Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Mst. ZAINAB vs GHAFOOR TEXTILE, MILLS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLD Karachi 438 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZAIBUN NISA vs MUHAMMAD MOZAMMIL1972 PLD Karachi 401 · Sindh High Court
  Family Courtguardianshipchild custodyforum of appealrevisional jurisdictiondeeming clauseprocedural lawsubstantive right of appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference before a Full Bench of the High Court arose out of conflicting views regarding the appellate forum and revisional supervisory jurisdiction applicable to orders passed by Family Courts in guardianship matters under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The primary questions referred were whether an appeal lies from a decision of a Family Court presided over by a judge below the rank of a District Judge in guardianship disputes and to which forum, and whether a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lies against such orders.

  The High Court held that under Section 14(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, an appeal against a decision or decree of a Family Court presided over by a Civil Judge lies to the District Court, not the High Court. Furthermore, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is inapplicable due to the express statutory exclusion under Section 17. The Court established that the deeming clause and procedural adoption in Section 25 relate purely to trial procedure and cannot expand the definition of 'procedure' to encompass substantive rights of appeal or revision.

  Questions settled

  • To which forum does an appeal lie from a decision of a Family Court under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, when the presiding Judge is not a District Judge or of equivalent rank?
  • Does the deeming provision in Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, confer the rights of appeal and revision provided under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Does the term 'procedure' in Section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, include the substantive rights of appeal and revision?
  • Is an order of a Family Court subject to the supervisory revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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• Mst. SHERINA vs Haji GHAWAR KHAN AND 12 Other1972 SCMR 646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  second appealinheritancesurvivorshipadmissionestateleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan in a second appeal, which had accepted the plaintiffs' claim for a share in the estate of their predecessor Mahmood. The core legal question concerned whether the findings of the High Court regarding the survivorship of the plaintiffs' predecessor, Mst. Zaujan, were properly based on the evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were indeed supported by evidence, including clear admissions made in written statements, testimonies, and concessions by counsel and parties at the bar. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact regarding survivorship based on admissions in written statements and evidence are sustainable in second appeal?
  • Can admissions made by parties and their counsel at the bar be relied upon to determine inheritance shares?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in restoring the trial court's decree based on the available material on record?
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• Mst. SHAHJAHAN BEGUM vs Mst. SHABBIR FATIMA AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 546 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHAFTQAN vs HASHIM ALI AND Another1972 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-26
  bailmurdercancellation of bailjudicial discretioncounter-versionscommitting magistrate
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the mother of a murder victim against an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to one of the accused, Hashim Ali. The petitioner challenged the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail in a murder case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court properly exercised its judicial discretion under the circumstances. The Court observed that there were counter-versions of the incident, making it a matter of trial to determine which party was the aggressor and whether the respondent committed an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had exercised its discretion properly and dismissed the petition. However, the Court laid down the principle that the complainant/petitioner remains at liberty to move the committing Magistrate for cancellation of bail once sufficient evidence has been recorded during the inquiry or trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted in a murder case where there are counter-versions of the incident and the aggressor is yet to be determined?
  • Can a complainant apply for the cancellation of bail before a committing Magistrate after evidence has been recorded, even if the High Court previously granted bail?
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• Mst. SARDAR BEGUM vs Mst. HUSSAIN BIBI AND Another1972 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  transfer of propertysettlement lawslocus standibelated appealspecial leave to appealestoppel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential house in Lahore under settlement laws. The primary legal question concerns the locus standi of the petitioner to challenge a transfer order passed in favor of the respondent when the petitioner had not filed her transfer application until after the original transfer order was made and after appeals by her children against that order had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi and was estopped from challenging the transfer order, as the matter had already attained finality upon the rejection of her children's appeal, and her belated application and subsequent appeal were entirely time-barred and incompetent. The key principle laid down is that a party who was not an applicant at the time of the original transfer order and whose belated claim was filed long after the transfer attained finality lacks the requisite locus standi to challenge the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who filed a belated transfer form after the initial transfer order have the locus standi to challenge that order?
  • Can a belated appeal against a property transfer order be entertained after the original transfer has attained finality through the dismissal of prior appeals?
  • Is a party estopped from challenging a settlement transfer order when they had full knowledge of prior proceedings and failed to file a timely application?
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• Mst. SARDAR BEGUM vs LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LAHORE AND 3 Other1972 PLD Lahore 458 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-13
  land acquisitionTown Improvement Actmandatory noticeSection 9 noticeCollector awardexemption from schemevoid orderwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The legal representatives of Mst. Sardar Begum challenged the acquisition of her bungalow at 78-Upper Mall, Lahore, by the Lahore Improvement Trust and its subsequent sale to the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA). The acquisition was initiated under the Town Improvement Act 1922 and the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The petitioner asserted that mandatory notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 were never served on her or the occupier, making the Collector's award and subsequent possession transfer void. The respondents argued that the award had become final under Section 12 and the property had vested in the Trust free of encumbrances under Section 16.

  The Lahore High Court accepted the writ petition, holding that compliance with Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is a mandatory prerequisite for a valid award and acquisition. Because no notice was served on the owner or occupier, the award dated 30 January 1965 and all subsequent actions—including the transfer of possession—were illegal and without lawful authority. The court declared all proceedings from the stage of Section 9 notice void.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to serve mandatory notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 render subsequent acquisition proceedings and the award void?
  • Can land vest in the acquiring authority under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 if the underlying award is legally invalid?
  • Is a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 an adequate remedy when an owner seeks exemption of property under Section 56 of the Town Improvement Act 1922?
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• Mst. SAKHIRA vs ROZI KHAN AND Another1972 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-13
  acquittalbenefit of doubtchild witnessmurdercorroborative evidencedelay in FIRspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, who had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of a young boy and sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established its case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on a single child eye-witness who was not examined during commitment proceedings and whose trial testimony materially departed from his police statement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the acquittal, holding that the child witness's testimony lacked conviction and was unreliable. The Court observed that the corroborative evidence could not salvage the prosecution's case when the primary eye-witness testimony was unsatisfactory, and further noted that the First Information Report was delayed and no clear motive was established. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the respondent was rightly given the benefit of doubt and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a child witness whose statement materially departs from their previous police statement?
  • Does corroborative evidence advance the prosecution's case if the primary eye-witness testimony is found to be unsatisfactory and unreliable?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in lodging a First Information Report on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
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• Mst. SADDIQUNNISA-Paintiff vs Khan Sahib Agha MUHAMMAD SULTAN MIRZA1972 PLD Karachi 103 · Sindh High Court · 1969-04-03
  limitationcondonation of delaydeficiency of court-feesspecific performancedamagesbreach of contractconsequential relief
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from an appeal against a Single Judge judgment dismissing a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell immovable property valued at Rs. 66,000, or in the alternative, damages of Rs. 33,000. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by time. When initially filed, the appeal carried nominal court fees of Rs. 4, and after office objections, the appellant filed an application for condonation of delay and paid additional court fees on an amended valuation of Rs. 10,000, abandoning the claim for specific performance. The High Court considered the effect of deficient court fees on the period of limitation, as well as the maintainability of a suit for damages without seeking specific performance. The Court held that an appeal is not properly instituted until full court fees are paid, rendering the appeal barred by 103 days without any adequate explanation or valid grounds for condonation. Additionally, abandoning specific performance while seeking damages violated Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • From what date is an appeal deemed to be properly instituted when the initial memorandum of appeal is presented with deficient court fees?
  • Whether illness and old age of an appellant constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay when steps for filing the appeal were otherwise actively taken?
  • Can a party claim damages for breach of contract without seeking the consequential relief of specific performance under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
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• Mst. RAZIA BEGUM AND 4 Others vs Mst. ARASH JAN AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  Marzul Mautdeath-bed giftIslamic lawconcurrent findings of factadmissibility of medical recordsgift deedspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which declared a gift deed executed by the deceased, Muhammad Ismail, in favor of his second wife, Mst. Razia Begum, invalid. The core legal question was whether the gift was executed during 'Marzul Maut' (death-bed illness), thereby rendering it subject to the restrictions applicable to death-bed gifts under Islamic law. The trial court, affirmed by the District Judge and the High Court, found as a matter of fact that the deceased was suffering from a terminal heart condition at the time of the gift, which occurred only twenty days prior to his death. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, rejecting arguments that the medical evidence was inadmissible or insufficient. The Court held that the medical history-chart prepared by a doctor in the course of professional duty was admissible under the Evidence Act, especially when produced without objection. The principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of 'Marzul Maut' based on credible medical and oral evidence are not subject to interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a medical history-chart prepared by a doctor in the course of professional duty admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of 'Marzul Maut'?
  • Does a gift executed by a person suffering from an advanced heart condition shortly before death constitute a gift made during 'Marzul Maut'?
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• Mst. RAJBAI And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1091 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. RABIA vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 8 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. RABIA BIBI AND 7 Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA1972 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-06
  special leave to appealallotment of landcongested areawrit jurisdictionejectmentsettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, legal heirs of the original allottee Abdul Ghani Shah, sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Letters Patent appeal by the Lahore High Court. The original allotment of agricultural land in a congested area was found to be based on a fraudulent claim of parentage, though subsequent administrative orders permitted the allottee to retain possession until alternative land in a non-congested area could be allotted. The core legal question concerned whether the Settlement Commissioner's subsequent order adversely modified the protection against immediate ejectment granted to the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's order expressly protected the petitioners' possession until alternative land was provided, meaning they were not aggrieved by the order, and that the High Court rightly refused to interfere in its writ jurisdiction to enforce administrative orders. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not exercise writ jurisdiction merely to implement subsisting administrative orders when the administrative authorities themselves have not violated the substantive protections granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court be approached in writ jurisdiction merely to implement orders passed by settlement authorities?
  • Whether an allottee is considered an aggrieved party when an administrative order explicitly protects their possession until alternative land is provided?
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• Mst. QAISA'r KHATOON AND 12 Other vs Maulvi ABDUL KHALIQ AND ANOTHER1972 PLD SC 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritancecustomary lawShariat lawonus of proofancestral propertyspecial leave to appealWajibul Arz
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns an inheritance dispute where the plaintiffs sought possession of property as heirs under Shariat law, while the defendant asserted a special family custom excluding females. The core legal questions involved the competency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the burden of proof regarding the existence of custom, and whether customary law applies to non-ancestral property. The Court held that it possesses the jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal where substantial questions of law exist, even if the certificate of fitness is technically deficient. Regarding the merits, the Court affirmed that the burden of proving a special family custom rests entirely upon the party alleging it; failing such proof, personal law (Shariat) governs. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that customary entries in records like the Wajibul Arz are presumed to apply only to ancestral property unless explicitly stated otherwise. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs regarding non-ancestral property, as the defendant failed to prove the custom applied to such assets.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal when a certificate of fitness is technically deficient?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a party asserts that a family is governed by custom rather than personal law?
  • Does customary law, as recorded in a Wajibul Arz, apply to non-ancestral property in the absence of an explicit provision?
  • Is a party required to file cross-objections to challenge findings of the trial court if the suit was dismissed in their favor?
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• Mst. PHURI AND Another vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB AND 41972 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-23
  review petitionlimited estateevacuee propertycustomary lawsuccessionmutationland ownership
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment concerning the nature of land ownership held by a female refugee (Mst. Bhuri) who migrated from India to Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner held the abandoned Indian lands as a limited owner under custom or as a full owner, and consequently, whether the collaterals of her deceased husband could claim a share in the evacuee lands allotted to her in Pakistan. The petitioner argued she inherited the Indian lands from her father, not her husband. The Court noted that the petitioner had previously failed to contest mutation proceedings in favor of the collaterals and had failed to produce evidence during the original appeal despite being granted time. However, the Court observed that the petitioner was still alive, meaning her limited estate had not yet terminated. The Court held that the succession to the husband's estate would only reopen upon her death. The judgment was modified to clarify that the mutation of the collaterals' share would only take effect upon the petitioner's death, protecting her possession during her lifetime.

  Questions settled

  • When does the succession to the estate of a limited owner under custom reopen?
  • Can a mutation order in favor of collaterals regarding a limited estate take effect during the lifetime of the limited owner?
  • Does the possession of a limited owner of evacuee land remain protected during her lifetime despite the rights of collaterals?
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• Mst. PANNA H BIBI vs The ST ATE1972 P Cr. L J 1240 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. NAWAB BEGUM vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 79 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. NASEER BEGUM vs SAIN AND 6 Other1972 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-20
  admissibility of evidencecivil judgment in criminal trialabductionspecial leave to appealcriminal revisionvalidity of marriage
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a criminal revision petition regarding the acquittal of respondents on charges of abduction and rape. The petitioner argued that the trial court and the High Court failed to consider a civil court decree declaring her alleged nikah with the accused invalid. The core legal question was whether a civil court judgment regarding the validity of a marriage is admissible as evidence to establish facts in a separate criminal trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly disregarded the civil judgment. The Court affirmed the principle that, under the law of evidence, a judgment of a civil court is not admissible in a criminal proceeding to establish the truth of the facts upon which it was rendered. A criminal court must independently determine the guilt of an accused based solely on the evidence presented before it, rather than relying on findings from separate civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil court judgment declaring a marriage invalid admissible in a criminal trial to prove the facts of the case?
  • Must a criminal court independently determine the guilt of an accused based on the evidence before it, regardless of findings in civil proceedings?
  • Does a civil court decree regarding the status of a marriage bind a criminal court in a trial for abduction?
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• Mst. MUSAHIB KHATUN AND 2 Others vs Mst. BEGUM NUR AND Another1972 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-20
  adverse possessionoccupancy tenancyPunjab Tenancy Actinheritance of occupancy rightsco-heirs possessionpartition suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which allowed the respondent's second appeal regarding a suit for possession and partition of land and a house. The core legal question concerns whether a co-heir entering into possession of occupancy land under a mistaken belief of custom can acquire title by adverse possession against other co-heirs, and the effect of section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act upon the devolution of occupancy rights. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the occupancy rights were extinguished upon the original tenant's death under section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act as no eligible heirs existed under that statute, and that the respondent acquired valid title to the land through open, hostile, and exclusive adverse possession exceeding twelve years. The key principle laid down is that possession taken under a mistaken belief of custom can ripen into adverse possession if it is openly hostile to the true position and maintained for the statutory period after the extinguishment of underlying tenancy rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether occupancy rights devolve upon daughters under section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act?
  • Can a person entering into possession of land under a mistaken belief of custom acquire title by adverse possession?
  • Does possession by a co-heir constitute adverse possession against other co-heirs under the circumstances?
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• Mst. MATLUB JAN vs Malik BASHIR AND Another1972 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-19
  acquittalbenefit of doubtsole eye-witnessinterested witnessindependent corroborationmedical evidenceconflict with medical evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a murder case where the High Court had acquitted respondent Malik Bashir by giving him the benefit of doubt. The prosecution's case rested principally on the sole eye-witness testimony of the deceased's widow, Mst. Matlub Jan, supported by neighbour witnesses and medical evidence. The High Court rejected the corroborative witnesses' testimonies due to doubts over identification, distance, and enmity, leaving only the widow's testimony. Upon evaluation, the High Court found her testimony inconsistent with the medical evidence regarding the number of assailants, the weapons used (both a rifle and a shot-gun), the lack of charring or powder marks, and the distance from which the shots were fired. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and held that the High Court's refusal to rely on the sole ocular testimony of an interested witness without independent corroboration was based on reasonable grounds. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's order of acquittal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of an interested eye-witness when it directly conflicts with medical evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment of acquittal where the rejection of ocular testimony is based on reasonable grounds?
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• Mst. MASOOMA SULTANA vs A. M. GHIAZ, ANSARI AND 3 OTHERS1972 PLC 266 · Labour Court · 1972-02-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. MAKHMURAN vs Mst. ARZUMANA AND Other1972 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-15
  giftdelivery of possessionvoid giftundue influencelimitationpardanashin ladyspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a civil suit for a declaration that a registered gift deed executed by the respondent in favor of her sister was fictitious, without consideration, and procured through undue influence and fraud, with an alternative claim for possession. The core legal question is whether a gift without delivery of possession is void ab initio, thereby attracting the longer limitation period under Article 120 rather than Article 91 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings of fact that the gift deed was not validly executed, that the donor's thumb-impression was not proved, and that possession was never delivered to the donee, as the donor remained recorded in revenue entries as owner and the petitioner's husband as a cultivator. The court held that an incomplete gift without delivery of possession is void ab initio, and thus the suit is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as no cancellation of the instrument was necessary. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a gift of immovable property without delivery of possession is void ab initio?
  • Does a suit challenging a void gift deed fall under Article 91 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent or factual findings regarding the execution of a gift deed and delivery of possession?
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• Mst. MAHMOODA AKHTAR AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. FATIMA Alias KAUSAR IQBAL1972 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-23
  preliminary decreelegal representativespartition suitsubstitution of heirscivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises out of a partition suit filed by petitioner No. 1, resulting in a preliminary decree. Following the death of the defendant, applications were made to implead legal heirs under Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial Court determined the legal representatives, and in a subsequent revision, the High Court held that after a preliminary decree, the applicable provision was Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 rather than Rule 4, and granted the petitioners rights to appeal with limitation considerations under the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal question was whether Order XXII Rule 4 or Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to the substitution or addition of legal representatives after a preliminary decree has been passed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's view, holding that Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies after a preliminary decree. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Order XXII Rule 4 or Order XXII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to the impleading of legal representatives after a preliminary decree has been passed?
  • Does the substitution of legal heirs in a suit governed by a preliminary decree fall under devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit?
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• Mst. KHAIR-UL-NISA AND 6 Other vs Malik MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE AND 2 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-18
  specific performancebona fide purchaserburden of proofwritten statementadmissibility of evidencesubsequent transferee
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The original owner had agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff-respondent, but subsequently sold it to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question was whether, under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877, the subsequent purchaser must lead affirmative evidence to prove that they are a bona fide transferee for value without notice, and whether a written statement filed by a deceased defendant can serve as such evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the onus lies heavily on the subsequent transferee to prove good faith and lack of notice. This negative burden can be discharged if the transferee states on oath in court that they had no knowledge of the prior contract, shifting the onus to the plaintiff. However, a written statement is not evidence on oath and cannot be treated as such if the defendant dies before being examined. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that a subsequent transferee of property is a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can a subsequent transferee effectively discharge the burden of proving lack of notice of a prior contract by merely stating so on oath in court?
  • Can a verified written statement filed by a defendant who dies before being examined in court be treated as substantive evidence in the suit?
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• Mst. JENNA T KHATOON vs MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND Other1972 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-02
  transfer of appealterritorial jurisdictionpre-emption suitHigh Courts (Establishment) Orderdissolution of province
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 9 of the High Courts (Establishment) Order, 1970, seeking the transfer of a pending Civil Miscellaneous Appeal from the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi, to the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, who had initiated a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land, argued that because the territory where the land is situated was transferred from the jurisdiction of the former Province of West Pakistan to the Province of Punjab following the dissolution of the former province, the appeal should be transferred to the Lahore High Court to facilitate the application of Punjab pre-emption laws. The core legal question was whether the transfer of territorial jurisdiction necessitated the transfer of a pending appeal to a different High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the mere change in territorial jurisdiction did not warrant the transfer of the pending appeal. The Court reasoned that the petitioner could effectively raise arguments regarding the applicability of Punjab pre-emption laws before the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which remained the competent forum to adjudicate the pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of territory from one province to another automatically necessitate the transfer of a pending appeal from one High Court to another?
  • Can a High Court adjudicate a case involving the pre-emption laws of a different province if the land in dispute is situated within its territorial jurisdiction?
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• Mst. JANAT AND 9 Othms vs PIR BUX1972 PLD Karachi 336 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. JAMSHED vs Mst. TAJWAR SULTAN AND 23 Other1972 SCMR 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-02-03
  legal representativeimadpleading necessary partyabatement of suitdeath of plaintiffinheritanceMuslim Law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a suit for a declaration regarding inheritance rights in property left by Mst. Miranjan. During the pendency of the suit, one of the plaintiffs, Mst. Channo, died. An application was filed to implead her husband as her legal representative, but a subsequent application was moved by Mst. Maqbool Jan claiming to be a consanguine sister and legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. The trial court and the High Court dismissed her application on the grounds that she was a step-daughter of Mst. Miranjan, that Mst. Channo had gifted her property share, and that her absence would not affect the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the courts below misconceived both the extent of the gifts and the rules of inheritance under Muslim Law regarding the estate of Mst. Channo. The Court ruled that where a bona fide question arises as to whether a person is the legal representative of a deceased party under Order XXII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the court must adjudicate upon it rather than refuse impleadment merely because the surviving plaintiff disputes it.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse to implead a necessary party claiming to be a legal representative of a deceased plaintiff simply because the surviving plaintiff disputes their interest?
  • Whether the failure to implead all legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 warrants the dismissal of an application without an inquiry on merits?
  • Does a transfer of property by way of gift during the pendency of a suit extinguish the right of legal representatives to be impleaded for determining the estate?
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• Mst. HAKIMZADI vs NAWAZ ALI1972 PLD Karachi 540 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAJRA BEGUM vs ABDUL AZIZ AND Another1972 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  interim injunctionexecution of decreebona fide purchasertransfer of propertyrevision jurisdictionbreach of undertakingattachment before judgment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to interfere in revision with lower court orders denying an interim injunction. The petitioner, the wife of a judgment debtor, sought to restrain the decree-holder from ejecting her from property she claimed to have purchased from her husband. The husband had previously breached an undertaking given to the court not to dispose of the property during the pendency of a partnership dissolution suit. The petitioner argued that the High Court judge lacked competence to hear the revision due to a prior revision being heard by a different judge, and asserted her status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that individual High Court judges are competent to hear matters assigned to them, even if different judges heard prior related proceedings. The Court declined to adjudicate the bona fide purchaser claim, noting it was a substantive issue to be determined in the petitioner's pending suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judge of the High Court competent to hear a revision application if a different judge heard a previous revision application arising from the same litigation?
  • Can a claim of being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice be determined at the interlocutory stage of an injunction application?
  • Does the breach of an undertaking not to dispose of property affect the rights of a subsequent transferee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajiani FATIMA BAI AND 6 Other vs IBRAHIM AND 13 Other1972 PLD Karachi 610 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-23
  functus officiofinal transfer deedPermanent Transfer RulesSettlement Commissionerrevisional jurisdictionDisplaced Persons Actevacuee propertypublic auction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 26th May 1966, which cancelled a final transfer deed issued to the petitioners for a building site and directed its disposal via public auction under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The petitioner had purchased structures from evacuees, had the transaction confirmed by the Custodian, and was issued a final transfer deed in 1961. The High Court held that upon the issuance of a final transfer deed (PTD), the settlement authorities become functus officio and lose jurisdiction to reopen or set aside the transfer under the general revisional powers of Section 20(3) of the Act, absent statutory authority under the Permanent Transfer Rules. Furthermore, following Supreme Court precedent, since Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules had been deleted and no fraud or misrepresentation was alleged, the Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to set aside the final transfer deed. The petition was accordingly accepted and the impugned order declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Commissioner become functus officio after a final transfer deed is issued under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can the suo motu revisional power under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 be invoked to cancel a final transfer deed in the absence of fraud or statutory rules empowering such cancellation?
  • Does a judgment of the Supreme Court prevail over conflicting High Court decisions under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajan NAWAB BIBI vs SETTLEMENT AUTHORITIES (SETTLEMENT1972 PLD Lahore 306 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN Etc.S1972 P Cr. L J 451 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. GAITI ARA BEGUM vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Another1972 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-15
  displaced personstransfer of propertycomposite propertysettlement authoritieschoubarashopsub-division of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dismissing the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer of property consisting of a shop on the ground floor and a choubara on top in Sargodha. The core legal question was whether the property, being situated in a commercial area, should have been treated as a shop in its entirety and transferred to the appellant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities acted in accordance with law and administrative instructions by dividing the property into two independent portions and transferring them to the respective occupants in possession to avoid serious hardship and dislocation. The Court laid down that instructions conferring discretion upon Settlement Authorities to divide composite properties with independent access to avoid hardship are directory in nature, and such administrative decisions achieving substantial justice will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a composite property in a commercial area must be transferred in its entirety as a shop to a single applicant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Do Settlement Authorities possess the discretion to divide a building into separate portions and transfer them to different occupants in possession to prevent hardship?
  • Are the administrative instructions issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the division of properties mandatory or directory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FAZLUN NISA BEGUM vs THE CHIEF SETFLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI1972 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-03-24
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertydisplaced personsettlement lawphysical possessionservant quartersLetters Patent Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the cancellation of a transfer order regarding an evacuee property in Karachi. The petitioner, a claimant displaced person, sought the transfer of a main building based on her alleged possession of a servant's quarter attached to the property. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was in physical possession of the servant's quarter and whether such possession, if established, entitled her to the transfer of the main building under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the High Court, holding that the petitioner failed to establish physical possession of the servant's quarter. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, possession of an outhouse or servant's quarter does not create an entitlement for the transfer of the main building. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference and dismissed the petition, upholding the lower authorities' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of an outhouse or servant quarter entitle a claimant to the transfer of the main building under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding physical possession made by a High Court be interfered with by the Supreme Court if it is based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATIMA BEGUM vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1972 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-19
  settlement lawproperty transferdiscretionary powerDisplaced Persons Actcommercial propertyremand order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave concerns the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, specifically involving a building containing both a residential unit and a business unit. The core legal question was whether such premises, situated in a predominantly commercial area, must be treated as a single shop for transfer purposes, thereby entitling the allottee of the residential portion to the entire building. The Supreme Court held that the administrative instructions governing such transfers are directory rather than mandatory. Consequently, settlement authorities retain the discretion to divide a property into separate units—transferring the residential portion to one party and the commercial portion to another—if they determine that transferring the entire building to one person would cause serious hardship or dislocation. The Court affirmed that authorities are entitled to exercise this discretion based on a proper appreciation of the facts. The appeal challenged the lower courts' refusal to interfere with the settlement authorities' decision to divide the property, which the Supreme Court upheld as a valid exercise of discretionary power.

  Questions settled

  • Are administrative instructions regarding the transfer of combined residential and commercial properties under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, mandatory or directory?
  • Do settlement authorities have the discretion to divide a building consisting of a shop and a residential unit into separate units for transfer purposes?
  • Is a decision passed on a remand order during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court conclusive if not separately appealed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FAIZ ELLAHI GUL MOHAMMAD vs GUL MUHAMMAD AND 4 Other WAHID1972 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  cross-casesabductionappreciation of evidencerevisional applicationbenefit of doubtdeclaratory suitvirginity medical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These cross-petitions arose out of an incident on 30 August 1969 involving the alleged abduction of a girl, Mst. Amir Mai, and resulting in a violent clash and the death of Mumtaz Hussain. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of evidence, the establishment of the marital status of the girl, and whether the High Court erred in its findings regarding conviction, acquittal, and sentence reduction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitions, being primarily concerned with the appreciation of evidence, provided no valid grounds to interfere with the well-reasoned orders of the High Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court ordinarily declines to interfere with concurrent findings of fact and the appreciation of evidence by lower courts unless a compelling error or misreading is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's findings based on the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does medical evidence establishing virginity falsify a disputed claim of marriage?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in reducing sentences to the period already undergone considering the circumstances of a cross-case?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 852 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. FAHMIDA BIBI vs MUKHTAR AHMAD AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 694 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-20
  restitution of conjugal rightsMuslim Family Laws Ordinancedivorce noticeFamily Court jurisdictiontalaqevidentiary valuewrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenges an appellate court's order remanding a suit for restitution of conjugal rights to a Family Court. The petitioner argued that a divorce certificate issued by the Chairman of a Union Committee was conclusive proof of divorce, rendering the suit incompetent. The core legal question was whether such a certificate is conclusive and whether a Family Court can inquire into the genuineness of a divorce notice during such proceedings. The High Court held that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 does not authorize the Chairman to issue a divorce certificate, and such a document holds no legal effect. The court affirmed that while a Family Court may not have jurisdiction to declare a divorce valid as a primary relief, it possesses the inherent authority to determine the validity of a divorce notice as a necessary incidental issue when adjudicating a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Consequently, the court upheld the remand order, allowing parties to lead evidence regarding the genuineness of the divorce notice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a certificate of divorce issued by a Chairman of a Union Committee conclusive proof of divorce under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Does a Family Court have the jurisdiction to determine the validity of a divorce notice when deciding a suit for restitution of conjugal rights?
  • Can a husband revoke a talaq after serving notice to the Chairman but before the expiration of ninety days?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. DILBARI BEGUM vs The STATE and 3 otherss1972 P Cr. L J 307 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. DASONDHAN vs HABIBUD DIN Alias HABIBUR REHMAN AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  allotment of houserehabilitation authoritiespreferential claimauthorized possessionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises out of a property dispute concerning the allotment and transfer of a disputed house. The core legal question involves determining whether the petitioner or respondent No. 1 held a preferential claim for the transfer of the house based on their respective allotment orders and possession dates. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that respondent No. 1 had a superior and earlier valid allotment dating back to 22nd February 1948, along with authorized possession, whereas the petitioner's husband's authorized occupation only commenced later and prior occupation was unauthorized. Furthermore, the Central Government Notification dated 7th March 1960 did not assist the petitioner. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision in favor of respondent No. 1.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment made earlier in time takes precedence over a subsequent allotment for the transfer of a disputed property?
  • Can an unauthorized occupation by a predecessor-in-interest confer a preferential claim for property transfer to an indirect claimant?
  • Does a government notification covering spouses of authorized occupants apply to persons whose occupation commenced through unauthorized means?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BASHIR BIBI vs AMINUDDIN AND 9 Other1972 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-07
  summoning of witnessescoercive processadministration suitdasti summonsshutting out evidenceabuse of process
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arose from an administration suit where the trial court directed the appellant to produce her two material witnesses on her own responsibility as a last opportunity, failing which her evidence would be closed. The appellant's revision petition was dismissed by the High Court, which found no jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a court can legally shift the responsibility of producing witnesses onto a party under pain of shutting out their evidence. The Court analyzed Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, noting that the law provides coercive machinery, including proclamations and warrants, to compel the attendance of witnesses who fail to appear. The Court held that there is no statutory provision authorizing a court to force a party to produce witnesses on their own responsibility. Unless a party is deliberately abusing the process of the court to delay proceedings, the court must utilize its own process to secure the attendance of material witnesses. The appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Is there any provision in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 that allows a court to place the responsibility of producing witnesses on a party under pain of losing the right to produce evidence?
  • What measures must a court take under Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a summoned or bound-down witness fails to appear?
  • Can a court refuse a party's request to summon witnesses through the court's process if the party previously undertook to produce them but failed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BASHIR BEGUM AND 2 Other vs GHULAM NABI AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 185 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. BANO vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 775 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. BACHI BAI vs NOT1972 PLD Karachi 278 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-13
  second appealurban rent restrictionstriking off defencedefault in rent depositwaiverestoppelevictionlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, concerning an eviction application filed by the respondent landlord against the tenant appellant for irregular payment of rent regarding an open plot of land in Karachi. The Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and monthly rent pursuant to section 13(6) of the Ordinance. Subsequently, the landlord applied to strike off the tenant's defence due to persistent delays in depositing monthly rent. The Rent Controller allowed the application and ordered eviction, a decision upheld in first appeal by the Additional District Judge. In the second appeal before the High Court, the tenant argued that old age excused compliance, that the landlord's delay in filing the striking-off application constituted waiver, and that a subsequent overlapping deposit order created confusion. The High Court held that old age without evidence does not excuse statutory non-compliance, that mere delay or inaction by a landlord in seeking remedies does not amount to waiver or create an estoppel in the absence of a statutory duty not to be silent, and that principles from section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be imported into the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does old age alone excuse a tenant from complying with an order for the deposit of rent under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does mere delay or inaction by a landlord in filing an application to strike off a tenant's defence amount to a waiver of the landlord's rights?
  • Can the statutory principles of waiver governing the acceptance of rent under section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 be imported into proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does a landlord's withdrawal of rent deposited in court after a tenant's default constitute a waiver or create an estoppel against prosecuting an eviction application?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ASGHARI BEGUM Alias MUNNI BEGUM vs THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT1972 PLD Karachi 615 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. AMRO JAN AND Others vs Malik AMIR MUHAMMAD KHAN1972 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyoccupancy tenancyco-sharercustodian of evacuee propertyrevenue recordspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the West Pakistan High Court, Peshawar Seat, which dismissed a second appeal in a suit for possession by pre-emption of certain lands. The core legal question involved whether the provisions of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949 and subsequent legislation prevented the operation of sections 4 and 4-A of the North-West Frontier Tenancy Act 1950 from conferring ownership rights to occupancy tenants over evacuee properties. The Supreme Court held that the non-obstante clause in the 1949 Ordinance only applied to laws in force at that time and did not bar subsequent competent legislation, such as the North-West Frontier Tenancy Act, from divesting the Custodian of evacuee property or conferring rights to occupancy tenants. The Court laid down that property vested in the Custodian can be lawfully affected by subsequent competent legislation enacted prior to the creation of the compensation pool, and that concurrent revenue records sufficiently establish pre-emption rights as a co-sharer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949 bars subsequent legislation from conferring ownership rights on occupancy tenants?
  • Can revenue records properly establish the status of a co-sharer for the purposes of a pre-emption suit?
  • Whether a non-obstante clause in respect of laws 'for the time being in force' prevents the passing of future laws by a competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ALFAT BIBI AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 121 · Lahore High Court
  quashment of criminal proceedingskidnappingabductionhabeas corpusminor custodyMuslim Law marriageSection 561-A CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These petitions under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, sought the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners for the kidnapping and abduction of minor girls. The core legal question was whether a minor girl's statement in habeas corpus proceedings—asserting her marriage to the accused and desire to live with him—renders the pending criminal prosecution for kidnapping infructuous. The Court held that the petitions were without merit and dismissed them. The ratio decidendi is that orders passed in habeas corpus proceedings under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, permitting a minor girl to reside with her alleged husband, do not constitute a final finding on the validity of the marriage or the innocence of the accused regarding kidnapping charges. The Court affirmed that even if a marriage is valid under Muslim Law, it does not absolve the accused of criminal liability for kidnapping a minor under sixteen years of age. Consequently, the criminal trial must proceed independently of the custody determination, as the consent of a minor is no defense to kidnapping charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order in habeas corpus proceedings allowing a minor to live with her alleged husband render pending criminal proceedings for kidnapping infructuous?
  • Can a marriage valid under Muslim Law absolve an accused of criminal liability for kidnapping a minor under sixteen years of age?
  • Does the consent of a minor female constitute a valid defense in a prosecution for kidnapping or abduction?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. MEHAR SULTAN JUNG vs QURBAN HUSSAIN1972 SCMR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-15
  inherent powersCode of Civil Procedureappointment of receiverletters patent appealcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan dismissing the petitioner's application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner had previously filed an application for the appointment of a Receiver which resulted in a consent order attaching the disputed property. Subsequently, the petitioner sought directions under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the Nazir to collect occupational charges and look after the property, without applying for the appointment of a Receiver. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the proper remedy lay under Order XL, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a Division Bench dismissed the subsequent Letters Patent Appeal in limine. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not available where the Code provides a specific procedure for obtaining the desired relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure be invoked where the Code provides a specific procedure for the relief sought?
  • Whether the appointment of a Receiver is required before directing the Nazir to collect occupational charges from a disputed property?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. GLADYS M. JACOB vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1972 SCMR 688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-05-30
  settlement authoritiesdisplaced personstransfer of propertyresidential unitwrit jurisdictionquestion of factevacuee property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the transfer of an annexe situated within the same premises as a main bungalow under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The appellant, an allottee of the annexe, challenged the Settlement authorities' decision to treat the annexe as part of the main bungalow and transfer the entire property to the respondent, a claimant displaced person. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities acted within their jurisdiction in determining the annexe was not a separate residential unit. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a property constitutes a single unit or separate entities is essentially a question of fact, which the Settlement authorities had consistently decided against the appellant. The Court emphasized that under the proviso to Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, premises within the same residential compound are deemed a single house unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise. Finding no evidence of arbitrary or mala fide action, the Court upheld the authorities' decision and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with a finding of fact made by Settlement authorities regarding the nature of a property?
  • Under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, what is the default status of premises within the same residential compound?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to determine whether an annexe and a main bungalow constitute a single house or separate units?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. AIYASHA KORESHI AND Another vs HISHMATULLAH, KORESHI AND Another1972 PLD Karachi 653 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-20Read full judgment →
• MR. RAHIM BUX P. MUNSHI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY1972 PLC 175 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-26Read full judgment →
• MOULA BUX vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 100 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-21Read full judgment →
• MOHSIN ALI AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-02
  quashment of proceedingseasement rightsencumbrancecanal watercriminal mischiefexemption from appearance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case registered against the petitioners under Section 430 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly closing down an irrigational channel supplying canal water to the complainant's bungalow. The petitioners had unsuccessfully moved the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash the proceedings, arguing that the dispute was of a civil nature and that any easement right was extinguished when the property was acquired by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's dismissal, holding that because the trial was at an early stage and evidence had yet to be led, it could not be pre-emptively determined whether the dispute was purely civil. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the term 'encumbrance' in Section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 does not include rights of easement vested in owners of adjoining properties.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed at an early stage under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before evidence is led to determine the nature of the dispute?
  • Does the term 'encumbrance' under Section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include rights of easement vested in the owners of adjoining properties?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for an aged accused seeking relief from personal appearance during a trial?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHARRAM vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 635 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-02Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD SARWAR vs The STATE1972 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-07
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustforgerymutation frauddiscretionary powerSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's application for pre-arrest bail. The petitioner, a Patwari, is implicated in a case involving allegations of entering a fraudulent land mutation purportedly made by a vendor who had died years earlier, and subsequently removing and forging the original mutation paper from the Tehsil Office. A case was registered against him under sections 380, 465, 467, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing pre-arrest bail for serious, non-bailable offences carrying severe punishments including transportation for life. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts and the High Court properly exercised their judicial discretion in denying bail, finding no grounds to interfere with the impugned order. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with the discretionary refusal of pre-arrest bail by lower courts unless such discretion has been improperly exercised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to grant pre-arrest bail?
  • Are offences under sections 380, 467, and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code bailable or non-bailable?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD RAFIQ AND 2 Others vs MIR ADAM KHAN, CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI1972 SCMR 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-04
  suo motu jurisdictionrevisional powerssettlement and rehabilitationallotment disputenatural justiceprejudicefindings of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of two godowns, which the Settlement Commissioner determined were not appurtenant to the shops previously allotted to the petitioners, noting they were separated by a passage. The petitioners challenged the Settlement Commissioner's suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction, which resulted in an order to auction the godowns. The core legal questions were whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner possessed the authority to exercise suo motu revisional powers in this context and whether the failure to provide prior notice to the petitioners rendered the order illegal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was legally entitled to exercise suo motu revision. Furthermore, the Court held that the absence of prior notice did not invalidate the order because the petitioners were present during the proceedings and suffered no prejudice, having had a full opportunity to present their claims. The Court declined to interfere with the findings of fact made by the Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to exercise suo motu revisional powers regarding property allotments?
  • Can an order passed in the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction be set aside solely for lack of prior notice if the affected party suffered no prejudice?
  • Is the High Court empowered to interfere with findings of fact made by the Settlement Commissioner under Article 98 of the 1962-Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD MAZHAR Alias ZUHRI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-09
  circumstantial evidencefingerprint evidencehouse-trespassmurder convictionappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court order maintaining the appellant’s convictions for murder and house-trespass. The core legal question concerns whether fingerprint evidence, standing alone after the rejection of other prosecution evidence, is sufficient to sustain convictions for both murder and house-trespass. The Supreme Court held that the fingerprint evidence was reliable and established the appellant’s presence at the factory during the incident. However, the Court ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove the appellant’s participation in the murder, as there was no evidence of motive or direct involvement in the killing, and the approver’s testimony had been discarded. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction for murder but maintained the conviction for house-trespass. The key principle laid down is that while fingerprint evidence is a valid form of circumstantial evidence to prove an accused's presence at a crime scene, it does not automatically prove participation in a distinct, more severe offense like murder without additional evidence linking the accused to the specific act of killing.

  Questions settled

  • Is fingerprint evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of other corroborating evidence?
  • Can a conviction for house-trespass be maintained solely on the basis of fingerprint evidence found at the scene?
  • Does the presence of an accused at a crime scene, established by fingerprints, automatically prove participation in a murder committed during the same incident?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD KHURSHID ALAM KHAN vs Ch. GHULAM RASUL1972 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-17
  civil proceduredismissal for defaultrestoration of suitadvocate's testimonypower of attorney
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, who declined to interfere with the restoration of a civil suit that had been dismissed for default due to the plaintiff's absence on July 24, 1968. The core legal question was whether the lower court erred in restoring the suit based on the testimony of an advocate who claimed he was instructed to appear on the date of dismissal but failed to do so due to professional pre-occupation in another court. The petitioner argued that the advocate only filed his power of attorney after the suit's dismissal. The Supreme Court observed that the advocate's testimony regarding his instructions for the hearing date remained unchallenged during cross-examination. The Court held that the advocate's subsequent filing of a power of attorney for the restoration application did not invalidate his testimony regarding his prior instructions. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision to uphold the restoration of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit dismissed for default be restored based on the testimony of an advocate regarding their failure to appear?
  • Does the filing of a power of attorney after the dismissal of a suit invalidate an advocate's testimony regarding their instructions to appear on the date of dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1972 PLC 362 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-08-23Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD HANIF AND 11 Others vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-05
  res judicatawrit jurisdictionLetters Patent appealfinding of factsettlement authoritiesunregistered industrial concernconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a Letters Patent appeal, which had challenged the dismissal of a constitutional petition. The petitioners, who were in possession of property in Gujranwala, contested the transfer of said property to respondent No. 3, who had acquired it as an unregistered industrial concern. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly applied the principle of res judicata to bar a second writ petition challenging the same underlying administrative order, and whether the nature of the property as an industrial concern was a finding of fact immune from writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly applied res judicata, as the second petition essentially challenged the same administrative findings upheld in the first unsuccessful writ petition. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the classification of the premises as an industrial concern was a finding of fact not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that the doctrine of res judicata applies to writ jurisdiction proceedings where the underlying cause of action and administrative findings remain identical to those previously adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to proceedings in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a finding of fact recorded by competent Settlement Authorities be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a second writ petition barred if it challenges an administrative order that was already upheld in a previous, unsuccessful writ petition involving the same subject matter?
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• MOHAMMAD BAKHSH vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 705 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 109 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-03Read full judgment →
• MITHO vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 553 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-25Read full judgment →
• Miss NASEEM KAUSAR ARBAB vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF PAKISTAN NAVY, KARACHI AND 3 Other1972 PLD Karachi 563 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-11Read full judgment →
• Miss ASMAJILANI Mst. ZARINA GAUHAR vs THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER THE PROVINCE OF SIND AND 2 Other (A) Constitution1972 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-20
  preventive detentionhabeas corpusmartial lawconstitutional lawjurisdiction of courtsstate necessitygrund-normoverruling precedent
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These two consolidated appeals by special leave challenge the legality of the detention of Malik Ghulam Jilani and Mr. Altaf Gauhar under Martial Law Regulation No. 78 of 1971, promulgated by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. The core legal questions involved the constitutional validity of the usurpation of power in 1969, the legality of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order 1969, and whether the doctrine of legal positivism enunciated in State v. Dosso correctly reflected municipal law. The Supreme Court held that the Proclamation of 1969 and subsequent legislative instruments lacked constitutional and legal foundation, that the rule in State v. Dosso was erroneously decided and should be overruled, and that the impugned Martial Law Regulation and Presidential Order were void ab initio and not saved by state necessity. The key principles laid down are that municipal courts will not accord de jure status to an illegal usurpation of power, that Kelsen's pure theory of law does not furnish a valid municipal rule of decision, and that the grund-norm of Pakistan is rooted in Islamic sovereignty as enshrined in the Objectives Resolution 1949.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a successful revolution or coup d'etat constitutes a law-creating fact within the municipal legal order?
  • Does the proclamation of Martial Law ipso facto abrogate the Constitution and oust the jurisdiction of municipal courts?
  • Are the legislative and administrative acts of an illegal de facto usurper protected by the doctrine of state necessity?
  • Can the executive deny superior courts the judicial power to determine questions concerning their own jurisdiction?
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• Miss ANITA GHULAM ALI AND 2 Other vs ABDUL REHMAN AND 4 Other1972 PLD Karachi 649 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-15Read full judgment →
• Mirza NAZIR AHMAD NAZ vs PUNJAB LABOUR COURT, CENTRAL ZONE, LAHORE1972 PLC 161 · Labour Court · 1970-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mirza GHULAM JILANI vs Mst. NAZ AKHTAR AND Other1972 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  dismissal for defaultrestoration of suitsufficient causeconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the High Court at Lahore in a revision petition. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency of cause for the non-appearance of the plaintiff and his counsel leading to the dismissal of a civil suit for default, and whether concurrent factual findings by the lower courts regarding the lack of sufficient cause warrant interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were arrived at after proper consideration of the evidence and were not based on conjectures or surmises, and since no question of law arose for consideration, the petition was without substance. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding sufficient cause for non-appearance under procedural rules where such findings are supported by evidence and involve no substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the absence of sufficient cause for non-appearance can be interfered with when no question of law arises?
  • Does the engagement of a counsel in the High Court constitute sufficient cause for non-appearance in a civil court at the appointed time without supporting evidence?
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• Mirza ASLAM BEG vs THE DIRECTOR ESTABLISHMENT, PAKISTAN CYCLE1972 PLC 348 · Labour Court · 1971-07-08Read full judgment →
• MIR MUHAMMAD And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1108 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
• Mir BALUCH KHAN AND Other, Mir BALUCH KHAN AND Other vs Mst. LAL BIBI AND Other Mir IBRAHIM KHAN AND OTHE Its Mir SHAHBAZ KHAN AND Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-15
  partition suitsovereign immunityRuler of Merged StateDasturul Amal Diwaniretrospective legislationCentral Laws Statute Reform OrdinanceAcceding State Property OrderShariat inheritanceexecution of decree
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  Civil appeals arose from suits instituted by respondents for possession by partition of their inheritance shares under Shariat in ancestral properties of the erstwhile Kharan State. The Qazi decreed the suits, but the Majlis-i-Shura remanded them. The High Court restored the Qazi's decrees. The appellants challenged the competence of the suits and appeals, asserting sovereign immunity, the bar under Section 87-A read with Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the jurisdiction of the Central Government under President's Acceding State (Property) Order 12 of 1961, and limitation. The Supreme Court held that prior to the merger, Shariat governed the dispute, which recognizes no sovereign immunity. Pursuant to Section 4(2) of the Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance 1960 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897, proceedings instituted between 14th October 1955 and 9th June 1960 were saved under Dasturul Amal Diwani, rendering Section 87-A inapplicable. Furthermore, Order 12 of 1961 only pertained to the personal estates of recognized Rulers, not ancestral property of predecessors, and Section 86(3) does not bar execution where a Ruler is in wrongful possession of co-heirs' property. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Shariat law recognize sovereign immunity preventing a Ruler from being sued in a municipal court within his own domain?
  • Whether Section 87-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies retrospectively to suits and appeals instituted before the promulgation of the Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance 1960?
  • Does the bar under Article 3 of President's Acceding State (Property) Order 12 of 1961 extend to inheritance disputes over the ancestral estate of a Ruler's predecessors?
  • Whether Section 86(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prohibits the execution of a partition decree against property held in wrongful possession by a Ruler?
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• MIR AHMAD AND Other vs NIAZ MUHAMMAD (DECEASED) AND 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 128 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-21Read full judgment →
• MIR AFZAL vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1025 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-28Read full judgment →
• MIDWAY HOUSE EMPLOYEES' UNION (REGD.) vs GENERAL MANAGER, THE MIDWAY HOUSE, LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 114 · Labour Court · 1971-03-17Read full judgment →
• MIANA vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 129 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
• Mian NOOR AHMAD vs THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICES (APPELLATE) TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB AND 5 OTHERS S1972 PLC 429 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-03Read full judgment →
• Mian MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., LYALLPUR1972 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-10
  general lienbanker's lieninterlocutory injunctionguarantorcivil revisionconcurrent findingsmandatory injunction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the release of goods held by a bank. The petitioner, a proprietor of a manufacturing firm, imported edible oil through a bank, which acted as a facilitator. After the petitioner paid the bank for the oil, the bank refused to release the goods, claiming a general lien based on guarantees it had provided on the petitioner's behalf. The trial court and the appellate court initially granted a temporary injunction for the release of the oil, but the High Court set aside these orders, upholding the bank's claim of a general lien. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the petitioner's contention that a bank cannot assert a general lien over goods when it has merely acted as a guarantor without depositing funds to the petitioner's credit. Furthermore, the Court expressed concern that the High Court had effectively decided the entire suit in revision, potentially prejudicing the petitioner's case. The Supreme Court directed the trial court to proceed with the suit but prohibited the announcement of a final judgment pending the appeal's outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bank assert a general lien over goods held on behalf of a client when the bank has only acted as a guarantor without depositing funds to the client's credit?
  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to decide the entire merits of a suit while exercising revisional jurisdiction against an interlocutory order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs THE CUSTODIAN EVACUEE PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 15 Other1972 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertylease rightsreversionary rightspermanent transfer deedsettlement departmentejectment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a dispute regarding agricultural land originally leased for 200 years. The core legal question concerns the rights of the appellants as successors-in-interest of the original lessor vis-a-vis evacuee property authorities and permanent transferees of structures standing on the leased land. The Supreme Court held that regarding certain Khasra numbers used as a road and a charitable building where no transfer deed was issued and ejectment was declined, the appellants must seek remedy in civil courts. As regards other Khasra numbers where permanent transfer deeds were issued by the Settlement Department, the Court directed the Settlement Department to reconsider the matter taking into account the terms of the original lease deed, which reserved reversionary rights of ownership to the lessors. The key principle laid down is that the Settlement Department must consider existing lease and reversionary rights before issuing permanent transfer deeds that extinguish such rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Settlement Department issue permanent transfer deeds that extinguish the reversionary rights of lessors under a subsisting lease without considering the lease terms?
  • Where the Rent Controller omits certain Khasra numbers from a final ejectment order, what is the appropriate remedy for the claimants?
  • Do permanent transferees acquire title free of existing reversionary leasehold interests under the evacuee laws?
  Read full judgment →
• MIAN MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Mst. ALLAH RAKHI AND 7 ANOTHER1972 PLD Peshawar 84 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-12-06Read full judgment →
• Mian JAMAL SHAH vs THE SECOND ELECTION TRIBUNAL, WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-04-17
  election petitioncorrupt practiceballot paper identificationwrit jurisdictionelection tribunalbriberyjudicial review
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from an election dispute concerning the National Assembly seat for Constituency No. N. II, Peshawar-2. The core legal question was whether an Election Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to exclude ballot papers on grounds of corrupt or illegal practices after they had been accepted by a Member of the Election Commission, and whether the Tribunal's findings regarding such practices were based on sufficient evidence to preclude interference by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal is the competent authority to adjudicate upon allegations of corrupt and illegal practices, and its jurisdiction to exclude objectionable votes is not ousted by prior decisions of the Election Commission. The Court further affirmed that the Tribunal’s findings—based on the presence of foreign objects like currency notes and marked chits in ballot papers—constituted valid inferences of pre-arranged identification and corrupt practice. Consequently, the High Court correctly declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction, as the Tribunal’s decision was supported by material evidence and not based on mere conjecture.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to exclude ballot papers on grounds of corrupt or illegal practices after they have been accepted by a Member of the Election Commission?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the findings of an Election Tribunal under writ jurisdiction if the findings are based on inferences drawn from physical evidence?
  • Does the inclusion of foreign objects in ballot papers constitute sufficient evidence of a pre-arranged plan for voter identification and corrupt practice?
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• Mian ABDUL RASHEED KHAN AND OTHERS vs Mst. NAZIR AKHTAR AND Other1972 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-20
  partition suitcompromise decreefrauddeclaratory suitfinal decreerestitution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revisional application concerning the execution and adjustment of shares in a partition suit. The core legal question involved whether co-sharers who made payments under a compromise final decree—subsequently set aside by a declaratory suit on the ground of fraud—could claim the shares of those co-sharers in final decree proceedings based on those earlier payments. The Supreme Court held that once the earlier compromise decree was set aside by a final decree, the petitioners could not be allotted the shares claimed on the basis of payments made under the defunct decree, and must instead seek the return of money through restitution or a separate suit. The Court laid down the principle that payments made pursuant to a decree subsequently nullified do not confer rights to property shares under that superseded decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim property shares based on payments made under a compromise decree that has subsequently been set aside by a court?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party who has paid money under a compromise decree that was later declared void due to fraud?
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• Mian ABDUL MAJID AND 7 Other vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1972 PLD Lahore 66 · Lahore High Court
  Waqf propertyAuqaf departmentShrine offeringsBeneficial interestNotificationRetrospective effectMutawalli
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment addresses multiple appeals arising from disputes over the control and sharing of offerings, box income, and subscriptions at the shrine of Hazrat Imam Sahib in Sialkot, following its takeover by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involved whether the initial notification of 1960 implicitly included shrine offerings, whether a subsequent notification of 1961 could retrospectively add such offerings, and whether taking over the administration of a waqf property extinguishes the pre-existing beneficial rights and shares of long-standing beneficiaries, Khadims, or Mujawars. The Lahore High Court held that property takeover under section 6 of the Ordinance requires an express, unambiguous notification and cannot be implied from general statutory definitions or explanations. Furthermore, the Chief Administrator possesses no legislative power to give notifications retrospective effect, nor does taking over management destroy the vested beneficial interests of historical beneficiaries. The Court ruled that while the corpus becomes waqf, existing beneficiaries retain their rights to share in the income, subject to supervisory regulation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the taking over of a shrine by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, automatically includes the income from boxes and offerings without an express notification?
  • Does the Chief Administrator of Auqaf have the legal authority to give a notification issued under section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, retrospective effect?
  • Whether the assumption of management and control of a waqf property by the Auqaf Department extinguishes the pre-existing beneficial interests and hereditary rights of traditional beneficiaries or Mujawars?
  • Does the definition of waqf property under section 2(d) of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, vest the corpus in the Chief Administrator of Auqaf as an absolute owner?
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• MEVO And 11 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 403 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-11Read full judgment →
• MESSRS ZAKARIA KASBATI & Co., KARACHI AND $ Other vs MESSRS H. A.1972 PLD Karachi 209 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• MESSRS TRANS-OCEANIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY LTD., KARACHI vs TRANS-1972 PLC 290 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-07-03Read full judgment →
• MESSRS ZAIBTUN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs LABOUR UNION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 507 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-01-01Read full judgment →
• MESSRS THE ASIATIC INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs ZAHID ALI1972 PLD Karachi 84 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-21Read full judgment →
• MESSRS TEXTILE TRADING COMPANY LTD. vs Syed JALILUR REHMAN AND 71972 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-09-18
  eviction petitiondefault in payment of rentimplied agreementdiscretion of controllersecond appealejectment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction proceeding initiated under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The respondents sought the eviction of the petitioner, a limited company operating a shop in Karachi, on the ground of default in paying monthly rent for a period of one year. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the First Appellate Court set aside the order, exercising discretion in the tenant's favour on the ground that default was partly attributable to the landlord's rent collector failing to collect rent. The High Court reversed this decision in second appeal, holding the tenant liable for default. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, observing that the petitioner failed to plead or establish any implied agreement or consistent practice excusing regular rent payments. The Court held that deliberate non-payment of rent for an entire year without circumstances beyond control constitutes default, and the High Court rightly interfered where the lower appellate court exercised discretion arbitrarily.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the practice of paying rent in lump sums to a landlord's collector establishes an implied agreement excusing regular monthly rent payments?
  • Does a tenant's deliberate failure to pay rent for a whole year without circumstances beyond control constitute default under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can the High Court in second appeal set aside an appellate court's decision if the statutory discretion regarding eviction was exercised arbitrarily?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS STAR VACUUM BOTTLE MANUFACTURING, Co. LTD. vs COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAD1972 PLD Karachi 210 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-15
  excise dutymanufacturecomposite goodsvacuum flaskscharging sectiondouble taxation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the recovery of excise duty on vacuum flasks manufactured by the petitioners by assembling tin, plastic, and glass components, which were themselves excisable goods. The core legal questions were whether the process of assembling readymade duty-paid components constitutes 'manufacture' under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and whether Section 3-B of the Act legally authorizes the levy of excise duty on a composite finished product containing excisable components. The court held that the assembly of components into a finished product, especially when subjected to processes like oxidisation, constitutes 'manufacture' within the ordinary meaning of the term, and that Section 3-B clearly and unambiguously authorizes the levy of duty on such composite goods at the rate applicable to the component bearing the highest duty. The key principles laid down are that simple physical assembly of finished components amounts to manufacture for excise purposes, that fiscal provisions must be given full effect according to their clear and unambiguous terms without importing unwritten words, and that double taxation, even if occurring, is permissible if expressly mandated by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the assembling of readymade duty-paid components into a finished product constitute manufacture under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  • Whether Section 3-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, independently authorizes the levy and collection of excise duty on composite goods?
  • Can a fiscal statute be interpreted to avoid double taxation when the statutory language clearly and unambiguously mandates the levy?
  • Are vacuum flasks chargeable to excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, by virtue of containing excisable component parts?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS SHAMEEM TEXTILE MILLS, Lahores vs THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1972 PLD Lahore 572 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-14
  constitutional petitionfactory sanctionimport licensestatutory presumptionindustrial undertakingnatural justiceprivilege versus right
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition arises from a long-standing dispute concerning the establishment of a rayon and art silk power-loom factory and the issuance of an import license for machinery. The petitioners sought to set up forty power-looms in Lahore, invoking the statutory presumption under section 5-A(i) of the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, where a failure by the Provincial Government to communicate a rejection within six months amounts to deemed permission. Despite earlier judicial success in a writ petition, the authorities repeatedly resisted granting formal clearance and subsequently refused to recommend or issue import licenses. The core legal questions involved whether a granted factory sanction could be arbitrarily revoked, whether the Central Government's independent sanction was legally necessary for a unit employing fewer than fifty workers, and whether an import license is a mere privilege or a valuable right enforceable through constitutional jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court held that the prior statutory sanction could not be negated by re-agitating rejected pleas, that the Central Government's independent sanction was not required under the applicable rules, and that an import license constitutes a valuable property right rather than a mere privilege, attracting the principles of natural justice and judicial review. The petition was accepted, declaring the refusal to sanction the factory illegal, and the matter of the import license was remanded to the competent statutory authority for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statutory permission deemed to have been granted under section 5-A of the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, can be subsequently revoked by the authorities on grounds previously rejected by the court?
  • Is an independent sanction from the Central Government legally required under the Development of Industries Rules, 1950, for establishing an industrial unit employing fewer than fifty workers?
  • Whether the issuance of an import license is a mere executive privilege or a valuable property right capable of being enforced through constitutional remedies under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962?
  • Does the denial of an import license by the executive without affording the affected party a proper opportunity of being heard violate the principles of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs S. J. & G. FAZAL ELAHI Ltd., KARACHI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 641 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-07Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PHONEX MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1972 PLC 412 · Labour Court · 1971-11-25Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PAKISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs FIVE ELECTED1972 PLC 581 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-10-07Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PAK MARBLE INDUSTRIES LTD., PESHAWAR vs CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-12-18
  Sales Tax ExemptionTaxation LawStatutory InterpretationConcrete Building ComponentsAssessment Year
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner-company sought an exemption from the payment of Sales Tax and Rehabilitation Tax for the assessment year 1964-65 regarding the sale of marble slabs, chips, and powder. The petitioner relied on item No. 40 of the list of exempted items under Notification No. 5 issued by the Central Government on December 18, 1953, pursuant to section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, which exempts 'concrete building components'. The taxation authorities and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal rejected this claim, citing the Supreme Court's precedent in Usmanla Glass Sheet Factory Limited v. Sales Tax Officer, Chittagong. The core legal question was whether marble products qualify as 'concrete building components' under the specified exemption. The Supreme Court held that the term 'concrete' qualifies 'components' and refers specifically to cement concrete components. Since marble slabs, chips, and powder do not contain cement as a constituent, they do not fall within the scope of the exemption. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the matter was settled by the principle that the exemption is restricted to cement-based concrete components.

  Questions settled

  • Do marble slabs, marble chips, and marble powder qualify as 'concrete building components' for the purpose of tax exemption under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  • Does the word 'concrete' in the phrase 'concrete building components' govern the word 'components' to imply cement-based materials?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS MUQTADA KHAN IQTIDA Khans vs Mst. ALLAH RAKHI BEGUM1972 PLD Karachi 471 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-18Read full judgment →
• MESSRS MOHAMMAD AKBAR MOHAMMAD AFZAL vs INCOME TAX APPELLATE1972 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  income tax referencequestion of factcredit balanceassessment yearreference jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the firm M/s. Mohammad Akbar Mohammad Afzal challenging the refusal of the Lahore High Court to direct a reference under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, regarding the assessment year 1959-60. The core dispute involved determining whether a sum of Rs. 30,000 standing as a credit balance in the name of Mohammad Younis Kelawala represented the income of the petitioner-firm or the sale proceeds of goods sent by his father, Wilayat Ali. The Income-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and Appellate Tribunal concurrently held that the sum represented the income of the assessee-firm, and the High Court declined to interfere on the ground that the matter involved a pure question of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the decision, holding that the question of whether an amount represents a firm's concealed income or genuine sale proceeds of a third party is a question of fact not amenable to reference jurisdiction under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of the nature of a credit balance in an assessee's account constitutes a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Can the High Court interfere under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, with concurrent findings of fact recorded by tax authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS MEENA TRADING Co., KARACHI vs ABDUL GHANI AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 19 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-28Read full judgment →
• MESSRS LODHI & Co., KARACHI-. vs MESSRS ANSONIA WATCH CO. AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 238 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-13Read full judgment →
• MESSRS KARIM SILK MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1972 PLC 428 · Labour Court · 1972-05-13Read full judgment →
• MESSRS JANS CATERERS vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN, PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY, LAHORE AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 169 · Lahore High Court
  civil procedurenecessary partyproper partyimpleadmentspecific performancecontractual disputerevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition concerns the propriety of impleading third-party contractors as defendants in a suit for declaration and injunction filed by the original contractor against the Pakistan Western Railway. The original contractor sought to challenge the termination of their catering contract, while the new contractors sought to be impleaded under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, claiming they would be adversely affected by the suit's outcome. The core legal question was whether these third parties were 'proper parties' to the suit. The Court held that the new contractors were neither necessary nor proper parties. It reasoned that the suit involved a specific contract between the plaintiff and the Railway, and the new contractors were not privy to this agreement. The Court established that 'questions involved in the suit' under Order I, Rule 10 refer only to questions between the existing parties, not disputes between defendants and third parties. Furthermore, where full adjudication is possible between existing parties, the Court lacks jurisdiction to add parties against the plaintiff's objection, especially when the third party's claim arises from a distinct, independent transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Are third-party contractors 'proper parties' to a suit challenging the termination of a contract between an original contractor and a public entity?
  • Does the term 'questions involved in the suit' under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 extend to disputes between defendants and third parties?
  • Can a court implead a third party as a defendant in a suit for specific performance against the objection of the plaintiff when full adjudication is possible between the existing parties?
  Read full judgment →