Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Syed SAID MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE QUETTA MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE1970 PLD Quetta 1 · Balochistan High Court · 1969-11-07Read full judgment →
• Syed NURUL ALAM vs THE MANAGER, CHITTAGONG JUTE MANUFACTURING TO LTD., CHITTAGONG1970 PLC 769 · Labour Court · 1970-05-11Read full judgment →
• Syed NAZEER AHMAD SHAH vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1970 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-24
  review petitionrailway serviceremoval from serviceservice lawsupreme court practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by Syed Nazeer Ahmad Shah against this Court's previous judgment dated 8th November 1965, challenging the validity of a Divisional Officer's order directing his removal from railway service and alleging non-production of certain documents by the railway authorities. The core legal question is whether the re-arguing of settled points regarding the authority to remove from service and complaints regarding non-production of documents not raised at the initial hearing constitute valid grounds for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that matters fully considered in the original judgment cannot be re-argued through a review and that complaints regarding document production not raised at the hearing cannot be entertained. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-litigate points already adjudicated upon or to raise new procedural grievances not urged at the original hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-argue the validity of an order of removal from railway service through a review petition after the matter has been fully considered in the main judgment?
  • Whether a complaint regarding the non-production of documents, not raised at the original hearing of the appeal, can be entertained for the first time in review?
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• Syed MEHDI HASNAIN vs MUHAMMAD AYUB AND Another1970 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  summary evictionexecutive orderpossessionproperty rightsinfructuous petitioncivil court jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an executive order issued by the District Magistrate, Karachi. The District Magistrate had ordered the eviction of the respondent from a property in Serai Quarter, Karachi, which the petitioner claimed to own through purchase from a transferee of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Department. The High Court, finding the District Magistrate's eviction order lacked legal sanction and validity, set it aside and directed the restoration of possession to the respondent. Before the Supreme Court, it was confirmed that the respondent had already been restored to possession pursuant to the High Court's order. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition had become infructuous and dismissed it. The Court clarified that the High Court's order, which focused solely on the illegality of the summary eviction, did not prejudice the petitioner's underlying property rights. The Court affirmed that such rights remain subject to adjudication and establishment through appropriate proceedings in the civil courts, rather than through summary executive action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Magistrate summarily evict a person from property without legal sanction?
  • Does a High Court order restoring possession to a person evicted by an illegal executive order prejudice the underlying title claims of the petitioner?
  • Is a petition rendered infructuous if the relief granted by the High Court has already been executed?
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• Syed MAZAHIR HUSSAIN NAQVI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 188 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-01Read full judgment →
• Syed MAHMUD ALAM vs Syed MEHDI HUSSAIN AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 6 · Lahore High Court · 1968-10-08
  limitationcondonation of delaydisplaced persons land settlementrevisional jurisdictionnullityfraudaudi alteram partem
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference arises from a set of writ petitions involving the question of whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals filed under section 18 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question addresses the availability of condonation of delay under special and local laws where section 5 has not been explicitly incorporated. Examining the scheme of the Limitation Act, 1908 and its section 29(2), the Lahore High Court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, either expressly or impliedly, to appeals filed under section 18 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. However, the Court laid down key principles that an appellate authority may still entertain a time-barred matter if the impugned order is a nullity, tainted by fraud under section 18 of the Limitation Act, or passed without notice violating the principle of audi alteram partem, in which case limitation runs from the date of knowledge. Furthermore, a revisional authority possesses wide powers under section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act to examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of subordinate orders regardless of whether a lower appeal was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals filed under section 18 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Can an appellate authority entertain a time-barred appeal if the impugned order is a nullity or tainted with fraud?
  • Does time for filing an appeal run from the date of the order or the date of knowledge when the affected party had no notice of the proceedings?
  • Whether a revisional authority can interfere with an order on merits despite the fact that the appeal before the lower forum was dismissed as time-barred?
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• Syed GHULAMALI SHAH vs Tim DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND TRIBUNAL, SANGHAR1970 P Cr. L J 393 · Sindh High Court · 1969-06-16Read full judgment →
• Syed BAQIR HUSSAIN SHAH vs Malik MUHAMMAD ALI AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  quo warrantoElectoral Collegeelection petitionwrit petitionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for a writ in the nature of quo warranto and a declaration challenging the holding of the office of Chairman of a Union Council by the respondent, along with a notification relating to membership of the Electoral College. The core legal question concerned the validity of a declaration of election results based on partial polling where further polling had been approved by the Provincial Election Authority following a disturbance, and whether a writ petition was maintainable when no regular election petition had been filed under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the legal questions raised merited detailed consideration regarding the legality of ignoring subsequently polled votes and the applicability of constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaration of election results based only on votes cast on an earlier date is valid when the Provincial Election Authority approved further polling due to a disturbance?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be maintained against the holder of a public office if no regular election petition was filed under section 58 of the Electoral College Act?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to interfere with election matters under the circumstances of incomplete polling?
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• Syed BAQAR HUSSAIN JAFRI vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN1970 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  National Bank of Pakistanpower of attorneydelegation of powersinstitution of suitpreliminary issuecivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a decision on a preliminary issue in a suit for recovery filed by the respondent-Bank against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the person who instituted the suit on behalf of the National Bank of Pakistan was legally authorized to do so, and specifically whether the appointment of an attorney to file and conduct court cases amounts to an impermissible delegation of powers or requires notification in the official Gazette under the relevant statutory framework. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of an attorney to conduct court cases is a routine administrative matter that does not constitute a delegation of the Central Board's statutory powers, but rather the appointment of an agent under the Civil Procedure Code. The Court affirmed the lower court decisions and dismissed the petition, ruling that the attorney was competently constituted and authorized to act for the Bank.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of an attorney by the National Bank of Pakistan to institute and conduct a suit amount to an impermissible delegation of powers?
  • Whether an attorney appointed to conduct court cases on behalf of the National Bank of Pakistan must be notified in the official Gazette of Pakistan?
  • Can a bank lawfully appoint an agent to institute legal proceedings under Order III Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed AZIZ UR RAHMAN vs Mst. HABIB BANO AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  leave to appeallimitationtime-barred petitionstay of possessionprocedural irregularity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The primary procedural issue addressed by the Court involves a reported delay of seven days, rendering the petition prima facie time-barred. Upon examination of the certified copy of the order under appeal, the Court observed that the dates regarding the preparation and delivery of the copy appeared to have been corrected and overwritten. Consequently, the Court declined to dismiss the petition on the ground of limitation at this preliminary stage. Instead, the Court exercised its discretion to grant leave to appeal, explicitly leaving the question of limitation open for a definitive decision at the final hearing, should an objection be raised by the opposing party. Additionally, the Court directed the petitioner to furnish security in the amount of Rs. 1,000 and ordered the continuation of the stay regarding the delivery of possession of the property in dispute, thereby maintaining the status quo pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal while leaving the question of limitation open for future determination?
  • Does the presence of overwritten dates on a certified copy of an order necessitate immediate dismissal of a petition on limitation grounds?
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• SYED ALI vs ABDUL KHALIQ1970 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08
  pre-emptionco-sharer tenantlimitationagricultural landstatutory notice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts and the High Court which granted pre-emption of agricultural land to the respondent co-sharer tenant. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption application was barred by limitation on the ground that the pre-emptor had prior knowledge of the transfer by virtue of being an attesting witness to the registered kobala, despite the absence of statutory notice under Section 89 of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court held that under Section 96 of the said Act, a co-sharer tenant is entitled to claim pre-emption within four months of the service of notice under Section 89, or within four months of the date of knowledge of the transfer if no such notice has been served. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory limitation period of four months for filing a pre-emption application runs from the date of receipt of the obligatory notice under Section 89, and the mere attestation of the transfer deed does not alter the statutory limitation period when the mandatory notice has not been served.

  Questions settled

  • Within what period must a co-sharer tenant claim pre-emption under the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act?
  • Does the knowledge of a transfer derived from being an attesting witness to a kobala start the limitation period for pre-emption when no notice under Section 89 has been served?
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• SURUJ MIA vs THE PIONEER BANK LTV. (IN LIQUIDATION)1970 PLD Dacca 648 · Dacca · 1968-07-24Read full judgment →
• SURUJ MIA AND Others vs KALAGAZI1970 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal revisionspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of factassaultmedical evidenceeye-witness testimony
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which had dismissed the petitioners' criminal revision against their conviction and sentence. The petitioners were convicted under Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for assaulting the complainant, Abdul Mannan, with iron rods and lathis. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the petitioners' guilt, based on the testimony of eye-witnesses and medical evidence, warranted interference by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the case through credible eye-witness testimony, which was further corroborated by the independent medical evidence of the Medical Officer who examined the victim's injuries. Finding no merit in the petition, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' reliance on the consistent evidence presented. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact when they are supported by reliable, corroborated evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when evidence is corroborated?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to corroborate eye-witness testimony in assault cases?
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• SURKHRU vs The STATE1970 SCMR 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  post-arrest bailmurder chargebail refusalcriminal petitionFirst Information Report
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a criminal case. The petitioner is facing a murder charge, with the First Information Report specifically attributing the fatal gunshot to the deceased Ghulam Hussain to the petitioner. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given the direct and specific allegation of murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to grant bail considering the grave nature of the allegation and the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the First Information Report. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that where an accused is directly nominated with a fatal blow in a murder case, bail is ordinarily refused unless exceptional grounds for further inquiry are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused directly charged with a fatal gunshot in the First Information Report is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing bail in a murder case?
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• SULTAN MUHAMMAD vs THE CROWN1970 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-10
  murderright of private defenceretracted confessiondying declarationcriminal appealself-defence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of death confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner, subsequently commuted to transportation for life. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether adequate consideration was given to the appellant's right of private defence, notwithstanding that the plea was not formally raised during the trial. Upon examining the evidence, including a retracted confession, a dying declaration, and witness statements, the Court found that physical circumstances such as the absence of blackening on the deceased's clothing and the distance between the parties contradicted the theory of a close-quarters struggle where the appellant's life was in danger. The Supreme Court held that the appellant fired at the deceased while running away and escaping, without any necessity or justification of private defence. The key principle laid down is that physical evidence, such as the absence of bullet charring and spatial distance, can conclusively negative a claim of self-defence and establish that the accused acted without justification when an avenue of escape was available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence can be considered by an appellate court when it was not raised during the trial or preceding enquiry?
  • Does the absence of charring or blackening on the deceased's clothes or wound exclude the possibility of a close-quarters struggle?
  • Is a retracted confession stating the right of private defence admissible and reliable when contradicted by physical evidence and a dying declaration?
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• SULTAN MUHAMMAD vs THE CROWN'1970 P Cr. L J 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-10
  murderprivate defenceretracted confessiondying declarationcriminal appealhouse-trespass
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the appellant, Sultan Muhammad, was entitled to the right of private defence regarding his conviction for the murder of one Khuban under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant had entered the deceased's house to commit adultery and shot the deceased with a rifle when surprised upon the husband's unexpected return. Although the plea of self-defence was not raised at trial, the Supreme Court evaluated the prosecution evidence, including a retracted confession, a dying declaration, and statements of an eyewitness. The Court held that physical circumstances—specifically the absence of powder charring on the wound or clothing and the distance between the parties—disproved the claim of a close-range struggle and established that the appellant shot the victim while attempting to escape when no threat to his life existed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder, ruling that the right of private defence was not available to the accused, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence can be successfully claimed when an accused shoots a victim while fleeing from the scene of a house-trespass?
  • Does the absence of charring or blackening on a bullet wound exclude the possibility of a close-range struggle between the accused and the deceased?
  • Can a retracted confession and an inconsistent dying declaration be evaluated together to determine the true sequence of events in a murder trial?
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• SULTAN MUHAMMAD vs Mst. HAMIDA BEGUM AND 18 Other1970 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-26
  ex parte decreesubstituted servicelimitation periodfraudulent suppressiondate of knowledgecivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. The underlying dispute involved an ex parte decree obtained by the petitioner against nineteen defendants after substituted service via newspaper publication. One defendant applied to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, alleging fraudulent suppression of addresses. The trial court and High Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the application was time-barred, holding that limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the decree when fraudulent suppression of service is alleged, rather than from the date of the decree itself. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, noting that because the newspaper citations contained incorrect addresses, the defendants were not duly served. The Court held that substituted service is ineffective if the publication itself contains incorrect information, preventing the running of limitation from the date of the decree. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as the lower courts correctly applied the law regarding limitation in cases of fraudulent service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree run from the date of the decree or the date of knowledge when fraudulent suppression of service is alleged?
  • Is substituted service via newspaper publication effective if the publication contains incorrect addresses of the defendants?
  • Can an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be filed after the expiry of 30 days if the summons was not duly served?
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• SULTAN MAHMOOD vs MESSRS OMAR SONS LTD. Co1970 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-13
  summary suitleave to defendfurnishing securitydiscretionary powerLetters Patent Appealrecovery of money
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, which had upheld a decree passed against the petitioner in a summary suit. The respondents had filed Suit No. 196 of 1968 for the recovery of Rs. 64,649.28 under the summary procedure provisions. The petitioner was granted conditional leave to defend the suit upon furnishing security but failed to comply with the court's directions despite being granted extensions on multiple occasions. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing further time to furnish security and subsequently decreeing the suit. The Supreme Court held that the courts below had granted sufficient time and that the discretion exercised by the Single Judge was proper. The Court found no evidence that the Nazir had illegally refused the security. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that a party who fails to comply with conditional leave to defend within reasonable extensions granted by the court cannot seek further indulgence as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant who fails to furnish security within the extended time granted by the court challenge the subsequent decree?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by a Single Judge in granting time to furnish security subject to interference if sufficient opportunities were provided?
  • Does the failure to furnish security as a condition for leave to defend justify the passing of a decree in a summary suit?
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• SULTAN AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 801 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-08Read full judgment →
• SULTAN Alias SULLAH vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 751 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-21Read full judgment →
• SULTAN ALI vs THE STATEs1970 P Cr. L J 806 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-14Read full judgment →
• SULTAN AHMED KHAN vs THS EAST PAKISTAN INLAND WATER TRANSPORT1970 PLC 864 · Labour Court · 1970-06-01Read full judgment →
• SULEMAN vs NUR JAMAL AND 11 Other1970 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  Settlement and Rehabilitation Schemeceiling limitland allotmentwrit jurisdictionrefugee rehabilitationvested legal right
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the confirmation of land allotments under the Settlement and Rehabilitation Scheme in a congested district where the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner fixed a ceiling limit of 114 units per allottee to accommodate refugees. The core legal question is whether an allottee possesses a vested legal right to claim land to the extent of their full entitlement in a particular area of choice, overriding a policy-based ceiling limit, and whether the High Court ought to interfere in writ jurisdiction with discretionary orders of rehabilitation authorities. The Supreme Court held that the fixing of the ceiling was within the discretionary jurisdiction of the rehabilitation authorities and that the petitioner had no vested legal right to enforce full entitlement in a specific area to the detriment of other claimants. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that rehabilitation authorities possess lawful discretionary power to fix ceiling limits for land allotments to accommodate refugees as a policy measure, and such administrative decisions cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction absent a vested legal right.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allottee possess a vested legal right to enforce a claim for land to the extent of their full entitlement in a particular area of their choice?
  • Can rehabilitation authorities fix a ceiling limit for the confirmation of land allotments as a policy measure to accommodate refugees?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in writ jurisdiction with discretionary orders made by rehabilitation authorities regarding land ceiling limits?
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• SULEMAN vs MOHAMMAD FIROZE KHAN AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 109 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-06-29Read full judgment →
• SULEMAN AND 4 Others vs THE BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1970 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-23
  Grow More Food CampaignTubewell Schemestate land allotmentlachesdelaywrit petitionlease cancellation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition on the ground of laches. The petitioners were initially allotted state land for three years under the Grow More Food Campaign, which was later extended to five years. Subsequently, the land was included in a Tubewell Scheme and allotted to another party. The petitioners challenged this before revenue authorities, but their revision was dismissed by the Member, Board of Revenue, who noted they failed to timely challenge the lease cancellation and instead pursued allotment under the new scheme. The core legal question is whether pursuing a collateral remedy under a new scheme constitutes a bona fide excuse to condone a delay of three years in challenging the original cancellation order. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' delay constituted laches and acquiescence, affirming the High Court's dismissal. The key principle laid down is that pursuing misconceived alternate remedies does not automatically excuse prolonged delay or cure laches in challenging an administrative order.

  Questions settled

  • Does pursuing a remedy under a new administrative scheme constitute a sufficient ground to condone laches in challenging a prior lease cancellation?
  • Whether a writ petition filed after an unexplained delay of three years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches?
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• SUDAN BALA MONDAL AND Another vs THS STATE-Opposite-Party1970 P Cr. L J 688 · Dacca · 1969-10-16Read full judgment →
• SUBHKARAN RAJGORIA (S. K. RAJGORIA) vs PIONEER BANK LTD. (IN LIQUIDATION) DACCA1970 PLD Dacca 738 · Dacca · 1969-11-12Read full judgment →
• SUBEDAR MUHAMMAD TUFAIL MUHAMMAD DIN AND Another vs THE CHIEF1970 SCMR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-07
  evacuee landmortgagee in possessionland settlementallotment of landdispossessed non-evacueecharge on propertyspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from petitions for special leave to appeal concerning whether Muslim mortgagees in possession of evacuee lands are entitled to retain possession until the mortgage debt is repaid. The petitioners, who were mortgagees of lands left by non-Muslim evacuees, challenged the allotment of such lands to displaced persons without prior repayment of their mortgage debts. The High Court had dismissed their writ petitions following its Full Bench decision in Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Amin (PLD 1969 Lah. 622). The Supreme Court examined the statutory evolution under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958, including the amendments introduced by Ordinance 1962 and Ordinance XIII of 1964. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view, holding that the statutory amendments effectively effaced the mortgage rights of Muslim mortgagees in evacuee lands, substituting them with a mere charge for the mortgage debt. Consequently, mortgagees cannot claim possession or prevent eviction to put allottees in possession. Finding the High Court's settled legal view correct, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mortgagee of evacuee land have the right to retain possession of the land until the mortgage debt is repaid?
  • Whether the statutory amendments to Section 14-A of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 convert a mortgage right over evacuee land into a mere charge.
  • Can Settlement Authorities evict a mortgagee in possession of evacuee land to put an allottee in possession?
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• STRAJ UDDOWLA vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 308 · Dacca · 1969-07-14Read full judgment →
• STEEL Brother & Co. LTD., KARACHI-S vs A. WAHID Opponent1970 PLD Karachi 173 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-26
  arbitration agreementsole arbitratorarbitration venueequitable groundsappointment of arbitratorservice agreementarbitration proceedingsdefaulting party
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerned an application under Sections 3 and 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, arising from a service agreement between an employer (applicants) and employee (opponent) that included an arbitration clause (clause 9) stipulating English law and the company's option for arbitration in London or Karachi. Disputes arose following the termination of the opponent's services and his subsequent refusal to relocate, leading to the opponent unilaterally appointing a sole arbitrator in Karachi under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, citing the applicants' delay. The core legal question was whether the opponent's appointment of a sole arbitrator was valid and if the court could intervene on equitable grounds, considering the contractual terms and the provisos of the relevant arbitration acts. The court held that it could exercise its discretion under the provisos to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act, 1950, on equitable grounds. It allowed the applicants 15 days to appoint their arbitrator in Karachi to proceed with arbitration alongside the opponent's nominee, emphasizing the court's power to grant further time to a defaulting party when sufficient cause is shown and a willingness to arbitrate exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court set aside the appointment of a sole arbitrator made under Section 9(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a court allow further time to a defaulting party to appoint an arbitrator under the proviso to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • What factors does a court consider when exercising its discretion to allow further time for arbitrator appointment on equitable grounds?
  • Does the proviso to Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act, 1950, allow the High Court to set aside an appointment of a sole arbitrator?
  • Can a party insist on a specific arbitration venue if the agreement grants the other party an option for the venue?
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• STATE vs Syed MIR AHMED SHAH AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Quetta 49 · Balochistan High Court · 1969-10-29
  jurisdictionspecial lawimplied repealcriminal procedurescheduled offencesplitting of offencesstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The State challenged an order by a Special Judge who declined jurisdiction over a criminal case involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, transferring the matter to a Deputy Commissioner under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question concerned the conflict between the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, and the Ordinance, specifically regarding the proper forum for trial when offences fall under both statutes. The Court held that both statutes are special laws; however, the Ordinance, being later and specific to certain localities, prevails over the Act regarding Pakistan Penal Code offences. Crucially, offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, are not scheduled under the Ordinance and remain exclusively triable by the Special Judge. The Court established that where a case involves both scheduled and non-scheduled offences, the proceedings must be split: the Special Judge retains jurisdiction over the corruption offence, while the Deputy Commissioner handles the scheduled offences. The principle laid down is that courts must reconcile overlapping statutes by splitting jurisdiction where possible, rather than assuming total repeal of one by the other.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, impliedly repeal the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, in its entirety?
  • Can a court split a criminal case involving both scheduled and non-scheduled offences to be tried by different forums?
  • Does the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal created by the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968?
  • When two special statutes are inconsistent, which principles of interpretation determine their application?
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• STANDARD BANK LTD., KARACHI vs S. ABDUL HAFIZ1970 PLC 233 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-24Read full judgment →
• Sree GOUR NITAI SAHA vs ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (REVENUE), BAKERGANJ AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  contempt of courtad interim injunctionviolation of injunctionnon-joinder of partiesspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner filed a civil suit for a permanent injunction against the Province of East Pakistan regarding certain land. After initial failures in the trial and appellate courts, the petitioner obtained an ad interim injunction from the High Court of East Pakistan. Subsequently, the petitioner alleged that the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Bakerganj, violated this injunction by approving a settlement of the suit land, leading to a contempt application. The High Court rejected the contempt application, finding no case was made out. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against this decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, observing that the High Court was satisfied that no contempt occurred. Crucially, the Supreme Court noted that the specific officer alleged to have violated the injunction was not made a party to the contempt proceedings in the High Court, nor was he impleaded in the petition for special leave. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was justified, as the absence of the alleged contemnor as a party was sufficient grounds for rejecting the application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contempt application be maintained if the alleged contemnor is not made a party to the proceedings?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere when the High Court has already determined that no case for contempt is made out?
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• SONAULLAH DHALI Alias MD. SONAULLAH DHALI vs The STATE1970 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-01-13
  criminal breach of trustabetmentmisappropriationre-appraisement of evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These criminal appeals relate to two convictions under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the appellant, the former President of the Union Board of Rohita, was convicted by the Special Judge of abetment of criminal breach of trust regarding tax collections, while the principal tax collectors were acquitted by the High Court. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant received the misappropriated funds or abetted the offense through the alleged suppression of a receipt book. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate and consider the material contradictions and weaknesses in the testimony of prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding the alleged tender of money and receipt books, and that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court laid down the principle that uncorroborated, inconsistent testimony regarding the handing over of misappropriated funds to a superior, coupled with the illiteracy of the accused and lack of proper examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction for abetment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether uncorroborated and contradictory testimony of prosecution witnesses is sufficient to prove the receipt of misappropriated funds by an accused?
  • Does the failure to question an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding a vital incriminating circumstance vitiate the finding on that point?
  • Whether a conviction for abetment of criminal breach of trust can be sustained when the principal offenders have been acquitted and the evidence against the abettor is doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• SONA MIA vs THE SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, NARAYANGANJ AND 2 Other1970 PLD Dacca 251 · Dacca · 1969-02-25Read full judgment →
• SONA AND Another vs (1) THE STATE,1970 PLD Supreme Court 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-20
  Frontier Crimes Regulationrepeal of statutesaving clausepending proceedingsconfirmation of sentenceretrospective operationprocedural law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a judgment of the West Pakistan High Court (Peshawar Bench) dismissing a writ petition filed under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellants were convicted of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Sections 11 and 12 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 (FCR). The core legal issue was whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction to confirm the conviction and sentences under Section 12(2) of the FCR after the FCR had been repealed by the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1963, and whether the Commissioner's appointment post-repeal rendered his confirmation invalid.

  The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Section 34(2) of the repealing Act read with Section 4(1)(e) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, pending legal proceedings and trials under the FCR were saved and was to be continued and concluded under the old procedural framework as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Consequently, the Commissioner had valid jurisdiction to confirm the sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of a procedural statute affect the continuation of pending legal proceedings initiated under that statute prior to its repeal?
  • Whether an officer appointed as Commissioner after the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 has jurisdiction to confirm sentences in pending cases saved by the general clauses act?
  • Does Section 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 save procedural steps and sentence confirmation in criminal trials commenced before the repeal of an enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Smt. VANIBAI AND Another vs REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 36 Other1970 PLD Karachi 42 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-23
  appointment of receiverinterlocutory orderevacuee propertyjust and convenientstatus quoallegation of fraud
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was preferred against an interlocutory order of the trial court dismissing the appellants' application under Order XL, Rule 1 of the CPC for the appointment of a receiver over disputed agricultural land. The appellants asserted title by inheritance from a deceased non-evacuee owner, whereas respondents Nos. 5 to 37 had been in possession as allottees since 1959. The allottees subsequently instituted a suit alleging that prior decrees obtained by the appellants were procured through fraud, following disclosures made in an enquiry report submitted to the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The core legal issue was whether it was 'just and convenient' to appoint a receiver during the pendency of the title suit. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to satisfy the test of justice and convenience as their title was heavily clouded by unresolved allegations of fraud and they had been out of possession since 1959. Moreover, appointing a receiver would conflict with the Custodian's existing status quo order and breach Section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957.

  Questions settled

  • Can a receiver be appointed under Order XL, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the plaintiff's title is prima facie clouded by unrebutted allegations of fraud?
  • Does the mere difficulty in estimating future income of agricultural land justify the appointment of a receiver against long-standing occupants?
  • Whether the appointment of a receiver by a civil court is barred when it effectively nullifies or modifies a status quo order issued by the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• Sk. AHMAD ALI vs ABDUR RAHIM1970 PLC 845 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• SIRAJ UD DIN GHULAM SARWAR Qazi MOHAMMAD DIN vs Haji KARAM KHAN1970 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-09
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyabatement of appeallegal representativescivil procedurejurisdiction of civil courtcompensation pool
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had affirmed the decision of the District Judge to remand pre-emption suits regarding agricultural land to the trial court. The core legal question was whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to pass decrees in respect of evacuee property, specifically regarding the status of land within the compensation pool prior to permanent settlement. However, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of this question. Instead, the Court held that the appeals before the High Court had ipso facto abated because the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, Haji Mannu Khan, were not brought on record within the prescribed time. The Court ruled that since the appeals had abated under the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court's decision on the merits was procedurally flawed. Consequently, the petitions for leave to appeal were not properly constituted. The Court directed the petitioners to either seek the setting aside of the abatement in the High Court or raise the issue of abatement directly in the civil proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to bring legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record within the prescribed time result in the automatic abatement of an appeal?
  • Can an appellate court decide an appeal on its merits if the appeal has already abated due to the non-impleadment of legal representatives?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party when an appeal has abated due to the failure to bring legal representatives on record?
  Read full judgment →
• SIRAJ DIN vs SAGHIR UD DIN Alias GOGA AND Another1970 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-24
  bailcapital offenceminor accusedjudicial discretionage determinationX-ray examination
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court granting bail to an accused person charged with a capital offence. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in granting bail to a minor accused. The Supreme Court observed that the accused was a minor, with his age estimated between 16 and 17 years based on an X-ray examination. The Court held that the minority of an accused is a valid ground for the grant of bail, even in cases involving capital offences. Consequently, the Court found no irregularity or excess of power in the High Court's exercise of judicial discretion. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that the age of an accused is a significant factor to be considered by courts when determining whether to grant bail in serious criminal matters.

  Questions settled

  • Is the minority of an accused a valid ground for granting bail in a capital offence case?
  • Does the grant of bail to a minor accused in a capital case constitute an irregularity or excess of power?
  Read full judgment →
• SIND BALUCHISTAN PROVINCIAL CO-OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED, KARACHI AND Another vs DILAWAR KHAN AND Another1970 PLD Karachi 200 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-19
  co-operative bankelection disputetemporary injunctioncivil court jurisdictionbar of jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Karachi, which suspended a previous appellate order and issued an injunction restraining the appellants from holding elections of the Directors of the Sind Baluchistan Provincial Co-operative Bank Limited. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits and grant injunctions regarding disputes over the election of directors of a co-operative society, given the bar on civil jurisdiction where disputes touch upon the business of a co-operative society. The court held that a dispute regarding the election of a co-operative society touches its business, thereby attracting the application of section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act and ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts. Consequently, the appellate court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and restored the earlier appellate order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits regarding election disputes of a co-operative society?
  • Does a dispute about the election of directors touch the business of a co-operative society under the Co-operative Societies Act?
  Read full judgment →
• SIDDIQULLAH Alias SIDDIQUE vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1970 P Cr. L J 1269 · Dacca · 1970-01-22Read full judgment →
• SIDDIQUE vs THS STATE1970 SCMR 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-12
  death penaltygrave and sudden provocationmurdercommutation of sentencecriminal appealjudicial delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the propriety of a death sentence imposed on the appellant, Siddique, for the murder of his wife, Mst. Salima. The appellant admitted to killing the deceased with a hatchet but pleaded grave and sudden provocation, alleging he found her in a compromising position with another man. The trial court and the High Court rejected this defense and upheld the capital sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence of provocation or mitigating circumstances. The autopsy confirmed recent sexual relations between the spouses, negating the appellant's claim of infidelity. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the delay in judicial proceedings warranted a reduction in the sentence, noting that such delays have become a common feature of the criminal justice system. The Court held that in the absence of mitigating factors, the death penalty was appropriate and dismissed the appeal, while noting the appellant's right to seek executive clemency under the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the disposal of criminal cases constitute a valid ground for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can a court presume provocation in a murder case where no evidence of an altercation or mitigating circumstances exists?
  • Is the remedy for a convict seeking commutation of a death sentence due to procedural delays found within the judicial process or through executive petition?
  Read full judgment →
• SHIRIN BAI vs MUHAMMAD ALI AND Other1970 PLD Karachi 450 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-02Read full judgment →
• SHERA AND 4 Other vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 735 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-30Read full judgment →
• SHERA AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 59 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-19Read full judgment →
• SHER MUHAMMAD, GENERAL SECRETARY, WAPDA ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL WORKSHOP AND 3 Other vs THE MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND1970 PLC 174 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-05-31Read full judgment →
• SHER MUHAMMAD SHER MUHAMMAD vs SARDAR MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  sale deedmental incapacitylimitation periodcourt-fee valuationdismissal in liminespecial leave to appealfraudulent alienation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeals in limine. The petitioner had filed civil suits seeking a declaration that two registered sale deeds for agricultural land were void, alleging mental incapacity at the time of execution, lack of consideration, and fraud. The trial court dismissed the suits, finding that the petitioner failed to prove insanity and that the suits were barred by limitation. Additionally, the court determined the proper valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction purposes based on the annual net profit of the land. The petitioner's subsequent appeals to the Additional District Judge were dismissed due to insufficient court-fee stamps. The Supreme Court reviewed the procedural history, noting the concurrent findings against the petitioner regarding the validity of the sales and the failure to properly value the suits. Finding no error in the lower courts' dismissal of the appeals, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for declaration of a sale deed as void be maintained if the plaintiff fails to prove mental incapacity at the time of execution?
  • Is an appeal liable to be dismissed if it is insufficiently stamped?
  • Does a failure to properly value a suit for court-fee and jurisdiction purposes justify its dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• SHER ALI AND 20 Other vs THE MANAGER, P. I. D. C. COLLIERIES, QUETTA AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Quetta 85 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-05-14Read full judgment →
• Sheikn HADIS AHMED NIZAMI vs EAST PAKISTAN SMALL INDUSTRIES1970 PLC 876 · Labour Court · 1970-05-26Read full judgment →
• Sheikh RASHID AHMAD vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Other1970 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-14
  displaced personsrevisional jurisdictionc. h. formtransfer of propertyremandconstitutional petitionsettlement commissioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a double-storey property in Lahore under the displaced persons laws. The core legal question is whether a revisional authority, under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, possesses the competence to restore a previously withdrawn C. H. Form and whether the High Court correctly remanded the case upon finding the Settlement Commissioner's decision was influenced by an erroneous legal view. The Supreme Court held that the revisional authority's powers under Section 20(3) are wide and extensive, encompassing the competence to pass any fit order, including the restoration of a withdrawn form. Furthermore, where an administrative order rests on multiple grounds—one being a legal error—the High Court properly quashed and remanded the matter. The key principle laid down is that statutory revisional powers under the Displaced Persons legislation are sufficiently broad to permit the revival of applications withdrawn under a misconception, and factual disputes regarding property allocation must be resolved on merits by the administrative authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a revisional authority under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 have the power to restore a C.H. Form once withdrawn?
  • Can the High Court interfere with an administrative order that is based on both valid and invalid considerations?
  • Are disputed questions of fact regarding property occupation suitable for determination in constitutional writ proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh RAFIUDDIN vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Other1970 PLD Karachi 170 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-27Read full judgment →
• Sheikh MUHAMMAD AMIN vs MUHAMMAD SHARIF1970 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-26
  ejectment proceedingslandlord-tenant relationshipstay of proceedingsRent Controller jurisdictionwrit petitionsine die
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court concerning ejectment proceedings under the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1958. The core legal question addressed was whether the High Court, in reviewing a Rent Controller's decision to stay proceedings sine die pending a civil suit, had prematurely determined the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. The petitioner contended that the High Court had recorded a positive finding on this relationship, which was a matter still pending adjudication before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's observations were strictly confined to the legality of the Rent Controller's stay order and did not constitute a final determination on the merits of the landlord-tenant relationship. The Court clarified that the Rent Controller retains the jurisdiction and duty to decide the existence of such a relationship based on the evidence presented by the parties. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the issue of tenancy remains open for the Rent Controller's determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Can a High Court's review of a stay order be construed as a final finding on the merits of the underlying tenancy dispute?
  • Is it appropriate for a Rent Controller to stay ejectment proceedings pending the outcome of a civil suit disputing the validity of a sale deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh ENSAN ALI vs ABDUR RAHMAN AND Another1970 P Cr. L J 596 · Dacca · 1969-12-16Read full judgment →
• Sheikh BASHIR AHMAD vs RAHIMUDDIN AND Another1970 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  Electoral College RulesSpecial leave to appealWrit jurisdictionStay of proceedingsInterpretation of rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question concerns the correct interpretation of Rule 34 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred in its application of this rule, noting that the High Court had previously expressed contradictory views on the matter in other writ petitions. The Supreme Court found that the contention raised by the petitioner merited consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, subject to the petitioner furnishing security for costs. Additionally, the Court ordered that the proceedings before the Controlling Authority, which were initiated in consequence of the High Court's order, remain stayed pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct interpretation of Rule 34 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964?
  • Does the application of Rule 34 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964, to the present case warrant further judicial review by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• SHARIFUDDIN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 33 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-03-12Read full judgment →
• SHAMSUZZAMAN vs THE PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, BASIC DEMOCRACIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 485 · Dacca · 1969-06-26Read full judgment →
• SHAMSUZZAMAN BHUIYA vs UREA FERTILIZER FACTORY (E. P. I. D.C.PROJECT), DACCA1970 PLC 790 · Labour Court · 1970-05-16Read full judgment →
• SHAMSUDDIN AHMED vs The STATE1970 SCMR 808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationdishonest intentioncashierprovident fundspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of conviction and sentence under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, a Cashier at the Government of Pakistan Press, was accused of misappropriating Rs. 300 withdrawn from a colleague's Provident Fund account. While the petitioner admitted to withdrawing the funds, he claimed to have disbursed the amount to the Manager for subsequent payment to the complainant. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the element of dishonest intention required for criminal breach of trust. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the prosecution successfully proved the petitioner withdrew the money and made a false entry in the cash book indicating disbursement, despite the absence of any acknowledgment of receipt by the complainant. The Court held that where an accused withdraws funds and falsely records their disbursement without actual payment, a legitimate inference of dishonest misappropriation arises. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings regarding the petitioner's criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of making a false entry in a cash book regarding the disbursement of funds, combined with the failure to pay the recipient, support an inference of dishonest misappropriation?
  • Is the absence of an acknowledgment of receipt by the intended beneficiary sufficient evidence to disprove a claim of payment in a criminal breach of trust case?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAMSHA KHATOON vs ABDUL SUKIR1970 PLD Dacca 763 · Dacca · 1969-12-03Read full judgment →
• SHAMROZ KHAN vs DR. LAL FAQIR KHAN AND 4 Other1970 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  pre-emptionsale vs giftmutation entriesquestion of facttamligh
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a pre-emption suit concerning a land transaction initially entered as a sale mutation but later attested as a gift or tamligh. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court and the High Court dismissed it, holding that the transaction was a genuine gift rather than a sale. The core legal question was whether the transaction was a sale subject to pre-emption or a gift. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the nature of the transaction is a question of fact based on the appraisal of evidence, and that initial entries in mutation columns do not constitute conclusive proof of a sale when the vendors themselves admit to a gift and there is no evidence of payment of consideration. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal, establishing that revenue record entries regarding consideration must be corroborated by satisfactory proof of payment to override the proved intent of the owners to make a gift.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction recorded via mutation is a sale or a gift when initial entries conflict with the subsequent statements of the owners?
  • Can revenue mutation entries regarding consideration be treated as conclusive proof of a sale without satisfactory evidence of payment?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by lower courts based on an appraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• SHALIMAR SILK MILLS MAZDOOR UNION vs SHALIMAR SILK MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 437 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• SHALIMAR SILK MILLS LTD.KARACHI vs SHALIMAR SILK MILLS MAZDOOR UNION1970 PLC 657 · Industrial Court · 1970-01-30Read full judgment →
• Shaikh MUHAMMAD HAFIZ ULLAH vs GHULAM YASIN AND Other1970 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  special leave to appealwrit petitionlacheslimitationsettlement departmentproperty division
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging a departmental property division. The core legal questions involve whether the departmental authorities acted within their jurisdiction in dividing the premises between rival occupants based on possession, whether a limitation plea not raised before departmental authorities can be urged in writ jurisdiction, and whether unexplained delay constitutes laches barring relief. The Supreme Court held that the departmental authorities acted within their jurisdiction, that the limitation point could not be raised for the first time in the writ petition, and that the four-year delay in approaching the High Court amounted to fatal laches. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principles laid down are that departmental divisions of property based on possession within jurisdiction will not be interfered with, points not raised before lower forums cannot be agitated for the first time in writ proceedings, and substantial delay in invoking constitutional jurisdiction constitutes laches sufficient to deny relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation not raised before the departmental authorities be taken for the first time in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether delay in filing a writ petition amounts to laches sufficient to deny relief?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an order of departmental authorities dividing property among occupants in accordance with their possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada MUHAMMAD UMAR BEG vs SULTAN MAHMOOD KHAN AND ANOHER1970 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  No judgment text was provided for analysis.

  Read full judgment →
• SHAHMAD Alias SHAMOO vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 853 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-24Read full judgment →
• SHAHJAHAN MIA vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1970 P Cr. L J 1178 · Dacca · 1970-04-09Read full judgment →
• SHAHIDULLAH vs LATIF BAWANY JUTE1970 PLC 879 · Labour Court · 1970-05-29Read full judgment →
• SHAHDARA (DELHI)-SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY Co., LTD vs S. S. RAILWAY1970 PLC 538 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-09-18Read full judgment →
• SHAHDAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1130 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-09Read full judgment →
• SHAHANSHAH HUSAIN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 427 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-03-28Read full judgment →
• SHAH MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 757 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-13
  culpable homicideintention to killknowledge of fatal injuryalteration of convictionsingle blowcriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, Shah Muhammad, was convicted by the Sessions Judge for the murder of his nephew, Muhammad Saleem, under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged the appellant struck the deceased on the head with a stick following a dispute over suspected witchcraft. On appeal, the High Court examined whether the appellant possessed the requisite intent for murder. The Court noted that an altercation preceded the incident, suggesting the appellant intended to punish the deceased for perceived misbehavior rather than kill him. While rejecting the argument that the offense fell under Section 325, the Court held that the appellant, having struck a fatal blow to the head, possessed the knowledge that such an injury was likely to cause death. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence to three years of rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single blow to the head with a blunt weapon necessarily imply an intention to commit murder?
  • When should a conviction for murder under Section 302 be altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II?
  • Is the knowledge that a specific injury is likely to cause death sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 304, Part II, in the absence of a specific intent to kill?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAH MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD YOUSUF AND ANOTHER1970 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  post-arrest bailcancellation of bailrapeminor victimdismissal for non-prosecutioneducational groundsleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court confirming post-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 in a case registered under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving the alleged abduction and rape of a minor girl. Bail had initially been allowed on educational grounds to enable the respondent to sit for an examination and was later confirmed by the High Court, which rejected the State's contention regarding the likelihood of tampering with prosecution evidence. The petitioner's earlier application for cancellation of interim bail had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court considered whether to interfere with the High Court's order confirming bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere with the impugned order at that stage. The Court laid down the principle that where an application for cancellation of bail is dismissed for non-prosecution, the complainant/petitioner retains the right to move a fresh application for cancellation of bail before the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a bail cancellation application for non-prosecution bar the petitioner from filing a fresh application for cancellation of bail?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with an order confirming bail where the remedy of moving a fresh cancellation application remains available to the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• SHABEEHUL HASSAN AND Another vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 57 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-01Read full judgment →
• SHABBIR HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-05
  leave to appealquestion of factsettlement commissionerprior allotmentpossessionremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Shabbir Hussain against Muhammad Afzal and others, challenging an order of the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred by deciding a disputed question of fact regarding prior allotment and possession of premises instead of remanding the matter to the departmental settlement authorities. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that questions of fact regarding prior allotment or possession should properly be adjudicated by the settlement authorities rather than the High Court directly. The Court laid down the principle that factual disputes in settlement matters ought to be remanded for departmental re-decision rather than determined by the High Court in the first instance. Interim protection against ejectment was granted subject to furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can adjudicate upon a disputed question of fact regarding prior allotment or possession instead of remanding the case to departmental authorities?
  • Should questions of fact concerning property possession in settlement matters be decided by the High Court or left to the Settlement Authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• SHABBIR HUSSAIN AND Others vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND. REHABILITATION1970 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  agricultural land allotmentcancellation of allotmentwrit petitionconversion of petitionlimitation actlachesdisplaced persons land settlement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The dispute in this matter relates to the cancellation of agricultural lands confirmed in favour of respondent No. 3 as the heir of a deceased right-holder, which allotment was cancelled by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) following an inquiry prompted by an anonymous or third-party complaint. Respondent No. 3 challenged the cancellation, leading to proceedings where the High Court initially permitted conversion of a writ petition into a revision petition under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, but subsequently re-converted it into a writ petition and declared the cancellation order null and void, remanding the case for a fresh decision. The petitioners sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to reconvert a time-barred revision petition into a writ petition and that the petition suffered from laches. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its competence by reverting the petition to its original writ form upon exceptions, and that there was no inordinate delay or laches given the respondent's detention under Martial Law Regulation prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can re-convert a revision petition back into its original writ petition form after permitting conversion subject to just exceptions?
  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act?
  • Whether the pendency of criminal or martial law prosecution constitutes sufficient explanation for delay in invoking writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. MUHAMMAD EHSAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-22
  writ petitionlachesdelaysettlement propertycompromisewaiverSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief on the ground of laches where the petitioner challenged orders passed by settlement authorities regarding the transfer of property, and whether a subsequent compromise and lack of diligence barred the claim. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition due to inordinate delay, as the petitioner had slept over his matter for years and had also entered into a compromise with the contesting respondents whereby he agreed to vacate the property, thereby waiving his rights. The key principles laid down are that the admission of a writ petition or interim orders do not preclude the court from considering the question of laches at final hearing, and that a party who enters into a compromise and behaves inconsistently with a subsisting claim cannot seek discretionary constitutional remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of laches is relevant when the impugned order passed by a settlement authority is not a nullity?
  • Does the admission of a writ petition for hearing or the refusal to vacate a stay order amount to a conclusive condonation of delay?
  • Can a petitioner who enters into a compromise to vacate the disputed property subsequently re-agitate the transfer dispute in a constitutional petition?
  • Whether the pursuit of incompetent remedies before administrative authorities constitutes a sufficient ground for condoning inordinate delay in filing a writ petition?
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• Sh. MAQBOOL ELLAHI AND 3 Other vs RASOOL & Co. LTD. AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 539 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-24
  provisional liquidatorwinding-upprivate limited companycompany deadlockreceiverpartnership analogyjust and equitable
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an application filed under section 175 of the Companies Act 1913 for the appointment of a provisional liquidator for a private limited company, pending a main petition for its winding-up under section 162 of the Act. The core legal question concerns whether a provisional liquidator or a receiver should be appointed when a deadlock arises in a two-man-type private company due to severe disputes and evenly divided control between two groups of shareholders and directors. The court held that while the conditions for a winding-up under the 'just and equitable' clause may prima facie exist based on partnership principles, the appointment of a provisional liquidator is a drastic measure that should be avoided if business can be preserved, and opted instead to appoint a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The key principle laid down is that private limited companies resembling partnerships may warrant equitable winding-up or receivership upon a complete deadlock, but courts must exercise extreme caution and prefer less drastic remedies like receivership to protect company assets without paralyzing ongoing business.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a provisional liquidator should be appointed when a deadlock occurs in a private limited company?
  • Can the court appoint a receiver under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the management of a company pending a winding-up petition?
  • Does the principle of partnership dissolution apply to the winding-up of a private limited company with equal shareholding?
  • What are the grounds for the appointment of a provisional liquidator under the Companies Act 1913?
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• Sh. MANZUR AHMAD AND 8 Other vs MUHAMMAD HANIF AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 391 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-06Read full judgment →
• Sh. INAYATULLAH vs Mian ABBAS AHMAD KHAN AND Another1970 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  ex parte decreerendition of accountsrecording of evidencepreliminary decreecivil revisionremand of casespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for the rendition of accounts filed by the petitioner, Sheikh Inayatullah. The trial court had initially passed an ex parte decree against the respondents without recording any evidence, solely on the basis of their absence. Following a failed attempt to set aside the ex parte order at the trial and appellate levels, the High Court, in revision, set aside both the ex parte order and the preliminary decree, remanding the case for the recording of evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a preliminary decree passed without any evidence being recorded is legally sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a decree passed in the absence of evidence is fundamentally flawed and lacks legal value. The key principle laid down is that a court cannot pass a decree, even in ex parte proceedings, without recording evidence to substantiate the claim, as a decree based on no evidence is a grave legal defect that warrants judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court pass a preliminary decree in a suit for rendition of accounts without recording any evidence?
  • Is an ex parte decree passed solely on the ground of the defendant's absence, without evidence, legally sustainable?
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• Sh. FAZAL AHMAD vs ABDUL HAKIM AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-23
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement authoritiesclerical mistakewrit jurisdictionauctionland dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the area of land transferred to the petitioner through a saltpetre factory auction. The petitioner, having purchased a factory site in Sargodha, claimed entitlement to additional land based on an area of 16 kanals mentioned in his Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.), despite the actual auction being for 11 kanals. The Settlement authorities rejected this claim, and the High Court declined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities possessed the authority to amend the P.T.D. to correct a clerical error regarding the land area. The Supreme Court held that the plea was devoid of merit, affirming that authorities have the inherent power to correct clerical mistakes in their documents. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the issuance of a P.T.D. containing a clerical error did not entitle the petitioner to claim land beyond what was actually auctioned and purchased. The petition was dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement authorities have the power to amend a Permanent Transfer Deed to correct a clerical mistake regarding the area of land transferred?
  • Does a clerical error in a Permanent Transfer Deed entitle a purchaser to claim land not included in the original auction?
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• Sh. BARKATULLAH AND Another vs Khawaja MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM1970 PLD Supreme Court 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-15
  specific performancelease agreementnecessary partyregistration of documentspart performancetransfer of propertynon-joinder of parties
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a suit for specific performance of a lease contract regarding a shop under construction, based on a compromise deed. The core legal questions were whether the deed constituted a registrable lease agreement under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, and whether a subsequent lessee in possession was a necessary party to the suit. The Supreme Court held that the compromise deed was vague, lacked essential terms like rent, and, given the ten-year term, required registration. Furthermore, the respondent failed to establish part performance through possession, a prerequisite under Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. The Court ruled that the subsequent lessee, being in possession, was a necessary party because their rights as a potential transferee for consideration without notice could be affected. Consequently, the suit was improperly constituted in their absence. The Court allowed the appeal, restoring the trial court's dismissal of the suit, establishing that a suit for specific performance of a lease cannot proceed without impleading a subsequent lessee in possession, especially when the contract lacks the certainty required for enforcement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise deed regarding a lease for a period of ten years require registration under the Registration Act 1908?
  • Is a subsequent lessee in possession a necessary party to a suit for specific performance of a prior lease contract?
  • Can a suit for specific performance of a lease be maintained under Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act 1877 without the plaintiff having taken possession of the property?
  • Does a contract to lease a shop that is not yet constructed and lacks fixed rent terms constitute a valid, enforceable agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI vs GHULAM HUSSAIN BROHI AND Other1970 PLD Karachi 51 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-10Read full judgment →
• SERAJUL HAQUE Alias SARAJAL HOQUE MIAH vs HURERNESSA CHOWDHURANI1970 PLD Dacca 379 · Dacca · 1968-04-24Read full judgment →
• Seed M. SULEMAN vs A. Y. MALIK, GENERAL MANAGER, EMCO FACTORY LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 165 · Industrial Court · 1969-11-01Read full judgment →
• SATTAR K14AN AND Another vs THE STATE1970 PLD Peshawar 185 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-04-23
  murderretracted confessiondying declarationcommon intentionsudden fightcorroborationbenefit of doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction and death sentences of two appellants, Sattar Khan and Habibullah, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Bhangi Khan. The prosecution relied on ocular evidence of two uncles of the deceased, a written dying declaration, and the retracted judicial confessions of both appellants. The High Court analyzed the credibility of the ocular witnesses, noting their close relationship to the deceased and their absence from the dying declaration. The Court also found the dying declaration suspicious due to omissions and inconsistencies. Regarding the confessions, the Court held that Sattar Khan's statement was exculpatory and did not amount to a confession, and that common intention was not established in what appeared to be a sudden fight. However, Habibullah's retracted confession was found to be voluntary and corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained dagger. Consequently, the Court acquitted Sattar Khan by giving him the benefit of doubt, but dismissed Habibullah's appeal, confirming his conviction and death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exculpatory statement that denies active participation in the main criminal act amount to a confession under the law?
  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration under the rule of prudence?
  • Whether common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be inferred in a sudden fight?
  • Is the mere youth of an accused a sufficient mitigating circumstance to avoid the death penalty in a brutal murder case?
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• SASANKA LAL BANIK vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN REPRESENTED BY THE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHITTAGONG AND 4 Other1970 PLD Dacca 433 · Dacca · 1968-10-31Read full judgment →
• SARJEET AND Another vs The STATE1970 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-05
  criminal petitionmurderculpable homicideappreciation of evidencedying declarationcorroborative evidenceleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal petition arises from the conviction of the petitioners, Sarjeet and Khurshid, for murder and causing simple injuries under sections 304 and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh, which was upheld on appeal by the High Court. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the timing of the incident, the reliability of eye-witnesses, the delay in recording the dying declaration, and the failure of the prosecution to produce the blood-stained shirt of the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, establishing the occurrence and guilt of the petitioners beyond doubt, and that minor omissions like the non-production of the deceased's shirt are not fatal to the prosecution case. The key principle laid down is that contentions challenging purely the appreciation of evidence by lower courts do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court unless a misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to produce the blood-stained shirt of the deceased is fatal to the case?
  • Does an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on the appreciation of evidence by lower courts?
  • Whether discrepancies regarding the timing of police involvement invalidate eyewitness testimony in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• SARGODHA BHERA BUS SERVICE, SARGODHA vs THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT1970 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  route permitstransport authoritystatutory dutypublic needwrit petitionmotor vehicles
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to issue a writ quashing a decision of the Regional Transport Authority (R. T. A.), Lahore, to issue additional route permits on the Sargodha-Bhera route. The core legal question was whether the absence of rules prescribed by the Provincial Government under Section 50 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, rendered the route survey conducted by the Secretary of the R. T. A. and the subsequent issuance of permits void in law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused the writ, ruling that the statutory duty of the R. T. A. to assess public need and issue permits cannot be stultified or delayed merely because the Provincial Government has not prescribed a particular mode for conducting the survey, especially when the public need—demonstrated by extensive overloading and passenger inconvenience—is manifest and urgent. The key principle laid down is that procedural omissions or the absence of prescribed rules by the government cannot frustrate the performance of a substantive statutory duty required to meet an urgent public necessity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of rules prescribed by the Provincial Government render a route survey and permit issuance void under Section 50 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965?
  • Can the performance of a substantive statutory duty by a Regional Transport Authority be delayed or avoided due to the lack of a prescribed mode for conducting a survey?
  • Is a route survey mandatory for determining the existence and extent of a public need for additional transport facilities?
  Read full judgment →
• SARFARAZ vs The STATE1970 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-15
  murderdeath sentenceabsence of motivemitigating circumstancecriminal appealcapital punishment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Sarfaraz against the confirmation of his death sentence for the murder of Taj Muhammad by the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench. The core legal question concerns whether the absence or non-provement of a motive for a murder serves as a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to transportation for life. The Supreme Court held that even if a murder is committed without a proven motive, it does not acquire any virtue to merit leniency in sentencing, particularly in cases of wanton and heartless murders. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence. The key principle laid down is that the absence of a proven motive is not a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence in a proven case of murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a proven motive is a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence?
  • Does a motiveless murder merit leniency in the sentence?
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• SARDARA AND Others vs GHULAM RASUL AND Another1970 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-26
  bail cancellationunlawful assemblymurderabetmentcriminal liabilitydiscretionary power
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court cancelling the bail previously granted to twelve petitioners by a Sessions Court. The petitioners were charged with murder and attempted murder as members of an unlawful assembly. The High Court had cancelled the bail, finding the Sessions Court's reasoning flawed, particularly regarding its reliance on police reports and the nature of injuries sustained. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners did not press the plea regarding the six individuals alleged to have carried firearms. However, they contested the cancellation for the five individuals alleged to have carried lathis and one individual, Noora, accused of abetment. The Supreme Court held that the allegation against Noora constituted a substantial part of the prosecution case. Regarding the lathi-wielders, the Court determined that their presence could not be deemed superfluous without a full evidentiary trial, as they might have been intended to ensure the success of the enterprise. Consequently, the Court found the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail to be correct and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be cancelled if the initial order granting bail relied on invalid reasoning?
  • Is the presence of members of an unlawful assembly considered superfluous if they did not personally cause injury?
  • Does an allegation of abetment constitute a substantial ground for denying bail in a murder case?
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• SARDARA AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-10-21
  murdercapital offenceeye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealdelay in FIRmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants stood convicted under section 148, and sections 302 and 325 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad alias Killi and related offences. The incident occurred in broad daylight near Malakwal when the victim was attacked and his head severed by the assailants. The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of a Magistrate (Mr. Lodhi) regarding the timeline and condition of an injured eye-witness (Yusuf) at the crime scene created a fatal discrepancy, thereby undermining the prosecution's case and the presence of other eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence, held that the Magistrate's estimated time intervals were unreliable and did not contradict the prompt lodging of the First Information Report, and affirmed that the prosecution witnesses' presence and accounts were credible. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inconsistencies in a Magistrate's estimate of time at the crime scene are sufficient to discredit prompt eye-witness accounts?
  • Can the presence of eye-witnesses be doubted merely because they did not approach a Magistrate who visited the crime scene without conducting inquiries?
  • Does the separation of an escort from the deceased at a short distance by itself render the presence of eye-witnesses incredible?
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• SARDAR vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 773 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-14Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MUHAMMAD KHAN ALVI AND Another vs BASHIR AHMAD AND 7 Other1970 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  land allotmentinheritance mutationfraudulent misrepresentationrehabilitation authoritiesremand orderspecial leave to appealsettlement of claims
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of 305 kanals and 17 marlas of land in Chak No. 127/G.B., Tehsil Jaranwala. The respondents, heirs of Niaz Din, secured land allotments based on an inheritance mutation sanctioned in 1953, claiming Niaz Din was deceased. The petitioners challenged these allotments, alleging fraud, as Niaz Din was alive at the time. Rehabilitation authorities initially cancelled the respondents' allotments, finding the inheritance mutation was procured through false representation. The High Court, in a Letters Patent Appeal, initially upheld this cancellation. However, upon a review application filed by the respondents, a Division Bench of the High Court considered fresh documentary evidence suggesting the mutation resulted from departmental sympathy regarding Niaz Din's disappearance rather than fraud. Consequently, the High Court remanded the case to the settlement authorities to determine if the petitioners held preferential rights. The Supreme Court is now petitioned for special leave to appeal against this remand order. The core issue involves the validity of allotments obtained through inheritance mutations and the impact of alleged fraud on such property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court review a previous judgment based on fresh documentary evidence regarding the alleged fraudulent procurement of an inheritance mutation?
  • Does the discovery of new evidence justifying a mutation allow for the remand of a case to settlement authorities to determine preferential allotment rights?
  Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MUHAMMAD AND 4 Other vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, JHELUM CITY1970 PLD Lahore 99 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-02Read full judgment →
• SARDAR MUHAMMAD Alias KAKA vs The STATE1970 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  murder convictiongrave and sudden provocationcommutation of sentenceillicit liaisonleave to appealcriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his sister-in-law, Mst. Hussain Bibi. Although initially sentenced to death by the trial court, the High Court of West Pakistan commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The petitioner admitted to the killing but raised the defense of grave and sudden provocation, alleging he found the deceased in a compromising position with his younger brother. The evidence established that the petitioner had an illicit relationship with the deceased, who subsequently engaged in a liaison with his younger brother. The Supreme Court observed that the murder was committed in cold blood and that the High Court had already exercised leniency by awarding the lesser penalty based on the petitioner's provocation arising from the deceased's infidelity. Finding no merit in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the conviction and the commuted sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery of a deceased's infidelity with a family member constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to mitigate a murder sentence?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained where the accused admits to the killing but claims provocation?
  • Is the appellate court justified in commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment based on the circumstances of the provocation?
  Read full judgment →
• SARDAR ALI vs Syed ASKAR ALI SHAH AND Other1970 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  Tribal AreaFrontier Crimes RegulationRight to hearingRevision petitionWrit jurisdictionStay of execution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, detained under the Frontier Crimes Regulation in a Tribal Area, challenged the dismissal of his revision petition by the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, which was decided without a hearing. After the High Court dismissed his writ petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over Tribal Areas, the petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal question as whether the Commissioner was obligated to provide the petitioner a hearing before adjudicating the revision petition. The Court emphasized the substantial importance of the matter, noting that fundamental rights to liberty and property were at stake, particularly given the potential lack of procedural precision in the underlying Jirga and Political Agent proceedings. Regarding a separate application for a stay of execution of a decree originating from the Tribal Area, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with such decrees. The Court affirmed that while it may review procedural fairness in administrative orders, it cannot intervene in the execution of decrees issued within Tribal Areas.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Commissioner required to grant a hearing to a petitioner before deciding a revision petition under the Frontier Crimes Regulation?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a decree passed in a Tribal Area?
  • Can a court grant a stay of execution for a decree issued within a Tribal Area?
  Read full judgment →
• SARBLAND KHAN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-26
  leave to appealdeath sentencedying declarationeyewitness testimonydelay in executioncriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court confirming his death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Mirabat. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitnesses, the reliance on a dying declaration, the contention regarding the language spoken by the witnesses and the necessity of an interpreter, and whether prolonged delay in the execution of the sentence warrants commutation by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitnesses were credible, their presence was corroborated by the dying declaration recorded by the village dispenser, and the objection regarding language was unfounded based on the trial record. While dismissing the petition for leave to appeal and affirming the legal sentence, the Court observed that the Government may consider reducing the sentence on the ground of delay in the disposal of the case. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court generally does not interfere with a legal death sentence based on delay alone, leaving commutation on such grounds to the executive authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a legal death sentence on the sole ground of delay in the disposal of the case?
  • Is a dying declaration recorded by a village dispenser admissible and reliable to corroborate eyewitness testimony?
  • Whether the absence of an interpreter during the recording of statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial when witnesses are cross-examined on their language proficiency?
  Read full judgment →
• SARANG vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 338 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-17Read full judgment →
• SAMAD ALI vs EJAMUDDIN1970 PCr.LJ 9 · Dacca · 1968-07-08Read full judgment →