Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Mst. WALAYAT JAN vs THE STATE1970 PLD Azad J & K 27 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-07-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. UMMAL MABIN Alias Mst. UMAL BANIN AND Another vs THE CLAIMS1970 PLD Lahore 897 · Lahore High Court · 1967-03-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. TAJ BEGUM vs FAQIR SHAH AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 7 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. TAHERA BEGUM vs SALEEM AHMED SIDDIQUI1970 PLD Karachi 619 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. SULTANO AND ANOTHER vs Mst. ALIMAN AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 1043 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHIRINBAT vs SALEEM JAMAL AND 7 Other1970 PLD Kar 657 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHARIFAN AND 8 Other vs Khan MUQARRAB KHAN, SETTLEMENT COMMIS1970 PLD Lahore 289 · Lahore High Court · 1969-02-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHARFO AND 2 Other vs GHULAM ABBAS AND 2 Other 'S1970 PLD Lahore 730 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHARAM KHATOON Alias HAKIM ZADI vs THE STATE AND 7 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal transfer applicationtransfer of criminal caseapprehension of dangerjudicial discretionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal transfer application filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns the exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court in refusing to transfer a criminal case on the grounds of alleged threats and danger to the life of the petitioner and her witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly exercised its discretion, noting that transferring the case to another nearby city would not remedy the alleged apprehensions and dangers. The Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while issuing a specific administrative direction to the Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, to provide armed escorts for the petitioner and her witnesses to and from the trial court on the dates of hearing. The key principle laid down is that discretionary orders of the High Court regarding the transfer of criminal trials will not be interfered with by the apex court unless discretion is shown to have been exercised improperly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to transfer a criminal case based on general apprehensions of danger?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court dismissing a criminal transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without proof of improper exercise of discretion?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue administrative directions for police protection to witnesses attending court hearings despite dismissing a transfer petition?
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• Mst. SHARAM KHATOON Alias HAKIM ZADI vs THE STATE And 7 Other1970 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal transfertransfer of criminal casepolice escortwitness securityleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal transfer application by the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench. The petitioner had previously obtained an order transferring her criminal case from Naushero Feroze to Tando Allahyar, but subsequently filed another transfer application under Section 526, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking a further transfer to Hyderabad city on the ground that her life and the lives of her witnesses were in danger. The High Court dismissed the second transfer application. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to transfer the criminal trial to another station despite apprehensions of danger to the petitioner and her witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal, holding that instead of transferring the case, adequate security arrangements should be provided to ensure safe passage. The key principle laid down is that where security concerns are raised regarding the attendance of parties and witnesses at trial, the appropriate remedy is to direct police protection and escorts rather than disrupting the judicial proceedings through a transfer of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal case should be transferred on the ground of danger to the life of the petitioner and witnesses?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct police escort for witnesses and parties attending a trial instead of ordering a case transfer?
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• Mst. SARDARA AND Another vs HANIFULLAH AND 15 Other1970 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  limited ownercustomary lawdower deedoccupancy tenancyinheritancespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a dispute over agricultural land and residential property originally owned by Said Rehman, who died in 1932. Upon his death, mutation was effected in favor of his widow, Mst. Sahib Jamala, under customary law as a limited owner. Mst. Sahib Jamala transferred the property to the petitioners before her death in 1958, following which the respondents (heirs of Abdur Rahim) instituted a suit for possession, claiming she was a limited owner and that a family arrangement existed. The trial court and District Judge decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the High Court modified the decree regarding certain Mianas situated in village Mian Isa, holding them to be validly transferred to Mst. Sahib Jamala by a dower deed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, holding that contentions regarding occupancy tenancy and its conversion not raised before the High Court were deemed abandoned, and that concurrent findings on property ownership supported by the record warranted no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a point regarding occupancy tenancy and its conversion not raised before the High Court be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a widow holding property as a limited owner under custom can validly transfer property received through a dower deed executed by her husband?
  • Are findings of fact regarding the location and status of property based on revenue records binding in second appeal?
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• Mst. SARDAR BEGUM vs Mst. SHERIN TAJA1970 PLD Peshawar 194 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-06-22
  execution of decreeattachment of propertyobjection to attachmentdismissal in defaultabandonment of attachmentlimitationdeclaratory suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from execution proceedings in which the respondent-decree-holder attached immovable property, and the appellant filed objections under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a registered gift deed. The objection application was dismissed in default, and a subsequent application for restoration was withdrawn. Although the executing Court initially directed that the attachment continue while consigning the execution to the record room, the decree-holder subsequently applied for fresh attachment, which the Court granted, indicating that the original attachment had been abandoned. The High Court held that while an order dismissing an objection under Order XXI Rule 58 for default is an adverse order requiring a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 within one year under Article 11 of the Limitation Act 1908, the abandonment and cessation of the original attachment relieved the claimant of the necessity to file such a suit. The fresh attachment gave rise to a new cause of action to object and institute a suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order dismissing an objection to attachment in default under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute an adverse order requiring a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 within one year?
  • Does the abandonment and cessation of an attachment by the decree-holder relieve a claimant of the obligation to file a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 within one year of an adverse order?
  • Where a decree-holder applies for and obtains a fresh attachment after an earlier attachment has ceased, can an objector file fresh objections or a suit contesting the new attachment despite failing to challenge the earlier adverse order?
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• Mst. SAFIA BIBI vs GHULAM HUSSAIN SHAH1970 PLD Azad J & K 13 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-07-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. ROSMATERNESSA vs MURTAZA ALI1970 PCr.LJ 1101 · Dacca · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. RESHAM JAN vs Khan NAWAB KHAN AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 66 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-04-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. RAMZAN BIBI vs Mst. AMINA BIBI (REPRESENTED BY SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST)1970 PLD Lahore 371 · Lahore High Court · -
  stay orderfunctus officiowrit jurisdictionexecution of decreedispossessionbailiff authorityrent restrictioninterim relief
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a civil miscellaneous petition filed within a writ petition, challenging the dispossession of the petitioner from a property despite a High Court stay order. The core legal questions were whether a High Court stay order takes effect immediately upon being passed, rendering the executing court functus officio, and whether bailiffs retain authority to execute warrants after the executing court has formally recalled them. The Court held that a stay order issued by a superior court becomes effective the moment it is passed, suspending the jurisdiction of the executing court. Consequently, any proceedings taken in ignorance of such an order are without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court found that once the executing court recalled the warrants, the bailiffs lacked legal authority to execute them, rendering the subsequent dispossession illegal. The Court affirmed the principle that the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal is ousted when a superior court occupies the field with a stay order, and ministerial officers become functus officio immediately upon the recall of their authority, regardless of whether they were personally notified at the exact moment of action.

  Questions settled

  • Does a stay order issued by the High Court take effect from the moment it is passed or only upon communication to the lower court?
  • Does the recall of warrants by an executing court render the bailiffs functus officio immediately?
  • Can an executing court proceed with execution after a superior court has issued a stay order, even if the stay order has not yet been formally communicated to the executing court?
  • Does the High Court have the power under Article 98 of the Constitution to issue interim relief in matters pending before it?
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• Mst. OMAI AND Othress vs HAKEEM KHAN AND Other1970 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  adverse possessioninheritance disputepossession of propertysecond appealspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute over the estate of Amar Din, who died in 1912, involving a claim for possession of a one-third share by his son Hakeem Khan. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners had established adverse possession over the suit land for the requisite statutory period of over twelve years. The Senior Sub-Judge, Bannu, initially dismissed the suit, finding the petitioners to be in adverse possession. However, the District Judge, Derajat, and subsequently the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, concurrently held that the possession of the petitioners was not proved to be adverse to the knowledge of the plaintiff, thus decreeing the suit and dismissing the second appeal. The Supreme Court considered the petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession. The Court upheld the judgments of the lower appellate and high courts, reinforcing the principle that a party claiming adverse possession must establish it clearly to the knowledge of the rightful owner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving adverse possession lies on the person claiming it against the rightful owner?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession be disturbed in second appeal without showing perversity?
  • Whether a suit for possession of inheritance is barred by time when adverse possession is not proved to the knowledge of the plaintiff?
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• Mst. NAWAB BIBI AND 14 Other vs Mst. ANWAR BIBI AND 6 Other1970 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. NASIBAN BIBI vs THE AUSTRALASIA BANK, LAHORE AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  bona fide purchaserequitable mortgagetransfer of propertydue diligencetitle deedsurban immovable property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that denied the petitioner protection as a bona fide purchaser of a house. The house had been subject to an equitable mortgage created by the original owner, Muhammad Bashir, in favour of the respondent-Bank through the deposit of title deeds. The petitioner claimed protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, arguing that her reliance on revenue records, which showed no encumbrances, constituted sufficient inquiry. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's limited inquiry into revenue records satisfied the requirement for a bona fide purchaser to act with reasonable care. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner's inquiry was insufficient. The Court established the principle that for urban immovable property, a purchaser's duty of inquiry is not satisfied by merely checking revenue records; it must extend to demanding the title deeds, which would have disclosed the existing equitable mortgage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does reliance solely on revenue records constitute sufficient inquiry for a purchaser to claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Is a purchaser of urban immovable property required to demand title deeds to establish bona fide status?
  • Can a purchaser claim protection as a bona fide purchaser if they fail to discover an equitable mortgage that would have been revealed by requesting the title deeds?
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• Mst. MURAD BEGUM AND Others vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND OTHER1970 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-05
  special leave to appeallegal representativesabatement of appealnecessary partiescultivators
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal on the ground that it had abated in its entirety for want of bringing on record the legal representatives of certain deceased parties. The core legal question is whether the non-joinder or failure to bring on record the legal representatives of certain deceased persons—who were allegedly mere cultivators with no independent title and had been given up in prior proceedings—resulted in the abatement of the entire appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that the whole appeal fell through on account of the said abatement, given that the contesting parties and principal representatives were on the record and the deceased individuals allegedly held no independent rights. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the appeal could proceed without those representatives, while directing the petitioners to furnish security for costs and maintaining the stay of execution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal abates in its entirety due to the failure to bring on record the legal representatives of parties who died during the pendency of the suit?
  • Do cultivators possessing no independent right to retain property constitute necessary parties whose absence causes an appeal to fail?
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• Mst. MAQSOODA BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN AND Other1970 PLD Azad J & K 9 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-09-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. KENEEZ AMNA AND Others vs THE FIRST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND Other1970 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  settlement lawsdivisibility of propertywrit jurisdictionfinding of factspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential building in Hyderabad under settlement laws, where rival applications for transfer were filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and the third respondent. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, can interfere with a concurrent finding of fact by settlement authorities regarding the divisibility of a house into separate residential units. The Supreme Court held that the question of divisibility of a house is a question of fact determined by settlement authorities after considering various factors, and such a finding cannot be challenged or interfered with in writ proceedings. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact rendered by specialized settlement tribunals regarding the physical divisibility of property are final and immune from judicial review under writ jurisdiction unless shown to be illegal or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of divisibility of a house is a question of fact that can be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by settlement authorities regarding property units?
  • Does a Letters Patent Bench properly dismiss a writ petition challenging a concurrent factual determination of settlement authorities?
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• Mst. KANIZ FATIMA Alias THANEDARNI vs THE COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1970 PLD Lahore 368 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. KANEEZ FATIMA vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (WITH THE1970 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyprovisional transfer ordersettlement authoritiespossession rightsleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property, specifically a residential building in Hyderabad, between the petitioner, Mst. Kaneez Fatima, and respondent, Mst. Zainab Khatoon. The core legal questions involve determining the exact portion of the disputed property transferred to the respondent via an Appendix and a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.), and whether the petitioner’s claim for the transfer of the portion of the first floor in her possession was rightly refused by the settlement authorities. The petitioner argued that the respondent was never in possession of the first floor, thus excluding it from the transfer. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, concluding that the transfer to the respondent encompassed the portion occupied by the petitioner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the ambiguity regarding the extent of the property transferred to the respondent necessitates a judicial construction of the relevant transfer documents. The Court determined that the petitioner's entitlement to the property depends on the resolution of the scope of the respondent's transfer.

  Questions settled

  • What is the exact portion of the disputed building transferred to the respondent under the issued Appendix and Provisional Transfer Order?
  • Is the petitioner entitled to the transfer of the portion of the first floor currently in her possession?
  • Does the transfer of property to the respondent include the portion of the first floor occupied by the petitioner despite the respondent's lack of possession of that specific area?
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• Mst. JANNA T BIBI vs THE STATE AND 6 OTHERS--Opponents1970 P Cr. L J 489 · Sindh High Court · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. IQBAL BEGUM vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Other1970 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-25
  settlement disputeproperty demarcationwrit petitionsupreme court appealtransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the demarcation of boundaries of adjacent properties in Lahore transferred under settlement laws. The petitioner, Mst. Iqbal Begum, sought the transfer of an adjoining property claimed to be part of her allotted house, while the respondent contended that portions had been wrongly included. Settlement authorities demarcated the boundaries, and the Settlement Commissioner held the properties to be distinct. A subsequent writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether courts can interfere with the factual demarcation and finding of distinct properties by settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that courts cannot interfere with the demarcation or the finding of fact that two distinct houses exist, provided the boundaries are delineated and safeguards are in place regarding payment. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations regarding property demarcation by specialized settlement authorities are final and not open to judicial interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts interfere with the demarcation of properties determined by settlement authorities?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the existence of distinct houses by settlement authorities can be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a party entitled to claim multiple properties beyond what was transferred under the final settlement order?
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• Mst. ILHAMIA AND Another vs MUHWALI (REPRESENTED BY HEIR) AND Other1970 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  inheritancemutationagricultural landspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of factShariat Law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal regarding a claim for possession of agricultural land. The dispute originated from the inheritance of land originally owned by one Sardar, who died prior to the introduction of Shariat Law in December 1935. The petitioners, Mst. Ilhamia and Mst. Zarjan, challenged the validity of mutation No. 3401, attested on February 22, 1938, which recorded a sale of half the suit land by the predecessor Jamaldar to a third party. The core legal question was whether the mutation, attested by the widow of the deceased seller based on her statement regarding the transaction and receipt of consideration, could be successfully challenged by the petitioners to increase their share of the inheritance. The Supreme Court held that since the trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court had all concurrently accepted the correctness of the mutation based on the evidence presented, the petitioners were precluded from re-agitating the issue. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mutation of land sale be challenged in a second appeal when the lower courts have concurrently accepted its correctness based on evidence?
  • Does the attestation of a mutation by a widow on behalf of her deceased husband, based on his prior transaction and receipt of consideration, constitute a valid transfer of land?
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• Mst. IFFAT BEGUM vs Mst. RASHIDA BEGUM AND Another1970 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-03
  settlement of propertytransfer of propertyfinality of ordersDisplaced Persons Actjurisdiction of Settlement Commissioneradministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a building site in Rawalpindi between two rival claimants, Mst. Iffat Begum and Mst. Rashida Begum. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the entire plot to Mst. Rashida Begum, but later issued a subsequent order reserving the plot for Mst. Iffat Begum. Following appeals, the Additional Settlement Commissioner divided the plot equally between the parties, a decision upheld in revision. Mst. Rashida Begum challenged this in the High Court, which held that the initial transfer order in her favor had attained finality under Section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, because it was not appealed against, rendering the subsequent order transferring a portion to Mst. Iffat Begum unlawful. Mst. Iffat Begum sought special leave to appeal, contending that the initial order was passed without notice to her and despite her pending application, and that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction by transferring the entire plot when only half was requested.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unappealed order of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner attain finality under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner lawfully issue a subsequent order transferring property that has already been subject to a final transfer order?
  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner act in excess of jurisdiction by transferring an entire plot when the applicant only requested half?
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• Mst. HAWABAI AND 6 Other vs ABDUS SHAKOOR AND 8 OTHER1970 PLD Karachi 367 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-28
  compromise decreereturn of plaintpecuniary jurisdictionamended plaintcourt feesmaintainability of suitfraudulent decree
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a suit filed to set aside a compromise decree obtained by the defendants in a previous partition suit, alleging fraud and lack of service. The plaintiffs initially filed a suit in a lower court, which was returned for presentation to the proper court due to pecuniary jurisdiction limits. Instead of presenting the original plaint, the plaintiffs filed a new, amended plaint in the High Court, altering the relief sought to avoid court fees and the bar of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff, upon receiving a plaint returned under Order VII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is entitled to file a fresh or amended plaint in the proper court, or if they must present the original plaint. The Court held that the suit was not maintainable, ruling that an order under Order VII, Rule 10 does not permit the filing of a new or different plaint. The principle laid down is that a suit presented in the proper court after being returned is a continuation of the original suit, and the plaintiff cannot unilaterally alter the plaint or file a fresh one.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff, after a plaint is returned under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, file a fresh or amended plaint in the proper court instead of the original one?
  • Does an order returning a plaint for presentation in the proper court under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, allow the plaintiff to treat the original plaint as a useless document?
  • Is a suit presented in the proper court after being returned under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 considered a continuation of the original suit?
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• Mst. HALIMA BEGUM AND Other vs SYED AHAMED AND Other Opposite Parties1970 PLD Dacca 644 · Dacca · 1969-05-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAJRAN vs SARDAR MUHAMMAD1970 SCMR 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeignorance of lawdue diligencegood faithleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a Second Appeal from Order (S.A.O.) as time-barred. The petitioner sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, pleading ignorance of the law of limitation. The core legal question was whether a litigant's personal ignorance of the law of limitation, in the absence of wrong legal advice, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court of Pakistan refused leave to appeal, holding that ignorance of the law does not constitute sufficient cause where the litigant acts without due diligence. The Court laid down the principle that while wrong advice by a lawyer may constitute sufficient cause in certain circumstances, a litigant who has no knowledge of the law of limitation does not act in good faith or with due diligence if they take it upon themselves to determine the time for filing an appeal in disregard of the prescribed statutory limits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a litigant's personal ignorance of the law of limitation constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can the involvement of valuable rights of a petitioner serve as a proper ground for condonation of delay in civil matters?
  • Under what circumstances can wrong advice given by a lawyer constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay under the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Mst. GHULAM SAKINA AND 6 Other vs KARIM BAKHSH AND 7 Other1970 PLD Lahore 412 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-23
  civil revisiondismissal for defaultrestoration of suithearing of the suitinterlocutory matterinherent jurisdictionorder without jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition arose from an order of the Senior Civil Judge, Multan, restoring the plaintiffs' suit which had previously been dismissed for default under Order IX, Rule 8 and Order IX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners contended that the restoration application under Order IX, Rule 9 was barred by limitation and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable. The High Court considered whether a suit could legally be dismissed for default on a date fixed solely for filing a replication, rather than for a substantive 'hearing of the suit'. The High Court held that the provisions of Order IX, Rule 8, C.P.C. are only attracted on dates fixed for hearing—namely, when evidence is recorded, arguments heard, or issues determining the suit are considered—and not for mere interlocutory stages. Consequently, the dismissal for default was without jurisdiction, a nullity, and amenable to rectification under Section 151, C.P.C. Furthermore, revisional jurisdiction is discretionary and not exercised where substantial justice has been achieved. The revision was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court possess jurisdiction under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to dismiss a suit for default on a date fixed merely for filing a replication rather than the substantive hearing of the suit?
  • Is an order dismissing a suit for default passed on a date not fixed for the hearing of the suit a nullity that can be set aside under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the High Court is bound to exercise its revisional jurisdiction to overturn a subordinate court's order when substantial justice has already been achieved between the parties?
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• Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH GENERAL1970 PLD Lahore 493 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATIMA BIBI vs Rana ALI HASSAN AND 2 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 178 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATEMA KHATUN vs MANINDRA MADHAB CHAKI Opposite Party1970 PLD Dacca 693 · Dacca · 1969-02-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. FAIZAN vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL,1970 PLD Karachi 362 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-01
  Telegraph ActDistrict JudgePersona DesignataPrincipal Civil CourtOriginal Civil JurisdictionKarachi BenchJurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner applied to the High Court under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 for the determination of compensation for telegraphic installations erected on her land in Karachi, valued at Rs. 3,78,000. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court, contending that the application should lie before the District Judge under the Telegraph Act. The core legal question was whether the High Court on its original side or the District Judge constitutes the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for Karachi under the statute, and whether the District Judge under section 16(3) is a persona designata or a court. The court held that the District Judge under section 16(3) is not a persona designata but a court, referring to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Furthermore, since the District Judge of Karachi has a restricted pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 25,000, the Karachi Bench of the High Court functions as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for proceedings exceeding that amount. Consequently, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition, and the respondent's application under Order VII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was rejected. The key principle laid down is that where a statute confers jurisdiction on a 'District Judge' without defining it, the General Clauses Act definition applies, and if the local District Judge's pecuniary jurisdiction is limited, the High Court exercising district court jurisdiction on its original side acts as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Judge named under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 is a persona designata or a court?
  • Does the Karachi Bench of the High Court function as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for the civil district of Karachi in proceedings exceeding Rs. 25,000?
  • Whether the term 'District Judge' under the Telegraph Act, 1885 includes a High Court exercising its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction?
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• Mst. BATUL BEGUM vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER;1970 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictionquestion of factsettlement authoritiesprior occupationadministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court. The core dispute between the parties concerned the determination of prior occupation of the premises in question, with the departmental authorities having ruled in favor of the second respondent, Syed Zahoor Hussain. The High Court had previously declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction, reasoning that the dispute involved a pure question of fact rather than a question of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that findings of fact made by departmental authorities are generally not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate or writ courts will not re-examine factual determinations made by competent administrative or settlement authorities unless there is a clear legal error or jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of departmental authorities in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a dispute regarding prior occupation of premises a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE AND Other1970 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-30
  autrefois acquitretrialfinality of acquittalcriminal proceduredouble jeopardyremand order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the scope of retrial orders following the setting aside of a criminal trial due to procedural irregularities. Four accused persons were initially tried, resulting in the conviction of two and the acquittal of two others. The High Court set aside the convictions due to the trial being conducted by successive judges, remanding the case for retrial. During the retrial, the trial judge excluded the previously acquitted accused from the proceedings. The petitioner sought to include them, arguing that the entire trial, including the acquittals, was set aside. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the acquittal of the respondents had attained finality as it was never challenged by the State or the petitioner. The Court affirmed the principle of autrefois acquit, ruling that an acquittal remains valid and binding unless specifically challenged and set aside by a competent appellate court. Consequently, the respondents could not be retried on the same charges, as the order of acquittal had become final and was not subject to reopening simply because the convictions of their co-accused were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order setting aside a trial due to procedural irregularity automatically vacate the acquittal of co-accused persons who were not parties to the appeal?
  • Can an accused person be retried on the same charges after an order of acquittal has become final and was not challenged by the prosecution?
  • Does the principle of autrefois acquit bar the retrial of an accused whose acquittal was not specifically set aside by an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BAKHSHI vs BASHIR AHMAD AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Supreme Court 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-14
  habeas corpuschild marriagepubertycustody of minorMuslim Personal Lawvalidity of marriage
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which granted a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and set the detenu, Mst. Shamim alias Nasreen, at liberty. The core legal question was whether a Muslim female who has attained puberty but is under sixteen years of age can contract a valid marriage, and whether her mother retains the right of custody. The Supreme Court held that while the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 penalizes the marriage of a female under sixteen, the marriage itself does not become invalid under Muslim Personal Law. Furthermore, a mother loses her right of custody upon marrying a stranger and once the minor attains puberty. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the clarification that observations made would not prejudice the pending criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a marriage contracted by a Muslim female under the age of sixteen years become invalid under Muslim Personal Law?
  • Does a mother lose the right of custody of her minor daughter upon marrying a stranger?
  • Can a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be invoked to set a detenu at liberty who is of consenting age and wishes to live with her husband?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ASIFA SULTANA vs HONEST TADERS, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Supreme Court 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-01
  special oathoaths actjudicial discretionresiling from agreementexecution of ejectmentrevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a revision petition in an ejectment execution matter. The core legal question was whether a party who offers to abide by the special oath of the opposing party under the Oaths Act 1873 can subsequently resile from that agreement, and under what circumstances the court may permit it. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to be bound by the statement or oath of the opposite party is contractual in nature, and a party may be permitted to resile from it based on sufficient cause and at the discretion of the court, which discretion must be exercised justly according to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court laid down that while sections 9 to 12 of the Oaths Act govern special oaths, the question of resiling from such an offer is governed by general legal principles and judicial discretion, which will not be interfered with in revision unless perverse or based on no evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who offers to abide by the oath of the opposite party subsequently resile from the agreement?
  • Whether the discretion to permit a party to resile from an oath agreement depends on the facts and circumstances of each case?
  • Is an agreement to be bound by the statement of the opposite party in the nature of a contract?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court permit a party to withdraw from a special oath agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ASGHARI BEGUM vs CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF LAHORE AND Another1970 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  review petitionforma pauperiscourt feeevacuee propertycivil proceduresupreme court of pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition seeking a review of the Court's earlier order dated 2nd October 1969, which had refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petitioner had sought permission to pursue her civil suit in forma pauperis for the recovery of Rs. 50,000 against the Corporation of the City of Lahore for the alleged illegal demolition of her house. Both the trial court and the High Court found that the petitioner possessed sufficient means to pay the court-fee, having obtained evacuee property valued at Rs. 6,000 as a permanent transferee. The core legal question addressed is whether a review of the previous order refusing special leave to appeal is warranted based on findings of fact regarding the petitioner's financial capacity. The Supreme Court held that no valid ground or reason was established to review the prior order, as it was founded on concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's ability to pay the court-fee. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court review an order refusing special leave to appeal based on concurrent findings of fact?
  • Does the ownership of evacuee property as a permanent transferee constitute sufficient means to pay court-fees in a pauper suit?
  • Under what circumstances will a review petition against an order refusing leave to appeal be entertained?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ANWAR SULTAN BEGUM AND Another vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 100 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. AHMADI BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ ALI KHAN AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 341 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. AHMADI BEGUM vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Other1970 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  Settlement lawproperty transferadministrative jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of property by Settlement authorities. The petitioner, Mst. Ahmadi Begum, challenged the orders of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, arguing that she should have been allotted the entire premises rather than only the portion in her possession. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities acted within their jurisdiction in dividing the property into two independent commercial units and determining the status of the respondent as a displaced person. The Supreme Court observed that while there was a factual dispute regarding the petitioner's C.S. Form application, the primary basis for the Commissioner's decision was the long-standing division of the property into two distinct portions occupied by the respective parties. The Court held that the Settlement authorities possessed the jurisdiction to divide the property into independent units and to determine the status of the occupants. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to interfere with the administrative orders and dismissed the petition, establishing that administrative findings on property division and occupant status are within the competent jurisdiction of Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to divide a property into independent units for transfer purposes?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the factual findings of Settlement authorities regarding the status of an occupant as a local or a displaced person?
  • Is a property division order by a Settlement authority sustainable if it is based on the long-standing possession of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ABIDA AND Another vs Haji MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  settlement disputeprovisional transfer orderwrit petitionproperty transferspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding two property numbers relating to a building in Lahore, which were subjected to conflicting transfer orders under the settlement laws. Mst. Abida and another obtained a provisional transfer order for one property number, and later successfully had an adjoining property number included in their transfer order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, a decision which was upheld through successive departmental appeals and revisions. However, the rival transferees, Haji Muhammad Boota and another, challenged the inclusion through a constitutional writ petition in the High Court. The Single Judge set aside the departmental orders favoring Mst. Abida, a decision subsequently affirmed by the Letters Patent Bench. Seeking special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the final settlement authority acted within its jurisdiction and that the High Court erred by not remanding the matter in case of any irregularity. The Supreme Court considered the contentions regarding the powers of the settlement authorities and the propriety of the High Court's interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the final settlement authority determining that two property numbers related to the same property?
  • Should the High Court have remanded the case for disposal in accordance with law if the departmental order suffered from any irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• MOSTAQUE, AHMED vs ANIL DAS AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-01
  persona designatarevisional jurisdictioncivil proceedingsubordinate courtjudicial functiondisturbed persons rehabilitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave addressed whether an order passed by a District Judge under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellant contended that the District Judge acted as a persona designata, thereby excluding the High Court's revisional powers. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework, specifically sections 7-B and 7-C of the Ordinance, which confer powers of a civil court upon officers acting under the Ordinance and deem proceedings before them to be civil proceedings. The Court held that the jurisdiction to hear appeals under section 3 was conferred upon the Court of the District Judge—an existing court subordinate to the High Court—rather than on the District Judge as a persona designata. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the District Judge exercised judicial functions, rendering the order amenable to revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a District Judge under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, open to revision by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does a District Judge acting under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, act as a persona designata or as a court subordinate to the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MOSHARRAF HOSSAIN vs THE STATE1970 PLD Dacca 686 · Dacca · 1969-06-24Read full judgment →
• MONTAZ ALI vs The STATE1970 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  criminal revisioncondonation of delaylimitationsurrendercriminal appealsupreme court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the summary dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the High Court on the ground of limitation. The petitioner was convicted under sections 457 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with a fine, which conviction and modified sentence were upheld by the appellate court on 4th June 1969. The petitioner filed his criminal revision petition nearly nine months later on 2nd March 1970 along with an application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court examined the delay application and found the grounds stated therein to be unreasonable, noting that the petitioner failed to surrender to undergo imprisonment or explain why he avoided the process of law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in dismissing the revision on limitation and that the case was not a fit one for interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that unexplained delay and failure to surrender disentitle a petitioner to discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing a criminal revision petition summarily on the ground of limitation?
  • Does failure to surrender and explain delay in filing a revision petition warrant the refusal of condonation of delay?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the summary dismissal of a revision petition where no reasonable grounds for delay are shown?
  Read full judgment →
• MONASEF HOWLADAR AND 6 Others vs THE' STATE-apposite Party1970 P Cr. LJ 1124 · Dacca · 1970-04-23Read full judgment →
• MOMTAZUL KARIM AND Others vs ABU HUSSAIN AND Another1970 SCMR 816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-19
  specific performancecontract of salebona fide purchaserreadiness and willingnesskhas possessionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which affirmed the decree of the trial Court granting specific performance of an oral contract of sale regarding the Mercantile Bank Building. The plaintiff claimed he entered into a contract to purchase the building for Rs. 65,000, paid Rs. 58,000 within the stipulated period, and sought specific performance when the vendor attempted to sell the property to third parties, namely the petitioners. The trial Court and the High Court concurrently found that the contract was established, that the vendor received the payments, and that the petitioners were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The Supreme Court examined contentions regarding the plaintiff's readiness to pay a minor variance in the balance consideration, alleged delay, and the redundancy of a decree for khas possession in a specific performance suit. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in calculated balances do not negate the plaintiff's continued readiness, that the suit was within limitation, and that a decree for khas possession, though redundant, caused no prejudice, ultimately dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy in the calculation of the balance consideration negate the plaintiff's continued readiness to perform a contract of sale?
  • Whether a decree for khas possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale is redundant or prejudicial?
  • Is a subsequent purchaser with notice of a prior contract of sale entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser for value?
  Read full judgment →
• MOJIBUR RAHMAN AND OTHERS vs BAZLUR RAHMAN1970 P Cr. L J 49 · Dacca · 1968-12-02Read full judgment →
• MOINUL ISLAM vs MESSRS M. ALI & BROTHERS LTD., DACCA1970 PLC 891 · Labour Court · 1970-05-23Read full judgment →
• MOHIUDDIN vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER,1970 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  condonation of delayLetters Patent Appealbarred by timewrong forumgross negligencesettlement writspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the petitioner's Letters Patent Appeal as barred by time. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner exhibited gross negligence and a lack of due care and caution in prosecuting the proceedings, noting that even after the petition was returned from the wrong forum, the petitioner failed to refile a properly constituted appeal within the time allowed by the High Court registry. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that time spent in a wrong forum may be excluded under a liberal view, but subsequent unexplained delays and gross negligence by a party will disentitle them to a condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in prosecuting an appeal in a wrong forum can be excluded for the purpose of limitation?
  • Does gross negligence and lack of due care in refiling an appeal justify the refusal to condone delay?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary power in refusing to condone delay when properly exercised?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD SOOMAR vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 478 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD SHAFQAT vs The STATE1970 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  Special leave to appealConvictionFirst Information ReportMaterial witnessOcular testimonyMotivePakistan Penal Code
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerned a petition for special leave to appeal against a conviction under Section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions revolved around the impact of the alleged absence of a First Information Report (FIR) and the non-examination of a material witness (the injured party, Riazul Hassan) on the reliability of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentence. The Court held that the absence of an FIR does not cause prejudice if there is no material contradiction between the witness's statement and the report, and the witness later admits to making the report. It further ruled that the prosecution is not bound to produce every witness, and a conviction can be based on other reliable evidence, even if a material witness is not examined, provided the court is satisfied with that evidence. Motive was deemed immaterial if the ocular testimony is sufficiently reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a First Information Report automatically prejudice the accused?
  • Is the prosecution bound to produce every witness?
  • Can a conviction be based on other reliable evidence even if a material witness is not produced?
  • Is motive essential for conviction if other evidence is reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD SADIQ AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1066 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD AYOOB vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1289 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-14Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD ALI vs ABDUL MAJID AND Another1970 SCMR 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-23
  Settlement Scheme No. 1displaced personproperty transfercancellation of transferauctionrestoration of propertyequitable jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the restoration of property to a claimant displaced person. The respondent No. 1 had been transferred property under Settlement Scheme No. 1, but the transfer was cancelled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner due to an alleged non-genuine claim surrender and subsequent failure to pay the required price within a short notice period. The property was then auctioned to the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 successfully challenged the cancellation before the Settlement Commissioner, arguing that the default was due to mischance and that the auction was conducted hastily, denying him the statutory 30-day period to pay the dues and seek restoration. The Supreme Court affirmed the Settlement Commissioner's decision, holding that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted hastily in cancelling the transfer and auctioning the property before the expiry of the period during which the original transferee could have sought restoration. The Court concluded that the Settlement Commissioner's order was just and that the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its equitable jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner can cancel a property transfer and auction it before the expiry of the statutory period allowed for the original transferee to pay the dues and seek restoration?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to interfere with an order of the Settlement Commissioner that restores property to a transferee after a hasty cancellation and auction?
  Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD ABOO ABDULLAH vs PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-09
  leave preparatory to retirementgovernment servantevictiondamagesrecovery of possessionservice law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a retired Deputy Inspector-General of Police, initiated a civil suit against the Province of East Pakistan and others seeking damages for his alleged illegal eviction from a room in the Provincial Circuit House. The eviction occurred while the petitioner was on leave preparatory to retirement. The petitioner challenged the legality of this eviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to specifically determine the interpretation of 'retirement' in the context of government service. The core legal question before the Court is whether a government servant who proceeds on leave preparatory to retirement and relinquishes charge on a specific date is considered to have retired from service from that date, pursuant to the provisions of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952. This determination is essential to establish the legal status of the petitioner at the time of the eviction and the applicability of the relevant recovery of possession statute.

  Questions settled

  • Is a government servant who takes leave preparatory to retirement and hands over charge considered to have retired from service from that date for the purposes of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952?
  Read full judgment →
• MIZANUR RAHMAN vs THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DACCA1970 PLD Dacca 767 · Dacca · 1969-06-25Read full judgment →
• MITHO AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 34 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-16Read full judgment →
• Miss ZARINA KHAN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1215 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-24
  superdaricustody of propertyinterim custodyrevision petitionjudicial discretionseizure of vehicle
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition challenges a Magistrate's order refusing to release a car, claimed by the petitioner Miss Zarina Khan, on superdari (custody). The car was seized by police as evidence in a case involving charges under sections 406, 420, and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against the petitioner's brother. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate exercised judicial discretion correctly in withholding the vehicle from its registered owner, given that the vehicle was not subject to decay and the petitioner was not accused of any offense. The Court held that the Magistrate's refusal was unjustified and legally flawed, noting that the Magistrate failed to consider the petitioner's legal right to use her property and relied on incorrect factual assumptions regarding pending transfer applications. The Court emphasized that under section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the primary objective is to ensure proper custody of property, and denying the rightful owner possession without sufficient justification constitutes an improper exercise of judicial discretion. The impugned order was set aside, and the car was ordered to be released to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a vehicle is not subject to decay justify a Magistrate's refusal to grant its interim custody to the rightful owner?
  • Can a court withhold property from its registered owner under section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the owner is not implicated in the alleged offense?
  • Is an order refusing the release of property on superdari vitiated if it is based on incorrect factual premises regarding the status of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss -NILUFFER ULLAH vs CHAIRMAN, EAST PAKISTAN FOREST INDUSTRIES:1970 PLC 316 · Dacca · 1969-11-19Read full judgment →
• Mirza MUHAMMAD BAKHATYAR vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH1970 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-04-14
  refugee statusevacuee propertyallotment cancellationnatural justicewrit petitionrehabilitation authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case comes before the Supreme Court as an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing the appellant's writ petition. The appellant, claiming to be a refugee and Nawab from India, challenged an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) confirming that he was not a refugee, directing his ejectment from an allotted house in Lahore, and cancelling the allotment of certain lands and a garden. The core legal questions involved whether the rehabilitation authorities' finding was vitiated by mala fides, reliance on secret police reports without opportunity to challenge, or violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must be dismissed, as the authorities' finding was substantially supported by ample independent evidence, including explicit admissions made by the appellant himself during the inquiry, rendering any reliance on secret reports non-prejudicial. The key principle laid down is that where a quasi-judicial order is independently and strongly grounded on material on record and clear admissions by a party, the order is not vitiated even if extraneous or secret reports are referenced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner determining a person's status as a non-refugee is vitiated if it relies on material other than disputed secret reports?
  • Can a writ petition succeed against a rehabilitation order when findings of fact are supported by admissions made by the petitioner during an inquiry?
  • Whether the initiation of ejectment proceedings during the pendency of an inquiry into a person's refugee status violates the principles of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza MEHBOOB BEG vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1248 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-13Read full judgment →
• MIRZA KHAN vs THE CROWN1970 P Cr. L J 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1955-02-03
  appeal against acquittalmurdercredibility of witnessessudden fightcriminal appealpresumption of innocencecommon object
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction and death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where the appellant, Mirza Khan, was convicted by the High Court after being acquitted by the trial judge. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court gave proper weight to the trial judge's views on witness credibility and the presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial judge's acquittal was based on erroneous assumptions, including a non-existent 'general rule' of false implication in the district, and that the High Court acted correctly in correcting a manifest error with due regard to established principles regarding appeals against acquittal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court gave proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of witnesses when reversing an acquittal?
  • Does a general rule exist in the Mianwali district that innocent persons are routinely and falsely implicated in criminal cases?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with findings of fact reached upon the evidence by the High Court in the absence of a violation of fundamental principles of criminal justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza KAIM BAIG vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1970 PLC 216 · Industrial Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mirza JAMIL AHMAD. vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1970 PLC 224 · Industrial Court · 1969-01-11Read full judgment →
• Mirza DAULAT HUSSAIN vs ABDUL KHALIQ AND Another1970 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-26
  murderacquittalappraisal of evidenceeye-witness testimonymedical evidencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the respondent, Abdul Khaliq, was initially convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Jhelum, and sentenced to death. The West Pakistan High Court subsequently set aside this conviction and acquitted the respondent, leading the petitioner to seek leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of eye-witness testimony and the plausibility of the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, finding that the eye-witness accounts were inconsistent with the medical evidence, which showed injuries on the chest and abdomen despite claims the victim was shot from behind. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's skepticism regarding the prosecution's theory of the respondent's movements from Karachi. The Supreme Court held that where prosecution evidence is contradictory to medical findings and lacks logical corroboration regarding the accused's presence, an acquittal is justified. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in rejecting eye-witness testimony that contradicts medical evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to explain the accused's movements and means of travel to the scene of the crime?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court acquittal when the lower court has properly appraised the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MIR HOSSAIN SOWDAGAR vs THE PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN AND Other1970 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  Urban Immovable Property Taxwaqf estatetax exemptioncharitable purposesreligious purposeswrit petitionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the assessment of Urban Immovable Property Tax on a building belonging to a waqf estate. The core legal question was whether a building belonging to a waqf estate and occupied by a bank is exempt from Urban Immovable Property Tax under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, merely because the income derived from it is utilized for religious or charitable purposes. The Supreme Court held that the building is not exempt from tax under the said provision because it is not exclusively occupied for religious or charitable purposes, notwithstanding that the rental income is ultimately used for such purposes. The key principle laid down is that the statutory exemption under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, requires the building itself to be occupied for religious or charitable purposes, and the ultimate utilization of the income derived therefrom for such purposes does not suffice to attract the exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a building belonging to a waqf estate and occupied by a tenant is exempt from Urban Immovable Property Tax under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, when the income derived from it is used for religious or charitable purposes?
  • Does the word 'for' in section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, mean 'for the benefit of'?
  • What is the scope of tax exemption for buildings and lands exclusively occupied for religious or charitable purposes under the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• MIR DOST AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 957 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-24Read full judgment →
• Mian MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs Ch. BASHIR AHMAD,1970 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-10
  First Appeal from OrderStay of ExecutionEx Parte DecreeMoney DecreeInterlocutory OrderSecurity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the High Court in a First Appeal arising from an ex parte money decree of Rs. 50,000 based on a pro-note. By the impugned order, the High Court admitted the appeal but refused to grant a stay of execution of the decree, while directing that the decree-holder could not withdraw the decretal amount without furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the executing court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's refusal to stay execution alongside the conditional allowance of withdrawal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the interlocutory discretion exercised by the High Court regarding execution and security. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts possess discretionary power in execution matters during pending appeals, and conditional stay orders requiring security for withdrawal are competent when balancing the interests of both judgment-debtor and decree-holder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to stay the execution of an ex parte money decree upon admitting an appeal against it?
  • Can an appellate court permit the decree-holder to withdraw the decretal amount subject to furnishing adequate security?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order refusing a stay of execution?
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• MIAN MUHAMMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND Another1970 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-24
  religious processionspolice powerslicense refusalMuharram processionPolice Act 1861regulation of processions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a resident of Talagang, sought special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his writ petition challenging the refusal of a license by the Superintendent of Police to take out a Muharram procession. The petitioner contended that under Section 30 of the Police Act 1861, the police lack the authority to ban processions. The High Court had held that the police possess the power to regulate processions, and since a license had already been granted to another resident of the same village, the refusal to the petitioner was not unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed this, holding that while Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 does not authorize an absolute ban on processions, it does empower the police to regulate them, including the discretion to refuse a license to a specific applicant in appropriate circumstances. The Court found no grounds for interference, noting that the petitioner was not forbidden from participating in the procession for which a license had already been issued to his co-villager.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 authorize the police to impose an absolute ban on taking out processions?
  • Does the power to regulate processions under Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 include the discretion to refuse a license to a specific applicant?
  • Is the refusal of a license to one applicant unlawful when a license for a similar procession has already been granted to another person in the same locality?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian MUHAMMAD RASH ID vs The STATE1970 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-11-03
  transfer of casesreasonable apprehension of biasfair trialcriminal procedurewitness intimidationspecial magistrate
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan rejecting the appellant's application for the transfer of criminal cases pending against him from the Court of a Special Magistrate. The charges against the appellant and his employees fell under sections 420 and 467 of the Pakistan Penal Code. During the trial, a prosecution witness gave evidence favorable to the defence, whereupon the Magistrate made remarks indicating an intention to arrest him immediately for prevarication, acting under a mistaken belief regarding section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate's attitude, even if bona fide, was likely to create a reasonable apprehension in the appellant's mind of bias and a lack of judicial detachment. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate's premature assessment of the witness's veracity was highly improper and justified a reasonable apprehension that the accused would not receive a fair trial. The Court laid down the principle that a trial judge giving positive indications during a pending trial that a witness is a liar creates alarm and the apprehension of bias, warranting the transfer of the case to secure the due dispensation of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the attitude of a trial Magistrate threatening to arrest a witness during proceedings is likely to create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the accused?
  • Does a Magistrate's premature assessment of a witness's statement at an intermediate stage disqualify him from proceeding with the case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order passed by the High Court under section 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
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• Mian MUHAMMAD NURULLAH AND 2 OTHERS vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LAHORE AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15
  No-Objection Certificatewrit jurisdictioncinematograph rulesexecutive discretionstatutory dutyjudicial reviewlocal objections
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which sought to invalidate a 'No-Objection Certificate' granted for constructing a cinema. The appellants argued that the certificate was obtained by concealing the proximity of mosques and a school, in violation of Rule 5 of the West Pakistan Cinematograph Rules, 1962, and that the authorities failed to consider local objections. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach. While the High Court correctly noted that it cannot act as an appellate authority or substitute its decision for executive discretion, it failed to address whether the executive had acted in accordance with the law. The Court emphasized that executive authorities must follow the statutory procedure, which includes inviting and considering local objections. Because the government had not yet finalized its decision on the objections, the Supreme Court directed the government to perform its statutory duty, noting that the government retains the power to withdraw a certificate if it was granted based on incorrect information or procedural failure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court under its writ jurisdiction substitute its own decision for that of an executive authority exercising statutory discretion?
  • Does the failure of an executive authority to consider local objections as required by statutory rules render a decision liable to review?
  • Is the grant of a 'No-Objection Certificate' for a cinema subject to the requirement of inviting and hearing local objections?
  • Does the government have the authority to withdraw a 'No-Objection Certificate' once granted if it was obtained through misrepresentation or procedural error?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH AND Another vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITA TION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 5 Other1970 PLD Lahore 915 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-27Read full judgment →
• Mian MIRAJ-UD-DIN vs THE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LAHORE1970 PLD Lahore 569 · Lahore High Court
  surveillancehistory sheethabitual offendernatural justiceshow-cause noticepolice ruleswrit jurisdictionlachescontinuing wrong
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged a police order to open a history sheet and place the petitioner under surveillance. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner qualified as a 'habitual offender' under the Police Rules, 1934, and whether the police were required to provide a show-cause notice before taking such action. The Court held that the impugned order was unlawful and set it aside. It determined that the petitioner, having only one conviction, did not meet the definition of a 'habitual offender,' and the police failed to establish a 'reasonable belief' for the action, having ignored the petitioner's positive antecedents. Furthermore, the Court established that actions affecting a citizen's reputation and liberty, such as surveillance, are subject to the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to be heard. Consequently, the Court ruled that the failure to provide a show-cause notice rendered the order void. Additionally, the Court clarified that surveillance orders constitute a continuing wrong, thereby rejecting the plea of laches regarding the delay in filing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single criminal conviction satisfy the criteria for classifying an individual as a 'habitual offender' under the Police Rules, 1934?
  • Is the police required to issue a show-cause notice to an individual before opening a history sheet or placing them under surveillance?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a challenge against a surveillance order, or is such an order considered a continuing wrong?
  • Can an order for surveillance be sustained if the authority fails to consider the positive antecedents of the individual?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian JAMAL SHAH vs THE SECOND ELECTION TRIBUNAL, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another1970 SCMR 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-03
  election petitionballot paperselection tribunaljurisdictionmarked votesmodus operandileave to appealcorrupt practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an election petition concerning the National Assembly constituency of N.W.F. Peshawar-2, held in March 1965. The petitioner, Mian Jamal Shah, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld an Election Tribunal's decision to declare Khan Nasrullah Khan as the elected candidate. The Tribunal had excluded twenty-six votes deemed to contain intentional, identifiable markings, specifically camouflaged numbers, which the Tribunal interpreted as a modus operandi. The core legal question concerns the scope of the Election Tribunal's jurisdiction to re-examine and exclude votes based on such markings, particularly when the Member of the Election Commission had previously adjudicated matters relating to the count. The Court noted a lack of consensus in previous Supreme Court judgments regarding whether matters strictly relating to the count fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Member or if the Tribunal possesses concurrent authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between the Election Tribunal and the Member of the Election Commission regarding the exclusion of marked ballot papers.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to exclude ballot papers bearing intentional and identifiable marks if the Member of the Election Commission has already adjudicated the count?
  • Is a matter relating strictly to the vote count within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member of the Election Commission?
  • Can an Election Tribunal exclude votes for being marked in a suspicious manner without a formal finding of corrupt or illegal practice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian FAZAL AHMAD vs THE STATE1970 PLD Lahore 726 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-19
  quashing of proceedingsmala fide investigationSea Customs Actmartial law jurisdictionfalse implicationtransfer of investigation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a criminal miscellaneous petition filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with clause 22 of the Letters Patent, seeking to quash allegations disclosing no offence under section 167, items 8 and 9 of the Sea Customs Act, or alternatively to transfer the investigation to an impartial police agency. The petitioner contended that he had previously sold the jeep from which contraband was recovered, and that he was falsely implicated due to his brother's exposure of local police corruption. The court examined the record, finding prima facie documentary evidence supporting the sale of the vehicle by the petitioner prior to the incident. However, noting that the case had been referred for trial before a Summary Military Court under Martial Law Regulations, and considering jurisdictional bars under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969, the court referred the matter to the Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'A', for review while strongly remarking on the mala fide and unfair investigation conducted by the local police.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the matter has been referred for trial to a Military Court under Martial Law Regulations?
  • Can a former owner of a vehicle be held criminally liable for contraband recovered from it after a proven bona fide sale of the vehicle to a third party?
  • What is the duty of the police and executive authorities when handling specious and spiteful criminal prosecutions arising from mala fide intentions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian FAIZ AHMAD vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 1235 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-16Read full judgment →
• MFSSRS FAZALUR REHMAN MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT1970 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  evacuee propertylocus standifinality of orderssuo motu revisiontransfer of propertyDisplaced Persons Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee building. The petitioner, a non-claimant, initially failed to secure the transfer of the property, which was awarded to a claimant respondent. After his appeal against the transfer was dismissed in 1960, the petitioner did not pursue further remedies until he filed an application for suo motu revision, relying on a government memorandum concerning oil company properties. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having failed to challenge the finality of the initial transfer order, possessed the locus standi to reopen the matter based on a subsequent memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked standing, as his entitlement had been conclusively determined by the earlier unappealed order. Furthermore, the Court held that the memorandum conferred rights only upon oil companies, not individuals. Consequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application. The principle laid down is that a party cannot reopen a settled matter regarding property entitlement once the initial adjudication has attained finality through failure to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge a property transfer order after failing to appeal the initial decision regarding their entitlement?
  • Can an individual assert rights under a government memorandum intended exclusively for oil companies?
  • Does an Additional Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to entertain a revision application from a party who has no legal entitlement to the property in question?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS ZENITH LABORATORY (PAK.) LTD. vs MESSRS BRITISH DRUG HOUSES1970 PLD Dacca 772 · DaccaRead full judgment →
• Messrs ZAHIR-UD-DIN ANSARI AND Other vs THE CHAIRMAN, PAKISTAN1970 PLC 319 · Industrial Court · 1968-05-25Read full judgment →
• MESSRS WAHID TEXTILE MILLS, KARACHI vs WAHID TEXTILE MILLS' LABOUR1970 PLC 776 · Labour Court · 1970-08-24Read full judgment →
• MESSRS VALIKA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER vs VALIKA TEXTILE1970 PLC 208 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-13Read full judgment →
• MESSRS TRIPURA MODERN BANK LTD. (PAK ZONE) vs ISLAM KHAN AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 724 · Dacca · 1969-12-02Read full judgment →
• MESSRS THE INDUSTRIAL GRINDING LTD., KARACHI vs FIVE ELECTED1970 PLC 41 (2) · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-04-03Read full judgment →
• MESSRS THE ATTOCK OIL Co. LTD. vs THE SUPREME BODY OF OILFIELDS LEAGUE1970 PLD Lahore 122 · Lahore High Court
  industrial disputebonussuspension of workersinterim awardsettlementfrivolous and vexatious dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil miscellaneous appeal arises from an industrial dispute concerning a reduction in workers' bonus and the suspension of eleven employees by the appellant-company. The core legal questions involve whether a long-term wage settlement barred the workers from demanding higher bonus or reinstatement during its operation, whether bonus disputes and employee suspensions constitute 'industrial disputes' under the law, and whether every preliminary decision under section 10(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance constitutes an interim award subject to immediate appeal. The Lahore High Court held that the settlement only covered disputes pending at its execution and did not preclude future bonus claims arising from arbitrary reductions, that bonus and suspensions directly affect terms of employment and thus constitute valid industrial disputes, and that an order overruling a preliminary objection is not an interim award. The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that bonus is a deferred wage and part of remuneration, and that interlocutory orders dismissing preliminary objections do not automatically warrant publication as interim awards.

  Questions settled

  • Does a long-term settlement barring demands involving financial commitments preclude workers from claiming restoration of a previously reduced bonus?
  • Does a dispute regarding the payment or variation of bonus constitute an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959?
  • Does the suspension of a worker without pay constitute a matter relating to employment or terms of employment under the definition of an industrial dispute?
  • Does every decision of an Industrial Court rejecting a preliminary objection under section 10(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959 amount to an interim award?
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• MESSRS TEXTILE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN; LTD, HYDERABAD vs SHAUKAT ALI1970 PLC 386 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1970-01-24Read full judgment →
• MESSRS STAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs THE STAR TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS' UNION,1970 PLC 423 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-04-17Read full judgment →
• MESSRS SHAFIQ METAL INDUSTRIES vs THE CHAIRMAN, FIRST WEST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 419 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-02-19Read full judgment →
• MESSRS REHMAN COTTON FACTORY-- Defendant vs MESSRS NICHIMEN Co.1970 PLD Lahore 455 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-25
  tenant by sufferancetenant holding overrent restriction lawsindustrial factorywrongful use and occupationnotice to quitdamages
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the Administrative Civil Judge regarding a suit for possession of a cotton factory and damages for wrongful use and occupation. The core legal questions involved whether rent restriction laws applied to an industrial factory and whether a tenant holding over without assent became a tenant by sufferance not requiring a notice to quit. The Lahore High Court held that industrial factories do not fall within the definition of buildings or rented lands under urban rent restriction legislation, meaning ordinary laws like the Transfer of Property Act govern such premises. The Court further held that a tenant remaining in possession after lease expiry without the landlord's express or implied assent is a tenant by sufferance and is not entitled to a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal was dismissed, subject to a minor rectification regarding court fees under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Do urban rent restriction laws apply to an industrial concern or a factory?
  • Whether a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of a lease without the landlord's assent becomes a tenant holding over or a tenant by sufferance?
  • Is a notice to quit required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 when a tenant remains in possession after the lease term expires?
  • Can an appellate court rectify a deficiency in court fees under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS QAMARUDDIN AHMAD & Co. D. B. GHADIALLY vs Haji DIN MUHAMMAD1970 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  arbitration awardrule of the courtunregistered firmpartnership actad hoc judgespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from civil petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals, which upheld the dismissal of objections against an arbitration award. The core legal questions involve whether an arbitrator misconducted himself by not basing the award on an alleged agreement regarding mode of payment, whether an unregistered firm is barred under partnership law from participating in proceedings where it did not file objections, and whether an ad hoc judge of the Supreme Court ceases to be a judge of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator did not misconduct himself, that section 69 of the Partnership Act does not bar a respondent firm from participating if it did not file objections, and that an ad hoc judge remains a judge of the High Court under the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that independent agreements not made the basis of an award can be enforced separately, and that an ad hoc judge's tenure does not extinguish their High Court judgeship.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitrator misconduct himself by failing to base an award on an alleged separate agreement regarding the mode of payment?
  • Is an unregistered respondent firm barred under section 69 of the Partnership Act from participating in proceedings where it did not file objections to an arbitration award?
  • Does a judge cease to be a judge of the High Court upon being appointed as an ad hoc Judge of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MESSRS QADRI SILK MILLS LIMITED, KARACHI vs QADRI SILK MILLS WORKERS'1970 PLC 265 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-10-08Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PUNJAB SOAP FACTORY, LAHORE vs THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, KARACHI1970 PLD Karachi 444 · Sindh High Court · 1966-11-28Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PUNJAB SOAP FACTORY vs THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF TRADE1970 PLD Karachi 604 · Sindh High Court · 1966-11-28Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PROGRESSIVE PAPERS LTD AND 6 Other vs THE SECOND WAGE BOARD1970 PLC 440 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-02-25Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PARIS MILLS (SABINA LTD.), KARACHI vs WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY THE PARIS MILLS WORKERS' UNION AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 166 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-20Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PAKISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs THE CHAIRMAN, SECOND WEST1970 PLC 159 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1968-05-23Read full judgment →
• MESSRS PAKISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD, KARACHI vs THE CHAIRMAN, SECOND1970 PLC 50 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-05-23Read full judgment →