Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore MUHAMMAD NIZAM-UD-DIN vs DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDLNT, P. W. R., LAHORE1970 PLC 93 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1966-08-09Read full judgment →
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore MUHAMMAD IKRAM vs MESSRS S. MUHAMMAD DIN & SONS LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 15 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1970-09-02Read full judgment →
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore MAHMOOD AHMAD SHAH vs DISTRICT MANAGER, R. T.7C., LAHORE1970 PLC 11 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1968-12-31Read full judgment →
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore KAKA KHAN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 20 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1968-10-31Read full judgment →
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Payment Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore AZIM KHAN AND 35 Other vs ISMAILJEE & SONS STEEL RE-ROLLING MILLS, LAHORE1970 PLC 83 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1966-03-26Read full judgment →
- Workmen's Compensation And Authority Under Paymant Of Wages Act, Lahore Division, Lahore ABDUL MANAN vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN PRESS1970 PLC 26 · Commissioner For Workmen's Compensation · 1966-03-22Read full judgment →
- WORKMEN OF CENTRAL KARNATAK MOTOR SERVICES LTD vs INDUSTRIAL1970 PLC 536 · Mysore High Court · 1968-08-26Read full judgment →
- WEST PAKISTAN ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION (REGD) AND ANOTHER vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 591 · Industrial Court · 1970-06-12Read full judgment →
- WEST PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT vs S. ABDUL KHALIQ, ACCOUNTANT, HAZARA1970 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave, brought by the Province of West Pakistan, challenges the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which accepted the respondent accountant's writ petition and declared him entitled to the prescribed scale of pay of an Accountant with effect from 14th October 1955 rather than 7th May 1962. The core legal question revolves around whether the inclusion of the post of Accountant in the Schedule of the Pay Revision Rules via a notification on 1st March 1962 operates retrospectively from 14th October 1955 under the statutory rules, and whether a note appended to the notification barring retrospective effect is ultra vires. The Supreme Court held that the retrospective operation from 14th October 1955 is mandated by the substantive provisions of the West Pakistan (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services Pay Revision Rules, 1959, and that rule-making powers under rule 18 do not permit executive notifications to override statutory rules, rendering the restricting note ultra vires. The Court laid down that subordinate notifications cannot curtail the retrospective applicability granted by principal statutory pay revision rules.
Questions settled- Whether the inclusion of a post in the Schedule of the West Pakistan (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services Pay Revision Rules, 1959 entitles the incumbent to the prescribed scale from 14th October 1955?
- Can a note appended to an executive notification override the substantive provisions of statutory rules regarding retrospective effect?
- Whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 is maintainable regarding the protection of remuneration under Article 178?
- WAZIR vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 546 · Sindh High Court · 1970-07-30Read full judgment →
- WAZIR KHAN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-10-07Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, confirming the conviction and sentence of death imposed upon the appellant, Wazir Khan, by the Additional Sessions Judge of Mianwali for the murder of Azim Khan. The prosecution case alleged that following a family dispute regarding marriage arrangements, the appellant and his co-accused entered a courtyard, where the appellant shot and killed Azim Khan. Although the trial court acquitted the co-accused and rejected parts of the prosecution's narrative regarding a second murder, it accepted the eyewitness testimony concerning the fatal attack on Azim Khan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of eyewitnesses could be selectively relied upon to convict one accused while acquitting others arising from the same transaction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that eyewitness testimony can be segregated and acted upon where natural witnesses provide credible, corroborated accounts regarding a distinct incident within the same transaction. The key principle established is that the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus rule does not apply in Pakistani jurisprudence, and courts may safely separate grain from chaff in appreciating witness testimony.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be selectively relied upon to convict one accused while acquitting others involved in the same transaction?
- Does the rejection of a portion of prosecution evidence necessitate the outright rejection of the entire case against an accused?
- Whether an appellate court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of ocular evidence by lower courts?
- WAZIR AND 3 Others vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 1284 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-18Read full judgment →
- WAZID MORAL Alias WAZID ALI AND 13 OTHERS WAZID MORAL vs THE STATE1970 SC M R256 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- WAZID MORAL Alias WAZID ALI AND 13 OTHERS THE STATE AND WAZID MORAL1970 P Cr. L J 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-06-14Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These two appeals by special leave arise out of a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan disposing of cross-cases and a revision regarding a violent clash between two rival groups resulting in a death and multiple injuries. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court correctly assessed the evidence in the cross-cases independently, whether the accused acted within the right of private defence, and whether individual criminal liability could be sustained in a free fight where identification was doubtful. The Supreme Court held that each criminal case must be decided independently upon the evidence led therein, and the High Court erred in disposing of one appeal merely based on findings in a cross-case. The Court found that the complainant party were the initial aggressors who pursued the accused to their dwelling house, giving rise to a right of private defence, but the main appellant exceeded that right by inflicting a fatal blow. The ratio decidendi establishes that where a party is attacked and pursues a lawful right of private defence against aggression up to their property, causing death by exceeding that right attracts Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code, and individual participation must be proven beyond doubt in a free fight.
Questions settled- Can a criminal appeal be disposed of solely on the basis of findings of fact arrived at in a separate cross-case?
- Whether the right of private defence of property and person extends to causing death when repelling an aggressive intrusion into one's dwelling house?
- Is a conviction sustainable in a free fight where individual participation and specific attribution of fatal or injurious blows cannot be determined with certainty?
- Does exceeding the right of private defence by inflicting a fatal injury convert the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- WALOO AND 5 Other vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 677 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-10Read full judgment →
- WALI MUHAMMAD vs THE COMMISSIONER, QUETTA DIVISION, QUETTA1970 PLD Quetta 76 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-06-18Read full judgment →
- WALI MUHAMMAD AND Another vs GHULAM RASOOL1970 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for leave to appeal calls in question a judgment of the High Court passed in second appeal arising out of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner-vendees resisted the suit on the grounds that the sale of evacuee property was not pre-emptible and that the court-fee was deficient. The trial court decided both issues against the petitioners, who subsequently abandoned the contention regarding evacuee property during their first appeal before the District Judge. When the petitioners sought to re-agitate both points in second appeal, the High Court disallowed the plea regarding the non-competency of the suit due to prior abandonment and ruled against them on the court-fee issue. The core legal question was whether a party can re-raise in second appeal an issue expressly abandoned before the lower appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its powers in refusing to permit the petitioners to agitate an abandoned matter. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that points abandoned in an intermediate appellate court cannot be revived in second appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a party can re-agitate in second appeal an issue that was expressly abandoned before the lower appellate court?
- Is the sale of an evacuee property subject to pre-emption under the law?
- Whether the High Court has the power to refuse leave to raise a point abandoned in the intermediate appellate forum?
- WALI MUHAMMAD AND 7 Others vs THE BORDER AREA COMMITTEE, BAHAWALNAGAR1970 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-16Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal concerns the cancellation of land allotments by the Border Area Committee, Bahawalnagar, regarding evacuee land held by the appellants. The Committee cancelled these allotments based on an interpretation of the Addendum to Martial Law Regulation 9, Zone B, dated 5th November 1960, which purportedly required reducing allotments of claimant displaced persons to the area held as temporary allottees. The appellants challenged this, arguing their allotments were confirmed prior to the Addendum's effective date. The High Court initially dismissed the writ petition in limine, citing lack of jurisdiction based on prior precedent regarding Martial Law period orders. The Supreme Court held that while Martial Law Regulations previously ousted jurisdiction, the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution restored the High Court's authority under Article 98. The Court determined that the Border Area Committee, as an authority performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre, is subject to judicial review. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring the Committee's cancellation order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution to review orders passed by the Border Area Committee?
- Are orders passed by the Border Area Committee after the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution immune from judicial scrutiny?
- Is the Border Area Committee considered an authority performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre for the purposes of writ jurisdiction?
- WAJED ALI AND Other vs SUDHIR CHANDRA DAS AND Other Opposite Parties1970 PLD Dacca 466 · Dacca · 1968-03-18Read full judgment →
- WAJAHAT ALI HASNIE vs Mst. GHAZALA1970 PLD Lahore 641 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-03Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This judgment disposes of two civil revision petitions directed against interlocutory orders passed by Judges, Family Courts, refusing to summon witnesses or treating certain witnesses as given up. The core legal question was whether interlocutory orders passed by a Family Court are revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Lahore High Court held that revision petitions against interlocutory orders of Family Courts are not maintainable under section 115, C.P.C. The ratio laid down is that by virtue of section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, the application of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is expressly excluded in proceedings before Family Courts (save for sections 10 and 11), thereby barring the invocation of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code, in order to fulfill the legislative intent of providing a speedy, simplified, and flexible remedy for family disputes without being hampered by procedural technicalities.
Questions settled- Whether interlocutory orders passed by a Family Court are revisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
- Is a Family Court established under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, a court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
- Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to proceedings before Family Courts in light of section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
- Wadera DALEL KHAN AND 7 Other- vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 61970 PLD Quetta 79 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-06-11Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was dismissed under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, due to the plaintiffs' absence and failure to produce witnesses, despite no evidence having been recorded. The core legal question was whether a court can invoke Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to dismiss a suit on merits when no evidence is available on record. The Court held that the trial court's order was illegal and untenable. It established that Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, requires existing evidence on record that fails to substantiate a claim; without such evidence, the court must proceed under Order XVII, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or Order IX, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court emphasized that litigation should ideally be decided on merits, and extreme measures like dismissal under Rule 3 should only be taken when a party's conduct makes trial impossible. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a court dismiss a suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, when no evidence has been recorded?
- What is the distinction between Order XVII, Rule 2 and Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the dismissal of a suit?
- Under what circumstances is it appropriate for a court to dismiss a suit for non-prosecution rather than on merits?
- UMAR HAYAT vs ABDUR RASHID AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a criminal case originally referred to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963. Following the Tribunal's submission of findings, one member provided an ambiguous opinion regarding the accused's guilt. The District Magistrate remanded the case to the Tribunal specifically to clarify this member's finding. The High Court set aside this remand order, ruling it unauthorized under Section 10(2)(a) of the Act, and directed that the case be referred to the Tribunal as a whole for a collective finding. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court clarified that the Tribunal is required to submit findings on the guilt or innocence of the accused, and until every member has recorded an unequivocal finding, the Tribunal has not fulfilled its statutory duty. Consequently, the District Magistrate possesses the authority to remand the case to the Tribunal, or to specific members, to ensure a clear finding is reached, as this is essential for the District Magistrate to determine if the requisite majorities for conviction or acquittal exist.
Questions settled- Does the District Magistrate have the authority to remand a case to a Tribunal member for clarification of an ambiguous finding under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1963?
- Is a collective finding by the Tribunal required under Section 10 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1963 before the District Magistrate can act?
- Can a District Magistrate remand a case to the Tribunal for further inquiry if one member has failed to provide an unequivocal finding on the guilt or innocence of the accused?
- UMAR HAYAT AND Another vs ABDUL SHAKOOR AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 741 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
- ULFAT HUSSAIN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 200 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-24Read full judgment →
- ULFAT H USSAIN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 278 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-24Read full judgment →
- TIC MANAGEMENT OF PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY, LAHORE vs THE GENERAL1970 PLC 236 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
- THE WEST PAKISTAN ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION (REOD,) RAWALPINDI1970 PLC 241 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-10-02Read full judgment →
- THE UNITED BANK LTD. MESSRS COMMERCE BANK LTD. PAXISTAN LTD. vs1970 PLD Lahore 235 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns winding-up petitions filed by creditor banks against a private limited company, 'Pak Wheat Products Limited,' under the Companies Act (VII of 1913). The core legal questions involved whether the company possessed the power to borrow, whether the loans were ultra vires, and whether the company's denial of debt constituted a bona fide dispute. The Court held that the company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association expressly granted borrowing powers, and the loans were validly incurred. The Court further determined that the company’s denial of liability was not a bona fide dispute but a mere cloak to avoid payment, as the company was unable to meet its current financial obligations. Consequently, the Court ordered the appointment of a provisional liquidator to take charge of the company’s assets and records. The key principle laid down is that a winding-up petition cannot be defeated by a frivolous or non-bona fide dispute regarding debt, and the Court must assess whether such a denial is a genuine defense or merely a tactic to delay payment of undisputed liabilities.
Questions settled- Does a company have implied borrowing powers if its Memorandum of Association allows for mortgaging and pledging assets?
- Can a company avoid winding-up proceedings by claiming that a debt is disputed when the dispute is not bona fide?
- Does the pendency of a civil suit regarding a debt bar the filing of a winding-up petition against a company?
- Is a person dealing with a company entitled to assume that the company's internal management and delegation of powers to a Managing Director are regular?
- THE' DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs ALI1970 PLC 477 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-05-01Read full judgment →
- THE WEST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAHORE1970 PLD Lahore 398 · Lahore High Court · 1969-02-24Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil appeal, treated as a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, arose from an order of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, appointing a sole arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to resolve disputes concerning the Gujranwala Hydel Project. The petitioner, the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, argued that the contractor's application was barred by Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, having been filed more than three years after completion of the works, and that no subsisting dispute existed. The Lahore High Court held that the right to apply for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 accrues only upon the expiry of fifteen days from the service of the statutory notice to concur, and not from the date of completion of the contract. The Court further ruled that pleas of limitation and whether claims are subsisting are matters falling within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide. The revision was dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- When does the right to apply for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 accrue for the purpose of limitation?
- Whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to applications made under the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Can a court refuse to refer a dispute to arbitration on the ground that the underlying claim is barred by limitation?
- Whether an order passed under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 is appealable under Section 39 of the said Act?
- THE VICE CHAIRMAN, EAST PAKISTAN ENEMY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT BOARD1970 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-02Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which invalidated two notifications issued by the Vice-Chairman of the East Pakistan Enemy Property Management Board and the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property. The notifications declared the Hanuman Rice and Oil Mills as enemy property and authorized the Deputy Commissioner of Dinajpur to manage it. The respondents, who claimed an interest in the mills through a partnership formed with a previous purchaser, challenged the notifications, asserting the property was not enemy property. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring the notifications issued without lawful authority. The petitioners contend that the High Court erred in its determination regarding the status of the property as enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, particularly given the circumstances surrounding the previous owner's departure to India. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the disputed mills constitute enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, ordering the existing stay to continue pending the final hearing.
Questions settled- Whether the Hanuman Rice and Oil Mills constitutes enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules?
- Does property acquired through a court decree for specific performance vest in the Custodian of Enemy Property if the transferor subsequently leaves for India?
- THE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR AND Another vs Syed BASHIR AHMAD1970 PLD Supreme Court 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil appeal by special leave arose from a writ petition filed by a Reader in Law against the University of Peshawar, seeking confirmation of service from the date of expiry of his probationary period. The High Court had allowed the petition, holding under Rule 5 of the University of Peshawar (Recruitment, Discipline, Punishment and Appeal) Service Rules that the probationer was deemed automatically confirmed upon the expiry of the maximum period of probation. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether Rule 5 provides for automatic confirmation of a probationer upon the expiry of the maximum probationary period, and whether an employee can establish legal rights of service without executing a written contract as mandated by Section 45 of the Peshawar University Act 1950. The Supreme Court observed that Rule 5 does not envisage automatic confirmation and that compliance with the statutory requirement of executing a written contract under Section 45 is essential. However, upon the advice of the Court, the University Syndicate agreed to confirm the respondent on a regular basis with effect from 5th September 1961 along with all consequential financial benefits, rendering the appeal infructuous.
Questions settled- Does Rule 5 of the University of Peshawar Service Rules provide for automatic confirmation of an employee upon the expiration of the maximum probationary period?
- Can a statutory employee claim service rights in the absence of a written contract mandated by Section 45 of the Peshawar University Act 1950?
- Are administrative instructions issued by the Government to its departments automatically applicable to autonomous statutory bodies such as a University?
- THE STATE vs VISHANDAS AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 744 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-25Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs MUZAFFAR ALI AND 2 Other1970 PLD Karachi 457 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-26Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs MUHAMMAD MOOSA AND 4 Other Opponents1970 PLD Karachi 386 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal revision application filed by the State challenged the order of the Special Judge-cum-Enquiry Officer, Hyderabad, discharging five respondents in a special case involving offences under sections 419, 420, 467, and 477-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The trial court had discharged certain respondents on the ground of previous acquittal under section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and others due to defective sanction. The core legal questions involved whether a subsequent distinct offence of tampering with official records is barred by a previous acquittal for forgery, and whether the prosecution sanction was legally defective for omitting exact dates and times. The Sindh High Court held that the subsequent offence constituted a distinct transaction not barred by section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the prosecution sanction was valid and legally sufficient. The revision application was allowed, the discharge order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial in accordance with law.
Questions settled- Does a previous acquittal for forgery bar a subsequent prosecution for tampering with official records relating to the same matter under section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Is a prosecution sanction rendered invalid merely because it omits the exact date and place of the alleged offence?
- Can a trial court discharge an accused on the ground of a defective sanction without providing the prosecution an opportunity to prove the validity of the sanction by extraneous evidence?
- Does delay in criminal proceedings constitute a sufficient ground to prevent the trial of an accused for serious offences?
- THE STATE vs Mirza MOHIUDDIN AHMED AID Others1970 P Cr. L J 131 · Sindh High Court · 1969-06-23Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs Mian FAZAL ELAHI1970 PLD Lahore 383 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-12Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs KHAN BEG AND 5 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by the State challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted six respondents of charges under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the murder of three individuals. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, particularly by allegedly relying on an inadmissible police statement to discredit eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court improperly referenced a police statement as substantive evidence, this error did not necessitate interference because the High Court’s conclusion regarding the doubtful presence of the eye-witnesses was independently supported by material contradictions and inconsistencies in their testimonies. The Court reaffirmed the principle that it will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless it can be demonstrated that none of the grounds for acquittal are supportable. Finding that the High Court’s decision was based on valid evidentiary grounds, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, maintaining the acquittal.
Questions settled- Can a statement made to the police be used as substantive evidence during a criminal trial?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
- Does the improper reference to an inadmissible police statement by a High Court automatically invalidate an acquittal if other evidence supports the decision?
- THE STATE vs KHAN BEG AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The State appealed by special leave against a High Court judgment setting aside the convictions and death sentences of six respondents under Sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of three relatives. The prosecution alleged that the respondents assaulted the victims following a family dispute. Leave to appeal was granted primarily on the ground that the High Court had improperly relied upon an inadmissible police statement of a witness as substantive evidence to discredit the eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence and held that while a police statement cannot be used as substantive evidence, the High Court’s acquittal was independently supported by material contradictions, unnatural witness conduct, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and weak motive. Reaffirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless all grounds supporting it are wholly unsupportable, the Court held that excluding the police statement did not undermine the High Court's finding of reasonable doubt. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a statement made by a witness to the police during investigation be relied upon as substantive evidence at trial?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
- Whether an order of acquittal remains sustainable if independent grounds of reasonable doubt exist despite the High Court erroneously referring to an inadmissible police statement?
- THE STATE vs KHAN AFSAR AND OTHERS1970 P Cr. LJ 64 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-30Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs JAGMAL SINGH Alias MADHU SINGH AND 4 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 649 · Lahore High Court · 1968-07-02Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs HADI BUX1970 PLD Karachi 737 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-30Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs GHULAM JAFFAR ETC.1970 PLD Peshawar 134 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs FAZAL AHMAD AND Anothers1970 P Cr. L J 633 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-02-27Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This State appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed against the acquittal of two respondents charged under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot and injured the complainant in his courtyard, with identification established via torchlight and voice recognition. The trial court acquitted the respondents, noting the existence of pending litigation between the parties, medical evidence indicating charring marks consistent with a self-inflicted wound from close range, and discrepancies in the site plan. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that identification by torchlight and voice in a dark night is highly unreliable. The Court reiterated that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the trial court's appreciation of evidence is perverse, foolish, or speculative. Finding the trial court's reasoning sound and based on the evidence, the High Court maintained the acquittal.
Questions settled- Is identification of an accused by torchlight during a dark night considered sufficient and reliable evidence for a conviction?
- Can an accused person be safely identified solely by their voice in a criminal trial?
- Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with and set aside an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
- THE STATE vs FATFH KHAN AND 3 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a State appeal against the acquittal of four respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The respondents were initially convicted by the Sessions Judge for the murder of the deceased in the District Bar Room, Mianwali, based on direct eye-witness testimony. The High Court subsequently acquitted the respondents, discrediting the eye-witnesses due to minor inconsistencies in their statements and surmises regarding their presence. The core legal question was whether the High Court's rejection of the eye-witness testimony and subsequent acquittal was based on a misconstruction of evidence and unreasonable inferences. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was far-fetched and contradicted by the established circumstances, including the immediate recording of the F.I.R. and the presence of police officials. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that minor, immaterial discrepancies in testimony do not necessarily render witnesses unreliable, especially when their presence is corroborated by independent circumstances. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, restored the convictions, and sentenced the respondents to transportation for life.
Questions settled- Does a minor inconsistency in an eye-witness's testimony regarding collateral facts necessarily render their entire evidence unreliable?
- Can an appellate court set aside a conviction based on surmises that contradict the established circumstances of the crime?
- Is the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of a crime sufficiently established when their statements are recorded immediately by police officials present at the scene?
- THE STATE vs FATEH KHAN AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal by the State challenges the High Court's acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The core legal question is whether the High Court's rejection of eye-witness testimony and subsequent acquittal was based on sound judicial reasoning or mere surmises and misappreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning for disbelieving the eye-witnesses—such as minor discrepancies in testimony and the timing of the FIR—was far-fetched, speculative, and contradicted by the established facts of the case. The Court affirmed that the presence of the eye-witnesses was established beyond doubt, and the prosecution had successfully proven the guilt of the accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the convictions recorded by the trial court, and sentenced the respondents to transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court cannot discard consistent eye-witness testimony based on trivial inconsistencies or conjectures that are physically impossible or unsupported by the record, especially when the crime occurred in public view and was promptly reported.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court set aside a conviction based on trivial inconsistencies in witness testimony that do not affect the material facts?
- Is it permissible for an appellate court to reject eye-witness testimony based on speculative surmises that contradict established physical facts?
- Does the recording of an FIR by a police officer present at the scene of a crime, rather than at a police station, invalidate the report?
- THE STATE vs ABDUR RASHID MIAH AND 5 Others1970 P Cr. L J 1157 · Dacca · 1970-01-30Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs ABDUL HAMID AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 384 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal revision reference arose from an order by a Magistrate in a case under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the Magistrate directed the recall of a prosecution witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to provide thumb impressions for expert analysis. The accused challenged this order, arguing that the trial had effectively concluded after arguments were heard and that the Magistrate was improperly attempting to fill gaps in the prosecution's evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the Magistrate’s order was legal and proper. The Court affirmed that Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confers wide discretionary powers upon a court to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of an inquiry or trial, provided the evidence is essential for a just decision. It established that a trial does not terminate until the judgment is pronounced. Furthermore, the Court clarified that if such evidence is prejudicial to the accused, the Magistrate must provide the accused an opportunity to rebut it, thereby ensuring fairness.
Questions settled- Can a Magistrate recall a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after arguments have been heard but before judgment is pronounced?
- Does the term 'trial' in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 include the period up to the pronouncement of judgment?
- Is a court permitted to recall a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the evidence is deemed essential for a just decision, even if it might assist the prosecution?
- THE STATE ABDUR RAHMAN AND 3 Others vs ABDUR RAHMAN AND 3 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against a judgment of the High Court, which had modified the convictions of four respondents from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents were originally sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge for the murder of Muhammad Shafi, but the High Court reduced the conviction, reasoning that the respondents only possessed the knowledge that their actions were likely to cause death, rather than the intention to cause death. The State challenged this, arguing that the nature and extent of the injuries—specifically those on vital parts and the severity of the beating—warranted a conviction for murder under Section 302. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the respondents' actions satisfied the requirements of clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby constituting murder. Non-bailable warrants were issued for the respondents' arrest.
Questions settled- Does the infliction of multiple injuries on vital parts of a deceased, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, satisfy the requirements of clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder be sustained when the injuries inflicted are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death?
- THE STATE ABDUR RAHMAN AND 3 Others vs ABDUR RAHMAN AND 3 Other THE STATE1970 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the High Court, whereby the respondents' convictions under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Shafi were altered to section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code, reducing their sentences to eight years' rigorous imprisonment. The respondents had been originally sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, Lyallpur, after being found guilty of causing a large number of injuries resulting in death. The core legal question is whether the respondents' acts, involving numerous injuries including one sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, attract clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code rather than culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that the nature and multiplicity of the injuries, particularly the fracture of ribs and damage to vital organs, require deeper examination regarding the applicability of murder provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the issuance of non-bailable warrants for the arrest of the respondents.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder given the multiplicity of injuries?
- Do multiple injuries inflicted on vital parts of a deceased attract clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- THE SECRETARY, EAST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DACCA THE SECRETARY, EAST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DACCA vs MD. SERAJUL HAQUE MD. SEKANDAR MIA1970 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-24Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that declared the termination of two employees of the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation illegal for lack of a show-cause notice. The respondents, whose services were terminated on the ground that they were no longer required, argued they were entitled to constitutional protection and natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the respondents, as employees of a corporation, were not entitled to the protection of Article 177 of the 1962 Constitution. Furthermore, the Court determined that because the termination orders contained no stigma or charges, they did not constitute a penalty. The Court clarified that an internal office note mentioning employee deficiency does not convert a non-stigmatic termination order into a penalty. Applying the principles of master and servant, the Court ruled that the Corporation was entitled to terminate services in accordance with the contract of employment without affording a show-cause opportunity, provided the order itself is free of stigma. The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's decision was set aside.
Questions settled- Are employees of a statutory corporation entitled to the protection of Article 177 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
- Does an internal office note regarding employee efficiency convert a non-stigmatic termination order into a penalty?
- Is a show-cause notice required when terminating an employee's services under the ordinary law of master and servant?
- Does a termination order that does not contain any charge or stigma constitute a penalty?
- THE SECRETARY, B. D. L. C. DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 2 Others vs SYED AHMED, MEMBER, SHIKARPUR UNION COUNCIL1970 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the validity of a ballot paper in a no-confidence motion against a Union Council Chairman. The core legal question was whether the absence of a member's signature on the ballot paper rendered the vote invalid under the applicable rules. The Circle Officer had rejected the respondent's ballot paper solely due to the lack of a signature, causing the no-confidence motion to fail for lack of the required two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the requirement for a signature or thumb impression on the ballot paper form was merely directory rather than mandatory. The Court reasoned that the specific sub-rule governing the voting procedure provided detailed instructions for both the Presiding Officer and the members but notably omitted any requirement for the member to sign the ballot paper. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the absence of a signature did not invalidate the ballot, and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the absence of a member's signature on a ballot paper invalidate a vote cast in a no-confidence motion under the East Pakistan Local Councils (Vote of No-Confidence) Rules, 1963?
- Is the requirement for a signature on a ballot paper in a no-confidence motion directory or mandatory?
- Can a vote be rejected for a procedural omission not explicitly required by the governing sub-rule?
- THE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN1970 PLC 275 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-24Read full judgment →
- THE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD HUSAIN1970 PLC 156 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-24Read full judgment →
- THE PUNJAB COMMERCE BANK LTD. (IN, LIQUIDATION) vs Sh. MAQBOOL ELAHI1970 PLD Lahore 486 · Lahore High Court · 1968-09-16Read full judgment →
- THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KHAIRPUR vs IMAM BAKHSH1970 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below establishing that the correct date of birth of the respondent was 25 May 1916 rather than 25 May 1905, as erroneously entered in his service book. Consequently, his retirement from the post of Salt Inspector in the Industries Department of the Government of West Pakistan with effect from 24 May 1965 was held to be illegal and void, and the decree in his favor was maintained. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding a date of birth in a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in declining to interfere with these concurrent factual determinations under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact affirmed by the lower appellate court are binding in second appeal and do not warrant interference or the grant of special leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a date of birth in a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether retirement based on an incorrect date of birth entered in a service book is illegal and void when concurrent findings establish the true date of birth?
- THE PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN vs His HIGHNESS MAHARAJA KIRIT BIKRAM1970 PLD Dacca 611 · Dacca · 1969-04-09Read full judgment →
- THE PREMIER TOBACCO Co. LTD., MARDAN vs PREMIER TOBACCO WORKERS'1970 PLC 126 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-07-09Read full judgment →
- THE PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LTD. LABOUR UNION, DACCA vs THE CHAIRMAN, FIRST LABOUR COURT OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 5 Otherss1970 PLC 643 · DaccaRead full judgment →
- THE MURREE BREWERY Co. LTD. vs PAKISTAN AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 821 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-17Read full judgment →
- THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, WATTAN ` WOOLLEN MILLS LTD vs FIVE1970 PLC 324 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-07Read full judgment →
- THE MANAGER, SPENCER & Co. (PAKISTAN) LTD., LAHORE vs WEST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 38 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-28Read full judgment →
- THE LUNGLA (SYLHET) TEA Co. LTD., SYLHET vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DACCA CIRCLE, DACCA1970 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-03Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which declined to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions of law regarding the taxability of compensation received by a tea company. The appellant, a tea company, received compensation from the Government of India prior to 1947 for land acquisition. In 1954, the company allocated a portion of these funds to its Profit and Loss account as revenue. The Income-tax Officer assessed this amount as income for the 1955-56 assessment year. The core legal question was whether this sum, received earlier but accounted for in 1954, was taxable in the 1955-56 assessment year, and whether the Tribunal’s refusal to refer the matter involved a question of law. The Supreme Court held that the classification of the funds as revenue in the 1954 balance sheet justified the assessment. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the nature of the receipts was a question of fact, not law, and that the limitation argument was not properly raised before the Tribunal.
Questions settled- Is the classification of a receipt as revenue in a company's balance sheet sufficient to justify its assessment as income in that year?
- Does the determination of whether a sum constitutes a revenue receipt involve a question of fact or a question of law?
- Can a party raise a question of limitation before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal?
- THE KARACHI PARSI CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. vs THE KARACHI1970 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court passed in a Letters Patent Appeal regarding a dispute over municipal taxation and civic services between the Karachi Parsi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The core legal question concerns the liability of the respondent-Corporation to refund expenses incurred by the petitioner-Society on street lighting and street sweeping after the Society's area was included within the limits of the Karachi Municipal Corporation by a notification dated 11th October 1952. The High Court upheld the petitioner-Society's claim in part while dismissing the remainder as barred by time. The Supreme Court evaluated the petition seeking leave to appeal against the High Court's decision. The principle laid down involves the extent of municipal liability for civic services upon the extension of municipal limits and the application of limitation periods to claims for recovery of such expenses.
Questions settled- Whether a municipal corporation is liable to refund expenses incurred by a housing society for civic services when the corporation fails to provide them after extending its limits?
- Are claims for the refund of municipal service charges subject to the laws of limitation?
- Does the inclusion of a housing society's area within municipal limits make the corporation liable to collect taxes and provide street lighting and sweeping?
- THE HOSIERY WORKMEN UNION vs M. & Q. HOSIERY, RAWALPINDI AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 286 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-05Read full judgment →
- THE HOME SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN, HOME1970 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 3 read with Section 25 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. The core legal question examined is whether it is incumbent upon the Commissioner to grant a hearing to an accused person before making an order of reference of their case to a Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the argument of the learned Advocate General raising a question of law for final determination is supported, and accordingly granted leave to appeal. Additionally, the Court granted a prayer for a stay of the Full Bench's direction requiring cases to be returned to the Division Benches for disposal pending the final decision of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that substantial questions regarding statutory interpretations of administrative hearing requirements under the Act warrant a full determination by the apex court, justifying interim stays to preserve the status quo.
Questions settled- Is it incumbent upon the Commissioner to grant a hearing to an accused person before making an order of reference to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act?
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a substantial question of law arises regarding the interpretation of statutory hearing requirements?
- THE GENERAL SECRETARY, RAILWAY WORKERS' UNION, QUETTA vs THE REGISTRAR, TRADE UNIONS, WEST-PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 485 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-05-23Read full judgment →
- THE GENERAL SECRETARY, AMIN JUTE MILLS LABOUR UNION (RECD.), HYDERABAD vs MESSRS AMIN FABRICS LTD., KOTRI1970 PLC 322 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-03-28Read full judgment →
- THE FIVE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKMEN OF SAEED SILK MILLS vs Messers SAEED SILK MILLS, KARACHI1970 PLC 312 · Industrial Court · 1968-06-29Read full judgment →
- THE EAST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, COMILLA-,Opposite-Party vs MOHAR ALI SAIYAL AND OTHERS-Opposite-Partiess1970 PLC 747 · Dacca · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs SHER1970 PLC 36 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-05Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs MUHAMMAD USMAN AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 96 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-11Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs GULZAR AHMAD AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 323 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-30Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs FAIZ1970 PLC 46 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-16Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs ALI1970 PLC 321 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-03-27Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUR vs ABDUL MAIEED SHAH1970 PLC 49 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-18Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, SUKKUK vs AMANULLAH AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 330 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-30Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs NAWAZ1970 PLC 499 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-05-01Read full judgment →
- THE DISTRICT MANAGER GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ1970 PLC 32 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-17Read full judgment →
- THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI vs MESSRS ZAMINDARA1970 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's application under subsection (2) of section 66 of the Income-tax Act seeking a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing registration to the respondent firm for the assessment year 1964-65 under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act on the basis of a partnership deed dated 1st March 1963. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether a partnership existed prior to the execution of the deed was purely a question of fact determined by the Tribunal upon consideration of relevant circumstances, and no question of law arose for examination by the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the view that factual determinations by the Tribunal regarding partnership creation do not warrant interference.
Questions settled- Whether the question of the existence of a partnership prior to the execution of a partnership deed constitutes a question of fact or a question of law?
- Is an Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's finding regarding the creation of a partnership open to reference under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act when based on factual circumstances?
- Whether a firm is entitled to registration under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act on the basis of a partnership deed executed on 1st March 1963 for the assessment year 1964-65?
- THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, EAST PAKISTAN AND 2 Others vs ASWAB ALI AND Another1970 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal addresses whether certificate recovery proceedings can be initiated against an individual denying membership in an assessee-firm without serving a personal notice under section 29 of the Income-tax Act or section 12 of the Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court held that where a person denies being a partner or member of the assessee-firm, and no prior notice has been served upon him or liability established during assessment, certificate proceedings cannot be taken against him without affording an opportunity of being heard and serving the requisite statutory notices. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision setting aside the certificate proceedings, establishing that an individual sought to be made liable must be served with a notice of demand under section 29 to enable them to dispute their liability or status as an assessee.
Questions settled- Whether certificate proceedings can be started against a person who denies his membership of the assessee-firm without issuing a personal notice on him under section 29 of the Income-tax Act or section 12 of the Sales Tax Act?
- Whether after the assessment has been completed the Department can enter upon an inquiry and hold that a person who denies his liability to pay tax is a member of the assessee-firm?
- Does section 44 of the Income-tax Act warrant taking action against a person who denies his membership of the assessee-firm where there is no finding of dissolution or discontinuance?
- THE COLONY TEXTILE MILLS LTD., LAHORE, Petitioner vs THE BEST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 735 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-30Read full judgment →
- THE CHITTAGONG CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CHITTAGONG vs C. S. LIMITED1970 PLD Supreme Court 132 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to generate a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or identify the author of the opinion. Please provide the full text of the judgment to enable the creation of the requested metadata.
- THE CHAIRMAN, RONDLAHOREORT CORPORATION, vs THE GENERAL1970 PLC 143 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-28Read full judgment →
- THE BURMAH SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY OF PAKISTAN1970 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question involves the validity of an administrative order that effectively withdrew a franchise after the grantee had fulfilled all procedural requirements and incurred significant financial expenditure—specifically mentioned as three lakhs of rupees—based on the reliance of that franchise. The Supreme Court observed that these circumstances raise difficult questions of law regarding the legitimacy of such administrative actions. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the High Court's decision. The Court further directed the petitioner to provide the necessary copies of documents to expedite the preparation of the case for hearing and set the security amount at Rs. 2,500.
Questions settled- Can an administrative authority validly withdraw a franchise after the grantee has satisfied all procedural requirements and incurred significant expense in reliance upon it?
- Does the withdrawal of a franchise after substantial investment by the grantee raise a justiciable question of law in writ jurisdiction?
- THE BANK OF BAHAWALPUR LTD., KARACHI vs SIDDIQ TEXTILES LTD. AND Other1970 PLD Karachi 643 · Sindh High Court · 1970-01-13Read full judgment →
- THE ASIAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., LAHORE vs NASEER AHMAD1970 P Cr. L J 847 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-17Read full judgment →
- THB DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs SAIFUL KABEER AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 90 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-17Read full judgment →
- TEPRI MAI BEWA vs FAREY MAHMOOD AND Other Opposite Parties1970 PLD Dacca 475 · Dacca · 1968-08-13Read full judgment →
- TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF TEXTILES vs LABOUR COURT, JULLUNDUR AND OTHERS1970 PLC 603 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1969-01-14Read full judgment →
- TAWAIB KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE1970 PLD Supreme Court 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-29Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellants, Khawaja Muhammad and Tawaib Khan, for the murder of Niaz Gul under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which convictions were confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question involves the evaluation of ocular testimony and dying declarations in the context of a long-standing blood-feud and interested witnesses, and whether the evidence can be safely relied upon to sustain convictions. The Supreme Court held that while dying declarations and testimony of related witnesses possess sanctity, they require close scrutiny, and the court must sift the grain from the chaff in light of physical circumstances and probabilities. The Court found the case against Khawaja Muhammad proved beyond doubt, supported by his false alibi and corroborative physical evidence, but acquitted Tawaib Khan due to grave doubts regarding his participation and improbable injury attribution. The key principle laid down is that the maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' does not apply automatically, and courts must rigorously evaluate partisan evidence and dying declarations against surrounding physical circumstances to prevent false implications arising from enmity.
Questions settled- Whether dying declarations can be accepted as the whole truth without reservations in cases involving deep-rooted blood-feuds?
- Can the uncorroborated testimony of an interested or partisan witness be safely relied upon without close scrutiny of the physical circumstances?
- Whether the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is applicable in the administration of criminal justice in Pakistan?
- How should courts evaluate discrepancies between initial police statements and subsequent dying declarations regarding the number of gunshots fired?
- TAJUDDIN SILK MILLS WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS TAJUDDIN SILK MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 757 · Labour Court · 1970-08-17Read full judgment →
- TAJA vs THE CROWN1970 P Cr. L J 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-05-31Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Taja, for the murder of an elderly widow, Mst. Daulan, allegedly committed to seize her land and property. The principal evidence against the appellant rested on the testimony of an accomplice, Faqir approver, who claimed that both he and the appellant strangled the deceased and stole her property. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the approver's testimony received sufficient and independent corroboration regarding the appellant's specific participation in the crime. The Court held that the recovery of keys from the appellant's possession, which fitted the locks in the victim's house, and the medical evidence matching the approver's account provided strong, objective, and independent corroboration satisfying the rule of prudence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of an approver requires independent corroboration connecting the specific accused to the crime?
- Can the recovery of keys belonging to the victim from the possession of the accused serve as sufficient corroboration of an approver's testimony?
- Whether subjective considerations regarding an approver's relationship to the accused can replace objective external corroboration?
- TAJ DIN AND Another vs MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Lahore 840 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-02Read full judgment →
- Syed YOUSUF ZAMAN vs ROSHAN ALI AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed against the High Court of West Pakistan's dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal, which arose from a writ petition challenging a Settlement Authority's decision to transfer only the upper floor of a composite property to the petitioner. The petition was barred by a one-day delay. The petitioner's counsel argued that under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, the day the judgment was pronounced and the day the copy was applied for (being the same day) should be excluded twice, effectively making the petition within time. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that Section 12(2) does not permit the same day to be excluded twice. On the merits, the petitioner contended that the initial appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner was time-barred, rendering subsequent proceedings void. However, because this point was not raised before the lower settlement authorities or the High Court, the Supreme Court held it could not be raised for the first time before it. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the same day can be excluded twice under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 if the copy of the judgment is applied for on the day of its pronouncement?
- Can a plea of limitation regarding lower departmental proceedings be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not pressed before the High Court or the lower authorities?
- Syed YOUSUF AND Another vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION, KARACHI AND Other1970 PLD Lahore 581 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Syed YASIN SAKAFF SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY,1970 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the retirement of the petitioner based on his recorded date of birth. The petitioner challenged the correctness of his date of birth entered in his service book as 20th July 1914, contending it should be 20th July 1916 as originally recorded during his earlier employment with the police. The core legal question concerned the determination of a disputed entry regarding a government servant's date of birth and whether writ proceedings are appropriate for resolving such factual disputes. The Supreme Court held that the dispute regarding the correct date of birth is a question of fact that cannot be appropriately resolved in writ proceedings and requires regular proceedings. The key principle laid down is that disputed questions of fact regarding a service record, such as a date of birth, should be pursued through a regular suit rather than a constitutional petition.
Questions settled- Can a disputed question of fact regarding a government servant's date of birth be resolved in writ proceedings?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for a government servant seeking correction of an entry in their service book?
- Syed SHAHZAD HUSSAIN vs THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF1970 SCMR 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a writ petition. The petitioner had challenged a recovery notice issued by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, for a loan obtained from the Pakistan Industrial Cooperative Bank Ltd. On remand, the Deputy Registrar rejected the petitioner's list of witnesses as vague and found his liability established, dismissing allegations that the Bank's ex-manager was a sleeping partner. The petitioner's subsequent revision was rejected as incompetent, and the High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity but had adopted dilatory tactics. The Court ruled that a revision is not a vested right but is subject to the discretion of the revisional authority. It further held that since the petitioner admitted the advance of the loan, his liability was established, and any claims against the ex-manager could be pursued separately in a civil court.
Questions settled- Whether the remedy of revision under the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance 1966 constitutes a vested right of a party?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding loan liability and execution of pledge documents be interfered with in writ jurisdiction where sufficient opportunity of hearing was provided?
- Whether a debtor's claim that a bank official was a sleeping partner in his firm absolves the debtor of his liability to the bank under the Co-operative Societies framework?
- Syed SAJJAD KAZIM vs M. A. Q. ANSARI AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 792 · Labour Court · 1970-05-15Read full judgment →
- Syed SAID MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE QUETTA MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE1970 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute concerning the validity of the tariff of octroi duty levied by the Quetta Municipal Committee. The core legal question is whether the tariff of octroi duty levied under the Quetta Municipal Laws, 1946, remains valid and continues to hold good after the enforcement of section 35 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, which mandates that municipal committees shall be guided by Model Tax Schedules framed by the Government in levying any tax, rate, toll, or fee. The Court held that the reasoning and conclusions of the learned judges below require further consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to the furnishing of security in the sum of rupees one thousand.
Questions settled- Does the tariff of octroi duty levied under the Quetta Municipal Laws, 1946, remain valid after section 35 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 comes into force?
- Are municipal committees bound to be guided by Model Tax Schedules framed by the Government when levying taxes, rates, tolls, or fees under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960?