Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Yaqeen Ud Din And Others vs Abdul Majid And Other1986 SCMR 1198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a property dispute regarding the Malawa Ram Cotton Factory, which was sold by public auction in 1956. The core legal question is whether the auction sale included Khasra No. 792 in addition to Khasra Nos. 793 and 794. The High Court had previously accepted the respondent's claim, relying on a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) that included Khasra No. 792, despite noting evidence of record tampering. The Supreme Court observed that the Settlement Commissioner failed to properly examine conflicting sets of documents regarding the property's scope and the authenticity of the records. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the findings and remanded the case to the Notified Officer under the Evacuee and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Court directed an inquiry to determine the genuine extent of the auctioned property and to investigate whether the appellants, as alleged allottees, possess the locus standi to challenge the respondent's claim, particularly in light of contentions regarding alternate allotments.
Questions settled- Can a court remand a case for further inquiry when there is a dispute regarding the authenticity of conflicting property records?
- Does a Notified Officer under the Evacuee and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 have the authority to determine the scope of a property sold at auction?
- Is it necessary to determine the locus standi of appellants in a property dispute if they have received alternate allotments?
- Yahya Bakhtiar vs Shaikh Shaukat Ali And Other1986 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding an office objection concerning the petitioner's failure to deposit a mandatory fee of Rs.500, which was a prerequisite for the entertainment of the petition. Upon the matter being fixed for orders, the petitioner failed to appear, and the required deposit remained unpaid. Furthermore, the Court examined the nature of the dispute raised in the proceedings and determined that the issues presented were not appropriate for resolution by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court held that the petition was not entertainable due to both the procedural default in depositing the required fee and the substantive unsuitability of the dispute for adjudication by the apex court. The petition was disposed of accordingly.
Questions settled- Can a petition be entertained by the Supreme Court if a mandatory fee has not been deposited?
- Is a dispute that is deemed inappropriate for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction liable to be dismissed?
- What is the consequence of a petitioner's failure to appear when a matter is fixed for orders?
- William Lawrence vs Government of Pakistan And Other1986 SCMR 1077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These three petitions arose from the import of foodstuffs by the petitioners, who sought clearance of the goods as unaccompanied luggage. Upon re-examination, the customs authorities discovered that the petitioners had misdeclared both the quantity and value of the goods, resulting in revenue loss. Consequently, the Collector of Customs (Preventive) exercised powers under Section 195 of the Customs Act 1969, set aside the initial release order of the Superintendent of Customs, and ordered the confiscation of the goods under Section 156(1)(9) of the same Act. The petitioners challenged this confiscation order directly through constitutional petitions in the Sindh High Court. The High Court dismissed the petitions on the merits and because the petitioners failed to exhaust the alternate and adequate statutory remedy available under Section 196 of the Customs Act 1969. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that constitutional petitions are incompetent when adequate statutory alternative remedies remain unexhausted.
Questions settled- Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an adequate and alternative statutory remedy under the Customs Act 1969 has not been exhausted?
- Can the Collector of Customs exercise powers under Section 195 of the Customs Act 1969 to set aside a release order passed by a subordinate customs officer if misdeclaration is established?
- Wazir Khan vs Additional District Judge II, Rawalpindi And Another1986 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court, arose from a writ petition challenging the decision of the appellate authority (Additional District Judge) which had reversed a Rent Controller's ejectment order. The landlord sought the tenant's eviction on the ground of personal bona fide need for his son's occupation. The appellate authority dismissed the ejectment petition, finding that the landlord had recently got two other similar houses vacated, making his demand for the disputed premises mala fide. The High Court declined to interfere, treating this as a finding of fact. The Supreme Court observed that the other houses were vacated during the pendency of the proceedings, and the tenant had failed to confront the landlord during cross-examination regarding the suitability or adequacy of those alternative properties. Relying on its precedent, the Court held that the suitability of alternative accommodation is a question of fact that must be established through evidence or uncontroverted pleadings. The Court concluded that the appellate authority misdirected itself in law by relying on material not on the record. The appeal was accepted, the orders of the High Court and the appellate authority were set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision.
Questions settled- Can an appellate authority rely on facts and materials regarding alternative accommodation that were not part of the trial record or put to the landlord in cross-examination?
- Whether the suitability and adequacy of alternative accommodation becoming vacant during pendency of ejectment proceedings must be established through evidence or pleadings?
- Is the High Court justified in refusing to interfere under constitutional jurisdiction when an appellate authority's finding of fact is based on misdirection of law and unproven material?
- Water and Power Development Authority vs Sh. Abdul Qadeer1986 SCMR 1541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside the respondent's removal from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, holding it to be a colourable exercise of power because an inquiry for misappropriation and misconduct had been initiated but abandoned. The core legal question is whether action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 is permissible when a departmental inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules has already been instituted against an employee. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting previous jurisprudence that action under section 17(1-A) is permissible even where a departmental inquiry has been started, provided the order is not successfully challenged on grounds of mala fides or coram non judice. Leave to appeal on the question of limitation was declined based on findings of fact by the Tribunal.
Questions settled- Whether action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 is permissible when a departmental inquiry has been initiated against an employee?
- Can an order of removal under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 be challenged on grounds other than mala fides or coram non judice?
- Zahid Hussain vs The State1986 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 7-5-1984, which had dismissed his Criminal Appeal No. 614 of 1980. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petition was time-barred by 66 days. Furthermore, the Court examined the merits of the case and determined that, even apart from the issue of limitation, it did not constitute a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition primarily on the ground of limitation. This decision reinforces the principle that petitions for leave to appeal must be filed within the prescribed period of limitation and that the Court retains the discretion to deny leave if the case lacks merit, regardless of procedural hurdles. The judgment underscores the strict adherence required regarding limitation periods in criminal appellate proceedings before the Supreme Court.
Questions settled- Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of being barred by limitation?
- Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to deny leave to appeal if a case is found to be without merit?
- Water and Power Development Authority vs Muhammad Rashid1986 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging the judgment of the Service Tribunal which set aside the respondent's removal from service ordered under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The respondent, a Budget and Accounts Officer, was removed from service following findings of financial irregularities and failure to exercise proper control and pre-auditing. The Service Tribunal concluded that while some negligence existed, the drastic action of removal under section 17(1-A) was unwarranted given his otherwise brilliant service record, and reinstated him. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in law by interfering with the employer's discretionary removal order under section 17(1-A). The Supreme Court held that orders passed under section 17(1-A) are appealable before the Service Tribunal, and findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal are not open to question under Article 212(3) in the absence of a question of law of public importance. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.
Questions settled- Are orders passed under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act appealable before the Service Tribunal?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the Service Tribunal in an appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
- Whether the Service Tribunal can substitute its own judgment for that of the employer in matters of removal from service?
- Water and Power Development Authority vs Muhammad Duryab1986 SCMR 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a decision of the Service Tribunal concerning the retirement of a WAPDA employee under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958. The core legal questions concerned the scope of the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction over such orders and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the principle of discrimination to establish mala fide. The Service Tribunal had set aside the retirement order, finding it discriminatory because a similarly situated employee had been reinstated. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s reasoning was flawed because the comparison case involved materially different facts, specifically regarding the existence of stay orders from the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Furthermore, the Tribunal failed to address the specific grounds raised in the respondent's appeal and relied on irrelevant subsequent events. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, emphasizing that findings of mala fide cannot be based on factually distinct comparisons and that all substantive grounds of appeal must be adjudicated.
Questions settled- Can a Service Tribunal base a finding of mala fide on the ground of discrimination by comparing the appellant's case to another employee's case when the facts are materially different?
- Is a Service Tribunal required to adjudicate upon the specific grounds raised in the memo of appeal rather than deciding the case on extraneous considerations?
- Does a misrepresentation regarding the date of dismissal in an application for restoration of an appeal necessitate a fresh examination of the restoration order by the Service Tribunal?
- Water and Power Development Authority vs Agha Nazim Ali1986 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) arose from a judgment of the Service Tribunal which set aside the removal of the respondent, an Executive Engineer, ordered under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The core legal question concerned the competence of an appeal before the Service Tribunal against an order passed under section 17(1-A) and the justification for such removal based on record. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and since the appellant authority failed to produce the relevant departmental record before the Tribunal despite being directed to do so, it could not secure a factual finding in its favour. The Court affirmed that it is the duty of parties to produce material in their possession to resolve questions of fact before the Service Tribunal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal is competent before the Service Tribunal in respect of an order passed under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 in view of section 17(1-C) thereof?
- Can an employer authority sustain an order of removal before the Service Tribunal while withholding the primary record upon which the action was based?
- Is a party permitted to produce withheld documents for the first time at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court?
- Water and Power Development Authority Through Its Chairman vs Shah Imroz1986 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal is directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's removal from service by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was set aside and he was reinstated with consequential benefits. The respondent, an office-bearer of the WAPDA Employees Union, was removed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act following a demonstration and manhandling of an Executive Engineer, despite not being named in the F.I.R. and being found by the Inquiry Committee to have merely been present and telephoning. The core legal questions involved were whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to question an order passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act and whether the Tribunal could substitute its discretion for that of the Authority. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to entertain appeals regarding terms and conditions of WAPDA employees, including orders under Section 17(1-A), and can set aside such orders if found to be mala fide, biased, or not passed bona fide. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals against orders passed by WAPDA under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
- Can the Service Tribunal set aside an order of removal passed by WAPDA under Section 17(1-A) if it is found to be arbitrary or not passed bona fide?
- Whether the Service Tribunal can substitute its own discretion and order reinstatement of an employee removed by WAPDA?
- Water and Power Development Authority Through Chairman And Another vs Firdaus Khan And Another1986 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comprises cross-appeals directed against an order passed by the Federal Service Tribunal modifying a penalty imposed by the employer. The core legal question concerned the extent of the Service Tribunal's power to interfere with departmental disciplinary penalties, specifically the conversion of an order of removal from service into compulsory retirement for an employee involved in protesting against a departmental officer. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal is competent to suitably interfere with departmental orders passed under section 17(1-A) of the relevant Act under given circumstances, and that the Tribunal's modification of the penalty to compulsory retirement was justified given the contributory discriminatory conduct of the executive engineer. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunal possesses the authority to review and modify departmental penalties where attending mitigating circumstances, such as provocative or discriminatory official behavior, warrant such interference.
Questions settled- Whether the Service Tribunal is competent to interfere with departmental penalty orders passed under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
- Can an order of removal from service be converted to compulsory retirement by the Service Tribunal in view of mitigating circumstances?
- Does provocative or discriminatory conduct by a superior officer justify mitigation of disciplinary penalties imposed on employees?
- Water & Power Development Authority Wapda' House, Lahore vs Amjad Hidayat Butt And Other1986 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of several appeals and petitions filed by WAPDA against orders of the Service Tribunal. The respondents, who were engineers serving in WAPDA, were retired under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act following an inquiry into financial losses. The Service Tribunal had set aside the retirement orders and ordered reinstatement, finding that WAPDA exercised its powers arbitrarily and with mala fides by according differential treatment to various officers involved in the same inquiry. The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that differential action recommended or taken against officers does not constitute unlawful discrimination unless an identity of interest and conduct is established among them. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that mala fides must be specifically pleaded and proved with legal evidence, rather than inferred from assumptions or surmises. Since the Tribunal failed to decide other issues raised by the respondents in their appeals, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's decisions and remanded the cases for fresh adjudication on those remaining pleas.
Questions settled- Does differential action against different officers involved in the same inquiry constitute unlawful discrimination without proof of identity of conduct and interest?
- What level of proof is required to establish a finding of mala fides against an authority?
- Is a Service Tribunal justified in recording a finding of mala fides based merely on assumptions and surmises?
- Water & Power Development Authority vs Sheikh Muhammad Ali1986 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had set aside the removal of the respondent Executive Engineer ordered under section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act and directed his reinstatement with consequential benefits. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to entertain appeals against orders passed under section 17(1-A) of the Act, the effect of limitation where no objection was raised before the Tribunal, and the justifiability of the removal order. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional issue stood already resolved by earlier precedent and declined to interfere with the Tribunal's factual findings regarding the arbitrary and unjustified nature of the removal under its limited constitutional jurisdiction. The Court further held that a plea of limitation not raised before the Service Tribunal cannot be successfully raised for the first time before the apex court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order passed under section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act?
- Can a plea of limitation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not urged before the Service Tribunal?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with findings of fact by the Service Tribunal regarding the arbitrariness of an order under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
- Wasil Khan vs Mst. Sakina Bayee And 3 Other1986 SCMR 1792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the lower courts' dismissal of his suit for specific performance of a contract. The core legal question concerned whether the defendants' failure to specifically traverse the averments in the plaint regarding the execution of the sale agreement amounted to an admission of those facts under procedural law. The Supreme Court held that the argument advanced by the petitioner had force, as a defendant must be specific with the allegation of facts and failure to do so results in those facts being taken as admitted. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted, and status quo was ordered to be maintained.
Questions settled- Whether a defendant must be specific when denying allegations of fact in a plaint under the Code of Civil Procedure?
- What is the legal consequence under the Code of Civil Procedure if a defendant fails to specifically deny an assertion of fact made in the plaint?
- Does the failure of defendants to rebut averments regarding a sale agreement warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
- WAPDA vs Saeed Ahmad1986 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment regarding the removal of a WAPDA employee. The employee was removed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, following a prior history of disciplinary proceedings. The core legal questions were whether the Authority could summarily remove an employee under Section 17(1-A) despite pending disciplinary inquiries, and whether the Service Tribunal possessed the authority to modify an order of removal into one of retirement. The Supreme Court held that no question of law of public importance arose to merit further consideration. The Court affirmed that action under Section 17(1-A) is permissible even where departmental inquiries have commenced, and that the Service Tribunal holds the power to vary, set aside, or modify impugned orders, including converting removal into retirement. Furthermore, the Court noted that allegations of mala fide must be substantiated according to the procedural requirements of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, which require full disclosure and supporting affidavits.
Questions settled- Can an employee be removed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 while a departmental inquiry is pending?
- Does the Service Tribunal have the power to modify an order of removal from service into an order of retirement?
- What are the procedural requirements for raising a plea of mala fide before the Service Tribunal?
- WAPDA vs Capt. Nazir Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by WAPDA against a decision of the Service Tribunal. The respondents, after serving in the Army, were recruited as Electrical Engineers in WAPDA and granted seniority benefits under Rule 5(2)(b) of the West Pakistan WAPDA Service of Electrical Engineers Rules 1965. Subsequently, WAPDA altered its policy regarding the grant of seniority to Army officers and sought to apply this new policy retrospectively to the respondents, thereby unsettling their established seniority. The Service Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that while a competent authority possesses the power to rescind or modify its decisions, such modifications cannot be applied retrospectively to reopen past and closed transactions or unsettle matters already competently settled and implemented. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as it raised no question of law of public importance.
Questions settled- Can a competent authority retrospectively apply a modified policy decision to reopen past and closed transactions?
- Whether seniority benefits competently granted and implemented under service rules can be subsequently withdrawn by a retrospective policy change?
- Does a competent authority's power to rescind or modify its decisions extend to unsettling matters already settled and acted upon for years?
- WAPDA Through Its Chairman vs Shujaat Ali Baghdadi1986 SCMR 2004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had condoned the delay in filing an appeal by the respondent, Shujaat Ali Baghdadi, and altered his punishment from removal from service to retirement. The respondent had a severe disciplinary record, including making wild allegations against staff, blackmailing officers and lady workers, insulting modesty, criminal intimidation, impersonating a military officer, and sending filthy letters. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Tribunal was justified in granting the benefit of retirement and altering the punishment given the grave misconduct established on record. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in altering the punishment contrary to public policy. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will examine whether service tribunals exercise their discretion judiciously when altering departmental punishments in cases of gross misconduct.
Questions settled- Whether the Service Tribunal was justified in giving the benefit of retirement to the respondent in the circumstances of the case?
- Can the Service Tribunal arbitrarily alter the punishment of an employee found guilty of grave misconduct?
- Whether the alteration of punishment in cases involving blackmailing and gross indiscipline is against public policy?
- Walla vs A.C., Kasur And Other1986 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment dismissing his challenge to the denial of twenty-five percent excess beshi land allotted against his verified claim. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was lawfully entitled to the excess land based on rehabilitation instructions and whether his admissions regarding the same were properly relied upon. The Supreme Court held that the factual objection regarding the timely filing and transfer of the claim form was not raised or pressed in the High Court and could not be agitated at the leave stage, and that the High Court committed no error in relying upon the petitioner's recorded admissions before the settlement authorities. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a factual objection not raised or pressed before the High Court can be agitated for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
- Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked to interfere with concurrent findings based on the petitioner's recorded admissions before settlement authorities?
- Whether the lack of clean hands of a reporting party in a Mukhbari application affects the resumption of unlawfully held land?
- Wali Muhammad And Others vs Government of the Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed in limine the petitioners' writ petition regarding the allotment of land. The core legal question concerns whether an allotment of land made in 1958 could be challenged decades later through an application under Settlement Scheme No. IX and whether the settlement authorities retained jurisdiction after the repeal of the relevant Act. The Supreme Court held that the petition must fail as the petitioners had lost their rights due to their own default and delay, the application under Settlement Scheme No. IX was not maintainable as it applied only to urban properties, and the settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction following the repeal of the Displaced Persons Act. The key principles laid down are that stale claims regarding property allotments cannot be entertained when a party is guilty of default and delay, and that settlement authorities lack jurisdiction to interfere with long-standing allotments after the repeal of the governing statute.
Questions settled- Can a party challenge an allotment of land made decades prior after failing to pursue timely and proper proceedings?
- Do settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to interfere with property allotments after the repeal of the Displaced Persons Act?
- Is an application under Settlement Scheme No. IX maintainable for properties that are not urban properties?
- Wali Dad And Others Mst. Zainab Bibi And Others vs Ghulam Mustafa And Other Mst. Muhammad Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions concern the inheritance of property and the validity of land alienations previously challenged under Customary Law. The core legal question was whether, under the evolving legislative framework, specifically Punjab Ordinance No. XIII of 1983, inheritance from Muslim landowners and challenges to their land alienations based on Customary Law remain viable. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the interpretation of the new law, inheritance from the deceased landowners in question must be governed by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), regardless of the date of death. Furthermore, the Court held that any pending proceedings challenging land alienations made by such landowners on the basis of Customary Law are deemed to have abated. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, affirming that Customary Law claims regarding ancestral property alienation are no longer sustainable against the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) as applied under the relevant Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does the Punjab Ordinance No. XIII of 1983 require that inheritance from Muslim landowners be governed by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) regardless of the date of death?
- Do pending proceedings challenging land alienations based on Customary Law abate under the provisions of the Punjab Ordinance No. XIII of 1983?
- Can land alienations made by Muslim landowners be set aside on the basis of Customary Law following the enactment of the Punjab Ordinance No. XIII of 1983?
- Walayat Ali Represented By Mubarik Ali And Others vs Central Board of Revenue And Other1986 SCMR 1518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-28Read full judgment →
- Wajid Ali Represented By Syed Nasir Ali Shah And Others vs Syed Sajid Ali1986 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for review was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging an earlier judgment. Upon examination, the Court first noted that the petition was filed with a delay of five days, for which no sufficient cause for condonation was established. Furthermore, the Court addressed a procedural defect regarding the representation of the petitioner. It observed that the review petition had not been drafted or signed by the same Advocate who had appeared at the original hearing of the case, as mandated by the procedural requirements governing the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that strict adherence to these procedural rules is necessary for the orderly administration of justice and found no compelling grounds to relax the specific rule requiring the original counsel to draw the review petition. Consequently, the Court held that the petition was procedurally incompetent and failed to meet the necessary criteria for review. The petition was accordingly dismissed on both the grounds of delay and non-compliance with the mandatory rules of the Court regarding legal representation in review proceedings.
Questions settled- Is a review petition required to be drawn by the same Advocate who appeared at the hearing of the original case?
- Can a review petition be dismissed for failure to comply with the procedural rules regarding legal representation?
- Must sufficient cause be shown for the condonation of delay in filing a review petition?
- Wahid Bux vs The State1986 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Wahid Bux, challenging his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his maternal uncle, Isa. The trial court had initially sentenced the petitioner to death, which the High Court subsequently commuted to imprisonment for life, alongside a compensation order under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the evidence, including the ocular testimony of eyewitnesses and forensic recovery of blood-stained items, sufficiently established the petitioner's guilt, despite his plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court examined the consistency of the eyewitness accounts, the medical evidence, and the corroborating forensic reports regarding the recovered weapon and clothing. Finding no error in the lower courts' appraisal of the evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that where ocular testimony is consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, it remains sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder, even when the motive remains obscure.
Questions settled- Is ocular testimony consistent with medical evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
- Does the failure to establish a clear motive for a murder invalidate a conviction when other evidence is strong?
- Can a conviction be maintained when the accused pleads grave and sudden provocation but fails to substantiate it against credible eyewitness accounts?
- Waheed Ahmed Shaheed vs Farid Ashraf1986 SCMR 1860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had set aside an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller. The petitioner had originally sought the respondent's eviction from the disputed premises based on two grounds: bona fide personal requirement and the unauthorized conversion of the premises into a motor workshop. The Rent Controller had initially allowed the ejectment application on both grounds. However, the High Court reversed this decision on appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller. Upon reviewing the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court's reasoning for setting aside the Rent Controller's findings did not align with the evidence on record. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's interference with factual findings was unwarranted. The principle established is that an appellate court should not disturb findings of fact by a lower forum if the reasoning for such interference is not supported by the evidence.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a Rent Controller if the reasoning is not supported by the evidence?
- Is the unauthorized conversion of premises into a motor workshop a valid ground for ejectment?
- Wafa Ullah vs M.M. Zahid And Other1986 SCMR 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the respondent landlord against a tenant in respect of a commercial shop. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, which was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge and subsequently challenged through a constitutional writ petition in the High Court by the tenant. During the writ proceedings, the petitioner, claiming to be a business partner and nephew of the tenant, filed an application to be impleaded as a party, which the High Court dismissed alongside the main writ petition. Following the dismissal, the landlord initiated execution proceedings, prompting the petitioner to file an objection petition claiming independent possession, which was rejected by the executing court and appellate authorities. The core legal question concerned whether a sub-tenant or alleged partner could obstruct execution proceedings of a valid ejectment order obtained against the primary tenant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's attempt to cling to the property was mala fide and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' concurrent findings.
Questions settled- Whether an alleged business partner of a tenant can be impleaded as a party in a writ petition challenging an ejectment order?
- Can a third party obstruct execution proceedings of an ejectment order by claiming independent possession through a mala fide objection petition?
- Wadho Akhara Trust vs Mst. Ghafooran And Other1986 SCMR 1339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of a structure (hut) built on land owned by the petitioner, Wadho Akhara Trust. The original tenant, Mst. Gandi Hajiani, constructed huts on the land and sub-let them. Upon her death, Mst. Ghafooran claimed rights to the structure via a Will, while the Trust contended that tenancy rights reverted to it upon the tenant's death. The Rent Controller and the High Court ruled in favor of Mst. Ghafooran, finding that the structure did not automatically vest in the landlord upon the tenant's death and that Mst. Ghafooran, as a relative, inherited the structure. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the claim was improperly based on a Will rather than inheritance and that tenancy rights should have reverted to the Trust. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the legal questions regarding the devolution of tenancy rights upon the death of a tenant and the validity of claims based on a Will versus inheritance merit further consideration by the Court.
Questions settled- Does a structure built by a tenant on rented land automatically vest in the landlord upon the tenant's death?
- Can tenancy rights be transferred via a Will, or do they revert to the landlord upon the death of the tenant?
- Is a claimant entitled to relief based on inheritance rights if their primary pleading was based on a Will?
- Usman Ghani vs Federal Service Tribunal And Another1986 SCMR 1875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, an Executive Engineer in WAPDA, was served with a charge-sheet under the West Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 regarding a fire incident at Regional Stores. While the inquiry was pending, the Authority removed him from service under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Act, 1958. His appeal to the Service Tribunal was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Authority could invoke Section 17(1-A) to remove an employee while disciplinary proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules were actively pending against him, and whether such an order was vitiated by mala fides. The Supreme Court held that while Section 17(1-A) grants wide powers of removal without assigning reasons, exercising this power during the pendency of active departmental proceedings initiated under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules renders the removal order mala fide in law. The Court laid down the principle that the exercise of power under Section 17(1-A) remains subject to scrutiny for competency, amenability, and the absence of mala fides or bias.
Questions settled- Can the Authority remove an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Act, 1958 while disciplinary proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules are pending against him?
- What are the key requirements to scrutinize the exercise of power under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Act, 1958?
- Does an order of removal passed under Section 17(1-A) stand vitiated if it is found to have been exercised mala fide?
- Usma Nasser And 4 Others vs Zaitoon Khatoon1986 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Rent Controller's order directing the petitioners to hand over vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondent-landlord. The core legal question before the court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding default in the payment of rent were sustainable in law. The Supreme Court held that no exception in law could be taken against the concurrent findings of the two courts below establishing that the petitioners were indeed defaulters in rent payment. Consequently, the court established the principle that concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding rent default, based on recorded evidence, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court unless a legal exception is made out. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without merit.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default made by the Rent Controller and the High Court?
- Does an order directing the handover of vacant possession for rent default warrant leave to appeal when concurrent findings exist?
- University Of' the Punjab vs Shahid Nazi R1986 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that directed the University of the Punjab to admit the respondent to an engineering program based on reserved seats. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with the University's admission criteria for reserved seats and mandate admission, particularly when the affected candidates who would lose their seats were not impleaded as parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction was improper because the candidates who would be displaced by the respondent's admission were necessary parties who had not been impleaded in the original writ petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, refusing to remand the case or allow the impleading of new parties at the appellate stage, as doing so would cause further confusion regarding academic sessions that had already passed. The Court declined to rule on the validity of the University's admission criteria, as those regulations had since been changed.
Questions settled- Can a court direct the admission of a candidate to an educational institution without impleading the candidates who would be adversely affected by such an order?
- Is a candidate who would lose their seat due to a court order a necessary party in a writ petition challenging admission criteria?
- Should a case be remanded to the High Court to implead necessary parties when the academic session in question has already concluded?
- University of Baluchistan Through Registrar vs Saeed Muhammad Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether an employee of the University of Baluchistan qualifies as a civil servant entitled to maintain a service appeal before the Baluchistan Service Tribunal. The respondent, formerly in provincial service, had taken a fresh appointment with the University, subsequently raising a seniority dispute and filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal under the Baluchistan Service Tribunal Act, 1974. The Tribunal had held that since the University is a statutory body corporate connected with the affairs of the Province, its employees are civil servants. The Supreme Court held that working in a statutory body connected with provincial affairs does not automatically make an employee a holder of a civil post or a civil servant under the Baluchistan Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Court ruled that the respondent was appointed by the University's Vice-Chancellor, did not hold office during the pleasure of the Government, and was governed by University rules rather than civil servant laws. Consequently, the respondent was not a civil servant, and the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The appeal was accepted and the Tribunal's judgment set aside.
Questions settled- Whether an employee of the University of Baluchistan is a civil servant for the purposes of the Baluchistan Civil Servants Act, 1974?
- Does employment in a statutory body connected with the affairs of the province automatically confer the status of holding a civil post?
- Does the Baluchistan Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain service appeals filed by university employees?
- Are the terms and conditions of service of a University of Baluchistan employee regulated by the provincial government or university rules?
- Umra vs Allah Yar And 51 Other1986 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a consolidation scheme dispute in District Jhang. The core legal question was whether the Member, Board of Revenue could lawfully affect a party's property rights in an ex parte remand order without affording them an opportunity of hearing, particularly after having previously deleted their name from the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order violated the principles of natural justice by adversely affecting the petitioner's property rights without a hearing. The Court laid down the principle that no party's rights in property can be legally affected without granting them a fair chance of being heard, setting aside both the High Court's judgment and the Board of Revenue's order, and remanding the matter for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue affecting property rights without granting a hearing violates the principles of natural justice?
- Can a party's rights in a consolidation scheme be altered on remand without notice to them?
- Umra Khan vs Shirin Buhar And Other1986 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to adjudicate disputes within the tribal areas of Swat. The core legal question presented is whether the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, remained applicable and enforceable in the tribal areas following the promulgation of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulation, 1975. The petitioner contends that the 1959 Ordinance ceased to have legal effect upon the enactment of the 1975 Regulation, rendering subsequent notifications regarding the appointment of Rent Controllers and the application of the Ordinance to the area ineffective. The Supreme Court, noting that similar legal points were raised in other pending matters, granted leave to appeal to examine the interplay between the 1959 Ordinance and the 1975 Regulation. The Court directed that the case be heard alongside related petitions and appeals, while simultaneously granting a stay order consistent with the precedent established in the case of Rehmani Gul.
Questions settled- Does the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, retain jurisdiction in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas after the promulgation of the PATA Regulation, 1975?
- Can a notification extending the application of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to tribal areas be valid if issued after the 1975 Regulation?
- Umar Din vs Chhajju And Other1986 SCMR 1147(2) · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the cancellation of land allotment to a displaced person whose verified claim was reduced following re-verification by the Central Record Office. The appellant challenged the cancellation, arguing he was denied the right to exercise a choice in surrendering excess land under Paragraph 23 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1, and that the cancellation occurred without notice. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant was entitled to exercise such a choice and whether the relevant scheme applied to his case. The Court held that the appellant had, in fact, already been granted and exercised the choice regarding his allotment. Furthermore, the Court determined that Paragraph 23 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1 was inapplicable as it pertained to land abandoned in non-agreed areas, whereas the appellant's case was governed by the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The Court affirmed that in the absence of specific statutory provisions, an allottee cannot claim a right of choice to retain specific land, as doing so would allow beneficiaries of erroneous allotments to profit from their own irregularities.
Questions settled- Does Paragraph 23 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1 grant an allottee the right to choose which excess land to surrender in all cases?
- Is the right to purchase excess land on payment of price available to allottees in the Punjab province?
- Under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, does an allottee have a legal right to choose which portion of land to surrender when an excess allotment is cancelled?
- Umar Din vs Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh And Other1986 SCMR 1580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging an ejectment order concerning a commercial shop. The core legal questions involve the determination of title in rent proceedings, the shifting of the onus of proof regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, and whether the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the appellate court and the High Court that the respondents established their title and landlord-tenant relationship based on documentary evidence including a Permanent Transfer Deed and mutation. The Court affirmed the principle that a Rent Controller may examine questions of title incidentally, while leaving ultimate establishment of disputed title to a civil court after surrendering possession.
Questions settled- Whether the matter of determination of title in an ejectment petition falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts?
- Whether a Rent Controller has the authority to decide a question of title incidentally in rent proceedings?
- Whether documentary evidence such as a Permanent Transfer Deed and mutation is sufficient to establish title and the relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Tufail And Another vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed against the concurrent conviction and sentence of the petitioners under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, which were upheld by the High Court. During the pendency of the main petition, the petitioners filed an application seeking the grant of bail. The core legal question addressed is whether bail should be granted to convicts whose appeal against a murder conviction is pending before the Supreme Court after concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail application, holding that no case is made out for the grant of bail when the petitioners stand convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with their conviction upheld by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that evidence will not be reappraised at the interim bail stage following concurrent findings of guilt, and bail is ordinarily declined in murder cases after conviction by two courts.
Questions settled- Whether bail can be granted during the pendency of a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence at the interim bail stage after concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below?
- Trustees of the Port of Karachi And Others vs Messrs Zamir Limited And Other1986 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses two cross-petitions for leave to appeal arising from a common judgment of the Sind High Court concerning the transit trade of goods through Pakistan to Afghanistan under the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965. An Afghan importer imported a consignment of polyester textured yarn and filed a Bill of Entry, but the Customs Authorities refused to allow transit without the production of a Letter of Credit pursuant to executive instructions and circulars. The importer challenged this requirement through a constitutional petition, contending that the administrative instructions lacked statutory force under the Customs Act, 1969. The High Court held that the authorities were empowered to examine Letters of Credit, but nevertheless directed the issuance of a delay certificate to exempt the importer from demurrage charges. The Trustees of the Port of Karachi and the importer both filed petitions for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave in both matters, holding that the complex legal questions regarding statutory authority, bilateral transit agreements, and the legality of administrative instructions required detailed examination.
Questions settled- Whether the Customs Authorities have the lawful authority under the Customs Act, 1969 to require the production of a Letter of Credit for goods in transit to Afghanistan?
- Do administrative instructions and circulars issued by customs authorities possess statutory force to regulate transit trade without rules framed under the Customs Act, 1969?
- Can a High Court direct the issuance of a delay certificate to waive demurrage charges when an importer fails to produce required import documentation?
- Whether the requirement to produce a Letter of Credit and Jawaznama violates the terms of the bilateral transit trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
- Trade Contact Limited, Lahore And Others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's Regular Second Appeal in a bank loan recovery case. The respondent Bank had instituted a recovery suit before the Special Court Banking, Lahore, which was decreed after the defendant's counsel made a statement withdrawing the contest and agreeing that the bank's claim be satisfied through the sale of pledged stocks. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the statement made by the defendant's counsel before the trial court amounted to an admission of the bank's claim and the withdrawal of the defense. The Supreme Court held that the language of the statement clearly conveyed the intention that the bank's claim be satisfied from the sale proceeds of the pledged goods, thereby precluding any further contest. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the interpretation of the courts below regarding counsel's binding statement.
Questions settled- Does a statement by a defendant's counsel agreeing to the satisfaction of a bank's claim through the sale of pledged goods amount to an admission of the claim and withdrawal of the defense?
- Can an appellate court interfere with the concurrent interpretation of a counsel's statement made before the trial court?
- The Water and Power Development Authority Through Its Chairman vs Muhammad Yousaf1986 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging an order related to the removal of an employee. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an appeal is competent against orders for the removal of employees passed by the petitioner Authority under the provisions of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The Supreme Court, relying on its own recent authoritative precedent established in a series of similar petitions, including WAPDA v. Aftab Ahmad Warsi (1986 SCMR 18), held that the matter was already settled. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the legal position regarding the competency of appeals against such removal orders had been definitively resolved in previous rulings. The judgment underscores the principle of stare decisis, confirming that where a specific legal question regarding the statutory powers of the Authority has been authoritatively decided by the Court, subsequent petitions raising identical issues must be dismissed in accordance with that established precedent.
Questions settled- Is an appeal competent against orders for the removal of employees passed by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958?
- The Textile Corporation of Pakistan Hyderabad vs Pakistan Textile1986 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the issuance of a show-cause notice to the appellant for failing to deposit the required security for costs. The core legal question was whether an appeal should be dismissed when the appellant fails to appear in response to a show-cause notice or deposit the necessary security. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's failure to appear or respond to the show-cause notice indicated an intention not to prosecute the appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, making no order as to costs. The key principle laid down is that an appeal may be dismissed for non-prosecution if the appellant fails to comply with procedural requirements, such as depositing security for costs, and subsequently fails to appear in response to a show-cause notice.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal can be dismissed for non-prosecution if the appellant fails to deposit the security for costs and fails to appear in response to a show-cause notice?
- What is the consequence of an appellant's failure to respond to a show-cause notice regarding procedural non-compliance?
- The State vs Syed Afaq Ali and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the validity of prosecution sanctions required for public servants under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the 'appropriate Department' or the 'appropriate Government' (specifically the Interior Division) is the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution, and how the Rules of Business, 1973, apply in the absence of specific rules framed under Section 12(2)(a) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the Interior Division of the Federal Government is the sole competent authority to grant such sanction. The Court rejected the contention that the concerned administrative department (e.g., the Ministry of Finance) was the competent authority. The key principle laid down is that in the absence of specific rules delegated under Section 12(2)(a) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, the Rules of Business, 1973, govern the allocation of functions, and the Interior Division is the designated authority for Anti-Corruption laws, as the 'appropriate Government' is the entity responsible for sanctioning prosecution.
Questions settled- Which authority is competent to grant sanction for the prosecution of a public servant under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
- Does the 'appropriate Department' or the 'appropriate Government' have the authority to grant sanction for prosecution under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
- In the absence of specific rules framed under Section 12(2)(a) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, which authority is responsible for granting prosecution sanction?
- Do the Rules of Business, 1973, determine the competent authority for granting prosecution sanction in the absence of rules under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
- The State through Advocategeneral, N.W. F. P. Petitioner vs Zubair and 4 Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition by the State sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment granting bail to respondents accused of murder and assault. The core legal question concerned the propriety of a second bail application being heard by a different High Court Judge than the one who dismissed the initial application. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing the petition due to the importance of this question. The Court held that a salutary and well-established principle dictates that all subsequent bail applications in the same case, by the same or co-accused, should be heard by the same Single Judge who heard the previous application. Exceptions exist only if the original judge is absolutely unavailable, in which case the Chief Justice may assign it. Counsel have a duty to disclose previous bail applications and their results, with concealment amounting to professional misconduct. A subsequent bail application must be based on fresh grounds not available or pressed previously. The Court found the High Court's departure from this rule to be improper, converted the petition into an appeal, and cancelled the bail granted to the respondents.
Questions settled- Can a subsequent bail application be heard by a different judge of the same High Court?
- What is the duty of counsel when filing a subsequent bail application after a previous one was dismissed?
- Under what circumstances can a second or subsequent bail application be filed in the same court?
- Does a judge's observation that 'no case has been made out for their release on bail' mean the application was not disposed of on merits?
- Who decides which judge hears a subsequent bail application if the original judge is absolutely unavailable?
- The Secretary to the Government of the Punjab Excise and Taxation1986 SCMR 1213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had reinstated the respondent after his appointment as an Excise and Taxation Officer was revoked. The core legal question was whether an appointment made by the Governor in relaxation of recruitment rules constituted an ad hoc appointment under Article 3 of Martial Law Instruction No. 21, thereby subjecting it to review and revocation. The Supreme Court held that the appointment, having been made otherwise than in accordance with the prescribed method of recruitment, fell squarely within the deeming clause of Article 3 of Martial Law Instruction No. 21. Consequently, the appointment was legally classified as ad hoc, and the subsequent revocation by the competent authority was valid. The Court further ruled that administrative minutes could not override the clear language of a legal instrument and that actions taken under Martial Law Instruction No. 21 were not subject to challenges regarding locus poenitentiae or the right to a hearing. The appeal was allowed, and the Service Tribunal's judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Does an appointment made by the Governor in relaxation of recruitment rules fall under the definition of an ad hoc appointment pursuant to Article 3 of Martial Law Instruction No. 21?
- Can administrative minutes be used to interpret or enlarge the scope of a legal instrument?
- Is an action taken under Martial Law Instruction No. 21 immune from challenge on the grounds of lack of hearing or locus poenitentiae?
- The Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs Ehsanul Haq Sethi And Other1986 SCMR 1454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Report of the respondent for the period between January 1, 1981, and June 9, 1981. During the pendency of the service appeal before the Tribunal, the impugned adverse remarks were expunged by the competent authority, rendering the main grievance infructuous. Consequently, the Tribunal disposed of the appeal as infructuous while briefly discussing the competency of the appeal under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, and repelling the contention that Article 203 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan barred such an appeal. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the underlying issue was no longer alive and the appeal had rightly been disposed of as infructuous by the Tribunal, any further consideration of the constitutional and legal questions would amount to a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court accordingly declined to examine the merits of the legal questions and dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal becomes infructuous when the impugned adverse remarks are expunged during the pendency of the proceedings?
- Should the Supreme Court adjudicate upon academic legal questions when the primary issue in the case is no longer alive?
- The Province of Punjab Through The Secretary, Department Of Agriculture, Punjab, Lahore And Others vs Messrs Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. And Other1986 SCMR 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- The President of Pakistan And Others vs Brig. (Rtd.) Abdul Rashid1986 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by the President of Pakistan and others against Brig. (Rtd.) Abdul Rashid. The core legal questions involve determining whether a civil servant proceeding on leave with pay is entitled to full pay during leave based on increments and revisions of pay scales arising from enforcement of new schemes, whether the Service Tribunal was competent to hold that Fundamental Rule 17 and the Revised Leave Rules 1980 were overridden by para 27 of the Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits scheme of 1983, whether Section 17 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 governs leave pay determinations, and whether the Service Tribunal erred in its construction of rule 32 of the Revised Leave Rules 1980. The Supreme Court held that the points raised are of considerable legal importance and granted leave to consider them, while directing that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents. The key principle laid down relates to the interpretation of statutory leave rules, pay scale revisions, and the jurisdictional limits of the Service Tribunal regarding rule interpretation.
Questions settled- Whether a civil servant proceeding on leave with pay is entitled to full pay during leave sanctioned for the post as raised by increments and revision of pay scales?
- Is the Service Tribunal competent to hold that Fundamental Rule 17 and Revised Leave Rules 1980 have been overridden by subsequent pay scale schemes?
- Does section 17 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 cover the determination of leave pay for a civil servant?
- Whether the literal construction of rule 32 of the Revised Leave Rules 1980 can be extended by the Service Tribunal to give the benefit of pay enhancement to a civil servant on leave?
- The Evacuee Trust Property Board And Another vs Haji Ghulam Rasul1986 SCMR 1474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the status of certain property as evacuee trust property. The core legal questions involve determining whether the conduct of the concerned evacuees prior to March 1, 1947, constituted a valid dedication of the property, thereby rendering it evacuee trust property, and whether specific transactions involving the property required the approval of Custodian authorities. Additionally, the Court identified the need to examine the legal effect of Section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, on the cases, should the property be determined to be trust property. The Court granted leave to appeal to address these issues, allowing the parties to proceed on the existing record with the liberty to file additional documentation. The decision highlights the necessity of interpreting historical documents and conduct to establish the nature of property under the relevant evacuee trust legislation.
Questions settled- Does the conduct of evacuees prior to 1-3-1947 constitute a valid dedication of property as evacuee trust property?
- Do transactions involving property require the approval of Custodian authorities?
- What is the effect of Section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, on property disputes?
- The Electric Lamp Manufacturer of Pakistan vs The Assistant1986 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by an electric bulb manufacturing company against a High Court judgment dismissing its constitutional petition. A notice was issued by the Deputy Collector, Central Excise, directing the petitioner to show cause regarding alleged tax evasion on Glass-Shells used as raw material. The petitioner challenged both the liability to pay sales tax and the jurisdiction of the excise authorities to issue demands or recover sales tax for a period prior to 1 July 1981, when powers of Sales Tax Officers were newly conferred upon Customs and Central Excise officers via Central Board of Revenue Circular No. 7 of 1981. The High Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge, holding that recovery provisions are liberally construed and the demand arose upon adjudication after 1 July 1981. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal question regarding whether the notification conferred retrospective powers on Customs/Central Excise officers to assess and recover sales tax for prior periods was a matter of general importance likely to affect numerous cases.
Questions settled- Whether notification conferring powers of Sales Tax Officers upon Customs and Central Excise officers under Section 5(2) of the Sales Tax Act 1951 can be given retrospective effect?
- Whether Deputy Collectors or Assistant Collectors of Customs and Central Excise have jurisdiction to assess and recover sales tax for periods prior to 1 July 1981 where proceedings were not pending before them on that date?
- The Controller of Examinations, Universi1y of the Punjab, Lahore And 3 Others vs Shamim Akbar1986 SCMR 1526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal, highlighting a divergence of judicial opinion regarding whether a candidate benefiting from an academic malpractice or tampered record can be presumed responsible for it without specific evidence. The Court notes conflicting precedents, wherein one line of authority holds that being a sole beneficiary is insufficient to prove wrongdoing, while another view suggests that such benefit raises a presumption of involvement. Finding it desirable to settle this cleavage of opinion through an authoritative pronouncement by a larger bench, the Court grants leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court directs that the appeal be fixed for hearing before a bench of five judges at an early date, while rejecting the petitioners' prayer for the suspension of the operation of the impugned High Court order.
Questions settled- Whether a candidate who benefits from a tampered academic record can be presumed ipso facto to be responsible for the malpractice?
- Does the circumstance of benefiting from an examination malpractice constitute sufficient proof of a candidate's wrongdoing without specific evidence?
- How should conflicting judicial precedents regarding the presumption of responsibility in examination malpractices be reconciled?
- The Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Messrs Shaiq Corporation Limited1986 PLD Supreme Court 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning the taxability of raw material used in the manufacture of electric fans under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Leave was granted to examine whether sales tax could be retrospectively imposed on raw material incorporated into finished electric fans after the abolition of sales tax on fans by a notification issued under section 7 of the Act. The core legal question revolved around whether raw materials imported tax-free by a licensed manufacturer and assimilated into finished goods prior to the exemption notification could be subjected to sales tax upon the exemption of the end-product. The Supreme Court held that once raw materials are assimilated into finished goods in the manufacturing process, and the end-product subsequently receives unconditional exemption from sales tax under section 7, the constituent raw materials lose their separate identity and cannot be retrospectively taxed in the absence of a specific statutory taxable event. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that tax payability is strictly governed by prescribed taxable events under the statute rather than general leviability.
Questions settled- Whether sales tax can be retrospectively imposed on raw material incorporated into finished goods when the end-product is exempted from sales tax?
- Does the assimilation of raw materials into finished goods constitute a taxable event under the Sales Tax Act, 1951 without an explicit statutory provision?
- What is the distinction between the leviability of goods and the payability of tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- Whether raw material exempt at the time of import loses its status and becomes taxable once the end-product is granted exemption under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- The Commissioner of Incometax, East Zone, Karachi vs Messrs Iqbal Engineering Works and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals concern the interpretation of income tax provisions regarding the set-off of losses incurred by a partner in an unregistered firm against their income from other sources. The core legal question was whether the second proviso to Section 24(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, operates as an independent substantive provision that prohibits an assessee from setting off their share of loss from an unregistered firm against their income from other business sources. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the second proviso is not an independent provision but is restricted to the scope of Section 24(1), which only governs the set-off of losses under one head against profits under a different head. The Court established the principle that because the losses and profits in question fell under the same head of business, Section 24(1) was not attracted. Consequently, the set-off is permissible under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which allows for the computation of income by lumping profits and losses from sources under the same head, regardless of the firm's registration status.
Questions settled- Does the second proviso to Section 24(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, operate as an independent substantive provision?
- Can a partner set off their share of loss from an unregistered firm against their income from other business sources under the same head?
- When is Section 24(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, attracted in the computation of income?
- Is the set-off of business losses permissible under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, when the loss and profit arise under the same head?
- The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore vs Messrs Shaikh1986 SCMR 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This tax reference appeal concerns the deductibility of interest paid on borrowed capital under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, where a company simultaneously provided interest-free loans to its Managing Director. The Income-tax Officer had disallowed the interest deduction, alleging the borrowed funds were diverted to the Director. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal deleted these additions, finding no evidence that the borrowed capital was used for the Director's loans. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that the High Court was strictly bound by the Tribunal's finding of fact, as that finding was not specifically challenged as perverse or unsupported by evidence in the reference application. The Court emphasized that the High Court's advisory jurisdiction under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, is confined to the questions referred and cannot disturb factual findings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the 1922 Act lacked provisions prohibiting companies from advancing interest-free funds to directors, a lacuna later addressed by the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979.
Questions settled- Can the High Court disturb a finding of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in a reference under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Is interest paid on borrowed capital deductible under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, if the company advances its own funds to a director?
- Does the Income-tax Act, 1922, contain a provision prohibiting a company from advancing interest-free loans to its directors?
- The Commissioner Of Income Tax, East Zone, Karachi. vs Messrs Iqbal Engineering Works And AnotherPTCL 1986 CL. 326 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These two appeals arise from judgments passed by the High Court on references under the Income Tax Act, 1922, concerning the set-off of losses incurred by an assessee as a partner in an unregistered firm against income from a registered firm or individual business under the same head of income. The core legal question was whether the second proviso to section 24(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, operates as an independent substantive provision or only as a proviso to the main enacting provision regarding set-off of losses under different heads. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso to section 24(1) is not an independent substantive provision and is attracted only when a set-off of loss under one head is sought against profits under a different head. Where the loss and profits fall under the same head of income, such as 'business', the computation is governed by section 10 of the Act, allowing deductions and set-offs from various sources under the same head independently of section 24(1). Consequently, the appeals by the Department were dismissed, affirming the assessees' right to set-off.
Questions settled- Whether the second proviso to section 24(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, operates as an independent substantive provision?
- Can a loss suffered by an assessee as a partner in an unregistered firm be set-off against profits earned from a registered firm or individual business under the same head of income?
- When does section 24(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, get attracted for the purpose of setting off losses against profits?
- The Commissioner Of Income Tax Lahore, Zone, Lahore. vs Messrs SheikhPTCL 1986 CL. 321 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves civil appeals arising from tax assessments where a private company engaged in cotton ginning paid interest on bank overdrafts while simultaneously advancing interest-free loans to its Managing Director. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the interest deductions proportionately, concluding the borrowings were diverted for personal use, a decision initially reversed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and upheld by the High Court on the basis that no evidence demonstrated the bank borrowings were directly diverted for personal loans. The core legal question concerned whether interest paid on bank borrowings could be disallowed under the Income Tax Act, 1922 when the company advanced interest-free funds to its director. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that an assessee is entitled to interest deductions on capital borrowed for business purposes unless it is established that the borrowed money was not used in the business. The Court laid down the principle that findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal regarding the utilization of capital are final and binding in a reference unless expressly challenged as perverse, and that the High Court's advisory jurisdiction under section 66 is strictly confined to answering the specific questions referred to it.
Questions settled- Whether interest paid on bank borrowings can be disallowed under section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 when an assessee company advances interest-free loans to its director?
- Can the High Court go behind or disturb a finding of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal when no question challenging it as perverse or without evidence has been framed?
- What is the scope of the High Court's advisory jurisdiction under section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- The Administrator Thal Development_ Chief Secretary And Another vs Mahboob Ali Khan1986 SCMR 1927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-09-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal by the Administrator of the Thal Development Authority against a High Court judgment directing the reinstatement of a civil servant and payment of salary arrears following a declaratory decree. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of an Intra-Court Appeal, the propriety of using constitutional jurisdiction to enforce a declaratory decree, and whether the dissolution of the Authority extinguished its liabilities. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional petition was maintainable as it sought redress against the Authority's failure to perform statutory duties, rather than mere execution of a decree. The Court affirmed that the dissolution of the Authority did not absolve it of legal liabilities, which transferred to the Administrator. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a wrongfully dismissed civil servant is entitled to arrears of salary, subject to set-off for other earnings. The Intra-Court Appeal was correctly dismissed as incompetent under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, because the underlying service order was appealable under the relevant service rules. The principle established is that statutory authorities cannot evade legal obligations through dissolution, and constitutional jurisdiction is available to compel performance of statutory duties.
Questions settled- Can a constitutional petition be maintained to enforce a declaratory decree where the authority fails to perform its statutory duties?
- Does the dissolution of a statutory authority extinguish its existing legal liabilities and obligations?
- Is a civil servant entitled to arrears of salary upon reinstatement following a declaration that their dismissal was illegal?
- When is an Intra-Court Appeal barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
- Tasleem Hussain vs Parvez Akhtar And Another1986 SCMR 1610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the petitioner challenged the dismissal of his suit for failure to deposit the pre-emption money within the time extended by the trial court. The trial court initially ordered a deposit, then extended the deadline, but subsequently dismissed the suit on the extended date for non-compliance. The appellate court remanded the case, imposing new conditions for deposit and security, which both parties challenged in the Peshawar High Court. The High Court accepted the respondent's revision, dismissing the petitioner's suit. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred in its factual assessment, particularly regarding the number of extensions granted, and that the dismissal was procedurally flawed without providing an opportunity to explain the default. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the contentions raised regarding the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction and potential misreading of evidence warranted further examination. The Court maintained the status quo regarding the property until the final disposal of the appeal.
Questions settled- Can a trial court dismiss a pre-emption suit for non-deposit of the pre-emption amount on the very date the deadline expires without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the default?
- Does the High Court exceed its revisional jurisdiction by misreading the record regarding the number of extensions granted to a party for depositing pre-emption money?
- Tariq Salim And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular testimony, the sufficiency of the motive, and the validity of the recovery of blood-stained weapons, particularly in light of alleged discrepancies in the time of the occurrence and the prosecution's failure to examine all cited witnesses. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the convictions were properly founded on consistent ocular accounts, corroborated by medical evidence regarding the deceased's digestion, and forensic reports confirming human blood on the recovered weapons. The Court affirmed that the prosecution is not legally obligated to produce every witness if the available evidence is sufficient. Furthermore, the Court held that family honor constitutes a plausible motive for such crimes, and minor variations in testimony do not necessarily undermine the prosecution's case when the core facts are established. The impugned judgment was upheld as a fair and impartial appraisal of the evidence.
Questions settled- Is the prosecution legally bound to produce and examine every witness cited in the case?
- Can medical evidence regarding the digestion of food in the stomach be used to corroborate the time of death?
- Does a motive based on family honor provide a sufficient basis for establishing the intent to commit murder?
- Are convictions sustainable when the recovery of blood-stained weapons is supported by forensic reports?
- Tariq Manzoor vs Abdul Aziz And Other1986 SCMR 1688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the restoration of a civil revision petition that had been earlier dismissed for default. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned whether the High Court erred in dismissing the restoration application and whether considering the past conduct of a party in absenting themselves constitutes an extraneous consideration when refusing an adjournment request. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding lack of notice and manoeuvring by ministerial staff lacked factual basis, and that noting the conduct of a party or their counsel is a valid factor when granting or refusing adjournments. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, upholding the High Court's order.
Questions settled- Whether the past conduct of a party in absenting themselves is an extraneous consideration when refusing an adjournment request?
- Can a civil revision petition dismissed for default be restored when the grounds raised for absence lack factual basis?
- Tanweer Jafar vs The Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad And Another1986 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of the Chenab Rangers, challenged his dismissal from service, which was subsequently modified to removal from service by the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner faced charges of misconduct, specifically involving the use of criminal force against a civilian while in custody. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the use of criminal force during the performance of duties did not constitute misconduct under the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959, particularly because the term 'misconduct' was not explicitly defined within the Ordinance. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, affirming the findings of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had relied on medical evidence of severe physical injuries to the victim. The Court held that torturing an accused person in custody clearly constitutes misconduct, regardless of the absence of a specific definition of the term within the governing statute. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the argument that such actions fell outside the scope of disciplinary purview.
Questions settled- Does the use of criminal force against a civilian in custody constitute misconduct for a member of the Pakistan Rangers?
- Can an act be classified as misconduct under the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance 1959 even if the term is not explicitly defined in the statute?
- Taj Muhammad vs Pesham Khan And Other1986 SCMR 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondents of charges under Sections 302, 307, 148, 149, and 404 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's ocular evidence and finding the delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR) fatal to the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that in cases involving a pre-existing blood feud, ocular testimony requires strong, independent corroboration to sustain a conviction. The Court found that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily explain the delay in lodging the FIR, noting that the complainant bypassed a closer village to seek assistance, which undermined the witnesses' credibility. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that mere abscondence of an accused is insufficient to sustain a conviction without solid evidence. The judgment reinforces the principle that 'chance witnesses' closely related to the deceased must withstand rigorous scrutiny, particularly when their testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence or surrounding circumstances.
Questions settled- Does a history of blood feud between parties necessitate independent corroboration of ocular testimony?
- Is the mere abscondence of an accused sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction?
- Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR, where closer assistance was available, undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
- Taj Muhammad Chaudhry vs The General Manager, Pakistan Railways1986 SCMR 1707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Sub-Inspector of the Pakistan Railways against the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified his dismissal from service to removal from service. The petitioner had been removed from his position following charges of disobeying a superior officer's order to attend a meeting and manipulating official records in the Roznamcha. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the removal order was legally infirm or suffered from illegality warranting judicial interference. Upon review, the Court observed that while the department's underlying motivation for removal appeared to be frustration with the petitioner’s conduct rather than the specific charges, the removal order itself was legally sound and free from procedural illegality. Consequently, the Court held that no case for interference was made out. The Court dismissed the petition but clarified that because the petitioner was removed rather than dismissed, the department is obligated to grant him all service benefits to which he is entitled under the law.
Questions settled- Does a removal from service, as opposed to a dismissal, entitle a public servant to service benefits?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a service tribunal's decision if the order of removal is legally sound despite the department's underlying motives?
- Is a service order legally infirm if the department's motivation for the action differs from the stated charges?
- Taj Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Iqbal And Other1986 SCMR 276 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 17-11-1981 in a rent matter, whereby the petitioners' constitutional petition against concurrent orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge was dismissed. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is competent when the sole contention raised is the appreciation of evidence on questions of fact by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was not competent in light of its prior observation in Abdul Rahman Bajwa v. Sultan and 9 others PLD 1981 SC 522, as the appreciation of factual evidence cannot be reopened through constitutional jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed as frivolous, establishing the principle that findings of fact concurrently arrived at by rent forums cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction on the ground of misappreciation of evidence.
Questions settled- Is a constitutional petition competent when the sole ground raised is the misappreciation of evidence on questions of fact by rent courts?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the appellate court be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
- Syed Zawwar Hussain vs The Secretary, Ministry of Planning &1986 SCMR 1826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question is whether a service appeal filed beyond the period of limitation without an accompanying application for condonation of delay is maintainable. The court held that the Tribunal's order dismissing the appeal as time-barred in the absence of any application for condonation of delay was unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that a time-barred service appeal without a formal request for condonation of delay cannot be entertained and is liable to be dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a service appeal filed beyond the period of limitation without an application for condonation of delay is maintainable?
- Is an order of the Service Tribunal dismissing a time-barred appeal unexceptionable when no condonation of delay was sought?
- Syed Tasaddaq Hussain vs Jaffar Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner. The petitioner, claiming to be the landlord of the property in dispute, had challenged the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the appellate court, which refused to recognize the respondents as the petitioner's tenants on the basis that the property in question was classified as evacuee trust property. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the status, nature, and character of the property in dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the same legal issue regarding the character of the petitioner's property was already pending adjudication in another matter, specifically Civil Petition No. 1063 of 1979, where leave to appeal had previously been granted. Finding that the resolution of the status of the property was essential to both cases, the Court held that it was appropriate to grant leave to appeal in the present petition and directed that both appeals be heard together to ensure consistent adjudication.
Questions settled- Does the classification of property as evacuee trust property preclude a landlord-tenant relationship under rent laws?
- Should separate petitions involving the same legal question regarding property status be consolidated for hearing?
- Syed Sultan Hussain vs Bahadur Khan1986 SCMR 1793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent, Bahadur Khan, against the petitioner, Sultan Hussain, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Swabi. The core legal question concerned the validity of a decree passed by the trial court based on a settlement reached through an oath taken on the Holy Quran. During the proceedings, the plaintiff offered to take an oath to prove his claim, and the defendant consented to be bound by the outcome of that oath, subsequently requesting that the suit be decreed in the plaintiff's favor. The trial court decreed the suit accordingly, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently affirmed by the Peshawar High Court in civil revision. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, reasoning that the petitioner had voluntarily undertaken to abide by the oath taken by the respondent. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision, establishing the principle that a party is bound by a decree passed on the basis of a solemn oath when they have explicitly consented to such a procedure.
Questions settled- Is a decree passed on the basis of a solemn oath taken by a party binding on the defendant who consented to the procedure?
- Can a defendant challenge a decree where they explicitly requested the court to pass the decree based on the plaintiff's oath?
- Syed Shakir Hussain And Others vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the dismissal of applications for acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The petitioners, accused in a case under Sections 406/420, P.P.C., had their initial acquittal application rejected as premature, and a subsequent application dismissed after some prosecution evidence was recorded. The High Court, while dismissing the constitutional petition, directed the trial Magistrate to dispose of the case expeditiously, observing that prior remarks made without evidence should not influence the trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's direction for final disposal would not impede the petitioners' right to seek acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The Court affirmed that a trial court is empowered to acquit at any stage if the necessary conditions are met, and there is no bar to entertaining a fresh application under this section on its merits.
Questions settled- Can a trial court entertain a fresh application for acquittal under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, even after previous applications have been dismissed?
- Does a higher court's direction for expeditious disposal of a case preclude a trial court from considering an application for acquittal under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Should observations made by a higher court without evidence on record influence a trial court's decision on the merits of a case?
- At what stage of a criminal trial can a court exercise its power to acquit an accused under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Syed Nasir Ali Shah vs Province of Punjab1986 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a retired government servant, challenged departmental proceedings initiated against him for the recovery of alleged unauthorized amounts. Initially, proceedings were commenced under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, within one year of his retirement. Following an appeal, the Punjab Service Tribunal set aside these proceedings, ruling that the 1975 Rules were inapplicable to a retired pensioner, but permitted the department to proceed under the West Pakistan Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963. The petitioner contended that the subsequent proceedings under the 1963 Rules were time-barred under Rule 1.8(b), which mandates that departmental proceedings must be instituted within one year of retirement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the initial proceedings commenced within the statutory period and the subsequent action was merely a continuation of the same process under a different legal provision. The Court established that a change in the legal provision invoked does not alter the character of the action, nor does it constitute the institution of fresh proceedings, provided the underlying cause of action remains consistent and the initial action was timely.
Questions settled- Does a change in the legal provision under which departmental proceedings are conducted constitute the institution of fresh proceedings for the purpose of limitation?
- Can departmental proceedings for recovery of losses from a pensioner be considered a continuation of earlier proceedings initiated under inapplicable rules?
- Does Rule 1.8(b) of the West Pakistan Civil Service Pension Rules 1963 require the institution of proceedings within one year of retirement?
- Syed Mustafa Hussain vs Muzaffar Alias Bhai Sahib1986 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which reversed a Rent Controller's order allowing the eviction of a tenant from commercial premises based on the landlord's personal requirement. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, correctly applied the principles of appreciation of evidence in civil cases when it overturned the Rent Controller's findings. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court appeared to have reassessed the evidence on speculative grounds, specifically regarding the credibility of witnesses and the nature of the landlord's business needs. The Court held that the High Court's approach to evaluating the evidence, particularly its rejection of testimony as 'interested' and its assumptions about the landlord's business operations, required further judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the High Court properly adhered to the rule that civil issues are determined by the preponderance of evidence, rather than by speculative conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the landlord's existing business space.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have the authority to reverse a Rent Controller's finding of fact based on speculative reasoning regarding the landlord's business needs?
- What is the correct standard for the appreciation of evidence in civil cases regarding the testimony of witnesses in rent control proceedings?
- Is the determination of a landlord's bona fide personal requirement subject to interference in appeal if the appellate court fails to apply the principle of preponderance of evidence?
- Syed Muharram Ali vs Secretary, Labour and Cooperation1986 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a common judgment of the High Court of Sind disposing of two interconnected constitutional petitions. The dispute concerned the cancellation of a shop lease originally granted to the predecessor of respondents 4 to 10 by a co-operative society, and its subsequent re-allotment to the petitioner. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition and allowed the respondents' petition, declaring the cancellation and re-allotment orders, as well as an arbitration reference, to be without lawful authority because they were not passed by the competent Administrator under the West Pakistan Co-operative Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought to challenge the common judgment only in relation to the dismissal of his own petition, without filing a separate leave petition against the decision in the respondents' petition. The Supreme Court held that a party cannot indirectly challenge or seek review of a decision in a connected petition without filing a proper, distinct petition for leave to appeal against that specific decision. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a petitioner challenge a common judgment of the High Court in so far as it relates to their own dismissed petition without filing a separate petition for leave to appeal against the decision in the connected petition?
- Whether an order passed by an authority other than the designated Administrator under the West Pakistan Co-operative Board (Dissolution) Act 1966 is valid and within jurisdiction?
- Is a party permitted to indirectly obtain a review of a decision in a connected constitutional petition where no proper leave petition has been filed against that specific decision?
- Syed Mir Ahmad Shah vs Pakistan And Other1986 SCMR 1200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an advocate, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his regular second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the lower courts dismissing his civil suit. The petitioner had previously litigated the refusal of Settlement authorities to transfer a disputed house to him through a constitutional petition and subsequent proceedings up to the Supreme Court, all of which were dismissed. In the second round of litigation, he filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership, which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of locus standi, and by the High Court on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the matter had already been conclusively decided in earlier proceedings and that the principles of res judicata and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities barred the civil court from entertaining the dispute. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.
Questions settled- Whether a civil suit is barred by res judicata when the subject-matter has already been adjudicated through earlier constitutional and appellate proceedings up to the Supreme Court?
- Do civil courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters relating to the refusal of Settlement authorities to transfer a property after the claimant has failed in higher forums?
- Whether a party having failed to secure property transfer through settlement authorities and constitutional petitions has the locus standi to institute a civil suit for the same relief?
- Syed Maqsood Ali vs Mst. Soofia Naushaba And Other1986 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from prolonged litigation between divorced parents concerning the custody and guardianship of their two minor children. Initially, the parties resolved multiple pending suits through a compromise before the High Court, whereby the father agreed to divorce the mother, pay dower and maintenance, and in exchange receive custody of the minor son upon his reaching seven years of age and the minor daughter upon reaching puberty, with visitation rights in the interim. Following the mother's subsequent refusal to surrender custody of the son when he turned seven, the father initiated proceedings under Sections 12 and 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act. While the Family Court awarded custody of the male child to the father, the Additional District Judge and the High Court ordered both minors to remain with the mother. The Supreme Court observed that the matter could not depend entirely on the wishes of the minors due to maternal alienation during litigation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court recorded a fresh mutual compromise submitted by the parties and passed an interim custody order operative for six months.
Questions settled- Can the custody of a minor child be determined solely on the basis of the child's wishes where there has been prolonged litigation and potential parental influence?
- Can the court implement an interim custody arrangement based on a mutual compromise of the parents to foster conducive relations between the minors and the non-custodial parent?
- Syed Intezar Hussain Zaldi vs Returning Officer Na 186, Karachi And Other1986 SCMR 1869 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an election petition filed by a defeated candidate challenging the election results of National Assembly Constituency NA-186, Karachi, held on February 25, 1985. The appellant, who secured 559 votes against the successful respondent's 20,647 votes, alleged widespread rigging and unfair election practices. The sole evidence presented to support these claims was a single ballot paper discovered by the appellant in a dried riverine several days after the election results were declared. The core legal question was whether the discovery of this isolated ballot paper, without evidence of systemic malpractice or attribution to the successful candidate, was sufficient to invalidate the election. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition, finding no material effect on the election result. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, ruling that the mere discovery of one ballot paper, absent proof of widespread irregularity or involvement by the returned candidate, does not materially affect the election outcome. The court affirmed that an election cannot be declared void based on unsubstantiated allegations of rigging without demonstrating a material impact on the result.
Questions settled- Does the discovery of a single stray ballot paper outside a polling station constitute sufficient grounds to declare an election void?
- Can an election be set aside on the basis of general allegations of rigging without proof of material effect on the result?
- Is a petitioner required to establish that the returned candidate was responsible for irregularities to successfully challenge an election?
- Syed Ikram Gardezi. vs State And AnotherPTCL 1986 CL. 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against an interim order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal complaint case under sections 406 and 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 282 of the Companies Act, wherein the accused was directed to produce certain documents under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question raised was whether an accused person can be directed to produce documents that would incriminate him in a pending criminal case. The Supreme Court did not formally answer or adjudicate upon the constitutional and statutory questions raised regarding self-incrimination, as the appellant agreed during the proceedings to produce the first few specified documents, while stating that the remaining documents were never in his possession, prompting the Court to observe that the respondent could seek permission to lead secondary evidence. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of on these statements without laying down a definitive ruling on the substantive legal question.
Questions settled- Can an accused person be directed to produce documents which would incriminate him in a case pending against him before a Court?
- Syed Hasan Hamid vs The State And Another1986 SCMR 1112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-05Read full judgment →
- Syed Ghulam Raza vs Federation of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 29-2-1984, which had previously disposed of the petitioner's petition for leave to appeal. The petitioner, a civil servant, contended that he was exempt from the requirement of having his employment case referred to the Public Service Commission, arguing that his appointment predated the relevant regulatory framework, specifically relying on definitions within the Ordinance XIV of 1981. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's arguments regarding his service status and the applicability of the Ordinance warranted a review of the previous judgment. The Court held that the petitioner's arguments had already been thoroughly considered and addressed in the original judgment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing the principle that a review petition cannot be utilized as a mechanism for a de novo rehearing of a case on grounds that have already been adjudicated upon. The scope of review jurisdiction is strictly limited and does not extend to re-arguing the entire merits of a previously decided matter.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be used to seek a de novo rehearing of a case on the same grounds already adjudicated?
- What is the scope and purpose of review jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
- Syed Ghulam Hussain Shah Through Legal Heirs vs Syed Sadiq Hussain1986 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a civil miscellaneous petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Syed Ghulam Hussain Shah vs. Syed Sadiq Hussain. The core legal question presented to the Court involved a request by the petitioners/appellants for permission to undertake the re-building of a shop that was the subject of the underlying dispute. The Court, exercising its discretion in the civil miscellaneous proceedings, granted the prayer sought by the petitioners. The holding of the Court was that the petitioners were permitted to proceed with the re-building of the disputed shop, subject to the specific condition that such construction would be undertaken entirely at the petitioners' own risk and cost. This decision establishes the principle that a court may grant interim relief allowing for the modification or reconstruction of disputed property during the pendency of litigation, provided that the party seeking such relief assumes full liability for the associated costs and any potential legal consequences arising from the alteration of the property's status quo.
Questions settled- Can a party to a civil dispute be granted permission by the court to re-build a disputed shop during the pendency of proceedings?
- Is a court empowered to allow the alteration of disputed property subject to the condition of risk and cost to the applicant?
- Syed Ghias Haider vs Mst. Allah Rakhi and Other1986 SCMR 853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a pre-emption suit due to abatement. The petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption, but the defendant died while proceedings were pending. The petitioner failed to implead the correct legal representatives within the statutory period, instead attempting to implead a business partner. The trial court dismissed the suit as having abated under Order XXII, Rule 4(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the suit could proceed despite the failure to bring the correct legal representatives on record within the limitation period, and whether the initial application could be treated as one to set aside abatement. The Supreme Court held that the suit abated automatically upon the expiry of the limitation period. The Court affirmed that an application to implead a wrong person does not satisfy the requirements of Order XXII, Rule 4, and that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 do not apply to the substitution of legal representatives. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff must establish 'sufficient cause' to set aside an abatement.
Questions settled- Does the failure to implead legal representatives within the statutory period result in the automatic abatement of a suit?
- Are the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to the substitution of legal representatives under Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can an application to implead a wrong person be treated as a valid application to set aside the abatement of a suit?
- Does the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 apply to cases where abatement occurred prior to its promulgation?
- Syed Ali Suleman Jafri vs Secretary to the Government of Sind And 3 Other1986 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a protracted dispute over the allotment of a plot in the Firdaus Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Karachi, claimed by both the deceased appellant and respondent No. 4. The core legal question revolved around the validity of the rival allotments and whether the appellant had become a member of the Society prior to respondent No. 4 to lawfully receive the plot. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the majority arbitrators and the High Court—establishing that respondent No. 4 was a valid member and allottee since 1951, whereas the appellant only became a member in 1955 and obtained manipulated documents—were well-founded. The Court affirmed that under the Society's bye-laws, regular membership and shareholding were prerequisites for a valid allotment, and irregularities in the Society's management did not override the sound documentary evidence supporting respondent No. 4. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an arbitration award under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 can be set aside in revisional proceedings by the Provincial Government?
- Does a person become entitled to the allotment of land in a cooperative housing society prior to obtaining regular membership and purchasing the requisite shares?
- Can conflicting stands taken by the management of a cooperative society vitiate concurrent factual findings based on independent documentary evidence?
- Syed Ali Hasan Rizvi vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan And Other1986 SCMR 1086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Sind Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation. The petitioner, a former police sub-inspector dismissed in 1959, engaged in protracted litigation spanning civil suits, execution proceedings, and a subsequent suit for arrears of salary which abated following the establishment of the service tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution. The core legal question concerned whether the Service Tribunal erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal and whether the rule in Syed Faiz Ali Shah's case applied to the petitioner's circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the question of condoning delay was a question of fact within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which did not exercise its discretion arbitrarily, and that the cited precedent was distinguishable on facts as the petitioner had indeed been afforded an opportunity to be heard on his condonation application. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the question of condoning delay in filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal?
- Does the admission of an appeal by a tribunal without noting a time-bar automatically imply the condonation of delay under the principle laid down in Syed Faiz Ali Shah's case?
- Whether the abatement of a civil suit upon the promulgation of service tribunal laws warrants the automatic condonation of delay for subsequent appeals?
- Syed Ali Akbar Rizvi And Others vs Messrs Pak Army Furnishing Stores1986 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, owners of land in Karachi, sought ejectment of the respondent tenant before the Rent Controller on the ground of personal requirement for reconstruction, having obtained an approved building plan. The Rent Controller framed an issue regarding good faith and sanction. During proceedings, a letter and circular were produced showing that the Building Control Authority had suspended the building plan pursuant to the Karachi Building Controller Regulation, 1984, issued under the Sind Building Control Ordinance No. V of 1979, requiring a landlord to enter an agreement with tenants for alternate accommodation prior to reconstruction. The High Court dismissed the respondent's appeal but conditioned the eviction on the revalidation of the building plan. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court's conditional order was beyond the scope of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised require examination and granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a High Court can condition an order of ejectment on the revalidation of a suspended building plan?
- Does the suspension of a building plan by a building control authority curtail a landlord's right of ejectment under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Can a building control authority impose conditions requiring a landlord to enter into an agreement with tenants before permitting reconstruction?
- Syed Ali Abbas Shah And Others vs Syed Muhammad Abbas Shah And Other1986 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns cross-petitions arising from a land dispute under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959, where a declarant sought to revoke previously declared gifts of land to his mother and wife while exercising a fresh choice of land retention. The core legal questions were whether a declarant, upon being permitted to amend his land declaration, could unilaterally revoke prior gifts, and whether he was entitled to a 10% rebate on produce index units for lift-irrigated land. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the Land Commission's authority is limited to determining total holdings and permissible retention limits; it is not the forum to adjudicate the validity or revocability of private gifts between donor and donee. The Court established that disputes regarding the validity of gifts made by a declarant are civil matters to be resolved between the parties, independent of the Land Commission's regulatory functions. Furthermore, claims for rebates not supported by specific legal provisions or schemes cannot be granted under constitutional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Does the Land Commission have the authority to adjudicate the validity or revocability of private gifts made by a declarant?
- Can a declarant under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959 claim a 10% rebate on produce index units for lift-irrigated land without a specific legal provision?
- Is the validity of a gift made by a declarant a matter to be resolved by the Land Commission or by civil courts between the parties?
- Syed Abid Ali Shah vs Fakhar Ud Din1986 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an unsuccessful defendant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his revision petition and affirmed the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two courts below. The plaintiff-respondent had instituted a civil suit claiming ownership and possession of a plot of land measuring 17 Marlas. The trial court decreed the suit, holding that the plaintiff's ownership extended only to 14 Marlas and not 17 Marlas, which finding was upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question concerned the petitioner's grievance regarding observations made in the High Court judgment concerning the remaining 3 Marlas of land. The Supreme Court held that since the decree of the trial court only granted 14 Marlas and left the residue untouched, the petitioner was not aggrieved by the unaltered decree. The Supreme Court laid down that a party cannot maintain a petition for leave to appeal against mere observations in a judgment when the actual decree does not adversely affect them. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.
Questions settled- Can a party seek leave to appeal against mere observations in a judgment when the underlying decree does not grant relief against them?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts can be disturbed in revision without jurisdictional error?
- Syed Abdullah Shah And Others vs Abdul Ghaffar Khan And Other1986 SCMR 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over agricultural land in Baluchistan, originating from a criminal complaint of trespass filed in 1960. Following a complex procedural history involving the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the Quetta/Kalat Ordinance (No. III of 1965), and Ordinance I of 1968, the petitioners' predecessor-in-title obtained a decree for possession. The respondent challenged this in revision before the Board of Revenue, where the Member, Mr. Agha Nasir Ali Khan, remanded the case for retrial, citing a failure to frame issues and determine limitation. The petitioners challenged this remand order in the High Court, which dismissed their petition. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the Member, Board of Revenue, was biased due to his prior involvement in the case and that the remand order was legally unsustainable as the relevant law did not require framing issues and the limitation plea was not raised in the pleadings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the questions regarding the necessity of framing issues under Ordinance I of 1968 and the propriety of raising limitation for the first time in revision were substantial questions of law.
Questions settled- Whether a Member of the Board of Revenue is disqualified from hearing a revision application if they previously expressed an adverse opinion on the merits of the same case?
- Does Section 4 of Ordinance I of 1968 require the framing of issues before a Tribunal, or can the entire dispute be referred?
- Can a plea of limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, be raised for the first time during revision proceedings if it was not pleaded in the written statement?
- Sumandar Khan vs Nawab Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a vendee of agricultural land, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which refused to interfere with the revisional order of the Member, Board of Revenue in a pre-emption matter. The respondent-pre-emptor had successfully claimed pre-emption as a tenant and was directed to deposit the decretal amount by a specified date, having already made the statutory one-fifth deposit under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Subsequently, the pre-emptor applied for and obtained a refund of the one-fifth deposit by stating he was abandoning his pre-emption right, but later deposited the full decretal amount within the stipulated time. The core legal question concerned whether the withdrawal of the section 22 deposit violated the statutory requirements and terms of the decree. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and strict compliance with the terms of the decree warranted an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal implications of withdrawing pre-emption deposits.
Questions settled- Must a deposit made under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act remain intact until the pre-emption suit is decided and the decree is complied with?
- Does the withdrawal of a one-fifth pre-emption deposit amount to an abandonment of pre-emption rights?
- Whether strict compliance with the terms of a pre-emption decree requires the initial statutory deposit to be maintained throughout the proceedings?
- Sultan Mahmood vs Anwar Ahmad1986 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing a second appeal filed by the appellant. The appellant had challenged his eviction order passed by the Rent Controller for non-compliance with a rent deposit order, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to review its orders passed in a second appeal under the relevant rent restriction law and thereby revive a dismissed appeal. The Supreme Court held that no exception could be taken to the view of the High Court that a second appeal once dismissed could not be revived by way of a review application. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with parties bearing their own costs. The key principle laid down is that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to review its orders passed in second appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to revive a dismissed matter.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to review its orders passed in a second appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can a second appeal once dismissed by the High Court be revived through a review application?
- Sultan Mahmood Mir vs Province of Punjab Through Secretary, Communications And Works Department, Lahore1986 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the civil servant's appeal seeking expunction of adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Report. The core legal question was whether adverse remarks in a service record must be expunged merely because disciplinary proceedings initiated on the same allegations resulted in exoneration on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's finding of fact justified the remarks and noted that the departmental appeal succeeded on technical grounds rather than a complete exoneration on merits. The Court concluded that no question of law of public importance was involved, thereby refusing leave to appeal and laying down the principle that an acquittal or success in disciplinary proceedings on technical grounds does not automatically entitle a civil servant to the expunction of adverse Annual Confidential Report remarks properly justified on record.
Questions settled- Whether adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report must be expunged when departmental disciplinary proceedings result in a successful appeal?
- Does an exoneration on technical grounds in disciplinary proceedings entitle a civil servant to the removal of adverse remarks from his service record?
- Is a finding of fact recorded by the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding Annual Confidential Report remarks open to interference by the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Sultan Ahmad And Others vs Khuda Bux And Other1986 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions for leave to appeal arose from pre-emption suits filed by the respondents against the petitioner vendees regarding agricultural land, wherein the plaints were originally filed with deficient court-fees. The core legal question concerned the legality of a subsequent order extending time for making up the deficiency in court-fees after the expiry of the period specified in an earlier order, and whether the plaints were liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the power of the Court to extend time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be exercised successively, even after the expiry of a previously fixed period, provided no specific amount of deficiency was originally quantified. The Court established that a subsequent order allowing time to make good deficient court-fees is legally valid, and the exercise of discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the appellate court was sound and in accordance with settled principles.
Questions settled- Can a court exercise power under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend time successively after the expiry of the period fixed under a previous order?
- Are plaints liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for deficient court-fees when the court has not initially specified the exact amount of deficiency to be made up?
- Whether an appellate court's exercise of discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend time for making up court-fee deficiencies can be interfered with without proof of perverse exercise?
- Sufaidullah vs The State1986 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a Depot-holder, challenged his conviction under sections 3/6 of the West Pakistan Food Stuffs (Control) Act, 1958, for alleged shortages of sugar and Atta, which was upheld by the lower appellate court and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained in the absence of crucial documentary evidence establishing the shortages and without examining the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the Atta shortage. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be maintained based solely on unsubstantiated oral evidence and the unverified ipsi dixit of the Food Inspector, particularly when the stock register and documentary evidence were not produced and the mandatory examination under section 342 was deficient. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the fine was ordered to be remitted.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for shortages of food stuffs be maintained under the West Pakistan Food Stuffs (Control) Act, 1958, in the absence of crucial documentary evidence such as the stock register?
- Whether reliance can be placed solely on the oral testimony and ipsi dixit of a Food Inspector to prove shortages of essential commodities?
- Does the failure to question an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding a material piece of evidence vitiate the conviction?
- State Through Advocate General And Another vs Zard Ali And Other1986 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and a complainant against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted two respondents previously convicted of murder. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The High Court, while acknowledging the promptness of the FIR and the presence of independent ocular evidence, overturned the conviction based on discrepancies between the medical evidence, the site plan, and the version of the occurrence provided by eye-witnesses. The State argued that the High Court misapplied legal principles regarding the weight of oral evidence versus medical evidence and site plans, citing established Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court's acquittal was based on well-recognized principles for the safe administration of criminal justice. The Court ordered the issuance of bailable warrants for the respondents pending the appeal.
Questions settled- Does the acquittal of an accused based on discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony align with the established principles for the safe administration of criminal justice?
- Can medical evidence be used to contradict ocular evidence that is otherwise considered convincing and free from taint?
- Is a site plan intended to corroborate or contradict the version of an occurrence provided by eye-witnesses?
- State Bank of Pakistan vs Abdul Khaliq1986 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by the State Bank of Pakistan challenges the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which had upheld the first appellate court's decision setting aside the dismissal of the respondent, a chowkidar, from service. The respondent was dismissed following a departmental inquiry for dereliction of duty under Regulation 22 of the State Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Regulations. The core legal questions involved whether a declaratory civil suit was maintainable when departmental rules were not violated, and whether the inquiry was vitiated by alleged bias because the inquiry officer was subordinate to the dismissing authority. The Supreme Court held that since no rules were violated and no plea of bias was raised during the departmental inquiry, findings of bias based on the subordination of the inquiry officer were speculative and not rooted in evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the first appellate court, and restored the trial court's judgment dismissing the suit, establishing that departmental actions conducted fairly without rule violations cannot be invalidated on surmises of bias.
Questions settled- Whether a declaratory civil suit is maintainable against a dismissal from service when there is no breach of any departmental rule regarding the enquiry?
- Can an administrative departmental enquiry be vitiated on the ground of bias simply because the enquiry officer is subordinate to the competent authority, when no such objection was raised during the proceedings?
- Is it open to a civil court or first appellate court to substitute its own discretion regarding the quantum of punishment inflicted by an administrative authority?
- Soomar Khan Lahroomal And Another vs Maudhomal1986 SCMR 1636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via petitions for leave to appeal challenging interim orders passed by the High Court during the pendency of appeals filed by the petitioners. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the discretionary interim orders issued by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had passed the impugned interim orders in the valid exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to warrant interference with these orders and dismissed the petitions. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court where such orders are found to be within the scope of the High Court's valid discretionary jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court when such orders are within the High Court's discretionary jurisdiction?
- Is a petition against an interim order maintainable if the High Court exercised its discretion validly?
- Sofia Sultan And Others vs Karachi Building Control Authority And Other1986 SCMR 1870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the Sind High Court concerning the conversion of a designated park area into residential plots within K.D.A. Scheme No. 24, Karachi. The petitioners, who were allottees of nearby residential plots, challenged the Works Co-operative Housing Society's decision to re-designate the park land for residential use, arguing it violated the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957. The core legal question was whether the authorities possessed the power to alter the site plan or scheme after its initial sanction. The Supreme Court declined to definitively interpret the conflicting provisions of the Karachi Development Authority Order regarding scheme alteration. Instead, the Court held that the authorities had demonstrated compelling public interest—specifically, the need to relocate the park due to underground water pipelines and drainage issues affecting other residential plots. Furthermore, the Court noted that a park facility remained available to residents. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the administrative action was justified and that judicial interference would cause unnecessary disruption to third parties who had already commenced construction.
Questions settled- Are authorities competent to alter a sanctioned site plan or scheme under the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957?
- Does the existence of compelling public interest justify the conversion of land reserved for a park into residential plots?
- Can a court refuse to interfere with an administrative action if such interference would cause undue hardship to third parties?
- Siraj vs The State1986 SCMR 1630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Siraj, who was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to imprisonment for life. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel limited the prayer to seeking the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which allows for the period of detention as an under-trial prisoner to be considered part of the substantive sentence. The Supreme Court, finding the case appropriate for such relief, converted the petition into an appeal and partly allowed it. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., and directed the jail authorities to account for the period spent by the petitioner as an under-trial prisoner when calculating the term of his imprisonment.
Questions settled- Is a convict sentenced to life imprisonment entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Can the Supreme Court grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during an appeal against conviction and sentence?
- Siraj Din And Others vs Allah Rakha And Other1986 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition concerning an urban settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether two properties, bearing distinct identification numbers, were in reality a single property, which would affect the validity of the transfer of the disputed property to the respondent via auction. Following a remand in an earlier round of litigation, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner rendered a finding of fact that the two numbers represented separate properties. This finding was subsequently affirmed by a Single Judge of the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the findings of fact were based on a misreading of evidence, specifically pointing to an administrative error regarding a statement purportedly made by a predecessor-in-interest after his death. The Supreme Court held that the mistake regarding the statement was minor and innocent, and that the finding of fact was supported by several other independent factors. Consequently, the Court found no legal infirmity in the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a minor factual error regarding a statement attributed to a deceased person invalidates a finding of fact supported by other independent evidence?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities and the High Court be interfered with in the absence of a manifest jurisdictional error or material illegality?
- Siraj And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that modified their convictions from murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to causing grievous hurt under Section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s reliance on ocular testimony and recovery evidence was legally sound, given the petitioners' contentions regarding the acquittal of a co-accused, the discrepancy between the weapons allegedly used and the injuries sustained, and the reliability of recovery witnesses. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s findings were in consonance with the principles of criminal justice. The Court affirmed that when ocular testimony is credible and corroborated by recovery evidence, and where no specific grounds exist to discredit the prosecution witnesses, the conviction is sustainable. The judgment reinforces that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact when the evidence is consistent and no material infirmity is demonstrated in the trial or appellate assessment.
Questions settled- Does the acquittal of one co-accused necessarily invalidate the conviction of other co-accused based on the same ocular testimony?
- Can a conviction be sustained when recovery witnesses are police officers and no public witnesses are present?
- Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court's assessment of evidence if the findings are consistent with established principles of criminal justice?
- Sind Road Transport Corporation vs Muhammad Ali G. Khokhar1986 SCMR 1667 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the legal status of service rules adopted by the Sind Road Transport Corporation. The core legal question presented is whether the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Rules, 1959, which were adopted by the petitioner Corporation to regulate the terms and conditions of service for its employees, possess a statutory character. Furthermore, the court addresses whether a constitutional petition is maintainable in the High Court for the non-compliance of such rules. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, indicating that the matter requires further examination on the merits. The judgment establishes that the nature of the rules governing the employees of the Corporation is a significant legal question that necessitates a formal determination by the Court, particularly concerning the availability of constitutional remedies for alleged violations of these service regulations.
Questions settled- Are the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Rules, 1959, adopted by the Sind Road Transport Corporation, statutory in character?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable in the High Court for the non-compliance of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Rules, 1959?
- Sind Employees' Socia6 Security Institution vs Messrs Kohinoor1986 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed its Miscellaneous Appeal filed under section 64 of the Social Security Ordinance against the order of the Social Security Court. The core legal question raised was whether the respondent's appeal before the Social Security Court was incompetent under section 59 of the Ordinance due to the absence of a proper decision under section 57. The Supreme Court held that since the point was not raised or argued before the High Court or the Social Security Court, despite being mentioned in the written objections, it could not be permitted to be raised for the first time before the apex court. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a legal ground contained merely in written pleadings, if not specifically argued and pressed before the lower courts, cannot be entertained in further appeal.
Questions settled- Can a party raise a legal ground in the appellate court that was pleaded in written objections but never argued before the lower courts?
- Whether an appeal before the Social Security Court is incompetent without a decision under section 57 of the Social Security Ordinance when the objection was not pressed below?
- Sibte Muhammad And Another vs Meraj Din And Another1986 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner and restored the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the demarcation and transfer of urban evacuee property comprising Khasra Nos. 2915 and 2916 in Raj Garh, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding the physical extent of the transferred property and its demarcation could be validly disturbed by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the Settlement Commissioner's order was based on irrelevant considerations and no order in the eye of the law, thereby justifying interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision as just and fair, laying down that an order of a settlement authority based on irrelevant factors and flawed inferences regarding property demarcation is amenable to correction under constitutional jurisdiction, and refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner in constitutional jurisdiction when the finding is based on irrelevant considerations?
- Does the ownership of adjacent plots by the same evacuee necessarily imply that they comprise a single property for transfer purposes?
- Whether an order passed without appreciation of relevant and material factors by a Settlement Commissioner can be sustained in the eye of the law?
- Sher Brothers Transport Co. Ltd., Lyallpur vs District Magistrate/1986 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the dismissal in limine of a writ petition filed by a private limited company seeking reimbursement of an amount of Rs. Four lacs allegedly recovered illegally from it in 1970 towards fines imposed upon its directors and managers by a summary Military Court under Martial Law Regulation No. 16-A in 1969. The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition on 30-1-1975 on the ground of extreme delay. The core legal question was whether the pursuit of departmental mercy petitions constitutes a valid justification for a gross and unexplained delay of five years in invoking the constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the filing of mercy petitions does not furnish a sufficient ground to excuse a delay of five years in approaching the High Court for a discretionary writ remedy. The Court affirmed that unexplained delays of such magnitude are fatal to constitutional petitions, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Does the pursuit of mercy petitions justify a delay of five years in filing a constitutional writ petition?
- Is a delay of five years fatal to the discretionary remedy of a writ petition?
- Whether the dismissal of a writ petition in limine on the ground of extreme delay is sustainable in law?
- Sheikh Ahmad Ali And Others vs The Settlement Commissioner And Another1986 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property under settlement laws, specifically involving the Kashmir Hotel and an adjoining shop. The petitioners challenge the transfer of the roof of their shop to the respondents, who had previously acquired the hotel and incorporated the roof into it through construction. The Settlement Commissioner and the High Court had previously held as a finding of fact that the roof became part of the respondents' hotel property through conversion. The petitioners contend that the roof of their shop could not legally be transferred to the respondents and allege discriminatory treatment, noting that a similar claim regarding an adjoining shop's roof was rejected by the authorities. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the transfer of the roof of the petitioners' shop to the respondents, as part of their converted hotel, was in accordance with the applicable settlement laws and whether the alleged discrimination vitiates the transfer.
Questions settled- Whether the transfer of a shop's roof to an adjoining hotel owner, as part of a converted hotel, is legally permissible under settlement laws?
- Can a finding of fact regarding property conversion be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal?
- Does the inconsistent treatment of similar property claims by the Settlement Commissioner constitute unlawful discrimination?
- Sheikh Aftab Ahmad And Others vs Deputy Commissioner, Karachi And Another1986 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the dismissal of appeals by the Sind Service Tribunal regarding the termination of temporary Surveyors. The appellants had initially filed civil suits challenging their termination, which were dismissed by the Additional District Judges on the ground of abatement prior to the promulgation of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Tribunal subsequently held that because the suits were not pending on the date the Act was promulgated, the appellants could not invoke Section 6 of the Act to transfer their cases. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Tribunal's finding was erroneous. Relying on established legal principles, the Court ruled that a cause remains 'pending' until the period of limitation for filing an appeal against the original order has expired. Since the limitation period for filing appeals in the High Court had not elapsed when the Act was promulgated, the proceedings were deemed pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the cases for decision on merits.
Questions settled- Is a legal cause considered 'pending' until the period of limitation for filing an appeal against the original order has expired?
- Does the abatement of a suit by a civil court preclude the application of Section 6 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act 1973?
- Can a service tribunal refuse to hear a case on the grounds that the suit was not pending on the date of the promulgation of the Sind Service Tribunals Act 1973 if the limitation period for an appeal had not yet expired?