Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry through President S.M.1998 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-28
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedyexhaustion of remediesleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sindh High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition filed by the Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The core legal question addressed was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of the availability of an alternate remedy, specifically noting that the petitioners had already initiated an appeal process before the Federal Government regarding the order of the Director, Trade Organization, without awaiting its outcome. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the dismissal was appropriate due to the existence of this alternate remedy. The Court held that when a petitioner has already invoked an alternate statutory remedy, they are precluded from simultaneously pursuing writ jurisdiction in the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, noting that the petitioners could challenge the Federal Government's subsequent appellate decision in the High Court if they remained aggrieved, thereby reinforcing the principle of exhaustion of alternate remedies before invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable when an alternate statutory remedy has already been invoked by the petitioner?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal before a statutory authority preclude the filing of a writ petition in the High Court?
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• Hussain Bibi and others vs Mst. Amina Bibi1998 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-11
  compromise decreemodification of decreesettlement agreementleave to appealdisposal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal, wherein the parties informed the Court that they had reached a mutual compromise regarding the disputed land. The core legal question was whether the Court could accept and record a compromise agreement between the parties to modify an existing decree. The Supreme Court, upon verifying that the compromise deed was duly signed and thumb-marked by all adult parties and vouched for by their respective counsel, accepted the agreement. The Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be converted into an appeal and allowed in terms of the compromise. Consequently, the Court ordered the modification of the Trial Court's decree to exclude specific land (Killa No. 20, Sq. No. 16) from the dispute, while maintaining the decree for the remaining land. Additionally, the Court directed the disbursement of the deposited consideration amount to the petitioners. The key principle established is that the Supreme Court may exercise its jurisdiction to record a compromise and modify a decree accordingly when all parties are sui juris and consent to the terms.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court modify a Trial Court decree based on a compromise reached between the parties during the pendency of a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a compromise agreement signed by all parties and vouched for by counsel sufficient for the Court to dispose of a matter?
  • Does the conversion of a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal allow the Court to implement a settlement agreement?
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• Humayun Iqbal Shami,Section Officer Ministry of Industries and Production, Islamabad vs Prime Minister of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division and anothers1998 SCMR 1175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-20
  leave to appealservice tribunaldepartmental inquirypenalty of censuredisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal and maintained a departmental penalty of censure. The petitioner faced ten charges, of which only charge number 8 was found established by the inquiry officer, relating to creating a law and order situation and misbehavior. The petitioner contended that the competent authority had previously dropped this charge, as evidenced by subsequent clearance certificates for foreign training and employment, and that no witness had supported the charge during the inquiry. The Supreme Court examined the contentions, noting the arguments regarding the dropping of charges and the lack of supporting evidence, and accordingly granted leave to appeal to consider these matters further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a disciplinary charge once dropped by a competent authority can be re-opened by a successor in office?
  • Can a departmental penalty be sustained when the inquiry officer's finding is unsupported by the testimony of any witness examined during the proceedings?
  • Does the issuance of a clearance certificate regarding pending disciplinary proceedings bar subsequent penal action on a prior charge?
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• Hitachi Limited and anothers vs Rupali Polyester and others1998 SCMR 1618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-10
  international commercial arbitrationcurial lawproper law of contractICC Rulesdomestic awardjurisdictionsetting aside award
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decision of the Lahore High Court remanding applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940, regarding interim awards rendered by an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitral Tribunal in London under a contract governed by Pakistani law. The core legal questions pertained to whether Pakistani Courts retain jurisdiction over arbitration proceedings and awards rendered abroad when the governing substantive law of the contract is Pakistani law, and how curial law relates to the proper law of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court held that since the governing law of the contract is Pakistani law, the arbitration agreement is governed by Pakistani law, making the awards domestic awards under the Arbitration Act, 1940, rather than foreign awards under the 1937 Act. The Court held that curial law governs procedural matters before the seat of arbitration, but substantive matters including the validity, effect, and setting aside of the award under Section 30 of the Act remain within the jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award rendered abroad under an agreement governed by Pakistani law is a foreign award or a domestic award under Pakistani law?
  • Does the choice of a foreign seat of arbitration exclude the jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts over substantive matters governed by Pakistani law?
  • Which law governs the procedural conduct of arbitration compared to the validity and challenge of an arbitration award?
  • Can Pakistani Courts entertain applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940, to set aside an award rendered abroad when the proper law of the contract is Pakistani law?
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• Hidayatullah and anothers vs Chief Secretary, N.-W.F.P. and anothers1998 SCMR 1999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-11
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsmodification of penaltyservice tribunalland acquisitionprivate negotiationequal treatmentminor penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal which modified a civil servant's penalty of removal from service to the withholding of four increments with reinstatement and back benefits. The civil servant was charged under departmental Efficiency and Discipline Rules concerning negligence in a land transaction acquired via private negotiations where title issues were involved. The government appealed against the mitigation of penalty, while the employee appealed against being found guilty of minor negligence. The Supreme Court considered paragraph 52 of the Revenue Circulars regarding duty of care in private land negotiations and examined the principle of equal treatment among co-delinquent officers. The Court held that the Service Tribunal appropriately exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to substitute a major penalty with a minor one, especially where co-accused officers involved in the transaction received lesser punishments. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that its scope of interference with the Tribunal's discretionary exercise in penalty modification is limited, dismissing both appeals.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by the Supreme Court regarding the Service Tribunal's discretionary exercise of modifying a major penalty to a minor penalty?
  • Can a civil servant claim parity in punishment when co-delinquents involved in the same transaction receive lesser penalties?
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• Hidayatullah and another vs Chief Secretary, N.-W.F.P. and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-11
  Service TribunalDisciplinary proceedingsLand acquisitionPenalty modificationEqual treatmentScope of appealRevenue officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which modified a major penalty of removal from service imposed on a Revenue Extra-Commissioner to a minor penalty of withholding four increments. The appellant, Hidayatullah, was charged with negligence in land acquisition proceedings for failing to verify vendor titles and ensure compliance with legal requirements. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in reducing the penalty and whether the appellant’s conduct warranted the original major penalty. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to reduce the punishment was justified, emphasizing that the appellant was entitled to equal treatment with other officers involved in the transaction who received lesser punishments. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that the scope of appeal from a Service Tribunal is limited, particularly where the Tribunal exercises its discretionary jurisdiction to convert a major penalty into a minor one. Consequently, the Court dismissed both appeals, maintaining the Tribunal's modified penalty order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the scope of appeal from a Service Tribunal limited when it exercises discretion to convert a major penalty into a minor one?
  • Does the principle of equal treatment apply to disciplinary actions against government officers involved in the same transaction?
  • What is the duty of a revenue officer regarding the verification of vendor titles during land acquisition by private negotiation?
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• Hassan-Ur-Rehman vs Haleem Shah and anothers1998 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-07-10
  revisional jurisdictionopportunity of hearingremandsection 169 CrPCnotice requirementprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of a petition challenging an order passed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a High Court can pass an order prejudicial to an accused person, who had been released under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, without giving him prior notice and an opportunity of hearing as mandated by Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was denied the mandatory notice required by law prior to the passing of the adverse order. With the State counsel conceding the legal flaw, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's failure to serve notice rendered the impugned order unsustainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the revision petition after providing a due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court pass an order in revision to the prejudice of an accused without giving him notice under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an order passed in criminal revision without hearing the affected person sustainable in law?
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• Haq Nawaz vs Ghulam Muhammad1998 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-24
  malicious prosecutiondamagespreventive proceedingsleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The core legal question examined by the court is whether proceedings initiated under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, being preventive and curative in nature, can constitute a prosecution sufficient to sustain a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. Granting leave to appeal, the court held that such preventive proceedings do not amount to prosecution, rendering the damages suit misconceived. The key principle laid down is that initiation of preventive or curative proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not provide a valid legal basis for a claim of malicious prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Do proceedings initiated under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 amount to prosecution for the purpose of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution?
  • Is a suit claiming damages for malicious prosecution maintainable when based upon preventive or curative proceedings?
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• Haq Nawaz Kiani vs The Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-02
  service recorddate of birth correctionsuperannuationservice rulesPunjab Service Tribunallimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the correction of his date of birth in his service record. The petitioner, a police officer, sought to change his recorded date of birth from 4th May 1936 to 20th July 1939, claiming he discovered the discrepancy late in his career. He had obtained a revised matriculation certificate based on a birth register entry made decades after his initial service entry. The core legal question was whether a government servant is entitled to seek rectification of their date of birth in service records near the age of retirement, contrary to established service rules. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the petitioner's belated claim was improbable and lacked merit. The Court affirmed the principle that government service rules requiring applications for age correction to be filed within two years of entry into service are sound and logical. It emphasized that such rules prevent unwarranted, late-stage claims and that courts must discourage the practice of fabricating or manipulating documents to extend service tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant seek the correction of their date of birth in service records near the time of retirement?
  • Is the limitation period of two years for seeking correction of date of birth in government service records legally binding and enforceable?
  • Does a belatedly obtained matriculation certificate constitute sufficient evidence to override the date of birth originally recorded at the time of entry into government service?
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• Haq Nawaz Kiani vs The Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Civil Secretariat Lahore and others1998 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-02
  service recorddate of birth correctionsuperannuationgovernment servicelimitation periodservice tribunalfabrication of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's request to alter his date of birth in his official service record. The petitioner, a Superintendent of Police, sought to change his recorded date of birth from 4th May 1936 to 20th July 1939, alleging he discovered the error late in his career based on family recollections and a subsequently obtained duplicate Matriculation Certificate. The core legal question was whether a government servant could seek rectification of their date of birth in service records near the time of retirement, contrary to established service rules. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the petitioner's belated claim was improbable and lacked merit. The Court affirmed that government servants cannot be permitted to seek such changes at the fag-end of their careers, as this encourages the fabrication of documents. The key principle laid down is that the declaration of age at the time of entry into government service is conclusive, and rectification must be sought within the prescribed limitation period, typically two years from the date of entry.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant seek rectification of their date of birth in service records near the age of retirement?
  • Is the declaration of age at the time of entry into government service considered conclusive?
  • Does the limitation period for seeking correction of date of birth in service records apply even if new documents are obtained?
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• Hakim Ali Zardari vs The State and another1998 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-10-15
  post-arrest bailcash securityEhtesab Actretrospective operationprocedural lawvested rightsrepeal of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against an order of the Ehtesab Bench of the Lahore High Court directing the appellant to furnish a cash security of Rs. 10,000,000 while confirming his post-arrest bail in an Ehtesab reference. The core legal question was whether the Ehtesab Bench acted within its jurisdiction and whether the procedural change introduced by the subsequent Ehtesab Act allowing the court to direct a cash deposit for bail applied retrospectively to pending proceedings. The majority of the court held that provisions relating to procedural changes and modes of granting bail apply retrospectively to pending actions under saved repeal clauses, making the order valid under the Ehtesab Act. The appeal was dismissed by majority, upholding the cash security condition with an extended timeframe for deposit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions relating to fixation of bail amounts and the discretion to order cash deposits under the Ehtesab Act apply retrospectively to pending proceedings?
  • Does a change in the mode or condition of bail constitute a procedural matter or a substantive vested right?
  • Whether a court granting bail under criminal or special laws is competent to order the deposit of cash security instead of executing personal bonds with sureties?
  • Whether the ouster provisions in the Ehtesab Ordinance and Act completely nullify sections 497, 498, and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
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• Haji Sardar Muhammad Amin through Legal Heir and 13 others vs The Chief Administrator Auqaf,, Punjab and 7 others1998 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-27
  Waqf propertycivil suitpossessionlimitationjurisdictionAuqaf Department
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of a petition filed under Section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners, in possession of land, sought a declaration that the property was not Waqf property, challenging a 1961 notification. The lower courts dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners' actual grievance was against the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), which sought to dispossess them based on an alleged purchase from the Auqaf Department. The Court held that while the challenge to the nature of the property under the Ordinance was correctly dismissed as time-barred, the petitioners were not precluded from seeking a remedy in a civil court to protect their possession against the LDA. The ratio is that a civil suit for possession simplicitor is maintainable against a third party (LDA) even if the property is Waqf, provided the suit does not challenge the Waqf status of the property, which must be presumed valid.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit maintainable to protect possession of property against a third party even if the property is classified as Waqf?
  • Can a civil court determine the status of property as Waqf property in a suit for possession against a third party?
  • Does the dismissal of a petition under Section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance 1979 as time-barred preclude a party from filing a civil suit to protect possession against a third party?
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• Haji Sakhi Dost Jan vs Pakistan Narcotics Control Board and anothers1998 SCMR 1798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-10
  revisional jurisdictionHudood lawsde novo trialcase decidedFederal Shariat Courtinterlocutory orderProhibition Order
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Court challenged a common judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which dismissed criminal revision applications filed by the appellant against an order of the Sessions Judge rejecting an application for a de novo trial. The appellant was facing criminal cases involving narcotics and arms offences, which were transferred between a Special Court for Speedy Trials and the Sessions Court. The core legal question was whether an order of a Sessions Judge declining a de novo trial in a case under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 constitutes a 'case decided' by a Criminal Court under any law relating to the enforcement of Hudood, thereby attracting the exclusive revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, rather than the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-DD extends to such interlocutory orders affecting rights in Hudood cases. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming that the High Court was justified in treating the revision petitions as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of a Sessions Judge declining a de novo trial in a case under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 constitute a 'case decided' under a law relating to the enforcement of Hudood?
  • Whether the revisional jurisdiction under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is attracted to interlocutory orders passed by a Criminal Court in Hudood cases?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court possess exclusive revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by Criminal Courts in Hudood matters, barring the jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can the term 'case decided' under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 encompass interlocutory decisions that do not finally dispose of the entire cause?
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• Haji Rab Nawaz vs Sikandar Zulqarnain and 7 others1998 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-10-23
  capital punishmentinterested witnessacquittal appealcorroborationcriminal conspiracyunlawful assemblyplea of alibiappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a murder case where the trial court convicted the respondents under Section 302/149/148 PPC, but the High Court subsequently acquitted all accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the respondents' plea of alibi. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of uncorroborated testimony from interested witnesses in capital cases and the criteria for interfering with an acquittal. The Court held that the appeal must be dismissed, affirming the acquittal. It established that in capital cases, the testimony of interested witnesses requires corroboration by independent, unimpeachable evidence to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it will not interfere with an acquittal unless the lower court’s findings are artificial, shocking, or ridiculous, or based on misreading of evidence. Additionally, the Court noted that the acquittal of co-accused rendered charges of criminal conspiracy and rioting legally unsustainable due to the statutory requirements of minimum participants for those offenses. The judgment reinforces the principle of safe administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction in a capital case be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses?
  • What are the specific grounds upon which the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused render a charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A PPC unsustainable?
  • Can a charge under Section 148 PPC be sustained if the number of accused persons is reduced to less than five?
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• Haji Qadar Gul vs Moembar Khan and anothers1998 SCMR 2102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-23
  pre-emptionTalb-i-IshhadTalb-i-MuwathibatProvincially Administered Tribal Areasrejection of plaintMuslim law of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Regulation in 1991 concerning a house situated in Malakand Agency. The trial court dismissed the suit and the appellate and revisional courts affirmed the dismissal, holding that the pre-emptor failed to fulfill the statutory notice requirements of Talb-i-Ishhad under section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987. The core legal question was whether the statutory notice requirements under the 1987 Act applied to a pre-emption suit in an area where the Act had not been extended at the relevant time, and whether the plaint could be rejected for want of such notice. The Supreme Court held that during the period when the 1987 Act was not extended to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, the area was governed by the general principles of Muslim law of pre-emption, which do not require a written notice attested and authenticated by two witnesses as mandated by the statute. The Court ruled that the lower courts erred in applying statutory provisions not yet in force in the area and in non-suiting the plaintiff without recording evidence on merits. The appeal was accepted, the impugned judgments were set aside, and the suit was remanded for a fresh trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory notice requirements of Talb-i-Ishhad under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 apply to pre-emption suits in areas where the Act has not been extended?
  • Does the general Muslim law of pre-emption require a written notice attested by two witnesses for the fulfillment of Talb-i-Ishhad?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for omission to plead statutory notice requirements that are not applicable to the area?
  • Whether evidence regarding the fulfillment of Talbs needs to be established through trial rather than determined at the preliminary stage without recording evidence?
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• Haji Mushtaq Ahmed vs Ibrarul Haq and anothers1998 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-13
  criminal appealmurderharabaextra-judicial confessionlast-seen evidencerecoveryacquittalrevaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which set aside the conviction and death sentence of the respondents under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 20 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 read with section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code, resulting in their acquittal. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, specifically the reliability of extra-judicial confessions made to interested witnesses, last-seen evidence with an unexplained delay in reporting, and planted recoveries of incriminating articles. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court had properly evaluated the evidence and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the weak extra-judicial confessions, uncorroborated last-seen testimony, and doubtful recoveries. The petition was accordingly dismissed as devoid of merit, affirming the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether extra-judicial confessions made exclusively to persons related to the deceased, while independent witnesses are withheld, can form the basis of a conviction?
  • Does an unexplained delay by a witness in reporting last-seen evidence to the family or police render the testimony untrustworthy?
  • Whether recoveries made after a considerable delay following arrest, showing exact division of stolen money between accused persons, can be deemed doubtful?
  • On what grounds can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment rendered by the Federal Shariat Court?
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• Haji Maula Bakhsh and anothers vs The State1998 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-18
  criminal appealsentence computationbenefit of section 382-Blife imprisonmentprivate defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the life imprisonment of the appellant, Allah Ditta, while the co-appellant, Haji Maula Bakhsh, passed away during the pendency of the proceedings, causing his petition to abate. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the surviving appellant to the statutory benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given that the lower courts had omitted consideration of this matter. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant was indeed entitled to the benefit under section 382-B, as the State did not oppose the plea and the High Court had failed to address it. The Court partly allowed the appeal, ruling that the period spent by the appellant during the trial must be taken into consideration while computing his sentence. The key principle laid down is that a convict is entitled to the benefit of section 382-B for the period spent during trial, and appellate courts must ensure such statutory relief is duly extended when omitted by courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convict is entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when it was omitted by the trial and high courts?
  • Does the death of a petitioner during the pendency of a jail petition for leave to appeal result in the abatement of that petition?
  • Can the period spent by an accused facing trial be taken into consideration while computing their sentence under section 382-B?
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• Haji Ghulam Rasool vs Mst. Halima Banker1998 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-06
  ejectmentmaterial impairmentrent controllerres judicataunauthorized alterationslandlord and tenantmilitary courts validation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises out of rent litigation between a landlady and her tenant concerning the eviction of the latter from the demised premises on the grounds of personal requirement, nuisance, and material impairment of the value or utility of the property. The core legal questions involved whether previous proceedings before military authorities under a special dispensation barred subsequent rent applications under the doctrine of res judicata, and whether grounds for eviction under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 are to be read conjunctively or disjunctively. The Supreme Court held that the prior dismissal by military authorities based on a special jurisdiction did not operate as res judicata against statutory rent applications, and that the various grounds for ejectment under section 15 are independent and disjunctive. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the unauthorized structural alterations made by the tenant, which materially impaired the value and utility of the premises, and consequently upheld the eviction order, refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by military authorities under a special dispensation operates as res judicata to bar subsequent rent applications under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance?
  • Are the various grounds for eviction enumerated in subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 to be read conjunctively or disjunctively?
  • Does the making of unauthorized additions and alterations by a tenant inside the demised premises constitute a ground for eviction based on material impairment of value or utility?
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• Haji Arbab Ali vs Deputy Director Sindh Agricultural Supplies1998 SCMR 1244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-09
  constitutional petitionequitable reliefclean handsconcealment of factsrecovery of duesarrears of land revenuestatutory body
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding the recovery of outstanding dues for fertilizer supplied on credit by the Sindh Agricultural Supplies Organization. The core legal question involves whether the High Court rightly exercised its equitable discretion to deny relief due to the petitioner's deliberate concealment of material facts and prior constitutional petitions, and whether the provincial government's notification suspending recovery of dues applied to the statutory body in question. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal was justified because a party seeking equitable relief under constitutional jurisdiction must come with clean hands and not conceal material facts, and further found that the notification relied upon by the petitioner did not apply to the statutory organization. The key principles laid down are that constitutional remedies are equitable in nature, requiring full disclosure and clean hands from the petitioner, and that statutory exemptions or suspensions of dues cannot be extended beyond their explicit terms to cover independent statutory bodies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner who conceals the filing and withdrawal of prior constitutional petitions is entitled to discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does a notification suspending the recovery of Provincial Government and cooperative dues automatically apply to independent statutory bodies like the Sindh Agricultural Supplies Organization?
  • Whether the High Court can refuse a constitutional petition on the ground of inequitable conduct and deliberate concealment of facts?
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• Haji Abdullah Khan vs The Deputy Commissioner, Quetta and 3 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-26
  Federal Leviesdismissal from servicecompetent authorityservice appealleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Risaldar Major in the Federal Levies, was dismissed from service by the Governor of Baluchistan following an inquiry for negligence and illegal disposal of government property. His subsequent service appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal was dismissed, leading him to seek leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner contended that under the Instructions Regarding Levies of 1935, only the Political Agent had the power of dismissal, that the Federal Levies are a federal body making the Provincial Governor's order without authority, and that in the absence of specific rules, the Civil Servants Act and rules govern the force. The Deputy Attorney-General conceded that no notification had been issued under Article 145 of the Constitution regarding the Governor acting as the President's agent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Tribunal's judgment was sustainable in light of these contentions regarding the competent authority for dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Governor of a province has the authority to dismiss a member of the Federal Levies?
  • Does the absence of specific rules make the Civil Servants Act and rules applicable to the Federal Levies?
  • Can the Governor act as the agent of the President under Article 145 of the Constitution without the issuance of a formal notification?
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• Haji Abdullah Khan vs Deputy Commissioner, Quetta and 3 others1998 SCMR 2734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-26
  Federal Leviesdismissal from servicecompetent authorityservice appealconstitutional delegationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Haji Abdullah Khan against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner, a Risaldar Major in the Federal Levies posted at Quetta, was dismissed from service by the Governor of Balochistan following an inquiry for negligence and involvement in the illegal disposal of government property. The core legal question concerns the competence and authority of the Governor of Balochistan to dismiss an employee of the Federal Levies, considering whether the Federal Levies are governed by the 1935 Instructions or the Civil Servants Act, and whether the Governor acted with proper delegated authority under Article 145 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the sustainability of the impugned judgment in light of these contentions regarding the lack of a proper notification under Article 145 and the statutory authority governing dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Governor of a Province have the authority to dismiss a member of the Federal Levies?
  • Whether the Federal Levies are governed by the Civil Servants Act in the absence of specific rules?
  • Can the Governor act as an agent of the President under Article 145 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 without the issuance of a formal notification?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Riaz vs The State1998 SCMR 1126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-10
  kidnappingrapeZina-bil-Jabrage of consentmitigating circumstancessentencing discretionlawful guardianship
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for kidnapping and rape under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions were whether the victim's consent to elope and her age (approximately 15 years) warranted converting the kidnapping conviction to a lesser offence and whether the victim consented to sexual intercourse, thereby necessitating a reduction of the rape conviction. The Court held that while the victim accompanied the appellant voluntarily, her age being under sixteen rendered the kidnapping offence complete under Section 11 of the Ordinance, as consent is irrelevant to the definition of kidnapping from lawful guardianship. However, the Court found the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse, maintaining the conviction for rape under Section 10(3). The principle laid down is that while consent of a minor female does not exonerate an accused from kidnapping charges under the Ordinance, such consent may serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing purposes, allowing the court discretion to reduce the punishment for kidnapping below the mandatory life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the consent of a minor female to elope with an accused negate the offence of kidnapping under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the puberty of a minor female relevant to a conviction for kidnapping under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a court exercise discretion to award a sentence less than life imprisonment for kidnapping under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does voluntary accompaniment of an accused by a victim necessarily imply consent to sexual intercourse?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Mehboob Elahi vs Mst. Saleh Afzal Khan1998 SCMR 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-09
  civil revisionstay orderexecution of decreepossession of propertymesne profitsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the possession of a house and mesne profits. The petitioner, having obtained a decree for possession and money, faced a revision petition in the Lahore High Court, which stayed the operation of the lower courts' judgments. Despite this stay, the petitioner sought to execute the decree, leading to the High Court directing the petitioner to restore vacant possession to the respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court's order directing the restoration of possession was legally justified given the existing stay order on the execution of the decree. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction was correct, as the petitioner's attempt to dispossess the respondent while a stay order was in effect was improper. The Court affirmed the High Court's order, finding no merit in the petition, but directed the High Court to expedite the disposal of the pending revision petition. The principle established is that a party cannot execute a decree once its operation has been stayed by a superior court.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a decree-holder to execute a decree for possession while a stay order against the operation of that decree is in force?
  • Does a High Court have the authority to direct the restoration of possession if a party executes a decree in violation of a stay order?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeez-Ur-Rehman alias Papu vs The State1998 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-11
  suspension of sentencestatutory delaycriminal appealpost-arrest bailmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court declining to suspend the petitioner's sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of statutory delay. The petitioner, convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, contended that he was entitled to release on bail due to the lapse of over two years in the disposal of his appeal. The core legal question is whether an accused is entitled to suspension of sentence solely on the ground of statutory delay when the appellate court offers to hear and dispose of the main appeal on merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where the High Court is willing to proceed with the early hearing and disposal of the main appeal on merits but the petitioner's counsel declines the offer or fails to appear, the application for suspension of sentence under section 426 can be validly refused. The principle laid down is that statutory delay does not confer an absolute right to suspension of sentence if the delay is not attributable to the court and the court offers an expedited hearing of the main appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely on the ground of statutory delay when the appellate court is willing to hear the main appeal on merits?
  • Does the refusal of the petitioner's counsel to accept an early hearing date offered by the court disentitle the petitioner to the suspension of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Ur Rehman vs The State1998 SCMR 2450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  qatal-e-amdleave to appealeyewitness testimonymedical evidenceweapon recoverymotiveadverse inference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction and sentence for qatal-e-amd under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in life imprisonment and compensation. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the eye-witness account, the legal consequence of the non-production of an eyewitness, the effect of an unproven motive in a murder case, and the proper appreciation of circumstantial and medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were based on unimpeachable ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and a prompt weapon recovery, and that the absence of a proven motive does not warrant exoneration where direct evidence is otherwise reliable. The court reaffirmed that the prosecution is not bound to examine every cited witness if the overall evidence is trustworthy, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a proven motive furnish a ground for complete exoneration of an accused in a murder case?
  • Whether the non-production of an eyewitness necessarily mandates an adverse inference against the prosecution under Article 129(g) of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can an accused's statement made in answer to the charge be utilized against them even if subsequently retracted in a statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ullah Sabir vs Shaukat Ali Kazmi and others1998 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-04-02
  writ petitionexpeditious disposaljudicial delaymotion stagecase management
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition seeking relief regarding the pendency of a writ petition filed by the respondent. The core legal question concerned the delay in the adjudication of the respondent's writ petition, which had remained at the motion stage for a duration of four months. The Court, after hearing arguments from the petitioner's counsel, declined to adjudicate on the merits of the underlying dispute. Instead, the Court exercised its discretion to dispose of the present petition by issuing a specific directive to the relevant forum. The holding of the Court was that the pending writ petition, identified as Writ Petition No. 22766 of 1996, should be resolved expeditiously. The Court established the principle that judicial efficiency is paramount, directing that the matter be concluded preferably within the current month to address the grievance of prolonged pendency at the motion stage. This decision emphasizes the supervisory role of the Supreme Court in ensuring the timely disposal of cases by lower courts without interfering with the substantive merits of the pending litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct a lower court to decide a pending writ petition within a specific timeframe?
  • Is a petition regarding the delay of a pending writ petition maintainable before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ullah and others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner_Member, Board of Revenue, Lahore and others1998 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-14
  Leave to AppealWrit PetitionReview ApplicationDelay and LachesConstitutional JurisdictionProperty TransferSettlement LawsPast and Closed Transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved two Petitions for Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a writ petition and a subsequent review application. The writ petition, filed after a delay of nearly 27 years, sought to challenge a Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order from 1968 which transferred a bungalow to Latif Ahmed. The petitioners claimed the transfer was for the benefit of all family members, including themselves, and that they only became aware of the exclusive transfer in 1995. The High Court dismissed the writ petition due to the inordinate delay and lack of evidence supporting the petitioners' claim of joint application or allotment. The subsequent review application was also dismissed for lack of legal infirmity. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decisions, refusing leave to appeal, on the grounds that constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised in matters that have become past and closed transactions after an unexplained delay of 27 years, and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity warranting review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition challenging a property transfer order be entertained after an inordinate delay of 27 years?
  • Is a High Court justified in declining to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction in a matter that has become a past and closed transaction due to long delay?
  • What grounds are necessary for a High Court to interfere in review jurisdiction?
  • Does a petitioner's claim of joint application for property transfer, without supporting evidence and after significant delay, warrant interference by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited, Etc. vs Syed Zia-Ul-Hassan Kazmi(K.L.R. 1998 SC 46) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-07
  interlocutory ordersuspension ordermaster and servantbank employeesgolden handshake packageconstitutional petitioninterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises five petitions for leave to appeal directed against interlocutory orders passed by the Lahore High Court, which had suspended the operation of bank suspension orders issued against the respondent employees. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in suspending the suspension orders of employees through interlocutory relief in constitutional petitions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in suspending the said suspension orders, as settled jurisprudence dictates that interlocutory orders of suspension—which are regulatory in character and during which employees continue to receive full salary and fringe benefits—should not be interfered with, and courts should avoid re-inducting employees or halting disciplinary inquiries prematurely. The Court established that granting interim relief that suspends an employer's suspension order violates established principles against arbitrary interference with interlocutory management decisions, particularly where no financial disadvantage is suffered. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, suspended the impugned High Court orders, and directed the High Court to expedite the final hearing on the maintainability of the writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in suspending an employer's suspension order through an interlocutory order in a constitutional petition?
  • Does the diminution or receipt of full salary and fringe benefits during a suspension period prevent a suspension order from being treated as a penalty?
  • Can constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution be invoked to challenge interim and regulatory orders like suspension when final remedies are available?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited and others vs Syed Zia-Ul-Hassan Kazmi1998 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-07
  interlocutory ordersuspension orderleave to appealmaster and servantmaintainability of writ petitioninterim reliefGolden Handshake Package
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of five petitions for leave to appeal filed by Habib Bank Limited against interlocutory orders of the Lahore High Court suspending the operation of suspension orders issued against bank employees who had opted for a Golden Handshake Package. The bank challenged the maintainability of the writ petitions and the High Court's interim relief. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in suspending the suspension orders through interlocutory orders. The Supreme Court held that while it generally refrains from interfering with interlocutory orders, interference is necessary where the lower court's order is arbitrary or contrary to well-settled law. The Court reaffirmed that suspension is regulatory in nature and does not constitute a penalty, especially when employees remain entitled to full salary and fringe benefits. Consequently, the High Court erred in suspending the suspension orders. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, suspended the High Court's interlocutory orders, and directed the High Court to decide the maintainability and merits of the main writ petitions expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order passed by a lower court?
  • Can a High Court suspend an employee's suspension order through an interlocutory order in a constitutional petition?
  • Does an order of suspension where full salary and benefits are paid constitute a penalty?
  • Does the rule of master and servant preclude an employee of a non-statutory corporation from seeking reinstatement via constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmed vs Director General, Pakistan Coast Guards and others1998 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-16
  coastal area jurisdictionPakistan Coast Guardsseizure of goodscustoms-portstatutory definitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petitions in limine. The petitioner challenged the seizure of three cartons containing television sets at the Karachi Cantonment Railway Station by the Pakistan Coast Guards, contending that the station did not form part of the coastal area as defined under the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973. The core legal question was whether the Karachi Cantonment Railway Station falls within the 'coastal area' under the said Act, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Pakistan Coast Guards to make the seizure. The Supreme Court held that the boundaries specified in the First Schedule to the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973, encompass the location in question and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the station falls within the limits of any port excluded from the coastal area. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's order, refused leave to appeal, and directed the adjudicating authority to finalize the pending customs proceedings within two months. The key principle laid down is that statutory definitions of 'coastal area' provided in specific legislation prevail over ordinary dictionary meanings, and areas expressly included within the statutory schedule fall within the operational jurisdiction of the Pakistan Coast Guards.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Karachi Cantonment Railway Station falls within the coastal area as defined under the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973?
  • Does the definition of a customs-port under the Customs Act, 1969 restrict the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Coast Guards under the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973?
  • Are the limits of any port excluded from the coastal area defined in the First Schedule to the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad and others vs Fazal Yazdan and others1998 SCMR 1521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-13
  review petitioncomplete justicetrust propertyland acquisition compensationjoint receiversabsent heirsfiduciary duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed a suit concerning the ownership of land in Swabi, N.-W.F.P., originally owned by Akbar Khan. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its review jurisdiction and powers to do complete justice, could issue specific directions to protect the interests of the rightful owners—the legal heirs of the deceased—who were residing in India and had not participated in the litigation. The Court held that while the previous judgment correctly determined the ownership status, it failed to secure the compensation funds and the agricultural produce/income derived from the land by the respondents, who admitted to holding the property as trustees. Consequently, the Court exercised its powers under Article 187 and Article 188 of the Constitution to appoint joint receivers to manage the property, recover past income, and secure the land acquisition compensation in profit-bearing schemes. The principle established is that the Supreme Court possesses the inherent power to issue necessary directions to protect the rights of absent beneficiaries and prevent the misappropriation of property held in trust by litigants.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court exercise its review jurisdiction to issue directions for the protection of property held in trust by litigants for absent beneficiaries?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to appoint joint receivers to manage property and recover income for the benefit of rightful owners who are not parties to the litigation?
  • Can the Supreme Court order the investment of land acquisition compensation funds into profit-bearing schemes to prevent wastage pending the identification of legal heirs?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa Khairati vs Federation of Pakistan and anothers1998 SCMR 1603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  service tribunalmaster and servanttermination of servicejurisdictionconstitutional petitionretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging his termination of service as Senior Executive Vice-President of Habib Bank Limited under the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981. The core legal question concerns whether the appropriate Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain matters regarding the terms and conditions of service of employees of corporations and bodies controlled by the Federal Government, following the enactment of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 via amendment Act XVII of 1997. The Supreme Court held that the incorporation of section 2-A has retrospective effect as a procedural amendment, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the Service Tribunal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that aggrieved employees must approach the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incorporation of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 have retrospective effect?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal alone has jurisdiction to entertain appeals regarding terms and conditions of service of employees of corporations owned or controlled by the Federal Government?
  • Can a constitutional petition challenging the termination of a bank employee be maintained in the High Court after the amendment of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa Khairati vs Federation of Pakistan and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  service tribunaljurisdictionmaster and servantretrospective effecttermination of serviceconstitutional petitionbank employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioner's Constitution petition challenging his termination of service as a Senior Executive Vice-President of Habib Bank Limited under the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981. The High Court held that in view of the amendment introduced via Act No. XVII of 1997 incorporating section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, jurisdiction to entertain appeals relating to the terms and conditions of service of employees of corporations owned or controlled by the Federal Government vests exclusively in the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerns whether the appropriate Service Tribunal alone possesses jurisdiction to entertain the matter following the said statutory amendment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the incorporation of section 2-A has retrospective effect as a procedural amendment, thereby affirming the High Court's view that the aggrieved employee must approach the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appropriate Service Tribunal alone have jurisdiction to entertain service disputes of employees of corporations and bodies controlled by the Federal Government following the insertion of section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Is the incorporation of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 retrospective in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Land Acquisition Collector, Tarbela Dam1998 SCMR 1233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuedamages for acquisitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court modifying the Acquisition Judge's decision regarding land compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question concerns the determination of proper market value for acquired land and the entitlement to damages for property allegedly affected during construction work. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the market value of the land based on evidence are unexceptionable in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that damages caused by blasting during road construction by a contractor do not fall within the scope of Section 23(1) fourthly of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as such damage was not sustained at the time of taking possession of the land by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting other property. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compensation assessed by courts below on the basis of oral and documentary evidence can be interfered with without proving misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does damage caused by blasting during road construction qualify as damage sustained at the time of taking possession under Section 23(1) fourthly of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Is a landowner entitled to enhanced compensation as a building site without proving the same through evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas and others vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-18
  service tribunaljurisdictionstatutory corporationtermination of serviceleave to appealabatement of suitstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals against the termination of their employment by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. The core legal question concerns the effect and interpretation of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, inserted on 10th June 1997, which brought employees of statutory corporations under the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, and whether the Service Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to entertain appeals against termination orders passed prior to the said amendment, given that civil suits challenging the same had abated. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the questions regarding the appropriate forum for remedy and the jurisdictional competence of the Service Tribunal under the newly inserted section 2-A. The Court ordered that status quo regarding the service of the petitioners be maintained until the disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of the insertion of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 on the forum to seek remedy for employees of statutory corporations?
  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is vested with the power to entertain appeals against termination orders passed prior to the coming into force of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas and 23 others vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation1998 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-18
  Service Tribunals ActStatutory CorporationsJurisdiction of Service TribunalAbatement of suitsTermination of serviceLeave to appealStatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals against the termination of their employment by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. The petitioners initially challenged their termination in the High Court of Sindh, securing interim orders that allowed them to remain in service. Following the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which brought employees of statutory corporations under the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, the High Court suggested that such suits abated, directing litigants to the Tribunal. However, the Federal Service Tribunal subsequently dismissed the petitioners' appeals, holding it lacked jurisdiction because the termination orders predated the amendment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying a significant question of law regarding the interpretation and effect of Section 2-A on the forum for seeking legal remedies. The Court held that the conflicting jurisdictional views between the High Court and the Tribunal created a legal vacuum, necessitating a definitive ruling on the Tribunal's authority. Consequently, the Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding the petitioners' employment pending the final disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act 1973 mandate the abatement of pending civil suits filed by employees of statutory corporations?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal possess jurisdiction to entertain appeals against termination orders passed prior to the enactment of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • What is the appropriate legal forum for employees of statutory corporations to challenge termination orders issued before the commencement of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghafoor Ahmad and 2 others vs Collector, Consolidation, Jhelum, Office at Attock, District Attock and 4 others1998 SCMR 2358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-16
  constitutional petitionwrit petitionrevenue recorddismissal in liminecivil suitapprehension of adverse entries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition in limine. The core legal question concerned whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against mere apprehensions of adverse changes in the revenue record by revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' apprehensions were misconceived as no final order had been passed against them and the respondents denied the allegations in their comments, rendering the writ petition premature and unwarranted. The Court laid down the principle that mere threats or apprehensions regarding potential changes to revenue entries, in the absence of a final adverse order, do not furnish a valid basis for invoking constitutional jurisdiction, and the appropriate remedy, if any valid grievance arises, lies in a civil suit rather than a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against mere apprehensions of changes in the revenue record?
  • Does a party have a cause of action for a constitutional petition in the absence of a final adverse order?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy when a party apprehends detrimental entries in the revenue record?
  Read full judgment →
• General Manager, Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore1998 PLC (C.S.) 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-29
  disciplinary proceedingsservice lawcompetent authoritydelegation of powersPakistan RailwaysFederal Service Tribunalremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute involving the removal of a Permanent Way Inspector (BPS-16) from Pakistan Railways. The employee was removed from service following disciplinary proceedings, with the removal order issued by the Member, Mechanical Engineering, a Grade-21 officer. The Federal Service Tribunal subsequently set aside this removal, holding that the General Manager (BPS-21) was the designated 'Authority' for employees in BPS-16, and therefore, the Member, Mechanical Engineering, lacked the requisite jurisdiction to pass the order. The petitioners, representing Pakistan Railways, contended that because the General Manager had previously acted as the 'authorized officer' by issuing the charge-sheet, he recused himself, and the Chairman of the Railway Board nominated the Member, Mechanical Engineering, to act as the 'Authority'. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the Member, Mechanical Engineering, was lawfully nominated as the 'Authority' and whether the removal order suffered from a lack of jurisdiction. The Court suspended the Tribunal's order pending a final decision on the legality of the nomination process and the delegation of authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman of the Railway Board designate an officer to act as the 'Authority' in disciplinary proceedings when the designated 'Authority' recuses himself?
  • Does an order of removal passed by an officer not designated as the 'Authority' under the relevant rules suffer from a lack of jurisdiction?
  • Is the nomination of a substitute 'Authority' by the Chairman of the Railway Board legally valid in the absence of a specific provision for such delegation?
  Read full judgment →
• General Manager Packages Ltd. and others vs Punjab Labour Appellate1998 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-12
  leave to appealback benefitsworkman statusgrievance petitionIndustrial Relations Ordinancewrit jurisdictionevidentiary burden
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the reinstatement and back benefits of an employee dismissed for misconduct. The core legal questions concern whether an employee, who failed to plead or prove joblessness during the termination period, is entitled to a remand for evidence on back benefits, and whether the status of a "workman" under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, can be established through presumption rather than evidence. The Supreme Court, noting the arguments regarding the impropriety of allowing a party to fill evidentiary lacunae and the necessity of proving manual or clerical duties to qualify as a workman, found these contentions substantial. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, maintaining the interim stay order. The judgment establishes that contentions regarding the improper exercise of writ jurisdiction to permit evidence-filling and the evidentiary burden to prove "workman" status are substantial legal questions requiring further adjudication by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court in writ jurisdiction remand a case to allow a party to fill evidentiary lacunae regarding back benefits?
  • Is the status of a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 determinable by presumption or must it be proven by evidence of manual or clerical duties?
  • Does the failure to plead or prove joblessness during the period of dismissal preclude an employee from claiming back benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• General Manager (Operation), WAPDA vs Javaid Aziz Qureshi and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-22
  WAPDAService TribunalDismissal from serviceCorruptionPenalty mitigationService Tribunals ActMisconductDisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that partially allowed an appeal by a WAPDA employee, Javaid Aziz Qureshi, by converting his dismissal from service for corruption into compulsory retirement with pensionary benefits. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in mitigating the penalty despite affirming the findings of corruption. The Supreme Court held that while the Tribunal possesses the authority under Section 5(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to modify penalties, this discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court ruled that in cases involving proven corruption, substituting a dismissal with compulsory retirement is improper and undermines the necessary deterrence against such misconduct. The Court emphasized that any alteration of penalty by the Tribunal must be supported by cogent reasons and a finding of arbitrariness on the part of the departmental authority. Consequently, the Court restored the original dismissal order, holding that leniency is inappropriate for proven corruption, thereby setting aside the Tribunal's modification of the penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the power to vary or modify a penalty imposed by a departmental authority?
  • Is it appropriate for a Service Tribunal to substitute a penalty of dismissal with compulsory retirement in cases where corruption charges are proven?
  • Must the Service Tribunal provide cogent reasons when altering a penalty imposed by a departmental authority?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence recorded by an Enquiry Officer in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Flying Kraft Paper vs Central Board of Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.. Revenue, IslamabadPTCL 1998 CL. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales tax exemptionnew industrybalancing modernization and replacementliquidation of companyconstitutional petitionterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the refusal of sales tax exemption under a notification dated 27.6.1991 to the appellant company, which had purchased the assets of a liquidated paper corporation in a court auction and subsequently resumed production of paper products, including Extensible Sack Kraft Paper. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was a new industry or a successor to the liquidated company, and whether the production of the new product resulted from the setting up of a new identifiable industrial unit or merely from balancing, modernization, and replacement of existing machinery. The Supreme Court held that while the appellant was a distinct legal entity and not a continuation of the liquidated company, the factual evidence demonstrated that the production of the disputed product commenced prior to the installation of the newly imported machinery and was the result of balancing, modernization, and replacement rather than the setting up of a new industry under the relevant notification. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of assets of a liquidated company in a court sale make the purchaser the legal successor of the wound-up company?
  • Whether the addition of new machinery to an existing factory for producing a new product amounts to setting up a 'new industry' under tax exemption notifications?
  • Can an objection as to the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court Bench be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when no prejudice is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd..Charsadda vs Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad And 2 Others1998 P.T.C.L.R. 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Sales tax exemptionNew industryTerritorial jurisdictionBalancing, Modernization and ReplacementWinding upTax incentive
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the denial of Sales Tax exemption under S.R.O. 580(1)/91, claiming their factory, established after purchasing the assets of a liquidated company, constituted a 'new industry.' The core legal question was whether the addition of new machinery for producing 'Extensible Sack Kraft Paper' qualified as 'setting up' a new industry, thereby attracting tax exemption. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish that the new product was exclusively the result of a new, integrated unit. Evidence revealed that production of the paper commenced via 'Balancing, Modernization and Replacement' (BMR) of existing machinery prior to the installation of the new equipment. The Court affirmed the principle that for tax exemption purposes, 'setting up' a new industry requires an identifiable, integrated unit distinct from mere modernization or replacement of existing plant assets. Additionally, the Court ruled that objections regarding territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest opportunity before the court of first instance, or they may be waived.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of assets of a liquidated company and subsequent operation of a factory constitute the 'setting up' of a new industry for tax exemption purposes?
  • Can a party raise an objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the addition of new machinery for the purpose of 'Balancing, Modernization and Replacement' (BMR) qualify as setting up a new industry under S.R.O. 580(1)/91?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Manzoor Hussain and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17
  civil servantsenioritySecretariat GroupGrade-20transferpromotionService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the fixation of seniority of a civil servant. The core legal question concerns whether the seniority of a civil servant transferred to the Secretariat Group should be reckoned from the date of his initial promotion to Grade-20 or from the subsequent date of his formal induction/appointment in the Secretariat Group, and whether an unconditional acceptance of an offer by the civil servant estops him from claiming earlier seniority. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the seniority of a Grade-20 officer transferred to the Secretariat Group must be determined from the date of continuous regular officiation or promotion to Grade-20, as the subsequent transfer or induction into a specific group is immaterial for seniority purposes under the applicable legal framework. The key principles laid down are that seniority in a post or grade commences from the date of regular appointment to that post or grade, and statutory rules governing seniority cannot be overridden by departmental letters or conditional offers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seniority of a civil servant transferred to the Secretariat Group is to be reckoned from the date of promotion to Grade-20 or from the date of induction into the group?
  • Does the unconditional acceptance of a departmental offer regarding seniority preclude a civil servant from claiming rightful seniority under the law?
  • How is seniority in a post, service, or cadre determined under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior (Interior1998 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-13
  Pakistan Rangersservice tribunalefficiency and discipline rulescivil servantjurisdictiondisciplinary proceedingsoverriding effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which had set aside the dismissal of the respondent from service as a Deputy Superintendent in the Pakistan Rangers and remanded the matter for fresh proceedings under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal question was whether the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 applied to employees of the Pakistan Rangers, or if their service matters were governed by the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 and the rules framed thereunder. The Supreme Court held that while employees of the Pakistan Rangers are deemed civil servants for the purpose of approaching the Federal Service Tribunal, disciplinary matters concerning them are governed exclusively by the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 by virtue of the overriding effect given to the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 over the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the appeal to be decided on merits under the specific Rangers Ordinance and Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are applicable to the employees of the Pakistan Rangers?
  • Do the provisions of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 prevail over the Civil Servants Act, 1973 in case of a conflict?
  • Are employees of the Pakistan Rangers considered civil servants for the purpose of maintaining an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Which rules govern the disciplinary proceedings and penalties for members of the Pakistan Rangers?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others vs Muhammad Ismail and anothers1998 SCMR 2326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-18
  service lawpremature incrementrule of consistencyFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealpay fixationadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had directed the restoration of a premature increment to the respondent, a government employee. The respondent, initially a Sub-Engineer in BPS-11, was placed in Selection Grade BPS-16 and granted a premature increment. After seven years, this increment was withdrawn. The Tribunal, relying on its previous decisions in identical cases involving other employees, set aside the withdrawal order and directed the Federation to restore the increment and refund any deducted amounts. The Federation challenged this on the grounds that the Tribunal should have decided the case on its own merits rather than merely following precedent. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the cases relied upon by the Tribunal were factually identical and that the impugned judgment upheld the rule of consistency. Finding no misreading of material or legal infirmity, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the Tribunal's decision was fair and did not warrant interference under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is legally justified in relying on its previous decisions in identical cases to grant relief to a government employee?
  • Does the rule of consistency require the government to grant similar service benefits to employees in identical circumstances?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others vs Muhammad Ismail and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-18
  service tribunalpremature incrementrule of consistencyleave to appealcivil servantpay fixation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which allowed the respondent's appeal regarding the restoration of a premature increment. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in setting aside the withdrawal of the respondent's premature increment based on identical past cases without independently re-examining the merits, and whether the withdrawal violated the principle of consistency. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and warranted no interference as the respondent's case was identical to previous successful cases within the department. The key principle laid down is that the rule of consistency applies in service matters, ensuring that similarly situated civil servants are granted identical benefits unless distinguishable material is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is justified in following its earlier decisions in identical cases without re-examining the merits?
  • Does the withdrawal of a premature increment already granted to a civil servant violate the rule of consistency when co-employees retain the benefit?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and anothers vs Sheikh Abdul Aziz1998 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-26
  dismissal from servicecivil servantconstitutional petitionmala fidecoram non judicewithout jurisdictionnatural justiceaudi alteram partemlacheslimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard two Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan and the Government of Punjab, challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the dismissal of a civil servant, Sheikh Abdul Aziz. The respondent, a Tehsildar inducted into the Provincial Civil Service, was dismissed in 1970 under M.L.R. 58 of 1969. His subsequent appeals and petitions abated or were dismissed, but a later Constitution Petition was accepted by the Lahore High Court in 1996. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent's dismissal was based on a pre-determined decision and without an opportunity of hearing, thus rendering the order mala fide, coram non judice, and without jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that High Courts are competent to interfere in such cases. The petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed on merits and also as being barred by limitation, as no satisfactory explanation was provided for the delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with an order of dismissal from service if it is found to be coram non judice, mala fide, or without jurisdiction?
  • Is an order of dismissal from service valid if it is based on a pre-determined decision without affording the affected party an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does the maxim 'audi alteram partem' apply to dismissal proceedings against civil servants?
  • Can an act without jurisdiction be considered an act done mala fide?
  • Is it necessary to explain each day of delay for the condonation of limitation in filing an appeal?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan Islamabad vs Abdur Rehman Sheikh and others1998 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-08
  service tribunaldeputation allowancecivil servantleave to appeallienmove-overjurisdiction of service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted various service-related reliefs to the respondent, a former Principal of the Islamabad College for Boys. The respondent had initiated litigation regarding non-payment of allowances, including house rent, project director allowance, entertainment allowance, disturbance allowance, and deputation pay, alongside disputes concerning his lien, deputation status, and entitlement to move-over to BPS-20. The Federal Service Tribunal had partially allowed these claims, directing payments for certain allowances while denying others, and affirming the respondent's status as a deputationist based on prior proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of the relief granted by the Tribunal, the finality of the respondent's status as a deputationist determined in previous proceedings where the petitioner was allegedly unheard, the relevance of the respondent's lien upon repatriation, and the jurisdictional question of whether the respondent, as a permanent employee of Sindh Madrassatul Islam, qualified as a civil servant subject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of relief in the manner adopted by the Tribunal is justified in law?
  • Whether the respondent could be treated as a deputationist and the finding of the Tribunal in a previous appeal in which the petitioner was not heard could be treated to have attained finality as to the status of the respondent?
  • Since the respondent has been sent back to his parent department from Islamabad College for Boys, whether the question of his lien was irrelevant?
  • The respondent being a permanent employee of the Sindh Madrassatul Islam, whether he could be treated as a civil servant justifying interference by the Service Tribunal?
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• Federation of Pakistan And Others vs Khursh1d Spinning Mills Ltd.1998 P.C.T.L.R. 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-14
  customs dutybonded warehouserate of dutyexemption notificationbill of entryimport of machinery
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from a dispute regarding the determination of the rate of customs duty applicable to imported machinery for a cotton spinning mill. The respondent imported machinery, filed an in-bond bill of entry, and subsequently filed an ex-bond bill of entry for clearance from a bonded warehouse. Before the entire assessed duty was paid and the goods were cleared, the Federal Government issued a notification granting total exemption from customs duties and sales tax on such machinery. The core legal question was whether the respondent, having paid only a part of the duty within seven days of presenting the bill of entry, fell under the second proviso to section 30(b) of the Customs Act, 1969, thereby attracting the rate of duty in force on the date the duty was actually and fully paid. The Supreme Court held that since the entire duty was not paid within seven days and delivery of the goods had not been taken prior to the issuance of the new notification, the second proviso to section 30(b) applied, entitling the importer to the benefit of the exemption notification issued on a subsequent date. The Court laid down that where customs duty is not paid in full within seven days of presenting the bill of entry for clearance from a warehouse, the applicable rate of duty is determined by the date of actual payment of the entire duty, making subsequent beneficial notifications applicable if the goods remain uncleared.

  Questions settled

  • What is the relevant date for determining the value and rate of import duty for goods cleared from a warehouse under section 104 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the second proviso to section 30(b) of the Customs Act, 1969 apply where only a part of the assessed duty is paid within seven days of presenting the bill of entry?
  • Is an importer entitled to the benefit of an exemption notification issued after the filing of a bill of entry but before the complete payment of duty and clearance of goods from a warehouse?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and 3 others vs Khurshid Spinning Mills Ltd.1998 SCMR 2173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-14
  customs duty exemptionbonded warehousebill of entrystatutory interpretationtax notificationdate of determination of dutyimport duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the applicability of a customs duty exemption notification to imported machinery. The respondent, Khurshid Spinning Mills Ltd., filed an Ex-Bond Bill of Entry for the clearance of goods from a bonded warehouse. Before the full duty was paid, the Federal Government issued a notification (SRO 458(I)/88) granting full exemption from customs duties and sales tax. The Customs Department denied the benefit, arguing that partial payment made before the notification precluded the exemption. The core legal question was whether the term "duty" in the second proviso to Section 30(b) of the Customs Act, 1969, refers to the entire assessed duty, thereby determining the applicable rate based on the date of actual payment. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso to Section 30(b) requires the payment of the entire assessed duty. Since the full duty was not paid within seven days of the Bill of Entry, the applicable rate is that in force when the duty is actually paid. Consequently, the respondent was entitled to the exemption benefit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'duty' in the second proviso to Section 30(b) of the Customs Act, 1969, refer to the entire assessed duty or only a partial payment?
  • If duty is not paid within seven days of the Bill of Entry, what is the relevant date for determining the applicable rate of duty under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can an importer claim the benefit of a new customs exemption notification if the full duty was not paid prior to the issuance of said notification?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Karim vs Rawal Malik and anothers1998 SCMR 1200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  restitutionpre-emption decreepossessionremandCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, initiated by the respondents for restitution of possession of land after the pre-emption decree initially passed in favour of the petitioner was set aside by the appellate court and the case remanded for retrial. The core legal question was whether restitution of possession was rightly ordered under Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the underlying trial court decree was reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the restitution was properly allowed as a natural consequence of the setting aside of the decree, and no illegality or infirmity was found in the concurrent orders of the lower courts and the High Court. The key principle laid down is that upon the reversal or setting aside of a decree, the court of first instance is bound to place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for the decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed, thereby mandating restitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether restitution of possession can be ordered under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a pre-emption decree is set aside on appeal?
  • Is a party who executed a decree and obtained possession during the pendency of an appeal bound to restore possession upon the reversal of that decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Fasihuddin Siddiqui and 7 others vs Government of Pakistan and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-23
  seniority listservice tribunaldirect recruits versus promoteesinter se senioritycivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal filed against a common judgment of the Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding the determination of their inter se seniority. The petitioners, working as Superintendents in Pay Scale B-16 in the Pakistan Postal Services Corporation, were placed junior to private respondents in a seniority list issued pursuant to departmental directions. The core legal question concerned the correctness of the seniority list determined vis-a-vis direct recruits and departmental promotees in light of established Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal rightly followed the guidelines and principles settled in the precedent case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdul Rasheed, and since no infirmity or failure to apply the laid-down rules was demonstrated in the petitioners' case, the petitions lacked merit. The court affirmed that seniority determinations complying with established binding precedents do not warrant interference, and consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal's determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and departmental promotees in accordance with established Supreme Court precedent is open to interference?
  • Does a seniority list issued pursuant to binding judicial guidelines warrant leave to appeal when no failure to follow those rules is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Farrukh J. Gulzar vs Secretary, Local Government and Rural1998 PLC (C.S.) 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-29
  political interferencetransfer and postingcivil serviceadministrative policyjurisdiction of High CourtArticle 212service matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an interim order of the High Court which had suspended a transfer order of a government employee, allegedly influenced by political pressure from an M.P.A. The core legal issue concerned the propriety of political interference in the administrative transfer of civil servants and the jurisdiction of the High Court to intervene in such matters given the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court emphasized that transfers must be conducted strictly in accordance with established government policy and that it is improper for elected representatives to direct or request the transfer of officials. The Court held that such interference undermines administrative integrity. Following the Court's admonition, the M.P.A. acknowledged the impropriety of his actions and pledged to refrain from future interference. The Department subsequently adopted a formal transfer policy for local council employees. Consequently, the petitioner did not press the appeal, and the respondent undertook to withdraw the underlying writ petition, rendering the matter disposed of.

  Questions settled

  • Is it permissible for an elected representative to direct or request the transfer of government officials?
  • Must transfers of government employees be conducted strictly in accordance with established transfer policies?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to interfere in the transfer of government employees in light of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmad vs Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission, Islamabad1998 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-04
  CSS competitive examinationre-checking of answer booksFederal Public Service Commissiontabulation of marksinspection of answer sheetsforfeiture of securityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had rejected the petitioner's challenge regarding the tabulation of marks in the CSS Competitive Examination 1994. The petitioner, having qualified but failed to secure an allocation due to low merit, alleged discrepancies in the marking and tabulation of three specific papers and sought inspection of his answer books. While examining the matter pursuant to a concession by the Federal Public Service Commission, the High Court inspected the sealed answer books and found no discrepancies in marking, totalling, or tabulation, subsequently dismissing the writ petition and forfeiting the petitioner's deposited security. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner alleged that the Commission had produced fabricated answer books. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings on factual verification were unexceptionable, and there was no basis to suspect fabrication by senior officers. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate challenge the tabulation and marking of competitive examination papers in constitutional jurisdiction after a factual verification confirms no discrepancy?
  • Whether unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and fabrication against public examining authorities can be entertained in a petition for leave to appeal without supporting evidence or prior plea before the High Court?
  • Is a candidate entitled to personal inspection of answer books where the relevant examination rules prohibit such access?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhat Ali Khan vs Ch. Muhammad Siddique and others1998 SCMR 2190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-26
  quo warrantojudicial appointmentreview jurisdictionactive practice requirementIncome Tax Appellate Tribunalvoid appointmentqualification criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenges a Supreme Court judgment that upheld the removal of the petitioner from the position of Judicial Member, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, due to a lack of requisite qualifications. The core legal questions addressed were whether the petitioner possessed the necessary experience to qualify for the appointment under the relevant statutory framework, whether the ten-year requirement for an Advocate refers to mere enrollment or active practice, and whether the scope of review allows for re-litigating settled points of law. The Court held that the appointment was void ab initio because the petitioner failed to meet the mandatory qualification criteria, specifically the requirement of ten years of active practice as an Advocate, as opposed to mere enrollment. Relying on the principles established in the 'Judges' case' (Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan), the Court affirmed that statutory qualifications for judicial posts are mandatory and not curable by subsequent events. The Court further held that a review petition cannot be used as an appeal to re-argue points already decided or to challenge the correctness of a previous interpretation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ten-year requirement for an Advocate to be eligible for judicial appointment refer to the period of enrollment or the period of active practice?
  • Can a review petition be utilized to re-argue points of law that were already considered and decided in the original judgment?
  • Is an appointment to a public office void if the appointee lacks the mandatory statutory qualifications at the time of appointment?
  • Does the doctrine of de facto exercise of power protect an appointment that was invalid and unconstitutional from its inception?
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• Faqir Muhammad and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi and others1998 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-04
  departmental appealreasoned orderservice tribunalcivil servantcourt of inquirystatutory interpretationmisappropriation of stores
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four civil petitions for leave to appeal filed by government employees against orders of punishment related to alleged irregularities and misappropriation of government stores. The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their departmental appeals, noting that some were rejected without reasons, while others were not communicated, leading them to approach the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal question involves the reconciliation of Rule 6(2) of the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977, which mandates that departmental appellate authorities provide reasons for their decisions, with the proviso to Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which allows a civil servant to approach the Tribunal after ninety days if their departmental appeal remains undecided. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Tribunal is obligated to remand matters for reasoned orders when departmental authorities fail to provide them, and to address substantive challenges regarding the legality of the Court of Inquiry constituted under the Financial Regulations, 1986. The Court ordered the stay of recovery of amounts from the petitioners pending the final disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a departmental appellate authority to provide reasons for an order necessitate a remand by the Service Tribunal?
  • How should the requirement for a reasoned departmental order under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 be reconciled with the right to approach the Service Tribunal after ninety days under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Can a Court of Inquiry constituted in violation of the Financial Regulations, 1986 be considered legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ahmed vs Government of the Punjab and others1998 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-27
  civil servanttransfer orderjurisdiction of High CourtService TribunalArticle 212 barinterim stay orderexclusive jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an interlocutory order of the High Court, which had suspended a transfer order of a civil servant without first addressing the jurisdictional bar posed by Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding the transfer of a civil servant, given the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that matters relating to the transfer or posting of civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, and the jurisdiction of all other courts, including the High Courts, is expressly barred by Article 212(2). Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interim stay order, directing the High Court to first determine the question of its jurisdiction before passing any further interim orders in the matter, while also suggesting an expedited disposal of the underlying writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding the transfer of a civil servant?
  • Must the High Court determine its own jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution before passing an interim stay order?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters of civil servant transfers?
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• Ex-Constable Muhammad Farooq vs I.-G. Police, Islamabad and anothers1998 SCMR 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-07
  service tribunalabsence from dutydismissal from serviceremoval from servicepolice disciplinary ruleshabitual absenteeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-constable of the Islamabad Police, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal upholding his dismissal from service for unauthorized and wilful absence from duty. The departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal concurrently found that the petitioner remained absent from duty without leave for a prolonged period, and his plea of illness supported by medical certificates was untenable due to tampered dates and his status as an outdoor patient who failed to inform the department. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the record and noted that the petitioner was a habitual absentee previously punished multiple times, and that his alleged illness did not prevent him from communicating with the department. Although the Service Tribunal had already taken a lenient view by modifying the penalty of dismissal to removal from service, the Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the decision of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized and wilful absence from duty warrants dismissal or removal from police service?
  • Can medical certificates submitted by an outdoor patient justify prolonged absence from duty without informing the department?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding departmental misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Establishment Secretary to the Government of Pakistan vs S.A.M. Wahidi, Deputy Solicitor, Law Division, Islamabad and others1998 SCMR 1985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-13
  civil service seniorityex-cadre postservice tribunalGrade 19continuous regular officiationSecretariat Group Service Rulesinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Service Tribunal decision regarding the seniority of a civil servant. The core legal question was whether the respondent, initially appointed to an ex-cadre Grade 19 post as Deputy Solicitor in 1974, was entitled to count his seniority from that date, or from his formal appointment as a Deputy Secretary in 1978. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision. The Court established that while generally, service in an ex-cadre post does not count for cadre seniority, this proposition is displaced where service rules explicitly provide that seniority is determined from the date of continuous regular officiation in Grade 19 or an equivalent post. Because the respondent's appointment was recognized as regular and the rules allowed for seniority based on such officiation, he was entitled to seniority from 1974. Furthermore, the Court rejected technical objections regarding the competency of the appeal, ruling that the Government had effectively undertaken the defense of the proceedings through its authorized functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Does service in an ex-cadre post count towards seniority in a cadre if the relevant service rules define seniority based on continuous regular officiation in a specific grade?
  • Can a government appeal be considered incompetent solely because the Power of Attorney was executed by a Deputy Secretary rather than the Secretary?
  • What is the effect of the 'continuous regular officiation' clause in the Secretariat Group Service Rules on determining seniority for officers promoted from ex-cadre posts?
  Read full judgment →
• Essa Cement Industries Workers' Union vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Hyderabad Region, Hyderabad and 4 others1998 SCMR 1964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-15
  trade union registrationindustrial relationslocus standijurisdictional factsconstitutional jurisdictioncollective bargaining agent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petition against the registration of a rival trade union. The core legal questions involved whether the Registrar of Trade Unions conducted a proper inquiry into the jurisdictional facts regarding union membership under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether pre-existing trade unions have the locus standi to challenge a union's registration or claim a right to be heard. The Supreme Court held that jurisdictional facts are subject to constitutional scrutiny, but the Registrar had properly applied his mind by ordering multiple inquiries to satisfy statutory requirements. Furthermore, pre-existing trade unions and employers lack the locus standi to challenge a registration decision merely due to the lack of a pre-decisional hearing, as the registration process is strictly between the applicant union and the Registrar. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are jurisdictional facts regarding trade union registration open to scrutiny in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does a pre-existing trade union have the locus standi to challenge the registration of a rival trade union on the ground of not being granted a hearing by the Registrar?
  • Is the Registrar of Trade Unions duty-bound to seek assistance or provide a hearing to existing trade unions or employers during registration inquiries?
  • Can a trade union be registered if its members include persons employed as officers rather than workmen?
  Read full judgment →
• Engineer-in-Chief, E-in-C Branch GHQ vs Dadan Khan1998 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-15
  work-charge employeesservice tribunalpensionary benefitscivil servant statusleave to appealtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order concerning the termination of employees hired by the Frontier Works Organisation on a work-charge basis. The respondents, whose services were terminated, sought reinstatement before the Service Tribunal. Although the department maintained that work-charge employees could be removed based on project exigencies, the Tribunal held that the respondents were entitled to benefits admissible to temporary civil servants, specifically granting pensionary benefits due to their ten-year service duration. The petitioner challenges this, arguing that work-charge employees are not civil servants and are ineligible for such benefits. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal was justified in granting pensionary benefits to work-charge employees when they failed to produce evidence establishing their status as civil servants, and when such relief was not explicitly claimed in their appeals. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the propriety of the Tribunal's decision to grant relief not sought by the parties and the underlying legal status of work-charge employees regarding pensionary entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees hired on a work-charge basis entitled to pensionary benefits admissible to civil servants?
  • Is a Service Tribunal justified in granting relief that was not specifically claimed by the appellants in their appeals?
  • Does the burden of proof lie with the employee to establish their status as a civil servant before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Engineer Bashir Ahmed vs Senior Superintendent of Police and 4 others1998 SCMR 1047 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-10
  F.I.R. cancellationalternate remedyprivate complaintcivil proceedingscriminal prosecutionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of leave to appeal arising from concurrent decisions of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional challenges against the cancellation of a First Information Report. The F.I.R. lodged by the petitioner under sections 420, 471, 468, and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code was cancelled under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the sole ground that parallel civil proceedings concerning the same subject-matter had been dismissed by a Civil Court. The High Court held that the petitioner had an adequate alternate remedy through the institution of a private complaint. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether a private complaint constitutes an adequate alternate remedy under such circumstances, and whether the cancellation of the police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the aforesaid ground was legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private complaint under the circumstances of the case, could afford an adequate alternate remedy to the petitioner?
  • Whether there was justification in disposing of the petitioner's complaint under section 173, Cr.P.C. on the ground that civil proceedings had been dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Eida and others vs Allah Dad and others1998 SCMR 2045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  petition for leave to appealdeclaratory suitpossessionreferee reportmisreading of evidencerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby a revision petition filed by the respondents was accepted, setting aside the concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below and dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration of ownership and possession. The core legal question revolves around whether the courts below misread and misconstrued the report of the referee appointed with the consent of the parties regarding the actual physical possession of the suit land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the referee's report established the respondents' physical possession over a portion of the land and failed to prove the plaintiffs' possession on the remainder, rendering the suit for declaration of ownership in possession not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that where a plaintiff fails to establish possession as asserted in a declaratory suit founded on possession, such a suit is not maintainable, leaving the party to seek the appropriate remedy of a suit for possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for declaration of ownership and possession is maintainable when the plaintiff fails to establish actual physical possession over the suit land?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts based on a misreading of a referee's report be set aside in revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ullah vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service lawpromotionseniorityres judicataFederal Service Tribunaldepartmental promotionservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner’s appeal against the refusal of the department to promote him to the post of Deputy Superintendent. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner could repeatedly challenge the same departmental promotion decisions through successive appeals and whether his claim for promotion was maintainable against a senior colleague. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal correctly applied the principle of res judicata, as the petitioner had repeatedly agitated the same issues despite prior dismissals or withdrawals of his appeals. The Court further affirmed that the promotion of a senior colleague was valid and that the petitioner, being junior, had no entitlement to be promoted in preference to those senior to him. The key principle laid down is that the Government maintains the authority to frame and amend service rules, and administrative decisions regarding promotion and seniority, once adjudicated or finalized, cannot be subjected to repetitive litigation by the same party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee repeatedly challenge the same departmental promotion decision through successive appeals?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to service appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Is the Government competent to frame and amend service rules regarding promotion quotas?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Taza Khan vs The General Manager (Personnel), Railway1998 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-20
  service tribunalleave as on dutystudy allowanceestacodewithdrawal of illegal orderpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the treatment of his leave period as on duty and the grant of a study allowance. The petitioner, a Railway Guard, had proceeded on extended leave to pursue an M.B.B.S. degree. The core legal question was whether a railway servant pursuing higher education on leave is entitled to be treated as on duty and granted a study allowance under departmental rules, and whether an erroneous departmental order granting such benefits can be subsequently withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that under para 2003 of the Estacode, a railway servant can only be treated as on duty during a study period if entitled to be appointed to the service upon completion of training and if the qualification benefits the railway service, neither of which applied here. The Court further affirmed that an illegal administrative order does not become a past and closed transaction and can be lawfully withdrawn. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a railway servant is entitled to be treated as on duty during a study period under para 2003 of the Estacode without showing entitlement to appointment upon qualification?
  • Can an illegal departmental order conferring benefits be subsequently withdrawn or cancelled by the authorities?
  • Does an order once passed and acted upon become a past and closed transaction that is irrevocable?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sher Wali Khan, Assistant Director, Health Service, Northern1998 PLC (C.S.) 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-16
  ad hoc appointmentregularizationsenioritycivil servantFederal Service Tribunalretrospective regularization
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a service dispute concerning the seniority of civil medical officers in the Northern Areas Health Department. The appellant was initially appointed on an ad hoc basis in Grade-17 in September 1975 and later promoted to Grade-18 in October 1981, with his ad hoc service subsequently regularized with effect from 1975 following reference to the Federal Public Service Commission under Rule 4 of the Federal Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1978. Respondent No. 1, who entered government service on a regular basis in 1982, challenged the appellant's seniority before the Federal Service Tribunal, which ruled in favor of the respondent on the principle that regular appointments take precedence over retrospective regularization affecting others. The core legal question was whether an ad hoc appointment regularized retrospectively can confer seniority over a regularly appointed civil servant who entered service earlier than the date of regularization, and the extent of powers under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that in the exceptional circumstances of this case—where no objection was raised for fourteen years and the regularization followed the specific mechanism under the Federal Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1978—the regularization from the initial date of appointment was valid and equitable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc appointment can be regularized retrospectively from the initial date of appointment?
  • Does the power of the President under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 permit regularizing service in a manner that affects the seniority of other civil servants?
  • Can ad hoc service followed without a break by regular service be counted for the purpose of length of service and seniority?
  • What is the scope of Rule 4 of the Federal Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1978 regarding appointments made between 1972 and 1977?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Islam, Instructor, Animal Husbandry in-Service1998 PLC (C.S.) 1430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-02
  honorable acquittalback benefitsservice lawsuspension periodburden of proofcriminal jurisprudencecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a service appeal by the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which denied the appellant, a Veterinary Officer, full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension following his acquittal in a criminal case. The core legal question was whether an acquittal, particularly one where the prosecution failed to produce evidence, constitutes an 'honorable acquittal' entitling a civil servant to full back benefits, or if such benefits can be withheld. The Supreme Court held that all acquittals are 'honorable' because the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt; if it fails, the accused is exonerated. The Court rejected the argument that the acquittal was based on a compromise, noting the trial record showed a lack of evidence. The Court further observed that the term 'honorable acquittal' is not defined in law and that the distinction between types of acquittals is legally unsound. Consequently, the Court ruled the appellant was entitled to full pay and allowances for the suspension period.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal based on a lack of evidence constitute an 'honorable acquittal' for the purpose of claiming back benefits?
  • Can observations made in bail orders be used to determine the nature of an acquittal in a subsequent service matter?
  • Is there a legal distinction between different types of acquittals regarding a civil servant's entitlement to pay during suspension?
  • Does the prosecution's failure to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt render an acquittal 'honorable'?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Islam vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Food, Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department, Peshawar and 2 others1998 SCMR 1993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-02
  acquittalsuspensionback benefitshonourable acquittalservice tribunalcriminal trialarrears of pay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether an acquittal from a criminal charge entitles a civil servant to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension resulting from the criminal case. The appellant, a Veterinary Officer, was suspended following the registration of a murder case against him, but was subsequently acquitted by the trial court after the complainant did not charge him and the prosecution withdrew. The department rejected his claim for back pay, asserting the acquittal was not 'honourable' due to a purported compromise, a view upheld by the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that all acquittals—including those based on benefit of doubt or lack of evidence—are essentially honourable as the prosecution failed to prove its case, and the law does not draw a distinction between types of acquittals. The Court ruled that the appellant was acquitted due to an absence of incriminating evidence, clearing him from the accusation, and thus he is entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances for the suspension period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal by a criminal court entitles a suspended civil servant to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension?
  • Can an acquittal resulting from a lack of evidence or benefit of doubt be considered an honourable acquittal?
  • Are observations made in bail orders relevant for determining the nature of an acquittal during a trial?
  • Does the law recognize a distinction between different types of acquittals as being honourable or dishonourable?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Ashraf vs Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad1998 PLC (C.S.) 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-08
  advance incrementsservice tribunalfresh employmentproper channelpetition for leave to appealemoluments
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the refusal of the respondent to grant two advance increments on account of past experience and performance. The core legal question is whether a government employee, upon joining a new post in a different department through proper channel, is entitled as a matter of right to carry forward advance increments previously drawn on account of past experience in a former institution without any governing statutory rule or instruction. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any statutory rule, instruction, or promise entitling the employee to such increments in the new establishment—which constitutes a fresh employment rather than a transfer—the allowance of advance increments falls within the discretion of the department. The Court laid down the principle that applying through the proper channel for a new post in a different department does not confer a vested right to carry over emoluments or advance increments from the previous employer unless specifically sanctioned by applicable rules or terms of the advertisement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee joining a new post in a different department through proper channel is entitled to carry forward advance increments drawn in a previous organization as a matter of right?
  • Does applying for a post through proper channel amount to a transfer from one department to another rather than a fresh employment?
  • Can advance increments for past experience be claimed in the absence of a statutory rule, instruction, or promise by the employing department?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mrs. Shahnaz Akhtar, Associate Professor vs Government of N.-1998 PLC (C.S.) 1112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-11
  civil serviceacting charge appointmentpromotion rulesvested rightregularizationservice tribunaleligibility criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal’s dismissal of a claim by an Associate Professor seeking regularization in BPS-19 from an earlier date, based on seniority and the application of pre-1984 qualification rules. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been appointed on an acting charge basis, was entitled to be governed by the qualification rules existing at the time of her initial appointment or the new rules introduced in 1984, which required additional research publications. The Supreme Court held that the government possesses the exclusive domain to amend promotion criteria and that civil servants hold no vested right in promotion or the specific qualification rules governing higher posts. The Court affirmed that eligibility must be determined by the rules in force at the time of regular promotion, not at the time of initial appointment or acting charge. Consequently, the appellant’s acting charge status did not exempt her from the new qualification requirements. The Court dismissed the appeal but directed the respondent to consider adjusting the regularization date to when the appellant actually fulfilled the new qualification criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acting charge appointment confer a vested right to regular promotion?
  • Can the government change the qualification rules for promotion to a higher post?
  • Are the qualification rules applicable to a promotion determined by the date of initial appointment or the date of regular promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mazhar-Ul-Haq Qureshi vs Dr. Yaqoob Baig Mirza and 2 others1998 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-12
  service matterwrit jurisdictionstatus quointerim reliefjurisdictional barexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court challenging the appointment of the petitioner, Dr. Mazhar-ul-Haq Qureshi, as Principal of de'Montmorency College of Dentistry, by the respondent, Dr. Yaqoob Baig Mirza, who claimed seniority. The High Court initially issued a status quo order, which it subsequently refused to vacate. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition due to the bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, regarding service matters. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel offered not to press the appeal if the main writ petition pending before the High Court was decided expeditiously. The respondent's counsel did not oppose this. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with a direction to the High Court to decide the pending writ petition by a specified date, while reserving the petitioner's right to approach the Supreme Court again should the High Court fail to meet this deadline.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a service matter in light of the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the High Court to decide a pending writ petition within a specific timeframe to avoid further litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. M. Afzal Beg vs University of Punjab and others1998 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-02
  interim reliefstatus quointra-court appealwrit jurisdictionuniversity appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an interim order passed by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in an Intra-Court Appeal. The High Court had suspended a notification appointing the petitioner as the Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Punjab. The core legal question concerned the validity of the interim relief granted by the High Court pending the final adjudication of the underlying writ petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court did not delve into the merits of the dispute. Instead, the Court recorded a mutual agreement reached between the learned counsel for both parties. The parties consented to maintain the status quo regarding the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor until the final disposal of the pending writ petition. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, disposed of it in accordance with the agreed terms, and issued a directive to the High Court to conclude the proceedings of the writ petition within a specified timeframe, specifically by February 1998.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of a petition for leave to appeal based on a mutual agreement between the parties regarding interim relief?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to direct the High Court to expedite the disposal of a pending writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Ikram-Ul-Haque Tariq vs Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and 3 others1998 SCMR 1061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-24
  service regularizationPakistan Air Forceadministrative policylegitimate expectationservice tribunalequal treatmentcivilian medical practitioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant’s claim for regularization as a Civilian Medical Practitioner in the Pakistan Air Force. The appellant contended that he was entitled to confirmation after five years of service pursuant to a 1986 assurance and the policy dated 29th November 1980, noting that a similarly situated colleague had been regularized. The core legal question was whether the respondents could unilaterally deny consideration for regularization despite these prior assurances and the precedent of consistent treatment. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were obligated to consider the appellant's case for regularization in accordance with the stated policy. The Court emphasized that administrative authorities must adhere to their established policies and assurances, ensuring fair and equitable treatment among similarly situated employees. By allowing the appeal, the Court directed the respondents to evaluate the appellant's eligibility for regularization, thereby reinforcing the principle that public bodies cannot arbitrarily depart from their own policies or treat comparable cases inconsistently, ensuring that administrative actions remain just, proper, and compliant with established service conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority unilaterally depart from an assurance given regarding the regularization of an employee?
  • Is a government department required to treat similarly situated employees consistently regarding regularization policies?
  • Does a policy assurance regarding confirmation create an obligation for the employer to consider an employee for regularization?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Akhtar Hussain, Ex.M.O. Pims, Islamabad vs Executive Director, Pims, Islamabad and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-02
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsmajor penaltyproportionality of punishmentenquiry committee recommendationsleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a majority decision of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the petitioner's removal from service as a Medical Officer at the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS). The petitioner faced disciplinary charges regarding the unauthorized operation of a private laboratory while drawing a non-practicing allowance, the receipt of shares from a blood bank, the possession of expired medical kits, and a fatal incident involving a wrong blood transfusion. Although an enquiry committee recommended minor penalties—specifically the recovery of allowances, cessation of future non-practicing allowances, transfer to the Pathology Department, and a stern warning—the departmental authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service. The Federal Service Tribunal, by a majority of two to one, affirmed this removal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the departmental authority was justified in imposing a major penalty of removal from service in light of the enquiry committee's specific recommendations for minor punishments, thereby addressing the proportionality of disciplinary sanctions in service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Is a departmental authority legally bound to follow the recommendations of an enquiry committee regarding the quantum of punishment?
  • Can a major penalty of removal from service be sustained when an enquiry committee has recommended only minor penalties for the established charges?
  • Does a majority decision of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary penalties warrant appellate review by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Akhtar Hussain, Ex.-M.O., Pims, Islamabad vs Executive Director, Pims, Islamabad and anothers1998 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-02
  service lawmajor penaltyenquiry committee recommendationsdepartmental authorityremoval from serviceFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Medical Officer at PIMS, Islamabad, sought leave to appeal against a majority decision of the Federal Service Tribunal which upheld his removal from service. The petitioner faced multiple charges, including running a private laboratory while drawing a non-practicing allowance, receiving shares from a blood bank, and possessing expired medical kits. Additionally, a later charge involved the alleged wrong blood transfusion resulting in a patient's death and the alteration of blood group records. An enquiry committee investigated these charges and recommended minor penalties, specifically the recovery of allowances, stoppage of future allowances, transfer to another department, and a stern warning. Despite these recommendations, the departmental authority imposed the major penalty of removal from service, which was subsequently upheld by a 2-1 majority of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the major penalty of removal from service was legally justified given the enquiry committee's findings and recommendations for lesser, minor punishments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental authority is legally bound to follow the recommendations of an enquiry committee regarding the quantum of punishment?
  • Can a major penalty of removal from service be sustained when an enquiry committee has recommended only minor penalties for the established charges?
  • Does a majority decision of the Federal Service Tribunal upholding a major penalty require judicial review when the underlying enquiry findings suggest a lesser punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aftab Ahmed Khan vs Mst. Zaibun Nisa1998 SCMR 2085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-08
  striking off defencetentative rent orderSindh Rented Premises Ordinancedefault in rentcollateral proceedingspenal actionlandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the striking off of a tenant's defence in an eviction proceeding under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a defence could be struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent order that was inherently ambiguous, uncertain, and failed to account for rent deposits made in collateral proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court were unsustainable. The Court ruled that tentative rent orders must be precise, definitive, and clearly quantify the amounts due, leaving no room for uncertainty. Striking off a defence is a penal measure that should not be invoked for technical defaults where the tenant has acted in good faith and without contumacious intent. The Court emphasized that where a tenant has substantially discharged their obligations by depositing rent in collateral proceedings, such deposits should be considered, and the penal consequence of striking off the defence is inappropriate. Consequently, the case was remanded for a fresh, definitive tentative rent order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, based on an ambiguous or uncertain tentative rent order?
  • Should deposits made in collateral rent proceedings be credited towards a tenant's obligations when determining default for the purpose of striking off a defence?
  • Is the striking off of a tenant's defence a penal measure that requires proof of contumacious conduct rather than mere technical default?
  Read full judgment →
• District Accounts Officer-I, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Sarwar1998 SCMR 2722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-31
  disturbance allowancediscriminatory treatmentcivil petitionhigh court staffallowance recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions challenging orders passed by the Lahore High Court regarding the payment of a thirty percent disturbance allowance to certain high court staff who joined service prior to 1981. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the employees to the continued receipt of this allowance and whether its stoppage and selective recovery constituted discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was legally justified in allowing the payment of the disputed allowance on the ground of discriminatory treatment, particularly since the petitioners failed to substantiate claims of a computer mistake or authorized recovery decisions with documentation. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, with the observation that the decision shall be strictly confined to the facts of the present case, laying down the principle that arbitrary or discriminatory withholding of established allowances without proper justification or proof of mistake is impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an established disturbance allowance granted to high court staff can be arbitrarily stopped?
  • Does the stoppage and selective recovery of an allowance without proper documentation amount to discriminatory treatment?
  • Are decisions regarding service allowances confined to the specific facts of each case?
  Read full judgment →
• District Accounts Officer-I, District Accounts Office, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Sarwar (1998 PLC (C.S.) 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-31
  disturbance allowancediscriminatory treatmentconstitutional petitionservice matterSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions challenging orders passed by the Lahore High Court regarding the entitlement of certain staff to a 30% disturbance allowance. The core legal question concerns the legality of stopping the payment of the disturbance allowance which had previously been disbursed to employees who joined service prior to 1981 under a provincial government letter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly allowed the petitions filed by the employees, noting the lack of evidence supporting the petitioner's claim of a computer mistake and highlighting the discriminatory treatment meted out to the respondents. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, with the observation that the decision shall be confined to the facts of the present case. The key principle laid down is that executive authorities cannot arbitrarily discontinue allowances without substantiated legal or factual justification, particularly when doing so results in discriminatory treatment among similarly situated employees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the discontinuation of a disturbance allowance previously granted to court staff is legally sustainable without proof of erroneous disbursement?
  • Does the arbitrary withdrawal of an allowance enjoyed by employees amount to discriminatory treatment warranting constitutional intervention?
  Read full judgment →
• Director-General, Pakistan Rangers, Lahore and others vs R-301059 ex-1998 SCMR 1087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-13
  Pakistan RangersCivil Servant statusFederal Service Tribunal jurisdictionDisciplinary proceedingsService mattersEfficiency, Discipline and Appeal Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns six appeals filed by the Director-General, Pakistan Rangers, challenging judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal which granted relief to various Rangers personnel regarding disciplinary actions. The core legal question was whether members of the Pakistan Rangers qualify as civil servants, thereby vesting the Federal Service Tribunal with jurisdiction to entertain their service-related appeals. The Supreme Court held that since the Pakistan Rangers Ordinance is silent on the status of its members, they are deemed civil servants as they perform duties in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, appeals regarding their terms and conditions of service are competent before the Federal Service Tribunal. The Court further established that while the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 govern disciplinary matters, these rules prevail over the Civil Servants Act, 1973 in the event of conflict. Finding no jurisdictional defect and concluding that the Tribunal’s decisions on the merits were based on the peculiar facts of each case, the Court dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Are members of the Pakistan Rangers considered civil servants for the purposes of service law?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals against disciplinary orders passed by Pakistan Rangers authorities?
  • Which rules prevail in the event of a conflict between the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 and the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Director-General, National Savings, Islamabad and anothers vs Aziz-1998 SCMR 2323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-01
  service tribunalquantum of punishmentefficiency and discipline rulesunauthorized absenceleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal modifying the respondent civil servant's penalty of removal from service to reduction in rank. The respondent had been proceeded against under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 for unauthorized absence from duty and found guilty by the departmental authority. On appeal before the Service Tribunal, the respondent did not press the matter on merits but sought leniency, which the Tribunal granted by reducing the punishment and treating the intervening period as extraordinary leave without pay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Service Tribunal was competent to modify the departmental penalty in the exercise of its discretion, and no relevant factor was shown to have been ignored. Furthermore, the case did not involve a substantial question of law of public importance under the Constitution. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal is competent to modify the punishment awarded by a departmental authority?
  • Does the reduction of punishment by the Service Tribunal lie within its discretion?
  • Does a petition against the modification of punishment by the Service Tribunal involve a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Director-General, National Savings, Islamabad and another vs Aziz-1998 PLC (C.S.) 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-01
  service tribunaldepartmental authorityefficiency and discipline rulesremoval from servicemodification of punishmentleave to appealunauthorised absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Director-General, National Savings, Islamabad against an order of the Service Tribunal. The respondent, a U.D.C. Selection Grade-9, was proceeded against under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 for unauthorised absence from duty and was removed from service. Upon appeal before the Service Tribunal, the respondent did not contest the merits but sought leniency. The Tribunal modified the penalty of removal from service to reduction to his substantive post of U.D.C. (B-7) for two years with related directions. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was competent to modify the punishment and whether the case involved a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal was fully competent to modify the departmental punishment in its discretion, and no relevant factor was ignored. Furthermore, the case did not raise a substantial question of law of public importance. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal is competent to modify a punishment awarded by a departmental authority?
  • Does the reduction of a penalty by the Service Tribunal involve a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by the Service Tribunal in reducing a service penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Director, Technical Education, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 3 others vs Abdul Samin1998 SCMR 2461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-12
  higher pay scaleannual incrementsunqualified incumbentservice tribunalupgraded postpresumptive pay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had directed the payment of annual increments in a higher pay scale (BPS-17) to the respondent, Abdul Samin, for the period he served on an upgraded post of Instructor despite lacking the requisite qualifications. The core legal question was whether an unqualified employee who held a higher post is legally entitled to annual increments in that higher pay scale during such service. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the respondent was entitled to the pay of the higher post for the period he functioned on it, he had no vested right to claim annual increments since he lacked the necessary qualifications for permanent appointment, and competent authorities possess the discretion under relevant service rules to restrict pay or deny full presumptive benefits to unqualified incumbents. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the Tribunal's order granting increments was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who lacks the requisite qualifications for a higher post is entitled to annual increments in the higher pay scale for the period they performed duties on that post?
  • Can a competent authority allow reduced terms or deny full presumptive pay to an incumbent who is not fully qualified for the higher post they are holding?
  Read full judgment →
• Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of Pakistan and 2 others vs Sikandar and 12 others1998 SCMR 2164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-19
  evacuee propertyallotment of landagricultural landSpecial Jamabandiconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the ownership of Khasra No. 2061, situated in Lahore. The appellants, the Intelligence Bureau, claimed this land was part of Bungalow No. 94-Upper Mall, which had been transferred to them. Conversely, the respondents asserted the land was independent agricultural property allotted to them under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the disputed land constituted part of the bungalow or was separate agricultural land subject to allotment. The Supreme Court held that the land in dispute was distinct from the bungalow, noting that the Intelligence Bureau’s purchase price and the area transferred to them corresponded solely to the bungalow (10 Kanals), excluding the disputed Khasra. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower authorities, emphasizing that the nature of land is determined by its classification in the Special Jamabandi at the time of Partition. The principle laid down is that the actual use and revenue record classification at the time of Partition govern the nature of property, and concurrent findings of fact by specialized settlement authorities are generally final and not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification of land in a Special Jamabandi determine its nature as agricultural or building site for the purpose of allotment under settlement laws?
  • Can a court in constitutional jurisdiction interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding property boundaries made by settlement authorities?
  • Does the presence of structures on land classified as agricultural in the revenue record change its status for the purpose of disposal under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Director of Education (Schools), Lahore Region, Lahore and others vs Muhammad Abbas1998 PLC (C.S.) 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-24
  service lawtermination of servicetemporary appointmentregular appointmentservice tribunalreinstatementrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment that set aside the termination of an Elementary School Teacher and ordered his reinstatement. The core legal question was whether the Department could terminate the respondent's services on the basis of a 'temporary' appointment clause when the applicable service rules did not recognize such a status. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was regular, as it was made through the prescribed recruitment committee, and that the Department could not rely on a 'temporary' designation to bypass legal termination procedures. The Court affirmed that there is no concept of 'purely temporary' appointments under the relevant service rules, and thus, the summary termination was unlawful. The principle laid down is that an appointment made in the prescribed manner constitutes a regular appointment under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and cannot be subjected to arbitrary termination based on clauses not supported by the governing service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a concept of 'purely temporary' appointment under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Can an employer terminate a civil servant's employment based on a 'temporary' clause if the governing rules do not provide for such a category?
  • Does an appointment made through a prescribed recruitment committee constitute a regular appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Dildar Baig vs The State1998 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-15
  criminal bailmurderous assaultleave to appealFirst Information Reportsuppression of terrorist activities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's pre-trial bail application by the Special Court. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the allegations against him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner was specifically named in the First Information Report with a distinct role involving serious allegations of a murderous assault while armed with firearms. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming that individuals facing grave allegations with specific attribution in the initial report are not entitled to bail at this stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused named in the FIR with a specific role for a murderous assault entitled to bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts denying bail in serious cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Dewan Scrap (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Government of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-18
  interim orderregulatory dutybank guaranteecustoms dutyship breakingconstitutional petitionSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an interim order passed by the High Court of Balochistan regarding the clearance and breaking of an imported ship, 'TT Mona', at the Gadani Customs area. The core legal question concerns the validity and reasonableness of conditioning the interim release of imported scrap on furnishing a bank guarantee for a newly imposed 10% ad valorem regulatory duty, amidst a factual dispute over the exact filing date of the bill of entry. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that where retention of a specific quantity of the imported scrap (3000 tons) sufficiently secures the government's financial interest in respect of the disputed regulatory duty, requiring an onerous bank guarantee causes undue hardship and liquidity problems. The Court modified the interim order to substitute the bank guarantee with the retention of 3000 tons of scrap, subject to the High Court expediting and deciding the main constitutional petition within a stipulated two-month period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim order requiring a bank guarantee for a regulatory duty can be modified when alternative security adequately protects government dues?
  • Can the Supreme Court substitute a bank guarantee with physical retention of goods as security during the pendency of a constitutional petition?
  • Whether customs authorities can withhold release of goods despite the deposit of permissible installments of customs duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Gujranwala and others vs Anwar1998 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-22
  service appealseniority and promotionpolice serviceexoneration from inquiryefficiency barSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which allowed a service appeal filed by the respondent regarding seniority and promotions in the Punjab Police. The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector along with others whose batchmates were confirmed earlier, while the respondent's confirmation was delayed due to a pending inquiry and failure to cross an efficiency bar. The core legal question was whether a civil servant exonerated in an inquiry and facing only minor matters can be lawfully deprived of seniority and promotion along with his batchmates. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly considered the relevant facts, noting the respondent was exonerated and the punishments were of a minor nature under the rules, thereby not warranting deprivation of seniority and promotions. The petition was dismissed as no question of law of public importance was involved, affirming that an exonerated employee is entitled to due seniority and consequential benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be deprived of seniority and promotion when exonerated in a departmental inquiry?
  • Does the withholding of promotion due to failure to cross an efficiency bar justify denying retrospective seniority upon exoneration?
  • When does a service matter involve a question of law of public importance to warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Director, Food, Bahawalpur and others vs Akhtar Ali and others1998 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-14
  civil servantdisciplinary proceedingsretirement from serviceservice tribunalembezzlementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which allowed appeals filed by respondents, who were previously Foodgrains Inspectors, against penalties of dismissal and recovery imposed upon them following disciplinary proceedings for heavy loss of foodgrains. The Punjab Service Tribunal set aside the penalties and ordered reinstatement, holding inter alia that one of the respondents had already retired from service before the penalty was imposed, thereby ceasing to be a civil servant and causing the disciplinary proceedings to abate, relying on Section 2(1)(b) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Supreme Court observed that a retired person technically falls outside the civil servant definition, but noted the petitioner's contention that such an interpretation allows guilty persons involved in heavy embezzlement to escape accountability, and that the omission might not be intentional. Finding no prior authoritative pronouncement by the Court on this matter, leave to appeal was granted to consider the question, while the Tribunal's order regarding reinstatement remained suspended.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant abate upon retirement?
  • Does a person who has retired from service fall within the definition of civil servant under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
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• Deputy Commissioner, Narowal and others vs Karamat Ali and others1998 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-19
  writ petitionejectmentZila Councilalternate landunauthorized undertakingdue course of lawSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking to restrain the authorities from ejecting them from shops belonging to the Zila Council without notice and due course of law. The High Court disposed of the petition based on an undertaking given by the Assistant Commissioner, acting as Administrator of the Municipal Committee, to accommodate the shopkeepers by providing alternate land. The petitioners, including the Deputy Commissioner, sought leave to appeal against this order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the Assistant Commissioner had the authority to bind the Zila Council or Highways Department by such an undertaking and whether relief not prayed for could be granted. The Court held that the Assistant Commissioner lacked the authority to make such a policy undertaking regarding land belonging to the Zila Council or Highways Department, and that relief not claimed by the respondents could not be granted. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed that the respondents shall not be ejected otherwise than in due course of law, laying down that public authorities cannot be bound by unauthorized undertakings and relief must conform to pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Administrator of a Municipal Committee have the authority to bind a Zila Council by undertaking to provide alternate land to evicted shopkeepers?
  • Can a court grant a relief that was not prayed for by the petitioners in their pleadings?
  • Whether tenants or licensees of a local authority can be ejected without recourse to the due course of law?
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• Deputy Commandant, F.R.P., N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and anothers vs Muhammad Siddique, Ex-Constable No. 2867 and 28 others1998 SCMR 2478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  service tribunalpolice rulesremoval from servicemajor penaltyremand of casedisciplinary inquirydisobedience of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal whereby the major penalty of removal from service imposed upon police constables for alleged disobedience of orders was reduced to a minor penalty. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could modify the penalty without properly examining or resolving alleged procedural defects, and whether the matter warranted a remand for a fresh inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the record did not support the conclusion that the respondents had admitted the charges, and that the Service Tribunal erred in simply reducing the sentence without addressing the procedural irregularities. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of, the Tribunal's judgment was modified, and the matter was remanded to the appellant-authorities to conduct a regular inquiry in accordance with the N.-W.F.P. Police Rules, 1975, while directing that the respondents remain in service pending the conclusion of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can reduce a major penalty to a minor penalty without properly examining procedural defects in the inquiry?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to remand a disciplinary matter for a fresh inquiry when the initial proceedings suffer from procedural irregularities?
  • Whether an alleged admission of guilt by members of a disciplined force can be sustained when not borne out by the record?
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• Delvi Kund Forests & Multi-Purposes Cooperative Society Limited1998 SCMR 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-10
  contempt of courtinterim ordercivil suittimber salecooperative societyfinal decreedisobedience of court order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two contempt of court petitions filed by the Managing Director of the Devli Kund Forests and Multipurposes Cooperative Society Limited against Forest Department officials, alleging willful disobedience of a Supreme Court order dated 31-5-1994. The core legal question was whether the respondents committed contempt by failing to comply with directions regarding the sale of timber and distribution of proceeds. The Court held that the interim order dated 31-5-1994 was explicitly intended to operate only until the final decision of the pending civil suit. Since the trial court rendered a final decree on 27-2-1997, the rights and obligations of the parties are now governed by that decree rather than the interim order. Consequently, the Court found no justification to proceed with contempt proceedings, noting that the petitioner's claims regarding timber distribution were largely addressed or superseded by the final judgment. The Court established that an interim order passed pending a suit is subordinate to the final decree, and contempt proceedings are inappropriate where the underlying dispute has been resolved by a final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interim order of the Supreme Court remain operative after the final decree of the trial court?
  • Can contempt proceedings be maintained when the underlying dispute has been resolved by a final decree?
  • Is an interim order subject to the final outcome of a pending suit?
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• Criminal Shariat Captain S.M. Aslam vs Mst. Ruby Akhtar and anothers1998 SCMR 1400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-12
  Criminal Shariat AppealCompromiseWithdrawal of complaintSetting aside convictionAmicable resolution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through two Criminal Shariat Appeals involving cross-litigation between the parties. The core legal question concerns whether the parties can amicably resolve their long-standing disputes by submitting a compromise application to withdraw their pending criminal complaints and associated civil and criminal proceedings. The court held that since the parties have agreed to withdraw all complaints and terminate a decade-long litigation, the compromise is accepted and permission to withdraw is granted. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant in the first appeal is set aside, the complaints stand dismissed as withdrawn, and all other related pending cases in various courts are disposed of in terms of the compromise. The key principle laid down is that courts may facilitate the amicable resolution of disputes by accepting bona fide compromises between parties in compoundable matters, thereby bringing an end to protracted multi-forum litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal appeals be disposed of on the basis of a compromise between the parties?
  • Whether permission to withdraw complaints can be granted pursuant to a compromise application?
  • What is the effect of an accepted compromise on pending civil and criminal cases between the same parties?
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• Cr. Zakhim Khan Masood vs The State1998 SCMR 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-20
  post-arrest bailmedical groundssick and infirmischemic heart diseaseprevention of corruptionmisappropriation of public funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's bail application on the ground of illness. The petitioner was accused of misappropriating public funds under sections 409, 468, 471, 477-A, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, suffering from ischemic heart disease, qualified as a sick and infirm person entitled to bail under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the petition and granted bail, holding that the petitioner's continued detention posed a serious hazard to his life due to stress and strain. The Court laid down the principle that where medical evidence establishes that continued detention in custody is likely to have hazardous effects on a patient's life and slow down recovery, the accused is entitled to bail on the ground of sickness and infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused suffering from ischemic heart disease qualifies as a sick and infirm person entitled to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can bail be granted on medical grounds if continued detention in custody is likely to have hazardous effects on the life of the accused?
  • What standard of medical evidence is required to establish that detention poses a serious danger to an accused's life for the purpose of granting bail?
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• Collector of Customs, Customs House, Nabha, Road, Lahore And 21998 P.C.T.L.R. 607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-24
  leave to appealsales tax exemptionwithdrawal of exemptionletter of creditcustoms dutySRO notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Collector of Customs against the High Court judgment allowing the respondent's writ petition. The core dispute involved whether the respondent was liable to pay sales tax on imported goods where letters of credit were opened prior to the withdrawal of an exemption notification under SRO No. 504(1)/1994 dated 9-6-1994. The petitioners demanded sales tax upon arrival of the goods following the withdrawal of the exemption on 4-4-1996, relying on Section 6 of the Sales Tax Act and Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969. The High Court had held that demanding sales tax for consignments where letters of credit were opened prior to the withdrawal of the exemption notification was without lawful authority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the legal question in line with a precedent involving similar issues.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sales tax can be demanded on consignments where letters of credit were opened prior to the withdrawal of an exemption notification?
  • Whether Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 applies to sales tax exemptions upon withdrawal of an exemption notification?
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• Collector of Customs, Customs House, Nabha Road, Lahore and 21998 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-24
  customs dutysales tax exemptionletters of creditimport of goodsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Collector of Customs, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court which had ruled in favor of the respondent regarding the payment of sales tax on imported goods. The respondent had opened letters of credit for the import of various components while a notification (SRO No. 504(I) of 1994) granting exemption from sales tax was in effect. Although this exemption was subsequently withdrawn, the respondent argued that the exemption should still apply because the letters of credit were established prior to the withdrawal. The customs authorities, relying on Section 6 of the Sales Tax Act and Section 31-A of the Customs Act, insisted on the payment of sales tax upon the arrival of the goods. The Supreme Court, noting that leave to appeal had already been granted in a similar matter (M/s M.Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.), granted leave in the present case to consider whether the exemption remained applicable to consignments where letters of credit were opened before the withdrawal of the exemption notification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a sales tax exemption notification affect goods for which letters of credit were opened prior to the withdrawal?
  • Is the demand for sales tax on imports lawful when letters of credit were established during the currency of an exemption notification?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 override previous exemptions for goods imported under letters of credit?
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• Collector of Customs And Others vs (M/s.) S.M. Ahmad & Co (Pvt.) Ltd.1998 P.C.T.LR. 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-30
  customs classificationwrit jurisdictionalternate remedyfiscal interpretationmixed question of law and factimport dutytariff heading
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the customs classification of imported wood. The Customs authorities classified the wood under PCT Heading 44.07, while the importer contended it fell under Heading 44.03. After the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) upheld the authorities' classification, the importer successfully challenged the assessment in the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternate statutory remedy exists and whether goods classification is a reviewable question of law. The Court held that a writ petition is maintainable if the alternate remedy is illusory, such as when the appellate authority has already pre-determined the issue. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that classification of goods constitutes a mixed question of law and fact, making it subject to judicial review. On the merits, the Court ruled that the imported wood, being in a rough condition, fell under PCT Heading 44.03. It established the principle that fiscal provisions must be interpreted in favor of the subject, and any ambiguity in such provisions should be resolved to the benefit of the taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable when the statutory appellate authority has already expressed a final opinion on the matter?
  • Does the classification of imported goods under the Customs Act constitute a pure question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact?
  • What is the principle of interpretation regarding fiscal provisions when ambiguity exists?
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• Collector Customs, Excise and Sales Tax, Peshawar and 3 others vs Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Charsadda1998 SCMR 1041 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-25
  Excise dutyStay orderInterim reliefRecovery of duesFiscal liabilitySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous application arose in a pending appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the recovery of excise duty by the Collector of Customs, Excise and Sales Tax. The core legal question was whether the applicant/respondent was liable to pay excise duty for the period during which a High Court stay order was in force, particularly when the applicant had not collected such duty from its customers in reliance on that order. The Supreme Court held that the recovery notice issued by the authorities was suspended until the final disposal of the appeal. Relying on the principle established in Messrs R.C.D. Ball Bearing Limited v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution, the Court determined that a party is not liable for dues during the currency of a valid stay order regarding the leviability of such charges. The Court reasoned that the stay order protected the applicant from liability for that period, and if the authorities required security for future dues, they should have requested it when the stay was initially granted. The application was allowed, subject to the applicant furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Is a manufacturer liable to pay excise duty for a period during which a court-ordered stay on the recovery of such duty was in force?
  • Can a party be held liable for statutory dues during the currency of a stay order if they did not collect those dues from their customers?
  • Does a stay order regarding the leviability of a tax or contribution protect a party from liability for that period until the final decision of the appeal?
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• Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Akram vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-06
  pro bono publicolocus standiactive serviceField General Court Martialwrit jurisdictionaggrieved partyPakistan Army Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed writ petitions filed by a petitioner acting pro bono publico regarding the legality of trials by a Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The petitioner argued that the convicts were not on 'active service' as required by the Act. The core legal questions were whether a third party could maintain a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in a criminal matter involving the conviction of others, and whether the convicts were legally deemed to be on active service. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi, as the principle of pro bono publico cannot be invoked to challenge the conviction of an individual where the petitioner has no personal interest. Furthermore, on merits, the Court affirmed that under Section 7(1) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, the Federal Government possesses the authority to deem persons subject to the Act as being on active service through notification, which had been validly exercised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party file a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to challenge the conviction of another individual on the basis of pro bono publico?
  • Does the Federal Government have the authority under Section 7(1) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, to declare persons subject to the Act as being on active service?
  • Is the principle of pro bono publico applicable to challenges against individual criminal convictions?
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• Col. (Retd.) M.R. Hassan vs S.H.O Margalla, Islamabad and others1998 SCMR 2738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  Intra-Court Appealexhaustion of remediesleave to appealjurisdictionprocedural lawappellate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order passed by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether a petitioner can bypass the available remedy of an Intra-Court Appeal (I.C.A.) by approaching the Supreme Court directly. The Supreme Court declined to entertain the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust the alternative remedy of an Intra-Court Appeal available within the High Court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue the appropriate Intra-Court Appeal before the High Court if so advised. The principle established is that the Supreme Court will generally not entertain a petition for leave to appeal where an adequate and efficacious remedy, such as an Intra-Court Appeal, has not been exhausted by the aggrieved party. The Court emphasized the necessity of exhausting lower appellate forums before invoking the jurisdiction of the apex court, thereby reinforcing the procedural requirement of exhausting alternative legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner approach the Supreme Court directly when an Intra-Court Appeal remedy is available in the High Court?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if the petitioner has bypassed an available Intra-Court Appeal?
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• Col. (Retd.) M.R. Hassan vs Chief Commissioner, Islamabad and 3 others1998 SCMR 1285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-24
  cooperative societiesfinancial irregularitiesnatural justiceprocedural improprietydocumentary evidenceaudit reportwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding an award passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, which held the petitioners (former office-bearers of a Cooperative Housing Society) liable for financial irregularities and losses. The core legal question was whether the proceedings under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, were vitiated by procedural impropriety, specifically the lack of an elaborate inquiry, denial of cross-examination, and reliance on an audit report without proper confrontation. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings were valid. The ratio is that where charges of financial irregularity are based on documentary evidence and the factual allegations are essentially admitted by the petitioners, the failure to conduct a full-scale trial or record oral evidence does not constitute a denial of natural justice. The Court affirmed that when petitioners admit to the underlying facts and merely attempt to justify them through by-laws or resolutions, the authorities are not required to conduct further inquiry into those admitted facts. The Court found no jurisdictional error or procedural irregularity in the lower forums' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to conduct an elaborate oral inquiry vitiate proceedings under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, where the charges are based on documentary evidence?
  • Can a party claim a violation of natural justice for lack of cross-examination when the underlying factual allegations are admitted?
  • Is an audit report admissible as evidence in proceedings under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, if the accused has been provided with the report and given an opportunity to reply?
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