Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• OBAIDUL HAQUE vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1185 · Dacca · 1970-02-26Read full judgment →
• N/A vs MANAGEMENT OF M. P. O. WAPDA, WORKSHOP, LYALLPUR1970 PLC 229 · Industrial Court · 1968-12-14Read full judgment →
• N/A vs EAST PAKISTAN CO-OPERATIVE COTTON1970 PLC 893 · Labour Court · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
• NURUL ISLAM vs MESSRS NATIONAL METAL WORKS, DACCA1970 PLC 839 · Labour Court · 1970-06-27Read full judgment →
• NURUL HAQUE vs AHMAD Kabiroppositeparty1970 P Cr. L J 379 · Dacca · 1969-07-23Read full judgment →
• NUR AHMED AND Others vs PUTUL RANI PAUL AND Another1970 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-16
  criminal revisionconcurrent findings of facttheftspecial leave to appealrevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which had dismissed the petitioners' criminal revision application. The petitioners were originally convicted under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for trespassing onto the complainant's land and harvesting paddy, receiving a fine of Rs. 50 each, with default imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact made by the trial Magistrate and the appellate court regarding the petitioners' guilt. The Supreme Court held that since the concurrent findings of the lower courts were firmly based on the evidence of six eye-witnesses, the High Court acted correctly in refusing to interfere with those findings in its revisional jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not typically disturb concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when such findings are supported by credible evidence, and the High Court is justified in upholding such findings in revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in revision with concurrent findings of fact based on evidence?
  • Is the Supreme Court likely to grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
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• NOORUDDIN AHMED vs MESSRS NATIONAL ENGINEERING WORKS, DACCA1970 PLC 784 · Labour Court · 1970-05-20Read full judgment →
• NOORA vs MUHAMMAD1970 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  amendment of decreeclerical errorsubstantial justicerevisional jurisdictioninheritanceproperty description
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, Noora, sought special leave to appeal against a High Court order that allowed the respondent, Muhammad, to amend a decree. The respondent had previously obtained a decree declaring him the sole heir of Mst. Allah Rakhi regarding her property. However, due to inadvertence, certain khasra numbers were omitted from the property description in the original decree. The trial court initially dismissed the respondent's application to amend the decree to include these omitted properties, but the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, set aside that dismissal and remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsideration. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, reasoning that the order achieved substantial justice between the parties. The Court held that where a plaintiff has been declared the sole heir of a deceased's entire estate, it is eminently just and fair to allow for the correction of a decree if specific property details were omitted by inadvertence. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's direction to the trial court to entertain the amendment application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court allow the amendment of a decree to include property details omitted by inadvertence?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to remand a case to the trial court for the correction of a decree?
  • Does the correction of a decree to reflect the true extent of an inheritance constitute substantial justice?
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• NOORA AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 682 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-19Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD AND 8 Others vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 8 Other1970 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-13
  writ jurisdictionjudicial reviewsettlement lawproperty partitionadministrative discretionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court regarding the allotment of property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the mode of partition of property, as determined by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, is subject to judicial review under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court when the divisibility of the property itself is not contested. The Supreme Court held that once it is conceded that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the division of property, the specific mode of partition cannot be challenged or reviewed through a writ petition. The Court found that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had exercised his discretion properly in allocating the upper floor to the petitioners and the ground floor to the respondents, given the petitioners' limited prior occupation of only one room. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that administrative discretion in property partition, absent jurisdictional error, is not amenable to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can the mode of partition of property by the Chief Settlement Commissioner be challenged under writ jurisdiction if the divisibility of the property is not in dispute?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in property allotment subject to judicial review under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
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• NOOR MIJ HAMMAD - FAIZI vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1970 PLC 370 · Industrial Court · 1969-01-07Read full judgment →
• NOOR HASAN AND 2 Other vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 34 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-03-12Read full judgment →
• NIZAM DIN (REPRESENTED BY 14 HEIRS vs Mst. NAWAB BIBI1970 PLD Lahore 923 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-04
  statutory tenantejectmentrent enhancementmunicipal assessmentretrospective rentDisplaced Persons ActRent Restriction Ordinance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against a statutory tenant regarding a shop. The core legal question was whether a transferee landlord is entitled to retrospectively demand rent at an enhanced rate based on the latest municipal assessment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether the Rent Controller correctly ordered the deposit of such rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Court held that while a transferee has the right to charge rent based on the latest municipal assessment, this right cannot be enforced retrospectively. The tenant remains liable for the previous rent rate until a valid notice is served, after which the enhanced rate applies prospectively. Consequently, the Rent Controller's order requiring the deposit of arrears at the enhanced rate for the entire period was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh order. The key principle laid down is that a landlord cannot unilaterally increase rent retrospectively; the right to charge rent based on the latest municipal assessment applies only prospectively from the date of notice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord retrospectively charge enhanced rent to a statutory tenant based on the latest municipal assessment?
  • Does a previous Rent Controller's order fixing tentative rent operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to determine if a tenant is a defaulter before ordering the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
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• NISAR AHMAD vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1171 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-14Read full judgment →
• NISAR AHMAD vs GENERAL MANAGER, TELEPHONE INDUSTRIES OF PAKISTAN, HARIPUR_HAZARA1970 PLC 222 · Industrial Court · 1969-11-24Read full judgment →
• NIRODA SUNDARI MONDAL AND Another vs BRAJA LAL MONDAL AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 383 · Dacca · 1968-02-02Read full judgment →
• NIAHMOODUL HASSAN AND Another vs MUEINMNIAD SHARIF AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Azad J & K 97 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-05-20Read full judgment →
• NEZAMAT ALI vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-Opposite-Parties1970 P Cr. L J 448 · Dacca · 1969-07-08Read full judgment →
• NEMAT ALI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 789 · Lahore High Court · 1969-02-18Read full judgment →
• NAZRA vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 163 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-24Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 865 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-26Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD Alias JEERA GUDDI vs The STATE1970 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-10
  arrest without warrantpolice powerscognizable offencewrongful custodymurder convictioncriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a death sentence for the murder of a police constable. The petitioner did not dispute the occurrence of the incident but challenged the conviction on the legal ground that the deceased constable lacked a warrant for his arrest, thereby granting the petitioner a right to resist what he claimed was wrongful custody. The Supreme Court examined the scope of police powers regarding arrests without warrants. The Court held that the deceased constable acted within his lawful authority under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the petitioner was a person against whom credible information existed regarding his involvement in cognizable offences. The Court clarified that Section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which governs arrests by subordinates under specific written orders, does not control or limit the independent power of arrest granted to police officers under Section 54. Consequently, the claim of wrongful custody was rejected, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 control or limit the powers of arrest granted under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a police officer have the authority to arrest a person without a warrant if there is credible information regarding their involvement in a cognizable offence?
  • Can a person claim a right to resist arrest on the basis that the arresting officer did not possess a specific warrant, even if the officer had statutory authority to arrest without one?
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• NAZIMUDDIN Alias MIR NAZIMUDDIN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17
  special leave to appealforgerycriminal misappropriationhandwriting expertcorroborationcriminal conspiracy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a clerk-cum-salesman, sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which upheld his conviction and sentence under sections 467 and 409/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code for forging a cash memo and misappropriation in collusion with a co-accused. The prosecution established that the petitioner fabricated a false cash memo to inflate the price and quantity of blankets purchased for an orphanage, resulting in misappropriation of funds. The core legal question revolved around whether the conviction based on the handwriting expert's opinion, corroborated by surrounding circumstances including the use of the showroom's seal, was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the handwriting expert's opinion was definite and adequately corroborated by independent evidence, establishing the petitioner's guilt satisfactorily. The key principle laid down is that an expert's opinion on handwriting, when supported by corroborative evidence such as the exclusive custody of official seals or admitted documents, is sufficient to maintain a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the opinion of a handwriting expert requires corroboration to sustain a conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a conviction for forgery and misappropriation be sustained based on circumstantial evidence and official seal usage?
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• NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1312 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-16Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1080 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-02Read full judgment →
• NAWAZISH ALI SHAH vs MERAJ DIN AND Another1970 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-27
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertywrit jurisdictiondisputed question of factsettlement authoritieslimitationsuo motu revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property comprising a shop and residential accommodation in Lahore, claimed by both parties under the settlement laws. The petitioner initially withdrew his claim before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, who then transferred the indivisible property to the respondent. After protracted proceedings through settlement authorities, the High Court's Single Judge interfered in writ jurisdiction, but a Division Bench reversed that decision. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that a disputed question of fact, such as whether the petitioner validly surrendered his claim, cannot be adjudicated in constitutional proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. Furthermore, the Chief Settlement Commissioner possesses powers in revision to interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate authorities, and settlement authorities are legally competent to treat composite buildings as a single unit under the relevant statute. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disputed question of fact regarding the withdrawal of a claim be adjudicated in constitutional proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner bound by concurrent findings of subordinate authorities in second revision?
  • Do settlement authorities have the power to treat a composite building as an indivisible unit under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• NAWAZA vs THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1970 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-03
  writ jurisdictionrehabilitationdisplaced personsallotment of landquestions of factremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal, by special leave, arose from a Letters Patent Bench judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which affirmed a Single Judge's decision in a writ petition quashing an allotment of agricultural land confirmed in favour of the appellant by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner. The dispute concerned competing claims of displaced persons over land allotments. In the writ proceedings, the Single Judge called for the record, made independent findings of fact regarding the appellant's entitlement, and quashed the allotment on the ground of its dubious nature. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, does not act as a court of facts and should not decide disputed questions of fact that were never considered or determined by the relevant statutory authorities. The proper course was to remand the matter to the Rehabilitation Authorities. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgments, and remanded the case to the Rehabilitation Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, have the authority to act as a court of facts and decide disputed questions of fact not determined by the relevant administrative authorities?
  • What is the proper course of action for a High Court in a writ petition when it discovers unresolved questions of fact that were not considered by the subordinate tribunal or authority?
  • Can a finding of fact by a subordinate tribunal or authority be interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
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• NAWAZA AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 574 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1969-10-10Read full judgment →
• Nawab Syed MOHIUDDIN ALI KHAN vs Haji JALALUDDIN1970 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-01-09
  Displaced Persons Actbig mansionstatutory tenantejectmentdefault in rentmunicipal assessmentcondonation of delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the petitioner, a transferee of a big mansion under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, against the respondent statutory tenant on grounds of default in payment of rent. The core legal issues centered on whether the occupant of a tenement within a big mansion qualifies as a protected tenant under Section 30 of the Act, and whether a default occurred where rent was paid at a higher rate prior to a reduction in municipal assessment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, dismissing the petition. The Court held that while a big mansion is excluded from the definition of a 'house' for transfer purposes under Section 2(4), it remains a house or shop within the purview of Section 30, thereby conferring statutory tenancy protections on occupants. Furthermore, because excess rent had been paid prior to the assessment reduction, no default occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Does an occupant of a tenement in a big mansion qualify as a statutory protected tenant under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the exclusion of a big mansion from the definition of a house under Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons Act deprive its occupants of protection under Section 30?
  • Can a tenant be held in default of rent when previous rent payments made at a higher rate cover the lawful reduced assessment amount?
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• NAWAB KHAN vs Mst. HAJRA BEGUM AND Other1970 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  evacuee propertytransfer of housedivisibility of propertysettlement authoritieswrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities failed to apply their mind to the divisibility of the subject house. The Supreme Court held that the contention was factually incorrect, as the record clearly demonstrated that the settlement authorities had indeed considered the question of divisibility and inspected the spot. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where the record reflects due application of mind by administrative authorities regarding the division of evacuee properties, writ interference on the ground of non-application of mind is unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities failed to apply their mind to the question of divisibility of an evacuee house?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained on grounds that are contrary to the record of the settlement proceedings?
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• NAWAB KARIM vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-05-16
  abatement of appeallegal representativeslimitation periodprocedural delayimpleadmentSupreme Court Rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a civil dispute involving settlement authorities, where a preliminary objection was raised regarding the abatement of the appeal due to the appellant's failure to implead the legal representatives of a deceased respondent (respondent No. 3) within the prescribed statutory period. The core legal question was whether the appeal abated upon the appellant's failure to bring the legal representatives on record within 90 days, despite having knowledge of the death and receiving formal intimation. The Court held that the appeal had indeed abated against the deceased respondent, rejecting the appellant's plea that ignorance of the law and ongoing out-of-court settlement negotiations justified the delay. The Court further dismissed the appellant's argument that the appeal could survive against the remaining respondents, noting that the relief sought was specifically directed against an order benefiting the deceased respondent. The key principle laid down is that each day of delay in procedural compliance must be explained, and ignorance of the law or informal settlement efforts does not constitute sufficient cause to condone a failure to meet mandatory limitation periods for impleading legal representatives.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal abate if the legal representatives of a deceased respondent are not brought on record within the period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules?
  • Can ignorance of the law regarding procedural timelines serve as a valid excuse for delay in impleading legal representatives?
  • Does an appeal abate as a whole if it fails to implead the legal representatives of one respondent but other respondents remain on the record?
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• NATIONAL SPINNING MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1970 PLC 655 · Industrial Court · 1970-05-28Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN vs S. R. REHMATULLAH AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Lahore 330 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-25Read full judgment →
• NASIR vs MESSRS KARACHI INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIOR, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 72 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-02-11Read full judgment →
• NASIM Alias SEEMA AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 674 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• NAQAB SHAH AND Another vs THE CROWN1970 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-03-08
  kidnappingrapeappreciation of evidencewitness credibilitycorroborationcriminal appealspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from convictions under sections 366 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the kidnapping and rape of a minor girl. The appellants challenged their convictions, arguing that the prosecutrix was not a witness of truth and that her testimony lacked necessary corroboration, particularly given her initial failure to report the crimes to the police. The core legal question concerned whether the appellate court’s reliance on the prosecutrix's testimony, despite her initial contradictory statements, was legally sound and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix provided a credible explanation for her initial silence, attributing it to tutoring by the accused. Furthermore, the Court found that her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial evidence, including medical reports and the conduct of the parties. Consequently, the Court affirmed the convictions, establishing that where an appellate court has properly appreciated evidence and provided reasoned findings, the Supreme Court will not interfere with such findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone if she initially failed to report the crime?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence by lower courts?
  • Is a victim's explanation for initial silence regarding a crime sufficient to maintain the credibility of her subsequent testimony?
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• N. M. KHAN AND Another vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1970 SCMR 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesproperty transferindependent residential unitsjudicial reviewfinding of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court order regarding the classification of two properties, Bungalow Nos. 45 and 47, Empress Road, by Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether Settlement authorities could arbitrarily treat two historically separate, independently assessed houses as a single unit based on contiguity and convenience, and whether the High Court could review this finding in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that the two bungalows were distinct entities with separate histories, tax assessments, and access points. The Settlement authorities' decision to treat them as one unit was based on an erroneous, unsupported inference that ignored cogent evidence of their separate status. The principle laid down is that where administrative authorities make a finding of fact based on an arbitrary deduction that contradicts established, objective evidence, such a decision constitutes an illegal exercise of power subject to judicial review. Mere contiguity of properties does not justify merging distinct residential units into a single transferrable unit.

  Questions settled

  • Can Settlement authorities arbitrarily treat two separate houses as a single unit based solely on contiguity?
  • Is a finding of fact by a tribunal subject to judicial review if it is based on an erroneous deduction from evidence?
  • Does the mere fact that two houses are located in a common campus justify their classification as a single unit for transfer purposes?
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• N vs THE CHAIRMAN, M. M. ISPAHANI LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 802 · Labour Court · 1970-05-16Read full judgment →
• N vs NISHAT JUTE MILLS LTD.; DACCA1970 PLC 858 · Labour Court · 1970-06-15Read full judgment →
• My. MD. ABDUL MAJID AND Others vs MD. JAINUL ABEDIN AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 414 · Dacca · 1967-08-16Read full judgment →
• MUZAFFAR KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANS-- PORT1970 PLC 142 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-10-03Read full judgment →
• MUZAFFAR KHAN vs CHANNA N KHAN AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  writ jurisdictionacquiescenceresignationelection disputeUnion Councilleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that quashed the actions of a Controlling Authority regarding the resignation of a Union Council Chairman and the subsequent election of a successor. The High Court had relied on the precedent set in A. K. Fazal Qader Chowdhury v. Syed Shah Nawaz (PLD 1966 SC 105) to invalidate these proceedings. The petitioner contends that the High Court failed to consider the doctrine of acquiescence, specifically noting that the respondent had participated in the subsequent election for the Chairman's seat—which he lost to the petitioner—before challenging the resignation and election process via a writ petition. The Supreme Court found that the issue of acquiescence raised by the petitioner constituted a substantial legal question that was not addressed in the precedent relied upon by the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondent's participation in the fresh election precluded him from later challenging the validity of the resignation and the subsequent election process.

  Questions settled

  • Does participation in a subsequent election after the resignation of a Chairman constitute acquiescence that bars a later challenge to that resignation?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained to challenge an election process if the petitioner has already participated in and lost the subsequent election?
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• MUZAFFAR KHAN AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 483 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-25Read full judgment →
• MUSTAFIZUR RAHMAN vs BERNARD JOSEPH ROZARIO AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 78 · Dacca · 1967-08-07Read full judgment →
• MUSLIM INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., DACCA-- Defendant vs MD. ABDUL1970 PLD Dacca 658 · Dacca · 1968-07-26Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PANJAB, LAHORE AND Other1970 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-10
  petition for special leave to appeallimitationbarred by timedefault of appearancewrit petitiondelay in filing
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the High Court for default of appearance, with an additional finding that the writ petition lacked merit. The Supreme Court examined the question of limitation and whether sufficient cause was shown for the delay in filing the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner was informed of the dismissal by the Deputy Registrar on 8th June 1967, obtained copies shortly thereafter, but delayed taking delivery and filing the petition until 21st August 1967, remaining out of time even after making all available allowances. The excuse that the petitioner awaited the reopening of the Court after summer vacation was rejected, as the petition was actually filed during the vacation through an attorney familiar with working arrangements during court vacations. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time due to the absence of any reasonable explanation for the delay, and consequently dismissed it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition filed beyond the prescribed period without a reasonable explanation for the delay is liable to be dismissed as barred by time?
  • Can the failure of an engaged counsel to intimate his disqualification excuse a client's delay in prosecuting legal remedies?
  • Whether the belief that a petition can be filed upon the reopening of the court after summer vacation constitutes sufficient ground to condone delay when the petition is filed during the vacation?
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• MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs RIASAT ALI AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 680 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-15Read full judgment →
• MURLI MALL KAPUR vs LAKSHMI COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-01
  cash credit accountevacuee propertylimitation periodstated balancerecovery of moneyacknowledgment of debt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a suit for the recovery of money filed by a bank against a partnership firm regarding a Cash Credit Account. The appellant contested the suit on grounds of jurisdiction, arguing the debt was evacuee property, and limitation, claiming the suit was time-barred. The trial court and the High Court ruled against the appellant on both counts. Regarding jurisdiction, the court noted that the Assistant Custodian, Evacuee Property, had already determined the debt was not evacuee property. Regarding limitation, the Supreme Court held that while the lower courts debated the applicability of Articles 57 and 115 of the Limitation Act, the correct provision was Article 64, as the suit involved a stated balance acknowledged by the defendants. Since the suit was filed within three years of this acknowledgment, it was within time. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, dismissing the appeal. The principle laid down is that a suit for recovery based on a stated balance of a cash credit account is governed by Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to try a suit involving a debt if the Assistant Custodian has determined it is not evacuee property?
  • Which Article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to a suit for the recovery of money based on a stated balance of a cash credit account?
  • Can a party raise a new objection regarding the sufficiency of court-fee stamps for the first time in the Supreme Court?
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• MURADALI AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 15 · Sindh High Court · 1968-01-22Read full judgment →
• MURAD AND 4 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-10-09
  criminal appealmurderriotingappraisement of evidenceeye-witnessmedical evidencedelayed FIRchance witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which confirmed the convictions and sentences of the appellants under sections 148 and 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of one Muhammad Anwar and for rioting. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court followed safe principles of criminal jurisprudence in appraising the evidence of eye-witnesses whose testimony was subjected to discrepancies regarding timing, medical evidence on stomach contents, and potential interest in the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appraisement of evidence by the High Court suffered from no legal infirmity or violation of safe administration of justice. The Court laid down that the mere fact that witnesses were farming partners with the deceased does not render them interested witnesses, that minor discrepancies in estimating time or moon position do not outweigh consistent testimony of early morning occurrence, and that generalized medical estimates of time of death based on stomach fluids are not absolute when inconsistent with reliable direct eye-witness accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that witnesses were farming partners with the deceased render their testimony interested?
  • Can minor discrepancies in estimating the time of occurrence or the moon's position discredit otherwise consistent eye-witness testimony?
  • Does medical evidence regarding the contents of a deceased person's stomach strictly override reliable direct eye-witness accounts as to the time of death?
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• MUQARRAB KHAN vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 80 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-31Read full judgment →
• Munshi TAMIZUDDIN HOWLADER AND Other vs ALTAFUDDIN MORAL AND OTHER1970 PLD Dacca 483 · Dacca · 1968-07-09Read full judgment →
• MUNICIPALITY, DINAJPUR vs ABDUL WAHID MAJUMDER AND Another1970 P Cr. L J 937 · Dacca · 1970-11-12Read full judgment →
• MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, JALALPUR JATTAN vs THE STATEs1970 P Cr. L J 994 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• MUNAWAR KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSP0RT1970 PLC 121 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-11Read full judgment →
• MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD SHAM AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  composite propertyChief Settlement Commissionertransfer of propertydisplaced personwrit jurisdictionapportionment of units
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a composite property comprising shops and residential accommodations under settlement laws. The core legal question is whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner was legally competent to divide the composite property into separate units and whether such apportionment was open to judicial interference. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner acted well within his lawful authority under the second proviso to subsection (12) of section 2 of the Act to divide the composite property into distinct commercial and residential units, and that the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere with such apportionment unless it is shown to be fanciful or arbitrary. The Court laid down the principle that once the statutory authority's competence to divide a composite property is established, the specific apportionment of units is a matter of administrative discretion not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction absent arbitrariness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner is competent to divide a composite property into separate residential and commercial units?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the apportionment of property units made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a division of property by the Chief Settlement Commissioner become illegal merely due to minor factual errors regarding the portions in possession of rival claimants?
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• MUKHTAR HUSSAIN vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, JHANG AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 1002 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-22Read full judgment →
• MUKHTAR ALI AND Another vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 94 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ZAMAN AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LANDS), RAWALPINDI AND Other1970 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-05
  writ jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesland allotmentquestion of factspecial leave to appealdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order passed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction concerning the cancellation of land allotments by settlement authorities. The petitioners contended that the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear a revision petition due to amendments introduced by Ordinance XIII of 1964 to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that if the Additional Settlement Commissioner had exercised revisional powers, a second revision before the Settlement Commissioner was legally incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner possessed the requisite powers was a question of fact that should have been raised earlier and could not be investigated at the appellate stage. Regarding the merits, the Court affirmed that the determination of whether the petitioners constituted a single family unit was a factual finding within the exclusive domain of departmental authorities. Consequently, the High Court correctly declined to interfere with these findings in writ jurisdiction. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a question of fact regarding the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the first time during a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is the determination of whether a group of migrants constitutes a single family unit a question of fact for settlement authorities?
  • Can a High Court interfere with factual findings of departmental authorities in writ jurisdiction?
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• MUHAMMAD ZAHOOR vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1970 PLC 78 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-02-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ZAFAR vs THE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 332 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YUSAF vs SIKANDAR1970 PLD Peshawar 160 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-04-22
  pre-emptionagricultural landcontiguous propertyvicinageKhasra numberholdingright of pre-emption
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference before the Full Bench of the Peshawar High Court arose from a second appeal concerning a suit for possession by pre-emption of agricultural land comprising multiple contiguous Khasra numbers. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor claiming a right of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage or contiguity under section 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950 must own land contiguous to all Khasra numbers sold under a single transaction, or whether a right of pre-emption accrues to the entire block of land if the pre-emptor owns land contiguous to only one of the several Khasra numbers. Reviewing land revenue laws, settlement manuals, and precedents, the Court held that a holding or parcel of land divided into various Khasra numbers for survey and crop-inspection convenience constitutes a single integral property rather than multiple distinct properties. The Court concluded that an owner of contiguous property is entitled to pre-empt the entire compact block of sold land even if their property adjoins only one of the constituent Khasra numbers.

  Questions settled

  • When a compact block of agricultural land comprising more than one Khasra number is sold, does the right of pre-emption of an owner of property contiguous to only one Khasra extend to the entire block under section 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • Does each Khasra number in an agricultural holding constitute a separate and distinct property for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • Is it a pre-requisite qualification for a pre-emptor claiming under the ground of contiguity to own land touching all Khasra numbers included in a single sale transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSUF MUHAMMADI vs MESSERS DAILY ANJAM LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 153 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 6 Other1970 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-14
  consolidation proceedingsagreed schemelimitationBoard of Revenuewrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for Special Leave to Appeal arose from a dispute regarding consolidation proceedings in village Bheelo Mahar, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot. The original consolidation scheme, confirmed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, was modified by the Collector on appeal. The Additional Commissioner subsequently set aside the Collector's order, citing that the scheme relied on statements from non-parties and that the appeal was time-barred. The Member, Board of Revenue, reversed this decision, finding that the respondents' rights were improperly ignored and that the reliance on non-party statements was unjustified. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition in limine. The Supreme Court examined whether the scheme was an 'agreed scheme' and whether the Member, Board of Revenue, erred in disregarding statements from non-parties. The Court held that the absence of objections did not render the scheme an 'agreed scheme' and affirmed that reliance on statements from non-parties was improper. The petition was dismissed, upholding the decision of the Member, Board of Revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of objections to a consolidation scheme automatically render it an 'agreed scheme'?
  • Can a consolidation scheme be validly based on statements made by persons who are not parties to the proceedings?
  • Is a quasi-judicial authority required to be conscious of the question of limitation before deciding proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUNIS AND 444 Other vs (1) GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN1970 PLD Lahore 157 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUNAS vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 498 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUNAS vs NARGIS SULTANA1970 PLD Lahore 41 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-03
  restitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriageres judicatastay of suitKhulafamily court jurisdictiontransfer of cases
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an application for the stay of a suit for dissolution of marriage pending in the Family Court at Sialkot, filed against a prior suit for restitution of conjugal rights in Gujrat. The petitioner argued that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and should be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that res judicata did not apply because the issues in the two suits were not identical, particularly regarding the claim for Khula, which constitutes a distinct ground for dissolution not present in the restitution suit. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was inapplicable because the subject matter of the two suits was not identical, as only the issue of cruelty overlapped. The Court established the principle that for a stay of proceedings under Section 10, there must be an identity of the entire subject matter, not merely commonality of one or two issues. The Court ultimately ordered the transfer of the restitution suit to Sialkot for joint disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for restitution of conjugal rights bar a subsequent suit for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of res judicata?
  • Is a suit for dissolution of marriage liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to a pending suit for restitution of conjugal rights?
  • Does the presence of a common issue of cruelty between two family court suits necessitate the stay of the subsequent suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YASIN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION1970 PLC 468 · Industrial Court · 1970-03-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB VEGETABLE GHEE AND GENERAL MILLS LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 137 · Industrial Court · 1969-11-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAQOOB AND 7 Other vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 21970 PLD Lahore 377 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WAZIR vs The STATE1970 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-22
  criminal misappropriationsanction for prosecutionanti-corruptionspecial leave to appealapplication of mindcriminal breach of trust
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a Forest Guard, challenged his conviction under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the sanction for prosecution was invalid due to the sanctioning authority's alleged failure to apply its mind or to seek an explanation from the accused prior to granting sanction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the sanction order clearly demonstrated on its face that the authority had applied its mind to the facts of the case. The Court established the principle that a sanctioning authority is not legally required to obtain or solicit an explanation from an accused person before granting sanction for prosecution. Consequently, the challenge to the validity of the sanction was rejected, and the conviction was maintained, as the prosecution case had been fully proved by the lower courts based on the evidence presented.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a legal requirement for a sanctioning authority to obtain an explanation from an accused person before granting sanction for prosecution?
  • Does a sanction order that shows on its face that the authority applied its mind to the facts satisfy the requirements for a valid prosecution sanction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAILWAY MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION RAILWAY DIVISION1970 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-02-22
  Section 240(3) Government of India Act 1935termination of serviceconstitutional protectiontemporary employeepermanent vacancyshow-cause noticerailway service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This certificated appeal arises from a suit challenging the termination of the appellant's services as an Executive Engineer in the Pakistan Western Railways. The appellant, initially appointed on a temporary basis, served for ten years, received increments, and was declared suitable for confirmation against permanent vacancies. The core legal question was whether the appellant, despite his 'temporary' designation, was entitled to the constitutional protection afforded by Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, against removal without procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, having held a post of indefinite duration and been treated as a permanent employee, was entitled to the constitutional guarantee under Section 240(3). Consequently, the Court ruled that his termination by mere notice, without a show-cause notice, was illegal. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's decree, establishing that employees holding posts of indefinite duration, regardless of their initial temporary status, are entitled to the procedural protections against removal guaranteed by the Government of India Act, 1935.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee appointed on a temporary basis but serving in a permanent vacancy for an indefinite duration entitled to the protection of Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935?
  • Does the termination of a railway employee's service by mere notice, without a show-cause notice, violate the constitutional guarantee under Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935?
  • Can an employee who has served for a long duration, received increments, and been declared suitable for confirmation be treated as a permanent employee for the purposes of constitutional protection against removal?
  Read full judgment →
• NEFAZUDDIN MONDAL AND 17 Others vs MAFIZUDDIN Mullaoppositeparty1970 P Cr. L J 38 · Dacca · 1969-06-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 454 · Industrial Court · 1970-04-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL AND Another vs SALIM AND 2 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 268 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs The STATE1970 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-24
  murdercapital punishmentplea of self-defenceappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonycriminal appealfatal injury
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, Muhammad Siddique, for the murder of Muhammad Sharif and related offences under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The prosecution case established that following an initial verbal altercation involving the appellant's brother, the appellant attacked the deceased with a chhuri, causing a fatal injury to the thigh that severed the femoral vein. The trial court convicted the appellant of murder and sentenced him to death, which the High Court subsequently upheld upon accepting the testimonies of eye-witnesses and rejecting the appellant's plea of private defence. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the corroborative recovery of the blood-stained weapon, and the lack of injuries on the appellant supporting self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the premeditated attack resulting in a fatal injury to a major blood vessel fell squarely within the third clause of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, justifying the capital sentence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence were affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of injuries on the accused undermines a plea of private defence in a murder trial?
  • Does an attack with a chhuri on a non-vital part of the body that severs a major blood vessel attract clause thirdly of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by the High Court regarding eye-witness credibility open to interference by the Supreme Court when supported by corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE SIDDIQI vs Mst. AZIZ BIBI AND 3 Other1970 PLD Lahore 596 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-07
  guardianshipordinary residencecustody of minorsjurisdictionGuardians and Wards Actunauthorized removalconstructive custody
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a guardianship dispute concerning four minors, originally residing in Rawalpindi with their father. While the father was abroad, the maternal grandmother removed the minors to Lahore and filed an application for guardianship. The core legal question is whether the Lahore Court possessed jurisdiction under Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, given the minors' physical presence in Lahore at the time of filing. The Court held that the Lahore Court lacked jurisdiction, as the minors' ordinary residence remained Rawalpindi. The Court determined that the removal of the minors was clandestine and unauthorized, intended to defeat the father's custody. Consequently, the proceedings in Lahore were quashed. The key principle laid down is that ordinary residence for the purposes of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 is not determined by the minor's physical location at the time of filing if such location results from an unauthorized or stealthy removal; rather, the court from whose jurisdiction the minor was removed retains the authority to adjudicate the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the physical presence of a minor in a city at the time of filing a guardianship application automatically establish ordinary residence under Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Can a court exercise jurisdiction over a guardianship application if the minor was removed from the jurisdiction of another court without the guardian's consent?
  • Does the unauthorized removal of a minor from one district to another by a relative alter the ordinary residence of the minor for the purpose of determining jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 3 Other vs THE MANAGEMENT OF COLONY TEXTILE1970 PLC 130 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ Appellant vs WEST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL COURT1970 PLC 483 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1970 SCMR 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-24
  review petitionallotment of propertypossessionwidow's rightsindivisible unitretrospective effect
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously refused to grant leave to appeal against a High Court decision regarding the transfer of a house. The core legal question was whether the widows of an allottee, who resided with him in the house since its allotment in 1947 and continued to reside there after his death, were entitled to the transfer of the property as an indivisible unit, despite the petitioner's claim based on his own partial occupation since 1949. The petitioner argued that a specific Central Government notification regarding the definition of possession did not grant retrospective effect to a widow's possession continuing after her husband's death. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the notification clearly imports retrospective effect. The Court affirmed that the widow's possession is deemed to extend back to the date she commenced living with her husband, provided the husband was in possession under a competent order dated on or before December 20, 1958. The Court found no grounds to alter its previous interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Central Government notification of 7th March 1960 regarding the definition of possession for widows have retrospective effect?
  • Are widows who resided with an allottee entitled to the transfer of a house declared an indivisible unit upon the death of the husband?
  • Does a widow's deemed possession under the notification extend back to the date she commenced living with her husband?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs Sh. MUHAMMAD AMIN AND OTHBRS1970 PLD Lahore 283 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF MALIK vs THE CHAIRMAN, THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BHAKKAR AND Other1970 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-25
  Special Leave to Appealservice terminationstatutory bodyconflicting interpretationsThal Development Authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for Special Leave to Appeal against the High Court's refusal to issue a writ challenging the termination of the petitioner's service by the Chairman of the Thal Development Authority, a statutory body. The core legal question concerns the propriety and validity of the termination order and the correct interpretation of the instruments governing the Authority's actions. The Supreme Court observed that the instruments in question had received conflicting interpretations by different Division Benches of the High Court, with leave to appeal already granted in related matters. Holding that an authoritative interpretation by the apex court is necessary to resolve this judicial conflict, the Court granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that where divergent High Court interpretations arise regarding statutory instruments governing service termination, the Supreme Court will grant leave to settle the authoritative construction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when conflicting interpretations of statutory instruments arise among Division Benches of the High Court?
  • What is the proper interpretation of the instruments governing the termination of service by the Thal Development Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN AND 4 Others vs BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST1970 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-11
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealcounsel negligencelitigant responsibilityprocedural delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was submitted with a delay of 133 days. The core legal question was whether the negligence or failure of a legal counsel to inform their client about the status or outcome of a case constitutes sufficient grounds to condone a significant delay in filing an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the limitation period commences from the date of the impugned order, not from the date the client receives information from their counsel. The Court established that a litigant cannot absolve themselves of responsibility by blaming their counsel for procedural delays. It is the duty of the client to remain diligent, maintain contact with their legal representative, and monitor the progress of their case. The Court emphasized that a valuable right accrues to the opposing party upon the lapse of the limitation period, and such rights cannot be undermined by the client's failure to exercise proper oversight over their legal affairs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a lawyer to inform a client of a court decision constitute sufficient grounds to condone a delay in filing an appeal?
  • When does the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal commence?
  • Is a litigant absolved of responsibility for procedural delays caused by their counsel's negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND Others vs MUHAMMAD, SAEED UZ ZAMAN, CLAIMS1970 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-26
  suo motu revisionlimitation periodclaims commissionerproperty claimsleave to appealverified claims
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the Claims Commissioner, who, acting in suo motu revision, significantly reduced the petitioners' verified property claims five years after the initial verification. The core legal question is whether the Claims Commissioner acted within the scope of his authority when exercising suo motu revision powers long after the prescribed 90-day limitation period had expired, particularly in light of the proviso allowing such action without a time limit if deemed fit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the similarity of the issue to the precedent set in Farooq Imam (PLD 1965 SC 585). The Court held that the matter requires further examination to determine if the Claims Commissioner properly exercised his discretion to interfere after the limitation period by considering the circumstances and recording a decision to that effect. The key principle established is that the exercise of suo motu revisional powers beyond the prescribed limitation period requires a reasoned decision demonstrating that the authority consciously deemed it fit to interfere.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Claims Commissioner exercise suo motu revision powers after the expiry of the prescribed 90-day limitation period?
  • Is a Claims Commissioner required to record a specific decision that he deems it fit to interfere when exercising suo motu revision powers beyond the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAM AND Another vs SHER ALI1970 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  concurrent findings of factsecond appealcancellation of sale-deedundue influenceconsiderationregistration of documents
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore. The underlying dispute arose from a suit filed by the respondent seeking the cancellation of a registered sale-deed of agricultural land, alleging that the transaction was executed without consideration and obtained through undue influence, citing the respondent's mental and physical weakness. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found in favor of the respondent, declaring the sale-deed void. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' second appeal, holding that the findings were based on concurrent questions of fact and that the mere existence of alternative viewpoints did not warrant interference in second appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed this position, holding that where concurrent findings of fact are based on evidence led by the parties, the appellate court will not interfere simply because a different view could be taken. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that concurrent findings of fact are generally final and not subject to re-examination in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact merely because an alternative view of the evidence is possible?
  • Is a registered sale-deed immune from challenge on grounds of lack of consideration and undue influence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH vs The STATE1970 SCMR 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  murder convictiongrave and sudden provocationocular evidencespecial leave to appealtransportation for lifecriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Shah, under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Noora, as confirmed by the High Court of West Pakistan. The petitioner admitted to the killing but raised a plea of grave and sudden provocation, alleging he discovered the deceased in an illicit relationship with his sister-in-law. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's admission of the act, coupled with the ocular evidence provided by witnesses, justified the conviction and whether the plea of grave and sudden provocation was sufficient to mitigate the offense. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial court and the High Court correctly rejected the plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Court maintained the sentence of transportation for life, noting that while the deceased's conduct regarding the petitioner's sister-in-law may have offended the petitioner's sense of honor, it did not legally excuse the murder. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission of killing under a plea of grave and sudden provocation automatically mitigate a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the accused admits to the act but claims provocation?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ vs MUHAMMAD HANIF AND Another1970 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-13
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailprima facie casereasonable groundsprivate complaintnon-bailable warrantscommitment for trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the cancellation of pre-arrest bail by the High Court in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the issuance of non-bailable warrants by a Magistrate following a preliminary inquiry, which establishes a prima facie case, constitutes "reasonable grounds" for believing the accused is guilty under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that when a Magistrate has taken evidence and determined a prima facie case exists, this finding is generally sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "reasonable grounds" for believing the accused is guilty. The Court clarified that at the bail stage, the court should not evaluate the merits of the prosecution case or perform a full appraisal of evidence, but rather look at the material placed before it to determine if tangible evidence exists which, if unrebutted, supports an inference of guilt. Consequently, if a prima facie case is established through judicial inquiry, bail is generally not appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of non-bailable warrants by a Magistrate after a preliminary inquiry constitute reasonable grounds for believing an accused is guilty for the purpose of bail?
  • Should a court evaluate the merits of the prosecution case or perform an appraisal of evidence when determining bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a finding of a prima facie case by a Magistrate sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing the accused is guilty under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MESSRS MADINA TEXTILE AND PRINTING WORKSHOP, LYALLPUR1970 PLC 372 · Industrial Court · 1968-12-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 868 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALLAH vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 695 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALIM vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 187 · Sindh High Court · 1969-06-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALEEM vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 299 · Industrial Court · 1969-01-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs The STATE1970 SCMR 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  murderspecial leave to appealdying declarationgrave and sudden provocationmitigating circumstancetender agedeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a minor petitioner convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a co-villager and sentenced to death, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the defence plea of grave and sudden provocation based on self-defence and sexual advances should have been accepted, and whether the sentence warranted reduction due to the petitioner's tender age. The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration of the deceased, corroborated by eyewitness testimony, abscondence, and the recovery of the blood-stained knife, was rightly relied upon by the courts below, and that the defence version lacked evidentiary support. The Court further held that tender age alone is not a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence and declined to interfere with the sentence. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tender age by itself constitutes a sufficient mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to transportation for life?
  • Does the failure of a deceased to disclose the motive for an attack in the presence of initial witnesses invalidate a dying declaration that is otherwise corroborated?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND 2 Others vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 9 Other1970 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  displaced personsland settlementreview jurisdictionlimitation periodcancellation of allotmentpermanent transfernatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal addresses the legality of a review order passed by the Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and the subsequent cancellation of permanent land allotments made to claimant displaced persons. The appellants held verified claims for agricultural land and were allotted lands in Campbellpur District, which were confirmed in February 1962. Subsequently, on a patwari's report alleging the lands were within urban municipal limits, the Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner passed a summary review order stating "Review allowed" without notice, beyond the statutory limitation period, and without mandatory sanction from the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The subordinate authorities cancelled the appellants' allotments ex parte and transferred the lands to third parties, while the Chief Settlement Commissioner sanctioned the sale of a portion of the land for a grid station. The High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition on the ground that the urban or rural character of the land was a disputed question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the review order was patently illegal, time-barred, passed without jurisdiction and mandatory sanctions, and violated natural justice. The Court laid down that permanent land settlements vest absolute rights in allottees, and a review of such orders must strictly comply with statutory limitations, procedural safeguards, and prior sanctions mandated by the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner can review a previous allotment order after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation prescribed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Is a review order passed without obtaining the mandatory sanction of the Additional Settlement Commissioner sustainable under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Can lands permanently transferred to allottees under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, be taken away through an ex parte review order without issuing a show-cause notice?
  • Whether the High Court can decline to exercise writ jurisdiction in matters involving the cancellation of permanent land allotments on the sole ground that the character of the land is a disputed question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RASHEED vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1299 · Lahore High Court · 1966-02-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs THE STATE.1970 P Cr. L J 675 · Lahore High Court · 1969-03-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1221 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, LARKANA AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Karachi 209 · Sindh High Court · 1969-03-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAZIR HUSSAIN vs Mst. IFTIKHAR BANG AND 2 OTHERS1970 P Cr. L J 999 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAZIR BISWA vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, PROGRESSIVE PAPERS1970 PLC 37 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-28Read full judgment →