Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• BAKHAT JAMAL vs The STATE1971 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-07
  murderdying declarationcriminal appealdeath sentenceretracted confessioncorroborationappellate review
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The appellant was convicted by the trial court for the murder of his wife and sentenced to death, a conviction later upheld by the High Court. The appellant challenged this on appeal, questioning whether his retracted version was corroborated by evidence and if the death sentence was legally appropriate. The Supreme Court examined the dying declaration of the deceased, which explicitly charged the appellant with shooting her, and found it consistent with the medical evidence and the circumstances of the occurrence. The Court rejected the appellant’s defense that the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle with his brothers-in-law, noting that physical evidence—specifically the firing of two distinct shots at different locations—rendered his account impossible. Consequently, the Court held that the dying declaration, supported by the surrounding facts and the impossibility of the defense's narrative, provided sufficient proof of guilt. The conviction and the death sentence were maintained, as the evidence conclusively established the appellant's culpability for the murder, dismissing the appeal in its entirety.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by surrounding circumstances?
  • Can a defense of accidental discharge be sustained when physical evidence of multiple shots contradicts the narrative?
  • Does the presence of a dying declaration, when consistent with medical evidence, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
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• BAJA AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 195 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-18Read full judgment →
• BAHADUR KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 955 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-10Read full judgment →
• BAHADUR AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 512 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-10Read full judgment →
• BAGGAR KHAN--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 189 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-28Read full judgment →
• BADSHA KHAN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20
  bail pending appealappeal against acquittalnon-bailable warrantsmurdercriminal procedureSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for bail filed by the petitioner, Badsha Khan, who had been acquitted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, but whose acquittal became the subject of an appeal filed by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the High Court. Upon admitting the appeal, the High Court issued non-bailable warrants for the petitioner's arrest. The petitioner subsequently sought bail from the High Court, which was rejected both on the ground that the earlier arrest warrant order barred reconsideration and on the merits of the case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing bail pending the State's appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the refusal of bail was justified given the prompt reporting of the crime, the specific attribution of fatal knife blows to the petitioner in the First Information Report, and the presence of named eye-witnesses without apparent motive for false implication. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order issuing non-bailable warrants upon the admission of an appeal against acquittal bars a subsequent application for bail?
  • Is bail to be granted during the pendency of an appeal against acquittal when the accused is implicated in the First Information Report with fatal blows supported by eye-witness testimony?
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• BADRUL ISLAM vs QAMARUL ISLAM AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 682 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-28
  pecuniary jurisdictionvaluation of suitsuit for accountsarbitrary valuationreturn of plaintwaqf propertycivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for rendition of accounts and mandatory injunction regarding a waqf property, filed in the court of a Sub-Judge whose pecuniary jurisdiction was limited to Rs. 25,000 under the Karachi Courts Order, 1956, despite the plaint itself stating the waqf property's value exceeded Rs. 67,000. The trial court dismissed the applicant's application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, holding that plaintiffs could arbitrarily value their suit for accounts under section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff could arbitrarily value a suit for accounts to confer pecuniary jurisdiction on a court below its actual subject-matter value. The High Court allowed the revision, holding that a plaintiff cannot value relief arbitrarily to bypass statutory pecuniary limits, and that the true subject-matter of the suit exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that the valuation of a suit for accounts must reflect the real subject-matter and cannot be manipulated to choose a forum without pecuniary competence, directing the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff arbitrarily value a suit for accounts to bring it within the pecuniary jurisdiction of a subordinate court?
  • Does the Karachi Courts Order, 1956 permit litigants to draft prayers so as to confer jurisdiction on a court lacking pecuniary competence?
  • What is the appropriate course of action when a plaint is found to be undervalued beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court?
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• BACHU MIA AND 6 Other vs THE MANAGER, NIAMATULLAH & Co., DACCA1971 PLC 285 · Labour Court · 1970-08-19Read full judgment →
• B. V. SWATHIAH & BROS. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MYSORE1971 PTD 369 · Mysore High Court · 1967-01-11Read full judgment →
• B. M. RASHID vs MRS. RAZIA ABBAS AHMED1971 PLD Karachi 468 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-11Read full judgment →
• AZIZUL HAMID vs MASOOD QURESHI AND Another1971 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-04
  undertaking to courtapprobate and reprobatesearch warrantscriminal revisionpublic policycriminal breach of trustresiling from undertaking
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court rejecting a reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. A dispute between the petitioner (a film distribution agent) and the respondents (film producers) led to a civil suit for rendition of accounts and subsequent criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against the petitioner. Pursuant to search warrants issued under Sections 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, film prints were seized. The petitioner applied before the Magistrate offering an undertaking to produce the remaining prints in court to stop execution of further search warrants. Upon the Magistrate directing production pursuant to this undertaking, the petitioner sought revision. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's rejection of the reference, holding that a party cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath. Having given a clear undertaking that prevented search warrants from being pursued, the petitioner was precluded by public policy and fairness from resiling therefrom.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who gives an undertaking to court to avoid the execution of search warrants subsequently resile from that undertaking on the ground that the search warrants were illegal?
  • Whether a revision under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 lies against an order passed pursuant to a party's voluntary undertaking?
  • Does the principle of approbate and reprobate apply to bar a litigant from challenging an order passed in accordance with their own express undertaking?
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• AZIMUNNISA BEGUM vs CLAIMS COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND LAHORE1971 PLD Karachi 8 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-06Read full judgment →
• AZHAR ALI vs THE CHAIRMAN BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY1971 PLD Lahore 972 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-22
  educational institutionsunfair meansdisciplinary committeenatural justiceconstitutional petitionstudent disqualificationreview jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition was filed by a student challenging an order of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan, which disqualified him from appearing in four examinations after he was caught using unfair means in an examination hall. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was condemned unheard, whether the Board possessed the statutory power under its governing Ordinance and Regulations to penalize candidates for using unfair means, and whether a right of hearing existed against a review petition before the Chairman. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was afforded a fair opportunity of defence through a charge-sheet, a written explanation, and a personal hearing before the Disciplinary Committee, and failed to substantiate his claim of duress. The Court ruled that the Board's general powers to conduct examinations inherently include the power to maintain discipline and penalize misconduct. Finally, the Court held that the Chairman's review power is strictly circumscribed and does not entail a right of oral hearing. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate caught using unfair means in an examination is entitled to cross-examine witnesses during a domestic disciplinary inquiry?
  • Does a Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education possess the implied statutory power under its enabling Ordinance to penalize students for misconduct and use of unfair means?
  • Whether the Chairman of the Board is bound to afford an opportunity of personal hearing when dealing with a representation invoking review powers under the Regulations?
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• AZAHAR BEPARI alias AZAHAR ALI BEPARI-Defendant vs ABDUL AZIZ GAZI AND OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 10 · Dacca · 1969-06-03Read full judgment →
• AZAD KHAN vs ABDUL LATIF AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 49 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-03-27Read full judgment →
• AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR vs MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Azad J & K 33 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• AYYUB MASIH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1304 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-18Read full judgment →
• AYUB ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-17
  theftpossession of stolen propertyburden of prooflimitationspecial leave petitioncriminal conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts convicting the petitioner under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the theft of a bicycle and sentencing him to two years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the propriety of placing the onus of proof on the accused when found in possession of stolen property, and the sufficiency of the explanation for a delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the onus was rightly placed upon the petitioner under Section 114, illustration 'a' of the Evidence Act, and that the explanation offered for the delay was unsatisfactory and unsupported by evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed both on merits and as being barred by limitation. The key principle laid down is that a person found in possession of recently stolen property must satisfactorily account for such possession under the Evidence Act, and insufficient or unverified explanations regarding delay in filing petitions will not condone limitation periods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the onus to account for possession of a stolen bicycle is rightly placed upon the accused caught red-handed under the Evidence Act?
  • Does an unverified claim of a transport strike and delayed letters constitute sufficient ground to condone delay in filing a petition for special leave?
  • Whether a conviction under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code is sustainable when the accused claims a mistaken belief of ownership regarding a stolen cycle?
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• AYEZUDDIN AHVAD vs THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY AND SUB DIVISIONAL1971 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  special leave to appealno-confidence motiondisqualification of membersElectoral College ActBasic Democracies Orderautomatic cesser of office
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Chairman of the Nimagachi Union Council to challenge the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court of East Pakistan regarding a no-confidence resolution passed against him. The core legal question was whether members of the Union Council who voted in the no-confidence resolution had automatically ceased to be members due to alleged disqualification under the Electoral College Act without a formal inquiry and notification. The Supreme Court held that there is no automatic cesser of office, and a member continues to hold office until a formal notification is issued following the prescribed statutory inquiry procedure. Furthermore, under the Basic Democracies Order, a local council member must be removed through prescribed procedures. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a member of an electoral college automatically cease to be a member upon incurring a disqualification under section 53(3) of the Electoral College Act?
  • Is a notification by the Commissioner required to effect the cesser of office of a disqualified member under the Electoral College Act?
  • Can a new point not urged before the High Court be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court without proper averment?
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• AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION OF BENGAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA1971 PTD 280 · Calcutta High Court · 1967-11-15Read full judgment →
• AUSTRALASIA BANK LTD., LAHORE-Plaintiff vs BASHIR BARTON STORES, SARGODHA 2 OTHERS¬Defendants1971 PLD Lahore 133 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-09
  equitable mortgagedeposit of title deedsbona fide purchasertransfer of propertyreasonable careurban immovable propertyrevenue recordsmortgage charge
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil second appeal arises from a suit filed by Australasia Bank Ltd. for the recovery of an overdraft amount through the sale of mortgaged property, specifically a house in Sargodha, which the principal debtor had mortgaged by deposit of title deeds before selling it to a third party, Mst. Nasiban. The core legal question was whether the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and thus entitled to the protection of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, relying solely on revenue records without inquiring into the original title deeds. The Lahore High Court held that for urban immovable property, a prudent buyer cannot rely exclusively on revenue entries and must demand and inspect the previous title deeds; failure to do so does not constitute reasonable care or good faith. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower appellate court's findings, ruled that the purchaser was not entitled to statutory protection, and granted a preliminary decree for the sale of the mortgaged property.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser of urban immovable property act with reasonable care under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 by relying solely on revenue records without demanding or inspecting the original title deeds?
  • Can a buyer claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice when the inquiry into property title is delegated entirely to a lay broker?
  • What constitutes reasonable care and good faith for ascertaining the power of a transferor to sell urban real property?
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• AUSAF SHERWANI vs DIRECTOR, LABOUR WELFARE, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 41971 PLC 268 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-17Read full judgment →
• AURANGZEB vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1285 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-20
  murderdeath sentencedefense of insanityunsoundness of mindconfessionocular testimonyhatchet injuries
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction of the appellant, Aurangzeb, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murders of two boys, and under sections 326 and 324 for causing injuries to several others, including an infant, by means of a hatchet. The Sindh High Court examined the ocular testimony of natural and injured witnesses, supported by circumstantial evidence including the appellant's apprehension at the scene with a blood-stained weapon and clothes, his extra-judicial disclosures, and his judicial confession. The core legal question addressed was whether the appellant had established the defense of legal insanity under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The court held that mere eccentricities of behavior, queerness in habits, talkativeness, or religious preoccupation do not constitute legal insanity under section 84 unless it is established that the accused, at the time of the commission of the offense, was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was contrary to law. Finding the defense of insanity to be feigned and noting the absence of any mitigating circumstances in the brutal killings, the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the convictions, and confirmed the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere queerness in habit or eccentricities of behavior constitute legal insanity under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What burden of proof rests on an accused person seeking to claim the benefit of section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the conduct of an accused person immediately before and after the commission of an offense be used to determine his sanity?
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• ATTAUL HAQUE AND 2 OTHERS vs H. MALIK ELECTRIC Co.1971 PLD Lahore 1007 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-02
  displaced personsbig mansionstatutory tenantprovisional transfer orderrent restrictionlandlord-tenant relationshippermanent transferSection 30 notice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a second appeal against a High Court judgment remanding a rent eviction case to the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether the appellants, claiming to be transferees of a 'big mansion' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, had acquired the status of 'transferees' sufficient to issue a valid notice under Section 30 of the Act and establish a landlord-tenant relationship. The Court held that mere acceptance of an offer to purchase property, where the price is payable in a lump sum without deferred payment, does not constitute a 'provisional transfer' or 'permanent transfer' entitling the purchaser to act as a landlord. The Court affirmed the remand, directing the Rent Controller to determine whether the property was permanently transferred to the appellants—specifically whether full payment was made and, if applicable, settlement fees paid and entries made in the register—prior to the issuance of the notice. The principle laid down is that a person only becomes a 'transferee' for the purposes of Section 30 when they are entitled to hold and enjoy the property and its appurtenant rights, or when specific rights are expressly transferred under the Act or relevant schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere acceptance of an offer to purchase a big mansion under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 constitute a transfer of property sufficient to create a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Can a finding regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship be challenged in an appeal against an order directing the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a Rent Controller empowered to direct the deposit of rent for a period exceeding three years?
  • Does the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) arise in cases where the transfer price of a big mansion is payable in a lump sum?
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• ATTAR KHAN vs KADIR BUX ETC.1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 21 · Board of Revenue · 1971-03-24Read full judgment →
• ATTA MUHAMMAD--Plaintiff vs AHMAD BAKHSH AND 2 OTHERS- Defendants1971 PLD Lahore 401 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-01
  pre-emptioncomposite saleindivisibility of saleco-sharersuperior right of pre-emptionagricultural landpartial pre-emption
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil regular second appeal addresses the question of whether a composite, single sale of agricultural land comprising multiple khatas is indivisible for the purpose of pre-emption, allowing a pre-emptor with a superior right in only one khata to pre-empt the entire transaction. The plaintiff brought a suit for possession by pre-emption concerning land across three khatas, claiming a superior right as a co-sharer in one khata while admitting no co-sharing in the other two. The lower courts decreed the suit only to the extent of the khata where the plaintiff was a co-sharer, while upholding the sale's price apportionment. Upon appeal, the Lahore High Court examined whether the sale was indivisible. The Court held that the rule of indivisibility is not absolute or inflexible, and where distinct properties or khatas are sold in a single transaction, a pre-emptor can only enforce pre-emption in respect of the property subject to their right, treating the transaction as divisible pro tanto. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the plaintiff's pre-emption right could not extend to khatas where he held no superior right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a composite sale of agricultural land comprising multiple khatas is strictly indivisible so that a pre-emptor with a superior right in only one khata can pre-empt the entire transaction?
  • Does the rule of indivisibility of a sale transaction operate as an absolute and inflexible rule of general application in pre-emption suits?
  • Can a pre-emptor enforce a right of pre-emption in respect of a specific property subject to their right in a single bargain without taking over the whole transaction?
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• ATTA MUHAMMAD QURESHI vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1971 PLD Supreme Court 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-28
  settlement lawproperty transferconverted usenatural justiceshow-cause noticerevisional powersmandatory provisionvoid orderdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerned the cancellation of a property transfer to a claimant displaced person. The appellant had initially secured transfer of a property as a house from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner based on its converted use, despite its original classification as a shop. Subsequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner reversed this transfer, deeming it an illegal multiple transfer of shops and interpreting the 'converted use' provisions differently. The Supreme Court held that the 'converted use' of a property under the relevant Press Note and Settlement Scheme was to be determined by its actual use on 20th December 1958, irrespective of its original structure or locale. The Court further ruled that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had the ordinary power to effect such transfers. Crucially, the Court found the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order of cancellation to be a nullity, as it was passed without affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, in violation of the mandatory Section 20(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appeal was allowed, and the original transfer order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'converted use' of a property for transfer under settlement laws depend on its structural alteration or its actual use on 20th December 1958?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner transfer property based on its converted use under the Chief Settlement Commissioner's Press Note?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, revising a previous order without giving the affected person a reasonable opportunity of being heard, a nullity?
  • Does a subsequent opportunity of being heard in a higher forum cure the defect of a mandatory statutory requirement for a show-cause notice not being met at an earlier stage?
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• ATA MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 354 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-18Read full judgment →
• ASIF ALI vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-29
  criminal appealadjournmentright to be heardcounsel withdrawalappellate procedureCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 326, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after the High Court dismissed his appeal in the absence of both the appellant and his counsel. The core legal question was whether the High Court judge acted illegally by proceeding to judgment after refusing an adjournment request, which led the appellant's counsel to withdraw. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the dismissal was neither illegal nor unjustifiable. The Court held that while counsel are entitled to professional consideration, they cannot dictate the court's schedule or control proceedings to suit their personal convenience. The judiciary retains the inherent power to regulate its docket and confine proceedings to relevant limits. The principle established is that where an appellant is absent and their counsel withdraws following a refused adjournment, the appellate court is not precluded from deciding the appeal on the merits based on the available record, provided the requirements of Section 423, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the perusal of the record and opportunity for hearing, have been satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal of an adjournment request by an appellate court, leading to the withdrawal of counsel, constitute a denial of the right to be heard?
  • Can an appellate court decide a criminal appeal on the merits when the appellant is absent and their counsel has withdrawn?
  • Does the term 'if he appears' in Section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate the personal presence of the appellant for the disposal of an appeal?
  • To what extent can counsel control the scheduling and proceedings of a court?
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• ASID ALI vs CHHATAK CEMENT FACTORY, EPIDC, SYLHET1971 PLC 125 · Labour Court · 1970-07-18Read full judgment →
• ASHFAQ-UR-REHMAN KHAN., MAJID & CO., LAHORE vs Ch. MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND ANOTHER., Ch. MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-28
  ejectmentrent duestatute of limitationtime-barred rentdeposit of rentinterlocutory orderpendente lite rent
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These two appeals by special leave arose from ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. In a prior round of litigation, the Supreme Court ruled that time-barred rent prior to the filing of ejectment applications could not be ordered to be deposited under Section 13(6). On remand, the Rent Controller ordered the tenants to deposit arrears for three years prior to the filing date as well as rent that accumulated during the decade-long pendency of the proceedings. The tenants challenged the order, contending that rent falling due after the filing of ejectment applications, but more than three years prior to the Rent Controller's subsequent remand order, was time-barred.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The Court held that an order under Section 13(6) directing deposit of future monthly rent is interlocutory in nature and remains operative until final determination. Because the tenants admitted to depositing monthly rent under the original operative order, or were otherwise in default of it, no part of the rent accumulating during the pendency of ejectment proceedings could be deemed barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Is rent that accumulates during the pendency of ejectment proceedings subject to the statute of limitation under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller directing the deposit of future monthly rent under Section 13(6) remain operative until the final disposal of ejectment proceedings?
  • Can a tenant plead limitation regarding rent accumulating during the pendency of ejectment applications when an earlier direction to deposit monthly rent remains in force?
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• ASGHAR vs The STATE1971 SCMR 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionerror apparent on face of recordgrave and sudden provocationself-defencefrivolous petitionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition was filed against the Supreme Court's order dismissing Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 111 of 1970. The petitioner's counsel argued that the courts, including the Supreme Court, had misjudged the petitioner's defense as one of self-defense rather than grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether a review could be granted on the basis of a newly introduced plea of grave and sudden provocation that was never originally contemplated by the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention was entirely misconceived and imaginatively introduced by counsel for the first time. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a review petition cannot be entertained where no error apparent on the face of the record is disclosed, and warned counsel against filing frivolous review petitions without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be granted based on a new plea raised for the first time by counsel?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of reviewing a Supreme Court judgment?
  • Whether a review lies when no error of law or fact is disclosed in the original judgment?
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• ASGHAR ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 982 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-26Read full judgment →
• ASGHAR ALI RANA vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PIUNJAB, IRRIGATION &1971 PLC 237 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-09Read full judgment →
• ASADULLAH vs MUHAMMAD ALI AND 5 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-04
  murderacquittal appealocular evidencecorroborative evidencedeath penaltyexpectation of lifemiscarriage of justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that acquitted five respondents of murder and related charges, overturning their conviction by the trial court. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court erred in disregarding ocular testimony and incriminating recoveries, and whether the death penalty should be restored upon reversing an acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied the law by isolating ocular evidence from corroborative evidence, specifically ignoring incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons and clothing that confirmed the accused's guilt. The Court affirmed that corroborative evidence must be read alongside ocular testimony to test its veracity, not in isolation. Consequently, the acquittal was set aside, and the convictions were restored. Regarding sentencing, the Court established that while the 'doctrine of expectation of life' may mitigate sentences in cases of inordinate delay, it does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty where a patently erroneous acquittal has caused a miscarriage of justice in a brutal, cold-blooded murder case. The principal offender was sentenced to death, while the others received life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Should ocular evidence be appraised in isolation from corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does an acquittal by a subordinate court create an absolute bar against the imposition of the death penalty by an appellate court?
  • Under what circumstances does the doctrine of expectation of life apply to sentencing in an appeal against acquittal?
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• ASAD HUSSAIN vs FLASHMANS' HOTEL, RAWALPINDI1971 PLC 155 · Labour Court · 1971-01-16Read full judgment →
• ARSALLAH AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 853 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-20Read full judgment →
• ARBAB KHAN vs FAUJDAR AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Peshawar 114 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-12Read full judgment →
• Aqa Syed ASGHAR HUSSAIN Appellant vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 959 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
• ANWAR (ANWAR ALI) vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 581 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-19Read full judgment →
• AMIR HUSSAIN AND 6 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 297 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-16Read full judgment →
• AMIN YOUSUF NIZAMI vs RASHID RAYON MILLS, KARACHI1971 PLD Karachi 505 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-20
  personal injuriesmaster and servantemployer's liabilitynegligencequantum of damagesmedical expensespermanent incapacityloss of earnings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil suit was brought by a weaving master claiming damages for personal injuries sustained to the index finger of his right hand due to the alleged negligence of the defendants' Managing Director, who suddenly switched on a twisting machine while the plaintiff was checking its gear box. The defendants raised multiple inconsistent pleas, denying the accident and alternatively alleging contributory negligence, but failed to substantiate them during trial. The core legal questions revolved around whether the accident occurred due to the employer's negligence, the assessment of special damages for medical expenses and loss of earnings during total disability, and the determination of general damages for permanent partial incapacity. The court held that the accident and resulting injury were duly proved to be caused by the defendants' negligence. The court laid down principles governing the award of damages in personal injury cases, factoring in medical evidence of permanent incapacity percentage, loss of earnings, and economic considerations. A decree was awarded to the plaintiff after adjusting admitted counter-claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant put forth totally inconsistent pleas in a written statement to avoid liability for personal injuries?
  • Is an employer liable for personal injuries caused to an employee by the sudden starting of machinery due to the negligence of the Managing Director?
  • How are general damages for permanent partial incapacity and loss of earning power calculated in personal injury suits?
  • Whether an injured employee is entitled to recover compensation for loss of earnings during the period of total disability resulting from an accident?
  Read full judgment →
• AMARJOTHI PICTURES vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 161 · Madras High Court · 1967-12-18Read full judgment →
• AMAR NATH KHURANA & SONS vs APPELLATE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, AMRITSAR1971 PTD 339 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-01-09Read full judgment →
• AMANAT ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 53 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-16
  revision petitioncounterfeit currencyforged currency notepossession of forged notesburden of proofcriminal intentacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a criminal revision petition directed against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts whereby the petitioner was convicted under Section 489-C of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment for possession of forged currency notes. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the mere recovery of forged currency notes from the possession of the accused is sufficient to establish the offence under Section 489-C, or if the prosecution must separately prove that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe the notes were forged and intended to use them as genuine. The High Court accepted the revision petition and held that under Section 489-C, the prosecution must affirmatively establish both the accused's knowledge/reason to believe the notes are forged and the intention to use them as genuine, which were not proven in this case given the small number of notes and lack of visible defects. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside and the petitioner was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere possession of forged currency notes is sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 489-C of the Pakistan Penal Code without proof of knowledge or reason to believe they were forged?
  • Does the onus lie on the prosecution to prove by direct evidence or reliable circumstances that the accused had the intention to use forged notes as genuine?
  • Can an inference of guilty knowledge be drawn solely from the recovery of a limited number of forged currency notes from an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• AM vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN,1971 PLC 212 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-13Read full judgment →
• ALLAHBANDA AND Another vs Haji AKHIAUDDIN AND Another1971 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-10
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of processsuccessive applicationscriminal complainttransfer of casepolice protection
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a second application for the quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioners, facing a complaint under Sections 419 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had previously sought quashment, which was not pressed, and a transfer of the case, which was granted. Subsequently, they filed a second application for quashment, which the High Court dismissed, holding it lacked competence to review the previous order. The core legal question was whether a second application for quashment under Section 561-A could be maintained without fresh material. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that repeated applications for quashment without new evidence constitute an abuse of the process of the court. The Court further observed that allegations of danger to the petitioners' lives upon attending court in another district should be addressed by seeking police protection rather than through repeated transfer applications. The principle established is that successive applications for quashment under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. are not maintainable absent fresh material.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second application for quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be maintained without the introduction of fresh material?
  • Does the filing of repeated applications for quashment without new evidence constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DIWAYA vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 493 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BUKHSH vs Tits STATE1971 P Cr. L J 211 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-01Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BAKHSH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 694 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-09Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BAKHSH vs AHMAD DIN AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-03
  murderacquittal appealappreciation of evidenceocular testimonyminor discrepanciesblood-stained weaponsmedical corroborationcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court acquitting the respondents who had been convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of a village official. The core legal question was whether the High Court misappreciated the ocular testimony and improperly discarded the evidence of eye-witnesses based on minor inconsistencies and misconceptions regarding medical corroboration and the timing of witnesses' arrival. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, overlooked well-established principles governing criminal appeals against conviction, and misconstrued minor discrepancies as fatal flaws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that minor inconsistencies are normal in human testimony and that the recovery of blood-stained weapons is relevant corroborative evidence even if the human origin of the blood cannot be conclusively determined by a serologist due to disintegration. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside, and the respondents were convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, with their sentences modified to transportation for life considering the passage of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor inconsistencies in the statements of eye-witnesses are sufficient to discredit their otherwise independent and trustworthy testimony?
  • Does the failure to ascertain the human origin of blood on a recovered weapon render the recovery entirely useless as corroborative evidence?
  • What are the established principles governing the review of criminal proceedings and the reversal of an acquittal by an appellate court?
  • Is medical evidence required to be in absolute verbatim conformity with ocular testimony to sustain a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BAKHSH AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1051 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-22Read full judgment →
• ALLAH BAKHSH AND 13 OTHER vs ASSISTANT INSPECTOR-GENERAL POLICE1971 PLC 75 [C.S.T] · Service Tribunal · 1970-09-21Read full judgment →
• ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 15 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-23Read full judgment →
• ALI SHER vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER; GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE,1971 PLC 139 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-09-18Read full judgment →
• ALI NAWAZ AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 860 · Sindh High Court · 1970-06-19Read full judgment →
• ALI NABI KHAN vs M. A. BARI, DXVISIONAL ENGINEER III, GAMMON (EAST1971 PLC 529 · Labour Court · 1970-08-17Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD vs Mst. RABIA BIBI AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 38 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1971-04-22Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD Alias ALI AHMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1224 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-14Read full judgment →
• ALI HUSSAIN vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 1222 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-05Read full judgment →
• ALI BAKHSH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 925 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-20Read full judgment →
• ALI ASGHAR vs The STATE1971 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  capital sentencemurdermitigating circumstancescommutation of sentencespouse murdertransportation for lifesudden provocation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, Ali Asghar, was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, Hazara, which sentence was confirmed by the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the appropriateness of the death sentence. The evidence showed the appellant beat his wife with a club over domestic grievances, resulting in death from cumulative shock of multiple blunt weapon injuries. The defense raised contentions regarding the appellant's mental state. Upon review of the circumstances, the Supreme Court noted mitigating factors: the deceased's provocative nature, the absence of individually fatal or grievous injuries, the cumulative cause of death, the lack of premeditation using a handy stick at the spur of the moment, and the existence of minor children who would be orphaned by the execution. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the capital sentence should be commuted. The Court ruled that where multiple non-fatal injuries cumulatively cause death without premeditation and under sudden provocation from a quarrelsome spouse, transportation for life is the appropriate sentence rather than death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cumulative effect of non-fatal injuries caused without premeditation constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
  • Is a sentence of transportation for life more appropriate than death when a murder is committed at the spur of the moment over domestic grievances?
  • Does the presence of minor children who have lost their mother serve as a mitigating factor in considering the commutation of a capital sentence for a father?
  Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMED vs MESSRS ABCO PRESS, DACCA1971 PLC 350 · Labour Court · 1970-09-29Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMED MOLLA vs MESSRS M. M. ISPAHANI LTD, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 536 · Labour Court · 1970-08-11Read full judgment →
• ALAUDDIN vs BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 829 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-23Read full judgment →
• ALAM KHAN vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, LOWER CHENAB CANAL, CIRCLE1971 PLC 179 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-01Read full judgment →
• ALAM CHAND AND 6 Other vs SITE MANAGER, SKANSKA CEMENTGJUTERIET, DACCA1971 PLC 84 · Labour Court · 1970-07-02Read full judgment →
• Al-Haj ABDUR RAB vs MOBARAKULLAH AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-19
  commitment proceedingsquashmentprocedural irregularitySection 211 CrPCprejudice to accusedcriminal trialmandatory provisions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for the quashment of a commitment order, challenging a Magistrate's failure to comply with Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate's failure to ask the accused for a list of defense witnesses after framing charges constitutes an illegality that automatically vitiates the commitment proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while the duty imposed by Section 211 is mandatory, non-compliance does not inherently vitiate the proceedings as an illegality. Instead, it is a procedural irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. The Court established the principle that procedural lapses in commitment proceedings do not necessitate quashment unless the accused demonstrates actual prejudice. Finding that the appellant had been afforded opportunities to present a defense and had claimed to be tried, the Court concluded that the procedural error did not warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to comply with the provisions of Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate commitment proceedings?
  • Is the non-compliance with Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an illegality or a curable irregularity?
  • Must an accused demonstrate actual prejudice to obtain the quashment of commitment proceedings based on a procedural lapse?
  Read full judgment →
• AKRAM MOQUIM ANSARI (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) AND 3 OTHERS vs Mst.1971 PLD Karachi 763 · Sindh High Court
  Benami transactionpartition suitburden of proofMuslim law of successionco-operative housing societydomestic bye-lawsbeneficial interest
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This suit for declaration, partition, and possession was brought by the legal heirs of the late Moquimuddin Ansari against his second wife, claiming that a bungalow in Karachi, held in her name, was a 'Benami' transaction. The core legal question was whether the property was purchased and constructed with the deceased’s own funds, making the wife merely an ostensible owner, or if she was the beneficial owner. The Court held that the property was indeed held 'Benami' by the defendant for her late husband, as the evidence demonstrated the deceased provided all consideration for the plot and construction. The Court rejected the argument that the transaction was fraudulent for evading society bye-laws, noting that such bye-laws are domestic and not statutory. The principle laid down is that while the burden of proving a 'Benami' transaction lies on the person asserting it, this burden is discharged by showing the purchase money was provided by the claimant. Furthermore, evading non-statutory domestic rules of a co-operative society does not render a transaction unlawful or fraudulent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving a Benami transaction shift once the claimant shows they provided the purchase money?
  • Can a transaction be considered fraudulent for violating the non-statutory bye-laws of a co-operative housing society?
  • Are documents like vouchers and receipts admissible under Section 32(2) of the Evidence Act 1872 when the maker's attendance cannot be procured?
  • Under what circumstances can a court order the sale of a property in a partition suit under the Partition Act 1893?
  Read full judgment →
• AKHTAR HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1314 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-13Read full judgment →
• AKBAR ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 154 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-31Read full judgment →
• AKBAR ALI vs JULIAN H. DINSHAW AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-18
  quashing of criminal proceedingscivil nature of disputepartnership propertymisappropriationabuse of processcriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had quashed criminal proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents. The dispute arose from allegations of misappropriation and fraudulent sale of partnership property, specifically a trawler, during the pendency of arbitration proceedings regarding partnership accounts. The core legal question was whether the dispute, which essentially concerned partnership accounts and property disposal, constituted a criminal offence or was merely a civil dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the allegations did not disclose a criminal offence and that the dispute was civil in nature. The Court affirmed that criminal courts should not be used to harass parties in matters that are essentially civil, particularly when the property in question was accounted for in the firm's books. The principle laid down is that where a dispute over partnership property and accounts is civil in nature, criminal proceedings are an abuse of process and should be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
  • Does the sale of partnership property by partners during pending arbitration necessarily constitute a criminal offence?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to consider documents and accounts to determine if a criminal complaint discloses a cognizable offence?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMED JEE vs AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR1971 PLD Azad J & K 30 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-12-10Read full judgment →
• AHMED H. SPED vs MANAGER, PARSONS CORPORATION, CHITTAGONG.1971PLC34 · Labour Court · 1970-03-25Read full judgment →
• AHMED ALI--Plaintiff vs REGISTRAR, CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES-Defendant-1971 PLD Karachi 182 · Sindh High Court
  restoration applicationdismissal in defaultinherent powerscivil procedurelimitationrevision applicationex parte dismissal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application was referred to a Special Division Bench of the Sindh High Court to resolve a conflict of judicial opinion regarding whether an application under Order IX, Rule 9 or Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which has been dismissed in default, can be restored, and under what provisions of law. The applicant's suit was dismissed in default, and his subsequent application for restoration under Order IX, Rule 9 was also dismissed in default. His second application to restore the first restoration application was dismissed by the lower court as non-maintainable. The High Court held that, in the absence of an express statutory bar, a second application for restoration is maintainable under the provisions of Order IX read with Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court observed that procedural laws should not be presumed to prohibit a remedy unless an express prohibition exists, and that Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies as the residuary limitation period. The revision application was accepted, and the case was remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which is dismissed in default, can be restored by a subsequent application?
  • Does Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 make the provisions of Order IX applicable to proceedings for the restoration of applications dismissed in default?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing a second application to restore a dismissed restoration application under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restore an application dismissed in default if no other express provision applies?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMED ALI vs THE PROPRIETOR, LATIF ART PRESS; DACCA1971 PLC 299 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• AHMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 439 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-19Read full judgment →
• AHMAD SHAFI SHEIKH vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, RAWALPINDI1971 PLD Lahore 206 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-16Read full judgment →
• AHMAD NAWAZ vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-15
  murderright of private defenceself-defenceaggressorbenefit of the doubtsudden fightcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Ahmad Nawaz, for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court and High Court partially accepted the defence version that the complainant party were the aggressors who ambushed the accused and initiated the assault, causing injuries to the appellant's companion, Bakhsha. However, the High Court sustained the conviction on the ground that the fatal shot struck the deceased from behind while retreating, negating the right of private defence. The core legal question is whether the right of private defence of person is vitiated when defensive firing results in an injury to an assailant from behind during a sudden, concerted attack by an aggressive party. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misapplied the law by compartmentalizing actions taken in the heat of a sudden, concerted assault, and that the appellant was fully entitled to the right of self-defence. The appeal was accepted, giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt, resulting in his acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence is lost when a fatal injury is inflicted on an assailant from behind during a sudden, concerted attack?
  • Does the acceptance of the defence version regarding the origin of aggression warrant a full consideration of the plea of self-defence for all ensuing acts?
  • Is an accused disentitled to the right of self-defence merely because the retaliatory firing caused harm to an assailant who was not facing the accused at the exact moment of the shot?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD DIN vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  rehabilitation authoritiesinheritance of refugeesjurisdiction of civil courtsmutation of inheritancelimitation perioddeclaratory suitconsequential relief
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a civil suit filed by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole heir of a deceased refugee, Allah Bakhsh, and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession. The mutation of inheritance had originally been attested in 1953 under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, allotting shares to various claimants. Years later, the appellant filed an appeal against the mutation and subsequently instituted a declaratory suit. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred and barred by jurisdiction, but the first appellate court remanded the matter. The High Court reversed this decision, holding the suit to be not maintainable, barred by civil court jurisdiction, and time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Rehabilitation Authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of inheritance relating to refugee right-holders under the relevant rehabilitation laws, thereby barring the jurisdiction of civil courts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the declaratory suit filed nearly nine years after the mutation order was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory suit challenging the inheritance mutation of a deceased refugee right-holder?
  • Do rehabilitation authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of inheritance regarding refugees under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Whether the time spent in prosecuting a time-barred appeal against a mutation order can be excluded in computing the period of limitation for a civil suit under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD BAKHSH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 75 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-02Read full judgment →
• AHMAD BAIG vs Mst. RAQIA BEGUM1971 PLD Azad J & K 27 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-01-25Read full judgment →
• AHMAD AND 32 OTHERS vs ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (REVENUE), LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 979 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-03Read full judgment →
• AHMAD AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-23
  private defencejoint liabilitycommon intentionculpable homicidegrievous hurtland dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over land possession where the appellants, armed with hatchets and lathis, assaulted the complainant party, resulting in one death and multiple injuries. The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 304 Part I read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which the High Court maintained on the ground that the appellants exceeded their right of private defence of property. The Supreme Court examined whether joint liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 could be attracted for the fatal injury when the right of private defence was exceeded. The Court observed that the right of self-defence is subject to Section 99 and is negatived if the harm caused is disproportionate. Finding that the appellants acted out of spite rather than self-defence, but lacked the intention to kill as they used only blunt weapons on the deceased, the Court held that they shared a common intention to cause grievous hurt. Consequently, the Court altered the convictions from Section 304 Part I to Section 325 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a case falls under Part I or Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when there is no intention to cause death but knowledge of the likelihood of death exists?
  • Can the principle of joint liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to make all accused liable for a single fatal injury when they act in concert to cause grievous hurt?
  • What are the limitations on the exercise of the right of private defence of body or property under Section 99 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• AGHA SAFDAR vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 51 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-16Read full judgment →
• Agha RASHID AHMAD KHAN vs THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB1971 PLC 193 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-18Read full judgment →
• AGHA MOHAMMAD vs Haji MAULA DAD1971 PLD Quetta 10 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-08-04
  sub-tenant evictionurban rent restrictionstatutory noticedisplaced personsexecution proceedingsappealable ordernecessary partyacceptance of rent
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 arises out of execution proceedings where a landlord sought to evict a sub-tenant following an ejectment order against the principal tenant. The core legal questions involved whether an order passed by an executing court in such circumstances is appealable, whether a sub-tenant must be impleaded in an ejectment application under the Ordinance when sub-letting is prohibited, whether an unauthorized sub-tenant is entitled to statutory notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether the withdrawal of rent deposited in court creates a tenancy. The Balochistan High Court held that the executing court's order fell under Section 47 read with Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and was appealable; that an unauthorized sub-tenant is not a necessary party in an ejectment application under the Ordinance prohibiting sub-letting; that an illegal sub-tenant is not entitled to Section 30 notice; and that mere withdrawal of deposited rent without animus to create a lease does not establish a tenancy. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an executing court regarding the execution of an eviction order against a sub-tenant is appealable under Section 47 read with Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a sub-tenant a necessary party in an ejectment application filed by a landlord under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 where sub-letting is prohibited?
  • Whether an unauthorized sub-tenant in possession of evacuee property is entitled to a statutory notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the withdrawal by a landlord of rent deposited in court by an occupant automatically operate to create a tenancy or revive a lease without the requisite intention?
  Read full judgment →
• AFTAB ANWAR JALEEL vs THE STATE1971 PLD Karachi 156 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-11Read full judgment →
• ADVOCATE-GENERAL, GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN, DACCA vs BENOY1971 PLD Supreme Court 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  loss of citizenshipmigration certificateforeigners actburden of prooftemporary refugedomicilecitizenship act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged an order of the High Court of East Pakistan acquitting the respondents of charges under section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. The respondents, original citizens of Pakistan, left for India in 1964 during communal disturbances using a migration certificate but returned to Pakistan within a couple of months. The prosecution alleged they lost their Pakistan citizenship and became foreigners. The core legal question was whether temporary migration to India under a migration certificate during disturbances amounts to a loss of Pakistan citizenship under the law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that migration requires an intention to permanently abandon domicile and acquire a new one in the country of arrival, which was absent here. The Court laid down that mere departure to India under a migration certificate for temporary shelter due to extraordinary circumstances does not extinguish a person's Pakistan citizenship, and the burden remains on the prosecution to prove that an admitted citizen has lost such status.

  Questions settled

  • Does temporary departure from Pakistan to India under a migration certificate during communal disturbances constitute migration resulting in the loss of Pakistan citizenship?
  • Where a person is an admitted citizen of Pakistan prior to traveling abroad, does the burden of proof lie on the prosecution to establish that citizenship was lost?
  • What constitutes migration under the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 in terms of domicile and intention to settle permanently?
  • Does the mere grant of an Indian migration certificate confer Indian citizenship or prove the permanent abandonment of Pakistan citizenship?
  Read full judgment →
• ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND), SARGODHA., MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Supreme Court 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-03
  evacuee propertylimited estatecustomary lawrehabilitation settlement schemestock of descentreversionersMuslim Personal Law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the devolution of evacuee property allotted to females in Pakistan in lieu of limited estates (customary life estates) held in India. The core legal question was whether such property, upon the death of the female allottee, devolves upon her own heirs or the heirs of the last male owner. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of land in Pakistan in lieu of a limited estate does not alter the character of the holding or the stock of descent. The female allottee holds the property as a representative of the last male owner, and the allotment does not constitute self-acquired property. Consequently, upon the termination of the limited interest, the property must devolve upon the heirs of the last male owner, as determined by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The key principle laid down is that the Rehabilitation and Settlement laws did not intend to change the line of succession or create a new stock of descent for female limited owners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allotment of evacuee property to a female in lieu of a limited estate in India create an absolute estate in her favor?
  • Upon the death of a female allottee holding land in lieu of a limited estate, who are the rightful heirs to the property?
  • Does the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, 1957, change the stock of descent for evacuee property allotted to female limited owners?
  • Is a female allottee of evacuee property considered a fresh stock of descent under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• ABUL KASHEM vs E.P.F.I.D.C. WOOD TREATING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 549 · Labour Court · 1970-08-17Read full judgment →
• ABUL KALAM AZAD vs MESSRS TECHNICAL ENTERPRISES INC.1971 PLC 543 · Labour Court · 1970-09-02Read full judgment →
• ABUL HOSSAIN MOLLA Alias HASANUR REHMAN vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1971 P Cr. L J 728 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-08-20Read full judgment →
• ABU TAHER AND 3 Other vs MANAGER, SWISSBORING OVERSEAS1971 PLC 272 · Labour Court · 1977-08-13Read full judgment →
• ABDUR REHMAN vs MASDAR ALI KHAN1971 PLD Peshawar 140 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-19Read full judgment →
• ABDUR REHMAN AND 5 OTHERS vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Peshawar 61 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-05-29
  writ jurisdictiontribal territoryFrontier Crimes RegulationCouncil-of-Eldersindependent discretionacquittaljudicial reviewadministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenges an order of the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, referring a criminal case to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction over administrative orders passed in settled areas regarding occurrences in tribal territories, whether the Deputy Commissioner exercised independent discretion in making the reference, and whether the Home Secretary had the authority to order the retrial of previously acquitted persons. The Court held that it maintains jurisdiction to review orders passed by authorities within its territorial limits, regardless of the location of the underlying occurrence. It ruled the reference invalid, finding that the Deputy Commissioner acted mechanically under the Home Secretary’s directive rather than exercising his own independent discretion. Furthermore, the Court held that the Home Secretary lacked the legal authority to set aside an acquittal and order a retrial. The key principle laid down is that statutory authorities must exercise independent discretion and cannot abdicate their duties by blindly following superior directives.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to review an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner in a settled area if the underlying occurrence took place in a tribal territory?
  • Can a Deputy Commissioner refer a case to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 based solely on a directive from the Home Secretary without exercising independent discretion?
  • Does the Home Secretary have the legal authority under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963 to set aside an order of acquittal and direct a retrial?
  • Is an accused person entitled to a hearing before a reference is made to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUR REHMAN AND 5 Others vs THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 8 Other1971 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-08
  evacuee propertynon-evacuee declarationcompensation poolspecial leave to appealjurisdiction of Custodian
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a house in Sialkot, which was declared non-evacuee property by the Custodian. The core legal questions involve whether the original owner, Chooni Lal, qualified as an evacuee under the relevant statutes, whether the Custodian had jurisdiction to make such a declaration after the property supposedly entered the compensation pool, and whether a delay in filing the initial application barred the relief. The Supreme Court held that Chooni Lal was not an evacuee because he had left Pakistan long before Partition in 1945 and settled in East Africa, and further found that the compensation pool notification explicitly excluded properties with pending proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an individual who left the territories now comprising Pakistan prior to the critical date of March 1, 1947, and did not acquire evacuee property in India or reside there, does not fall within the statutory definition of an evacuee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who left the territory now comprising Pakistan prior to the 1st day of March 1947 can be classified as an evacuee under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957?
  • Does the filing of a claim in Bharat by or on behalf of a person create a legal presumption that such person is an evacuee?
  • Did the Custodian lack jurisdiction to declare a property non-evacuee after the issuance of the notification under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• ABDUR RAZAQ vs DISTRICT MANAGER, LAHORE OMNIBUS SERVICE, LAHORE1971 PLC 199 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1979-06-09Read full judgment →
• ABDUR RASHID vs The STATE1971 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-23
  criminal appealappeal against acquittalmurderappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonyPakistan Penal Code
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by right under the Constitution arose from a judgment of the High Court which reversed the acquittal of the appellant by the Sessions Judge and convicted him under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for stabbing a young man to death with a knife. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony in a criminal trial and the principles governing the interference of an appellate court with an order of acquittal on appeal by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted on recognized principles in disagreeing with the trial court, as the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for discarding reliable eye-witness testimony were speculative and artificial. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that an appellate court will re-examine evidence and set aside an acquittal if the trial court's conclusions are perverse, based on misinterpretation of evidence, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal in a State appeal?
  • Does an order of acquittal weaken the presumption of innocence of the accused?
  • Whether minor discrepancies in witness statements and absence of blood at the immediate spot of attack are sufficient to reject trustworthy ocular evidence in a murder case?
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• ABDUR RAHMAN vs THE ADMINISTRATOR, NORTH BENGAL SUGAR MILLS Co.1971PLC232 · Labour Court · 1970-11-14Read full judgment →