Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MESSRS JALEEL Brother LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES UNION1972 PLC 5 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-03-05Read full judgment →
• MESSRS INDUS CHEMICAL & ALKALIS LTD., KARACHI vs WORKERS UNION1972 PLC 117 (1) · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-03-20Read full judgment →
• MESSRS HOTEL COLUMBUS LTD., KARACHI vs KARACHI HOTEL WORKERS' UNION1972 PLC 441 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
• MESSRS HAROON TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs ALLAH DITTA1972 PLD Karachi 57 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-04Read full judgment →
• MESSRS GUEST KEEN AND NETTLEFOLDS IN PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI vs GEN1972 PLC 146 · Labour Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs GENERAL TRACTORS & MACHINERY COMPANY Ltd., KARACHI vs The STATE1972 P Cr.L J 604 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS GABOLE Brother vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1972 PLD Karachi 515 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-08
  arbitration agreementsole arbitratorstay of legal proceedingsbias of arbitratorrescission of contractdomestic arbitrator
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, arose from a suit filed by Messrs Gabole Brothers against the Government of Pakistan for the recovery of damages following the rescission of three supply contracts by the Quarter Master-General. The defendants sought a stay of the suit under the arbitration clause, which designated the Quarter Master-General as the sole arbitrator. The plaintiffs resisted the stay on two grounds: first, that the defendants failed to invoke arbitration prior to the suit; and second, that the Quarter Master-General was disqualified as an arbitrator because he had formed a pre-judged opinion on the dispute by rescinding the contract and alleging breach by the plaintiffs. The High Court held that a defendant's right to seek a stay under Section 34 remains unfettered until the filing of a written statement and that expressing administrative views or rescinding a contract in the line of official duty does not automatically disqualify a domestic, party-appointed arbitrator unless there is clear proof of a closed mind or bias. The application was allowed and the suit stayed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a defendant to invoke arbitration prior to the institution of a suit bars an application for stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does an official act of rescinding a contract and expressing administrative dissatisfaction disqualify a party-appointed sole arbitrator from acting in that capacity?
  • Can a contractor escape a binding arbitration clause designating an employee of the other contracting party as sole arbitrator merely because that official formed a view in the course of administrative duties?
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• MESSRS FIRDOUS TRADING CORPORATION vs REGISTRAR, CO OPERATIVE1972 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-29
  arbitration awardco-operative societieswrit jurisdictionstatutory time limitscope of referenceprocedural illegalityRegistrar of Co-operative Societies
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition regarding the Registrar of Co-operative Societies' order setting aside an arbitration award. The core legal questions were whether the Registrar possessed the authority to set aside the award and whether the award suffered from fatal legal infirmities. The Supreme Court held that the Registrar’s order was valid, notwithstanding the erroneous citation of Section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, because the power to set aside the award was clearly vested under Section 54-A of the same Act. The Court affirmed that an award made significantly beyond the statutory two-month period without an extension, and one granting relief (a refund) outside the scope of the original reference, constitutes an illegality apparent on the face of the record. Furthermore, the Court established that an award signed only by the Registrar's nominee, without appending the dissenting opinions of the parties' nominees, is procedurally defective. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Registrar's decision to direct a de novo arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order remain valid if a statutory authority cites an incorrect provision while possessing the power under a different correct provision?
  • Can an arbitration award be set aside if it is made beyond the prescribed statutory time limit without an extension?
  • Is an arbitration award invalid if it grants relief that was not specifically referred to the arbitrators?
  • Does an arbitration award suffer from illegality if it is signed by only one arbitrator without appending the dissenting opinions of other nominees?
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• MESSRS FAZAL SHAFIQ TEXTILE MILLS Ltd., Karachis vs REHMAT KHAN AND Anothers1972 PLC 364 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-27Read full judgment →
• MESSRS FARID SONS LTD., KARACHI- Petitioner vs MESSRS GHULAM FARID1972 PTD 453 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-14Read full judgment →
• MESSRS FARID SONS LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS GHULAM FARID MOHAMMAD1972 PLD Lahore 311 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS EVEREADY PICTURES, KARACHI vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX1972 PLD Karachi 243 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-11Read full judgment →
• MESSRS EVER SHINE CANDLE INDUSTRIES, LAHORE AND 36 Other vs MUHAMMAD JAMIL1972 PLD Lahore 845 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS EVA HORNBY & COMPANY vs ORIENTAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE Ca.1972 PLD Lahore 795 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS BOKHARA PALACE LTD. vs BRIGADIER HIS HIGHNESS MUHAMMAD1972 PLD Karachi 105 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-09Read full judgment →
• MESSRS AZIZ TANNERIES LTD. vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, LOWER BARI1972 PLD Lahore 517 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS AWAN INDUSTRIES LTD. vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN Etc.S1972 SCMR 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-25
  leave to appealcontempt of courtproduction of documentswithdrawal of applicationrevival of contempt petitioncivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioner against the Province of West Pakistan for the recovery of outstanding dues under an irrigation works contract. During the proceedings, the petitioner obtained an order under Order XI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the production of documents, which the respondents failed to comply with. The petitioner initiated contempt proceedings in the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 but subsequently withdrew the application under a mistaken legal assumption. When the petitioner later sought to revive the contempt application, the High Court dismissed it, holding that a second application was incompetent after the withdrawal of the first. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the significant legal question of whether contempt proceedings initiated by a private party can be abandoned at the sweet will of that party, or whether the court is duty-bound to vindicate its own authority regardless of the petitioner's withdrawal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution of a contempt of court matter initiated by a private party can be left entirely to the sweet will and discretion of that party?
  • Can a court decline to vindicate its authority and purge a gross contempt solely because the private petitioner who initiated the action chose to withdraw or drop the application?
  • Is a second application to revive contempt proceedings competent after a previous application on the same facts has been withdrawn?
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• MESSRS ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD., BOMBAY THROUGH ITS DULY1972 PLD Lahore 201 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD., BOMBAY THROUGH ITS DULY1972 PTD 97 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-29Read full judgment →
• MESSRS ALPHA INSURANCE Co. LTD. KARACHI AND Another vs MESSRS M. A.1972 PLD Karachi 265 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-13Read full judgment →
• MESSERS. PINDI HAZARA TRANSPORT Co. LTD., RAWALPINDI vs GOVERNMENT1972 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  transfer of writ petitionconflicting decisionstransport permitsHigh Court jurisdictionjudicial consistencywrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application, filed under Article 9 of the High Court's (Establishment) Order, 1970, sought the transfer of a writ petition pending in the Peshawar High Court to the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, a transport company, had filed identical writ petitions in both courts challenging the re-categorization of a transport route and the validity of specific transport rules, which affected their stage-carriage permits. The core legal question was whether the transfer was justified to avoid the risk of conflicting judicial decisions regarding the same subject matter and parties. The Supreme Court held that the potential for conflicting decisions, combined with the fact that the petitioner’s registered office and the original permit-granting authority were located within the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, provided cogent and valid grounds for the transfer. Consequently, the Court allowed the application and ordered the transfer of the Peshawar petition to the Lahore High Court for a consolidated hearing. This decision affirms the principle that judicial consistency is a paramount consideration when identical litigation is pending in multiple jurisdictions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be transferred from one High Court to another to avoid conflicting decisions?
  • Does the existence of identical writ petitions in different High Courts constitute a valid ground for transfer under the High Court's (Establishment) Order, 1970?
  • Is the location of a petitioner's registered office a relevant factor in determining the appropriate High Court for hearing a writ petition?
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• MESSERS TAJ RESTAURANT, KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1972 PLC 297 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-09-24Read full judgment →
• MESSERS SITALDAS & Co. vs SALES TAX OFFICER, MIRPURKHAS AND Another1972 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-15
  sales tax assessmentrectification of mistaketime-barredwrit jurisdictiontax arrearsfinality of assessment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging tax assessment orders. The petitioner, a company, had been assessed for sales tax in 1962. Following a demand for arrears, the petitioner engaged in protracted correspondence with tax authorities, claiming improper assessment and lack of credit for exemptions. The petitioner contended that a 1965 letter to the Sales Tax Officer constituted an application for rectification of mistakes under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and that subsequent proceedings were timely. The tax authorities and the High Court rejected these contentions, noting that the assessment order had attained finality, the petitioner failed to pursue available appellate remedies, and the attempt to reopen the matter after several years was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner's correspondence could not be construed as a valid application for rectification and that the assessment order contained no patent mistakes. The Court concluded that the dismissal of the writ petition was correct, as the petitioner failed to justify the excessive delay in challenging the tax assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a letter contesting tax arrears be construed as an application for rectification of mistakes under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a tax assessment order after a significant delay where the petitioner failed to pursue statutory appellate remedies?
  • Does an assessment order that has attained finality due to the failure of the assessee to pursue an appeal remain open to challenge via a belated rectification application?
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• MESSERS JALEEL Brother LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1972 PLC 219 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-06-04Read full judgment →
• MEHRAJ DIN AND 3 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 177 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-14Read full judgment →
• MEHR KAMIR vs WALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other1972 PLD Lahore 287 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mehr ALLAH DITTA AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ALI AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Supreme Court 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-20
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionjoinder of partiesstrangerprocedural defectstare decisis
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land sold in Lahore. The primary legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether a pre-emptor who jointly files a suit with a person having no right of pre-emption (a stranger) wholly forfeits their right, or whether such a procedural defect can be cured by striking out the name of the stranger under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that joining a stranger is a procedural defect rather than a substantive violation under Punjab law, and it can be remedied at any stage of proceedings by striking off the stranger's name, thereby allowing the qualified pre-emptor to maintain the suit alone. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, upholding the pre-emption decree after deleting the deceased stranger's legal representatives, based on long-standing Punjab jurisprudence and the principle of stare decisis.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person having a right of pre-emption wholly lose that right by associating with them as co-plaintiff a person who has no such right?
  • Can the improper joinder of a stranger in a pre-emption suit be remedied by striking out their name under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the Allahabad High Court doctrine of forfeiture of pre-emption rights upon joining a stranger applies within the Punjab Province.
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• MAZHAR ALI vs WEST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION1972 PLC 249 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1972-02-02Read full judgment →
• MAULA BAKHSH vs MUHAMMAD ISHAQ (REPRESENTED BY HIS 5 HIERS)1972 PLD Lahore 173 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-29Read full judgment →
• MASIHUDDIN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1972 PLC 490 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-11-13Read full judgment →
• MASAM vs The STATE1972 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  criminal appealocular evidencemedical evidencemurder convictionappreciation of evidencewitness credibility
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Sahib Shah. The petitioner contended that medical evidence regarding the location of wounds and the deceased's stomach contents contradicted the ocular testimony of the eyewitness, and that the loss of blood-stained clothes by the police undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence, finding that the location of entry wounds and charring confirmed the shots were fired from close range at the front of the body, refuting the claim that the deceased was attacked from behind. The Court further held that the empty stomach of the deceased did not contradict the eyewitness account, as the timing and quantity of the deceased's last meal were not established. The Court affirmed that in the absence of previous enmity and given the prompt reporting of the crime, the conviction was sound. The petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to replace the death sentence with transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of an empty stomach in a post-mortem examination necessarily contradict an eyewitness account of the time of death?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when blood-stained clothes are lost by the police during investigation?
  • Does the location of an outlet wound on the chest mid-axillary line prove that a victim was shot from behind?
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• MANZUR AHMAD vs MANZUR AHMAD And 8 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 1192 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-10Read full judgment →
• MANZOOR SHAH vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, K. D. C. PLYWOOD FACTORY, JHELUM1972 PLC 166 · Labour Court · 1971-06-04Read full judgment →
• MANZOOR KHAN vs KAMIR AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-10
  grant of bailprolonged detentionunder-trial prisonersdelay in inquirymurder casecancellation of bailcapital offences
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court granting bail to the respondents. The respondents were charged with murder but had been detained in custody since July 1969 without the inquiry being finalized, despite repeated directions from the High Court. The primary legal issue was whether prolonged detention of under-trial prisoners charged with capital offences justifies the exercise of discretion to grant bail when no concrete steps have been taken to complete the inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the High Court's discretion and holding that the law does not intend to keep under-trial prisoners in custody indefinitely without a satisfactory explanation for the delay. However, the Court observed that if the committing Magistrate finds sufficient grounds to commit the respondents upon concluding the inquiry, the bail may be cancelled and the respondents remitted to custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inordinate delay in finalizing an inquiry justifies granting bail to accused persons charged with capital offences?
  • Can bail granted on the ground of delay in inquiry be cancelled if the committing Magistrate subsequently finds grounds to commit the accused to custody?
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• MANZOOR HUSSAIN SHAH AND Another vs GHULAM HUSSAIN AND 22 Other1972 PLD Lahore 855 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-05Read full judgment →
• MANZOOR AND 4 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Supreme Court 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-12
  post-arrest bailmurderpolice investigationjudicial discretioncriminal procedurecomplainant's statement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant bail to four petitioners accused of murder, despite the complainant's statement exonerating them. The core legal question is whether a court should rely exclusively on police investigation reports to refuse bail when the complainant's version contradicts the police findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in relying solely on the police's assertion of guilt. The Court ruled that bail is not a punishment and should not be withheld based merely on the ipse dixit of the police. Instead, courts must independently examine the available data and evidence to determine if reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused to the crime. The Court emphasized that while the release of a guilty person can be rectified upon conviction, the unjustified incarceration of an innocent person causes irreparable harm. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to the four petitioners and allowed them interim bail.

  Questions settled

  • Should a court rely solely on police investigation reports to refuse bail in non-bailable offences?
  • Is bail to be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused?
  • What is the standard for determining reasonable grounds for believing an accused committed an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment?
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• MANUAL (EMANUEL) And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 958 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-31Read full judgment →
• MANTHAR vs DHINGANO AND 2 Other1972 PLD Karachi 628 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-06Read full judgment →
• MANTHAR And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1242 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-02Read full judgment →
• MANTHAR AND 4 OTHER vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 214 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-02Read full judgment →
• MANSUKHLAL & BROTHERS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY1972 PTD 532 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-09-03Read full judgment →
• MANSABDAR vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 182 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-14Read full judgment →
• MANJHA AND 7 Others vs Haji ABDUL MAJID AND 32 Other1972 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-26
  adverse possessionprescriptive titlesuit for possessionregistered sale deedtacking of possessionfindings of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court (Bahawlpur Circuit) which allowed the respondents' appeal and decreed their suit for possession regarding the disputed land. The property in dispute was purchased by the predecessor of respondents Nos. 1-5 via a registered sale deed in June 1950. The plaintiffs filed a suit for possession after discovering that the defendants were asserting an adverse prescriptive title. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the defendants had acquired prescriptive title by adverse possession, which was affirmed by the District Judge. However, the High Court reversed these findings upon second appeal, concluding that none of the defendants were in continuous possession of any particular field number for the requisite prescriptive period. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that adverse possession of one defendant could be tacked to that of another. The Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to discharge the onus upon them and that the case was concluded by findings of fact, seeing no reason to interfere with the High Court's order. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse possession of one defendant be tacked to the adverse possession of another defendant for the purpose of acquiring title by prescription?
  • Does a registered sale deed confer valid title when the defendants fail to prove it is collusive and without consideration?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding continuous possession?
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• MANAGING COMMITTEE, MASJID MUHAJREEN Lahores vs S. IJAZ HUSSAIN1972 PLD Lahore 245 · Lahore High Court
  locus standiaggrieved persondisplaced persons propertytransfer of propertyreligious property schemeSettlement Scheme No. VI
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner dismissing a revision petition concerning the transfer of a vacant site comprised in Khasra No. 1134 in Lahore. The core legal question was whether the petitioner Managing Committee of a mosque had the locus standi as an aggrieved person to challenge a transfer of the plot made in favour of a displaced person under Settlement Scheme No. VI prior to the introduction of the Religious Property Scheme, and whether the site in dispute constituted a religious institution. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner, having failed to apply for the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI at the relevant time, was not an aggrieved person and lacked locus standi to challenge the completed transfer, and that the residence of an Imam did not qualify as a religious institution under the Religious Property Scheme. The key principle laid down is that a party lacking a subsisting legal interest or failing to contest at the relevant time cannot subsequently challenge a finalized property transfer, and a residential structure for a mosque's Imam separated from the mosque does not convert into a religious institution or an educational institution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an association that failed to apply for property transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VI has locus standi to challenge a transfer made to another party?
  • Does the residence of an Imam constructed on a separate plot qualify as a religious institution under the Religious Property Scheme?
  • Whether an order of transfer passed by a competent Settlement Authority is void ab initio merely due to procedural irregularities or association of an Additional Settlement Commissioner?
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• MAMOORI Alias MAMOORA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 816 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-09Read full judgment →
• Malik NISAR MUHAMMAD AND Another vs ABDUL RAUF1972 SCMR 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-19
  ejectmentlandlord-tenant disputebona fide personal requirementrent controllereviction proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute concerning the ejectment of a tenant from a shop in Peshawar City. The landlord sought eviction on two grounds: unauthorized subletting and the bona fide personal requirement of the premises. While the Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal, finding the landlord's personal need established. The High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's second appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the lower courts' findings regarding the landlord's personal requirement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the landlord is not required to detail all supporting evidence or factors regarding personal need within the initial ejectment application itself; such details are appropriately established during the evidentiary phase. The Court affirmed that the landlord's circumstances—specifically the growth of his children and the inability to continue his shoe-making business from his residence—sufficiently substantiated his bona fide personal need. Consequently, the Court found no justification for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord required to detail all evidence supporting a claim of personal requirement within the initial ejectment application?
  • Can an appellate court order eviction based on personal requirement if the Rent Controller dismissed the application?
  • Does the growth of a landlord's family and the inability to conduct business from a residence constitute sufficient grounds for a bona fide personal need for a commercial property?
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• Malik HADAYAT ULLAH AND 2 Other vs MURAD ALI KHAN1972 PLD Supreme Court 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-26
  pre-emptionzari panjamextension of timesuo motu powersjurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionPunjab Pre-emption Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan holding that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the initial 1/5th pre-emption money (zari panjam) under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, without a formal application. The core legal question was whether a court possesses the jurisdiction to extend the time for making a pre-emption deposit under section 22 either upon an oral or written request or suo motu. The Supreme Court held that subsection (4) of section 22 explicitly contemplates further time allowed by the court, thereby conferring a discretionary power to extend time, which can be exercised upon oral or written application or even suo motu in the interest of justice. The Court laid down that unless a statute expressly makes a formal application a condition precedent, a court retains the inherent discretionary jurisdiction to grant time extensions until it loses seisin of the matter, and such an exercise of jurisdiction—even if arguably improper in discretion—is not open to revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the initial pre-emption money under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a court extend the time for making a pre-emption deposit suo motu in the absence of a formal written application?
  • Is a formal application a condition precedent for a court to exercise its discretionary power to extend time under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Does the improper exercise of judicial discretion in extending time render the order subject to revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
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• Malik HABIBUR REHMAN vs SIDDIQUE AHMAD KHAN AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 8 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-01
  unfair meansdisciplinary committeeuniversity examinationnatural justicedisqualificationright to silencewrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the disciplinary orders of the University of the Punjab disqualifying the petitioner for one year for allegedly using unfair means and possessing unauthorized papers during an M.A. Examination. The core legal questions concerned whether a candidate's refusal to make a written statement to a Centre Superintendent constitutes an independent punishable offense under university regulations, and whether mere possession of unspecified 'objectionable' materials without proper inquiry or evidence of their relevance to the examination subject can sustain an order of disqualification. The Lahore High Court held that a candidate under scrutiny has no legal obligation to provide an inculpatory statement on demand and that failure to do so cannot be treated as an act of disobedience under Regulation 18. Furthermore, the Court held that the disciplinary orders were vitiated by a lack of proper inquiry, absence of evidence establishing the relevance of the missing recovered documents, and violations of natural justice. The impugned orders were consequently declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal consequence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate's refusal to make a statement before a Centre Superintendent when accused of using unfair means constitute an independent punishable offense of disobedience under university regulations?
  • Can a student be legally penalized for possessing unauthorized papers when the alleged documents are lost and there is no evidence establishing their relevance to the examination subject?
  • Whether the failure of a Centre Superintendent to expel a candidate from the examination hall creates a material circumstance affecting the validity of subsequent disciplinary proceedings for possession of unfair means material?
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• MAHMOODUL HASAN vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES AND NATURAL RESOURCES, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND 3 OTHERS1972 PLC 563 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-29Read full judgment →
• MAHFOOZ ALI vs Thb STATE1972 PCr.LJ 1261 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-09Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ALI vs THE TEXTILE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD., HYDERABAD1972 PLC 64 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-03-30Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ALI vs Syed QAMAR ALI AND Another1972 SCMR 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-08
  oral acquittaljudgmentinherent jurisdictioncriminal procedurepending casesuccessor magistrate
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from an oral acquittal pronounced by a Magistrate who died shortly thereafter without reducing the judgment to writing or signing it as required by law. The appellant challenged the oral acquittal via a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the High Court, which dismissed it on the ground that an alternative remedy was available under section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether an oral acquittal without a written and signed judgment is valid in law and whether inherent powers under section 561-A can be invoked when other remedies exist. The Supreme Court held that an oral acquittal without a written, dated, and signed judgment is a complete nullity, meaning the case remains pending. The Court affirmed that the High Court should have granted relief under section 561-A to prevent the abuse of process, and directed the trial Magistrate to issue process for the appearance of the accused to conclude the trial in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an oral pronouncement of acquittal by a magistrate valid in the absence of a written, dated, and signed judgment?
  • Does the inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when another procedure is available?
  • What is the legal status of a criminal case when the trial magistrate announces an acquittal orally but dies before writing the judgment?
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• MAHBOOB ALI ANSARI vs THE SECRETARY, EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF SIND, KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1972 PLC 541 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-25Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ALI ANSARI vs THE SECRETARY, EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF SIND, KARACHI AND 2 Other1972 PLD Karachi 598 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-25Read full judgment →
• MADURAI DISTRICT CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD., MADURAI vs THIRD1972 PTD 429 · Madras High Court · 1968-10-15Read full judgment →
• M. Y. KHAN vs M. M. ASLAM AND Other1972 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28Read full judgment →
• M. RASHID AHMAD vs NATIONAL & GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 48 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-03Read full judgment →
• M. IMAM-UD-DIN JANJUA vs THE THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN, T.D.A., JAUHARABAD1972 PLD Supreme Court 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-12
  arbitration agreementlimitation periodresiduary articleestoppel against statutewithdrawal of applicationSection 20 Arbitration Actaccrual of right to apply
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, a contractor, challenged a High Court decision dismissing his application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 as time-barred. The core legal questions were whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to proceedings under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940, whether Section 37 of the Arbitration Act 1940 permits the exclusion of time spent in previously withdrawn proceedings, and whether the respondent was estopped from raising limitation due to a prior consent agreement. The Supreme Court held that Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 is a residuary provision applicable to such applications, and the limitation period begins when the dispute arises. The Court further held that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act 1940 does not apply to voluntary withdrawals of proceedings, and that there can be no estoppel against a statute, meaning parties cannot waive mandatory limitation requirements. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the applications were filed beyond the prescribed period.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can parties to an arbitration agreement waive the statutory requirements of the Limitation Act 1908 through consent?
  • Does Section 37 of the Arbitration Act 1940 allow for the exclusion of time spent in previously withdrawn arbitration proceedings when computing limitation?
  • When does the right to apply under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 accrue for the purpose of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• M. IBRAHIM vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AND KASHMIR AFFAIRS (HOME AFFAIRS DIVISION), ISLAMABAD1972 PLD Lahore 60 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-01Read full judgment →
• M. ANWAR, BARRISTER-AT-LAW vs THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CIVIL LINES, POLICE STATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 493 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-24
  first information reportcognizable offencestatutory dutypolice officerLetters Patentpreliminary investigationcriminal administration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition under clause 22 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court was filed by a practicing barrister alleging that the Station House Officer failed to register a criminal case against the former President of Pakistan upon a written information detailing cognizable offences including murder, treason, and conspiracy. The core legal question concerned the statutory duty of a police officer under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to record information relating to a cognizable offence and the High Court's jurisdiction to order a preliminary investigation. The Full Bench held that upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence, a police officer is under a mandatory statutory obligation to enter it in the prescribed register, and such registration does not depend upon the officer's discretion or assessment of its correctness. Since a formal FIR was registered during the proceedings, the petition was disposed of as having borne fruit. The key principle established is that the duty to record a first information report under section 154 is absolute upon receiving information of a cognizable offence, provided it constitutes an accusation intended to set the police machinery in motion.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police officer under a statutory obligation to record information relating to a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the registration of a first information report depend on the discretionary will or opinion of a police officer regarding its correctness?
  • What are the conditions precedent for recording a first information report under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the High Court have the power under clause 22 of the Letters Patent to direct a preliminary investigation into cognizable offences where no investigation has been initiated?
  Read full judgment →
• LYALLPUR COTTON MILLS, LYALLPUR vs MAQSOOD ALI AND 16 OTHERS1972 PLC 448 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-05Read full judgment →
• LHMOOD ALI QADRI AND Another vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Other1972 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-14
  auction purchasecompensation bookdeferred paymentconsent ordersettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld a consent order regarding the mode of payment for an industrial concern purchased in auction. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners were entitled to make payment for the auctioned property on the basis of the total amount of their verified claims in their compensation books rather than through deferred payment or cash as directed by the settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the adjustment was to be made on the basis of deferred payment as per the auction conditions and that the parties, having entered into a compromise before the learned Single Judge, were bound by it. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that auction purchasers are bound by the specific terms of auction conditions regarding payment and by consent orders entered into before the court.

  Questions settled

  • Are auction purchasers bound by the specific terms and conditions of an auction regarding the adjustment of verified claims?
  • Can a party challenge a consent order entered into before a court in subsequent appellate proceedings?
  • Whether payment for an auctioned property under the settlement laws is governed by the conditions of the auction relating to deferred payment.
  Read full judgment →
• LAYALLPUR COTTON MILLS, LAYALLPUR vs MAQSOOD ALI AND 16 Other1972 PLD Lahore 864 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-05Read full judgment →
• LATE NAWABZADA RASHIDUZZAFAR KHAN (REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIR) vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, M. P1972 PTD 412 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-09-17Read full judgment →
• LAL KHAN AND Another vs SARKAR1972 PLD Azad J & K 1 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-09-28Read full judgment →
• LAL HUSSAIN vs AMIR MUHAMMAD KHAN AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 256 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-18Read full judgment →
• LAKSHMIPAT SINGHANIA vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1972 PTD 401 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-12-10Read full judgment →
• LAKSHMI NARAIN LATH TRUST vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI AND RAJASTHAN1972 PTD 321 · Rajasthan High Court · 1965-11-10Read full judgment →
• LAKSHMI INSURANCE Co. LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NEW DELHI1972 PTD 233 · Delhi High Court · 1967-10-17Read full judgment →
• Lahore DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD NASEER-1972 PLC 403 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
• LABOUR UNION vs MESSRS ZAIBTUN TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 388 · Labour Court · 1971-10-04Read full judgment →
• LABOUR UNION vs GENERAL MANAGER, INDUS GLASS WORKS LTD. HYDERABAD1972 PLC 494 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-11-13Read full judgment →
• L. JOSE KANNA MPILLY vs CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, KERALA1972 PTD 581 · Kerala High Court · 1968-10-04Read full judgment →
• KRISHNA MADAN LAL Alias JAN MASIH vs THE STATE THE STATEP L D1972 Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-04
  persona designataEnemy Agents Ordinanceappellate jurisdictionSupreme CourtSpecial JudgeReviewing AuthorityOfficial Secrets Actcompetency of appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals arose from orders passed by a High Court Judge acting as a Reviewing Authority under the Enemy Agents Ordinance, 1943, affirming convictions for espionage. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain appeals against decisions rendered by a High Court Judge exercising powers as a Reviewing Authority under the said Ordinance. The Court held that the appeals were incompetent. It reasoned that the Reviewing Authority, though required to be a High Court Judge, was appointed eo nomine by the Central Government, with the judgeship serving merely as a qualification for appointment. Consequently, the Reviewing Authority acted as a persona designata rather than in the capacity of a High Court. As the impugned orders did not constitute judgments, decrees, or sentences of a High Court, they fell outside the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution of 1962. The principle established is that where a statute confers special jurisdiction upon a judge by name or designation, they act as a persona designata, and their decisions are not subject to the ordinary appellate hierarchy of the High Court or Supreme Court unless specifically provided.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court from a decision of a High Court Judge acting as a Reviewing Authority under the Enemy Agents Ordinance, 1943?
  • Is a High Court Judge appointed as a Reviewing Authority under the Enemy Agents Ordinance, 1943, acting as a persona designata?
  • Does the Enemy Agents Ordinance, 1943, confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Special Judge and the Reviewing Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• KIKABHAI BHAGUBHAI AND ANOTHER vs COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT1972 PTD 602 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-09-18Read full judgment →
• KIKABHAI SAMSUDDIN vs CONTROLLER OE ESTATE DUTY, ,GUJARAT1972 PTD 63 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-10-10Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 716 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-06Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs Mst. AZIZ BIBI1972 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-12
  limited ownercustomary lawmutationallotment of landrefugee propertyshariat application
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over the land allotted to Mst. Aziz Bibi, a widow who held property as a limited owner under custom in India prior to Partition and received refugee land in Pakistan in lieu thereof. The appellant, claiming to be the brother of the deceased husband, sought a mutation of three-fourth shares in the allotted land following the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962. After successive rejections of the appellant's claims across revenue authorities, the High Court, and civil courts, leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether a female limited owner acquired absolute title to lands allotted to her in Pakistan in lieu of limited estate lands held in India. Relying on the precedent set in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi, the Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to the mutation. The appeal was consequently allowed and the Assistant Collector's order restoring the mutation in favor of the appellant was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does a female limited owner acquire absolute title to lands allotted to her on migration to Pakistan in lieu of lands inherited as a limited owner in India?
  • Whether a brother of a deceased landowner is entitled to a share in the property under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-03
  quashment of proceedingspolice investigationcriminal inquiryjudicial functionchallanpolice report
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine the petitioners' application for quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioners were accused in an F.I.R. registered under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, later converted to Section 302. During the police investigation, the petitioners were placed in column No. 2 and found innocent; however, they were still challaned and brought before the Inquiry Magistrate. The core legal question was whether, once the police investigation concludes that a party is innocent, any further inquiry against that party is legally barred under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the police's opinion on innocence or guilt is not binding and does not usurp the judicial function of the court. The Court affirmed that the police do not determine guilt or innocence, and therefore, the inquiry proceedings were properly initiated and could not be quashed on the basis of the police report alone.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police finding of innocence during investigation bar further criminal inquiry against an accused?
  • Is the police opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused binding on the court?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed solely because the police report placed the accused in column No. 2?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 51 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-07Read full judgment →
• KHIZAR HAYAT vs The STATE1972 SCMR 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-19
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurderdeath sentenceeyewitness testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal jurisprudence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 27th May 1971, which dismissed his appeal and confirmed his death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Mir Ahmad. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular evidence, specifically the reliability of the sole eyewitness and the alleged improbabilities regarding his presence and conduct at the scene of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the eyewitness was consistent and free of material discrepancies, and that the minor behavioural variations pointed out by the defence did not render his presence unnatural. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence. The key principle laid down is that minor alleged improbabilities or distances between eyewitnesses do not discredit a consistent and unimpeached ocular account of a crime unless material discrepancies are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a sole eyewitness can form the basis of a murder conviction without corroboration?
  • Does a minor distance between co-travelling eyewitnesses render their presence at the crime scene unnatural?
  • Whether an exchange of hot words prior to the incident is sufficient to discredit subsequent consistent prosecution evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• KHITAB KHAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 380 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-01Read full judgment →
• Khawaja USMAN SHAH vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 77 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-13Read full judgment →
• Khawaja GHULAM QADAR vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HAZARA, ABBOTTABAD1972 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-15
  non-prosecutionrestoration applicationlimitation perioddelay in filingspecial leave to appealrevision petitionland settlement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against orders of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition for non-prosecution and subsequently rejected an application for restoration. The petitioner had challenged the cancellation of land allotments under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly dismissed the revision petition for non-prosecution due to the petitioner's absence and counsel's failure to appear, and whether the subsequent restoration application was properly denied. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal was justified, noting that the petitioner's counsel had failed to act despite having a valid power of attorney, and the petitioner had failed to appear even after receiving personal service of notice. The Court emphasized that a party must explain each day of delay when seeking condonation for a time-barred appeal. Finding no merit in the petitioner's arguments and noting an unexplained 43-day delay in filing, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal on both merits and limitation grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is a counsel justified in claiming a lack of instructions in a revision petition when a power of attorney has not been withdrawn?
  • Does a party seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal need to explain each day of the delay?
  • Can a court dismiss a revision petition for non-prosecution when the petitioner fails to appear after being personally served?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAN ZAMAN vs KACHKOL AND Another1972 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  murderacquittalspecial leave to appealdying declarationmedical evidenceocular testimonybenefit of the doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the acquittal of the respondent by the High Court for the murder of Zar Muhammad. The core legal question involves the appreciation of ocular evidence, medical corroboration, and the reliability of a dying declaration in a criminal murder trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly scrutinized the evidence, finding material contradictions between the ocular testimony regarding the firing distance and the medical evidence, as well as significant doubts concerning the dying declaration's authenticity based on the medical expert's testimony regarding the loss of the victim's power of speech. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquittal order, holding that the prosecution case was not free from genuine doubt. The key principle laid down is that where eye-witness testimony conflicts with medical evidence regarding the distance of firing and a dying declaration is rendered doubtful by medical testimony on the victim's capacity to speak, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused, and an acquittal will not be lightly interfered with on a petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular evidence conflicting with medical evidence regarding the distance of firing can be relied upon to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does a dying declaration become doubtful when medical testimony establishes that the injured person would have lost the power of speech shortly after sustaining the injuries?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan UMAR KHAN vs (1) MARKET COMMITTEE, JHELUM AND (2) THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 497 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-31
  quashment of proceedingscantonment arealegislative competencepith and substance doctrinemarket committeeagricultural produce marketsprovincial legislation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves criminal miscellaneous petitions filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners for alleged evasion of market fees under rules framed pursuant to the Agricultural Produce Markets Act 1939. The core legal question was whether a Provincial Legislature lacks the competence to extend a provincial enactment like the said Act to a cantonment area, given the Central Legislature's exclusive powers over cantonments under Item 1(e) of the Third Schedule read with Article 131 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The Lahore High Court held that the proceedings could competently be challenged under section 561-A and that the impugned extension was valid, applying the doctrine of 'pith and substance' to determine the true nature and character of the legislation. The Court laid down that provincial laws enacted within their proper legislative domain—such as agriculture and markets—are not invalidated merely because they incidentally affect cantonment areas, and that the Central Legislature's power over cantonment local authorities is primarily related to the Defence of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Can a citizen invoke section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to challenge the validity of a law and seek quashing of criminal proceedings?
  • Does the extension of a provincial agricultural market law to a cantonment area violate the Central Legislature's exclusive legislative powers under the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  • How is the true nature and character of a statute determined when a conflict of legislative competence arises between provincial and central domains?
  • Does the power of the Central Legislature to regulate local self-government in cantonment areas entirely exclude Provincial Legislatures from legislating on matters otherwise within their provincial domain?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan AZIZUL HASSAN KHAN vs Haji MUHAMMAD ISMAIL1972 PLD Lahore 142 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-15
  statutory tenancyejectment applicationnotice of demandcontracting out of statuteestoppel against statuteProvisional Transfer Orderrent controller
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from an ejectment petition filed by a landlord who acquired property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant based on an alleged default in rent and a previous compromise agreement wherein the tenant purportedly agreed to vacate the premises. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the Appellate Court remanded the case to determine whether statutory notices under Section 30 of the 1958 Act were served. Before the High Court, the landlord argued that the statutory tenancy was replaced by a fresh contractual tenancy through the compromise, and that the tenant was estopped from pleading lack of statutory notice. The High Court held that statutory tenancy created by Section 30 cannot be contracted out of, making any contrary agreement void. Serving a notice of demand is a mandatory condition precedent for claiming eviction on the ground of default. Finding it admitted that no notice of demand was issued for the default period, the High Court dismissed the landlord's ejectment application.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties contract out of the statutory tenancy created under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is a notice of demand under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 a mandatory precondition for seeking eviction on grounds of rent default?
  • Can the plea of estoppel be invoked against the mandatory provisions of a statute regulating public policy?
  • Is the court obligated to apply a relevant law based on admitted or proved facts even if a party failed to explicitly plead it in its written statement?
  Read full judgment →
• KHALID RASHID AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 729 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-25Read full judgment →
• KHALID RASHEED AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 722 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-07Read full judgment →
• KHAIRATI AND Others vs ALEEMUDDIN AND Another1972 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  evacuee propertymortgage deedspecific performanceequity of redemptionprovisional transfer ordersettlement scheme
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The dispute relates to an evacuee property transferred to one Dinu in January 1960, who subsequently executed a deed in December 1960 titled as a mortgage deed containing a stipulation amounting to an agreement to sell. Dinu passed away before the issuance of the permanent transfer deed, which was later issued in his name. The respondents-mortgagees filed a suit for specific performance or alternatively a mortgage decree. The trial court passed a preliminary mortgage decree allowing redemption, but the District Judge on appeal set it aside and granted specific performance. The High Court dismissed the subsequent second appeal in limine. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a person holding a provisional transfer order under Settlement Scheme No. 1 may mortgage the property. The Court further ruled that questions of limitation and court-fees not raised via cross-objection in the first appellate court cannot be reagitated, and that the issuance of a permanent transfer deed in the name of a deceased person does not invalidate the underlying transfer as substitution of heirs can be made by Settlement Authorities. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person holding a provisional transfer order can mortgage evacuee property under Settlement Scheme No. 1?
  • Can a party reagitate questions of limitation and court-fees in a higher appellate court when no cross-objections were filed before the first appellate court?
  • Does the issuance of a permanent transfer deed in the name of a deceased person invalidate the transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MOHAMMAD AND Another vs MIR. MOHAMMAD AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-04
  acquittalbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceocular evidencecriminal appealeyewitness credibilityleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had overturned the convictions of the respondents for murder and related offences. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of eyewitnesses and the consistency between ocular and medical evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the High Court correctly identified significant discrepancies. Specifically, the medical evidence regarding the distance of the fatal shot contradicted the eyewitness accounts, and the prosecution failed to secure crucial forensic evidence, such as blood samples from the crime scene. Furthermore, the failure to examine engaged foot trackers and inconsistencies in witness testimonies regarding material particulars raised reasonable doubts. The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material inconsistencies and contradictions, particularly when contradicted by medical evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order of acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant contradiction between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the distance of a fatal shot justify the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can the failure of the prosecution to examine engaged foot trackers support an adverse inference against the prosecution's case?
  • Is an appellate court justified in overturning a conviction when the prosecution fails to secure material forensic evidence from the crime scene?
  Read full judgment →
• KHADIM HUSSAIN vs ILYAS And 5 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 657 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-08Read full judgment →
• KAZIM HUSSAIN SHAH And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1012 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-31Read full judgment →
• KAYSONS vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI1972 PLD Karachi 174 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-01Read full judgment →
• KARAMAT HUSSAIN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-02
  circumstantial evidencechain of circumstanceslast seen togetherextra-judicial confessionrecovery of blood-stained articlesmotivemurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan upholding the appellant's conviction and sentence of transportation for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a fellow railway pointsman. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including a purported extra-judicial confession, alleged motive concerning job permanency, recovery of blood-stained articles from a shared quarter, and the fact that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant on night duty. The Supreme Court observed that the extra-judicial confession was rightly disbelieved by the courts below, the alleged motive was thoroughly disproved by official railway rules, and the recoveries were unreliable and unlinked to either the accused or the deceased. Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be fully established and inconsistent with any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, rendering mere last seen evidence insufficient for conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence when links in the chain of circumstances are broken?
  • Is evidence of last seen together alone sufficient to convict an accused of murder without corroborative evidence?
  • Can recovered blood-stained items be relied upon as incriminating evidence without proof connecting them to the accused or the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION vs MOOSA M. ADAM AND 4 Other1972 PLD Karachi 571 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-11
  estoppel against statutemunicipal contractsummary evictionmandatory statutory provisionsunauthorized occupationmunicipal corporationlease validity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute between the Karachi Municipal Corporation and occupants of a municipal plot who claimed tenancy rights. The respondents sought a declaration and injunction against eviction, alleging they were tenants. The trial court dismissed the suit, but a Single Judge of the High Court reversed this, invoking the doctrine of estoppel against the Corporation. The core legal question was whether the doctrine of estoppel could be invoked against a statutory body to validate a contract (lease) that failed to comply with mandatory statutory provisions of the Karachi Municipal Corporation Act 1933, and whether the Corporation could summarily evict the occupants. The High Court held that statutory provisions prescribing the manner of executing contracts by municipal bodies are mandatory, not directory. Consequently, no estoppel can be raised against a statute, and the alleged lease, not executed in the prescribed manner, was void. The Court further held that the Corporation was entitled to summarily remove the unauthorized structures under its rules. The key principle laid down is that estoppel cannot be pleaded against a statute, and mandatory formalities for municipal contracts must be strictly observed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the doctrine of estoppel be invoked against a statutory body to validate a contract that fails to comply with mandatory statutory requirements?
  • Are the provisions of the Karachi Municipal Corporation Act 1933 regarding the execution of contracts mandatory or directory?
  • Does a Municipal Corporation have the authority to summarily remove temporary structures from its land without prior notice to the occupant?
  • Can an oral agreement or receipt of rent create a valid lease against a Municipal Corporation when the statute requires a written contract executed in a specific manner?
  Read full judgment →
• KARACHI HOTEL WORKERS UNION vs MESSERS CAFE MILLAT, KARACHI1972 PLC 303 · Labour Court · 1972-02-28Read full judgment →
• KARACHI COTTON ASSOCIATION LTD. vs KARACHI COTTON WAREHOUSE1972 PLC 275 · Labour Court · 1971-05-22Read full judgment →
• KANHAIYA LAL MOTI LAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1972 PTD 362 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-11-11Read full judgment →
• KAMIL SHAH And Another vs SHAH MUHAMMAD and another--Opponent1972 P Cr. L J 1121 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-19Read full judgment →