Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD Nawazs MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 2 Others vs THE STATE THE STATE1970 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-19
  criminal appealinterested witnessdying declarationbenefit of doubtcommon intentionsentence reductionmurder conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions and sentences of three appellants under Sections 302/34 and 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and causing grievous hurt to his son. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of interested eye-witness testimony, the propriety of the trial court's reliance on a dying declaration discovered by the court itself, and the sufficiency of evidence against one appellant who had no prior enmity with the deceased. The Supreme Court held that while the convictions of two appellants were supported by consistent eye-witness testimony, the third appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt due to established enmity with the prosecution witnesses and lack of independent corroboration. Furthermore, the Court ruled that it is improper for a trial court to actively search for evidence, such as a dying declaration, instead of allowing the prosecution to conduct the case. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions of two appellants, reduced one death sentence to transportation for life, and acquitted the third appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Should a trial court actively search for evidence instead of allowing the prosecution to conduct the case?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained solely on the testimony of interested witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt where there is evidence of deep-seated enmity with the prosecution witnesses?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to transportation for life based on the secondary role of an accused in a joint criminal act?
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• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 909 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs KHAN MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ KHAN AND Another vs MAKHDOOM SYED GHULAM1970 PLD Supreme Court 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-30
  pre-emptioncourt-feevaluation of suitrejection of plaintlimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption suit dismissed by the trial judge for undervaluation and insufficient court-fee without granting an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. The core legal question was whether a trial court is bound to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the valuation of relief and supply the deficient court-fee under Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or if it has the discretion to dismiss the suit outright once limitation has expired. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 must be read harmoniously, and where a plaint is undervalued, the court is required to grant time to correct the valuation and make good the deficient court-fee, which upon compliance relates back to save limitation. The key principle laid down is that undervaluation of relief falls within the statutory scheme requiring the court to provide an opportunity to rectify court-fee deficiencies rather than summarily dismissing the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is required to grant time to correct the valuation of a suit and supply deficient court-fee under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does the undervaluation of relief exclude a case from the purview of Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Whether the correction of valuation and payment of deficient court-fee under Section 149 saves limitation as if paid in the first instance?
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• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE:1970 P Cr. L J 297 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND Another vs THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, HAZARA AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  criminal law amendmenttribunal referenceright of hearingnatural justicewrit jurisdictionbail cancellationsupreme court
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a criminal case registered against the petitioners under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code on 22nd April 1965. The Commissioner, Peshawar Division, referred the question of the petitioners' guilt to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The petitioners challenged the reference before the High Court via a writ petition, arguing that the reference order was passed without affording them a hearing. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that any initial illegality was cured by a subsequent hearing before the Member, Board of Revenue. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held, following precedent, that the Commissioner's reference made without hearing the accused was without lawful authority. However, considering the repeal of the said Act and inordinate delay, the Court declined to grant leave to appeal, instead advising the Provincial Government to cancel the reference and transfer the case to a court of competent jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, made without hearing the accused, is without lawful authority?
  • Can the illegality of an order of reference passed without a hearing be cured by a subsequent hearing given by a higher revenue authority?
  • How should pending proceedings under a repealed special law be handled in cases of inordinate delay?
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• MUHAMMAD NAJIBULLAH KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  Martial Law Regulationdisplaced personsland settlementpast and closed transactionfundamental rightsspecial leave to appealacquiescence
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The petitioner, a displaced person from India, was allotted lands in Pakistan under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Following Martial Law Regulation No. 89 in August 1961, his entitlement was scaled down, and excess lands were ordered to be surrendered. Subsequently, the petitioner accepted the government's offer to purchase the excess land on preferential terms and paid installments until August 1966. When a later installment demand was made in May 1967, the petitioner challenged the validity of Martial Law Regulation No. 89 before the High Court via a writ petition, alleging violation of constitutional equality provisions and Fundamental Right No. 15. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine due to laches and acquiescence. Seeking special leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that a constitutional right cannot be defeated by laches and that the regulation became assailable under the 1962 Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Fundamental Rights were suspended by the proclamation of emergency, that the curtailment of entitlement in 1961 constituted a past and closed transaction, and that the subsequent purchase of land did not reopen the settled matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Martial Law Regulation No. 89 could be challenged as violative of fundamental rights after the commencement of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does the curtailment of land entitlement under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 constitute a past and closed transaction?
  • Whether subsequent payments of installments for the purchase of excess land render the prior entitlement curtailment an ongoing transaction?
  • Can a petitioner challenge land entitlement reduction after acquiescing to the government's offer to purchase the excess land?
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• MUHAMMAD MAKKI AND 2 Other vs NOOR SILK MILLS LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 67 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LUQMAN vs The STATE1970 PLD Supreme Court 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to provide a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or identify the author of the opinion.

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• MUHAMMAD LATIF AND Others vs THE, STATE1970 P Cr. L J 225 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF AND Another vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 9 Other1970 PLD Supreme Court 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-10
  murderunlawful assemblybenefit of doubtacquittal appealinjured witnessesinterested witnessesappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal by special leave challenged the High Court’s acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents formed an unlawful assembly, murdering one person and injuring several others. The trial court convicted some respondents, but the High Court acquitted all, citing the benefit of doubt due to deep-seated enmity and lack of independent evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the injured witnesses’ testimony was credible and should not be discarded. The Supreme Court faced the core question of whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a sound appreciation of evidence or if it warranted interference. Wahiduddin Ahmad, J. opined that while the principal accused deserved acquittal, the remaining respondents should be convicted based on the injured witnesses' testimony. However, Sajjad Ahmad, J. disagreed, holding that the prosecution’s case was so tainted by hostility and exaggeration that it was unsafe to rely on the same evidence to convict the remaining respondents after acquitting the principal ones. Consequently, the acquittal was maintained, affirming that appellate interference with an acquittal requires strong, independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured witnesses can be relied upon when the prosecution case is otherwise tainted by enmity and exaggeration?
  • Is it safe to convict some accused persons based on evidence that has been rejected against their co-accused in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court?
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• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN AND Other1970 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  abatement of appeallegal representativessubstitutionlimitation periodpre-emptionprocedural law
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A.) as having abated. The original dispute involved a decree for possession of agricultural land obtained by the respondent's predecessor-in-interest based on superior rights of pre-emption. Following the death of the sole respondent during the pendency of the second appeal, the petitioner failed to implead the legal representatives within the statutory period. The petitioner contended that the limitation period should commence from the date of his actual knowledge of the death, rather than the date of death itself. The High Court rejected this plea, finding the petitioner's claim of ignorance regarding the death implausible, and subsequently dismissed the appeal as abated. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no error in the dismissal of the appeal for failure to implead the legal representatives in time. The court affirmed that procedural requirements regarding the substitution of legal representatives must be strictly adhered to, and ignorance of a party's death is not a valid excuse when evidence suggests otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for impleading legal representatives of a deceased respondent commence from the date of the party's death or the date of the appellant's knowledge of the death?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal as abated when the appellant fails to bring legal representatives on record within the prescribed time?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court regarding the date of knowledge of a party's death subject to interference if the finding is based on evidence?
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• MUHAMMAD KHAN Alias MALTA AND 2 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-10-12
  murderdeath sentenceocular evidencemedical evidencegunshot injuriesjoint trialcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment that confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for the murders of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned the legality of a joint trial for accused persons committed under separate orders, and whether the ocular evidence was reliable given alleged inconsistencies with medical evidence regarding the nature and distance of gunshot injuries. The Supreme Court held that there was no material conflict between the eyewitness accounts and the medical evidence. The Court reasoned that eyewitness estimations of distance during a chaotic pursuit are inherently imprecise, and that medical findings regarding the range of fire and the nature of wounds did not definitively contradict the prosecution's version of events. Furthermore, the Court clarified that injuries on the front of the victims were consistent with victims turning while fleeing. Consequently, the Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, establishing that minor discrepancies in medical testimony do not automatically invalidate credible direct evidence, and that eyewitness testimony regarding distance during a dynamic pursuit should not be held to impossible standards of precision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the distance of firing automatically invalidate eyewitness testimony?
  • Can injuries on the front of a victim be reconciled with a prosecution theory that the victim was shot while fleeing?
  • Whether the presence of gunshot injuries on the front of a victim necessarily contradicts the testimony that the victim was shot while running away?
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• MUHAMMAD KHALID KHAN vs (1) THE ROAD 'TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 84 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-01-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAMIL AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 252 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAMADAR vs GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 3 Other1970 PLD Dacca 374 · Dacca · 1968-02-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs Mian EJAZ AHMAD1970 PLC 404 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND 20 OTHERS vs Mst. NAWAB BIBI AND Other1970 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationtime-barredpetition for leave to appealprocedural delaydismissal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question presented was whether the petition could be entertained despite a significant delay in filing. The Court examined the limitation period applicable to the filing of the petition and determined that the petition was barred by time by 367 days. Consequently, the Court held that the petition could not be adjudicated upon its merits due to this procedural defect. The decision reinforces the fundamental legal principle that strict adherence to statutory limitation periods is mandatory for the maintainability of legal proceedings. As the petition was filed well beyond the prescribed time limit without sufficient justification provided to condone such a substantial delay, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, thereby affirming that procedural compliance regarding limitation is a prerequisite for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained if it is filed 367 days beyond the limitation period?
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• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 180 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 567 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND 2 Other vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Karachi 261 · Sindh High Court
  dacoitywrongful confinementpolice officerssanction for prosecutiondeadly weaponsextortionanticipatory bailenhancement of sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal arises out of a judgment by the Sessions Judge, Nawabshah, convicting three police officers and four private individuals for dacoity and wrongful confinement under sections 395 and 342 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the police officers, acting in collusion with private appellants, raided the complainant's house at midnight despite an anticipatory bail order, assaulted him, seized cattle, and wrongfully confined him and his relatives in the police lock-up to extort a bribe. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution of police officers acting during an incident required prior sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whether the mere carrying of deadly weapons attracts section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether obedience to unlawful orders of a superior officer exonerates subordinates. The court held that sanction under section 197 is not required for public servants removable by authorities subordinate to the Provincial Government, and that police officers committing high-handed criminal acts cannot claim to act in the discharge of official duties. Furthermore, the court held that mere carrying of deadly weapons during dacoity attracts the minimum sentence under section 397, and blind obedience to unlawful orders does not excuse criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is required for the prosecution of police officers who are removable from service by an authority subordinate to the Provincial Government?
  • Does the mere carrying of a deadly weapon during the commission of a dacoity attract the enhanced minimum sentencing provisions of section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a police constable or subordinate officer successfully plead obedience to unlawful orders of a superior officer as a complete defense to criminal liability under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When does an act committed by a public servant cease to be one done or purporting to be done in the discharge of official duty for the purposes of statutory protection?
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• MUHAMMAD ISLAMUDDIN (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) AND 2 Others vs S. EJAZ1970 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  settlement propertytransfer of propertycomposite buildingresidential and business unitswrit petitionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of urban property consisting of a residential portion and a shop under settlement laws. The core legal question involves the authority of settlement authorities to divide a composite building containing residential and business units into separate units for disposal and transfer, and whether a shop located in a commercial area can be claimed as part of a residential house. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is duly authorized by law to divide buildings consisting of both residential and business units into separate units and allot them separately. Furthermore, the Court noted that the property was situated in a predominantly commercial area and could not be claimed as part of the residential portion, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the writ petition due to inordinate delay. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities possess the lawful power to divide composite properties into distinct residential and business units for separate disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner is authorized by law to divide a building consisting of residential and business units into separate units?
  • Can a shop located in a predominantly commercial area be claimed as an integral part of a residential portion?
  • Does an inordinate delay of more than three years in filing a writ petition justify its dismissal?
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• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 412 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IRSHAD vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB VEGETABLE GHEE AND GENERAL MILLS LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 135 · Industrial Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs The STATE1970 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  murderstrangulationapprehension at the spotconfessional statementspecial leave to appealconcurrent findingscriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of an 8/9-year-old girl, Mst. Sabri, though he was acquitted of the rape charge under Section 376. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's apprehension at the scene and his involvement in the murder warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was based on a proper appreciation of reliable eyewitness testimony, a confessional statement, and corroborating medical evidence, finding no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' findings. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely implicate an accused and their testimony is supported by independent evidence, direct apprehension at the crime scene, and medical reports, concurrent findings of guilt will not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the conviction is based on reliable eyewitness testimony and medical evidence?
  • Does apprehension of the accused at the spot by eyewitnesses serve as strong corroboration of guilt in a murder charge?
  • Whether the absence of motive for prosecution witnesses to falsely implicate the accused sustains a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs S. A. M. KHAN, MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST1970 PLD Lahore 614 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-16
  mutationrevisional jurisdictionlimitationfraudtitleaggrieved personalternative remedyrevenue record
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 challenged the orders of the Revenue authorities which cancelled a mutation of land previously sanctioned in the petitioner's favour on the basis of an alleged oral gift. The respondents contended that the mutation was obtained fraudulently without their knowledge. The petitioner argued that the respondents' failure to file an appeal within thirty days barred the Collector from exercising revisional jurisdiction, and that the revision application was time-barred. The High Court held that the existence of an alternative right of appeal does not bar the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 164 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967. Furthermore, since the mutation was found to be procured by fraud, the limitation period does not run, as fraud vitiates all proceedings. Crucially, the Court ruled that mutation entries are merely fiscal in nature for revenue collection and do not determine or create title. Consequently, an order setting aside a mutation does not affect substantive property rights, meaning the petitioner was not an 'aggrieved person' under Article 98, especially since an adequate alternative remedy via a civil suit remained available.

  Questions settled

  • Does the availability of an alternative right of appeal bar a Revenue Officer from exercising revisional jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Does the limitation period run against an application challenging a revenue mutation that was obtained through fraud?
  • Do mutation proceedings in revenue records determine or create proprietary title to immovable property?
  • Can a party challenge a mutation order under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 when they have an alternative remedy of establishing title in a civil court?
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• MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 303 · Industrial Court · 1968-06-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 743 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1205 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND 11 Other vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITA1970 PLD Lahore 780 · Lahore High Court · 1968-11-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL Alias BALA vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 111 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs MAKBUL AHMAD AND 3 Others1970 P Cr. L J 407 · Dacca · 1969-10-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSATN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 191 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 66 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-01
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionappreciation of evidencemurderpre-concertreasonable grounds
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This second post-arrest bail application was filed by the applicant, who was accused of murder alongside another assailant. The applicant's counsel raised several contentions, arguing that there was no pre-concert between the applicant and the co-accused, thereby rendering Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 inapplicable. It was further argued that the applicant only inflicted a non-fatal stick blow, that he had sustained injuries rendering him unable to strike, and that the eye-witness testimonies were highly contradictory and unreliable. The State opposed the bail, arguing that the committal inquiry was ongoing, that the applicant was apprehended at the spot, and that the appreciation of evidence was the exclusive domain of the trial court. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that at the bail stage, the court's role is limited to determining whether reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused with the crime. A deeper appreciation of evidence or a definitive finding on the applicability of Section 34, P.P.C. would be premature and prejudicial to the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court conduct a deep appreciation of evidence and make definitive findings on facts at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  • Whether the absence of pre-concert under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be conclusively determined at the bail stage when there is prima facie evidence of joint action?
  • What is the scope of inquiry for a court when determining whether to grant bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 P LC 341 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs Mian MAHMOOD AHMAD AND 3 Other1970 PLD Lahore 140 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-26
  interpretation of statutesurban rent restrictiondeposit of rentmeaning of beforerent controllertenant obligations
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter came before a specially constituted Division Bench of the Lahore High Court to determine the correct interpretation of the phrase 'before the fifteenth day of each month' under subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, as amended. The core legal question was whether the word 'before' excludes or includes the fifteenth day of the month for the purpose of depositing monthly rent by tenants. The Court held that in the absence of ambiguity or a contrary statutory indication, words in a statute must be given their ordinary dictionary and natural meaning. Reviewing lexicographical authorities and comparative case law, the Court concluded that the word 'before' when preceding a specific date or point in time means earlier than or previous to that date, thereby excluding it. The ratio decidendi is that the phrase 'before the fifteenth day of each month' strictly requires the rent to be deposited on or before the fourteenth day, excluding the fifteenth day itself, and the Legislature's omission of terms like 'on or before' or 'by' confirms this restrictive interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct interpretation of the phrase 'before the fifteenth day of each month' under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does the word 'before' when preceding a specified date include or exclude that date in statutory construction?
  • Can standard dictionaries be relied upon to interpret a word when it is not defined in the statute?
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• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs AMTUL BATUL1970 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  ejectmentdefault in rentretrospective operationurban rent restrictionlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a dispute over residential premises in Karachi, which were transferred to the respondent in 1959 and subsequently let out to the petitioner in 1961. The petitioner defaulted on rent payments from July 1961 to December 1963, prompting the respondent to file an ejectment application. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioner's eviction, a decision upheld by both the First Appellate Authority and summarily by the High Court of West Pakistan. The core legal question addressed is whether Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, has retrospective application to ejectment proceedings instituted before its enactment, and whether prolonged rent default can be condoned due to collateral disputes in the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that Section 13-A cannot be applied retrospectively to an ejectment application filed in 1963 before the provision came into force in 1965, and that arrears exceeding two years of rent cannot be condoned based on pending settlement department disputes. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, apply retrospectively to ejectment applications filed before its enactment?
  • Can a tenant's default in rent exceeding two years be condoned merely because a collateral dispute is pending in the Settlement Department?
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• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs BEGUM AKHTARUL ISLAM1970 P Cr. L J 210 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 1330 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSAIN vs ABDUL RAZZAQ AND Another1970 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  temporary injunctionexpert opinionadmissibility of evidencecross-examinationremand of casecivil procedurespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a High Court order remanding a civil suit for permanent injunction to the trial court. The petitioner, a landowner, sought to restrain the respondents from operating a brick kiln, alleging that smoke emissions threatened his garden. The trial and appellate courts granted a temporary injunction based on a certificate from an agricultural expert. The High Court, however, set aside these orders, ruling that the expert's certificate was inadmissible as evidence because it lacked supporting affidavits and the author had not been produced for cross-examination. The core legal question was whether a court can rely on an expert's certificate as substantive evidence without the author being examined as a witness. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that such documents are inadmissible without the author's testimony. The key principle laid down is that an expert's opinion or certificate, when contested, cannot be treated as legal evidence unless the author is produced as a witness in court and subjected to cross-examination by the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on an expert's certificate as evidence if the author has not been produced for cross-examination?
  • Is an expert's certificate admissible in civil proceedings without supporting affidavits or oral testimony?
  • Does a court err by granting an injunction based solely on an expert's document that has been contradicted by the same expert?
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• MUHAMMAD HOSSAIN vs OLYMPIA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 851 · Labour Court · 1970-06-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAYAT vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITA TION1970 PLD Lahore 679 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-29
  police investigationcognizance of offencedouble jeopardywrit jurisdictionaudi alteram partemregistration of FIRDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This writ petition challenged the registration of a criminal case and subsequent police investigation initiated by a report from an Officer on Special Duty. The petitioner contended that Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 barred the investigation, that the Magistrate had already taken cognizance upon receiving the FIR, and that the second investigation constituted double jeopardy and violated natural justice. The Court held that Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 governs the taking of cognizance by a court, not the registration or investigation of cases by the police. It further clarified that the mere receipt of an FIR by a Magistrate does not constitute the taking of cognizance. The Court affirmed that police possess a statutory right to investigate cognizable offenses, which is not subject to the principle of double jeopardy at the investigation stage. Additionally, the principle of audi alteram partem does not apply to the registration of an FIR. Consequently, the Court found the petition misconceived and dismissed it as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 bar the police from registering or investigating a case?
  • Does the mere receipt of an FIR by a Magistrate constitute the taking of cognizance of an offence?
  • Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to the stage of police investigation?
  • Is the principle of audi alteram partem applicable to the registration of an FIR?
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• MUHAMMAD HASSAN AND Another vs THE STATE Opponent1970 PLD Karachi 413 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-25
  murderdeath sentenceocular evidencechance witnessballistic expertidentification paradecommon intentionconfirms death reference
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the convictions and death sentences imposed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, upon the appellants Muhammad Hasan and Sadhoro under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the premeditated murders of Muhammad Usman and Natho. The incident occurred on March 2, 1967, in the Shahi Bazar of Hala Town, where the appellants allegedly targeted Usman to avenge the prior murders of the first appellant's brothers, incidentally killing Natho who was caught in the line of fire. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence from chance witnesses, the integrity of corroborative recoveries such as crime empties and blood-stained clothing, and the evidentiary value of an identification parade. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentences, holding that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were fully corroborated by immediate lodging of the First Information Report, police pursuit, and forensic ballistic and chemical reports, leaving no mitigating circumstances to justify leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses who happened to be present at the scene by chance can be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Does a delay in sending incriminating articles to the chemical analyzer vitiate the evidentiary value of the presence of human blood?
  • Whether an accused who kills an unintended bystander while firing at a target is liable for the murder of the bystander under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • What is the evidentiary impact of flaws in holding an identification parade on the in-court identification of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF vs Ch. MUZAFFAR HUSSAIN AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  displaced persontransfer of propertylandlord and tenantpast and closed transactionleave to appealestoppel of tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court at Lahore, which had allowed a writ petition filed by a local respondent and set aside the transfer of a house previously made in favor of the petitioner, a claimant displaced person. The core legal question concerns whether the transfer of the property had become a past and closed transaction, and whether the respondent, having previously accepted the petitioner as his landlord and paid rent, was barred in law from disputing the petitioner's title. The Supreme Court held that there was force in the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the transaction being past and closed and the estoppel against disputing the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transfer of property in favor of a claimant displaced person constitutes a past and closed transaction that cannot be subsequently challenged?
  • Is a tenant who has accepted a petitioner as his landlord and paid rent barred in law from disputing the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act?
  • Can settlement authorities review a transfer order after the power of review has been taken away by law?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF vs ABDUL QAYYUM AND 4 Others1970 P Cr. L J 283 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF AND Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA1970 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  settlement proceedingsrevisiontransfer of landstatus quosupreme court appealdemarcation proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on March 4, 1970, to examine the validity of an order passed by the Settlement Commissioner in revision, which set aside the transfer of certain lands in favour of the petitioners and ordered a fresh division. The core legal question concerned whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to alter transfer orders during demarcation proceedings, and whether one of the petitioners was improperly excluded under a misconception. The Court held that pending the final determination of the appeal, the impugned order of fresh division passed by the Settlement Commissioner should not be given effect to, and the status quo between the parties must be maintained. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may grant an order to maintain the status quo during the pendency of an appeal to prevent the execution of a disputed administrative or quasi-judicial order that threatens to alter rights before the matter is fully adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner has jurisdiction to alter orders of transfer in demarcation proceedings?
  • Can the Supreme Court order the maintenance of status quo during the pendency of an appeal against an order of the Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD GUL vs The STATE1970 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-01
  murderSection 302 PPCeyewitness testimonydelay in FIRrelated witnessescorroborative evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his co-villager, which was affirmed by the High Court of West Pakistan. The prosecution case rested on the eyewitness testimony of the deceased's son, uterine brother, and relative, supported by motive evidence and the location of the occurrence near a mosque. The petitioner challenged the conviction primarily on grounds of delay in lodging the First Information Report, discrepancies between the weapon named in the FIR ('bandook') and at trial ('rifle'), and arguments regarding the target and direction of the shot. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that although the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained, it was not fatal as the prosecution gained no unfair advantage and only a single assailant was named without prior background enmity. The Court affirmed that natural related witnesses corroborated by local circumstances provide reliable evidence, and minor descriptive terms for firearms do not undermine the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging a First Information Report render the prosecution case doubtful if no false implication or advantage is gained?
  • Can the testimony of related eyewitnesses sustain a conviction for murder if they are natural witnesses corroborated by the physical surroundings of the occurrence?
  • Does describing a firearm as 'bandook' in an Urdu First Information Report constitute a material discrepancy when trial evidence specifies a rifle?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD FAROOQ vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 845 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1159 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN AND Another vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 9 Other1970 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  evacuee propertyequity of redemptionmortgagee rightssettlement authoritiescompensation poolimmovable property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, who held possession of certain lands as mortgagees, challenged the allotment of these lands to respondents by the Settlement Authorities. The petitioners argued that the land was not evacuee property, that it could not be treated as such after 1957, that the mortgagor's right was merely a right to sue, and that their possession could not be disturbed until redemption. The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the equity of redemption is immovable property which vested in the Custodian in 1947, and that the petitioners held only a charge over the property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that the property was indeed evacuee property and that the petitioners' rights were limited to a charge over the property for the mortgage money due. The Court held that the petitioners could seek assessment and recovery of this charge through the proper forum as provided by the statute, and that their rights were not prejudiced by the allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Is the equity of redemption considered immovable property?
  • Does the equity of redemption vest in the Custodian as evacuee property?
  • Can a mortgagee of evacuee property claim a charge over the property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD CHAND MIA vs MUHAMMAD NOAB ALI Alias NOAB AND Other1970 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  special leave to appealorder of remandsecond appealnecessary partyhouse rentEast Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of remand passed by the High Court of East Pakistan in a second appeal. The petitioner had instituted a suit for the recovery of arrears of house rent against the respondents, which was decreed by the trial Court and upheld by the first appellate Court. However, the first appellate Court failed to consider a crucial issue regarding whether the Province of East Pakistan was a necessary party. Consequently, the High Court set aside the decisions and remanded the matter. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in remanding the second appeal for reconsideration of a material issue not properly addressed by the lower appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the remand order was lawful and well-founded, as the issue required the evaluation of legal precedents and the potential taking of further evidence which the High Court could not appropriately undertake at the second appeal stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order a remand in a second appeal when the lower courts failed to consider a material issue?
  • Is an order of remand illegal or without jurisdiction when the unresolved issue requires the taking of further evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 12 Others vs Ch. FAIZ MUHAMMAD AND 8 Other1970 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  dispossessioncriminal procedurepossession disputefinality of ordersmagisterial jurisdictionimplementation of order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated from a dispute over the possession of two squares of land, where the respondent filed an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Following an inquiry, the Additional District Magistrate passed an order on 27 November 1962, declaring the respondent had been illegally dispossessed and was entitled to recover possession. Despite this, the Magistrate later dismissed the respondent's application for implementation, claiming the original order was merely declaratory and lacked specificity regarding the land's identity. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Sessions Judge and the High Court, finding that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to review the final order of 27 November 1962. The Court held that an order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not merely declaratory but requires a determination of possession, and that the identity of the land was sufficiently established in the initial application and preliminary order. Consequently, the Magistrate's refusal to implement the order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional District Magistrate have the jurisdiction to review a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely declaratory in nature?
  • Can a Magistrate refuse to implement an order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds of lack of specificity if the land was identified in the preliminary order?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs Mst. REHMAT BIBI AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-15
  inheritance disputepaternityconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealmutation of propertyappellate review
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the West Pakistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal regarding the inheritance of agricultural land. The core dispute concerned the paternity of the respondent, Mst. Rehmat Bibi, who claimed to be the daughter of the deceased, Noor Muhammad. The petitioner, a collateral heir, alleged that the respondent was not the deceased's daughter but the child of the widow from a previous marriage, and sought a declaration of ownership of the disputed share. The trial court, the district court, and the High Court all concurrently found that the respondent was indeed the daughter of the deceased, based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court held that where there are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding paternity, the Supreme Court will not re-open such findings unless they are perverse or against the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Finding no such error, the petition was dismissed, affirming the established principle that concurrent findings of fact are generally final in appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts?
  • Is the burden of proof regarding paternity shifted to the plaintiff when challenging a mutation entry?
  • Can a finding of fact be re-opened in the Supreme Court if it is not perverse or against the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR Alias SHIKRA vs The STATE1970 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  murderappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonyabscondencecriminal petitiondeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, convicted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the West Pakistan High Court, filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question involved the appreciation of prosecution evidence and the reliability of eye-witness testimony, including allegations of a delayed First Information Report and the presence of charring marks from close-range firearm shots. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts properly appraised the evidence, that minor procedural irregularities by the police do not vitiate the prosecution case, and that unrelated eye-witnesses without enmity towards the accused provide reliable testimony. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and unrelated eye-witnesses can be relied upon in a murder trial when corroborated by other circumstances?
  • Does a procedural irregularity by the police in recording the First Information Report vitiate the entire prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the abscondence of an accused person after the commission of a crime?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH AND 5 Others vs S. A. A. KHAN, C. S. P. MEMBER, BOARD1970 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  writ jurisdictiondisputed titlerevenue boardcivil courtlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises from the decision of the High Court of West Pakistan refusing to interfere in writ jurisdiction with an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, which directed the petitioners to seek their remedy in a civil court regarding a disputed land. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the Revenue Board's order relegating the parties to a civil court when title is seriously disputed and no relationship of landlord and tenant is established. The Supreme Court held that where complicated questions of fact and law regarding title are involved and the respondents genuinely dispute the petitioners' title while claiming possession in their own right, the Revenue Board acted within its jurisdiction in directing the parties to resolve the matter through a civil court. The key principle laid down is that revenue authorities and writ courts should not adjudicate upon complex, disputed questions of title, which are properly left for determination by civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue can direct parties to seek remedy in a civil court when complicated questions of title are involved?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with an order of the Board of Revenue relegating a title dispute to a civil court?
  • Is a revenue court the appropriate forum to adjudicate upon a serious dispute of title where the relationship of landlord and tenant is absent?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZIM vs PAKISTAN EMPLOYEES' CO OPERATIVE HOUSING1970 PLD Karachi 202 · Sindh High Court · 1969-01-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZIM KHAN AND Another vs THE DISTRICT TRIBUNAL, MIANWALI1970 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-10
  leave to appealcourt-feewrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncivil naturebail proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court passed under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, seeking release on bail pending proceedings under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance. The core legal question was whether a petition for leave to appeal arising from a writ petition relating to bail in proceedings under the said Ordinance is of a criminal nature exempt from standard court-fee or of a civil nature requiring a stamp of Rs. 250. The Supreme Court held that the petition is of a civil nature requiring the requisite court-fee stamp, following its recent precedent in Ex-Captain Muhammad Akram Khan. The key principle laid down is that petitions for leave to appeal arising from writ petitions under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution are classified as civil in nature and must be duly stamped accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal arising from a writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution is of a civil or criminal nature?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal from a High Court order concerning bail in proceedings under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance require a court-fee stamp of Rs. 250?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZEEM vs ROADTRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 125 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-05-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZAM vs THE STATE.1970 P Cr. L J 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  quashing of commitment orderprima facie evidencecommittal proceedingsframing of chargecriminal trialleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application for the quashing of a commitment order passed by a Magistrate. The petitioner and a co-accused were committed to the Court of Sessions to stand trial for murder and attempted murder under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to quash the commitment order, given the petitioner's contention that the evidence on record was insufficient to justify framing a charge. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that it was premature to conclude at the committal stage that there was a total absence of evidence against the petitioner, as the First Information Report specifically named the accused and there was prima facie evidence implicating them. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should not interfere with a committal order where there is prima facie evidence to support the framing of charges, as the accused must stand trial to test the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court should quash a commitment order when there is prima facie evidence against the accused?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to determine the sufficiency of evidence for conviction at the committal stage?
  • Does the naming of an accused in the First Information Report constitute sufficient grounds to proceed to trial?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZAM vs The STATE1970 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  commitment orderquashing of proceedingsprima facie casecriminal trialleave to appealmurder charge
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the West Pakistan High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application for the quashing of a commitment order passed by a Magistrate. The petitioner and a co-accused were committed to the Court of Sessions to stand trial for offences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a criminal case registered against them regarding a shooting incident. The core legal question was whether the commitment order should be quashed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to implicate the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was sufficient prima facie evidence on the record to warrant the trial. The Court affirmed that it is premature to quash commitment proceedings when there is evidence available to implicate the accused, and that the accused must face trial before the Sessions Court. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the evaluation of evidence at the commitment stage is limited to determining the existence of a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate to quash a commitment order when there is prima facie evidence against the accused?
  • Does the existence of named accused in an F.I.R. constitute sufficient grounds to proceed to trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order dismissing a petition for quashment of proceedings when evidence exists?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZAD AND 6 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1957-04-15
  criminal appealcommon intentionunlawful assemblyconstructive liabilityriotinggrievous hurtmurderappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from convictions for murder, rioting, and causing grievous hurt following a violent election-day clash. The core legal questions were whether the evidence sufficiently established the primary appellant's guilt for murder and whether the constructive liability for the other appellants should be predicated on Section 149 or Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court upheld the murder conviction, finding the eyewitness testimony credible. Regarding the other appellants, the Court held that while they were liable for grievous hurt, the application of Section 149 was inappropriate because the violence consisted of sporadic, isolated assaults rather than a unified mass attack. Consequently, the Court substituted the basis of liability to Section 34, reflecting joint responsibility for specific acts. The judgment establishes the principle that where assaults are sporadic and isolated, constructive liability is more appropriately grounded in common intention under Section 34 rather than the common object of an unlawful assembly under Section 149. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its practice of not interfering with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constructive liability for grievous hurt should be based on Section 149 or Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases of sporadic assaults?
  • Can a conviction under Section 325 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the evaluation of witness evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN CHUGHTAI vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, MIANWALI1970 PLD Lahore 804 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM RAJA vs THE STATE THE STATE (A) Penal Code (XLV Of 1860),1970 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM And RAJA vs The STATE- The STATE- Respondents (a)1970 P Cr. L J 987 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 500 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND Another vs THE BORDER AREA COMMITTEE, LAHORE1970 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  Border Area Committeeexternmentwrit jurisdictionundesirable personscompensationstatutory compliancenatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the actions of the Border Area Committee regarding the petitioners' externment. The petitioners, residents of a border area, were proceeded against under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, for activities prejudicial to the security or economy of Pakistan. After failing to respond to notices or participate in proceedings, they were declared undesirable persons and subsequently externed. The petitioners later sought permission to re-enter the area, claiming ownership of immovable property, which was refused. The High Court dismissed their challenge, finding the Committee's actions regular and noting the petitioners' own negligence in failing to disclose their property interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners could not complain of illegality when their own non-compliance with statutory notices caused the situation. The Court emphasized that the petitioners' right to compensation for their immovable property remained protected under the High Court's order, and thus, no interference was warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who fails to respond to statutory notices and participate in administrative proceedings later challenge the resulting order as illegal?
  • Does the failure of a party to disclose immovable property to the Border Area Committee preclude them from later claiming compensation for that property?
  • Is the High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition against an administrative order where the petitioner's own negligence caused the adverse outcome?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAM KHAN AND AN OTHER vs Mst. SAID JAN AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  pre-emptionsale versus exchangesecond appealquestions of fact and lawspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed a second appeal in a suit for pre-emption. The petitioners filed the suit alleging that a transaction of sale of land and a haveli was disguised as an exchange to defeat their right of pre-emption. The trial and appellate courts concurrently found that the haveli was transferred separately in 1950 and that the transfer of agricultural land was genuinely an exchange rather than a sale, a concurrent finding of fact upheld by the High Court in second appeal. The core legal question was whether the characterization of the transaction as a sale or an exchange was a pure question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts rightly concluded the transaction was an exchange and that the subsequent sale a year and three months later did not alter the nature of the original exchange transaction. The key principle laid down is that the determination of whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange based on the sequence and nature of subsequent transfers is essentially a question of fact supported by evidence, and timing distinct from immediate succession (unlike a transfer occurring merely two days later) negates any presumption of a disguised sale.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the characterization of a transaction as a sale or an exchange is a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact?
  • Can the High Court interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a property transaction?
  • Does a subsequent sale of land received in exchange, occurring a significant period after the exchange, render the original transaction a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF, MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs DR. ARSHAD MALIK, C. S. P., CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT FAMILY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER_CHAIRMAN, FAMILY PLANNING BOARD, LAHORE1970 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-31
  temporary government employeetermination of servicewrit jurisdictionshow-cause noticeconstitutional protectionservice matterunsatisfactory performance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by former temporary Family Planning Officers whose services were terminated by the Family Planning Department. The core legal question was whether temporary government employees, whose services were terminated due to unsatisfactory performance, are entitled to a show-cause notice under the constitutional framework, despite the temporary nature of their employment. The Supreme Court held that the petitions must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that under Article 179(2) of the Constitution, temporary employees are expressly denied the protections afforded by Articles 175 to 178, which would otherwise require an opportunity to show cause against termination. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court correctly refused to exercise writ jurisdiction, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate that any specific law enacted under Article 174 provided them with a right to a hearing. The Court clarified that if the petitioners felt aggrieved by the stigma attached to their termination or alleged a breach of service conditions, their appropriate remedy lay in seeking redress through civil courts rather than through constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Are temporary government employees entitled to a show-cause notice before the termination of their services under the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does the High Court have writ jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination of temporary government employees where no statutory right to a hearing exists?
  • Can temporary employees claim the protection of Articles 175 to 178 of the Constitution of 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 526 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 447 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ARIF vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 402 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ARIF GULAB KHAN AND 6 Others IMTIAZ KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE. THE STATE. THE STATE1970 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-17
  cognizance of offencepolice reportcancellation of casemagisterial discretioncriminal procedureinvestigation report
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the initiation of criminal proceedings. The petitioners faced various criminal charges, but the Crimes Branch, upon investigation, recommended the cancellation of these cases, deeming them false. The Additional District Magistrate, Jhelum, disagreed with the Crimes Branch's recommendation and directed the police to submit a proper challan, effectively taking cognizance of the offences. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the Magistrate could not proceed when the police report recommended cancellation. The High Court rejected this contention and transferred the cases to another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a Magistrate is not bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a case. The Court affirmed that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(b) regardless of a negative report submitted by the police under Section 173. The Magistrate is entitled to independently evaluate the facts and proceed with the case if they disagree with the investigating officer's conclusions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a criminal case?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 despite a negative report from the police?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to order the submission of a challan when the investigating officer has recommended the cancellation of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ARIF GULAB KHAN AND 6 Others IMTIAZ KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE THE STATE THE STATE Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),1970 P Cr. L J 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-17
  cognizance of offencepolice reportcancellation of casemagisterial discretioncriminal procedurechallan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter concerns a criminal petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld a Magistrate's decision to proceed with a case despite a police report recommending cancellation. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is legally bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a case, or if the Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of an offense and order the submission of a challan despite such a negative report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions of the investigating officer. The Court affirmed that a Magistrate possesses the judicial discretion to take cognizance of an offense under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, regardless of whether the police report suggests the case should be cancelled. The principle established is that a Magistrate’s power to take cognizance of an offense is independent of the police's opinion in a report submitted under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a criminal case?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offense despite a negative report submitted by the police?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to order the police to submit a challan after receiving a report recommending case cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs The STATE1970 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-16
  murdersentence commutationheat of passionprovocationdeath penaltycriminal appealsurgical negligence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Fazal Elahi and sentenced to death, a decision upheld by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted to determine whether the lesser sentence of transportation for life was appropriate given the circumstances. The prosecution established that the appellant, seeking an individual named Abdul Ghafoor, engaged in a quarrel with the deceased. The altercation escalated into a physical struggle, during which the appellant stabbed the deceased, who later died in the hospital. The appellant argued that the incident occurred in the heat of passion following provocation and that the offence should be reduced to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, citing potential surgical error. The Supreme Court rejected the plea of self-defence, noting the deceased was unarmed, and dismissed the claim of surgical negligence. However, the Court held that the sudden nature of the fight, arising from a heated exchange, constituted sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant commuting the death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden altercation and exchange of abuses constitute sufficient provocation to mitigate a death sentence for murder?
  • Is the plea of self-defence available to an accused who kills an unarmed person during a physical struggle?
  • Can an accused successfully argue that death resulted from surgical error rather than the inflicted injury without specific evidence of such negligence?
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• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs ABDUL MAJID AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L. J 232 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1970 PCr.LJ 217 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIR vs MEMBER (COLONIES) BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST1970 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  lambardari grantproprietary rightsgovernment grantvested rightland resumptionwrit jurisdictionadministrative policy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court regarding the acquisition of proprietary rights in land held under a lambardari grant. The petitioner, a temporary lambardar who later became permanent, sought to acquire proprietary rights in the allotted land at a price of Rs. 130 per acre, based on an old policy. The Board of Revenue, however, fixed the price at Rs. 800 per acre in accordance with current policy, and upon the petitioner's refusal to pay this amount, ordered the resumption of the land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed a vested right to acquire proprietary rights at a previously quoted price. The Supreme Court held that a government grant is a favor, not a vested right, and the government retains the authority to revise its policies regarding such grants. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner could not dictate the terms or price of the grant, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lambardari grant confer a vested right upon the grantee to acquire proprietary rights at a fixed price?
  • Is the government entitled to revise its policies regarding the price for acquiring proprietary rights in lambardari grants?
  • Can a grantee of state land dictate the terms and conditions for the acquisition of proprietary rights?
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• MUHAMMAD AMIN vs MUHAMMAD JAMIL1970 P Cr. L J 192 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIN vs Mst. SURRAYA BEGUM AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 475 · Lahore High Court · 1968-10-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD Alias MUHAMMAD ALI vs RAJA AND 7 Other1970 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-02
  giftreversionary rightsfemale proprietary rightsalienation of propertycolonization of government landsjurisdictionappellate jurisdictionstatutory interpretationDarya Burdi Schemelife estate
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This certificated appeal arose from a civil suit seeking a declaration that a gift of land by Mst. Salehon in favor of the appellant was null and void against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs. The core legal questions concerned the interpretation of "on account of some male person" in Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, regarding a female tenant's proprietary rights, and the High Court's jurisdiction to deliver judgment after the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962 came into effect. The Supreme Court held that Mst. Salehon's tenancy was acquired "on account of some male person" (her deceased husband Ahmad) as she received the land due to his prior loss, not in her own independent right. Therefore, Section 30-A(b) applied, restricting her alienation powers, and the gift was void. The Court further ruled that the High Court retained jurisdiction to announce judgment because the appeal was not "pending hearing" under Section 28(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962, as arguments had concluded before the Ordinance's commencement. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the phrase "on account of some male person" in Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Does Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, apply to grants made under the Darya Burdi Scheme to a widow in lieu of her deceased husband's lost property?
  • When does an appeal cease to be "pending hearing" for the purpose of transfer of jurisdiction under Section 28(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962?
  • Can a High Court deliver judgment in an appeal if arguments were heard before the commencement of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962, which altered appellate jurisdiction thresholds?
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• MUHAMMAD ALI vs The STATE1970 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-24
  murder convictioninterested witnessescorroboration of evidencerecovery of weaponspecial leave to appealcriminal appealblood-stained weapon
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of Muhammad Saleem under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court initially convicted the petitioner and three co-accused, but the High Court acquitted the co-accused while maintaining the petitioner's conviction and death sentence. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the testimony of interested eye-witnesses when corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained weapon. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence of interested witnesses requires corroboration in cases of enmity, the recovery of a weapon at the instance of the accused, which was subsequently confirmed by a Serologist to be stained with human blood, provided sufficient corroborative evidence to support the conviction. The Court affirmed that the High Court had properly appreciated the evidence and that no grounds existed to interfere with the sentence. The judgment reinforces the principle that recovery of a weapon linked to the accused can serve as valid corroboration for interested witness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be relied upon to sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused serve as sufficient corroboration for eye-witness testimony?
  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable when co-accused are acquitted based on a lack of corroborative evidence?
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• MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 737 · Lahore High Court · 1959-12-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 1182 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs MUHAMMAD AMIN And Another1970 P Cr. L J 362 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKRAM vs The STATE1970 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  illicit charasrecovery witnessespolice stock witnessessearch and recoverypetition for leave to appealexcise offence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Akram against his conviction under section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act for the possession of illicit charas. The core legal question concerned whether the recovery of the contraband violated section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code due to the alleged status of the recovery witnesses as police stock witnesses and their residence outside the immediate locality. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, finding that the witnesses were residents of areas close to the place of recovery and that at least one witness was an independent zamindar not disqualified from testifying. The court established the principle that witnesses residing in areas close to the place of recovery who are not biased or proven to be stock witnesses satisfy the requirements for validating a search and recovery under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of recovery witnesses residing close to the place of recovery satisfy the requirements of search?
  • Can witnesses who have assisted excise officials in the past be automatically categorized as police stock witnesses?
  • Whether the provisions of search require witnesses to be strictly from the immediate locality of the recovery?
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• MUHAMMAD AKRAM vs Mst. ISLAM BIBI AND 7 Other1970 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-03-29
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesinformerstatutory interpretationpending proceedingsjurisdictionrepeal of law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities retained jurisdiction to transfer evacuee property to an informer after the amendment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, via Ordinance No. II of 1962. The petitioner argued that proceedings were pending prior to the law change and thus protected under the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the amendment to Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by Ordinance No. II of 1962, removed the power of the Central Government to approve alternative methods of property disposal, effectively stripping Settlement Authorities of the jurisdiction to transfer property to informers. Furthermore, the Court noted that the reference by the Enforcement Staff was made after the change in law, rendering the proceedings incompetent. The key principle established is that the repeal or amendment of a statutory provision authorizing a specific administrative power terminates that power, and pending proceedings cannot be saved where the underlying jurisdiction for the action itself has been extinguished by legislative change.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment of Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 by Ordinance No. II of 1962 extinguish the power of Settlement Authorities to transfer property to informers?
  • Can proceedings initiated after a change in law be considered 'pending proceedings' protected by the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Does the deletion of a clause authorizing a specific method of property disposal remove the Central Government's power to approve such disposal methods?
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• MUHAMMAD AKHTAR vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1056 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKHTAR HUSSAIN AND 4 Other vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST1970 PLD Supreme Court 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionjudicial reviewexecutive authorityultra vireswrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation and application of statutory provisions in a writ petition context. The primary legal question centers on whether administrative or executive orders passed without lawful authority or in violation of statutory rules can be sustained under constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court evaluated the scope of judicial review over executive actions, examining whether procedural non-compliance invalidated the impugned orders. Holding in favor of strict adherence to governing rules, the Court determined that executive actions failing to conform to mandatory statutory requirements are void and without legal effect. The Court re-affirmed the fundamental principle that statutory bodies and executive authorities must act strictly within the parameters defined by law, and any exercise of power exceeding statutory limits or violating principles of natural justice is subject to correction under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executive order passed in violation of statutory rules is void and without legal effect?
  • Can administrative decisions exceeding statutory power be corrected under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does procedural non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions invalidate an administrative action?
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• MUHAMMAD AKBAR KHAN vs SULTAN GHANI AND Other1970 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  Sale deedConsiderationPossession of landEvidence ActRecital in deedNon-payment of sale priceContractual dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a suit for possession of land, where the appellant, Muhammad Akbar Khan, sold 192 kanals and 4 marlas to the respondent, Sultan Ghani, via a sale deed. The appellant forcibly re-entered the land, claiming the full sale price of Rs. 60,000 had not been paid, specifically alleging Rs. 26,000 remained outstanding despite a recital in the deed stating private receipt. The lower courts concurrently found against the appellant on the question of payment and the identity of the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that the appellant was precluded by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act from going behind the recital in the sale deed that the entire sum had been paid, as he had not pleaded that the sale was vitiated by fraud, intimidation, want of due execution, want of capacity to contract, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law, as per the second proviso to Section 92. The respondent's suit for possession was thus rightly decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant contradict the recital of payment in a registered sale deed if fraud or other vitiating factors are not pleaded?
  • Does the Evidence Act preclude a party from going behind the recitals in a sale deed regarding the payment of consideration?
  • Is a party bound by the recitals in a sale deed concerning the receipt of consideration when no vitiating circumstances under the Evidence Act are alleged?
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• MUHAMMAD AKBAR AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM And Another1970 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-04
  compromiseadjustment of suitthird party statementcontractual agreementretraction of agreementdiscretion of courtarbitration actoaths act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal addresses whether an agreement between parties to have a suit decided by the statement of a third person constitutes an adjustment under Order XXIII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or an arbitration under the Arbitration Act, or an oath under the Oaths Act 1873. The appellants filed a suit for rendition of accounts and dissolution of partnership and subsequently agreed to abide by the statement of one Abdur Razzak. Before Abdur Razzak's statement was recorded, the appellants applied to retract from the agreement alleging misconduct, but the trial court proceeded to record the statement and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court held that such an agreement does not amount to an adjustment under Order XXIII Rule 3, nor does it fall under the Oaths Act or the Arbitration Act, but operates as a contract which the court may enforce in its discretion. The Court ruled that parties may retract from such agreements before the third person's statement is made, and the court must exercise its discretion whether to hold the parties to it based on the circumstances. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Is an agreement to have a suit decided by the statement of a third person an adjustment within the purview of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can parties to an agreement to abide by a third person's statement retract from the agreement before the statement is recorded in court?
  • Does an agreement to be bound by the statement of a third person fall under the provisions of the Oaths Act 1873 or the Arbitration Act?
  • How should a trial court exercise its discretion when a party seeks to resile from an agreement to have a dispute decided by a third person?
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• MUHAMMAD AFZAL, vs THE CROWN1970 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-06
  criminal appealwitness credibilityresiling witnessesadmissibility of evidencecommitting magistratetransfer of statementsculpable homicide
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the admissibility and evidentiary value of statements made by prosecution witnesses before a Committing Magistrate, which were transferred to the Sessions file under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, despite being marked 'subject to objection' by the trial judge. The appellant contended that the failure to formally decide these objections rendered the statements inadmissible. The Court held that the transfer of such statements to the Sessions file is valid and they constitute substantive evidence in the case, even if the witnesses resile from their earlier testimony at trial. The key principle laid down is that while witnesses who materially alter their testimony are inherently unreliable, a trial court may, after careful scrutiny, rely on their earlier statements made before a Committing Magistrate if it concludes those statements were truthful and the subsequent changes were deliberate attempts to favor the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can statements made before a Committing Magistrate be treated as substantive evidence in a Sessions trial if the witnesses resile from their testimony?
  • Does a trial court's notation that evidence is transferred 'subject to objection' invalidate the admissibility of that evidence if the objection is not formally adjudicated?
  • Is a conviction sustainable based on statements transferred from a Committing Magistrate's record when the witnesses have turned hostile at trial?
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• MUHAMMAD AFZAL vs THE CROWN1970 P Cr. L J 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-06
  criminal appealculpable homicidetransfer of statementcommitting magistratehostile witnesseye-witness testimonycriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerns the admissibility and legal effect of previous statements of eye-witnesses made before the Committing Magistrate that were transferred to the Sessions file under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 'subject to decision of objection'. The Supreme Court held that the statements were validly admitted and treated as evidence in the case, despite the ambiguous phrasing of the trial judge, as they were read out and relied upon without any precise objection being pressed. The key principle laid down is that where witnesses resile from their statements at the trial, the court may, after careful scrutiny and caution, rely upon their previous statements made before the Committing Magistrate if found to be true and deliberately altered at the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous statements of witnesses made before the Committing Magistrate can be treated as evidence under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when transferred subject to objections?
  • Can a court rely on statements made before the Committing Magistrate in preference to resiled statements made during the trial?
  • What is the duty of the court when evaluating witnesses who alter their statements in material particulars between the committing court and the trial court?
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• MUHAMMAD AFZAL KHAN vs THE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 433 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-01-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AFSAR AND 7 Others vs ALLAH DITTA AND 13 Other1970 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  occupancy rightsabandonment of tenancyPunjab Tenancy Actrevenue recordssecond appealextinction of tenancy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a second appeal in a suit filed by landlord-petitioners seeking a declaration that the respondent-tenants had abandoned their occupancy rights and were consequently ineligible to acquire ownership rights under Section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the minority of certain co-sharer tenants constituted a sufficient cause for non-cultivation under Section 38 of the Act. The District Judge reversed this decision, placing the burden of proof on the tenants. On second appeal, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment, holding that revenue records consistently reflected the respondents as tenants, a tenancy cannot be extinguished in part, and minority constituted sufficient cause. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, holding that a finding of fact can be interfered with in second appeal where material evidence, such as consistent revenue entries, was ignored by lower courts. The Supreme Court also affirmed that a tenancy cannot be extinguished in part. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact be disturbed in a second appeal if material evidence was ignored by the lower courts?
  • Whether the minority of a co-sharer tenant can constitute a sufficient cause for non-cultivation under Section 38 of the Punjab Tenancy Act?
  • Can an occupancy tenancy be extinguished in part?
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• MUHAMMAD ' INAYAT ALI KFIAN AND ANOTHER vs FAZLURREHMAN AND Another1970 P Cr. L J 792 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-15Read full judgment →
• MUHABAT vs ABDULLAH AND 9 Other1970 PLD Lahore 303 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-30Read full judgment →
• MUGHAL KHAN vs The STATE1970 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-26
  murderspecial leave to appealmedical evidenceeyewitness testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition seeks special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of death for the murder of Umar Din deceased. The prosecution case is that the petitioner stabbed the deceased with a knife following a dispute over the deceased serving the petitioner's opponent. The defense contended that the occurrence happened differently, alleging the deceased attacked the petitioner first, and further argued that medical evidence regarding an empty stomach contradicted the prosecution's timeline. The core legal question was whether the direct eyewitness testimony should prevail over the medical evidence regarding the time of meals and whether the conviction was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that in the face of reliable direct eyewitness evidence, no adverse importance can be attached to the medical evidence regarding the stomach contents. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can medical evidence regarding the contents of the stomach override reliable direct eyewitness testimony in a murder case?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts based on appreciation of evidence?
  • Is a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when supported by natural eyewitnesses and corroborated circumstances?
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• MUBARIK SHAH vs Mst. BAKHMALA AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  mortgage redemptionadverse possessioninheritance mutationspecial leave to appealproprietary rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal regarding a property dispute. The petitioner claimed exclusive ownership of certain land, asserting that he had redeemed the property from a mortgage using his own funds and had maintained possession for over 12 years, thereby challenging the inheritance mutation of his deceased brother. The core legal question was whether the act of redeeming mortgaged property confers ownership upon the redeemer or merely substitutes them as the mortgagee, and whether the petitioner could claim the mortgage amount in the current proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not become the owner by redeeming the land; rather, he merely stood in the shoes of the mortgagee. The Court affirmed that the petitioner could not be granted relief for the mortgage amount in the present suit, as his claim was based on exclusive ownership, not mortgage recovery. The principle laid down is that a redeemer of mortgaged property cannot claim ownership based on redemption, and any claim for the recovery of mortgage funds must be pursued through a separate, appropriate suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the redemption of mortgaged property by one co-owner confer exclusive ownership upon the redeemer?
  • Can a plaintiff who pleads exclusive ownership of property in a suit be granted relief for the recovery of mortgage funds in the same proceedings?
  • Does a person who redeems a mortgage on behalf of others merely stand in the shoes of the mortgagee?
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• MUBARIK ALI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 711 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZAITOON AND Another vs FARZAND ALI AND 8 Other1970 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  writ petitionstatus quo orderdiscretionary reliefviolation of stay orderpendente lite purchaserlocus standiallotment of land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the allotment of agricultural lands in the district of Multan. The core legal question involves whether a petitioner who violates a status quo order passed by the High Court during pending writ proceedings remains entitled to discretionary constitutional relief, and whether a pendente lite purchaser of the disputed property can challenge the High Court's order. The Supreme Court held that a petitioner who commits an act of highhandedness by alienating disputed property in direct violation of a stay order disentitles herself to any discretionary relief from the court. The Court further held that a purchaser pendente lite who was not a party to the original writ petition lacks locus standi to challenge the High Court's order and purchases the property at his own peril. The key principle laid down is that interference with the due course of justice through the breach of a court's interim injunction bars a litigant from obtaining discretionary remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the violation of a status quo order by a petitioner disentitle her to discretionary relief in a writ petition?
  • Does a pendente lite purchaser have locus standi to challenge an order passed in a writ petition to which they were not a party?
  • At whose peril does a person purchase property that is subject to pending litigation and interim stay orders?
  Read full judgment →