Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• AHMAD AND Others vs GHULAM HAIDER1972 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-02
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionstranger vendeeconcurrent findings of factsecond appealproprietary rightsjamabandi
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core dispute involved whether one of the seven vendees, who was a tenant in possession without payment of rent, should be classified as an 'owner' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, thereby preserving the superior pre-emption rights of the group. The petitioners argued that this status was a question of law. The Supreme Court held that the definition of 'owner' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act refers to a person possessing full proprietary rights, not the definitions found in land revenue statutes or regulations. Since the jamabandi recorded the Provincial Government as the owner, the lower courts' finding of fact was conclusive and not subject to interference in second appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that when vendees associate with a stranger in a purchase, they lose their superior right of pre-emption, especially where the sale consideration is paid in a lump sum without specified individual contributions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'owner' in the Punjab Pre-emption Act include a tenant in possession without payment of rent?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership status in a second appeal?
  • Does the association of a stranger in a land purchase result in the loss of superior pre-emption rights for the other vendees?
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• AHMAD ABDUL GHANI TEXTILE MILLS, KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1972 PLC 382 · Labour Court · 1971-09-17Read full judgment →
• AGHA MUHAMMAD-Objector vs Haji MAULA DAD Decree Holder1972 PLD Karachi 436 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-07Read full judgment →
• ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL, KARACHI And 2 Others vs JUMMA1972 P Cr. L J 1213 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-08Read full judgment →
• ADAMS TEA BLENDING FACTORY, KARACHI vs ADAMS TEA WORKERS UNION1972 PLC 271 · Labour Court · 1971-05-21Read full judgment →
• ACHARYA DAVENDRA PRASADJI AND 2 Other vs TIRATHDAS AND 10 Other1972 PLD Karachi 251 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABID HUSSAIN vs Mst. AFSAR JEHAN BEGUM AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 54 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-27Read full judgment →
• ABDUR REHMAN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-05
  criminal petitioncheatingimpersonationmutation proceedingslambardarrigorous imprisonment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by the petitioner, a Lambardar, challenging his conviction under sections 419, 420 read with 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's identification of an impostor during mutation proceedings, which resulted in the purchaser being deceived into buying property, constituted an innocent act or criminal culpability. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's identification of the impostor were supported by evidence, specifically the testimony of the purchaser. The Court concluded that the identification was not innocent and that it directly deceived the purchaser. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentences of rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the identification of an impostor before a Patwari during mutation proceedings amount to cheating under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding criminal identification warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a Lambardar liable for abetment and cheating when identifying a fraudulent vendor to a purchaser?
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• ABDUR RASHID vs ABDUL ALI AND Another1972 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  auction salepublic auctionsuo motu revisionlocus standievacuee propertyrevisional jurisdictionsettlement commissioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition against the decision of a Settlement Commissioner setting aside an auction sale of a share in Qadiria Flour Mills. The core legal questions were whether the auction was invalid due to lack of due publicity and whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the authority to set aside the auction. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, affirming that the question of whether due publicity was given is primarily a question of fact, which had been resolved against the petitioner. The Court held that even if the respondents lacked standing to challenge the auction, the Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction by exercising suo motu revisional powers under the relevant statute once the irregularities were brought to his notice. The key principle laid down is that a Settlement Commissioner, upon becoming aware of irregular auction proceedings, is empowered to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to ensure compliance with prescribed procedures, regardless of the standing of the initial complainants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise suo motu revisional powers upon learning of irregularities in an auction process?
  • Is the determination of whether due publicity was given for a public auction a question of fact?
  • Does a person who is not an applicant for the transfer of evacuee property have locus standi to challenge its disposal by public auction?
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• ABDUR RASHID KHALID AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 90 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-10Read full judgment →
• ABDUR RAHMAN vs GADAT KHAN AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-20
  free fightright of private defenceindividual liabilitybenefit of doubtacquittal set asideland dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was filed against a High Court judgment acquitting the three respondents of charges under Sections 302, 307, and 325 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a fatal armed clash over disputed agricultural land. The High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that it was impossible to ascertain which party fired first, thereby extending the benefit of doubt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, in a case of a mutual free fight, the inability to determine which party initiated firing entitles the accused to an acquittal or whether participants remain individually liable for their acts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and convicted the respondents based on ocular and medical evidence. The Court held that in a mutual free fight where both parties anticipate resistance and knowingly engage in a trial of strength, no right of private defence arises, and failure to prove who struck first does not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt; each participant is individually liable for their specific criminal acts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence is available to participants in a mutual free fight?
  • Does the inability to establish which party struck first in a free fight entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Whether participants in a mutual free fight are individually liable for their respective acts?
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• ABDULLAH vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Other1972 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-12
  occupancy tenancyevacuee propertyredemption of mortgagePunjab Alienation of Land Actagricultural tribeusufructuary mortgageCustodian of Evacuee Property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal regarding the redemption of occupancy tenancy lands mortgaged to Hindu mortgagees who subsequently migrated to India, vesting their rights in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an occupancy tenant, could retrospectively invoke the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, to convert existing mortgages into usufructuary mortgages by claiming a change in tribal status to "Gujars." The Supreme Court held that the relief provided by the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, is not available to those who were not members of an agricultural tribe at the time the mortgage was created. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the conversion of a mortgage under the Act is not automatic and requires a formal application, which was not timely filed. Additionally, the Court affirmed that ex parte proceedings conducted without notice to the Custodian of Evacuee Property are not binding on the Custodian. The petition was dismissed, maintaining that the petitioner must redeem the property through payment of dues.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefits of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 be claimed retrospectively by a person who was not a member of an agricultural tribe at the time of the mortgage?
  • Is the conversion of a mortgage into a usufructuary mortgage under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 an automatic process?
  • Are ex parte proceedings regarding property rights binding on the Custodian of Evacuee Property if the Custodian was not given notice?
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• ABDULLAH KHAN AND Others vs KHALIL AHMAD AND Other1972 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03
  limitationcondonation of delaycivil procedureleave to appealLetters Patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was challenged on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question addressed is whether a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal can be condoned when the petitioner fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the period between receiving the refusal of a certificate under the Letters Patent and the actual filing of the petition. The Court held that the petition was barred by 248 days and dismissed it accordingly. The ratio of the decision emphasizes that while the time spent obtaining a certificate for appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent may be condoned, the petitioner must demonstrate continuous diligence and provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court established the principle that delay in civil matters is not to be lightly excused, as the lapse of time creates valuable rights for the opposing party that cannot be arbitrarily extinguished. Consequently, without a valid explanation for the specific period of delay, the petition was rejected as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal run from the date of the judgment in second appeal?
  • Can delay in filing a petition be condoned if the petitioner fails to explain the entire period of delay?
  • Is delay in civil matters to be lightly excused by the court?
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• ABDUL WAHID And 3 Others--Appellants vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 1144 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-15Read full judgment →
• ABDUL WAHEED vs ZULQARNA1N, Additional Deputy Commissioner1972 P Cr. L J 177 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABDUL WAHEED vs SATTAR INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 410 · Labour Court · 1971-11-15Read full judgment →
• ABDUL WAHAB KHAN vs THE GENERAL IRON AND STEEL WORKS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 112 · Labour Court · 1971-03-13Read full judgment →
• ABDUL SATTAR And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 503 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-20Read full judgment →
• ABDUL SAMAD Alias DADDA vs Khan IQBAL AHMAD KHAN LODHI, P.C.S., DISTRICT TRIBUNAL, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 41 · Lahore High Court
  control of goondasimplied repealdistrict tribunalrevisional jurisdictiondouble jeopardyacquittal as evidenceshow-cause noticepreventive detention
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This full bench reference arises from numerous revision petitions under section 19 of the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, wherein a learned Single Judge referred twelve questions of law for determination. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of the 1959 Ordinance regarding the constitutionality of multiple tribunals within a single district, the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction, the nature of hearings required under section 14(2), the use of prior acquittals or insufficient material as evidence, and whether a person brought before the Tribunal is an accused person. The court held that the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 does not impliedly repeal the 1959 Ordinance, that only one tribunal can be legally established per district, that proceedings under the Ordinance do not constitute a criminal trial rendering the person an accused, and that the High Court's revisional powers are confined to jurisdictional errors. The key principles laid down include the strict construction of special statutes regarding district tribunals, the permissibility of utilizing prior acquittal records as evidence without constituting double jeopardy, and the limitations on High Court review of factual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the enactment of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 impliedly repeals the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959?
  • Whether it is permissible under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 to constitute more than one Tribunal in a district?
  • What is the exact nature of the hearing to be afforded to a Goonda under subsection (2) of section 14 of the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, and does it postulate a formal show-cause notice?
  • Whether a person brought before a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 is an accused person?
  • Can an order of acquittal by a criminal Court be used as evidence for making an order under section 13 of the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959?
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• ABDUL REHMAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 491 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-10Read full judgment →
• ABDUL REHMAN vs Mst. CHAMAN ARA1972 PLD Karachi 164 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-18
  supervisory jurisdictionsubordinate courtsconstitutional petitionscourt-feeadministrative controljudicial reviewrevision
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This Full Bench reference before the Sindh High Court addresses the nature, scope, and proper procedure governing applications filed under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962, particularly regarding court-fees and bench jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether Article 102 confers a remedy akin to writ jurisdiction under Article 98, attracting a higher court-fee and Division Bench hearing, or whether it constitutes an administrative and supervisory power over subordinate courts. Delivering the opinion, the court held that Article 102 is exclusively a supervisory and control provision directed at ensuring subordinate courts function properly and adhere to jurisdiction, rather than providing an appellate or revisional remedy for individual litigants. Consequently, it is distinct from Article 98, does not require a higher court-fee of Rs. 100, and does not necessitate a Division Bench hearing. The key principle laid down is that the supervisory power under Article 102 is designed to keep the administration of justice pure by supervising subordinate courts, and cannot be invoked as a substitute for ordinary appeals, revisions, or constitutional petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 is analogous to Article 98 regarding the nature of remedies provided to litigants?
  • Does Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 empower the High Court to interfere with the merits of orders passed by subordinate courts as an appellate or revisional authority?
  • What is the correct amount of court-fee payable on applications filed under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Should applications under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 be heard exclusively by a Division Bench or a Single Judge?
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• ABDUL RASHID vs THS STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-25
  interim bailpost-arrest bailscope of Section 498 CrPCcommitment for trialmurderidentification paradereasonable grounds
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter concerns an interim bail application arising from a murder case where the appellant was identified solely by the hair of his head during an identification parade. The Supreme Court addressed the legal complexities surrounding the scope of bail after commitment for trial in offences punishable with death or transportation for life, and the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court examined whether Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is merely ancillary and subsidiary to Sections 496 and 497, or if it confers independent, residuary, and supplementary powers upon superior courts. Noting a lack of judicial uniformity and questioning the correctness of the majority view in a prior precedent, the court referred several key questions regarding the scope of bail powers and committing magistrates' discretion to a Full Court for authoritative determination.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct scope of section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whether it is ancillary or subsidiary to sections 496 and 497 in all respects?
  • Does section 498 confer a supplementary and residual power on the superior courts, namely the Sessions Court and the High Court, which is not available to other criminal courts?
  • What precisely is the scope of the phrase that the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial under section 210(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as contrasted with section 497?
  • Does the committing Magistrate have the power to grant bail even after he decides to commit the accused person for his trial for an offence punishable with death or transportation for life?
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• ABDUL RASHID vs MOINUDDIN AND ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 724 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-10Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID vs CAFE MOOSA (MOOSA SETH MALABARI)1972 PLC 438 · Labour Court · 1972-05-19Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 796 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-26Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RAHMAN vs KHUDA BAKHSH AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  evacuee propertyauction confirmationcondonation of delayagreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIlimitationwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from writ proceedings wherein the High Court set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal questions pertained to whether an appeal filed after an inordinate delay of five years could be entertained by the Settlement Commissioner without examining sufficient cause for condonation, and whether an agreement of association submitted prior to the confirmation of an auction was legally valid. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the Settlement Commissioner erred in concluding that limitation did not apply and in failing to evaluate whether sufficient grounds existed to condone the five-year delay. The Court further noted that no legal provision prohibited the acceptance of an agreement of association after an auction but before its confirmation, provided it was submitted before the statutory deadline. Consequently, the petitioner's belated challenge after losing ejectment proceedings was unjustified, and the leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate authority under settlement laws can entertain an appeal filed after five years without considering condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is an agreement of association submitted after an auction but before its confirmation legally valid if filed within the prescribed statutory cutoff date?
  • Can a party challenge an auction confirmation in settlement proceedings after failing to raise such objections in prior rent controller proceedings resulting in eviction?
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• ABDUL QADIR KHAN vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 714 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-08Read full judgment →
• ABDUL QADIR And Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 742 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-01-28Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID vs SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT JAIL, LAHORE and 2 otherss1972 P Cr. L J 1220 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-27Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 188 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-21Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID AND 57 Other vs THE MEMBER (CONSOLIDATION) BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 35 Other1972 PLD Lahore 530 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABDUL LATIF vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1095 · Lahore High Court
  rash and negligent drivingcausationpost-mortem examinationgrievous hurtcriminal revisionmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought revision of his conviction under Section 304-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for causing death by rash and negligent driving. The core legal question was whether a conviction for causing death could be sustained when no post-mortem examination was conducted to establish the direct causal link between the injuries sustained and the victim's subsequent death. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the injuries were the immediate, proximate, and efficient cause of death due to the absence of an autopsy. Consequently, the conviction under Section 304-A was set aside. However, because the medical evidence clearly established the existence of grievous injuries, the Court altered the conviction to Section 338, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that for a conviction under Section 304-A, the prosecution must provide medical evidence establishing the injuries as the causa causans of death; a failure to perform a post-mortem examination creates a fatal lacuna that precludes a conviction for causing death.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained in the absence of a post-mortem examination?
  • Is a post-mortem examination necessary to establish the causal link between injuries and death in a prosecution for rash and negligent driving?
  • Can an appellate court alter a conviction from Section 304-A to Section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on proven grievous hurt?
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• ABDUL LATIF vs THE STATE And 7 Other1972 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-09
  transfer of casereasonable apprehensionbias of judgefair trialcriminal procedurejudicial impartiality
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal case pending against him under Sections 376, 368, 346, and 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from the court of a Magistrate in Gujranwala. The transfer application, filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was based on the allegation that the trial Magistrate was the nephew of one Mirza Azam Beg, against whom the petitioner had previously testified. The High Court dismissed the transfer application, finding the allegations unsubstantiated. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court observed that if the petitioner could prove he had indeed testified against the Magistrate's uncle, it would create a reasonable apprehension in the petitioner's mind regarding the fairness of the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the current petition but granted the petitioner liberty to renew the transfer application before the High Court, provided he submits a certified copy of his previous statement against the Magistrate's relative to substantiate his claim of bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does a familial relationship between a trial Magistrate and a person against whom the accused has testified constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a case?
  • Can a transfer application be renewed before the High Court if new evidence substantiating the grounds for transfer is produced?
  • What is the standard for determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists in a criminal trial?
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• ABDUL LATIF And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 353 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-01Read full judgment →
• ABDUL KHALIQ vs MESSRS SHAN INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 425 · Labour Court · 1972-04-05Read full judgment →
• ABDUL KARIM MOOSA vs MOHINI BAI AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  evacuee propertyspecific performanceCustodian jurisdictionland acquisitionnon-evacuee propertyDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had dismissed his writ petition challenging the Custodian's refusal to approve an agreement for the sale of agricultural land. The petitioner had entered into an agreement to purchase land from respondent No. 1, who subsequently migrated to India without completing the transaction. The core legal question was whether the Custodian retained jurisdiction to approve the sale agreement after the property had been acquired by the Government. The Supreme Court held that because the property in dispute had been acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, via a notification dated 8th June 1960, it had ceased to be evacuee property. Consequently, the Custodian lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity or approval of the sale agreement. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that once property loses its character as evacuee property through government acquisition, the Custodian's authority over it terminates. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Custodian retain jurisdiction to approve a sale agreement regarding property that has been acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does property acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, cease to be evacuee property?
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• ABDUL KARIM BUTT vs ABDUL QAYYUM And ANOTHER1972 PCr. L J 1182 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-15Read full judgment →
• ABDUL KARIM AND Another vs MUHAMMAD SALIM AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  evacuee propertycivil court jurisdictioninheritance of evacuee landrehabilitation settlement schemedisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal regarding the inheritance of evacuee land allotted under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme to a widow, Mst. Bago, who died in 1955 prior to the conferment of permanent rights. The core legal question is whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance disputes relating to evacuee land held by a deceased allottee before permanent settlement rights are conferred. The Supreme Court held that as long as the land retains its evacuee character, the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under section 12 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1948, and section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that ordinary civil courts have no jurisdiction to entertain inheritance claims over unconferred evacuee properties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance disputes concerning evacuee land held by a deceased allottee before the conferment of permanent rights?
  • Does land allotted under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme retain its evacuee character prior to the conferment of permanent rights under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Is the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts barred in matters relating to evacuee property under the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1948?
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• ABDUL KARIM Alias KARIM KHAN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-24
  murder convictionreversal of acquittaleye-witness testimonyballistic evidenceappellate interferenceappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The appellant, Abdul Karim, was tried for the murder of Nur Aslam Khan, a Sub-Inspector of Police, following a dispute over the construction of a wall. The trial court acquitted the appellant, disbelieving the prosecution witnesses on conjectural grounds regarding their presence and credibility. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial court had erred in rejecting the testimony of natural eye-witnesses based on hypothetical reasoning. The Court emphasized that the eye-witnesses were truthful and consistent, and their testimony was further corroborated by forensic evidence, specifically the ballistic report confirming that the crime shell matched the appellant's licensed rifle. The judgment establishes that the rejection of eye-witness testimony by a trial court must be based on solid evidence rather than conjecture, and that natural witnesses present at the scene of a crime should not be disregarded merely due to minor discrepancies or the trial court's speculative doubts about their ability to hear or witness the incident.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court reject the testimony of eye-witnesses based on purely conjectural grounds?
  • Is the recovery of a crime empty matching a licensed weapon sufficient corroborative evidence in a murder trial?
  • Are labourers working at the scene of a crime considered natural witnesses whose testimony should be credited?
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• ABDUL KARIM Alias KAMUC vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 201 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-11Read full judgment →
• ABDUL JABBAR KHAN vs THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (L), MULTAN AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-02
  property disputemutationinheritancesettlement commissionercivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises out of a property dispute concerning land allotted to Mst. Ummat-un-Nisa after migration to Pakistan, which was subsequently mutated in favor of the petitioner, Abdul Jabbar Khan, upon her death in 1959. The mutation was challenged by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who claimed to be the real brothers of the deceased. After various proceedings before revenue and settlement authorities, the Additional Settlement Commissioner held that the respondents were entitled to half the property. The petitioner's writ petition and subsequent Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of authorities under the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the factual determination of heirship. The Supreme Court held that the officers passing the impugned orders exercised jurisdiction under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, rendering the petitioner's technical objection untenable, and that the question of heirship being a question of fact could be agitated through a civil suit. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an officer exercising dual jurisdiction under the Punjab Land Revenue Act is without jurisdiction on technical grounds?
  • Can a disputed question of fact regarding heirship and being real brothers be challenged through a civil suit?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance by revenue authorities?
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• ABDUL HAYEE vs THE STATE And Another1972 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-14
  quashing of criminal proceedingsparallel civil and criminal litigationstay of criminal proceedingsownership disputecriminal trial procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Sections 379 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought to stay criminal proceedings on the basis that a parallel civil suit regarding ownership of the disputed property (a truck) was pending, arguing that the criminal court should stay its hands when the core issues overlap. The High Court, while noting the criminal and civil matters were not identical, directed that the criminal trial proceed but ordered the criminal court to withhold judgment until the civil suit was decided. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings. The holding affirms that where civil and criminal proceedings coexist, the criminal court may continue its trial, provided that the final judgment is deferred until the civil court resolves the underlying dispute, thereby preventing conflicting outcomes while ensuring the criminal process is not prematurely terminated.

  Questions settled

  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed merely because a civil suit regarding the same property is pending?
  • Is a criminal court required to stay its proceedings when a civil suit involving the same subject matter is ongoing?
  • Can a criminal court proceed with a trial while deferring the announcement of judgment pending the outcome of a civil suit?
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• ABDUL HAQ vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE CHIEF1972 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-09
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesdelegated powerstransfer of propertyfraudsecond appealwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal regarding the transfer of evacuee property. The dispute concerns property acquired by the Central Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, an occupant, had previously withdrawn his claim in favour of respondent No. 2 before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, who possessed delegated powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's withdrawal of his claim was procured by fraud and whether the Assistant Settlement Commissioner lacked the delegated authority to transfer the property. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, concluding that no fraud was proven regarding the petitioner's statement. Furthermore, the Court found that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner was indeed acting with the delegated powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner at the time of the transfer, as confirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the transfer of the property was valid and legally competent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit be maintained to challenge the transfer of evacuee property after the settlement hierarchy has finalized the matter?
  • Does the lack of delegated powers in a Settlement Commissioner vitiate the transfer of evacuee property?
  • Is a statement withdrawing a claim for property transfer binding if the allegation of fraud is not proven?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs Tub STATE1972 P Cr. L J 521 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-19Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs The STATE1972 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-06
  review petitiongrave and sudden provocationmanslaughterdeath sentenceself-defensegeneral amnestymercy petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a petitioner seeking review of his conviction and death sentence. The petitioner argued that scattered wares in his shop and blood found on the road indicated an offensive intrusion by the complainant party, which constituted grave and sudden provocation, thereby reducing his offense to manslaughter. He also contended that his death sentence was disproportionate given the sudden and unpremeditated nature of the crime. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised to support the new plea of provocation had already been considered and rejected under the pleas of self-defense and sudden fight during the leave petition. The Court observed that no apparent error on the face of the record existed to justify reopening the case in review jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court noted that while the sudden nature of the incident did not alter the offense of murder due to the cruelty of inflicting four knife blows, such factors could be considered by executive authorities in a mercy petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new plea of grave and sudden provocation be raised in a review petition if the underlying factual circumstances were already considered and rejected under other pleas during the leave petition?
  • What constitutes a sufficient ground or error apparent on the face of the record to justify reopening a criminal case under the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of a review petition before the Supreme Court act as a legal impediment to the executive commutation of a death sentence under a general amnesty?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs SARDAR-MUHAMMAD and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 183 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-28Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs MUMTAZ HUSSAIN AND Another1972 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  wilful defaultejectment proceedingsstatutory tenantrent controlconcurrent findings of factDisplaced Persons Actnotice to quit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondents against the petitioner, a statutory tenant, on grounds of wilful default in rent payment and personal use. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioner committed wilful default in paying rent and the determination of the correct rent amount payable for the premises. The respondents had issued notices under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which the petitioner failed to satisfy. Following a series of proceedings, the Rent Controller and the first appellate court concurrently found that the petitioner had committed wilful default, thereby losing the protection afforded by section 30 of the Act. The High Court, in the second appeal, affirmed these concurrent findings of fact regarding the wilful default and the validity of the notices, while adjusting the rent rate based on subsequent revisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the disputes between the parties were concluded by concurrent findings of fact and that no substantial question of law remained for consideration. The judgment reinforces the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding wilful default in rent payment are generally not subject to interference in further appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant lose the protection of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, upon committing wilful default in rent payment?
  • Can a defect in a notice regarding the rate of rent be cured by a subsequent valid notice?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding wilful default in rent payment reviewable by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD., LAHORE1972 PLC 87 · Labour Court · 1971-06-14Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI DIVISION1972 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-15
  settlement of propertylimitation periodrevision petitiondisplaced personstransfer of propertyindependent residential unit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner acted lawfully in entertaining and accepting a revision petition filed by the petitioner, Abdul Hamid Khan, years after the original order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 10 December 1959, which had transferred the disputed property as a single unit to other claimants. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner's revision petition was hopelessly barred by limitation without any valid explanation for the delay. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner could not claim preference over the existing claimants because the portion of the property in his possession had never been legally partitioned or treated as an independent residential unit by a competent settlement authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the property remained a single unit and the belated revision was unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition be entertained by a Settlement Commissioner when it is filed years after the original order without a valid explanation for the delay?
  • Does a claimant have a right to claim preference over other claimants for a portion of a property that has not been declared an independent residential unit by a competent authority?
  • Is a property that has been treated as a single unit by a settlement authority subject to being split based on a belated claim by an occupant?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHAN vs (1) GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, AND (2) CENTRAL1972 PLD Lahore 336 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMEED vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 21972 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  settlement departmenttransfer of propertyestoppellacheswrit petitioncontractual obligation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of the National Cotton Factory, Khanpur, which was auctioned and subsequently transferred to the petitioner upon his voluntary offer to match the highest bid price. The core legal question is whether the petitioner can retract from a contractual price he voluntarily agreed to pay to the Settlement Department after enjoying possession and making part payments for six years. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner is legally estopped from challenging the price he bound himself to pay and that his challenge was further barred by laches. The key principle laid down is that a party who voluntarily enters into an agreement to purchase property from a government department, takes possession, and remains silent for years cannot subsequently turn around and challenge the agreed price under the guise of statutory violation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the price of a property transferred by the Settlement Department after voluntarily agreeing to it and making part payments for six years?
  • Does a writ petition challenging a voluntary contract with a state department suffer from laches after a prolonged delay?
  • Is a party estopped from retracting from a bid price offered to oust another purchaser in property transfer proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHAYOOR KHAN And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 632 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABDUL GHANI vs S. ALI ZULQARNAIN1972 SCMR 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-02
  in limine dismissalabuse of powersummary trialtransfer applicationprocedural illegalityjudicial misconductconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the High Court’s summary dismissal in limine of a petition filed under Article 123 of the Constitution of 1962. The appellant alleged that a Magistrate, acting in a dual capacity as the complainant and the judge, convicted him summarily for an offence under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, without recording evidence or examining the accused, and ignored a transfer application. The High Court dismissed the petition, characterizing it as a personal grievance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the petition, which raised serious allegations of abuse of power and procedural illegality. The Court ruled that where a petition contains substantial allegations of judicial misconduct and disregard for mandatory legal provisions, it cannot be dismissed in limine without investigation. The Supreme Court emphasized that courts must investigate claims regarding the failure to follow mandatory procedural requirements, such as adjourning for a transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the necessity of recording evidence even in summary proceedings. The case was remanded for proper disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court dismiss a petition in limine when it contains serious allegations of abuse of power and procedural illegality?
  • Is a Magistrate required to adjourn proceedings under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon the filing of a transfer application?
  • Does a conviction recorded without examining the accused or recording the substance of evidence in summary proceedings violate the law?
  • Can a Magistrate who is the ex officio Chairman of a Municipal Committee try a case where the complaint was lodged by the Municipal Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHAFOOR Alias GHAFOORA vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 1183 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-07Read full judgment →
• ABDUL ELAHI vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 973 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-17Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ vs MESSRS AHMAD BAKHSH & BROTHERS, LAHORE1972 PLC 274 · Labour Court · 1971-07-14Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ vs AZIZ UL HAQ1972 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29
  pre-emptiondeposit of zar-e-punjamextension of timevalid tenderdefault in deposit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's finding that the pre-emptor had made a valid deposit of the pre-emption money. The respondent filed a suit for possession through pre-emption and was ordered by the trial court under section 22(1) of the Pre-emption Act to deposit one-fifth of the probable value of the land. Although the actual physical deposit into the bank occurred one day after the extended deadline due to the bank closing early, the respondent had obtained the challan and made a bona fide effort to deposit the amount within the stipulated time. The core legal question was whether the delayed physical deposit constituted a default under the statute. The Supreme Court held that the respondent made a valid tender and sufficient compliance with the court's order by attempting to deposit the amount in time, thus committing no default. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to physically deposit pre-emption money on the exact date due to early bank closure constitute a default when a valid effort to deposit was made?
  • Whether obtaining a challan and attempting to make a deposit within time amounts to sufficient compliance with a court order under the Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• A.R. SOOFI vs WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1972 PLC 568 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-02Read full judgment →
• A. R. SOOFI vs WATER & POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1972 PLD Lahore 718 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-02Read full judgment →
• A. KANDASWAMI PILLAI (REPRESENTED BY HEIR) AND ANOTHER vs CONTROLLER1972 PTD 644 · Madras High Court · 1968-09-03Read full judgment →
• A. K. T. K. M. VISHNUDATTA ANTHARJANAM vs COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, TRIVANDRUM1972 PTD 389 · Kerala High Court · 1968-08-21Read full judgment →
• A. K. ANSARI vs THE STATE1972 PLD Azad J & K 38 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1972-12-11Read full judgment →
• A. G. ABID NAQASHBANDI vs MUHAMMAD ALTAF1972 PLC 359 · Labour Court · 1971-08-05Read full judgment →
• A. A. GILL vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, PROGRESSIVE PAPERS LTD., LAHORE1972 PLC 13 · Labour Court · 1970-12-22Read full judgment →
• [Punjab] vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB,1971 PLC 186 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-16Read full judgment →
• ZULFIQAR vs THE STATE-.Respondent1971 P Cr. L J 244 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-23Read full judgment →
• ZIL MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs Mst. HAYAT BIBI AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-11
  limitationdeclaratory suitoccupancy rightscustomary lawinheritance mutationleave to appealLetters Patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute over occupancy rights in agricultural land, originally held by a predecessor-in-title under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. Following the death of a co-tenant, his share devolved upon his daughter, the respondent, under customary law, subject to her marriage. Despite her marriage in 1944, she remained in possession and received produce, leading the appellants' predecessor to file a suit in 1957 for a declaration of ownership and ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge and the High Court dismissed it as time-barred. The Supreme Court examined whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether time spent pursuing a certificate for a Letters Patent appeal could be excluded. The Court held that the cause of action accrued in 1944, rendering the 1957 suit time-barred. Furthermore, the Court held that even if time spent in certificate proceedings could be excluded, the appellants failed to explain the delay in filing, resulting in the rescission of the leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for a declaratory suit under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When does the cause of action accrue for a suit challenging an inheritance mutation based on a change in marital status?
  • Can time spent pursuing an application for a certificate for a Letters Patent appeal be excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ZARIN KHAN AND Another vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-11-01
  murderprivate defensegrave and sudden provocationexcessive forcecriminal appealconfessionevidence-based findings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murder of an intruder, Ghulam Jan, whom the appellants claimed they mistook for a burglar. The appellants confessed to the killing, asserting they acted in defense of their property. The lower court had rejected the burglary theory, instead speculating that the deceased was killed due to an illicit affair, and subsequently rejected a plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court held that the lower court’s factual findings regarding the motive were based on conjecture rather than evidence. However, the Court affirmed the conviction for murder, ruling that the force employed—repeated rifle shots and multiple weapon injuries—was grossly disproportionate to the necessity of defending property. The Court established that where the volume and degree of force used against an intruder are entirely out of proportion to the threat, the act cannot be mitigated by the right of private defense or exceptions to murder. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the sentences were maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court base its findings of fact on conjecture regarding the motive of the deceased?
  • Does the use of excessive force against an intruder negate the right of private defense?
  • Is the killing of an intruder who is shot multiple times and beaten with weapons considered murder under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• ZARDULLAH KHAN vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 906 · Sindh High Court
  superdariinterim custodycriminal proceduredisposal of propertyquestion of titlebona fide purchaserrevision application
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal revision application arises from an order regarding the interim custody of an auto-rickshaw seized by the police during a criminal investigation under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involves the power of a criminal court under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine questions of title or ownership regarding property produced before it, and the proper scope of interim custody versus final disposal under Sections 516-A, 517, and 523. The Sindh High Court held that criminal courts are not empowered to adjudicate complex questions of civil title or ownership when disposing of property, and that entitlement to possession pending or upon the conclusion of an inquiry or trial cannot be equated with ownership, which must be resolved by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The court established that interim custody should generally remain with the person from whom the property was recovered unless exceptional circumstances exist, and set aside the lower courts' orders directing the delivery of the vehicle to the respondent, while conditioning the applicant's continued custody on the furnishing of adequate security.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal court determine questions of civil title and ownership when disposing of property under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • At what stages can property regarding which an offence has been committed be disposed of by a criminal court under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether entitlement to possession under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be equated with ownership of the property?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances can a criminal court depart from the general rule of restoring seized property to the person from whose possession it was recovered?
  Read full judgment →
• ZARDAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-25
  private defenceculpable homicidemurdercriminal appealproportionality of forceappreciation of evidencetransportation for life
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of a police officer for the murders of two brothers. The appellant claimed he acted in self-defence after being attacked by the deceased party. The trial court convicted the appellant for both murders, sentencing him to death. The High Court subsequently altered the conviction regarding one victim to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part 1, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and commuted the sentence for the second murder to transportation for life. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant’s plea of private defence was substantiated. The Court held that the right of private defence is a question of fact and found no evidence of a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt that would justify the use of a firearm against unarmed or minimally armed individuals. The Court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing that the force used was disproportionate to any threat faced. Although the Court expressed reservations regarding the leniency of the commuted sentence, it declined to interfere in the absence of a state appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defence justify the use of a firearm against an unarmed person?
  • Is the determination of the existence of a right of private defence a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a commuted sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State?
  • Does the use of force in self-defence require a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAIBTUN TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI AND OTHERS vs CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 333 · Sindh High Court
  production capacity taxdelegated legislationexcessive delegationcentral excise dutyconstitutional validitytaxation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns 24 petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the production capacity tax imposed on textile and sugar mills under Section 3(4) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as amended by the Finance Act, 1966. The core legal question was whether the amended provisions constituted an impermissible delegation of essential legislative power to the Central Board of Revenue, and whether the administrative determination of production capacity was procedurally valid. The Court held that the legislation is intra vires and constitutional. It established that the Legislature did not abdicate its essential functions; rather, it delegated the implementation of a complex fiscal policy to an expert body. The Court affirmed that delegated legislation in taxation matters is permissible, and the absence of rigid standards is not fatal where procedural safeguards, such as the Review Board, exist. The key principle laid down is that the constitutionality of delegated legislation must be judged by whether the Legislature has abdicated its essential authority, applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat to ensure the statute's effectiveness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the delegation of power to the Central Board of Revenue to levy production capacity tax constitutes an impermissible abdication of legislative authority?
  • Can the absence of explicit standards in a statute render delegated legislation unconstitutional if procedural safeguards exist?
  • Does the fixation of tax rates by an executive authority instead of the Legislature violate the Constitution?
  • Is an administrative order passed without a prior hearing valid if a statutory review mechanism exists?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAHID ALI vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1955-06-03
  circumstantial evidencecriminal conspiracycheatingforgerybenefit of doubtappellate review
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellant, a government desk clerk at a bank, under sections 120-B and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code for conspiracy and cheating in connection with forged government bills. The core legal question was whether the entirely circumstantial evidence adduced was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had handled the forged bills or that he was involved in any conspiracy, noting that the evidence pointed equally to irregularities by senior bank officers and that the lower appellate court had misconstrued the record by confusing the appellant's case with that of his co-accused. The Court laid down the principle that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained where the links connecting the accused to the crime are mere assumptions and where alternative hypotheses consistent with innocence, such as the oversight of superior officers, are equally plausible. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the appellant acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence be sustained where the missing links in the chain of evidence are mere assumptions?
  • Whether an accused clerk can be held liable for bank fraud in the absence of proof that the fraudulent documents passed through his hands.
  • Does the presence of irregularities in official records by itself justify an inference of criminal conspiracy against a subordinate employee?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAFARULLAH KHAN AND 7 Others vs ABDUL REHMAN AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-18
  mesne profitsinterim ordersecurity for mesne profitsleave to appealreceiversupreme court jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, which directed the petitioners to furnish security for mesne profits in the sum of Rs. 5,000 per annum as a condition for setting aside the appointment of a Receiver during the pendency of the suit. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with interim orders regarding the estimation of mesne profits and furnishing of security in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that interim orders of this nature ought not to be interfered with in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, and found no merits to differ with the High Court's estimation of mesne profits. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with discretionary interim orders relating to security for mesne profits passed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with interim orders regarding the furnishing of security for mesne profits in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction?
  • Can an interim order setting aside the appointment of a Receiver subject to furnishing security be challenged through a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAFAR HUSSAIN vs THE CHIEF ENGINEER, IRRIGATION, BAHAWALPUR1971 PLC 149 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-01-12Read full judgment →
• YUSUF AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 257 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-15Read full judgment →
• YUSUF ALI KHAN vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  review petitioncontempt of courtbias of judgeapologyerror apparent on the face of the recordsupreme court rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of two review petitions filed against an earlier decision of the Supreme Court dismissing criminal appeals arising from contempt of court proceedings. The petitioner argued several grounds, including an objection to a member of the bench hearing the review because he had initially signed a show-cause notice in a separate matter, the refusal of an adjournment to engage another counsel, the alleged omission to consider certain precedents, and observations made regarding his suitability as a member of the Bar. The Supreme Court held that a judge issuing a show-cause notice in the administration of justice does not acquire a personal interest disqualifying them from hearing the case under the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, review in criminal proceedings is restricted to errors apparent on the face of the record, and none of the grounds urged warranted a review of the judgment. The Court affirmed that what another bench did in different circumstances is irrelevant, and dismissed both review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge become personally disqualified from hearing a case merely because they previously directed the issuance of a show-cause notice for contempt in a different matter?
  • What are the permissible grounds for reviewing a judgment in a criminal proceeding before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a court bound to refer to every judgment cited at the Bar during the hearing of an appeal?
  • Can the refusal of a High Court to accept an apology in contempt proceedings be interfered with by the Supreme Court where cogent reasons have been provided?
  Read full judgment →
• YOUSAF KHAN AND 10 Others vs CHAIRMAN, BORDER AREA COMMITTEE, NAROWAL, DISTRICT SIALKOT AND 6 Other1971 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-16
  Border Area Committeejudicial reviewLetters Patent Appealrehabilitation and settlementland restorationimmunity from challenge
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants, who originally owned lands in Tehsil Shakargarh that were lost due to river erosion and subsequently restored to Pakistan, sought the restoration of their original lands after having been allotted alternative lands under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. Their request was rejected by the Border Area Committee, and their subsequent writ petition and Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the premise that the Committee's orders were immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents, clarified that while orders passed by the Border Area Committee before June 8, 1962, are immune from challenge, orders passed on or after that date are subject to judicial scrutiny. As the record did not clearly establish the date of the impugned order, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case. The High Court was directed to determine the date of the Committee's order and, if passed on or after June 8, 1962, to adjudicate the matter on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Are orders passed by the Border Area Committee on or after June 8, 1962, immune from judicial review?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to examine the validity of an order passed by the Border Area Committee after June 8, 1962?
  • What is the legal status of orders passed by the Border Area Committee prior to June 8, 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• YAR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 971 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-21Read full judgment →
• YAQUB KHAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LANDS), LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-26
  settlement lawland allotmentfalse pretencequestion of factspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of land allotted to him under Claim Form No. 10855 by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) acting under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Settlement authorities found that the petitioner was not related to the original claimant, Samey Singh, and had procured the land on a false pretence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding the petitioner's relationship with the deceased claimant. The Supreme Court held that the relationship was a question of fact determined on a valid appreciation of the record, notably the pedigree-table from India, and no question of law arose under section 21 of the Act to warrant interference in revision. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the cancellation applied solely to the property obtained via Claim Form No. 10855, leaving other claims intact. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of relationship between a claimant and a deceased landowner is a question of fact?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding land settlement claims where no question of law arises?
  • Does the cancellation of property obtained under a specific claim form affect other independent property claims of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• YAQOOB KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 266 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-26
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powerstheft of cropssuperdarcriminal investigationabuse of process
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated under section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged theft of crops. The core legal question concerns whether the removal of crops sown by persons in possession of disputed land, where the appointment of a superdar over the produce lacks lawful authority, constitutes the offense of theft. The Lahore High Court held that in the absence of lawful authority empowering revenue officers to entrust the crop to a superdar, the petitioners remained entitled to the produce they had sown and maintained, rendering the continuation of criminal proceedings an abuse of the process of the court. The court laid down the principle that High Courts possess the inherent power under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings even at the investigation stage in appropriate cases, and that harvesting crops grown while in lawful possession does not constitute theft.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at the investigation stage?
  • Does the removal of a crop by a person in possession amount to theft when the appointment of a superdar over the produce is without lawful sanction?
  • Are criminal proceedings liable to be quashed if they constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• YAKOOB AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 890 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-07Read full judgment →
• YACOOB AND Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1273 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-08Read full judgment →
• WORKERS"UNION vs Messrs 'INDIA FLOUR MILLS LTD., KARACHI1971 PLC 135 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-09-02Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS RENWICK & Co. LTD., KUSHTIA AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLC 214 · Labour Court · 1970-09-19Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs Measles HANARAS SAREE HOUSE LTD., KARACHI1971 PLC 237 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs INDUS CHEMICAL & ALKALIS LTD- KARACHI1971 PLC 516 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-01-07Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs CHAIRMAN, EAST PAKISTAN ROAD TRANSPORT1971 PLC 291 · Labour Court · 1970-09-01Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION (RECD.) vs MESSRS HAMSI CLOTH &, GENERAL MILLS LTD., KARACHI1971 PLC 446 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
• WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, FOOD DEPARTMENT, LAHORE vs Haji1971 PLD Peshawar 20 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-13Read full judgment →
• WEST PAKISTAN ROAD TRANSPORT BOARD, LAHORE vs INCOME TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES WARD VI, LAHORE AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28
  writ jurisdictionstay of recoveryseizin of courtfunctus officiotax assessmentpublic utilitydismissal in limine
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an application for a stay of tax realization filed by the West Pakistan Road Transport Board against the Income-tax Department. The Board, having failed to secure a stay from revenue authorities and having had its writ petition dismissed in limine by the High Court without recorded reasons, sought relief from the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court could entertain a miscellaneous petition for stay of tax recovery while the underlying writ petition remained pending in the High Court, specifically where the High Court had not yet issued a signed, sealed judgment. The Supreme Court held that it could not entertain the stay application because the High Court retained seizin of the matter until it became functus officio upon the delivery of a final judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court cannot interfere while proceedings are pending in the High Court. The key principle established is that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution is triggered only by a judgment, decree, or order of the High Court, and it lacks authority to intervene in ongoing High Court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a miscellaneous petition for stay of tax recovery while the underlying writ petition remains pending in the High Court?
  • At what point does a High Court become functus officio regarding a pending matter?
  • Is a short order dismissing a writ petition in limine without recorded reasons appropriate in civil matters?
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• WEST PAKISTAN LAND COMMISSION, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS vs FATEH ULLAH1971 PLD Supreme Court 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  land reformsdelegation of powersrevisional jurisdictionretroactive legislationgift under Muslim lawdelivery of possessionsuo motu revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an action under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959 regarding gifts of agricultural land made by a big landowner to his heirs. The Deputy Land Commissioner recommended cancellation of the mutation entries as void under the Regulation, but the Land Commissioner upheld them. Subsequently, the Chief Land Commissioner revised and set aside that order suo motu. The High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, holding that the Land Commissioner's exercise of delegated authority exhausted the power and could not be revised by a co-ordinate delegatee. During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVI of 1970 was promulgated with retrospective effect, making orders passed under delegated powers subject to appeal, review, or revision. The Supreme Court held that the amending Ordinance retroactively validated the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the Chief Land Commissioner, thereby neutralizing the High Court's judgment. However, because the Chief Land Commissioner had failed to properly examine the evidence regarding the completion of gifts and delivery of possession to the various donees under Muslim Law, the Supreme Court set aside the matter and remanded the case for a fresh hearing and decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an authority in exercise of delegated powers under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959 is subject to appeal or revision by a co-ordinate authority?
  • Does the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVI of 1970 operate retrospectively?
  • Is physical delivery of possession necessary for the completion of a gift of land by a donor to his resident daughters and son under Muslim Law?
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• WASIBULLAH vs The STATE1971 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  dacoitydying declarationwitness recognitioncriminal appealcorroborationspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a conviction and sentence under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a dacoity incident resulting in death. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred in relying on the testimony of a witness whose recognition of other co-accused was doubted, and that the dying declaration was unreliable due to prior enmity and discrepancies in the time of recording. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound. It affirmed that the testimony of a witness regarding the recognition of an accused can be relied upon if corroborated by other reliable evidence, such as a dying declaration. Furthermore, the Court held that a dying declaration, provided by a declarant in full senses, remains credible despite prior enmity, especially when the declarant demonstrates honesty by admitting limitations in their recognition. The Court concluded that the dying declaration, corroborated by earlier statements made to household members, provided sufficient grounds to sustain the conviction, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness's testimony regarding the recognition of an accused be relied upon if their recognition of other co-accused was doubted?
  • Does prior enmity between a deceased and an accused automatically invalidate a dying declaration?
  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by earlier statements made to witnesses?
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• WASI AHMED RIZVI vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE MINISTRY1971 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionservice matterlachespromotiondelay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought review of the Supreme Court's order dismissing his appeal against the High Court's refusal of a writ regarding a service complaint concerning denial of promotion and higher pay scale dating back to 1952. The core legal question was whether the finding of laches should be reviewed in light of new material showing no disruption to intervening departmental arrangements. The Supreme Court held that while additional documents presented in the review petition could have affected the finding of laches, the review petition itself must be dismissed, leaving it open to the Government to reconsider the petitioner's case in accordance with the Court's interpretation. The key principle laid down is that delay or laches may be evaluated against evidence showing that granting relief would not upset settled departmental arrangements, though established court findings on limitation and laches are not casually displaced on review without prior presentation of such material.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of laches be reconsidered in a review petition based on new material showing absence of disruption to intervening arrangements?
  • Does the pendency of departmental representations justify a prolonged delay in filing a constitutional writ petition?
  • Is it open to the Government to reconsider a service grievance in light of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court despite the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of delay?
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• WASI AHMAD RIZVI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE1971 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-07-11
  service lawwrit jurisdictionlachespay fixationattached departmentcivil servantequitable relief
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a writ petition filed by a civilian employee of the Naval Headquarters challenging the denial of promotion and pay fixation benefits under Rule 8(a) of the Central (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1949. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant’s department constituted an "Attached Department" and whether he was entitled to the pay scale of an Assistant under the 1949 Rules. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s department was indeed an "Attached Department" and that the 1949 Rules were applicable to his service conditions. However, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal on the ground of laches. The Court determined that the appellant had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in challenging government orders issued in 1955 and 1957. The principle established is that even where a petitioner possesses a valid substantive claim regarding service rights, the court will decline to exercise its equitable writ jurisdiction if there has been inordinate, unexplained delay that would cause irreparable administrative disruption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of laches bar a writ petition challenging service-related administrative orders after a significant, unexplained delay?
  • Can a department be considered an 'Attached Department' for the purpose of service rules based on historical administrative directories despite later definitions in the Rules of Business?
  • Is a government employee entitled to the pay scale of a higher post under Rule 8(a) of the Central (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1949, if they have been approved for promotion but no vacancy exists?
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• WARYAM AND 3 Others vs THE STATE AND Another1971 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-19
  bail after commitmentmurder trialdelay in trialseparation of trialsbail cancellation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, committed to stand trial under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against the High Court's order setting aside their bail granted by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the delay in the trial caused by waiting for commitment proceedings of a co-accused justifies granting bail to the petitioners after commitment. The Supreme Court held that once a person is committed to stand trial, they are not ordinarily entitled to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as reasonable grounds exist to believe they are guilty of an offense punishable with death or transportation for life. The Court laid down the principle that instead of granting bail on the ground of delay caused by a co-accused, the trial court should either expedite the inquiry against the co-accused or separate their case and proceed with the trial of the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person committed to stand trial ordinarily entitled to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the delay caused by waiting for commitment proceedings of a co-accused justify granting bail to the petitioners?
  • What procedure should a Sessions Judge adopt if the inquiry against a co-accused is likely to be delayed?
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• WARMS IQBAL AND ANOTHER vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 1020 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• WALI MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE AND OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 433 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-16
  government land leasediscretionary poweradministrative lawrenewal of leasepublic intereststatutory interpretationfettering of discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns several writ petitions challenging the Collector's refusal to renew government land leases granted under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme. The petitioners contended that the renewal clause in the Statement of Conditions, using the word "may," created a mandatory obligation for renewal, and that a government Memorandum altering the renewal policy was invalid for lack of formal notification. The Court held that the word "may" confers discretionary power rather than a mandatory duty, particularly as the petitioners held no vested right to renewal. The Court affirmed that public authorities cannot fetter their future executive discretion by contract or prior policy, as they must remain free to act in the public interest. Furthermore, the Court ruled that administrative instructions issued by a controlling authority, such as the Board of Revenue, possess the force of law and effectively guide the exercise of discretion. Consequently, such instructions do not require formal Gazette notification unless explicitly mandated by statute. The petitions were dismissed, upholding the Collector's authority to align renewal decisions with current government policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word "may" in a lease renewal clause create a mandatory legal duty for the authority to renew the lease?
  • Can a public authority fetter its future executive discretion by entering into contracts or policies that limit its ability to act in the public interest?
  • Do administrative instructions issued by a controlling authority regarding land allotment have the force of law?
  • Is formal Gazette notification required for administrative instructions that modify existing conditions of a government land grant?
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• WALI MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS vs INAM-UL-HASSAN KHAN AND 5 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 332 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-02
  letters patent appeallimitation and condonation of delaybig mansion transferdisplaced persons compensation and rehabilitationdelegation of powerssuo motu reviewwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal calls in question a judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the appellants' writ petition, which challenged the transfer of a big mansion ('Dinga Singh Building') through private negotiations under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the transfer order passed by a Settlement Commissioner (Industries) without formal Gazette notification delegation under section 31(2) was valid, whether a delegatee could review or dispose of the matter upon transfer under section 32-A, and whether the appeal was barred by time. The Lahore High Court held that the appeal was barred by limitation as no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was shown, and further held on merits that although the initial delegation lacked a Gazette notification, the appellants were precluded from challenging it in subsequent proceedings due to their earlier conduct and departmental practice, and that the Settlement Commissioner lawfully exercised review powers under the applicable notifications and discretion. The court established that a party cannot belatedly challenge an administrative action in subsequent rounds of litigation when it was omitted in earlier challenges, and that departmental practice and subsequent notifications validate the exercise of delegated powers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation can be condoned on the ground of a fluid state of law or mistaken legal advice regarding the maintainability of appeals?
  • Can an officer to whom powers have not been formally delegated by a Gazette notification exercise the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Whether a party is precluded from challenging an administrative order on jurisdictional grounds in subsequent writ proceedings if such grounds were omitted in an earlier writ petition involving the same subject matter?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner competent to review an order passed by a predecessor who exercised delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
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• WALI MUHAMMAD Alias WALIA vs HAQ NAWAZ AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-29
  police investigationjurisdiction of High CourtLetters Patentcriminal investigationtransfer of investigation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenges two orders of the High Court of West Pakistan, which passed an interim order and subsequently dismissed the appellant's miscellaneous application regarding the High Court's interference in a police investigation. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction under clause 22 of the Letters Patent or any other law to interfere with or direct the transfer of a police investigation conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held, following its precedent in Shahnaz Begum v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, that the High Court possesses no such power under clause 22 of the Letters Patent, the Constitution, or any other law to interfere with an investigation conducted by competent agencies. Consequently, the High Court's interim order was declared without jurisdiction and set aside, establishing that superior courts cannot lawfully interfere with or direct police investigations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under clause 22 of the Letters Patent to interfere with the investigation of a case by a police officer?
  • Can the High Court direct or influence the transfer of a criminal investigation from the local police to another agency?
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• WALI AHMAD vs MESSRS HABIB BANK LTD., CHITAGONG1971 PLC 111 · Labour Court · 1970-07-10Read full judgment →