relief based on the delay in judicial proceedings?
  • Is the credibility of a witness a question of law or a matter of human judgment?
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• FAYYAZ MUHAMMAD vs DEPUTY INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, BAHAWALPUR RANGE, BAHAWALPUR AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 361 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• FATAH UDDIN vs ZARSHAD AND Another1973 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-19
  limitation periodfraudundue influencegift deedmental capacityright to suedeclaration suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment in a suit for declaration, which sought to invalidate a gift deed executed in 1957. The respondent alleged the deed was obtained through fraud and undue influence by the petitioner, who posed as a Pir. Evidence indicated the respondent was a lunatic at the time of execution, and the petitioner failed to rebut claims regarding the respondent's mental state or the fraudulent nature of the transaction. The petitioner argued the suit was time-barred, calculating limitation from the date of the deed's execution. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the right to sue accrues upon the discovery of fraud. Since the fraud was discovered in 1969 and the suit was filed in 1970, the action was within the limitation period. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the suit was timely and the evidence of fraud remained unrebutted, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period for a suit challenging a gift deed on the grounds of fraud begin to run?
  • Does the right to sue for a declaration regarding a fraudulent transaction accrue from the date of execution or the date of discovery of the fraud?
  • Is a suit filed within the limitation period after the discovery of fraud maintainable despite the lapse of time since the execution of the impugned deed?
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• FARMAN ALI SHAH AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 217 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-06Read full judgment →
• FAQIRULLAH AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 236 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-21Read full judgment →
• FAQIRA vs The STATE1973 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-01-08
  circumstantial evidencelast seendeath sentencemitigating circumstancesghairatparity of sentencecriminal appealextra-judicial confession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the appropriateness of the death sentence given the mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence, comprising the last-seen testimony, the recovery of the deceased’s clothing and shoes at the appellant’s instance, and the established motive of ghairat (honor) due to the deceased’s intimacy with the appellant’s wife, was sufficient to sustain the conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. While affirming the conviction, the Court reduced the death sentence to transportation for life. The Court established the principle that while criminal antecedents do not disentitle an individual from preserving family honor, the motive of ghairat arising from the seduction of a spouse constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the necessity of maintaining parity in sentencing between co-accused who are held to have participated equally in the commission of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when it includes last-seen testimony and the recovery of the deceased's belongings at the instance of the accused?
  • Can the motive of ghairat (honor) arising from the seduction of a spouse be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing for murder?
  • Should parity of sentencing be maintained between co-accused who are found to have participated equally in the commission of a crime?
  • Does the fact that an accused has a criminal record disentitle them from claiming mitigation based on family honor?
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• FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 515 · Lahore High Court · 1972-12-03Read full judgment →
• FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHAN vs Mir AKBAR SHAH1973 PLD Supreme Court 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-04
  pre-emptionreview petitionerror apparent on the face of the recordjudicial discretionbinding precedentFull Bench decisionstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a refusal by a High Court Single Judge to review a judgment in a pre-emption suit. The appellant argued that the Single Judge erred by failing to notice a binding Full Bench decision of the same High Court, which should have constituted an "error apparent on the face of the record" under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the failure to notice an authoritative, binding decision, such as a Full Bench judgment, indeed constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. However, the Court clarified that the granting of a review remains a matter of judicial discretion. Upon examining the merits, the Court found the Full Bench decision in question to be based on an incorrect interpretation of Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Single Judge's refusal to review the judgment, upholding the dismissal of the pre-emption suit on substantive grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a court to notice a binding Full Bench decision constitute an error apparent on the face of the record for the purposes of a review petition?
  • Is the granting of a review petition mandatory once an error apparent on the face of the record is established?
  • Does the phrase 'measuring more than one kanal' in Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, qualify both 'house' and 'vacant site'?
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• FAKHRE ALAM YOUSAF LODHI vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER THE STATE THE STATE AND Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-13
  contempt of courtexpunction of remarksjudicial conductadvocate-generalpress and publicationscriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns criminal appeals and petitions arising from contempt proceedings initiated by the Peshawar High Court regarding an article titled "Imagine" published in the weekly newspaper 'Frontier Guardian'. The High Court convicted Yousaf Lodhi, the author, editor, printer, and publisher, sentencing him to six months imprisonment and a fine. Additionally, the High Court directed the Provincial Government to initiate proceedings against Lodhi for alleged violations of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, specifically regarding his academic qualifications. Simultaneously, the High Court made adverse observations against the then Advocate-General of N.W.F.P., Sardar Fakhre Alam, criticizing his conduct and hesitancy during the examination of the Chief Secretary. Fakhre Alam subsequently filed an appeal seeking the expunction of these disparaging remarks. The Supreme Court addressed the validity of the contempt conviction and the propriety of the adverse judicial observations made against the Advocate-General. The judgment highlights the necessity for judicial restraint and the requirement that judicial observations concerning the conduct of legal officers must be strictly relevant to the proceedings and supported by the record, rather than based on personal perceptions of embarrassment.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse judicial observations against a law officer be expunged if they are not supported by the record?
  • Does the publication of an article in a newspaper constitute contempt of court if it scandalizes the court?
  • Is the High Court empowered to direct the government to initiate proceedings under the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963?
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• FAIZ GUL AGHA AND ANOTHER vs A. R. SADIQ AND ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 745 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-11Read full judgment →
• FAIZ ALAM vs The STATE1973 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-30
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiontrap casesanction for prosecutionappreciation of evidencebribery
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a Police Head Constable, was convicted by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, for demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 500 from the complainant to avoid initiating proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The conviction was upheld by the High Court, which reduced the sentence of imprisonment. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the conviction on grounds that the bribe money was not recovered from his person, that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable, and that the sanction for prosecution was granted without due application of mind. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had correctly appreciated the evidence. The Court affirmed that the prosecution had successfully established the demand and acceptance of the bribe, noting that the sanctioning authority had consciously considered the facts, circumstances, and the accused's explanation before granting sanction. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to recover bribe money directly from the person of the accused invalidate a conviction for bribery?
  • What is the standard for determining whether a sanctioning authority has applied its mind in granting sanction for prosecution?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of witnesses who witnessed the passing of bribe money even if the money was recovered from the ground?
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• EVACUEE TRUST BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another vs MUSLIM HIGH SCHOOL THROUGH THE SECRETARY1973 PLD Karachi 618 · Sindh High Court
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeurban rent restrictionevacuee trust propertysecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil second appeal arose from proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (Ordinance VI of 1959), where the respondent sought fixation of fair rent against the appellant Evacuee Trust Board, and the lower courts rejected the appellant's objection regarding the non-applicability of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the appellant had sufficiently explained the delay in filing the appeal to warrant condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and whether section 5 applied to appeals under the Ordinance. The court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and further found that even if it did, the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that government authorities must meet the same standard of diligence as private parties in explaining delay, and routine administrative delays or oversights do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals filed under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can administrative oversight or routine departmental delay be accepted as sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing an appeal by a government entity?
  • What is the standard of conduct required from an appellant seeking condonation of delay for an appeal filed beyond the prescribed limitation period?
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• EMPLOYEES' UNION (Regd.) vs M1BSSRS FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY1973 PLC 50 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-25Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS AVERY SCALES LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 35 · Labour Court · 1972-06-14Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSERS AHMED ABDUL GHANI TEXTILES MILLS, KARACHI1973 PLC 353 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1972-05-25Read full judgment →
• DUR MUHAMMAD vs ABDUL KARIM AND 4 Others1973 P Cr. L J 539 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-12Read full judgment →
• DR. IJAZ HASSAN QURESHI AND 2 Other MOHAMMAD MUKHTAR RANA vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER THE STATE AND 2 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  review petitionmartial law regulationsspecial military courtmala fidescoram non judicejurisdictioninterim constitution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These are two review petitions filed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court disposing of multiple criminal appeals concerning convictions under Martial Law Regulations. The core legal questions involve whether the findings of the Court regarding the validity of Military Court proceedings and the presence of mala fides or lack of jurisdiction warranted a review, and whether separate proceedings stood on the same footing regarding undertakings given to the Court. The Supreme Court held that review cannot be granted on the ground of a party's misconception of arguments or failure to fully argue, and that distinct proceedings involving different facts and different dates cannot claim parity with cases vitiated by a breach of an undertaking given to the Court. The key principle laid down is that review is not maintainable merely due to a party's self-perceived lack of full argumentation when the core issues were duly considered, and distinct factual matrices determine the validity of separate military court convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained on the ground that counsel failed to advance full arguments due to a misconception?
  • Does the validity given by the Interim Constitution to acts done under Martial Law Regulations protect actions that are coram non judice, without jurisdiction, or mala fide?
  • Are separate proceedings before a military court governed by the same considerations when only one set of proceedings involves the violation of an undertaking given to the Supreme Court?
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• DR. HABIBUR RAHMAN vs THE WEST PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS SION, LAHORE AND 4 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-08
  Public Service Commissionhigh technical postswrit jurisdictionstatutory ruleslacheswaiverservice of Pakistanjudicial review
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals against the Lahore High Court’s dismissal of writ petitions challenging the recruitment process for Professors of Surgery conducted by the West Pakistan Public Service Commission. The appellant alleged that the Commission violated government instructions regarding the evaluation of "high technical posts" and questioned the eligibility of a non-citizen respondent. The Supreme Court held that while departmental instructions can operate as statutory rules under Articles 178 and 186 of the 1962 Constitution if they possess sufficient precision and general application, the Commission did not materially breach them. The Court further ruled that Article 175(2) permits non-citizens already in the service of Pakistan to continue their service, regardless of specific post changes. Crucially, the Court determined that the Commission’s recommendations are advisory and inchoate, generally rendering them non-justiciable until an appointment is finalized. Additionally, the Court found the appellant’s claims barred by laches and waiver due to his participation in subsequent selection processes without protest. The appeals were dismissed, though the Court expressed hope for the appellant’s future absorption into a professorial rank.

  Questions settled

  • Can departmental instructions issued by the government be considered statutory rules binding on the Public Service Commission?
  • Does Article 175(2) of the 1962 Constitution allow a non-citizen already in the service of Pakistan to be appointed to a different post?
  • Are recommendations made by the Public Service Commission to the government subject to judicial review before an appointment is finalized?
  • Does participation in a subsequent selection process without protest constitute a waiver of grievances regarding an earlier selection?
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• DR. FAIZ MUHAMMAD vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1973 PLD Lahore 250 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-29Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUL SAMI vs The DIRECTOR, HEALTH SERVICES, BALUCHISTAN1973 PLC 331 · Balochistan High Court · 1973-05-14Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD vs ROZI KHAN AND ANOTHER---Opponents1973 P Cr. L J 392 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-25Read full judgment →
• DOST ALI AND3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 931 · Sindh High Court · 1973-01-08Read full judgment →
• DODO KHAN vs JALAL UD DIN AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Karachi 564 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-04Read full judgment →
• DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., KARACHI VICE-CHAIRMAN, WEST PAKISTAN RAILWAY BOARD AND Anothhrs vs BASHIR AHMAD MOHAMMAD TAJ SHER MOHAMMAD1973 PLD Supreme Court 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-30
  reinstatementback wageswrongful dismissalPayment of Wages Actdeduction of wagesremedial statuteRailway Establishment Code
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns three appeals by the Railway Administration challenging the payment of full back wages to reinstated employees who had previously been removed from service. The core legal question was whether the Railway Administration could rely on Rule 2044 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code to deduct portions of salary from employees reinstated following civil court decrees declaring their removal unlawful, notwithstanding the strict provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Supreme Court held that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a remedial statute that strictly limits deductions from wages to those explicitly authorized by the Act itself. The Court determined that Rule 2044 of the Railway Code applies exclusively to departmental revisional or appellate proceedings and cannot be invoked to justify deductions following a civil court judgment. Consequently, the Railway Administration lacked the authority to make such deductions. The principle laid down is that where a civil court declares an employee's removal unlawful, the employer cannot rely on internal departmental rules to withhold wages, as the Payment of Wages Act mandates payment without unauthorized deductions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Railway Administration rely on Rule 2044 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code to deduct wages of an employee reinstated following a civil court decree?
  • Does the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 permit deductions from wages that are not explicitly authorized by the Act itself?
  • Is a civil suit for the recovery of arrears of salary competent for a civil servant wrongfully removed from service?
  Read full judgment →
• DILMURAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 535 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-23Read full judgment →
• DEPUTY REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES, HYDERABAD REGION, HYDERABAD AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE ANSARI1973 PLD Karachi 417 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, LAHORE RANGE, LAHORE vs Ch.1973 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-08
  departmental inquirymisconductpolice rulesreduction in rankrevisional powersfurther investigationconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police challenging the judgment of the High Court, which had allowed a Constitution petition filed by a Sub-Inspector of Police. An inquiry for misconduct had been initiated against the respondent under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, resulting in an exoneration report accepted by the Superintendent of Police. However, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police disagreed, issued a show cause notice, and reduced the respondent in rank without conducting further investigation. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Inspector-General of Police could lawfully impose a penalty under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules without conducting or directing further investigation. The Supreme Court held that Rule 16.28 empowers superior police officers to call for records and inflict or modify punishments, but explicitly requires them to make or direct further investigation before passing orders of punishment if no prior punishment was inflicted. The key principle laid down is that the exercise of revisional or supervisory penal powers under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules necessitates conducting or directing further investigation before imposing a penalty in cases where the subordinate authority has exonerated the official.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Deputy Inspector-General of Police impose a punishment under Rule 16.28 of the Police Rules without making or directing further investigation?
  • Does the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 provide for an appeal or revision from an order of a competent authority accepting an inquiry officer's report of exoneration?
  Read full judgment →
• DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KARACHI vs ALLAH DAD KHAN AND Other1973 PLD Karachi 632 · Sindh High Court · 1973-06-17Read full judgment →
• DCTRWAISH KHAN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 551 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-13Read full judgment →
• DADAN ETC. vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 838 · Sindh High Court · 1972-07-27Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAY (INVESTIGATION), KARACHI vs MESSERS VALI1973 PLD Karachi 258 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-21Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, EAST, KARACHI vs Messrs REYAZ O KHALID1973 PLD Supreme Court 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  limitation periodbusiness profits taxescaped assessmentfinance actvested rightadvisory jurisdictionstatutory commencement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This certificated appeal arises from a reference answered by the High Court regarding whether an assessment under the Business Profits Tax Act made on 31st March 1958 for the period ending 31st March 1953 was within limitation. The respondent firm disputed the assessment, arguing it was barred by section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, which prescribed a four-year limitation period. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that section 34 of the Income-tax Act had replaced section 14. The High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that section 14 remained in force until 31st March 1957, creating a vested right. The Supreme Court examined the Finance Act, 1957, and held that the Act came into force immediately upon receiving the President's assent on 4th March 1957, thereby repealing section 14 and incorporating section 34 of the Income-tax Act with immediate effect. The Supreme Court concluded that the assessment completed on 31st March 1958 was well within time, allowed the appeal, and answered the reference in the affirmative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Finance Act 1957 came into force immediately on receiving the President's assent or on the first day of the financial year?
  • Does the repeal of section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act and its replacement by section 34 of the Income-tax Act take effect immediately upon the commencement of the Finance Act 1957?
  • Whether an assessee acquires a vested right under a repealed limitation provision before the expiry of the limitation period?
  • What is the correct method for computing the period of limitation for completing an assessment on escaped profits under section 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• COLONY SARHAD TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND CUSTOMS, NOWSHERA1973 PLD Peshawar 68 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-02-23Read full judgment →
• CHANDER BHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 241 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-28Read full judgment →
• Ch. SARDAR ALI vs THE ADMINISTRATOR, TOWN COMMITTEE, PASRUR AND Other1973 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-21
  Defence of Pakistan Rulesdelegation of powersemergency powerslocus standijudicial reviewadministrative lawmunicipal administration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a challenge to a District Magistrate's directive to relocate a bus stand in Pasrur under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the delegation of powers from the Central Government to the Provincial Government and subsequently to the District Magistrate, the scope of Rule 79 regarding emergency measures, and the authority of a Town Committee to operate facilities outside its municipal limits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 3(5) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971, explicitly authorizes the Provincial Government to delegate such powers to local officers. The Court affirmed that the necessity of emergency measures, such as relocating infrastructure for protection against hostile attack, falls within the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority, not the judiciary. Furthermore, the Court ruled that emergency orders are not invalidated merely by having permanent effects, provided the underlying purpose relates to the emergency, and that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge the Town Committee's administrative jurisdiction over property outside its limits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Provincial Government delegate powers conferred upon it under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971 to a District Magistrate?
  • Is the necessity of an emergency measure taken under Rule 79 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971, subject to judicial substitution of opinion?
  • Does an order issued under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971, become invalid solely because it has a permanent effect after the emergency concludes?
  • Does a private individual have the locus standi to challenge a Town Committee's authority to operate property outside its municipal limits?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. SAMI ULLAH vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 57 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-06Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Siddiq And Ch. Muhammad Farooq vs Book Not Found1973 PLC 12 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-09-24Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM HALEEM vs DR. M. S.H. SIDIDIQI AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 61 · Labour Court · 1972-09-18Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM HALEEM vs DR. M. S. H. SIDDIQI AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 163 · Labour Court · 1971-12-12Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs BAHADUR AND 2 Others1973 P Cr. L J 582 · Sindh High Court · 1973-07-16Read full judgment →
• Ch. KHUDA BAKHSH vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, MULTAN AND Another1973 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28
  settlement operationsproperty divisibilitywrit jurisdictionlimitation plearemand ordertransfer of propertyclaimant vs non-claimant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order, which had upheld a decision to remand a property dispute to Settlement Authorities. The dispute involved the transfer of a house, where the Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the entire property to the petitioner (a claimant), but an Additional Settlement Commissioner later divided the property, transferring a portion to respondent No. 2 (a non-claimant). The High Court set aside the Settlement Commissioner's revisional order, which had restored the original transfer, on the grounds that the Commissioner failed to consider the divisibility of the property. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the respondent's initial appeal to the Additional Settlement Commissioner was time-barred and should not have been entertained. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to challenge the High Court's ratio regarding the necessity of considering property divisibility. However, the Court clarified that its dismissal did not preclude the petitioner from raising the plea of limitation during the remanded proceedings before the Settlement Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure by a Settlement Commissioner to consider the divisibility of a property amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction?
  • Can a party raise the plea of limitation in remanded proceedings if the issue was not previously decided by the High Court?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if the petitioner fails to challenge the core ratio of the High Court's remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. BASHIR AHMAD AND Others vs WEST PAKISTAN WAPDA, LAHORE1973 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20
  temporary injunctionprima facie casebalance of convenienceelectricity tarifftube-well electricity ratescivil revisionWest Pakistan WAPDA
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the refusal of lower courts to grant a temporary injunction in a suit challenging the enhancement of electricity tariff rates for agricultural tube-wells by the West Pakistan WAPDA. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners established a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction against the revised electricity charges levied under Section 25 of the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to make out a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience was not in their favour, declining to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissing the petition while directing the trial court to expedite the disposal of the main suit. The key principle laid down is that interim injunctive relief against statutory tariff revisions requires a clear prima facie case and balance of convenience, and appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent refusals of temporary injunctions where these elements are lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the petitioners made out a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction against enhanced electricity charges?
  • Is WAPDA competent to raise the rate of electricity charges under Section 25 of Act XXXI of 1958?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts refusing a temporary injunction where the balance of convenience is not in favour of the petitioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. ATAULLAH vs Ch. MUMTAZ AHMAD KAHLOON AND 3 Afinng1973 P Cr. L J 69 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-09
  FIR registrationcognizable offencepolice investigationexecutive interferencecross-casesmultiple investigationsconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the registration of an FIR, which was initiated following a directive from an Adviser to the Government of Punjab to a Station House Officer. The petitioner contended that the Adviser lacked the authority to direct the registration of a case, rendering the subsequent proceedings illegal. The Court held that while an executive directive to register a case may be outside the Adviser's competence, the Station House Officer is statutorily obligated under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to register a case upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence. The Court clarified that the police's duty to investigate is triggered by the nature of the allegations, not by executive orders, and that the police are not barred from conducting further investigations or registering cross-cases arising from the same incident. The Court affirmed that there is no statutory prohibition against multiple investigations into a crime, emphasizing that the police's primary function is to discover the truth. The petition was dismissed, with a caution that the police must investigate independently, uninfluenced by the Adviser's directive.

  Questions settled

  • Is the registration of an FIR invalid if it was initiated pursuant to an unauthorized directive from an executive official?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prohibit the police from conducting a fresh investigation into a matter that has previously been investigated?
  • Is a Station House Officer legally obligated to register a case upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence regardless of executive directives?
  • Can cross-cases be registered in respect of different allegations arising out of the same incident?
  Read full judgment →
• BUDHO vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 537 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-17Read full judgment →
• BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD. vs SECOND SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI1973 PLC 111 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-10
  Labour Court jurisdictioninterim injunctionIndustrial Relations OrdinanceCode of Civil Procedurestatutory interpretationprocedural powersindustrial dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition challenges an interim order passed by the Second Sind Labour Court, which restrained a company from terminating an employee's services pending the adjudication of an application under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal question was whether a Labour Court, while adjudicating an industrial dispute, possesses the jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court held that the Labour Court lacked the authority to issue such interim injunctions. The court established the principle that Section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, does not confer all powers of a civil court upon the Labour Court; rather, it limits the Labour Court's powers to those strictly necessary for the purpose of adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute. The powers enumerated in the statute are procedural in nature and do not extend to granting substantive interim relief. The court emphasized that statutory interpretation must avoid rendering specific provisions superfluous and must focus on the legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Labour Court have the power to pass an order under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does Section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, confer all powers of a civil court upon a Labour Court?
  • Is a Labour Court's power under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, limited to procedural powers necessary for adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• BRIG. MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN (RTD.) vs AZAD GOVERNMPNT OF THE STATE1973 PLD Azad J & K 62 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-11-18Read full judgment →
• DARA vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 247 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-17Read full judgment →
• BUDHO vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 395 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-17
  possession of stolen propertyproduction of crime propertymarking of exhibitsretrialde novo trialstolen goatsSection 411 PPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal was preferred against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Tharparkar at Sanghar, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment for possession of stolen goats. The main legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether a conviction for theft or possession of stolen property can stand when the alleged crime property is not produced before the trial court nor marked as an exhibit or article. The High Court held that the prosecution is under a duty to produce the crime property before the trial court and have it properly marked as an article or exhibit to afford assurance to the court that the property was actually recovered from the accused. In the absence of such production and marking, the conviction is vitiated. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, ordering a de novo retrial before a different judge with directions to produce and mark the subject-matter property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to produce and mark the alleged stolen property as an exhibit at trial vitiates a conviction under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the prosecution under an imperative duty to produce the recovered crime property before the court to prove possession of stolen property?
  • Can a court order a de novo trial for the proper production and marking of crime property when the trial court failed to do so?
  Read full judgment →
• BOOTA vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 798 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• BILLA AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 123 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-16Read full judgment →
• BILAWAL AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1059 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-26Read full judgment →
• BHAWANDAS AND 2 Others vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN1973 P Cr. L J 411 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-25Read full judgment →
• BEGUM SYED HASHIM RAZA vs PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (RAILWAYS)1973 PLD Supreme Court 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  bailmentrailway negligenceexcepted goodsonus of proofloss of luggageRailways Act Section 75
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had set aside the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the appellant's suit for compensation against the Railway. The appellant's luggage, containing household silk clothes and silver articles, was booked from Kotri to Lahore. During transit, the trunks were stolen from the luggage van due to the gross negligence of the railway guard. The core legal questions involved were whether the burden of proving that the lost goods were excepted articles under section 75 of the Railways Act lay upon the Railway administration, and whether the necessary declaration of value and contents had been made. The Supreme Court held that the onus of proof regarding the application of section 75 rests squarely on the Railway to establish that the goods are excepted goods exceeding three hundred rupees in value. The Court further held that the Railway failed to discharge this onus, and that the un-rebutted evidence established that a proper declaration had been made. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree in favor of the appellant was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that lost goods are excepted articles under section 75 of the Railways Act?
  • Does a loose description of items as silk or silver in a plaint suffice to discharge the Railway's onus under section 75 of the Railways Act without affirmative proof?
  • What are the legal consequences under the Railways Act when a railway administration fails to prove that stolen goods fall within the category of excepted goods?
  Read full judgment →
• BEGUM N. J. KHAN vs WAHEEDUZZAMAN1973 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-02-14
  criminal dischargerevisional jurisdictionmisidentification of accusedcriminal complaintSupreme Court appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Dacca, which had set aside an order of a Second Class Magistrate discharging the appellant, Begum N. J. Khan, under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The first respondent had filed a criminal complaint against 'N. J. Khan for Meher Industries Limited', alleging various offences including mischief, wrongful obstruction, and theft under sections 432, 291, 379, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial magistrate discharged the appellant on the ground that the complaint and initial statement clearly referred to a male accused, using masculine pronouns, whereas the appellant was a woman. The High Court in revision reversed this discharge, holding that the magistrate's reasoning was flawed. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the High Court failed to exercise its revisional discretion judicially under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the complaint and sworn statement consistently indicated a male accused and the appellant was not properly identified as the intended target. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the magistrate's order discharging the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's revisional discretion under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was judicially exercised when setting aside an order of discharge based on the identity of the accused?
  • Does a complaint and initial statement referring to a male accused through masculine pronouns justify the discharge of a female appellant erroneously hauled into court?
  • When should the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court passed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• BEGUM AGHA ABDUL KARIM SHORISH AND 2 KASHMIRI vs SENIOR1973 P Cr. L J 482 · Lahore High Court · 1972-09-20Read full judgment →
• BEEKHO Alias IM AM BUK AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 896 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-15
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonycriminal appealmurder referenceballistic expertcommon intention
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, convicting the appellants under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the premeditated murder of Wahid Bux, sentencing Beekho to death and the other two to transportation for life. The prosecution case alleged that the appellants ambushed the deceased and Loung while they were proceeding on a bullock cart, whereupon Beekho fired his gun at the deceased and the other appellants severed his head. The core legal questions involved the credibility of ocular testimony, corroboration, and the reliability of ballistic evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the eyewitness testimonies of Loung and Kaim were trustworthy, consistent, and corroborated by circumstances, notwithstanding the rejection of the ballistic evidence due to tampering with parcels. The court laid down the principle that reliable and natural ocular testimony alone can sustain a conviction for murder even if investigative flaws exist regarding recovery and forensic evidence, confirming the death sentence of the principal accused and dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a murder conviction be sustained solely on ocular testimony when forensic and ballistic evidence is discarded due to tampering?
  • Whether the testimony of an eyewitness who is a tenant of the deceased's employer can be relied upon without corroboration?
  • Does the abscondence of accused persons immediately following a crime constitute incriminating conduct against them?
  Read full judgment →
• BASRA SOAP FACTORY vs PUNJAB SOAP FACTORY AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Karachi 279 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-25
  trade mark registrationrectification of registerconflicting trade marksprocedural irregularitypending applicationstrade mark oppositionseven-year validity period
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of a miscellaneous appeal and an application for rectification under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, concerning conflicting trade mark applications for soap products by Basra Soap Factory and Punjab Soap Factory. The core legal question revolved around the procedural regularity of the Trade Marks Registry in registering a later-in-time trade mark while a prior conflicting application and opposition were still pending, and the interpretation of Section 24 of the Trade Marks Act regarding the seven-year validity period. The court held that the procedure adopted by the Registry was irregular and prejudicial, as competing applications and pending oppositions for identical or similar marks ought to be connected and heard together. Furthermore, the court held that legal proceedings initiated for rectification before the expiry of the seven-year period do not attract the bar under Section 24. Consequently, the appeal and application were accepted, and the matter was remanded to the Registry for a joint hearing and fresh decision on the merits in accordance with proper procedure.

  Questions settled

  • What is the proper procedure for the Trade Marks Registry when dealing with competing applications and pending oppositions for identical or similar trade marks?
  • Does the expiration of the seven-year period under Section 24 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 bar rectification proceedings that were already instituted before the expiry of that period?
  • Can the Trade Marks Registry validly register a subsequent trade mark application while a prior conflicting application and related opposition proceedings are still pending?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMED PARDESI vs THE WEST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER1973 PLC 374 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-15Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD vs SHAKAR ALI AND 2 OTHERSs1973 P Cr. L J 794 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-15Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD vs Mst. AZIZ BEGUM AND Another1973 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-28
  custody of minorGuardians and Wards Actwelfare of minormaternal grandmother custodyvisitation rightsMuslim personal law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the custody of a minor girl, Tahira Parveen, between her father, the petitioner, and her maternal grandmother. The petitioner initially sought custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, against the mother, subsequently impleading the grandmother. The Guardian Judge originally granted custody to the father, finding the mother unsuitable due to remarriage. However, the High Court reversed this decision, determining that the minor was in the actual custody of the grandmother and that her welfare was best served by remaining with her. The core legal question was whether the father's right to custody overrides the grandmother's right under Muslim law, given the minor's age and welfare. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the grandmother holds a superior right to custody under Muslim law in the absence of evidence against her suitability. The Court also ensured the father's right to visitation, emphasizing that the father retains the right to meet the child and is legally obligated to maintain her, despite the denial of physical custody.

  Questions settled

  • Does a father have an absolute right to the custody of a minor daughter over the maternal grandmother under Muslim law?
  • Can a court grant visitation rights to a father even when custody is awarded to another party?
  • Is the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration in determining custody disputes under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD KHAN vs QAISER ALI KHAN AND 2 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-06
  amendment of plaintcase decidedrevisional jurisdictionconsequential reliefjoinder of partieslimitationThal Development Authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of two petitions for special leave to appeal stemming from a civil suit concerning title to agricultural land acquired by the Thal Development Authority. The defendant initially raised preliminary objections under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 regarding maintainability without consequential relief, and for non-joinder of the Authority. After leave to appeal was granted to address these issues, the plaintiffs sought to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to claim compensation received by the defendant and to implead the Authority under Order I Rule 10. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's revisional order allowing the amendments and joinder. The Court held that an order rejecting an application for amendment of a plaint constitutes a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, amendments introducing consequential reliefs to cure maintainability defects are permissible even if delayed or contested on limitation grounds under special circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order rejecting an application for amendment of a plaint constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court allow an amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add consequential relief after the period of limitation under special circumstances?
  • Can a co-defendant object to the non-service of a statutory notice required to be served on a newly impleaded public body under the Thal Development Authority Act 1949?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR A. MALIK vs THE PUNJAB LABOUR COURT (NORTHERN ZONE), LAHORE1973 PLC 318 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-19Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI AND Another vs THE STATE1973 PLD Karachi 659 · Sindh High Court · 1973-04-08
  smuggled goldburden of proofstatutory presumptionbenefit of doubtSea Customs Actexculpatory confessioncriminal appealacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment arose from two connected criminal appeals challenging the conviction and five-year rigorous imprisonment sentences of the appellants under Section 167(81) read with Section 212 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, following the recovery of 44 gold bars (440 tolas) from their residential premises. The central legal issue concerned the scope and effect of the statutory presumption and reverse burden of proof under Section 177-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, particularly whether its application mandates conviction where a reasonable doubt remains after reviewing the entire evidence. The High Court held that the burden placed on an accused under Section 177-A is not as heavy as that on the prosecution; the accused needs only to establish a preponderance of probability or raise a reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove the essential ingredients beyond reasonable doubt upon a review of the entire case. Finding that the foreign markings and refinement levels on the gold bars were inconclusive of smuggling, and noting the exculpatory nature of the alleged confessions, the Court acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • What standard of proof is required of an accused person to discharge the burden cast under Section 177-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878?
  • Whether the statutory presumption under Section 177-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 mandates a conviction if the evidence as a whole still leaves a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's guilt?
  • Can the presence of foreign markings and high refinement on gold bars alone conclusively establish that the gold was smuggled into Pakistan?
  • Does a statement by an accused that is primarily exculpatory qualify as a confession to sustain a conviction for smuggling offences?
  Read full judgment →
• BAJHI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 517 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-07Read full judgment →
• BAHADUR AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 612 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-02Read full judgment →
• BAGH ALI vs THE STATE1973P Cr. L J 812 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-21Read full judgment →
• BAGH ALI AND 4 Other vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-19
  capital chargeocular testimonypartisan witnessesmedical corroborationcriminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtappraisement of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which dismissed the appeal of the five appellants and confirmed their death sentences for murder under section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside convictions under section 13(d) of the Arms Act. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the uncorroborated ocular testimony of three closely related and partisan eye-witnesses could be safely relied upon in a capital case characterized by a background of previous retaliatory murders, inherent improbabilities, and material contradictions with the medical evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and death sentences, and ordered the immediate release of the appellants. The Court held that where eye-witnesses are partisan and inimical, and their testimony suffers from serious infirmities and irreconcilable conflicts with medical evidence, such evidence cannot form the basis of a capital conviction without strong, independent corroboration from an unimpeachable source.

  Questions settled

  • Can the uncorroborated ocular testimony of partisan and inimical eye-witnesses be relied upon to sustain a capital conviction?
  • Whether material contradictions between oral testimony and medical evidence render the prosecution case unsafe for reliance?
  • Is independent corroboration from an unimpeachable source required when eye-witnesses are interested and there is a background of retaliatory enmity?
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• BACHAL AND 6 Others vs The STATE1973 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-01
  bailbail cancellationdacoitycriminal procedureSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the cancellation of pre-trial bail granted to the appellants, who were challaned under Section 395 and Section 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core allegation was that the appellants, being haris, forcibly took away cotton pods from land under the receivership of the Mukhtiarkar. The appellants were initially granted bail by a Magistrate, but the Sessions Court cancelled the bail, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent bail application. The Supreme Court considered whether the bail granted by the Magistrate was rightly cancelled in a case where the offences charged are not punishable with death or transportation for life. Holding that the Magistrate was fully justified in granting bail for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and Sessions Court and restored the bail granted to the appellants, laying down the principle that bail should normally not be withheld or arbitrarily cancelled in non- prohibitory offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be cancelled when the offence charged is not punishable with death or transportation for life?
  • Was the Magistrate justified in granting bail to the appellants charged under Sections 395 and 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Did the High Court and Sessions Court err in cancelling the bail granted by the Magistrate?
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• AZIM UD DIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE-Opponent1973 P Cr. L J 364 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-13Read full judgment →
• AZAM KHAN AND 2 OTHERS vs The STATE1973 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-03
  dying declarationcriminal appealbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidenceburden of proofmurder conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 302, read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the admissibility and proof of an alleged dying declaration, and whether the ocular evidence could be relied upon given material inconsistencies with medical evidence and the site plan. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the dying declaration, as the original record was never produced and oral testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Evidence Act 1872. Furthermore, the Court found significant discrepancies between the ocular evidence and medical findings regarding the position of the assailants and the number of shots fired. The Court established that where the prosecution's case rests on a dying declaration that is not properly proved, and where ocular evidence is inconsistent with medical findings and the witnesses are interested, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused. Consequently, the convictions were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a dying declaration that was never produced in court and not proved according to the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does a material discrepancy between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the position of the assailants entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on ocular evidence that contradicts medical findings without resolving the inconsistency?
  • What is the legal requirement for proving the contents of a document when the original is not produced in court?
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• AYOOB vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06
  dying declarationfact in issuerelevant factadmissibility of evidencemurder convictionEvidence Act interpretationcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against his conviction for murder, challenging the admissibility of dying declarations. The core legal question was whether a dying declaration is inadmissible to prove a "fact in issue" under the Evidence Act 1872, based on the argument that Section 32 only permits secondary evidence for "relevant facts." The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that "facts in issue" are not mutually exclusive from "relevant facts" and that the Evidence Act 1872 does not preclude the use of secondary evidence, such as dying declarations, to prove facts in issue. The Court clarified that facts in issue are a specific category of relevant facts, and interpreting Section 32 to exclude them would lead to disastrous results. Consequently, the Court affirmed that dying declarations are admissible to prove facts in issue, and finding no merit in the petitioner's argument, dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Are facts in issue and relevant facts mutually exclusive categories under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can a dying declaration be admitted in evidence to prove a fact in issue?
  • Does Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872 exclude the admissibility of secondary evidence regarding facts in issue?
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• AYOOB AND Another vs MASJID E NOMAN1973 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-27
  statutory tenancydisplaced personsshop definitionevacuee propertypossessionsettlement departmentleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from the dismissal of the appellants' second appeal by the High Court, which affirmed the lower courts' decrees for possession and mesne profits in favor of the respondent mosque. The core legal question was whether an open building site transferred to the mosque, upon which the appellants subsequently ran a fodder business, qualified as a 'shop' and entitled the appellants to statutory tenancy protection under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the disputed premises was an open building site transferred as such by the Settlement Department, and since it was not an evacuee business premises at the relevant time and the appellants lacked authorized possession under Section 2(6) of the Act, they were not statutory tenants under Section 30. The key principle laid down is that an open plot of land cannot be classified as a 'shop' merely because an occupant subsequently erects a structure for business purposes, and statutory protection under Section 30 is strictly contingent upon authorized possession of an evacuee house or shop as defined by the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does an open building site upon which a structure is subsequently erected qualify as a 'shop' under Section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a person claiming possession of an open plot without an allotment order from a rehabilitation authority claim the protection of a statutory tenant under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the term 'shop' under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, carry a different meaning than the definition provided in Section 2(12) of the said Act?
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• ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES'1973 PLD Karachi 167 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-20
  industrial disputeawarddomestic inquiryprivilege leavebonusretrospective effect
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This statutory appeal under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959 was brought against an award of the Industrial Court of West Pakistan, Karachi, concerning multiple industrial demands raised by an employees' union against an employer company. The High Court adjudicated several disputed findings of the award, modifying or setting them aside. Regarding disciplinary proceedings, the Court held that while Standing Order 13 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1960 provides specific procedural requirements, domestic inquiry proceedings are quasi-judicial; hence, fairness dictates that an employee be furnished with copies of all witness statements recorded during the inquiry. On bonus, relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that employees cannot claim bonus for years in which the employer suffered financial losses, as payment of bonus requires substantial profits. Regarding pay revision and additional benefits, the Court held that an employer's poor financial position and existing compensation packages must be evaluated before altering terms. Finally, the Court affirmed that an Industrial Court may grant relief with retrospective effect from the date of the application.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee facing disciplinary action entitled to copies of witness statements recorded during a domestic inquiry?
  • Can workers claim a bonus for a financial year in which the employer company suffered commercial losses?
  • Can an Industrial Court grant an award on industrial demands with retrospective effect from the date of the application?
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• ASPAIN GUL AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 345 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-28Read full judgment →
• ASHIQ vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 387 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-02Read full judgment →
• ASHIQ HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs MESSRS FANCY FABRICS INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 351 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1972-11-23Read full judgment →
• ASHFAQUE AHMAD vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 218 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-15Read full judgment →
• ASHFAQ AHMAD SHEIKH vs The STATE1973 SCMR 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-04
  contempt of courtreview petitionbenefit of doubtsentence reductionprofessional misconduct
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition seeks to review a decision of the Supreme Court refusing to interfere with an order punishing the petitioner for contempt of court, though the sentence was previously reduced. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doubt based on a cited precedent and whether the punishment awarded was excessively harsh. The Supreme Court held that neither ground is available for review, distinguishing the facts of the cited precedent from the present case where a deliberate and serious act of contempt was committed, and noting that the sentence had already been considerably reduced keeping in view the petitioner's standing as a junior pleader. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether grounds for review are made out when a petitioner claims the benefit of a previously reported precedent?
  • Does an act of deliberate contempt disentitle a contemnor to the benefit of doubt regarding good faith?
  • Whether a sentence already mitigated on the grounds of youth and inexperience can be further reduced in review?
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• ASADULLAH vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 571 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-23Read full judgment →
• ASAD HUSSAIN vs A. H. MALIK AND ANOTSSR1973 PLC 81 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-11Read full judgment →