Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Sh. ALLAH DIVA SALEEM vs ABDUL QADEER1971 PLD Lahore 311 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-29Read full judgment →
• Sh. AHMAD vs Sh. MUHAMMAD YUNUS1971 P Cr. L J 331 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-23
  quashing of criminal proceedingsstay of criminal proceedingscivil and criminal litigationconflicting decisionstransfer of civil suitsbusiness disputes
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves connected civil and criminal litigation between the same parties arising from business transactions, including a criminal complaint under sections 406, 417, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code and multiple civil suits for recovery and rendition of accounts. The core legal questions relate to whether criminal proceedings should be quashed or stayed pending the outcome of related civil litigation. The Lahore High Court held that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because civil litigation is pending between the parties. However, to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions and to balance the interests of justice, the court laid down the principle that criminal proceedings intimately connected with civil matters may be stayed until the decision of the civil suits, provided appropriate measures are taken for the expeditious disposal and consolidation of the related civil cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed simply on the ground that civil litigation is also pending between the parties?
  • Whether criminal proceedings should be stayed till the disposal of connected civil cases to avoid conflicting decisions?
  Read full judgment →
• SH. ABDUL RASHID vs THE CHIEF ENGINEER, IRRIGATION AND 3 OTHERS1971/PLC 72 · Civil Services Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• SEKANDAR ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-30
  criminal petitionillegal gratificationbriberyappreciation of evidenceprevious acquittaltrap witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by Sekandar Ali, who was convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for demanding and accepting a bribe in his capacity as a Tehsildar. The petitioner was caught in a trap alongside his co-accused, with marked currency notes recovered from their possession. The core legal question addressed is whether the acquittal and evidence in a connected previous case can be used to influence the adjudication of the present distinct criminal charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the present case stands or fails on its own evidence and that the judgment or evidence from a separate previous transaction is inadmissible for determining guilt or innocence in the current matter. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming that the Supreme Court does not generally interfere with concurrent factual findings and appreciation of evidence by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evidence and judgment from a connected previous case can be considered for the conviction or acquittal of an accused in a distinct criminal trial?
  • Does the Supreme Court entertain contentions relating merely to the appreciation of evidence by the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AND KASHMIR AFFAIRS AND STATES AND FRONTIER REGIONS AND 3 OTHERS vs NASREEN BANU1971 PLD Karachi 209 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-05Read full judgment →
• SECRETARY, B. & R., GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 4 OTHERS vs FAZAL1971 PLD Karachi 625 · Sindh High Court
  civil proceduresuit against public officersofficial designationnecessary partymeasure of damagesmaintainability of suittrespass
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Hyderabad, which decreed a suit for damages and injunction brought by the respondent against various government officials designated by their official titles. The core legal questions involved whether a suit could be maintained against public officers by their official designations rather than their individual names, and whether the Provincial Government was a necessary party when no application under Order XXVII Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was made by the Government Pleader. The court held that public officers cannot be sued by their official titles unless they constitute a corporation sole, and that failing to name the Provincial Government or to follow statutory requirements rendered the suit not maintainable and bad in form. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public officer be sued by their official designation or title rather than their individual name?
  • Does a suit against public officials fail if the Provincial Government is a necessary party and is not properly impleaded?
  • What is the proper measure of damages for injury caused to land by trespass?
  • When does a suit against public officers proceed as a suit between private parties under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• SATHAPPA TEXTILES (PRIVATE) .LTD. vs SECOND INCOME-TAX CIRCLE II, COIMBATORE, AND ANOTHER1971 PTD 444 · Madras High Court · 1968-02-05Read full judgment →
• SARWAR HAYAT KHAN vs COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA DIVISION, SARGODHA1971 PLC 250 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-17Read full judgment →
• SARFRAZ AND 4 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 205 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-26
  murderconstructive liabilitychance witnessesconcealment of evidencedeath sentencetransportation for lifeocular testimonycriminal conspiracy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants challenged their convictions for murder and rioting. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of chance witnesses, the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction under Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for moving a dead body, and the appropriateness of the death penalty when the specific fatal shot could not be attributed to a particular accused. The Court held that the ocular testimony, though involving chance witnesses, was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence and recovery of incriminating items. However, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ruling that the open parading of the deceased's body did not constitute the concealment or disappearance of evidence required by the statute. Regarding sentencing, the Court held that where multiple accused are convicted under Section 302/149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the fatal shot cannot be identified, the death sentence should be substituted with transportation for life. The State’s appeal against acquittals was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere removal of a dead body from the place of occurrence constitute the offense of causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the death penalty appropriate for multiple accused convicted under Section 302/149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, when the specific fatal shot cannot be attributed to any individual?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses be relied upon if it is corroborated by independent circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar QADIRDAD vs THE STATE1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 25 · Board of Revenue · 1971-04-13Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs Mst. HABIB KHATOON AND Other Mst. HABIB KHATOON AND Other1971 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-30
  civil reviewland settlementcompensation pooljurisdiction barpermanent settlementdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from civil review petitions filed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court concerning land settlement and inheritance disputes. Allah Bakhsh, a displaced person, died leaving behind a widow, a son, and three daughters, including Mst. Habib Khatoon, whose name was initially omitted from the inheritance mutation. Upon revision, the Settlement Commissioner included Mst. Habib Khatoon as an heir and granted her a share in the estate. Subsequent purchasers of the land filed suits challenging the Settlement Commissioner's order. The core legal question was whether the civil suits were barred by section 25 of the Land Settlement Act, and whether the land had been permanently settled so as to take it out of the compensation pool. The Supreme Court held that since the settlement fees had not been paid, the allotment was never confirmed, and the land remained in the compensation pool, thereby attracting the bar under section 25 of the Land Settlement Act. Consequently, the review petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 25 of the Land Settlement Act bars civil suits challenging orders passed by settlement authorities when land remains part of the compensation pool?
  • Does the failure to pay settlement fees prevent the permanent settlement and confirmation of land allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Rules, 1959?
  • Can a review petition be entertained when there is no apparent error on the face of the judgment regarding the pendency of proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MUHAMMAD Alias KAKA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 659 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-03Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MOHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 621 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-30Read full judgment →
• Sardar HIDAYAT ULLAH KHAN MOKAL AND ANOTHER vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF WEST1971 PLC 79 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1976-12-23Read full judgment →
• Sardar GHULAM SARWAR KHAN AND 2 OTHERS vs Sardar MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Peshawar 170 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-16
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timerejection of plaintjudicial discretionmandatory provisions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a suit for pre-emption where the trial court initially granted a decree for possession after extending the time for the deposit of pre-emption money. The core legal question is whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction in granting an extension of time for the deposit of pre-emption money under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, without sufficient cause, and whether such failure to deposit within the original time mandated the rejection of the plaint. The Court held that while a court has discretion to extend time for deposit, such discretion must be exercised judicially for good and sufficient reasons, ensuring the applicant's conduct is bona fide. The Court found that the trial court granted the extension on a vague, unsubstantiated excuse without applying its mind, rendering the order illegal and without jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court held that the mandatory requirement of the statute was violated, the extension was void, and the plaint must be rejected. The principle laid down is that the right of pre-emption is a predatory, artificial right, and statutory provisions governing it must be strictly construed against pre-emptors.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to extend the time for the deposit of pre-emption money under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • Must the discretion to extend time for the deposit of pre-emption money be exercised for good and sufficient reasons?
  • Does the failure to deposit pre-emption money within the time fixed by the court mandate the rejection of the plaint?
  • Can an order passed in excess of the court's jurisdiction be treated as final or binding?
  Read full judgment →
• SANTOSH KUMAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 437 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-02-20Read full judgment →
• SANTI GOPAL SAHA vs BENGAL CONSTRUCTIONS LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 530 · Labour Court · 1970-08-10Read full judgment →
• SAMUEL SHERRIFF vs RITA MOODY AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 215 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-12Read full judgment →
• SAMIULLAH vs Mst. ZUBEDA KHATOON AND Another1971 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-18
  arbitration awardrendition of accountsrevisional jurisdictionincomplete awardspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had accepted a revision petition and restored a trial court order making an arbitration award a rule of the court. Respondent No. 1 had filed a suit for rendition of accounts against the petitioner, wherein a pro forma defendant was also impleaded without any relief claimed against him. The parties referred the dispute to an arbitrator, who passed a decree against the petitioner but none against the pro forma defendant. The trial court made the award a rule of the court, but the Additional District Judge set it aside. The High Court reversed this decision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the arbitrator's award was incomplete and whether the High Court validly exercised revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator was justified in not granting relief against a party against whom no claim was made, rendering the award complete, and that the High Court rightly corrected the Additional District Judge's jurisdictional error under Section 115. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to interfere with an erroneous order of an Additional District Judge setting aside an arbitration award?
  • Does an arbitrator commit misconduct or render an award incomplete by failing to grant relief against a pro forma defendant when no relief was claimed against such defendant in the suit?
  • Is an arbitrator bound to determine a dispute between parties when there is no interpleader claim between them?
  Read full judgment →
• SAMIULLAH vs Mian MUHAMMAD SALEEM, DISTRICT JUDGE, RAWALPINDI AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-27
  cantonment rent restrictiondefault of payment of renteviction applicationwaiver of forfeitureconstitutional petitionarrears of rent
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether a previous default in rent payment, committed prior to the promulgation of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, and subsequently wiped out by payment accepted by the landlord prior to filing an eviction application under the said Act, entitled the landlord to maintain the application. The Supreme Court held that since the landlord had already received and withdrawn the arrears of rent deposited by the tenant with mutual consent, there was no rent outstanding against the tenant at the time of filing the eviction application, and the landlord's acceptance of rent amounted to a waiver of forfeiture. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the eviction order set aside, laying down the principle that an eviction application for default of rent under section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, is not maintainable where no rent remains outstanding due to prior payment and acceptance.

  Questions settled

  • Does a previous default in rent payment wiped out by payment prior to an eviction application entitle a landlord to maintain an application under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Whether acceptance of previously deposited rent by a landlord constitutes a waiver of forfeiture of the lease?
  • Can a landlord maintain an eviction application under section 17(2)(i) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, when no rent is outstanding against the tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• SAMAR PERVAIZ vs BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-06
  educational institutiontampering of recordsfraudulent admissionnatural justicedomestic tribunalburden of proofcancellation of result
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant, whose intermediate examination result marks were found to be inflated, leading to his disqualification by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and the striking off of his name from King Edward Medical College, Lahore. The core legal questions involve whether a candidate's result can be quashed and penal action taken on mere suspicion and conjecture regarding the tampering of records, and whether an admission obtained through an incorrect statement of marks can be cancelled despite the lapse of time. The Supreme Court held that while domestic tribunals are not bound by strict judicial trial rules, a finding of guilt and penal disqualification cannot rest on mere conjectures or suspicion where direct evidence connecting the candidate to the tampering is lacking; however, an admission secured on the basis of an incorrect representation of marks is vitiated by fraud, and lapse of time does not sanctify such an action. The key principle laid down is that conjectures cannot replace legal proof in penal actions by domestic tribunals, but fraudulent misrepresentation in college admission forms lawfully justifies expulsion regardless of elapsed time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a domestic tribunal like an educational board penalize a candidate for tampering with records based solely on suspicion and the fact that he is a beneficiary?
  • Does the lapse of time sanctify an admission obtained through a fraudulent or incorrect representation of marks in a college application?
  • Must a domestic tribunal establish guilt through legal evidence before quashing a candidate's examination result for a mistake?
  Read full judgment →
• SALEHON vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 224 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-05Read full judgment →
• SALEHON AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1957-10-28
  murderdeath sentenceadditional evidenceballistics expertappellate court powersexamination of accusedcorroboration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan confirming the conviction and death sentences of the appellants, Salehon and SaeeD, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Khan, while acquitting a co-accused, Nazra. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court was justified in permitting additional evidence, specifically the testimony of a Ballistics Expert, to be led at the appellate stage, and whether the failure to re-examine the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding such fresh evidence vitiated the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion to admit additional formal and expert evidence to ascertain the truth without prejudicing the accused, and that no prejudice was caused by the lack of a fresh Section 342 examination since the core facts concerning the weapon were already put to the accused at trial. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in allowing additional evidence to be led by the prosecution?
  • Does the failure to re-examine an accused person under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding additional appellate evidence vitiate the proceedings?
  • Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses requires corroboration before forming the basis of a murder conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• SALEH MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 1329 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-16Read full judgment →
• SALEEM AHMED vs MESSRS CALTEX OIL PAKISTAN LTD.1971 PLD Karachi 305 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-16Read full judgment →
• SALAHUDDIN vs THE MANAGER, MOMIN MOTOR Co., DACCA1971 PLC 59 · Labour Court · 1970-08-06Read full judgment →
• SAKHI MUHAMMAD vs Mst. RASOOL BEGUM AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 55 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
• SAJJAD ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 910 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-28Read full judgment →
• SAIFUR RAHMAN AND 2 Others vs A. H. KHAN NIAZI AND Another1971 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-21
  review petitionlocus standiremandnecessary partieswrit petitionsettlement commissionerevacuee property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals arise from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan disposing of writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner and Additional Commissioner in review. The core legal question concerned the legality of review orders passed without impleading affected parties and whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case for fresh decision after setting aside the review orders. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted properly in remanding the matter to the competent authority for a fresh decision after joining all necessary parties, as disputed questions of fact regarding locus standi and property allotments required further examination on the basis of evidence. The key principle laid down is that where review orders are set aside due to non-joinder of necessary parties and procedural defects involving disputed questions of fact, remanding the case to the original authority for a proper decision in the presence of all affected parties is appropriate and legal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a case for a fresh decision after finding that necessary parties were not impleaded in review petitions?
  • Does a party lacking interest in specific disputed land properties possess the locus standi to apply for the review of an allotment order concerning those lands?
  • Can review orders adversely affecting parties made behind their backs be sustained?
  Read full judgment →
• SAID AKBAR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1108 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-23Read full judgment →
• SAID AKBAR AND Another vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS -- s1971 P Cr. L J 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  criminal law amendmentreference to tribunalleave to appealidentification evidencejurisdiction of ordinary courts
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which dismissed in limine a writ petition challenging the reference of a criminal case to a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The core legal question concerns whether the Commissioner's apprehension that identification evidence might not be believed by an ordinary court constitutes a valid and lawful ground under the statute for referring a case to a tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the point raised regarding the validity of the Commissioner's reasoning carries substance and merits full consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of transferring the case away from the ordinary courts of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the apprehension that identification evidence may not be believed in an ordinary court is a valid ground for referring a case to a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963?
  • Can a criminal case be withdrawn from an ordinary court of law and referred to a special tribunal without a legally sustainable reason?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahibzada Syed MOHAMMAD MATIN MIRZA vs JEHANGIR RUSTAMJI1971 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-18
  second appealrent restrictionconcurrent findingsstriking off defencemisreading of evidencerent defaultpenal order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a rent restriction dispute where the High Court, in second appeal, set aside concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge regarding a tenant's default in rent payments. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact that were allegedly based on misreading of evidence, conjectures, and surmises. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to interfere because the lower courts had ignored material evidence and relied on unfounded assumptions regarding the tenant's alleged 'chronic default.' The Court affirmed that where lower courts fail to consider material evidence or base findings on conjectures, such findings are not immune from interference in second appeal. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that penal orders requiring rent deposits must be strictly construed, and that the Rent Controller must properly examine whether a default actually occurred, considering all relevant contentions, before striking off a defence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact if they are based on conjectures and misreading of evidence?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to strike off a tenant's defence for non-payment of rent without strictly complying with the legal requirements for such an order?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower courts immune from interference in second appeal if they ignore material evidence on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEEDUDDIN Alias SAEEDA vs The STATE1971 SCMR 776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  Advocate-on-Recordprofessional misconductnon-prosecutionshow-cause noticelegal ethicsduty of counselSupreme Court practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the professional conduct of an Advocate-on-Record who failed to appear before the Supreme Court of Pakistan for the hearing of a petition for special leave to appeal, resulting in the petition's initial dismissal for non-prosecution. Upon the petition's restoration, the Court issued a show-cause notice to the advocate regarding his absence and failure to provide timely intimation of his inability to attend. The advocate offered an explanation that his client had retrieved the case papers, which the Court deemed unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court held that an Advocate-on-Record bears full responsibility for the prosecution of proceedings as the client's representative. The Court established the principle that notices are served upon the Advocate-on-Record, not the client; therefore, it is incumbent upon the advocate to attend to such notices or, if unable, to formally apply for discharge from the case. While the Court noted that such professional negligence could warrant removal from the roll of advocates, it opted to issue a formal warning in light of the advocate's repentance.

  Questions settled

  • What is the professional responsibility of an Advocate-on-Record regarding the prosecution of proceedings?
  • Is an Advocate-on-Record required to formally apply for discharge if unable to attend a court hearing?
  • Does the service of notice to an Advocate-on-Record satisfy the requirement of notice to the client?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEED KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE,1971 PLC. 174 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-09-19Read full judgment →
• SAEED AHMAD vs THE STATE AND Another1971 SCMR 774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-03
  disposal of propertyacquittalreturn of propertycriminal procedurediscretionary power
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which accepted a revisional application and directed that the disputed cattle remain with respondent No. 2. The core legal question concerns the proper disposal of property seized during a criminal trial when the accused persons are subsequently acquitted of the charge under section 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that under Section 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is no compulsion to return property to the person from whom it was seized, as the provision grants discretion to the court to make such order for disposal as it thinks fit. The Court established that while the ordinary rule is to return property to the person from whom it was taken upon acquittal, exceptional circumstances may warrant a departure from this rule. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the appellant to pursue civil remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Is a criminal court under a legal compulsion to return seized property to the person from whom it was taken when the accused is acquitted?
  • Does Section 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 grant discretion to the court regarding the disposal of property upon the conclusion of a trial?
  • Can exceptional circumstances justify not returning seized property to the person from whose possession it was taken upon acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEED AHMAD KHAN Alias SHENO AND Others vs THE STATE AND Other1971 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-23
  Frontier Crimes Regulationrepeal of statutefundamental rightsProvisional Constitution Orderabatement of proceedingsconfirmation of sentencenatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves petitions for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court of West Pakistan, wherein the petitioners challenged their convictions and the confirmation of their sentences under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The core legal questions centered on whether the confirmation of sentences after the repeal of the said Regulation was void, whether the F.C.R. became void due to inconsistency with Fundamental Rights, and whether writ petitions seeking enforcement of fundamental rights survived the abrogation of the Constitution and promulgation of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969. The Supreme Court held that pending proceedings could be continued and completed as if the repealing act had not been passed, pursuant to the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, and that upon the abrogation of fundamental rights under the Provisional Constitution Order, pending proceedings for their enforcement abated and the F.C.R. regained full operation. The Court laid down the principle that the validity of proceedings must be judged by the law in force at the time of adjudication, and the disappearance of fundamental rights revives the unclipped operation of previously challenged laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the confirmation of sentences under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 after its repeal is void ab initio?
  • What is the effect of the abrogation of fundamental rights and the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969 on pending writ petitions seeking the enforcement of fundamental rights?
  • Does the repeal of a statute affect pending legal proceedings in respect of any liability under the West Pakistan General Clauses Act?
  • Can a new point regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice, not raised before the High Court, be permitted to be urged for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• SADIQ MASIH vs GHULAM MOHAYUDDIN AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 1075 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-05Read full judgment →
• SADEQUR RAHMAN CHOWDHURY vs Maulvi ABDUL BARI AND OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 120 · Dacca · 1969-11-21Read full judgment →
• SADEK ALI vs CHHATAK CEMENT FACTORY, E. P. I. D. C., SYLHET.1971 PLC 562 · Labour Court · 1970-12-31Read full judgment →
• SAADULLAH vs The STATE1971 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-15
  right of appealenhancement of sentenceacquittal set asidecriminal appealconstitutional rightmurder conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had set aside the petitioner's acquittal for murder and convicted him under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, enhancing his sentence to transportation for life. The petitioner had originally been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Peshawar, only under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving five years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed an automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court following the High Court's reversal of an acquittal and subsequent enhancement of the sentence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had a right of appeal under Article 58(2)(b) of the 1962 Constitution and Article 6(1)(a) of the Provisional Constitution Order of 1969. Relying on the precedent in Rashid Ahmad v. The State, the Court determined that the petition should be treated as a memorandum of appeal and registered as a direct appeal, thereby affirming the right of an accused to appeal when an acquittal is overturned by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused have a right of appeal to the Supreme Court when the High Court reverses an acquittal and convicts the accused?
  • Under which constitutional provisions can a petitioner file a direct appeal to the Supreme Court following a High Court judgment enhancing a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• S. ZAHID ALI vs WAH CANTT. AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 229 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-22Read full judgment →
• S. P. JAISWAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB1971 PTD 958 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-07-10Read full judgment →
• S. N. SYED MUHAMMAD SAHEB & BROS. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA1971 PTD 110 · Kerala High Court · 1967-11-23Read full judgment →
• S. M. FAKHAR HUSSAIN AND 6 OTHERS vs ABDUS SATTAR AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-19
  evacuee propertybig mansionpublic auctionDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958Chief Settlement Commissionerex post facto approvalstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from appeals challenging a High Court decision that declared the auction of a portion of "Bakhshi Market," an evacuee property, illegal. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner could dispose of a portion of a property previously declared a "big mansion" under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, via public auction without declaring that specific portion a "big mansion" itself. The Supreme Court held that the auction was unauthorized and illegal. The Court reasoned that the statutory provisions regarding the disposal of a "big mansion" are mandatory, requiring the entire property to be auctioned unless the government directs otherwise. The Chief Settlement Commissioner lacked the competence to auction a mere portion of a big mansion without first declaring that portion a big mansion. Furthermore, ex post facto approval by the Chief Settlement Commissioner could not cure the fundamental lack of legal authority to auction a portion of the property. The Court affirmed that the property remained available for lawful disposal by the Settlement Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner dispose of a portion of a 'big mansion' by public auction without declaring that portion to be a 'big mansion'?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the power to dispose of a 'big mansion' by any method other than unrestricted public auction?
  • Can an ex post facto approval by the Chief Settlement Commissioner cure the lack of legal authority in the initial auction of a portion of a 'big mansion'?
  Read full judgment →
• S. IQBAL AHMED vs WAZIR ALI1971 PLD Karachi 783 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• S. AZIZUL HASSAN AND Another vs Malik GHULAM MUHAMMAD1971 SCMR 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-14
  revisional jurisdictionrejection of plaintOrder VII Rule 11Section 115 CPCcompetency of revisionalternate remedy of appealdeed of association
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan in a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court had set aside an order of the trial court rejecting the respondent's plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after examining the respondent under Order X Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The central legal issue was whether a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is competent in the High Court when an appeal against the decree or appealable order lay in the first instance to a subordinate court (such as the District Judge). Reaffirming its earlier precedent, the Supreme Court held that where an appeal is provided under the Code, whether directly to the High Court or to a lower appellate court, a revision before the High Court is incompetent. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 competent in the High Court when an appeal against the decree lies to an intermediate subordinate court?
  • Does the expression 'in which no appeal lies thereto' in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar revisional jurisdiction where an appeal lies to the District Judge?
  • Does an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute a decree appealable under the Code?
  Read full judgment →
• S. ANWAR HUSSAIN SANI., Malik KHUSHI MUHAMMAD (REPRESENTED BY 51971 PLD Supreme Court 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-13
  Permanent Transfer Deedfunctus officioSettlement authoritiesdemarcation of propertyevacuee propertyPermanent Transfer Rules 1961jurisdiction of civil court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment addresses appeals arising from orders of Settlement authorities modifying or clarifying Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.Ds.) issued under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The Supreme Court considered whether Settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to alter, re-demarcate, or determine ownership rights in properties after the issuance of P.T.Ds. The Court held that upon the issuance of a P.T.D., title passes to the transferee and the Settlement authorities generally become functus officio. Under Rules 4, 6, and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules 1961, Settlement authorities can only interfere post-issuance in limited circumstances: (1) to correct minor errors or omissions without formal adversary inquiry under the first part of Rule 6; or (2) to vary, amend, or cancel P.T.Ds. where transfer was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation after proper inquiry under the second part of Rule 6 or Rule 7. Where substantial re-demarcation or title disputes are involved without fraud or misrepresentation, Settlement authorities lack jurisdiction, and civil courts retain exclusive jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement authorities become functus officio after a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) is issued under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Under what circumstances can Settlement authorities alter, modify, or cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed under Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules 1961?
  • Does a dispute regarding substantial re-demarcation or title between transferees after the issuance of P.T.Ds. fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• S. ABBAS QULI vs MESSRS HASAN MOVIES LTD., DACCA1971PLC 20 · Labour Court · 1970-06-10Read full judgment →
• S. A. JAFFRI vs THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT THROUGH SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, FOOD BG CO-OPERATIVE DEPARTMENT, LAHORE, AND .4 OTHERS1971 PLC 244 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-08Read full judgment →
• S. A. HAMID vs MESSRS BLUE TRADING Co. LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 349 · Labour Court · 1970-09-26Read full judgment →
• S. A. ANSARI vs EASTERN RUBBER INDUSTRIES, DACCA1971 PLC 473 · Labour Court · 1970-11-12Read full judgment →
• S. A. AHMED vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN,1971 PLC 8 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-11-09Read full judgment →
• RUSTOM vs The STATE1971 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-16
  murderappreciation of evidenceocular testimonycriminal appealmiscarriage of justicerecovery of weapon
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction for murder and a sentence of death upheld by the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the ocular testimony was unreliable due to insufficient lighting at the scene, that the recovery of the incriminating hatchet was fabricated, and that the prosecution witnesses were biased. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence to the extent that it resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appreciation of evidence is not the function of the Supreme Court unless a specific rule regarding the evaluation of evidence has been disregarded. Finding no such defect or grave miscarriage of justice, the Court affirmed the conviction. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court does not function as an ordinary court of criminal appeal and will only interfere in matters of evidence if a fundamental error in the legal principles of appreciation has occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts in a criminal case?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan an ordinary court of criminal appeal for the re-examination of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• RUSTAM vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1112 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-04Read full judgment →
• RUQIA BIBI AND 5 OTHERS vs JALAL DIN AND 8 Other1971 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-26
  abatement of appeallegal representativescondonation of delaysufficient causeprocedural negligencespecial attorneylimitation period
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Circuit, which refused to set aside the abatement of an appeal following the death of the original appellant, Haji Abdul Ghafoor. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone a delay of over one year in filing an application to bring legal representatives on record, despite the petitioners' claim that they were unaware of the pending appeal due to the alleged negligence of a special attorney. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the extensive delay. The Court held that the petitioners' claim of ignorance regarding the pending appeal was implausible, characterizing the failure to pursue the litigation as inexplicable negligence and carelessness. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no valid ground to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to set aside the abatement, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of a principal terminates the authority of a special attorney to pursue an appeal?
  • Does the failure of legal representatives to bring themselves on record within the prescribed limitation period warrant the setting aside of an abatement?
  • Can a court refuse to condone a significant delay in filing an application for impleadment if the applicants fail to provide sufficient cause for their ignorance of the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• ROSHAN SHAH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1071 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-25Read full judgment →
• RIYAZUDDIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 1053 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-24Read full judgment →
• RIAZUL HAQ vs DIRECTOR, LAND RECLAMATION,LAHOREAND 2 OTHERS1971 PLC 217 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-26Read full judgment →
• RIAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1971 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-19
  special leave petitiondisplaced persons land settlementtransfer of landdiscriminatory pricingmarket value
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special lease arises from an order of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner concerning the sale of agricultural land under section 12(b) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner challenged the reasonableness of the land price and the reduction of the allotted area. The High Court partly allowed the petitioner's application by holding that charging a higher price compared to similarly situated allottees was discriminatory, but declined to interfere with the reduction of the area. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the High Court and concluded that there was no legal infirmity in considering the relevant law and evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly ensured fairness and uniformity in terms for comparable cases and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner is required to maintain uniformity and reasonableness in pricing when selling land under section 12(b) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the reduction of land area determined to be reasonably required by an allottee?
  • Whether differential pricing among similarly situated allottees in the same vicinity constitutes unfair discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• RIAZ KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 575 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-10Read full judgment →
• RESIDENT EDITOR, THE EASTERN EXAMINER, CHITTAGONG vs SHAFIQUR1971 PLC 101 · Labour Court · 1970-07-06Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ALI Alias LUNDA vs The STATE1971 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-01
  limitation periodcriminal appealreview petitiontime-barredstatutory limitationadmissibility of review
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a High Court judgment that had upheld the petitioner's convictions under sections 458 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an inadmissible review petition in the High Court could be excluded from the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition was hopelessly time-barred and dismissed it. The Court reasoned that review proceedings are not admissible in criminal matters under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the filing of an incompetent review petition cannot serve as a valid basis to extend the limitation period or create a fresh starting point for filing an appeal. The Court condemned the practice of filing such review petitions as a ruse to circumvent statutory limitation periods, establishing that time spent on legally impermissible proceedings does not toll the limitation period for subsequent appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review petition admissible in criminal proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the time spent pursuing an incompetent review petition be excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the dismissal of an inadmissible review petition create a fresh starting point for the limitation period for an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• REHMAN vs Mst. RASOOLAN AND 7 OTHERS1971 PLD Rev. (Punjab) 43 · Board of Revenue · 1971-08-11Read full judgment →
• REHMAN GUL vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-07-23Read full judgment →
• REHM ALI AND ANOTHER vs Mst. BIBI JI BEGUM AND OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-27
  revisional jurisdictioncode of civil procedurecall for recordtemporary injunctionjurisdictional errorremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave addresses whether the High Court, when exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent to reverse an order without calling for the record of the case. The core legal question revolves around whether calling for the record is a mandatory condition precedent to the exercise of revisional power. The Supreme Court held that section 115 is an enabling and discretionary provision, meaning that the High Court is not legally incompetent to exercise its revisional jurisdiction without calling for the record, provided the statutory jurisdictional conditions are met. However, the Court ruled that if material documents are missing and not furnished, it may lead to prejudice. In this case, because the High Court failed to call for the records and consequently overlooked crucial trial applications and an appellate affidavit, prejudice was caused. The Court laid down the principle that while calling for the record is not a condition precedent to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, acting without records where material documents are absent can occasion prejudice, warranting a remand for rehearing.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court competent to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure without calling for the record of the case?
  • Is calling for the record a condition precedent to the exercise of revisional power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the exercise of revisional jurisdiction without calling for the record render the resulting order without jurisdiction if material documents are absent?
  Read full judgment →
• REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, KARACHI vs GHULAM MOHIUDDIN AND 91971 PLC 110 · Labour Court · 1971-04-15Read full judgment →
• RAZA ALI AND 3 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-- s1971 P Cr. L J 1296 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-30
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powerscheatingcriminal breach of trustcivil loanmisrepresentationcriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings pending under Sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 before a Magistrate. The core legal question concerned whether the transaction of a civil loan and subsequent unfulfilled marriage promises constituted criminal offences of cheating or criminal breach of trust, and whether inherent powers should be exercised to quash the process. The court held that a pure and simple loan does not constitute cheating merely because it is unpaid, absent initial dishonest intention or misrepresentation. Furthermore, the court held that criminal breach of trust and cheating are mutually exclusive offences, as trust and entrustment are absent in cheating where property is obtained by deception. The application for quashment was dismissed with the observation that process under Section 406 was misconceived, while leaving the factual controversies regarding the marriage dispute to be resolved through trial evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to repay a friendly loan constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the offences of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 and cheating under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply simultaneously to the same set of facts?
  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when disputed questions of fact require recording of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• RASHID Alias KAKA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 976 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
• RASHID AHMAD vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-27
  criminal breach of trustadditional evidencerebuttal evidenceright of defenseexamination of accusedprejudice to accusedretrial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, an Agricultural Assistant, for criminal breach of trust under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was tried by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, who, after the close of the prosecution case and the initial examination of the accused, recalled the complainants to rebut certain receipts produced by the defence. The trial court did not afford the appellant an opportunity to explain this additional evidence or to rebut the complainants' denial of the receipts, and proceeded to convict him. The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether failing to provide the accused an opportunity to explain or rebut additional evidence brought on record by the court under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial. The Supreme Court held that while receiving fresh evidence at a late stage is permissible, failing to give the accused an opportunity to rebut such evidence or be re-examined causes grave prejudice, rendering the trial irregular and unsustainable. The convictions were set aside and the cases remanded for retrial from that stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal court can receive fresh or additional evidence after both sides have closed their evidence?
  • Does the failure to give an accused an opportunity to rebut additional evidence brought on record by the court cause prejudice and vitiate the trial?
  • Must an accused be re-examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when additional evidence is recorded by the court after the close of the defense case?
  Read full judgment →
• RASHEED HASAN SIDDIQUI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1207 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
• RASHEED Alias HIRO vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 953 · Sindh High Court · 1970-12-30Read full judgment →
• RANJHO AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1078 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-11Read full judgment →
• RAMZAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 782 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-06Read full judgment →
• RAMZAN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 931 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-04Read full judgment →
• RAJPUTANA TRADING Co. LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST1971 PTD 920 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-09-05Read full judgment →
• SARDAR AND ANOTHER vs SULTAN AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 690 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-28Read full judgment →
• RAJOO vs The STATE1971 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-16
  murderhostile witnesstransferred evidencecorroborationcriminal appealSection 288 CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a conviction for murder and related offences. The appellant was convicted of murdering his cousin after his marriage proposals were rejected by her and another relative. At trial, several prosecution witnesses resiled from their earlier statements made before the Committing Magistrate, likely due to familial ties. The core legal question was whether the trial court and High Court correctly relied upon the statements of witnesses transferred to the Sessions record under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, despite the witnesses resiling at trial. The Supreme Court held that the transferred statements were admissible and constituted substantive evidence, particularly when corroborated by other evidence such as the recovery of blood-stained clothes and the established motive. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the lower courts correctly preferred the earlier, consistent statements over the testimony given at trial, which was clearly aimed at shielding the appellant. The principle established is that statements transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 serve as valid substantive evidence for conviction when supported by corroborative circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can statements of witnesses recorded by a Committing Magistrate and transferred to the Sessions record under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used as substantive evidence for conviction?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when prosecution witnesses resile from their earlier statements at trial but the evidence is corroborated by other circumstances?
  • Does the recovery of human blood-stained clothes from an accused provide sufficient corroboration to support a conviction based on transferred witness statements?
  Read full judgment →
• RAJBA vs LALA AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 1056 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-15Read full judgment →
• Raja MUHAMMAD DIDAR KHAN vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, EXCISE1971 PLC 247 [C.S.T] · Service Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• Raja MUHAMMAD ALAM vs Mst. AKBARI BEGUM AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 164 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
• Raja HAQ NAWAZ vs MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-06-23
  inherent powers of High Courtquashing of criminal proceedingsabuse of processfalse complaintvexatious litigationSection 561-A CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals arose from a High Court order quashing two criminal complaints filed by the appellant against the respondents under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash these proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was correct, as the complaints were demonstrably false, vexatious, and filed as a "counterblast" to previous failed litigation in Jhelum, intended solely to harass the respondents. The Court observed that the allegations were inherently improbable and lacked credibility. The key principle laid down is that while the inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should be exercised sparingly to avoid circumventing the due process of law, the High Court is fully justified in quashing criminal proceedings where it is satisfied that the complaints are groundless, fabricated, and constitute an abuse of the court's process to subject the accused to unnecessary harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings that are found to be false and vexatious?
  • Does the initiation of criminal proceedings solely to harass the accused constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Is it permissible for the High Court to consider the inherent improbability of allegations when deciding whether to quash criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• RAISUDDIN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17
  bail pending appeallimitation perioddiscretionary orderspecial leave to appealcriminal appealdelay in filing
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, convicted under Section 304, Part II read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment, sought special leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant bail pending appeal. The petition was filed four days beyond the limitation period. The Supreme Court found the explanation for this delay—difficulty in obtaining an attested vakalatnama from jail authorities—wholly unconvincing. On the merits, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretionary order denying bail. Addressing the petitioner's argument that the appeal might not be heard before the sentence is served, the Court held that criminal appeals are typically prioritized and disposed of within one to one and a half years. The Court affirmed that while a five-year sentence is not short, there is no presumption that an appeal will remain pending for the entire duration of the sentence. The petition was dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to renew the bail application before the High Court if the appeal remains pending for an unreasonable duration.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal excusable based on the time taken to obtain an attested vakalatnama from jail authorities?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order denying bail pending appeal without sufficient grounds?
  • Does the potential for a long delay in the disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court automatically entitle a convict to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Rais DUR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs Takari ABDUL HAMID AND 8 OTHERS1971 PLD Quetta 93 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-06-29Read full judgment →
• Rai BASHIR AHMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 255 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-11Read full judgment →
• RAHMAT SHAH AND 2 OTHERS vs SARWAR AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Peshawar 205 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-16
  pre-emptionoral salemutationtransfer of titlesuperior right of pre-emptionrevenue recordscompletion of salesecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of two second appeals arising from pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff-pre-emptors had acquired a superior right of pre-emption when their own acquisition of land and the impugned sales were recorded in mutations attested on the same date, or where the pre-emptors' mutation was attested earlier but the sale was completed earlier. The lower courts had held that the plaintiffs had a superior right based on the serial number of the mutations. The High Court held that a sale of land is deemed completed on the day it is effected and admitted by the vendor, not on the date the mutation in the revenue records is formally sanctioned. Title passes when the transaction of sale is completed, and is not postponed until the attestation of the mutation. Therefore, the plaintiffs, having completed their purchase earlier through an oral sale admitted by the vendor, had become co-sharers before the impugned sales were completed, thus possessing a superior right of pre-emption. Both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • When is an oral sale of land considered complete for the purpose of establishing a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Does the attestation date of a mutation in revenue records determine the completion date of a sale for pre-emption purposes?
  • Do entries in mutation proceedings constitute conclusive evidence of facts recorded?
  • When does title in property pass in an oral sale recorded through mutation?
  Read full judgment →
• RAHIM BAKHSH vs THE STATE -1971 P Cr. L J 269 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• RAHIM BAKHSH vs KHALIL-U R-REHMAN1971 PLD Lahore 517 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-09
  transfer of suitcontempt of courtreasonable apprehension of biasjudicial impartialitycivil procedureshow-cause notice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 sought the transfer of a civil suit from the Court of a Civil Judge on the grounds of apprehended bias. The petitioner alleged that the trial judge acted with prejudice by issuing a show-cause notice for contempt of court after the petitioner claimed the defendant had boasted of having influence over the court regarding an interim injunction. The core legal question was whether the mere initiation of contempt proceedings by a trial judge against a party constitutes sufficient grounds for transferring the case to another court due to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the issuance of a show-cause notice is a standard judicial procedure to maintain court decorum and does not, by itself, indicate bias or justify transfer. The court established that for a transfer to be granted, there must be a reasonable apprehension of partiality, and the mere initiation of contempt proceedings, which is an extraordinary jurisdiction intended to protect the purity of justice, does not satisfy this test.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere issuance of a show-cause notice for contempt of court by a trial judge constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a case?
  • What is the legal test for determining whether a party has a reasonable apprehension of bias justifying the transfer of a case?
  • Is the power of contempt intended to be used as a ground for transferring a case from the court initiating such proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• RAHIM BAKHSH AND 3 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-29
  murderdeath sentencefirearm evidencecorroborationinterested witnessesalibiappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal where four petitioners were convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of five persons across two incidents, and under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned the appreciation of ocular testimony, medical evidence, forensic corroboration relating to firearm empties, and the defense of alibi. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that the natural eye-witnesses were fully corroborated by medical evidence, recoveries of weapons, and matching crime empties, and that the defense of alibi was rightly disbelieved by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that in cases involving interested witnesses, general corroboration implicating the crime is sufficient, and individual corroboration for every single accused person is not strictly required when solid collective corroboration exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of interested eye-witnesses requires individual corroboration for each accused person?
  • Does minor discrepancy between medical evidence and ocular account vitiate a murder conviction?
  • Whether the High Court's appreciation of a plea of alibi can be interfered with when supported by sound reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• RAHIM BAKHSH AND 12 OTHERS vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER (LAND) WEST, PAKISTAN LAHORE AND 12 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 323 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
• RAHEM BUX AND ANOTHER vs GUL MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 746 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-03
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of suitinherent powersvoid orderlimitationact of courtdate of hearingcivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition arose from an order of the Civil Judge restoring a suit that had been dismissed for default on a date not fixed for hearing. The suit was adjourned to 30-09-1963 for filing a written statement, but the Reader mistakenly recorded the date in the order sheet as 26-07-1963, on which date the suit was dismissed in default. The plaintiffs applied for restoration on 30-09-1963 upon learning of the dismissal. The primary legal questions were whether the restoration application was time-barred under Article 163 of the Limitation Act 1908 and whether inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 could be invoked to restore the suit. The High Court held that dismissal on a date not fixed for hearing is ab initio void and a nullity, against which no period of limitation runs. Order IX Rule 9 applies only to dismissals on a date fixed for hearing under Order IX Rule 8; where a suit is dismissed due to a mistake of the court staff, Section 151 CPC is applicable, as no party should suffer due to an act of the court. The revision was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing a suit in default on a date not fixed for its hearing is ab initio void and a nullity?
  • Does Article 163 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to bar an application for restoration of a suit where the dismissal order was a nullity?
  • Whether Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to suits dismissed on a date not fixed for hearing?
  • Can a court exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restore a suit dismissed due to an error of the court staff?
  Read full judgment →
• RAHELA KHATUN--Opposite-Party vs RAMELA KHATUN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Dacca 24 · Dacca · 1969-11-18Read full judgment →
• RAFIQ AND 6 Others vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1118 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-16Read full judgment →
• RAFIQ AHMAD KHAN QURESHI vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY1971 PLC 194 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-04Read full judgment →
• RAFAT ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-17
  bail cancellationtampering with witnessescommittal to trialmurderspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the cancellation of the petitioner's bail by the High Court. The petitioner was an accused in a criminal case involving offences under sections 302/149, 148, and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Additional Sessions Judge had initially granted bail to all thirteen accused, but the High Court cancelled the petitioner's bail on the grounds that he had abused the concession by threatening and assaulting prosecution witnesses and tampering with them. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether bail should remain granted or be interfered with when the accused has been subsequently committed to trial. The Supreme Court held that since the accused had been committed to trial in the Court of Session and a prima facie case had been found to exist, reasonable grounds appeared for believing the petitioner was guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, rendering the question of bail infructuous. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that committal to trial upon a finding of a prima facie case suffices to justify detention in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the committal of an accused to the Court of Session affect a pending petition regarding the grant or cancellation of bail?
  • Can bail be cancelled on the grounds of threatening and assaulting prosecution witnesses?
  • What is the effect of a finding by a committing Court that a prima facie case exists against an accused charged with a capital offence?
  Read full judgment →
• RADHA VILAS KARYALAYA, VARANASI vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, LUCKNOW1971 PTD 530 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-10-07Read full judgment →
• R. N. OSWAL HOSIERY AND MAHABIR WOOLLEN MILLS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB1971 PTD 85 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-03-28Read full judgment →
• R. B. ANGADI & SONS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MYSORE1971 PTD 793 · Mysore High Court · 1968-10-17Read full judgment →
• QASIM AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Karachi 473 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-17
  good behaviour securityhabitual offendergeneral reputehearsay evidencerevision applicationpolice testimonypreventive detention
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application challenges an order passed under Section 118, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, requiring the applicants to furnish security for good behavior. The core legal question is whether an order for security based solely on the testimony of police officers, without independent corroboration or proof of habitual criminal conduct, is legally sustainable. The Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable, as the prosecution failed to produce any independent witnesses from the locality to substantiate allegations of habitual offending or general repute. The Court emphasized that while police officers are competent witnesses regarding a person's reputation, their testimony must be subjected to strict scrutiny and corroborated by independent evidence to avoid reliance on bare ipse dixit. The key principle laid down is that 'habit' implies repeated or persistent engagement in criminal acts, which cannot be established by stray incidents or vague, uncorroborated police testimony. Furthermore, evidence of general repute, while admissible under Section 117(4), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, requires a foundation of solid facts rather than mere rumors or hearsay.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order for security under Section 118, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of police officers?
  • Does the term 'habitually' in the context of criminal proceedings require proof of persistent engagement in offenses rather than isolated incidents?
  • Is evidence of general repute admissible to prove habitual criminal behavior under Section 117(4), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an acquittal in previous criminal cases be used as evidence to establish a disposition to commit offenses for the purpose of binding down an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• QAIMUDDIN AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 229 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-15
  unlawful assemblycommon objectphysical possessionbenefit of doubtvicarious liabilityinterested witnessescriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder and rioting involving eight appellants following a violent dispute over agricultural land. The core legal questions concerned determining the aggressor party based on physical possession of the land and assessing the reliability of witness testimony regarding the participation of all accused. The Court held that while formal possession had been transferred to the appellants, the complainant party retained actual physical possession, identifying the appellants as the aggressors. Regarding the participation of the accused, the Court found the testimony of independent witnesses unreliable due to material improvements and inconsistencies, thus extending the benefit of the doubt to three appellants who lacked injuries and whose presence was not corroborated. The convictions of the remaining five appellants were upheld under the principle of vicarious liability, as they formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of forcibly dispossessing the complainants, thereby incurring liability for the resulting murder and injuries. The appeal was consequently allowed in part, setting aside the convictions of three appellants while maintaining the sentences of the others.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delivery of formal possession by a revenue official establish actual physical possession in a criminal dispute?
  • Can the testimony of witnesses who make material improvements at trial be considered reliable for corroborating the presence of accused persons?
  • Are members of an unlawful assembly liable for murder under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if they had knowledge that murder was likely to be committed?
  • Should the benefit of the doubt be extended to accused persons in a rioting case when their participation is not corroborated by independent evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• QADAR BAKHSH AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-31
  committal ordercommitting magistrateexamination of accuseddefence witnessespre-trial inquiryprima facie case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a committal order passed by the District Magistrate, Makran, committing the appellants to stand trial in the Court of Sessions at Kalat for murder and attempted murder. The appellants challenged the committal order on the grounds that they were not formally called upon to provide a list of defence witnesses, and that the committing Magistrate failed to record their statements as required under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the examination of an accused person by a committing Magistrate is mandatory before making a commitment order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the words 'if necessary' in Section 209 and 'if any' in Section 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confer discretion on the committing Magistrate. The Court ruled that the committing Magistrate is not legally obligated to examine the accused before commitment, as the primary function of the inquiry is to determine if a prima facie case exists, not to assess the evidence or decide questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is a committing Magistrate legally bound to examine an accused person under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before making a commitment order?
  • What is the legal effect of the words 'if necessary' in Section 209 and 'if any' in Section 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the examination of an accused?
  • Does the failure of an accused to file a list of defence witnesses in the committing court preclude them from doing so before the trial court?
  • Does Section 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 make the recording of an accused's statement by a committing Magistrate mandatory?
  Read full judgment →