Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Ch. MUHAMMAD SHAM AND 8 Other vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1972 PLD Lahore 187 · Lahore High Court
  evacuee trust propertycharitable institutioncompensation poolwrit petitiondisplaced personsdedicationfree hospital
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of two connected writ petitions challenging orders concerning the disposal of a property in Lahore under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, on the ground that it was an evacuee trust property attached to a charitable institution (a free hospital). The core legal question was whether the property was validly determined to be attached to a charitable institution and excluded from the compensation pool under section 4(3) of the Act, despite the absence of a formal written trust deed. The court held that under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, a property need not be held strictly in trust but is required only to be attached to a charitable, religious, or educational institution to be excluded from the compensation pool. The key legal principle laid down is that the expression "property attached to a charitable, religious or educational trust or institution" under the 1958 Act differs distinctively from a formal public trust under the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, and can be established through clear and unequivocal owner intent, conduct, and continuous user prior to Partition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property must be held in a formal written trust or if being attached to a charitable institution suffices to exclude it from the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the absence of a formal trust deed negate the finding that a property was attached to a charitable institution before Partition?
  • Can a finding of fact by the Chief Settlement Commissioner's delegatee regarding the status of an evacuee property be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution if it is neither fanciful nor arbitrary?
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• Ch. MUHAMMAD NAZIR AHMAD vs Mirza MAHMOOD ALI BEG AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  land allotmentsettlement departmentwrit petitiontentative confirmationpending inquiryspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a Settlement Commissioner against the dismissal of his Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld an order directing the tentative confirmation of land allotment in favor of the respondent pending a pending inquiry into his claim. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's interim direction confirming the proposed allotment subject to the outcome of ongoing verification inquiries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was merely tentative and properly safeguarded by making the confirmation subject to the final result of the pending inquiry, thereby removing any legitimate grievance. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that an interim or tentative confirmation of land claims subject to pending inquiries does not warrant interference where subordinate claimants have not contested the matter themselves and the departmental authority lacks personal legal standing to challenge it on their behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order tentative confirmation of a land allotment pending the result of an inquiry into the genuineness of a claim?
  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner has personal standing to maintain an appeal against an order directing tentative confirmation of land when no affected private claimants have challenged the order?
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• Ch. ABDUR RAHIM vs Sardar ABDUL ALEEM AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  evacuee propertyallotment disputesettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionproperty divisionremandearmarking scheme
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allotment and division of evacuee property, specifically Units 28, 29, and 30, among various claimants. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to partition the property itself during writ proceedings, and whether the Settlement authorities had adequately addressed the physical divisibility of the property and the necessity of access for the respective portions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by undertaking the division of the property itself, as such administrative determinations fall within the purview of the Settlement authorities. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of both the High Court and the Settlement authorities. The matter was remanded to the Settlement Commissioner with directions to re-evaluate the divisibility of the property, ensuring that any division accounts for practical necessities such as access, rather than imposing a rigid or inequitable partition. The Court emphasized that judicial review should not substitute the fact-finding and administrative functions of specialized settlement tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, undertake the physical division of disputed property instead of remanding the matter to the relevant administrative authorities?
  • Is it a legal requirement for settlement authorities to consider the necessity of access when dividing evacuee property among claimants?
  • Does the failure of settlement authorities to properly apply their minds to the divisibility of property constitute grounds for setting aside their orders?
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• Ch. ABDUL HAYEE vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 1231 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• CAPT. SAEED GUL BADSHAH AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyassociation of claimantssettlement schemecompensation bookstransfer priceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' writ petition challenging the refusal of Settlement authorities to approve an association agreement regarding a transferred evacuee bungalow. Bungalow No. 4 on Domeli Road, Peshawar, was transferred to Hamidullah (appellant No. 2) as a non-claimant displaced person in October 1959. Having failed to pay the transfer price and public dues within the stipulated time or subsequent notices, Hamidullah sought to associate Captain Saeed Gul Badshah (appellant No. 1), a local, to pay the price in exchange for a portion of the property, relying on press notes extending time for utilizing Compensation/Rehabilitation books. The core legal question was whether a non-claimant transferee could associate a local who possessed no compensation books to avail of the extended time concessions for paying transfer prices under the settlement laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that association under the relevant press notes and Settlement Schemes was restricted to associating claimants holding Compensation/Rehabilitation books, and did not permit a non-claimant or local transferee to associate a non-claimant for such purposes. The key principle laid down is that the concession of extended time through association is exclusively meant for the utilization of compensation books held by claimants, and a non-claimant or local cannot be associated to bypass payment obligations where neither party holds valid compensation books.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a non-claimant transferee of evacuee property can associate a local who does not possess Compensation or Rehabilitation books for the payment of the transfer price?
  • Does a press note extending the time limit for utilizing Compensation/Rehabilitation books through association apply to parties who have not satisfied the pre-requisite cash payment requirements?
  • What is the true scope and intent of association under the Settlement Scheme regarding the types of persons who may be associated for paying the transfer price of evacuee properties?
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• C. V. SADASIVA RAO, OFFICIAL RECEIVER vs GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS1972 PTD 540 · Madras High Court · 1968-09-18Read full judgment →
• C. D. A. WORKERS' UNION, ISLAMABAD vs SULTAN KHAN1972 PLC 307 · Labour Court · 1971-07-24Read full judgment →
• C. A. No. 141 Of 1970 KOHINOOR TEXTILE MILLS (Now INDUSTRIES) LTD. PREMIER1972 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-16
  ultra vires rule-making powercotton controlimport licence feeretrospective validationtaxation by executivestatutory interpretationtextile mills
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal challenges the legality of import fees levied under rule 21 of the West Punjab Cotton Control Rules, 1949, on textile mills importing ginned cotton from outside specified zones. The core legal questions are whether rule 21 was intra vires the parent West Punjab Cotton (Control) Act, 1949, and whether subsequent ordinances retrospectively validated the impugned fee. The Supreme Court held that the unamended section 23 of the 1949 Act did not authorize the levy of import fees, making rule 21 ultra vires to that extent. Furthermore, the validating provisions of the 1966 Ordinances lacked explicit retrospective wording to cure the defect prior to their enactment, following the principle in Muhammad Ismail & Co. v. Chief Cotton Inspector. The Court declared the fee levy illegal for the period prior to 8th May 1966, while allowing it thereafter upon the promulgation of West Pakistan Cotton Control Ordinance No. XX of 1966.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rule 21 of the West Punjab Cotton Control Rules, 1949, imposing a fee on import licences, was ultra vires the West Punjab Cotton (Control) Act, 1949?
  • Can subordinate legislation impose a fee without express substantive authorization in the parent statute?
  • Whether subsequent validating ordinances provided effective retrospective validation for fee levies that were initially illegal?
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• BURHANUDDIN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 7 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-04Read full judgment →
• BRIG. MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR GOVERNMENT vs GOVERNMENT OF AZAD J & K BRIG. MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN1972 PLD Azad J & K 80 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-10-25Read full judgment →
• BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE vs ALA UD1972 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-03
  natural justiceright to show causeadministrative lawexamination resultseducational eligibilityestoppel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Controller of Examinations, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore, which quashed the respondent's Intermediate Examination results due to an alleged shortage of lectures. The respondent had initially passed all subjects except Geography, for which he was placed in compartment, and was subsequently permitted by the petitioner to sit for the supplementary examination. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could unilaterally cancel the respondent's examination results after allowing him to sit for the examination, without providing him an opportunity to be heard, on the grounds of lecture shortage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is unjust to cancel a candidate's results after they have been permitted to sit for and pass an examination, particularly when the responsibility for verifying eligibility lies with the educational authorities. The court affirmed that the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to show cause, must be observed even if the relevant rules do not explicitly mandate notice before such adverse administrative action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of educational authorities to verify lecture attendance before permitting a student to sit for an examination preclude them from later cancelling the results?
  • Is an administrative order quashing an examination result valid if issued without providing the affected student an opportunity to show cause?
  • Do the principles of natural justice apply to administrative actions even when the relevant rules are silent on the requirement of notice?
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• BILANDRAI vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, KHAIRPUR1972 PLD Karachi 620 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-11Read full judgment →
• BHAWANDAS And 2 Others vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI1972 P Cr. L J 619 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-01Read full judgment →
• BEGUM MEHRUNNISA vs NATIONAL BUILDING INDUSTRIES LID. KARACHI AND 21972 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-08
  impleadment of partiesspecific performancepartnership accountsdiscretionary powercivil procedurespecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Order I, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be impleaded as a party in a specific performance suit. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing to implead a partner in a suit for specific performance of partnership property when a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts has already been passed in a separate partnership suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion lawfully and reasonably, as the petitioner was not a party to the specific performance contract and her interests would not be prejudiced by the refusal, thereby preventing unnecessary prolongation and complication of proceedings. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with the discretionary powers exercised by lower courts under Order I, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless the considerations are irrelevant or result in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a third party can be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after a compromise has been reached in a specific performance suit?
  • Is the discretion exercised by a High Court under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 open to interference by the Supreme Court when based on reasonable considerations?
  • Does the refusal to implead a partner in a specific performance suit regarding partnership property materially affect their pending rendition of accounts suit?
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• BASHIR vs The STATE1972 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-07
  murderassault on public servantocular testimonymedical evidencediscrepancy in distancedeath sentenceconfirmation of sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a police constable and for assaulting a public servant. The appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court, and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether alleged discrepancies between the ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number of shots fired and the distance from which the shot was fired were sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court observed that the ocular evidence was consistent with the doctor's opinion that the injuries could result from a single shot. Furthermore, minor discrepancies regarding distance were attributable to honest estimation errors by illiterate witnesses testifying long after the incident. Consequently, the Supreme Court maintained the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can minor variations in estimations of distance by eye-witnesses invalidate ocular evidence when supported by medical testimony?
  • Whether an honest mistake regarding distance by an illiterate witness testifying after a considerable lapse of time affects the credibility of eyewitness testimony?
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• BASHIR HUSSAIN SHAH AND 4 Others vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1972 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  leave to appealreverification of landsurplus area cancellationrehabilitation settlement schemechief settlement commissionerassistant rehabilitation commissionerexcess allotment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition challenges the jurisdiction of the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner to reduce, upon reverification, land allotments made to the predecessor of private respondents. The core legal question concerns whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner possessed the lawful authority to cancel or reduce surplus land allotments under the relevant statutory framework. The Supreme Court held that the power of cancellation or reduction of an allotment is vested exclusively in the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, and subordinate schemes such as the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme cannot override these substantive statutory provisions. The Court laid down the principle that subordinate delegated legislation and administrative schemes cannot confer powers inconsistent with or broader than the substantive provisions of the parent statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner have the jurisdiction to cancel or reduce land allotments on reverification?
  • Can a rehabilitation settlement scheme override the substantive provisions of the parent statute regarding the cancellation of land allotments?
  • Who is exclusively empowered under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act to cancel or reduce excess land allotments?
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• BASHIR AHMAD vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 81 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-13Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD vs MUHAMMAD HANIF AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 98 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-20Read full judgment →
• BASHARAT ALI MIRZA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 511 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-17Read full judgment →
• BARKAT vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 486 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  review petitionSupreme Court RulesAdvocate appearancespecial leaveprocedural requirement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition was filed seeking review of the Supreme Court's order dated 4th April 1972 passed in Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 262 of 1971, which had been dismissed. The core legal question concerned the procedural requirement for filing and arguing a review petition under the Supreme Court Rules where a different counsel appeared during the original hearing. The Supreme Court highlighted that under Order XXVI, Rule 5 of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules, no application for review can be drawn up by any Advocate other than the Advocate who appeared at the hearing of the case wherein the judgment or order sought to be reviewed was made, unless special leave of the Court is obtained. Furthermore, the rule mandates that the Advocate who originally appeared must be present at the hearing of the review petition unless their presence has been dispensed with. Applying these procedural rules, the Court addressed the competence of the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be drawn by an Advocate other than the one who appeared at the original hearing of the case without special leave of the Court?
  • Is the Advocate who appeared at the main hearing required to be present during the hearing of the review petition?
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• BARKAT ALI vs GHULAM NABI AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 183 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-13Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI AND Other DILAWAR KHAN AND Other WALI MUHAMMAD AWAN AND Other vs MAULA BAKHSH AND Other WALI MUHAMMAD AND Other AND ABDUL GHAFOOR AND Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-28
  Rehabilitation Commissionerland allotmentomnibus orderrevisional jurisdictionRehabilitation Settlement Schemenatural justiceevacuee property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that invalidated an omnibus order issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on November 11, 1956, which revised land allotments across several Chaks. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner possessed the authority to issue such a general order, effectively superseding previous revisional orders and altering the "relevant date" for allotment eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner acted within the scope of his powers under the Rehabilitation Act of 1956. The Court determined that the Commissioner could issue general orders to correct irregularities and ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, provided that affected parties were given an opportunity to be heard. The Court further ruled that fixing a new "relevant date" for eligibility did not constitute an invalid departure from the scheme, as the Commissioner had the authority to issue instructions to better implement the scheme's fundamentals. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Rehabilitation Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Rehabilitation Commissioner issue an omnibus order to revise land allotments across multiple estates?
  • Does the Rehabilitation Commissioner have the authority to alter the 'relevant date' for determining eligibility for land allotments?
  • Is an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner invalid merely because it modifies previous revisional orders?
  • Must the Rehabilitation Commissioner grant an individual hearing to every affected person before issuing a general revision order?
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• BAQRI AND 4 Other vs SALMON AND 3 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  pre-emptionwaiver of pre-emptionauction saleco-ownershipestoppelagricultural land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 sold agricultural land through a private auction in 1955, where the appellants offered the highest bid of Rs. 30,000. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit to pre-empt the sale based on co-ownership, which was resisted on the ground that his participation in the auction estopped him from asserting his pre-emption right. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge and the High Court on second appeal decreed it. The core legal question is whether a pre-emptor's mere participation in an auction sale and failure to outbid the purchaser constitutes a waiver of the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that mere participation in an auction or failure to outbid the highest purchaser does not amount to a waiver. The Court laid down that a right of pre-emption arises upon the completion of a sale, and while it can be waived prior to sale by express refusal or clear conduct showing a lack of interest, mere competitive bidding participation or not outbidding the purchaser does not constitute waiver.

  Questions settled

  • Does participation in a private auction sale by a pre-emptor amount to a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Whether the failure of a person entitled to pre-emption to outbid the purchaser at an auction constitutes a waiver.
  • When does the statutory right of pre-emption arise in respect of a sale of agricultural property?
  • Can a pre-emption claim be defeated on the ground of waiver without evidence of an express refusal or clear conduct showing disinterest in the purchase?
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• BANARAS KHAN vs SARDAR KHAN AND 8 Other1972 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  occupancy tenancyleasehold rightscivil court jurisdictionappellate court powerscompensation assessmentrepudiation of tenancy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a civil suit for possession of land filed by the plaintiffs-respondents against the defendants-petitioners, involving claims of occupancy tenancy and leasehold rights. The core legal questions concerned whether the defendants' predecessor-in-interest purchased leasehold rights or merely a right to receive compensation, whether the civil court possessed jurisdiction to try the suit, and whether the High Court was empowered to modify the compensation amount despite the dismissal of cross-objections. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, affirming that the evidence established the defendants held the land as lessees under the occupancy tenant. The Court held that the civil court had jurisdiction because the defendant had repudiated the tenancy and asserted title. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, an appellate court possesses broad powers to pass any decree or order required by the justice of the case, including the reduction of compensation, regardless of whether a formal appeal or cross-objection was filed regarding that specific issue.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to try a suit for possession where the defendant has repudiated the tenancy and set up title in themselves?
  • Does an appellate court have the power under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reduce a compensation award even if the cross-objection regarding that amount was dismissed?
  • Can a court exercise its powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in favour of parties who have not filed an appeal or objection?
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• BALWANT SINGH AND OTHERS vs R. D. SHAH, DIRECTOR OF INSPECTION, INCOME-TAX, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS1972 PTD 8 · Delhi High Court · 1968-03-22Read full judgment →
• BAKHU vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 131 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-08Read full judgment →
• BAKHSH ELAHI vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SILK AND RAYON MILLS LTD., LYALLPUR1972 PLC 169 · Labour Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
• BAJ DIN AND Another vs DIN MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 567 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-17
  pre-emption suitevacuee propertycompensation poolDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actprovisional permanent allotteejurisdiction of civil courtslimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition arises out of a pre-emption suit filed in respect of agricultural land sold on 30th October 1964, which was originally evacuee property allotted to the vendor under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether a pre-emption suit regarding land that was part of the compensation pool at the time of sale is barred by section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and whether such a suit becomes competent after the property ceases to be part of the compensation pool. The Lahore High Court held that section 6 of the Act bars suits only against property currently forming part of the compensation pool and does not permanently immunize property that was once part of it. The court laid down the principle that a pre-emptor must show the right of pre-emption on the date of sale, the date of the suit, and the date of the decree, and a suit for pre-emption is maintainable once the statutory bar or defect is removed, provided the suit is within limitation. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit is barred by section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, if the land was part of the compensation pool at the time of sale but subsequently ceased to be so?
  • Does the acquisition of property by the Central Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, extinguish all evacuee interest in it?
  • Can a suit initially barred by a statutory restriction be continued or freshly instituted after the removal of that bar, provided it is within limitation?
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• BAHAR KHAN And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 411 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-14Read full judgment →
• BAGU vs THE STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymedical evidence vs ocular evidenceformal witnesshostile police witnessbenefit of doubtmurder appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302/34 and 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to transportation for life and rigorous imprisonment. The appellant argued that he did not participate in the fatal attack on the deceased, relying on minor discrepancies in medical evidence concerning the estimated age of injuries, the alleged site of bloodstains, and favorable statements made in cross-examination by a formal police witness. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's active participation in attacking witnesses to prevent them from aiding the deceased clearly established vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that approximate medical estimations regarding injury duration cannot override reliable direct eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the practice of subordinate formal police witnesses attempting to make obliging concessions for the defence during cross-examination, ruling that such testimony carries no evidential value.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused who did not inflict the fatal blow be convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for sharing common intention by assaulting witnesses who tried to rescue the deceased?
  • Does an approximate medical estimate regarding the duration or age of injuries outweigh direct and credible eyewitness testimony?
  • What evidential weight should be attached to obliging concessions made during cross-examination by formal subordinate police witnesses on matters beyond their scope of investigation?
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• BAGH ALI And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 334 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-10Read full judgment →
• BADRUDDIN vs Kazi MUNSHI AND 2 Other1972 PLD Karachi 101 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-16Read full judgment →
• B. A. WAIEN AND 18 Other vs COL. EHSAN UL HAQ, CHAIRMAN, BORDER1972 PLD Lahore 273 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-15Read full judgment →
• AZIZ SALIMUDDIN HYDER vs FAROOQ AHMAD Judgment Debtor1972 PLD Karachi 74 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-12Read full judgment →
• AZIZ AHMAD vs The STATE1972 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  special leave to appealattempt to murderassault on public servantmedical evidence vs ocular accountcross-examinationreappraisal of evidencecriminal revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under sections 307 and 333 of the Pakistan Penal Code for firing at a superior police officer and injuring another during an incident at the police lines. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner suffered prejudice from the alleged denial of cross-examination of a material witness, whether a minor contradiction between medical and ocular evidence warrants acquittal, and whether the Supreme Court can reappraise witness testimony concurrent findings of lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the failure to cross-examine was attributable to the defence, the medical contradiction regarding charring was immaterial to the core injuries sustained, and concurrent factual findings based on proper appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with in special leave proceedings. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies between medical and ocular evidence do not vitiate a conviction where core facts are established, and failure of the defence to avail cross-examination opportunities creates no legal prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding charring vitiate a conviction when the injury itself is established?
  • Can an accused claim prejudice for lack of cross-examination when the trial record shows the opportunity was given and not availed of?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts regarding the appreciation of witness testimony in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• AZIMULLLAH vs Sped SHAUKAT ALI and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 306 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-07Read full judgment →
• AZHAR ALI vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 602 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-15Read full judgment →
• AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR GOVERNMENT vs BRIG. MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN1972 PLD Azad J & K 70 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-07-18Read full judgment →
• AYUB KHAN vs Mst. BALQEES BEGUM1972 PLD Lahore 686 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-06Read full judgment →
• AYUB JAMES AND 2 Others vs STATE1972 P Cr. L J 759 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• AUSTRALASIA BANK L7D., KARACHI Decree-Holder vs BASHIR SONS AND 21972 PLD Karachi 327 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-18Read full judgment →
• AURANGZEB vs TheCSTATE1972 P Cr. L J 228 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-23Read full judgment →
• ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR PAKISTAN vs YUSUF ALI KHANB, BARRISTER AT LAW1972 PLD Supreme Court 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-18
  contempt of courtscandalizing the courtunconditional apologySupreme Judicial Councilpresidential referencejudicial integritypublication of contempt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a contempt of court proceeding initiated against a barrister who wrote a letter to the President of Pakistan making malicious and false allegations against the integrity and impartiality of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved whether sending such a letter constituted contempt, whether publication was necessary, and whether the communication was protected under Article 128(5) of the 1962 Constitution as information given to the President for a reference to the Supreme Judicial Council. The court held that the allegations were maliciously false, constituted gross contempt, required no formal publication to be actionable, and did not enjoy protection under Article 128(5) because bad faith and falsity stripped them of any legal immunity. The ratio decidendi is that while information against a judge may be submitted to the President in good faith under constitutional provisions, making recklessly false allegations to scandalize the judiciary constitutes punishable contempt. The court accepted the respondent's unconditional apology and withdrawal of allegations only in mitigation of sentence, imposing a lenient penalty of imprisonment and a fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transmission of a letter containing false allegations against judges to the President constitutes contempt of court?
  • Is prior publication of an offending document a necessary prerequisite to constitute contempt of court?
  • Does information supplied to the President under Article 128(5) of the 1962 Constitution regarding a judge's alleged misconduct enjoy absolute immunity from contempt proceedings?
  • What is the legal effect of an unconditional apology and withdrawal of allegations in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR PAKISTAN vs THE CHIEF EDITOR AND BUREAU MANAGER, PAKISTAN PRESS INTERNATIONAL, LAHORE AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-18
  contempt of courtmisrepresentation of court proceedingsnews reportpress responsibilitySupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon contempt notices issued to the respondents, including news editors, printers, and publishers of various newspapers, for publishing a baseless news-story that misrepresented court proceedings and tended to prejudice a pending matter. The core legal question concerns whether the publication of an unverified and incorrect news-report regarding court proceedings constitutes contempt of court. The Supreme Court held that while the publication of the baseless report, originating from a news agency without verifying from the court's Press Relations Officer, betrayed a lack of responsibility, the rule is nevertheless discharged under the circumstances. The key principle laid down emphasizes the necessity for reporters to verify court proceedings through official channels rather than relying on unverified sources to avoid misrepresenting judicial matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the publication of an unverified news-story misrepresenting court proceedings constitute contempt of court?
  • Is a news reporter required to consult the Press Relations Officer of the Court to verify information before publication?
  Read full judgment →
• ATTAULLAH MALIK vs RASHID AND ANOTHER S1972 PLD Karachi 273 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-14
  recovery of rentlimitation periodcause of actionevacuee propertyconfirmation of salemerger of orderssecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent filed by the respondents against the appellant tenant concerning an evacuee property house. The core legal question was whether the suit for recovery of rent for a period exceeding three years prior to the institution of the suit was barred by limitation under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, specifically interpreting the meaning of the word 'due' and when the cause of action accrued given that confirmation of the property sale under evacuee laws was subject to pending revisions before the Custodian. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the word 'due' in Article 110 means legally demandable and recoverable, and that limitation does not run until an enforceable cause of action arises. The Court laid down the principle that where the enforceability of a landlord's status and title is sub judice before appellate or revisional authorities under evacuee property legislation, the cause of action remains suspended and the rent becomes due only upon the final determination and merger of orders by the final authority, from which date the limitation period commences.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal meaning of the word 'due' under Article 110 of the Limitation Act 1908 in relation to a suit for arrears of rent?
  • When does the cause of action for the recovery of rent accrue when the landlord's title and status are subject to pending proceedings under evacuee property laws?
  • Does the filing of a revision petition render a matter sub judice such that the lower authority's order merges into the revisional order for the purpose of computing limitation?
  • Can arrears of rent become barred by limitation during a period when the landlord is legally incompetent to assert their status or file a suit for recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• ATTA MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-06
  unnatural offencewhipping sentencefear of bodily injurycriminal revisionsentencing enhancementstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court order enhancing the sentence of the appellant, who was convicted under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing an unnatural offence. The core legal question is whether a sentence of whipping under section 4(b) of the Whipping Act, 1909, is legally sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish that the victim was compelled or induced to submit to the offence by a "fear of bodily injury." The Supreme Court held that the imposition of whipping requires specific, affirmative proof that the accused induced fear of bodily injury prior to the commission of the offence. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found no evidence that the victim was threatened with bodily harm, noting that the statutory condition was not met. Consequently, the Court ruled the sentence of whipping illegal and set it aside, while maintaining the conviction and the term of imprisonment. The judgment establishes that the "fear of bodily injury" is an essential condition precedent for the imposition of whipping under the Whipping Act, 1909.

  Questions settled

  • Is the 'fear of bodily injury' an essential condition for imposing a sentence of whipping under section 4(b) of the Whipping Act, 1909?
  • Can a sentence of whipping be imposed for an unnatural offence without evidence that the victim was threatened with bodily harm?
  • Does the general nature of an unnatural offence satisfy the statutory requirement of inducing fear of bodily injury for the purpose of sentencing under the Whipping Act, 1909?
  Read full judgment →
• ATHAR KHAN AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 19 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-25
  constructive liabilitycommon intentionmurdergrievous hurtfree fightcriminal assaultplea of self-defence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court arises from criminal appeals and a revision petition concerning a violent clash between two neighbouring families in District Multan, which resulted in one death and multiple injuries. The core legal question involved the scope and applicability of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code in determining constructive liability for murder and grievous hurt where an unpremeditated fight ensued following a minor local dispute, and whether a common intention to commit murder could be inferred from the circumstances. The court held that the appellants did not share a common intention to commit murder, as evidenced by the specific weapons used and the careful employment of the blunt side of a hatchet by one of the assailants, but that their common intention extended to causing grievous hurt. The court set aside the murder convictions under section 302 read with section 34, while upholding the conviction of the principal offender for murder under section 302 simpliciter and maintaining convictions under section 326 read with section 34 for causing grievous hurt. The key principle laid down is that section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code requires strict proof of a pre-arranged plan and a common intention directed precisely towards the crime actually committed, and vicarious liability cannot be extended to a capital offence merely because an unlawful enterprise resulted in a death, unless the shared intention encompassed that specific consequence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code can be invoked to sustain a conviction for murder when the common intention of the accused persons did not extend beyond causing hurt or grievous hurt?
  • Does the use of the blunt side of a cutting weapon during an assault negative the presence of an intention to cause death?
  • How does the scope of constructive liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code differ from that under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether multiple accused persons participating in a sudden, unpremeditated assault can be held constructively liable for the specific fatal act committed independently by one of the co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• ATA-UL-HAQ vs QAMAR UR RAHIM AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 505 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-22Read full judgment →
• ATA ELAHI AND Others RAHIM BAKHSH AND Others vs MUHAMMAD SHAFT AND Other MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND Other1972 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-20
  land allotmentforgerylachesinformerlocus standiwrit jurisdictiondelegation of power
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These two petitions arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition. The dispute concerned the allotment of certain land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The Settlement Commissioner had upheld an allotment order passed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 10 of the Act, ruling that the order could not be challenged before other settlement authorities. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches, as the petitioners failed to challenge the initial 1963 order, and on findings of extensive fraud, forgery, and tampering with the official land records received from India. Additionally, a cousin's claim as an informer was rejected due to collusion and a lack of locus standi. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to land beyond the reverified amounts and that an informer has no vested interest in the property to invoke writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 can be challenged before other settlement authorities?
  • Can a petitioner invoke writ jurisdiction to claim land when the underlying entitlement is based on forged and tampered official records?
  • Does an informer who colludes with claimants have a vested interest or locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, HYDERABAD vs Nawab Sir Mir1972 PTD 152 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-23Read full judgment →
• ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY vs Nawab Sir Mir OSMAN ALI KHAN1972PTD 156 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1964-07-02Read full judgment →
• ASKARAN KISSENLAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL1972 PTD 517 · Calcutta High Court · 1967-07-11Read full judgment →
• ASHIQ HUSSAIN AND Another vs ASHIQ ALI1972 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-17
  Muhammadan Lawgiftdelivery of possessionseisinwaqfrevocation of gifttransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the validity of a gift of agricultural land. The donor, after executing a registered gift deed in favor of the appellants, subsequently revoked the gift and created a waqf. The appellants filed a suit for a declaration of ownership, which was decreed by the trial and first appellate courts, finding that the gift was valid and possession had been transferred. However, the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the gift was incomplete due to the absence of actual delivery of possession. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's judgment. The Court held that under Muhammadan Law, a valid gift requires three essentials: a declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee, and the delivery of possession (seisin). The Court clarified that a mere recital in a gift deed stating that possession has been delivered is insufficient to effect a transfer, especially when the land is in the possession of tenants. A conscious, unequivocal, and distinct act of transferring possession is mandatory to perfect the gift.

  Questions settled

  • What are the three essential requirements for a valid gift under Muhammadan Law?
  • Is a mere recital in a gift deed sufficient to prove the delivery of possession when the property is in the possession of tenants?
  • Can a donor revoke a gift after it has been completed by the delivery of possession?
  Read full judgment →
• ASHFAQUE AHMAD SHEIKH vs THE STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29
  contempt of courtcontempt in facie curiaeright of criticismjudge as prosecutor and judgeapology in contemptreduction of sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal, filed as of right under Article 58(2) of the 1962 Constitution, challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan convicting the appellant, an Advocate, of gross contempt of court for interrupting judicial proceedings and inciting disobedience of a court order. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's actions constituted contempt in facie curiae, whether the presiding judge was barred from trying the contempt matter, and whether the law of contempt violated Islamic principles or required prior framing of rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction, holding that the appellant's conduct in challenging the court order in an insolent tone and urging its disobedience amounted to gross contempt and did not fall within the scope of good faith criticism. The Court affirmed that contempt proceedings in facie curiae are an exception to the rule against a judge acting as both prosecutor and judge, and that the power to punish under Article 123 of the 1962 Constitution is absolute and not dependent on rules. However, considering extenuating circumstances including the appellant's youth and junior standing, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate or stranger intervening in court proceedings and publicly challenging an interim order constitutes contempt of court?
  • Does the rule against a judge acting as both prosecutor and judge apply to contempt committed in the face of the court?
  • Is the exercise of the power to punish for contempt under Article 123 of the 1962 Constitution dependent upon the framing of rules?
  • Whether an unrepentant or qualified apology tendered after justifying contumacious conduct can be accepted by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• ASAL DIN vs MIR BAHADUR AND Another1972 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-23
  criminal appealmurderacquittalself-defencebenefit of doubtirrigation water dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court acquitting the respondent of the murder of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the respondent shot the deceased following a dispute over the turn of irrigation water. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction and granting the respondent the benefit of the doubt on the grounds of self-defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the acquittal order was sustainable on sound reasoning and was not arbitrary or fanciful. The Court noted that the respondent sustained injuries during the occurrence, a grappling had taken place between the parties wherein the deceased held a lethal weapon, and the possibility that the respondent acted in the exercise of the right of private defence could not be excluded. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, laying down the principle that an acquittal based on a plausible view of self-defence and the benefit of doubt will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal based on the right of self-defence can be interfered with by the Supreme Court when it is supported by sound reasoning?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the person of the accused in the first information report support a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused where prosecution witnesses were partly found to be false and a grappling preceded the fatal shooting?
  Read full judgment →
• ASAD ULLAH KHAN AND 3 Others vs The STATE1972 SCMR 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-05
  murdermurderous assaultcommon intentionright of private defenceaggressorleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their criminal appeal and upheld their conviction and sentence for murder and murderous assault. The petitioners were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, and convicted under section 302/34 and section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that following an altercation regarding the watering of a buffalo, the petitioners and co-accused armed with weapons attacked the complainant party inside their haveli, resulting in the death of one person and injuries to others. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding the place of occurrence, the role of the aggressors, and the availability of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the attack indeed took place near the haveli, that the petitioners were the aggressors, and that no right of private defence was available to them. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's finding regarding the place of occurrence can be interfered with when supported by overwhelming prosecution evidence?
  • Does the right of private defence accrue to an accused party who is established to be the aggressor?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ANWAR HUSSAIN ZAIDI vs ATTA UR RAHMAN AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-02-16
  hire-purchase agreementallotment cancellationsublettingforfeiture clauserehabilitation authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan quashing a departmental order that cancelled a hire-purchase agreement and the allotment of a property for alleged subletting in violation of agreement terms. The core legal question was whether the hire-purchase agreement prescribed a penalty or forfeiture clause for the breach of the condition against subletting. The Supreme Court held that the relevant clause of the agreement was directed solely towards default in the payment of instalments and did not provide a penalty for the breach of the condition against subletting, a view further fortified by the subsequent issuance of a departmental correction slip introducing a new clause. The appeal was accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a hire-purchase agreement providing for forfeiture upon default in instalment payments also authorize the cancellation of the agreement for subletting?
  • Whether the High Court correctly quashed the departmental order cancelling an allotment in the absence of a penalty clause for subletting?
  Read full judgment →
• ANWAR And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 589 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-24Read full judgment →
• ANSARUDDIN vs APPELLATE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA1972 PTD 200 · Dacca · 1969-03-28Read full judgment →
• ANFORDS (PAKISTAN) WORKERS' UNION vs ANFORDS (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 279 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-06-23Read full judgment →
• AMIR vs THE STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-02
  post-arrest bailright of private defencecross-casebenefit of doubtculpable homicidebail adjudication
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had rejected the petitioner's bail application in a murder case while granting bail to his co-accused. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the potential applicability of the right of private defence, arising from a cross-case involving a land dispute where the petitioner allegedly acted after the deceased had killed a member of the petitioner's party. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to consider the statements of witnesses other than the complainant, which might support the petitioner's plea of self-defence. The Court held that while it would not grant bail at this stage, the High Court should re-examine the bail application by considering the entire available evidence. The key principle laid down is that even at the bail stage, the law should not be stretched in favour of the prosecution, and any benefit of doubt arising from the evidence must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Should the benefit of doubt in bail proceedings be extended to the accused?
  • Is the right of private defence a relevant consideration for the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Must a court consider the entire body of available evidence when adjudicating a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR KHAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 609 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-13Read full judgment →
• AMIR BUX And 3 Others vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 45 · Sindh High Court · 1970-12-18Read full judgment →
• AMINUL HAQ vs Mst. MUSTAWARA Etc.S1972 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16Read full judgment →
• AMANAT ALI vs Syed PANAH ALI SHAH AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 556 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• AMAN Alias AMAN ALI vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 369 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-27Read full judgment →
• AMALGAMATIONS (PVT.) LTD vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1972 PTD 300 · Madras High Court · 1972-02-19Read full judgment →
• ALLARAKHA vs BABOO BROTHER TRANSPORT Co., KARACHI Opponents1972 PLD Karachi 215 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-25Read full judgment →
• ALLAH YAR vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 90 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-14Read full judgment →
• ALLAH WARAYO vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 585 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-09Read full judgment →
• ALLAH RAKHIO vs TAE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 319 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-15Read full judgment →
• ALLAH RAKHA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 530 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-20Read full judgment →
• ALLAH NOOR AND 5 Others ISMAIL AND 3 Others vs THE STATE THROUGH COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR DIVISION, PESHAWAR THE STATE AND 3 Other M. Zahural Haq, Advocate Supreme Court Instructed By Nur Ahmad Khan,1972 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  criminal lawtribunal referralright to hearingnatural justiceprocedural illegalityvoid order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves two appeals by special leave concerning the procedural requirements for referring criminal cases to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether an accused person is entitled to notice and a hearing before a Commissioner issues an order referring their case to a Tribunal under Section 3 of the Act. Relying on established precedents, the Supreme Court held that the decision-making process by a Commissioner regarding the referral of a case constitutes 'proceedings' under Section 25 of the Act. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the accused has a mandatory right to be heard before such an order is passed. An order issued without providing this opportunity is void ab initio, rendering all subsequent proceedings tainted with illegality. Following the concession by the Advocate-General, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the Commissioners, and directed that the cases be tried before ordinary criminal courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to notice and a hearing before a Commissioner refers their case to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1963?
  • Does the process of referring a case to a Tribunal constitute 'proceedings' under Section 25 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1963?
  • Is an order of reference to a Tribunal void if passed without affording the accused an opportunity of being heard?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DIWAYA vs The STATE1972 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonymedical evidencerelated witnessescorroborationcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the appellant's sentence of death under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Noor Muhammad. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony by related witnesses, the necessity of independent corroboration, and alleged contradictions between the medical evidence and the statements of eyewitnesses regarding the level of the assailant. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were well-founded, as the medical evidence was consistent with the eyewitness accounts regarding the relative positions of the assailant and the deceased, and the broad daylight occurrence left no doubt regarding identification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses requires independent corroboration in a murder trial?
  • Does an inconsistency between the entry and exit wound levels and the ocular testimony regarding the assailant's position warrant a rejection of the prosecution case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable on the basis of related eyewitnesses when some co-accused have been given the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 841 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-13Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA vs KARIM BAKHSH AND 6 Other1972 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-24
  acquittalleave to appealmisreading of evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealphysical evidenceself-defense
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted six respondents of charges under sections 148, 302, and 307 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court overturned this, citing doubts regarding the incident's location and the nature of injuries sustained by the accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a misreading of evidence or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s conclusions were not perverse. The Court found that the prosecution's case was undermined by the presence of blood in multiple fields and the nature of the injuries on the accused, which could not have been caused by a single sickle as claimed. Consequently, the Court affirmed that it would not interfere with an acquittal that is sustainable on the record and does not constitute a grave miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court's findings are sustainable on the record?
  • Does the presence of blood in multiple fields contradict a prosecution case asserting a single location for an occurrence?
  • Can an appellate court reject a prosecution version of events if the injuries sustained by the accused are inconsistent with the alleged weapon used by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DAD vs MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Alias BAGGA AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtdying declarationextra-judicial confessionweapon recoveryacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Peshawar, which set aside the conviction of the respondent under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and ordered his acquittal for the murder of Malik Dad. The prosecution case rested on a dying declaration, an extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a blood-stained knife, supported by an alleged motive. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in extending the benefit of the doubt and setting aside the conviction based on the appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court provided cogent and valid reasons for disbelieving the dying declaration, extra-judicial confession, and weapon recovery, and that its conclusions were neither perverse nor unreasonable. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal order based on a plausible appreciation of evidence and the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside a murder conviction by giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  • Can a dying declaration be discredited due to the presence of relatives and the possibility of prompting?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession reliable when the witness failed to mention it in earlier police statements?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal order when the High Court's conclusions are based on a reasonable appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH D1TTA And 2 Others vs Thp STATE1972 P Cr.L J 427 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-15Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BAKHSH And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 761 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-17Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BACHAYA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 162 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-20Read full judgment →
• Alimad BAKUSH vs Tub STATE--1972 P Cr. L J 279 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-14Read full judgment →
• ALI SHER And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 754 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-24Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1972 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  post-arrest bailmurderunlawful assemblypolice raidsupreme court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Ali Muhammad against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a case involving charges under sections 302, 307, and 148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail on grounds of delay in commitment proceedings, advanced age, and alleged lack of incriminating evidence regarding membership of an unlawful assembly. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing bail, particularly given that the petitioner was apprehended at the scene of the crime inside the raided house. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is arrested directly at the spot during a police raid, bail may be properly refused by the superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused arrested at the spot during a police raid is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does delay in commitment proceedings automatically entitle an accused facing serious criminal charges to bail?
  • Can advanced age alone serve as a sufficient ground for granting bail in heinous offences?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD vs Hakim MUHAMMAD SHAFI1972 PLD Lahore 751 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-14Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Raja MUHAMMAD ZIAULLAH AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  settlement propertycomposite buildingadministrative discretiondivision of propertywrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a composite property consisting of shops and residential units under settlement laws. The petitioners and respondents both claimed the property, leading to a series of administrative orders by settlement authorities. Initially, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the entire property to the petitioners, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner subsequently divided the property between the parties, allocating specific portions to each based on their possession. This division was upheld through subsequent revisions and by the Lahore High Court in writ and Letters Patent Appeal proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the administrative division of the composite building. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was correct, affirming that the power to divide a composite building under the relevant settlement statute rests with the Settlement Authorities. The Court ruled that it would not interfere with such administrative discretion unless the exercise of power was shown to be arbitrary or capricious, finding that substantial justice had been served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to divide a composite building under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 rest with the Settlement Authorities?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with the division of a composite building made by Settlement Authorities?
  • Is the division of a composite building between parties in possession considered a valid exercise of administrative power under settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI HASAN AND Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 558 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-24Read full judgment →
• ALI AKHTAR HUSSAIN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-17
  murderdying declarationbenefit of doubtocular testimonytainted evidencecriminal appealcorroboration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the conviction could be sustained based solely on a dying declaration and the testimony of a single witness, both of which were challenged as unreliable. The Supreme Court observed that the investigation was tainted, as the dying declaration included names of witnesses previously discredited by lower courts as stock witnesses. Furthermore, the sole remaining ocular witness was a friend of the deceased and held animosity toward the appellant, necessitating independent corroboration. The Court held that a dying declaration tainted by the inclusion of unreliable witnesses could not serve as corroborative evidence for the testimony of an interested witness. Establishing the principle that one piece of tainted evidence cannot corroborate another, the Court granted the appellant the benefit of the doubt, set aside the conviction, and ordered his immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration that includes the names of discredited witnesses be relied upon for conviction?
  • Does the testimony of a sole eyewitness require independent corroboration when the witness is an interested party?
  • Can one piece of tainted evidence serve as corroboration for another piece of tainted evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMAD MAHMOOD vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 1139 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-12Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMAD AND Another vs MUHAMMAD FAZAL AND Another1972 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  pre-emptionconsent decreemutationlimitation periodexecution of decreerevenue record
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of a consent decree in a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a mutation of land based on a civil court consent decree could be sanctioned by revenue authorities when the decree holder had failed to execute the decree within the statutory period of limitation. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's decision, which had restored a mutation order despite the decree having become time-barred. The Court held that a decree for pre-emption, once it becomes ineffective due to the failure to execute it within the prescribed period of limitation, cannot be used as a valid basis for sanctioning a mutation of land in the revenue records. The key principle laid down is that revenue authorities cannot bypass the law of limitation by sanctioning mutations based on stale or time-barred civil court decrees. Consequently, the Court found the respondent's reliance on the time-barred decree to be legally unsustainable, thereby setting aside the previous order that had allowed the mutation to proceed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mutation of land be sanctioned based on a consent decree that has become time-barred?
  • Does the failure to execute a pre-emption decree within the limitation period render the decree ineffective for mutation purposes?
  • Are revenue authorities empowered to sanction a mutation based on a civil court decree that is no longer executable?
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• AKHTAR KHAN vs THE COMMISSIONER OF KARACHI AND 2 Other1972 PLD Karachi 132 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-16Read full judgment →
• AKHTAR ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1034 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-10Read full judgment →
• AKBAR vs SADIQ AND 15 Other1972 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-23
  refugee right-holderrehabilitation schemeinheritance of evacuee landconfirmed allotteecondonation of delaylimitation actsuccession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the inheritance of land allotted to a refugee right-holder, Khuda Bakhsh, who died in 1956. The core legal question was whether the deceased was a 'confirmed allottee' at the time of his death, thereby subjecting his estate to Muslim Personal Law, or a mere 'right-holder,' subjecting succession to the Rehabilitation Scheme. The High Court had dismissed the appellant's review petition on grounds of limitation and merits. The Supreme Court held that because the rehabilitation fee was paid in 1959, after the deceased's death, he remained a 'right-holder' at the time of death. Consequently, succession is governed by the Rehabilitation Scheme, specifically paragraph 46, rather than Muslim Personal Law. Furthermore, the Court condoned the two-day delay in filing the review petition, finding the appellant had been pursuing his remedies in good faith. The principle laid down is that until the rehabilitation fee is paid and the allotment is finally confirmed, the deceased remains a 'right-holder,' and inheritance is determined by the Rehabilitation Scheme rather than general personal law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a refugee right-holder before the payment of the rehabilitation fee render the succession governed by the Rehabilitation Scheme rather than Muslim Personal Law?
  • Is a delay of two days in filing a review petition a fit case for condonation under the Limitation Act when the party has been pursuing remedies in good faith?
  • At what point does an allottee under the Rehabilitation Scheme become a 'confirmed allottee' for the purpose of inheritance?
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• AKBAR ALI vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD1972 PLC 255 · Labour Court · 1971-12-20Read full judgment →
• AIJAZ HUSSAIN--Appellant vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 738 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-24Read full judgment →
• AHMAD NOOR And 5 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 910 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-08Read full judgment →
• AHMAD KHAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 30 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• AHMAD KHAN And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 877 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-08Read full judgment →
• AHMAD DIN vs FAIZ AHMAD AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-24
  acquittalself-defencebenefit of doubtsuppression of injurycriminal appealmurderprosecution evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal order passed by the Lahore High Court, which had overturned the conviction of the respondents for the murder of the petitioner's son. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in accepting the plea of self-defence and whether the accused exceeded that right. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to explain a serious injury sustained by one of the accused, which lent credibility to the defence version. Furthermore, the Court held that the prosecution's suppression of this injury and the existence of a motive on the complainant's side created a strong possibility of the truthfulness of the defence. Regarding the plea of self-defence, the Court affirmed that the right to self-defence cannot be measured in golden scales or modulated step-by-step, and the mere disparity in the number of injuries inflicted does not automatically prove an excess of that right. The petition was dismissed, maintaining the benefit of the doubt extended to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the accused support a plea of self-defence?
  • Can the right of self-defence be measured by the number of injuries inflicted on the deceased versus the accused?
  • Is the right of self-defence lost simply because the accused inflicted more injuries than they received?
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• AHMAD DIN AND 3 Others vs TOWN COMMITTEE DIPALPUR1972 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  withdrawal of suitformal defectliberty to file fresh suitpreliminary issuesestoppelmisjoinder of causes of actioncivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership regarding specific plots and shops, challenging the Town Committee's authority to collect rent. The respondent raised preliminary objections regarding estoppel, misjoinder of causes of action, and inconsistent pleadings. Subsequently, the petitioners sought to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one, citing technical defects. The trial court allowed the withdrawal, but the High Court set aside this order, ruling that the issues raised were substantive rather than formal. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to allow the withdrawal of a suit with permission to file a fresh one based on alleged formal defects. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the issues raised—estoppel, misjoinder, and inconsistent pleas—were not merely formal but went to the root of the case. The Court affirmed that permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh one cannot be granted when the defects are substantive rather than formal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court allow the withdrawal of a suit with permission to file a fresh one if the defects in the original suit are substantive rather than formal?
  • Do issues regarding estoppel, misjoinder of causes of action, and inconsistent pleadings constitute formal defects under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is a trial court's discretion to permit the withdrawal of a suit with liberty to file a fresh one absolute?
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