Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• GHULAM JILANI MUHAMMAD YOUSUF vs MUHAMMAD YOUSUF AND Another1972 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-22
  interim custodyvehicle titlecriminal revisiondisputed ownershipspecial leave to appealdiscretionary orderhire purchase
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which directed conflicting parties to approach a civil court for the determination of title regarding a disputed lorry and ordered the vehicle to remain in police custody in the interim. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in declining to restore possession of the vehicle directly to one of the contesting parties and instead relegating them to civil proceedings amidst disputed questions of fact and law. The Supreme Court held that the distribution of custody and the decision to direct parties to a civil court involve the exercise of judicial discretion, which had been properly exercised by the High Court given the complex disputed facts regarding ownership and hire purchase claims. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that appellate interference is unwarranted where discretionary orders regarding interim custody of disputed property are based on unresolved, bona fide questions of title best suited for civil adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in directing parties to approach a civil court for determination of title when disputed questions of fact and law exist regarding a vehicle's ownership?
  • Is the interim custody of a disputed vehicle pending civil adjudication a matter of judicial discretion?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary interim custody order passed by the High Court where no error of principle is shown?
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• GHULAM HYDER And 4 Others vs Tub STATE1972 P Cr. L J 789 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-07Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 153 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-16
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicidestrangulationbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionPakistan Penal Code
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his sister. The prosecution alleged the appellant strangled the deceased, a tuberculosis patient, following her previous elopement with the complainant's brother. While the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the appellant contended that the act occurred under grave and sudden provocation. The High Court observed that the prosecution witnesses did not witness the actual act of strangulation, leaving the precise circumstances preceding the death uncertain. Applying the principle that where two interpretations of a situation are possible, the one favorable to the accused must be preferred, the Court held that the possibility of the deceased having provoked the appellant through defiant threats could not be excluded. Consequently, the Court ruled that the case fell within the purview of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The conviction was altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court alter a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on grave and sudden provocation if the plea was not specifically raised at trial?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt where two reasonable interpretations of the facts exist?
  • Does the act of a sibling killing a sister following a provocative threat regarding her immoral conduct fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN AND 3 OTHERS vs Khan MUKARAB KHAN, ADDITIONAL1972 SCMR 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil reviewremandsettlement lawindustrial concernagricultural landpolicy decision
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This civil review petition arises from an order remanding a property dispute to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision after hearing both parties on the factual and legal character of the disputed land. The core legal question was whether a newly discovered policy decision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding conflicting transfers under different settlement laws constitutes a valid ground for review. The Supreme Court held that the ignorance of such a policy decision at the time of the original hearing does not furnish a ground for review, and dismissed the petition while noting that the applicants are free to urge any valid factual or legal ground before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that ignorance of a policy decision at the original hearing does not warrant review of an appellate order, particularly when the remand order already permits the parties to raise all available legal and factual contentions before the original authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery of a policy decision after the decision of the court furnish a valid ground for review?
  • Can parties raise valid factual and legal grounds before the Chief Settlement Commissioner upon remand?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN Alias HUSSAINI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  criminal appealmurder convictioninjured witnesshostile witnessocular evidenceappreciation of evidenceretraction of statement
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This is a criminal appeal filed by Ghulam Hussain against his conviction and death sentence for the murder of Mst. Rehm and attempted murder of Mst. Maqsud Mai, as confirmed by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained despite the hostile turn taken by several prosecution witnesses, including the deceased's husband who retracted his identification of the assailant. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, relying on the consistent and credible testimony of the injured witness, Mst. Maqsud Mai, and another eyewitness, Jindwadda. The Court affirmed that the evidence of an injured witness, whose presence at the scene is established and who has no motive to falsely implicate the accused, carries significant weight. The Court rejected the appellant's defense of enmity and influence, noting that the trial and appellate courts correctly discarded the testimony of witnesses who had been won over or compromised. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld based on the reliable ocular evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of an injured witness when other prosecution witnesses have turned hostile?
  • Is the testimony of an injured witness, whose presence at the scene is established, sufficient to support a conviction?
  • Under what circumstances can the statement of a witness who died before trial be transferred to the Sessions file?
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• GHULAM HAIDER vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR AND Other1972 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  settlement disputeunauthorized occupationremand order compliancequestion of factleave to appealproperty transfer
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the alleged unauthorized occupation of a portion of a house by the petitioner, which had been transferred to the respondent. The core legal question was whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner failed to comply with a previous remand order by the Settlement Commissioner, specifically regarding the inspection of a property plan and Cantonment Board records. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower authorities, finding that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had indeed complied with the remand order by inspecting the site and the relevant records. The Court held that the petitioner's objections regarding the non-existence of the plan and the failure to inspect records were factual in nature and, crucially, had not been raised in earlier proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner, the High Court, or in the leave petition. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioner could not raise these new factual contentions at this late stage. The petition was dismissed, affirming that questions of fact settled by lower authorities are not subject to re-examination when raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise new factual objections before the Supreme Court that were not raised in earlier proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner or the High Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to re-examine questions of fact already determined by lower authorities in a settlement dispute?
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• GHULAM HABIB vs THE STATE AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 158 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-11Read full judgment →
• GHULAM FARID AND 21 Others GHULAM FARID AND 21 Others vs GAHROO AND 12 Other MAMMA AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-02
  additional evidencewithdrawal of suitadverse possessionprescriptionsecond appealcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners filed three civil suits claiming title to the property in dispute on the basis of prescription and seeking a declaration that a mutation in favour of the contesting defendants was illegal. The trial court dismissed the suits, and the Second Appeal was also unsuccessful. The petitioners' application for a certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal was refused, along with their request to withdraw the suit or lead additional evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners' counsel conceded the concurrent findings against them on adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court and the High Court committed no error in refusing additional evidence, as the parties are generally debarred from producing additional evidence in the appellate court under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 unless specific conditions are met, which were absent here. Furthermore, withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was unwarranted as the suit did not fail due to a formal defect. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can parties produce additional evidence in an appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff withdraw a suit with permission to institute a fresh suit when the failure of the suit is not due to a formal defect?
  • Whether an appellate court is bound to permit the withdrawal of a suit or the leading of additional evidence when such a request was never made before the trial court.
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• GHULAM AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-11
  murder convictionspecial leave to appealeye-witness testimonyself-defensecommon intentioncriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that confirmed the death sentences of two brothers convicted of murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions addressed whether the eye-witness testimony was credible despite challenges regarding their presence at the scene and whether the plea of self-defense raised by one petitioner was valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court established that minor discrepancies in witness testimony, such as the disputed ownership of land, do not necessarily invalidate the entire prosecution case when other evidence remains convincing. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a plea of self-defense is untenable where the deceased, armed only with a wooden fork, could not reasonably be considered the aggressor against two assailants armed with lethal hatchets. The Court emphasized that the presence of injuries on an accused does not automatically establish self-defense if the disparity in weaponry and surrounding circumstances indicate the accused were the primary aggressors.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy regarding a witness's land ownership invalidate their testimony in a murder trial?
  • Can a plea of self-defense be sustained when the deceased was armed with a wooden fork and the assailants were armed with hatchets?
  • Is the recovery of a blood-stained weapon sufficient corroboration for eye-witness testimony in a murder case?
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• GHULAM ABBAS vs ZOHRA BIBI AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Supreme Court 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-09-05
  execution of decreeauction salematerial irregularitysale proclamationsubstantial injuryCode of Civil Procedureconfirmation of salejudgment-debtor rightspublicity of sale
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal, by special leave, challenged the confirmation of an auction sale of the appellant's property in execution of a decree. The core legal questions concerned alleged material irregularities in the execution proceedings, including an inflated decretal amount in the sale proclamation, non-publication of the proclamation by beat of drum, the sale being held on a solemn day (Moharram), and alleged undervaluation of the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the confirmation of the sale. The Court held that to claim a violation of the right to stop a sale by tendering payment, the judgment-debtor must prove the right was asserted and denied. It further ruled that non-compliance with sale proclamation rules, such as publication by beat of drum, constitutes a material irregularity, not an illegality, and does not vitiate the sale unless substantial injury resulting from the irregularity is proved by the complaining party. Substantial compliance with publicity requirements is sufficient if the object of wide publicity is achieved and a fair offer is received.

  Questions settled

  • Can an auction sale be set aside due to an erroneous or inflated decretal amount in the sale proclamation without proof of prejudice?
  • Is non-publication of a sale proclamation by beat of drum a fatal irregularity that vitiates the entire execution proceedings?
  • Does the non-compliance with provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding sale proclamation and its publication constitute an illegality or merely a material irregularity?
  • Can a sale be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud without proof of substantial injury sustained by the applicant?
  • Does holding an auction sale on a solemn day, such as Moharram, automatically warrant its cancellation without evidence of prejudice to bidders?
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• GHULAM ABBAS vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 149 · Labour Court · 1971-05-14Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ABBAS vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 363 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-08-18Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ABBAS vs Mst. ALMAS BEGUM AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-16
  maintenancewife and childrenex parte orderdesertioncriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld an ex parte maintenance order passed under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Respondent No. 1, the wife of the petitioner, along with her minor daughters, had filed for maintenance before the Magistrate, who awarded Rs. 400 per mensem from the date of the application. The Additional District Judge reduced the maintenance amount but upheld the order, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's revision. The core legal questions involved the competence of the Magistrate to award arrears of maintenance and the proper exercise of discretion regarding the wife and children's residence and the children's education. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate acted competently in awarding maintenance from the date of the application and that the courts below rightly concluded that the petitioner had deserted his family. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is competent to award maintenance from the date of the application under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a husband's objection to his daughters being educated in an English school constitute a valid ground to deny maintenance?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding desertion and maintenance?
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• GENERAL SECRETARY, WASHING AND DRY CLEANING WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS NEW WAY DYERS & DRY CLEANERS' HYDERABAD AND1972 PLC 310 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-08-26Read full judgment →
• GENERAL IRON AND STEEL WORKS LTD., KARACHI vs ABDUL WAHAB KHAN1972 PLC 215 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-06-05Read full judgment →
• GANESH SUGAR MILLS LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL1972 PTD 314 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-05-09Read full judgment →
• G. R. NARASIMIER & Co. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1972 PTD 77 · Madras High Court · 1968-08-12Read full judgment →
• FTIKHAR ALI RAZI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 189 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-11Read full judgment →
• FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY AND COMPANY S EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MESSRS FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. KARACHI1972 PLC 261 · Labour Court · 1971-12-31Read full judgment →
• FIDA MUHAMMAD PARACHA And 3 Others vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 951 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-10
  revisional jurisdictionForeign Exchange Regulation Actpersona designataexemption from personal appearanceCode of Criminal Procedurefinality of ordersTribunal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The applicants, facing trial before an Additional Sessions Judge acting as a Tribunal under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, sought revision of an order denying their exemption from personal appearance. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction over the Tribunal’s orders under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that it lacks such revisional jurisdiction. The ratio is that while conferring jurisdiction on an established court typically attracts ordinary procedural incidents, this rule is superseded by the express statutory provision in section 23-A(7) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, which declares the Tribunal's orders final, save for the specific appeal provided. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision petition. However, it observed that the trial judge erred in law by failing to recognize his authority to grant exemption under section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and expressed confidence that the trial judge would reconsider the application appropriately.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Tribunal constituted under Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947?
  • Is a Tribunal constituted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, considered a 'persona designata' or an established court?
  • Does the power to grant exemption from personal appearance in a criminal trial exist under Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• FEROZE SULTAN INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1972 PLC 321 (1) · Labour Court · 1972-02-21Read full judgment →
• FAZAL SHAFIQ TEXTILE MILLS LTD., Karachis vs REHMAT KHAN AHD ANOTHER1972 PLD Kar. 397 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-27Read full judgment →
• FAZAL MUHAMMAD AND Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (L), SARGODHA DIVISION AND Other1972 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-24
  agricultural landallotmentevacuee propertysettlement authoritieslegal heirsremandsupreme court
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition arises out of a dispute regarding the allotment of agricultural land abandoned by a deceased evacuee, Noor Muhammad. The petitioners challenged a High Court judgment that remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to determine the entitlement and shares of the legal heirs, including respondents Nos. 4 to 6, and to cancel any excess land held by Wali Muhammad or his heirs. The core legal question was whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to remand the matter for proper settlement of the claims of the legal heirs and whether non-sitting allottees could claim a portion of the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in ensuring that the rightful legal heirs received their proper shares in the estate. The court established that heirs of a deceased property owner are prima facie entitled to share in the land left by the deceased, and remand orders by the High Court to rectify erroneous verifications and allotments are within proper jurisdictional bounds. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to remand a case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to determine the shares of legal heirs in abandoned property?
  • Can legal heirs who are not sitting allottees claim a portion of the property in possession of another heir?
  • Whether excess land erroneously verified in favor of one heir can be cancelled and redistributed according to true legal entitlement?
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• FAZAL MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs N/A1972 P Cr. L J 422 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-25Read full judgment →
• FAZAL KARIM vs PARVEEN AKHTAR And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 185 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
• FAZAL HAQ KHAN And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1257 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-31Read full judgment →
• FAZAL DIN vs WALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other1972 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  writ petitioncompromiseleave to appealabuse of processres judicata
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a second writ petition by the High Court, which was held to be incompetent after the petitioner's initial writ petition was dismissed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The core legal question was whether a party, having concluded a dispute through a compromise and withdrawn a writ petition, can subsequently reagitate the same matters by filing a second writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the second writ petition constituted an abuse of the process of the court and that the petitioner was precluded in principle from reagitating the settled matters. The court established the principle that a litigant who effectively withdraws a writ petition pursuant to a compromise cannot subsequently file a fresh writ petition on the same subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner file a second writ petition after withdrawing the earlier one based on a compromise?
  • Does the dismissal of a writ petition pursuant to a compromise preclude the petitioner from reagitating the dispute?
  • Is the filing of a successive writ petition on the same matters considered an abuse of the process of the court?
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• FATEH MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 179 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
• FARZAND ALI-- vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 746 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-01Read full judgment →
• FARZAN ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 282 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-03Read full judgment →
• FARHATULLAH KHAN vs THE STATE1972 PLD Peshawar 22 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-11-02Read full judgment →
• FAQIRIA ADAT vs CUSTODIAN, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE, Etc. CUSTODIAN, WEST1972 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-07Read full judgment →
• FAQIRIA ADAT vs CUSTODIAN, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE ETC. CUSTODIAN, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE ETC. Sh. Ghias Muhammad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Instructed By Rana Maqbool1972 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-07Read full judgment →
• FAQIR M UH AM MAD vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 673 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-12Read full judgment →
• FAKIR SPINNING MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs ABDUL AZIZ KHAN AND Other1972 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-21
  Limitation ActBreach of contractCause of actionLetters Patent AppealRecovery suitTime-barred suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order in a Letters Patent Appeal, which set aside a trial court's dismissal of a suit on the grounds of limitation and remanded the case for trial. The dispute originated from a construction agreement where the respondent stopped work due to the petitioner's failure to secure necessary site permissions. The trial court initially dismissed the respondent's recovery suit, applying Article 56 of the Limitation Act 1908, concluding the claim was time-barred as the limitation period commenced when work ceased. The High Court, however, reversed this decision, determining that the suit was governed by Article 115 of the Limitation Act 1908, relating to compensation for breach of contract. The High Court held that the cause of action accrued on the date the bill was submitted or when the petitioner demanded the return of materials, rendering the suit filed within the statutory period. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the suit was not time-barred, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for recovery of money for work done under a contract fall under Article 56 or Article 115 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When does the cause of action accrue for a claim regarding compensation for breach of contract?
  • Can a suit be remanded for trial if the appellate court determines it was wrongly dismissed as time-barred?
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• FAKHARUDDIN AHMAD And 2 Others vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 62 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-15Read full judgment →
• FAIZULLAH KHAN GHAZI MARJAN vs THE STATE FAIZULLAH KHAN AND Another1972 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• FAIZ And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 895 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
• FAIZ AHMAD vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND Another1972 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-03
  regular second appealpre-emptionnew grounds in second appealdeficient court-feefunctus officio
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These three petitions arise from orders of the High Court of Lahore passed in Regular Second Appeals involving common questions of fact and law regarding pre-emption suits. The core legal question is whether an appellant can raise new questions of law and fact in a second appeal that were not argued before the first appellate court, and whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to order the payment of deficient court-fee contemporaneously with passing a decree. The Supreme Court held that points not argued before the first appellate court, and unsupported by an affidavit in the high court, cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal or before the Supreme Court, and that an order for deficient court-fee passed contemporaneously with the decree does not render the court functus officio. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise new questions of law and fact in a second appeal that were not argued before the first appellate court?
  • Does a trial court become functus officio when it orders the payment of deficient court-fee contemporaneously with passing a decree?
  • Will the Supreme Court permit the raising of questions for the first time when they were not presented before the High Court through proper evidentiary support like an affidavit?
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• ESTATE OF THE LATE A. M. K. M. KARUPPAN CHETTIAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1972 PTD 176 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-22Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs THE CHAIRMAN, WAPDA, LAHORE AND 5 OTHERS1972 PLC 497 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-04-26Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1972 PLC 155 · Labour Court · 1972-12-19Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, SARGODHA REGION, LYALLPUR1972 PLC 25 · Labour Court · 1971-01-27Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MWSRS FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 576 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-03-31Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS STEEL BROTHERS & COMPANY LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 39 · Labour Court · 1971-04-02Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS SIMPLEX RUBBER MANUFACTURERS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 414 · Labour Court · 1972-12-09Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS PAKISTAN STANDARDS INSTITUTIONS, KARACHI1972 PLC 144 · Labour Court · 1971-05-03Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS HABIB BANK LTD., HYDERABAD AND 5 OTHERS1972 PLC 80 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS DYER TEXTILE & PRINTING MILLS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 394 · Labour Court · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS COLONY TEXTILE MILLS, MULTAN1972 PLC 164 · Labour Court · 1971-02-01Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS AHMAD ABDUL GHANI TEXTILE MILLS, KARACHI1972 PLC 321 (2) · Labour Court · 1972-02-19Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION AND ANOTHER vs PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT1972 PLC 484 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-08Read full judgment →
• ELAHI BAKHSH vs The STATE1972 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-15
  suspension of sentenceinterim bailmurderabetmentcriminal appealspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Lahore High Court. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the abetment of five murders and sentenced to transportation for life, with his main appeal pending before the High Court. The core legal question is whether the appellant was entitled to interim bail pending his appeal before the High Court given the facts and circumstances of the case, including a delayed implication by prosecution witnesses and an apparent lack of motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant made out a case for interim relief. The appeal was accordingly accepted, and the appellant was granted interim bail to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Pakpattan, during the pendency of his appeal in the High Court. The key principle laid down is that interim bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 may be granted pending appeal where ex facie the facts presented—such as delayed witness statements and absence of an evident motive—warrant relief without prejudicing the merits of the main case.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellant convicted of murder entitled to interim bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 pending the disposal of their appeal when there is a delay in implicating them and an apparent lack of motive?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for special leave to appeal into an appeal and grant interim bail to the convicted person?
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• Dr. WALI MUHAMMAD vs The STATE and 4 otherss1972 P Cr. L J 732 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
• DR. MUNAWAR HUSSAIN CHAUDHRY vs CENTRAL PUBLIC SERVICE1972 PLC 624 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-03Read full judgment →
• DR. AZIZUR REHMAN CHOWDHURY vs Chowdhary MUHAMMAD DIN1972 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-22
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notetriable issueLetters Patent Appealbelated pleaconsideration
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court of West Pakistan, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal against a summary decree passed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The respondent had sued the appellant for recovery of dues based on a promissory note. The appellant's application for leave to defend was rejected by the trial court as it failed to disclose facts making it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration. Subsequently, during the Letters Patent Appeal, the appellant filed a belated affidavit raising entirely new pleas, including that the loan was secured by a mortgage and that the promissory note was merely collateral without consideration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that new, inconsistent, and belated pleas not raised before the trial court cannot be entertained on appeal. It reaffirmed that leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can only be granted where there is a bona fide, non-illusory triable issue, which the appellant failed to demonstrate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant raise entirely new and inconsistent factual pleas for the first time in a Letters Patent Appeal that were never raised before the trial court in an application for leave to defend?
  • What is the standard for granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a belated affidavit raising illusory and unproven allegations of a lack of consideration is sufficient to establish a bona fide triable issue in a summary suit?
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• DR. ABDUL FATEH URSANI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20
  sanction for prosecutionpublic servantcognizance of offenceSpecial Judgeprevention of corruptioncriminal breach of trustretrial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether previous sanction of the appropriate Government was required for the prosecution of a former public servant under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, and at what point a Special Judge takes cognizance of an offence. A case was registered against the appellant, an Assistant Health Officer, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The Special Judge issued summons on 4th October 1965, but the appellant subsequently resigned, and the municipal committee refused sanction for prosecution. The Special Judge discharged the appellant, but the High Court ordered a retrial, holding that prosecution starts only when the accusation is read to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the Special Judge had already taken cognizance when applying his mind to issue summons, and further ruled that the requirement of previous sanction under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 applies to protect public servants whose services have terminated if the prosecution relates to their tenure as public servants.

  Questions settled

  • At what point does a Special Judge take cognizance of a case under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958?
  • Does a person lose the protection of requiring previous sanction for prosecution under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, upon the termination of their service as a public servant?
  • Does a Special Judge have jurisdiction to try a person who is not a public servant for offences specified under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958?
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• DR. A. R. KHAN vs MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE1972 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  ejectmentbona fide requirementsecond appealfinding of factrent restrictionconjectures and surmiseslandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from commercial premises in Murree to establish his son in business. The Rent Controller granted the ejectment order, but the District Judge reversed it, drawing inferences of bad faith from the landlord's delay, choice of location, and prior request for rental assessment increase. The High Court reversed the District Judge's decision in second appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that while bona fide requirement is ultimately a question of fact, the District Judge erred in law by basing his findings on pure conjectures, surmises, and personal preferences regarding business location. The Supreme Court clarified that a lower appellate court's finding of fact that differs from the trial court is not immune from second appeal if arbitrary, illogical, or based on conjecture. Furthermore, Section 13(4) of the Ordinance acts as a check against bad faith but does not relieve the landlord of the initial onus to prove bona fide requirement.

  Questions settled

  • When can the High Court in second appeal interfere with a finding of fact reached by the first appellate court that differs from the trial court?
  • Does a landlord's choice of location for setting up a business constitute a valid basis for a court to infer bad faith in ejectment proceedings?
  • What is the effect of the penal provisions in Section 13(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 on the landlord's burden of proving bona fide requirement?
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• DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD NASEER UD DIN1972 PLD Lahore 301 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs SHABBIR HUSAIN AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 11 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-02-15Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs MUHAMMAD BAKHSH1972 PLC 377 · Labour Court · 1971-05-26Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD And 4 Others vs I Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1229 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-06Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other vs BOOTA AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 709 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-29Read full judgment →
• DHANI BAKHSH And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 270 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-12Read full judgment →
• DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KARACHI vs ABU BAKAR AND Other1972 PLD Karachi 128 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-26
  land acquisitionfair market valuecompensation assessmentstatutory allowancerepealed legislationcompulsory acquisitionvaluation of land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference concerns the determination of fair compensation for land acquired by the government in Deh Safooran and Deh Mehran, Karachi, for airport expansion. The Deputy Commissioner had initially fixed compensation rates based on the Land Control (Capital of the Federation) Ordinance, 1948, which restricted valuation. The core legal question was whether the compensation, previously limited by the now-repealed 1948 Ordinance, could be reassessed based on market value evidence, particularly given the land's development potential near the National Highway. The Court held that since the 1948 Ordinance was repealed without a savings clause for such decisions, the compensation must be determined under the general provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court emphasized that compensation must reflect the fair market value, rejecting the restrictive rates imposed by the repealed Ordinance. Consequently, the Court set the compensation at Rs. 2 per square yard, plus the statutory 15% allowance and 6% interest from the date of possession, establishing that acquisition compensation must be based on relevant market sales evidence rather than arbitrary, repealed statutory caps.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of the Land Control (Capital of the Federation) Ordinance 1948 allow for the reassessment of compensation for land acquired while the Ordinance was in force?
  • Should compensation for land acquisition be determined based on market value evidence despite previous administrative reliance on a now-repealed restrictive Ordinance?
  • Is the classification of land as agricultural or non-agricultural relevant for determining compensation when the land has significant development potential?
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• DAREY KHAN AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  murderocular evidenceconflict between medical and ocular evidencedying declarationbenefit of doubtacquittalinimical witnesses
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death/life imprisonment sentences of two brothers under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The prosecution relied upon the ocular evidence of related and inimical witnesses, a dying declaration by the deceased, absconding by the accused, and bullet piece recoveries. The core legal question was whether the convictions could stand when the medical evidence directly contradicted the ocular testimony and dying statement regarding the number of shots fired. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence established only a single shot (one entrance wound and one exit wound) caused the injuries, supported by the recovery of pieces of only one bullet, whereas the witnesses and deceased alleged that both appellants fired shots that hit the deceased. Additionally, the assailants fired from behind haystacks, concealing their identity. Finding the ocular and dying evidence unreliable due to these glaring contradictions, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted both appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a glaring contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the number of gunshots fired create reasonable doubt requiring acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses where physical and medical evidence contradicts their account?
  • Is a dying statement reliable when its details regarding the number of assailants' shots hit are disproved by post-mortem examination results?
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• DALAI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  confessional statementco-accused confessioncorroborationkidnappingransomleave to appealcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Dalai against the judgment of the High Court maintaining his conviction for kidnapping under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved whether the conviction of the petitioner could be lawfully sustained on the basis of a confessional statement of a co-accused supported by corroborating evidence regarding ransom demands rather than direct recovery of the abducted child from the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the confessional statement of the co-accused was sufficiently and substantially corroborated in material particulars regarding the petitioner's participation in the offence, and that corroborative evidence need not independently warrant a conviction. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that corroboration of a co-accused's confession requires confirmation of the implicating statements rather than independent proof of every single element.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the confessional statement of a co-accused can be used against an accused if corroborated in material particulars?
  • Is it necessary for corroborating evidence to be sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction?
  • Whether demand for ransom constitutes sufficient corroboration of participation in the offence of kidnapping?
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• DAD KARIM vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 1174 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-23Read full judgment →
• CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, GUJARAT vs CHANDRAVADAN AMRATLAL1972 PTD 334 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-10-04Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, DELHI & RAJASTHAN vs GANGANAGAR1972 PTD 349 · Rajasthan High Court · 1969-01-10Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI vs MESSRS1972 PLD Lahore 773 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-25Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P vs RAM ACHAL RAM SEWAK, AKBARPUR1972 PTD 500 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-12-10Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs PANDYAN BANK LID., MADURAI1972 PTD 285 · Madras High Court · 1972-04-03Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs P. N. N. BANK, LTD., SALEM1972 PTD 291 · Madras High Court · 1968-06-24Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs N. S. PANDARIA PILLAI1972 PTD 356 · Madras High Court · 1972-01-23Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs K. S. IMAM SAHEB1972 PTD 397 · Madras High Court · 1968-08-21Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs K. R. PATEL AND OTHERS1972 PTD 506 · Mysore High Court · 1968-11-12Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs JANAB N. HYATH BATCHA SAHIB1972 PTD 416 · Madras High Court · 1972-06-25Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA PRADESH & NAGPUR vs CHAMPALAL SUKHRAM1972 PTD 189 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-09-24Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE-Applicant vs S.1972 PTD 587 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-12Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE vs S. MUBARAK1972 PLD Lahore 787 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs RAMAKRISHNAN1972 PTD 94 · Kerala High Court · 1972-09-04Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs P. P. JOHNY AND ANOTHER1972 PTD 358 · Kerala High Court · 1972-07-29Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs K. B. KALIKUTTY (DECEASED) AND ANOTHER1972 PTD 527 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-02Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs A. D. COTTON MILLS (PVT.) LTD.1972 PTD 164 · Kerala High Court · 1968-10-16Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, GUJARAT II vs B. M. KHARWAR1972 PTD 618 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-13Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, GUJARAT II vs ALEMBIC GLASS INDUSTRIES1972 PTD 445 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-10-03Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY. I vs C. N. PATUCK1972 PTD 371 · Bombay High Court · 1968-01-22Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY II, BOMBAY vs NEW INDIA1972 PTD 458 · Bombay High Court · 1967-11-06Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR & ORISSA vs UMA MAHESHWARI1972 PTD 137 · Patna High Court · 1968-04-15Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR & ORISSA vs PRAKASH RAM GUPTA1972 PTD 54 · Patna High Court · 1968-11-08Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX vs S. ARUMUGHAM PILLAI1972 PTD 302 · Madras High Court · 1968-12-13Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NORTH ZONE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE vs Mst. WAZIRUNNISA BEGUM1972 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-19
  income taxdividend paymentassessment yeardividend warrantstatutory interpretationtax refund
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute regarding the assessment year for income tax purposes on dividend income received by the respondent. The core legal question was whether a dividend is considered 'paid' under Section 16(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, at the time of its formal declaration by a company or at the time the dividend warrant is actually issued to the shareholder. The Income-tax Officer contended that the declaration date determined the assessment year, while the respondent argued that the actual payment date was controlling. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the mere declaration of a dividend at an annual general meeting creates a liability but does not constitute 'payment'. The Court ruled that 'payment' occurs only when the dividend warrant is issued and the shareholder is in a position to receive the funds. Consequently, because the warrant was issued on June 1, 1956, the dividend pertained to the assessment year 1957-58. The Court further noted that amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1956, reinforced this interpretation of 'paid'.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of a dividend at an annual general meeting constitute 'payment' under Section 16(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • At what point in time is a dividend considered 'paid' for the purpose of determining the relevant assessment year?
  • Does the issuance of a dividend warrant constitute the actual payment of a dividend for tax assessment purposes?
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• COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs NILAMBUR RUBBER1972 PTD 266 · Kerala High Court · 1968-08-20Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OE WEALTH TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA vs PARSHVA PROPERTIES1972 PTD 307 · Patna High Court · 1968-03-19Read full judgment →
• Chowdhry MUHAMMAD DIN vs The NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., KARACHI1972 PLD Karachi 287 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-14Read full judgment →
• CHIRAGH DIN vs Mst. AMIRUNNISA AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-01
  Displaced Persons ActSettlement of propertyPrior possessionAllotment orderRemand of caseQuestion of factTransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over the transfer of a property in Lahore under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant challenged the transfer of the property to the respondent, asserting his own entitlement based on prior possession and an alleged allotment order. The lower courts and Settlement authorities had previously dismissed the appellant's claim, primarily focusing on his status as a non-allottee without adequately addressing his plea regarding prior possession under a specific government notification. The Supreme Court observed that the Settlement authorities and the High Court failed to consider the appellant's claim of prior possession, which was supported by certain documents. The Court held that the determination of prior possession is a question of fact that must be decided by the competent Settlement authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the previous orders and remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, to determine which party held prior possession and to scrutinize the validity of the appellant's allotment order and the basis of the respondent's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of Settlement authorities to consider a claim of prior possession under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, warrant a remand of the case?
  • Is the determination of which party holds prior possession of a disputed property a question of fact to be decided by the Settlement authority?
  • Can a High Court or appellate court decide a disputed question of fact regarding property possession without it being first determined by the relevant Settlement authority?
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• CHAN PIR SHAH vs Hafiz MUHAMMAD TAHIR1972 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  evictiondefault in rentdisplaced personscompensation poolsecond appealtenant default
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the eviction of the petitioner from a disputed shop. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was justified in withholding rent under the bona fide impression that the property belonged to an evacuee trust rather than the respondent transferor. The Supreme Court held that the property formed part of the compensation pool and was rightly transferred to the respondent, making the petitioner a lawful tenant who remained in default for failing to pay rent either to the respondent or the trust. The court concluded that the eviction order was rightly passed and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a tenant who withholds rent on a mistaken belief of ownership without paying it to the claimed alternate authority remains in willful default under rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can withhold rent from a transferred property owner on the plea of a bona fide impression that the property belongs to an evacuee trust?
  • Does failure to pay rent to either the respondent transferee or the claimed trust constitute default warranting eviction?
  • Whether a determination by the High Court that property is part of the compensation pool establishes the tenancy of the transferee?
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• Ch. SHAH MUHAMMAD vs ABDUL GHAFOOR AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03
  settlement of claimsdisplaced personsundisputed possessiontransfer of propertyejectment proceedingssettlement authoritieslocal entitlement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a house in Tandlianwala, Lyallpur, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The petitioner, claiming entitlement as a local in possession, sought the transfer of the property, which was instead auctioned and purchased by the respondent. The petitioner's claim was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner due to a failure to file an eligibility declaration and clear rent arrears. Subsequent appeals and revisions were dismissed on grounds of limitation and lack of undisputed possession. The petitioner alleged that prior ejectment proceedings had been dropped by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, but failed to produce evidence of such an order. The High Court, noting the petitioner's failure to contest the department's report and the admission that he was under ejectment orders, upheld the settlement authorities' findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that in the absence of proof of undisputed possession, the petitioner could not claim the property as a local under the relevant notification. The petition was dismissed as no grounds for interference existed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner claim property transfer as a local under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 without proving undisputed possession?
  • Is a claim of dropped ejectment proceedings maintainable without documentary evidence of the final order?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding possession made by settlement authorities and the High Court?
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• Ch. MUHAMMAD YUNOUS vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND 3 Other1972 PLD Lahore 847 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-06
  locus standiwrit jurisdictionaggrieved personenemy propertytender processpro bono publicoadministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner challenged the sale of property declared as "enemy property" by the Custodian of Enemy Property to a foreign banking institution, arguing that the respondent was ineligible under tender instructions and that the petitioner, as a taxpayer, had standing to challenge the administrative action. The Lahore High Court examined whether the petitioner, as an unsuccessful bidder and taxpayer, qualified as an "aggrieved person" under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1962. The Court held that an advertisement inviting tenders constitutes an invitation to offer, not an offer itself, and no binding contract arises until a tender is formally accepted. Consequently, the petitioner possessed no vested right or personal interest in the property. The Court further ruled that a taxpayer cannot maintain a petition pro bono publico without demonstrating a specific personal interest or legal injury. The principle established is that to invoke writ jurisdiction, a petitioner must show a direct personal interest in the performance of a legal duty, rather than a general interest shared with the public. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an advertisement inviting tenders constitute a binding offer or merely an invitation to treat?
  • Can a taxpayer maintain a writ petition challenging administrative action without demonstrating a specific personal interest or legal injury?
  • Does an unsuccessful bidder have locus standi to challenge the sale of property by a public authority?
  • What constitutes an 'aggrieved person' for the purpose of invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1962?
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