Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• DAFFADAR BHAGAT SINGH & SONS vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, FEROZEPORE1971 PTD 870 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-22Read full judgment →
• CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, MYSORE vs S. ASWATHANARAYANA SETTY AND ANOTHER1971 PTD 482 · Mysore High Court · 1966-09-29Read full judgment →
• CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, MADRAS vs C. R. RAMACHANDRA GOUNDER1971 PTD 953 · Madras High Court · 1968-11-25Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER. OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL I vs NATIONAL AND GRINDLAYS BANK LTD1971 PTD 659 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-02-28Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER, KHAIRPUR DIVISION, KHAIRPUR AND ANOTHER vs ALI SHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-02
  appellate jurisdictioninterim stayimplied powersancillary powersControl of Goondassuspension of orderwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The State appealed by special leave from a High Court judgment concerning the scope of appellate powers under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959. The District Tribunal, Sukkur, restricted the movements of an individual under sections 13 and 14 of the Ordinance for one year. The individual appealed under section 18 to the Commissioner, Khairpur Division, and sought an interim stay of the Tribunal's order. The Commissioner declined to entertain the stay application on the ground that the Ordinance lacked an express provision empowering him to grant interim relief. The High Court allowed a writ petition against that refusal, holding that the power to grant interim relief is implied. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal. It ruled that where a statute confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants all ancillary powers necessary to render that jurisdiction effective. Consequently, the Commissioner has the implied power under section 18 to suspend the operation of an impugned order pending appeal to prevent the appeal from being rendered infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate authority under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 possess the implied power to suspend the operation of an impugned order pending appeal in the absence of an express statutory provision?
  • Is the power to grant interim relief or stay considered ancillary to the statutory appellate power to discharge or modify an order upon final adjudication?
  • Does a Commissioner's refusal to consider an application for interim suspension of an order on the ground of lack of express statutory power amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL-I vs RAJENDRA SINGH SINGHI1971 PTD 885 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-06-17Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT-II vs KESHAV MILLS Co. LTD.1971 PTD 1103 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-09-09Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, BOMBAY CITY II vs PURSHOTTAM N. AMERSEY1971 PTD 389 · Bombay High Court · 1968-03-16Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL-III vs KALLU BABU LALCHAND1971 PTD 935 · Calcutta High Court · 1969-02-12Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL vs NAWN ESTATES (PRIVATE)1971 PTD 55 · Calcutta High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL vs BENGAL ASSAM INVESTORS1971 PTD 1042 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-05-31Read full judgment →
• DAD Alias ALLAH DAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-12-07
  murder convictioncircumstantial evidencemedical evidenceacquittal appealexpert witness credibilitygunshot woundcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, recorded by the High Court of West Pakistan following an appeal by the State under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an initial acquittal. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court correctly reversed the acquittal based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence, despite conflicting medical testimony provided by doctors at the trial stage. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, finding that the medical evidence, which suggested an incised wound rather than a gunshot, was demonstrably disingenuous and suspicious. The Court emphasized that the substantial body of circumstantial evidence—including motive, eyewitness accounts of the accused holding the weapon, and X-ray evidence confirming a bullet fragment—was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that where medical testimony is clearly flawed or misleading, it cannot override a consistent and compelling chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to the accused's culpability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on circumstantial evidence to convict an accused when medical testimony is found to be disingenuous or unreliable?
  • Does the presence of a weak firing pin in a weapon necessarily negate the conclusion that the weapon caused the fatal injury?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to reverse an acquittal based on a re-evaluation of the evidence presented at trial?
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• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL vs ALUMINIUM CORPORATION1971 PTD 751 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-02-12Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL II vs Smt. ANUSUYA DEVI1971 PTD 101 · Supreme Court of India · 1967-11-28Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL II vs SATISH CHURN LAW1971 PTD 457 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-05-03Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL II vs A. N. CHOWDHURY1971 PTD 711 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-06-03Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL I vs CHOWRINGHEE SALES1971 PTD 318 · Calcutta High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P. vs JAGANNATH MAHADEO PRASAD1971 PTD 545 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-02Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MYSORE vs LIQUIDATORS, HUBLI ELECTRICITY1971 PTD 949 · Mysore High Court · 1968-10-23Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs SUNDARAM INDUSTRIES1971 PTD 759 · Madras High Court · 1968-07-12Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs SUNDARAM (PRIVATE) LTD.1971 PTD 456 · Madras High Court · 1968-06-20Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs S. MEYYAPPAN1971 PTD 615 · Madras High Court · 1971-11-25Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs S. DEVARAJ1971 PTD 597 · Madras High Court · 1968-09-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs RAMAN & RAMAN LTD.1971 PTD 723 · Madras High Court · 1971-02-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs K. RATHNAM NADAR1971 PTD 982 · Madras High Court · 1968-09-27Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs ASHOK LEYLAND LTD.1971 PTD 674 · Madras High Court · 1968-02-08Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, M. P. vs DR. FIDA HUSSAIN G. ABBASI1971 PTD 562 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1967-12-07Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, M. P. vs BADRILAL BHOLARAM1971 PTD 73 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-03-08Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA vs TRAVANCORE SUGARS AND CHEMICALS LTD1971 PTD 764 · Kerala High Court · 1968-04-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI EAST, KARACHI vs MESSRS1971 PTD 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-23
  additional depreciationincome taxprivate limited companyregistered firmreference to high court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan refusing to direct the Income-tax Tribunal to refer a question of law under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act. The core legal question was whether a private limited company, formed by the incorporation of a previously registered firm, is entitled to additional depreciation allowance on machinery originally purchased and used by the firm when no actual change in the underlying enterprise or re-installation of machinery occurred. The Supreme Court held that where partners of a firm reorganize their business as a limited company and transfer the existing assets and machinery into the company's share capital without new installation, the enterprise remains identical and the depreciation allowance attaches to the machinery rather than the distinct legal personality of the owners. The Court affirmed that the respondent-company was rightly entitled to the depreciation allowance, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private limited company taking over machinery from a predecessor registered firm is entitled to additional depreciation allowance on such machinery?
  • Whether the transformation of a registered firm into a private limited company constitutes a change of ownership or new installation of machinery for depreciation purposes?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to direct the Income-tax Tribunal to refer the question of law under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act?
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• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CITY I, BOMBAY vs KORES (INDIA) (PRIVATE)1971 PTD 221 · Bombay High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA vs KEJRIWAL TRADERS1971 PTD 1006 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-03-07Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA vs BOARD OF MUTWALLIS TO THE WAKF ESTATE, EBRAHIM SOLAIMAN SALEJI1971 PTD 163 · Calcutta High Court · 1967-06-19Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY vs RAMNARAIN KAPUR & Co. (PVT.)1971 PTD 125 · Bombay High Court · 1968-02-29Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY vs BALVANTRAI S. JAIN1971 PTD 567 · Bombay High Court · 1971-11-22Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, ASSAM vs KEDARMALL KESHARDEO1971 PTD 942 · Assam High Court · 1971-02-20Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, A. P. vs UNITED CONSTRUCTIONS, RAJAHMUNDRY1971 PTD 277 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1967-06-16Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, 'BIHAR AND ORISSA vs ATMA RAM MODI1971 PTD 407 · Patna High Court · 1968-05-10Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX vs PRAFULLA KUMAR MALLICK1971 PTD 804 · Orissa High Court · 1969-01-23Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX vs MESSRS BEACH LUXURY HOTEL1971 PLD Karachi 481 · Sindh High Court · 1970-12-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX vs CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS Co. LTD.1971 PTD 245 · Calcutta High Court · 1967-07-14Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (CENTRAL), CALCUTTA vs BIRLA BROS.1971 PTD 496 · Calcutta High Court · 1966-01-07Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (CENTRAL), CALCUTTA vs ASSOCIATED1971 PTD 643 · Calcutta High Court · 1969-02-03Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-Applicant vs MESSRS BEACH LUXURY HOTEL1971 PTD 348 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARACHI EAST, KARACHI vs MESSRS AMSONS1971 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-23
  Income taxDepreciation allowanceCorporate incorporationRegistered firmBusiness re-adjustmentTax assessment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which refused to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding depreciation allowances. The core legal question was whether a private limited company, formed by the incorporation of a previously registered firm, is entitled to claim additional depreciation on machinery originally purchased and used by the firm, or whether such machinery should be treated as second-hand upon transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the lower authorities' decisions, affirming the principle that where a firm incorporates into a private limited company, the enterprise remains effectively the same, with identical ownership and assets. The Court held that such a transition constitutes a mere re-adjustment of business structure rather than a change in ownership or a new installation of machinery. Consequently, the depreciation allowance attaches to the machinery itself rather than the legal entity owning it, and the respondent-company was entitled to the claimed depreciation. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a private limited company formed from a registered firm entitled to claim additional depreciation on machinery previously used by the firm?
  • Does the incorporation of a firm into a private limited company constitute a change of ownership for the purpose of depreciation allowances on machinery?
  • Does the depreciation allowance for machinery attach to the legal person owning the asset or to the machinery itself?
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• COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, MADRAS vs L. K. G. (PRIVATE)1971 PTD 746 · Madras High Court · 1967-12-20Read full judgment →
• COLONY WOOLLEN MILLS vs ESMAIL ABDUL SATTAR & Brother1971 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20
  civil suitrefund of moneydamagescontractual samplereappreciation of evidenceforward contractmarket price
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises out of a civil suit for the refund of money deposited as the price of blankets and for the recovery of damages due to the petitioner's failure to supply goods in accordance with the contractual sample. The suit was decreed by the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which found that Exhibit 69 was the correct sample and held that the goods did not agree with it. The petitioner challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arguing that the High Court ignored material facts and seeking a reappreciation of evidence, while also disputing the basis for the assessment of damages. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's finding on the sample was based on cogent evidence and that the Supreme Court will not undertake its own appreciation of evidence. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that where a particular criterion, such as a forward contract, is available for assessing damages, it should form the basis rather than the market price.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court undertake a reappreciation of evidence to determine a question of fact already decided by the High Court?
  • What should form the basis for the calculation of damages when a particular criterion is available?
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• COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE1971 PLD Lahore 376 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-13Read full judgment →
• COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE1971 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-17
  writ jurisdictionexhaustion of remediescentral excisecapacity dutyleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute regarding the deduction of duty on exported cotton fabrics from monthly capacity duty installments. The core legal question is whether a petitioner can invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court without first exhausting statutory remedies of appeal and revision provided under the relevant tax statute. The Court held that the petitioner was precluded from approaching the High Court in writ jurisdiction because he failed to avail of the statutory remedies of appeal to the Central Board of Revenue and revision to the Central Government. The key principle laid down is that extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be utilized to bypass statutory remedies and hierarchical forums established by law for the redressal of grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can approach the High Court in writ jurisdiction without exhausting statutory remedies of appeal and revision?
  • Does failure to file an appeal under section 35 of the Central Excises Act 1944 preclude a party from invoking writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to deduct duty on cotton fabrics exported from monthly capacity duty installments without first seeking redress before the Central Board of Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• COLLECTOR, SAHIWAL AND 2 Others vs MOHAMMAD AKHTAR1971 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-13
  civil servantdismissal from serviceshow-cause noticenatural justiceaudi alteram partemvoid ab initioconstitutional requirement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a High Court judgment setting aside the dismissal of a Revenue Patwari by the Deputy Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to show cause, as mandated by the Constitution, could be cured by subsequent hearings at the appellate or revisional stages. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order was void ab initio because the Deputy Commissioner decided the matter before the expiry of the notice period and without granting the respondent a hearing, despite his legitimate absence due to civil defense duties and illness. The Court affirmed that where a statute or the Constitution prescribes a mandatory procedure for notice and hearing, non-compliance renders the resulting order void. Consequently, such a fundamental defect cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings before higher authorities. The principle laid down is that when a notice is a mandatory condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction, failure to comply makes the entire proceedings illegal and incurable by later hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a failure to provide a mandatory show-cause notice be cured by subsequent appellate or revisional hearings?
  • Is an order passed in violation of a constitutional requirement to provide a reasonable opportunity of showing cause void ab initio?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply when a statute or the Constitution mandates a specific procedure for dismissal?
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• COLLECTOR OF KARACHI vs CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, KARACHI AND 14 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 560 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-16Read full judgment →
• CHUHAR KHAN vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 328 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-04Read full judgment →
• CHITTARANJAN COTTON NULLS LTD. vs STAFF UNION1971 PLC 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-26
  Labour Court constitutioncoram non judicejurisdiction at appellate stageindustrial disputerepeal and savingsnullity of proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan affirming an award given by the Second Labour Court, Dacca, under the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965, regarding a labor dispute over the dismissal and reversion of employees. The core legal question concerned whether the Labour Court was properly constituted under the 1965 Act, whether the failure to raise this jurisdictional defect before the Labour Court was fatal, and whether the proceedings were coram non judice. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court was not properly constituted since its members were not selected in accordance with the mandatory panel provisions of the 1965 Act, rendering the entire proceedings coram non judice and void, and that a pure question of jurisdiction going to the root of the matter can be raised at the appellate stage. The key principle laid down is that where a tribunal is ab initio not properly constituted under the governing statute, its proceedings are a nullity in the eye of the law and cannot be saved by repeal and savings clauses or general absence provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question relating purely to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
  • Whether proceedings conducted by a tribunal not properly constituted under the governing statute are coram non judice and void?
  • Do the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 regarding the constitution of Labour Courts stand inconsistent with the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965?
  • Does the saving clause in section 44 of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 validate a tribunal partially reconstituted under the new Act without adherence to mandatory panel selection provisions?
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• CHITTARANJAN COTTON MILLS LTD. vs STAFF UNION1971 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-26
  labor disputejurisdictioncoram non judicenullityLabour Court constitutionstatutory interpretationinconsistency
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan affirming an award given by the Second Labour Court, Dacca, under the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965. The underlying dispute involved the dismissal of one employee and reversion of another following a shortage of goods. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court was properly constituted under the 1965 Act, or if the proceedings were coram non judice and null and void due to failure to select members from notified panels. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the repealed Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 and the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 regarding the constitution of Labour Courts are fundamentally inconsistent, and that a failure to constitute the tribunal in accordance with the mandatory statutory mechanism renders its proceedings coram non judice and void. The Court laid down that a jurisdictional defect rendering proceedings a nullity can be raised at the appellate stage, and that statutory savings clauses only validate actions consistent with the new enactment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question relating purely to the jurisdiction of a court, rendering proceedings a nullity, be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
  • Whether the provisions governing the constitution of a Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 and the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 are inconsistent?
  • Does the saving clause under section 44 of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 validate a tribunal constituted under the repealed Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959?
  • What is the legal effect of an adjudication made by a Labour Court that was not properly constituted in accordance with the mandatory requirements of the governing statute?
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• CHINTA HARAN BARUA AND Another vs AHMAD KABIR CHOWDHURY AND 21971 P Cr. L J 358 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-03-17Read full judgment →
• CHHOTEY LAL vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANOTHER1971 PTD 121 · Allahabad High Court · 1967-03-24Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry NOOR MUHAMMAD vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 367 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-18Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry MUHAMMAD KHAN vs SANAULLAH AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-15
  bail cancellationjudicial proprietysuccessive bail applicationsdelay in trialplea of alibifurther inquiry
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a challenge to an order of the High Court granting bail to the respondent, who was accused of murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent's first bail application had been rejected by a Single Judge of the High Court. Subsequently, a second Single Judge granted interim and then confirmed bail on the grounds of prosecution delay and a plea of alibi, invoking Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the record and found that the delay was primarily caused by the dilatory tactics of the defence, rather than the prosecution. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 497(2) was inapplicable once the final report under Section 173 had been submitted and witness statements recorded. The Court also emphasized that judicial propriety and established practice required the second bail application to be referred to the same Judge who had previously refused bail, to avoid contradictory orders. The appeal was allowed, and the bail was cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second bail application in the same case should be heard by the same Judge of the High Court who rejected the first application?
  • Can Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked for further inquiry after the final report under Section 173 has been submitted and witness statements recorded?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on the ground of delay if the delay is primarily attributable to the dilatory tactics of the defence?
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• CHAUDHRY BROTHERS LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FOOD & AGRICULTURE, ISLAMABAD1971 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-27
  transfer of proceedingsjurisdiction of High Courtforum selectionLetters Patent Appealadministrative seat relocation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an application filed under Clause 9 of the President's Order 8 of 1970, seeking the transfer of a Letters Patent Appeal from the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi, to the High Court, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the relocation of the respondent-Government's seat from Karachi to Rawalpindi/Islamabad necessitated a transfer of pending litigation to a different High Court jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the change in the capital's location does not alter the jurisdiction of the court where the litigation was originally instituted. The Court emphasized that a petitioner must adhere to the forum they originally selected for their action. The ratio establishes that the shifting of a government seat does not provide a valid legal ground for transferring pending judicial proceedings between High Courts, as the forum of the original action remains the appropriate venue for the disposal of appeals arising from that court's judgments. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the continuity of jurisdiction in the Karachi High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relocation of a government seat from one city to another affect the jurisdiction of a High Court over pending litigation?
  • Can a petitioner transfer a pending Letters Patent Appeal to a different High Court solely due to the shifting of the respondent's administrative headquarters?
  • Is a party bound to the forum originally selected for their legal action despite subsequent administrative changes?
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• DIL vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 292 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-23Read full judgment →
• CHATURBAI vs MUHAMMAD AYUB AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-05-24
  evacuee propertyco-operative housing societyregistered deedfraud vitiates transactionswrit jurisdictiontransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute regarding the ownership of a bungalow in Hyderabad, claimed by the appellant as non-evacuee property acquired from a co-operative housing society before Partition, and by the respondent under the evacuee laws and transfer by settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether the appellant had acquired valid title to the property and whether the High Court rightly set aside the declarations of the Custodian authorities in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the appellant acquired no title to the property as no registered deed was executed by the Society transferring the property or its site valued at over Rs. 100, rendering entries in the society's register ineffective under the Registration Act. Furthermore, orders obtained by fraud or suffering from a patent error of law are open to judicial review. The appeal was dismissed with costs, upholding the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can title to immovable property valued at over Rs. 100 pass through an entry in a society register without a registered deed?
  • Whether orders of Custodian authorities obtained through suppression of material facts and fraud are open to review under constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does non-registration of a document required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act affect immovable property comprised therein?
  Read full judgment →
• CHARSADDA SUGAR MILLS LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS1971 PLD Peshawar 210 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-05
  writ petitionexcise dutyproduction capacitynatural justiceaudi alteram partemretrospective legislationdelegated legislationsugar mills
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 was filed by Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd. challenging the validity of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1966 and the assessment of its production capacity under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944. The petitioner contended that the rules were framed before the enabling statutory provision came into force, that the assessment was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) as no hearing was granted, and that the calculation of working days and rebates was flawed. The Peshawar High Court held that the rules were framed on 11-6-1966, whereas the enabling Section 3(4) of the Act, introduced via the Finance Act 1966, only became effective on 12-6-1966 under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931. Consequently, the rules were framed without lawful authority. The Court also ruled that assessing authorities must act judicially and provide an opportunity of hearing, and that undisclosed principles of universal application cannot be used to condemn a party. The petition was accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Can statutory rules be validly framed under an enabling provision before that provision has legally come into force?
  • Is an administrative or assessing authority bound by the principles of natural justice, specifically the right of hearing, when determining tax liabilities that affect property rights?
  • Can a Review Board decide a matter based on 'principles of universal application' that are not disclosed to the affected party?
  • How should the 'liquidation period' and 'working days' of a factory be calculated for the purpose of tax abatement and rebate in the absence of explicit statutory definitions?
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• CHAN MUHAMMAD Alias CHANNA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 506 · Sindh High Court · 1969-04-30Read full judgment →
• CHAKAR AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1121 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD DIN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 217 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-16
  evacuee trust propertylimitation periodcondonation of delayexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusstatutory interpretationdisplaced persons appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal under subsection (4) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, against an order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner holding that the disputed property was not an evacuee trust property. The core legal question was whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied to appeals filed under subsection (4) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, so as to allow condonation of delay. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal in limine as time-barred, holding that section 5 of the Limitation Act is specifically applicable only to appeals under section 19 of the 1958 Act and not to appeals under section 4(4). Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court determined that the express mention of sections 5 and 12 in relation to section 19 appeals excludes their application to other provisions where they were not explicitly extended by the Legislature.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to appeals filed under subsection (4) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal under section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, can be extended by invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the express mention of sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, in section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, exclude their application to other proceedings under the same Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. SHALJICAT ALI vs COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA DIVISION, SARGODHA AND 14 OTHERS1971 PLC 271 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-17Read full judgment →
• Ch. SHAHAB UD DIN AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 79 · Sindh High Court · 1963-02-21Read full judgment →
• Ch. SHAFQATULLAH vs DELIMITATION COMMISSION, PAKISTAN THROUGH ITS1971 PLD Lahore 533 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-13Read full judgment →
• Ch. SALAHUDDIN AND 98 Others vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 31971 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-25
  writ petitionpay scale revisionconstitutional jurisdictionservice matterpress communique
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition filed by S.A.S. Accountants of the Audit Department seeking refixation of their pay under a Government Press Communique dated 29th November 1962. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to invoke constitutional writ jurisdiction regarding the applicability of a government press communique concerning pay scales. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' remuneration was not affected and that the applicability of the press communique was not a matter guaranteed in the Constitution. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioners could not seek redress by having recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee seek constitutional redress under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution regarding the applicability of a government press communique on pay scales?
  • Whether the application of a press communique concerning pay scale revision is guaranteed by the Constitution.
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. NAZIR AHMAD vs Agha AHMAD RAZA KHAN AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-10
  service disputearbitrationtouching the business of a societyco-operative societiesjurisdictionwrit petitionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the High Court of West Pakistan's dismissal in limine of a constitutional writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The petitioner, a bank employee, had sought arbitration regarding service disputes (including confirmation, promotion, pay scale reduction, and leave status). The Assistant Registrar had rendered an award in the petitioner's favor, but the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Co-operation Department, set aside the award for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that service disputes between an employee and a co-operative society do not constitute disputes 'touching the business of a society' within the statutory scope of arbitration provisions. Consequently, neither the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 nor the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 empowered the Assistant Registrar to entertain arbitration proceedings over internal service matters. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Do internal service disputes between an employee and a co-operative bank constitute disputes touching the business of a society under the Co-operative Societies Act?
  • Can service matters such as promotion, pay scale reduction, and leave status be legally referred to arbitration under Section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act 1925?
  • Does an Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies have jurisdiction to entertain arbitration proceedings over service grievances of a bank employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. NASEER-UD-DIN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH CHIEF1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 45 · Baghdad-ul-JadidRead full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD YAQUB SINDHU, DIRECTOR, CO-OPERATIVE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND OTHRRS. vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF WESPAKISTAN,1971 P LC 31 [C.S.T] · Service Tribunal · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD SALEEM., Mian MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND OTHERS., Ch. MUHAMMAD SALEEM1971 PLD Supreme Court 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-25
  arbitration awardmediationpart performancespecific performanceadmissibility of documentsstamp dutysuit for possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from a suit for possession of land. The core legal question was whether a document (Exh. D/1), drafted by a mediator, constituted an arbitration award or a mere agreement to sell, and whether it could be relied upon as a defence. The Court held that the document was not an arbitration award because the proceedings lacked the essential characteristics of a judicial inquiry; rather, it was a memorandum of an agreement to sell. The Court ruled that the defendant could rely on this agreement as a defence under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, as the plaintiff had signed the document and the defendants had performed part of their obligations. The key principle laid down is that the true legal character of a document must be determined by the substance of the parties' intentions and actions rather than by the terminology used. Furthermore, an unfiled award or agreement, if performed, can be set up as a defence to a suit for possession, and a party seeking the protection of Section 53-A must perform their contractual obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a document drafted by a mediator constitutes an arbitration award or a mere agreement to sell?
  • Can an unfiled arbitration award or agreement be set up as a defence in a suit for possession if it has been performed?
  • Does Section 36 of the Stamp Act 1899 bar a court from questioning the admissibility of a document on the ground of insufficient stamp duty once it has been admitted into evidence?
  • Can a defendant rely on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 to resist a claim for possession without having a formal deed of conveyance?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD NAZIR vs ATA-UL-HAQ AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 180 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-02Read full judgment →
• Ch. INAYAT ULLAH AND 180 OTHERS vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 482 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-05Read full judgment →
• Ch. GHULAM HAIDER. vs THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB1971 PLC 208 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-14Read full judgment →
• Ch. ALTAF HUSSAIN vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB1971 PLC 199 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-29Read full judgment →
• Ch. ALTAF AHMED vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE (EXCISE AND1971 PLC 12 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-13Read full judgment →
• Ch. AHMAD DIN AND 2 Others vs THE AUSTRALASIA BANK LTD., BHALWAL1971 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28
  amendment of plaintcivil revisioncase decidedrecovery suithypothecation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The respondent-Bank filed a recovery suit against the petitioners based on a loan secured by hypothecated goods. Subsequently, the respondent-Bank filed an application to amend the plaint to explain the circumstances surrounding the hypothecation and the dealing of the goods, which the trial court allowed. The petitioners challenged this amendment through a civil revision, which the High Court dismissed. The petitioners then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the permissibility of amending the plaint and whether a revision petition was competent against such an interlocutory order. The Supreme Court held that the amendment did not alter the character of the suit and that the order allowing the amendment did not constitute a 'case decided' so as to make a revision application competent before the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, laying down the principle that interlocutory orders allowing amendments that do not change the suit's character are not amenable to civil revision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment of the plaint that explains the circumstances of hypothecated goods change the character of a recovery suit?
  • Is an order allowing the amendment of a plaint considered a 'case decided' for the purpose of filing a civil revision?
  Read full judgment →
• CENTRAL INDIA MACHINERY MANUFACTURING CO. LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, NAGPUR1971 PTD 861 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-10-10Read full judgment →
• CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE INCOME-- TAX OFFICER, DERA ISMAIL1971 PTD 747 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE INCOME TAR OFFICER, DERA ISMAIL1971 PLD Peshawar 153 · Peshawar High Court
  civil court jurisdictionincome-tax assessmentstatutory barterritorial jurisdictionexhaustion of remediesrevision application
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application challenged a civil court's order rejecting a preliminary objection regarding the court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit against an income-tax assessment. The respondent had filed a suit seeking a declaration that an assessment order by an Income-tax Officer was illegal, arguing the officer lacked territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, bars civil court jurisdiction when the Act itself provides a specific appellate machinery to resolve disputes, including those concerning the place of assessment. The Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction, as the Act provides a comprehensive mechanism for challenging assessments, including disputes over the place of assessment under Section 64(3). The principle laid down is that when a statute creates rights and liabilities and establishes a specific forum for their adjudication, parties must exhaust those statutory remedies rather than invoking the jurisdiction of civil courts, which is barred by Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Consequently, the revision was allowed, and the plaint was ordered to be returned.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, bar a civil suit challenging an income-tax assessment order?
  • Can a civil court adjudicate a dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer to assess a taxpayer?
  • Is a taxpayer required to exhaust the appellate machinery provided under the Income-tax Act, 1922, before seeking relief in a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• BRITISH-BORNEO PETROLEUM SYNDICATE LTD. vs CROPPER (INSPECTOR OF TAXES)1971 PTD 864 · Chancery DivisionRead full judgment →
• BHOMAR ALI MIA AND Others MD. NURUL HAQUE AND Others vs MOINUD DIN1971SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• BHAISAKUR GHARA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1047 · Dhaka High Court · 1971-01-14Read full judgment →
• Before S. A. Mahmood, Chairman, Bashir Ahmad Khan And Ashfaq Ali Khan, Members . SIKANDAR KHAN vs MEMBER (EXCISE AND TAXATION) BOARD1971 P LC 59 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-09-30Read full judgment →
• Before Maksum-Ul-Hakim And T. H. Khan, JJ. A. K. M. SHAMSUZZAMAN KHAN1971 PLC 89 · DaccaRead full judgment →
• BEERUDDIN vs ALLAH BAKHSH AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-05
  auction cancellationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIdefault in paymentwrit jurisdictioncompensation bookauction bid
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which upheld the cancellation of an auction for a commercial property. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted lawfully in cancelling the auction of a shop after the petitioner failed to meet the mandatory financial requirements under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The petitioner had provided a compensation book with a value insufficient to cover the required one-fourth of the bid amount and failed to deposit the balance despite the passage of time. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was justified because the petitioner failed to fulfill the essential condition of depositing one-fourth of the auction bid. The Court affirmed that where a bidder defaults on the initial payment obligation and fails to rectify the deficiency, the Settlement Authorities possess the authority to cancel the auction. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim regarding lack of notice, noting that the lower authorities had correctly established that notice regarding the intended cancellation had been duly issued to the defaulting party.

  Questions settled

  • Can an auction be cancelled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner if the successful bidder fails to deposit one-fourth of the auction bid?
  • Is the cancellation of an auction valid if the bidder fails to meet the financial requirements stipulated under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Does the failure to associate a co-bidder in a compensation book invalidate the sufficiency of the initial deposit for an auction bid?
  Read full judgment →
• BAZALAHMED vs Messers RAHMANIA ELECTRIC STORES, CHITTAGONG1971PLC27 · Labour Court · 1970-03-25Read full judgment →
• BATI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 753 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• BASHIR ALI vs THE STATE-Opponent1971 P Cr. L J 997 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-03Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMED MIRZA vs Book Not Found1971 PLC 111 [C. S. T.] · Service Tribunal · 1971-02-25Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-12
  contempt of courthabeas corpusdetenusappreciation of evidencebreach of undertaking
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan convicting the appellant of contempt of court and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for two months. The core legal question concerns whether the appellant committed contempt by failing to produce detenus as undertaken before the court and obstructing the recovery process initiated under a habeas corpus application. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, including the uncontroverted statements of the Bailiff and a Sub-Inspector of Police, establishing that the appellant detained the persons and deliberately breached his assurance to the court. The key principle laid down is that a deliberate false assurance given to court officials preventing the execution of a lawful court order, coupled with unrefuted testimony of official witnesses, constitutes valid grounds for a contempt conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncontradicted statements of a court bailiff and police officer are sufficient to establish contempt of court?
  • Does giving a false assurance to produce detenus and failing to do so amount to contempt of court?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's appreciation of evidence in a contempt matter where findings are supported by the record?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-25
  self-defenceprivate defenceculpable homicidemurderballistic expertcorroborationinjured witnessescriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellants, Bashir Ahmad and Noori, under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and attempted murder, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the plea of self-defence raised by the appellants was reasonably possible and sustainable based on the evidence, and whether the appellants exceeded any right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the plea of self-defence was rightly rejected by the lower courts, as the site plans, medical evidence showing close-range gunshots with burnt and black margins, and the absence of injuries on the appellants rendered the defence version improbable. However, considering the totality of circumstances and corroborative ballistic evidence, the Court altered the conviction under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code, while maintaining the sentence of transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that a plea of self-defence must be evaluated by juxtaposing prosecution and defence allegations against proved facts and circumstances, and close-range firing without injuries to the accused negates such a plea.

  Questions settled

  • How is a plea of self-defence to be evaluated by a court against the background of proved facts and circumstances?
  • Does medical evidence showing close-range firearm injuries with burnt and black margins negative a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether the absence of injuries on the accused persons affects the sustainability of a plea of self-defence?
  • When does an offence of murder convert to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• BARKAT ALI AND Others vs Mst. FAZAL BIBI AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-24
  mutationfraudnext friendunsound mindconcurrent findings of factprocedural irregularitycivil appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a civil suit challenging a land mutation on grounds of fraud, collusion with revenue staff, and lack of consideration. The respondents alleged that the mutation was fictitious and that one respondent, being deaf and dumb, could not have consented to the sale. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal in limine. The core legal questions were whether the appeal before the Additional District Judge was incompetent due to the failure to appoint a next friend for a deaf and dumb respondent, and whether the respondents were precluded from relief because the specific type of fraud proved at trial differed from that pleaded. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was competent, as deafness and dumbness do not equate to unsoundness of mind under the law, and the fraud proved was consistent with the allegations. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the mutation and dismissed the petition, establishing that procedural irregularities causing no prejudice do not invalidate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a party is deaf and dumb necessitate the appointment of a next friend under Order XXXII Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party succeed in a claim of fraud if the specific evidence presented at trial varies slightly from the initial pleadings?
  • Does a procedural irregularity that causes no prejudice to the opposing party invalidate an appellate proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• BANK OF INDIA LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY II1971 PTD 815 · Bombay High Court · 1968-01-29Read full judgment →
• BANK OF BAHAWALPUR LTD. vs PUNJAB TANNERIES, WAZIRABAD LTD. AND 21971 PLD Lahore 199 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-20
  choice-of-forum clauseterritorial jurisdictionwaiver of jurisdictionpledge agreementrecovery suitbanking disputereturn of plaint
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant-Bank filed a recovery suit against the respondents before the Civil Judge, Wazirabad, based on a cash credit facility and pledged goods. During the trial, after the plaintiff had closed its evidence, the defendants filed an application under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to frame a preliminary issue based on a clause in the pledge agreement stipulating that Karachi courts alone would have jurisdiction. The trial court framed the issue and ultimately returned the plaint to be presented before the Karachi court. In appeal, the Lahore High Court examined the validity and enforcement of the choice-of-forum clause. The High Court held that while an agreement restricting litigation to a particular court having jurisdiction is generally valid, the right to invoke such a contractual forum can be waived. The Court found that both Wazirabad and Karachi courts possessed territorial jurisdiction, but the defendants had unequivocally waived their right under the choice-of-forum clause by filing a written statement on merits without raising this objection at the earliest opportunity, participating in framing issues, and allowing the plaintiff to lead evidence. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the trial court's order and remanded the matter for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement between parties restricting the trial of disputes to a specific court having jurisdiction is valid and enforceable?
  • Can an objection regarding a contractual choice-of-forum clause be waived by the conduct of a party, such as filing a written statement on merits?
  • At what stage of the proceedings must an objection founded on a choice-of-forum clause be raised by the defendant?
  • Does a civil court possess the discretion to refuse the enforcement of a purely contractual choice-of-forum clause?
  Read full judgment →
• BALCHAND vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, SAGAR1971 PTD 826 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-19Read full judgment →
• BALADIN RAM vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 879 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-21Read full judgment →
• BAKHSHA AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1282 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-23Read full judgment →