Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ch. Meraj Din And Others vs Lahore Improvement Trust1986 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-05
  leave to appealestoppeladministrative lawdevelopment schemeland acquisitionregulatory approval
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the actions of the Lahore Improvement Trust regarding a private development scheme. The core legal question presented for examination is whether the Lahore Improvement Trust, having previously sanctioned a private scheme submitted by the petitioner, is legally estopped from subsequently pleading a lack of authority to sanction such a scheme or a lack of duty to obtain provincial government approval. Furthermore, the Court is tasked with determining whether the Trust can lawfully ignore its prior sanction when framing future development schemes. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court granted interim relief, ordering that the land owned by the petitioner at the time of the relevant notification be excluded from the implementation of the impugned scheme. The petitioner was directed to coordinate with the respondent to determine the precise area for exclusion. The Court granted leave to appeal to address these issues of administrative consistency and the binding nature of prior regulatory approvals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory body, having sanctioned a private scheme, subsequently plead lack of authority to sanction it?
  • Is a statutory body bound by its prior sanction when framing future development schemes?
  • Can a statutory body ignore its own prior approval regarding a private scheme submitted by a petitioner?
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• Ch. Mehraj Din and 01HERSs vs bn Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore through the Chairman1986 PLD Supreme Court 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-18
  town planning schemedevelopment schemepermanent injunctionstatutory interpretationMunicipal Administration OrdinanceLahore Improvement Trustland acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the validity of a private housing scheme and the authority of the Lahore Improvement Trust (LIT) to include the subject land in a larger development scheme. The appellants contended that their private scheme, having received technical approval from the LIT, was immutable and could not be superseded. The core legal question was whether the LIT was legally debarred from incorporating land covered by a prior private scheme into its own development scheme framed under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' scheme lacked the requisite government sanction to be considered final. Furthermore, the Court ruled that even a duly sanctioned scheme is not immutable or perpetual. The Court affirmed that the LIT possesses the statutory authority to frame development schemes and incorporate land covered by prior schemes, provided that affected parties are afforded a fair opportunity to represent their case and raise objections. Consequently, the power to execute a scheme inherently includes the power to amend, vary, or rescind prior arrangements, subject to due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a development scheme framed by the Lahore Improvement Trust include land already covered by a private housing scheme?
  • Is a private housing scheme approved by a municipal authority immutable and perpetual?
  • Does the power to execute a development scheme include the authority to amend or rescind prior schemes?
  • Is government sanction required for a private housing scheme to be considered final under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960?
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• Ch. Imdad Ali vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1986 SCMR 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-14
  evacuee propertysuo motu revisiontransfer cancellationDisplaced Persons Actremandauction irregularitiesbona fide transferee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition against the cancellation of transfer orders for forty-four evacuee properties. The appellant, having acquired these properties under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, faced cancellation following allegations of procedural irregularities and underpricing. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court erred in upholding the cancellation without addressing the rights of subsequent transferees, failing to consider prior adjudications regarding specific properties, and ignoring the possibility of rectifying price deficiencies rather than cancelling transfers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s disposal was insufficient. It ruled that the High Court must re-examine the case, specifically addressing the status of alienated properties, the finality of previous decisions, and the appropriateness of cancellation versus requiring payment of price deficiencies. The Court established that where procedural irregularities in auction committees occur, the burden of justification should not rest solely on the purchaser, and that cancellation is not the automatic remedy for unauthorized price reductions where the auction itself was valid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can cancel property transfers without impleading subsequent transferees who have acquired interest in the properties?
  • Is cancellation of a property transfer the appropriate remedy when the only irregularity is an unauthorized reduction in the bid price below the reserve price?
  • Does a prior judicial decision regarding the legality of a property transfer bar subsequent revisional proceedings by a Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can a purchaser be held solely accountable for procedural irregularities in the constitution of an auction committee?
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• Ch. Abdul Aziz vs M. K. Abbasi1986 PLD Supreme Court 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  rent restrictioneviction applicationinfructuous proceedingsjurisdiction of Rent Controllerquantum of rentlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller. The petitioner, a landlord, had two concurrent applications against the respondent/tenant: one under Section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for eviction due to default, and another under Section 14 of the same Ordinance for ejectment following the petitioner's retirement. The Section 14 application succeeded, and the tenant vacated the premises. However, the Rent Controller proceeded to determine the quantum of rent in the pending Section 13 application, despite the petitioner's objection that the application had become infructuous upon the vacation of the premises. The High Court upheld the Rent Controller's decision. The core legal question is whether a Rent Controller retains jurisdiction to determine ancillary matters, such as the quantum of rent, in an eviction application under Section 13 after the premises have already been vacated by the tenant. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether such an application becomes infructuous upon the vacation of the premises, necessitating a civil suit for rent recovery instead.

  Questions settled

  • Does an eviction application under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 become infructuous once the tenant vacates the premises?
  • Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to determine the quantum of rent in an eviction application after the tenant has already vacated the premises?
  • Must a landlord file a civil suit for recovery of rent if the eviction application becomes infructuous due to the tenant vacating the premises?
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• Central Government of Pakistan vs Sardar Fakhr E Alam And Another1986 SCMR 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-18
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationbuilding sitepotential valueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Central Government of Pakistan sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed its Regular First Appeal regarding land acquisition compensation. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts erred in determining the market value of the acquired land by treating it as a potential building site rather than agricultural 'Maira' land. The Collector had initially awarded compensation at a lower rate, disregarding the land's potential as a building site despite acknowledging surrounding commercial and residential development. The Senior Civil Judge, upon reference, enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,00,000 per Kanal based on evidence, including a local commissioner's report and testimony. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly examined the evidence, noting that the Collector failed to provide cogent reasons for excluding the land's potential as a building site. The Court affirmed that the factual determination of market value, supported by the record and evidence of comparable sales, did not warrant interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, upholding the enhanced compensation awarded to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can land acquired for public purposes be valued as a building site if its location and surrounding development indicate such potential?
  • Does the failure of a Land Acquisition Collector to provide cogent reasons for rejecting a specific valuation method justify judicial intervention?
  • Is a factual determination of market value by lower courts, based on evidence and local commissioner reports, subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Central Board Of Revenue And Another vs Khan MuhammadPTCL 1986 CL. 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  smugglingattempt versus preparationforeign currencyconfiscation of goodscustoms adjudicationconstitutional petitionconcurrent remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which accepted a constitutional petition and set aside the confiscation of foreign currency belonging to the respondent, an Afghan citizen in transit. The core legal question was whether the respondent's acts constituted an attempt to smuggle foreign currency out of Pakistan or amounted merely to preparation, and whether the constitutional petition was competent. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's act of boarding a domestic flight from Peshawar to Karachi was not an act sufficiently proximate to constitute an attempt to smuggle, but was at best mere preparation, which is not punishable as smuggling. The Court affirmed that there was no legal restriction on importing foreign currency into Pakistan and that departmental confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, concurrent remedies. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the distinction between preparation and an attempt to commit the offence of smuggling under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the definition of smuggling under Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969 include an attempt to bring in or take out goods?
  • Are departmental confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecution under the Customs Act mutually exclusive or independent concurrent remedies?
  • Does the possession of foreign currency imported into Pakistan without statutory restriction constitute the possession of smuggled goods?
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• Cementation Intrafor Limited And Another vs Indus Valley1986 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-29
  review petitionremand of casearbitration agreementappellate procedureerror apparent on the face of the recordSection 20 Arbitration Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 18-5-1982, which had allowed an appeal against a High Court order. The original dispute involved an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by the respondent to compel the filing of arbitration agreements in court. The High Court had initially accepted the petitioners' appeal solely on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not binding on one of the petitioners, without addressing other legal objections raised by the petitioners. The Supreme Court, in its 1982 judgment, reversed the High Court's finding on the arbitration agreement but failed to address the remaining unresolved legal contentions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it committed an error apparent on the face of the record by deciding the appeal in its entirety instead of remanding the case. The Court ruled that when an appellate court reverses a finding on a preliminary issue that led to the dismissal of an appeal, it must remand the case to the lower court to decide the remaining undecided questions of law and fact.

  Questions settled

  • When an appellate court reverses a finding on a preliminary issue that disposed of an appeal, is it required to remand the case for the determination of remaining undecided issues?
  • Does a failure by the Supreme Court to remand a case for the determination of outstanding legal questions constitute an error apparent on the face of the record?
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• Cantonment Executive Officer And Another vs Burshane (Pakistan)1986 SCMR 1308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-13
  octroi dutyCantonment Boards Act 1924LPG cylindersmetric conversiondefinition of userate enhancementrepetitive levy
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal concerning whether octroi duty was validly chargeable under a notification dated 31 May 1979 on empty liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders brought repeatedly into the Cantonment Board area for refilling. The respondent company challenged the levy, arguing that octroi duty was payable only once upon initial import, that the notification unlawfully enhanced octroi rates without complying with statutory procedures under Sections 61 and 62 of the Cantonment Boards Act 1924, and that temporary entry for refilling did not constitute 'use'. The High Court had invalidated the notification on the basis of an unprocedural rate enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, finding that the revision from Rs. 0.68 per maund to Rs. 0.02 per Kilo was merely a metric conversion pursuant to statutory conversion laws, not an enhancement requiring procedural compliance under Sections 61 and 62. The Court further held that 'use' denotes utilization for a purpose without requiring total consumption, making the cylinders subject to octroi duty each time they were brought into the cantonment limits for refilling.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of an octroi tax rate from imperial weight to metric units constitute a rate enhancement requiring statutory procedural compliance under the Cantonment Boards Act 1924?
  • Does bringing empty containers into a cantonment area repeatedly for the purpose of refilling constitute 'use' within the meaning of an octroi duty notification?
  • Is octroi duty payable repeatedly each time goods enter a cantonment area for utilization, or is it restricted to a single initial import?
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• Cajetan Pinto vs Dr. (Mrs.) Shirin1986 SCMR 1967 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-21
  ejectment proceedingsimpleadmentlocus standitenancy disputeconcurrent findingsquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against a third party, wherein the petitioner sought to be impleaded as a necessary party, claiming to be the actual tenant of the premises and asserting regular payment of rent to the respondent. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's application for impleadment, finding that the petitioner failed to establish the status of a tenant and lacked locus standi to participate in the proceedings. Subsequently, an ejectment order was issued against the original respondent. The petitioner challenged both the dismissal of the impleadment application and the ejectment order before the High Court, which dismissed the appeal due to a lack of cogent or satisfactory evidence proving the petitioner's tenancy. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether there were grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the determination of tenancy status is a question of fact, and finding no error in the concurrent decisions of the courts below, it dismissed the petition, thereby affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party be impleaded in ejectment proceedings without establishing a valid tenancy relationship?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding tenancy status?
  • Is a person who fails to prove tenancy entitled to join ejectment proceedings as a necessary party?
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• Brush Rehman Limited. vs Brush Electrical Engineering Company LimitedPTCL 1986 CL. 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  winding upprivate limited companysuspension of businessjust and equitablecompany petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal against the winding up of a private limited company. The company had suspended its manufacturing business since 1978, failed to hold general meetings, failed to audit accounts, and accumulated substantial liabilities, leading the minority shareholder to petition for its winding up under the Companies Act, 1913. Although the majority shareholders were granted time to resume production, they failed to do so. The Supreme Court considered whether the winding up order was legally sustainable under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1913. The Court held that the suspension of the company's business for a whole year provided a clear and sufficient statutory ground for winding up under Section 162 of the Companies Act, 1913, rendering the winding up order entirely legal and proper. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suspension of a company's business for a whole year constitutes a valid ground for its winding up under the Companies Act, 1913?
  • Can a winding up order be maintained when a private limited company has ceased production and failed to hold annual general meetings or audit its accounts?
  • Whether principles governing the dissolution of partnerships are applicable to the winding up of a private limited company?
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• Brush Rehman Limited vs Brush Electrical Engineering Company1986 SCMR 1612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  winding upprivate limited companysuspension of businessjust and equitablecompany lawinsolvency
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment ordering the winding up of a private limited company. The core legal question was whether the winding up was justified under the Companies Act, 1913, given the company's prolonged suspension of business, failure to hold statutory meetings, and financial insolvency, despite the petitioner's argument that the company could potentially resume operations. The Supreme Court upheld the winding-up order, finding that the company had suspended its business since 1978 and failed to recommence operations despite being granted multiple opportunities by the lower courts. The Court held that the winding-up order was legally sound and referable to the statutory provisions regarding the suspension of business. The key principle laid down is that where a company has suspended its business for a prolonged period and lacks the financial capacity to resume operations, the court is justified in ordering its winding up, regardless of the company's private status or arguments regarding potential future profitability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company be wound up under the Companies Act 1913 if it has suspended its business for a period exceeding one year?
  • Is the winding up of a private limited company permissible when the company has failed to hold annual general meetings or audit its accounts for several years?
  • Does the 'just and equitable' clause for winding up a company apply when the substratum of the company has effectively disappeared due to prolonged inactivity?
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• Brig. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum Khan vs Mst. Hanifan Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-09
  land settlementconstitutional petitionremand orderrebuttal evidenceleave to appealSettlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a constitutional petition arising from a land settlement dispute. The High Court had remanded the case for a fresh decision after excluding certain evidence, reasoning that the Settlement Commissioner, while admitting fresh evidence and allowing cross-examination, had failed to provide the respondent side an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal, rendering the order without lawful authority. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan identified significant legal questions regarding the Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction to admit additional evidence, the adequacy of the opportunity afforded for rebuttal, and whether the High Court should have decided the merits of the claims itself rather than remanding the matter. Finding the case fit for fuller examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and directed that the matter be prepared on the existing record with liberty for the parties to file additional documents, while also ordering the appeal to be fixed for hearing alongside a related matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to admit and record additional evidence during revision proceedings in a land settlement case?
  • Is a remand order by the High Court appropriate when a Settlement Commissioner fails to provide an opportunity for rebuttal evidence?
  • Should the High Court decide the merits of a claim itself rather than remanding the case for fresh decision when procedural irregularities occur in lower proceedings?
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• Boota And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidencecriminal convictionmurdervicarious liabilitySupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by several petitioners against their convictions and sentences for murder and related offences. The petitioners were tried and convicted under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 326/149, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving various sentences including life imprisonment and death sentences for the murders of Allah Ditta and Mst. Nooran, alongside sentences for causing injuries. Following the dismissal of their appeal by the High Court, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the evidence on record warranted a reappraisal by the apex court. The Supreme Court held that, upon considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not a fit case for the reappraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not undertake a reappraisal of evidence in criminal matters unless a compelling case for such review is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan routinely undertake a reappraisal of evidence in criminal appeals?
  • Is a case fit for reappraisal of evidence if the prosecution case rests on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses?
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• Bokhari Recruiting Agency vs Ministry of Labour And Manpower1986 SCMR 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  recruiting agentlicence renewalalternative remedyclean handsconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Messrs Bokhari Recruiting Agency, challenged the refusal of the respondent authorities to renew its recruiting agent's licence by filing a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the petitioner had failed to avail of the alternative remedy of an appeal provided under the rules, and that the petitioner had approached the court with unclean hands by concealing material facts regarding the knowledge and receipt of the refusal letter. In the petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined the findings of the High Court and concluded that the determination that the petitioner had knowledge of the refusal and had suppressed material facts was based on a rational appraisal of the record and supported by sufficient evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's refusal to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal principle established is that a writ petition under constitutional jurisdiction may be competently dismissed where the petitioner fails to approach the court with clean hands or bypasses an adequate alternative statutory remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 can be dismissed for failure to avail an alternative remedy of appeal?
  • Is a writ petition liable to dismissal when a petitioner conceals material facts and fails to approach the court with clean hands?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the knowledge of a refusal order, based on the record, be successfully challenged in a petition for special leave?
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• Bhai Khan vs Allah Bakhsh and Another1986 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-23
  pre-emptionappellate discretionextension of timedeposit of pre-emption moneystay ordercivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the claim conditional upon the deposit of pre-emption money by a specified date. The appellant challenged the decree in the appellate court, which initially granted a stay order that subsequently expired. Upon the final hearing, the appellant withdrew the appeal but requested an extension of time to deposit the pre-emption money, which the District Judge refused. The Lahore High Court affirmed this refusal, citing the appellant's gross negligence and mala fide conduct in prolonging the litigation. The core legal question was whether an appellate court is mandatorily required to grant reasonable time for depositing pre-emption money when dismissing an appeal. The Supreme Court held that while appellate courts possess the discretionary power to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money, this is not an absolute right. Such discretion may be withheld in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the conduct of the pre-emptor demonstrates negligence or bad faith. Consequently, the Court upheld the lower courts' refusal to extend the time.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court have the power to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when dismissing an appeal?
  • Is an appellate court mandatorily required to grant reasonable time for the deposit of pre-emption money in every case?
  • Can an appellate court refuse to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money based on the conduct of the appellant?
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• Begum Zaheerul Haq and Others vs CH. Muhammad Younus and Another1986 PLD Supreme Court 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-22
  civil reviewrent restrictionconflict of interestleave to appealappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition arises out of an order dismissing an appeal in a rent restriction matter. The primary contention raised by the applicant in person was that counsel for the respondent had previously represented the appellants in earlier proceedings, creating a conflict of interest, and secondly, that this Court failed to examine certain points ignored by the Additional District Judge despite leave to appeal being granted, arguing that the grant of leave opens the entire matter. The Court held that the power-of-attorney relied upon pertained to a distinct preceding case, negating any conflict of interest. Furthermore, while the Court possesses vast discretion to examine points even when leave was not specifically granted, it declined to consider points that were never raised before the High Court. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil review petition be entertained in the absence of a certificate of fitness signed by the Advocate?
  • Does the grant of leave to appeal automatically require the apex court to examine points not raised before the High Court?
  • Whether previous representation in a distinct preceding case constitutes a conflict of interest in current proceedings?
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• Ch. Muhammad Insha Ullah And Others vs Chief Conservator of Forests (P&E), Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 1600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-16
  civil servicepromotion rulesvested rightsqualification amendmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The private petitioners, who were directly recruited as Forest Rangers holding B.Sc. degrees in Forestry, and the official petitioner (the Government) challenged the Tribunal's decision which held that the respondents (promoted Forest Rangers holding only certificates) were entitled to be considered for promotion to Grade-17 under the rules in force at the time of their entry into service, notwithstanding subsequent amendments prescribing a degree in Forestry as a minimum qualification. The core legal question is whether a civil servant has a vested right to be governed in matters of future promotion by the rules in force at the time of their entry into service, or whether the Government retains the authority to alter such rules to meet changing administrative needs. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider this question, confirming the interim order in the meantime.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim a vested right to be governed in matters of future promotion by the rules in force at the time of their entry into service?
  • Is the Government precluded from altering service rules and qualifications for promotion to higher grades after a civil servant has entered service?
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• Bashir Beg vs Aftab Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 2011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-14
  petition for leave to appealcivil revisionlimitationgift deedappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which accepted a civil revision and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the respondents. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had filed a suit for ownership of a disputed property based on a written gift deed executed in consideration of her marriage to the petitioner's stepson. While the trial court decreed the suit, the appellate court set it aside holding the suit to be time-barred. The High Court accepted the civil revision and restored the trial court decree without adverting to the crucial question of limitation. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction by omitting to consider the question of limitation raised and decided by the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the omission of the limitation question requires further examination and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in revisional jurisdiction without addressing a material finding of the appellate court regarding limitation?
  • Does the omission of the appellate court's finding on time-barred claims warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
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• Bashir And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 2014 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  concurrent sentencesconsecutive sentencesinterested witnesscorroborationleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners were convicted by the trial court for murder and attempted murder, receiving sentences of life imprisonment and seven years' rigorous imprisonment, respectively. The Lahore High Court dismissed their appeal, affirming the convictions based on eye-witness testimony and corroborating medical and recovery evidence. The petitioners challenged the convictions in the Supreme Court, primarily arguing that the complainant was an interested witness and that the injury on one of the petitioners remained unexplained. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding the evidence well-discussed and the findings of the High Court sound. However, the petitioners further contended that the trial court failed to order the sentences to run concurrently, thereby implying consecutive sentences, which conflicts with statutory provisions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically on this point, noting that the issue of whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently requires examination under the relevant procedural law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sentences awarded for multiple offences must run concurrently or consecutively in the absence of a specific order by the trial court?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to specify that sentences are to run concurrently violate the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Bashir Ahmad Awan vs Additional Secretary And Another1986 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-05
  civil servantpromotioneligibilityrecruitment rulesservice tribunalseniority listleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Administrative Officer in the Deputy Commissioner's Office, Chilas, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as an Administrative Officer, was eligible for promotion to the post of Sub-Divisional Magistrate without satisfying the prescribed recruitment rules or passing the departmental examination. The Supreme Court held that the applicable promotion rules of 1973 restrict selections to specific categories such as Tehsildars, Public Prosecutors, and Lawyer Magistrates, and the petitioner failed to show that he fell within any of these specified categories. Furthermore, the court held that seniority lists and subsequent circulars regarding enquiry committee recommendations did not amend or override the governing recruitment rules to make Administrative Officers eligible. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, laying down the principle that eligibility for promotion is strictly governed by applicable recruitment rules and cannot be established merely through seniority lists or administrative circulars that do not amend those rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Administrative Officer is eligible for promotion as a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under the 1973 recruitment rules?
  • Can a seniority list override or control statutory recruitment rules for promotion?
  • Does an administrative circular implementing enquiry committee recommendations automatically alter statutory recruitment rules?
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• Bashir Ahmad And Others vs Muhammad Aslam And Another1986 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-04
  pre-emptionZar-e-Panjumrevisional jurisdictiondiscretionary powerextension of timejudicial application of mind
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by the petitioners regarding pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether the District Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, acted arbitrarily or beyond his discretion by setting aside the trial court's order, which had refused to extend the time for the deposit of Zar-e-Panjum under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the District Judge's exercise of discretion was neither fanciful nor arbitrary. The Court held that the trial court had acted arbitrarily by failing to properly apply its mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case when refusing the extension of time. The key principle laid down is that while revisional jurisdiction is discretionary, an appellate or revisional court is justified in correcting a trial court's order if that order was passed in a perfunctory manner without judicial application of mind to the individual circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revisional court set aside a trial court's discretionary order regarding the extension of time for depositing pre-emption money?
  • Does a trial court act arbitrarily if it refuses an extension of time for depositing Zar-e-Panjum without applying its mind to the specific facts of the case?
  • Is the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by a District Judge subject to interference if the discretion was exercised reasonably?
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• Barkat Ali vs The State1986 SCMR 1616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-21
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurderdeath sentenceeye-witness testimonyweapon recoverylimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by Barkat Ali against his conviction and sentence for the murder of his brother's wife, Mst. Allah Rakhi, who was killed after refusing to develop illicit relations with him. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the sole accused based on eye-witness testimony, medical evidence of multiple stab injuries, and the recovery of a blood-stained weapon. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on solid evidence, including two independent eye-witnesses and corroborative recovery of a blood-stained chhuri. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery, and independent witnesses have no motive for false implication, conviction for a heinous crime will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a jail petition barred by limitation can be dismissed on that ground?
  • Does the uncorroborated testimony of independent eye-witnesses suffice to maintain a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of guilt in a heinous murder case where guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Barkat Ali vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan1986 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-20
  evacuee propertysettlement of claimsadministrative lawleave to appealproperty transferinternal inconsistencydisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property located in Multan, involving conflicting claims between a claimant and a non-claimant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question involves the validity of an order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, which purportedly transferred the entire property to the claimant while simultaneously claiming to uphold a prior order that had actually directed the division of the property between the parties. The Supreme Court observed that the impugned order was internally contradictory, as it declared the property indivisible while referencing an order that mandated division, and further misattributed the authorship of the order it sought to uphold. Consequently, the Court held that the matter required further consideration due to these patent inconsistencies and factual errors in the administrative proceedings. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the legality of the administrative orders, and a status quo order was maintained pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a settlement authority pass an order that is internally contradictory regarding the divisibility of an evacuee property?
  • Does an administrative order that misattributes the authorship of a prior order it purports to uphold suffer from legal infirmity?
  • Is an ex parte order by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner a bar to passing a fresh order in subsequent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali And Another vs Ch. Fazal Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Bannu Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Pakistan Industrial Development1986 SCMR 1665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-10
  bank guaranteeinterim injunctiondiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appealencashment of bank guaranteecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Division Bench of the Sind High Court, which had affirmed a Single Judge's order dismissing the petitioner's application for an interim injunction. The petitioner sought to restrain the respondents from encashing a bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner during the pendency of the underlying suit. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in refusing to grant the temporary injunction to restrain the encashment of the bank guarantee. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts provided valid and cogent reasons for dismissing the application and that the impugned judgment was passed in a valid exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no legal error or grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by lower courts unless such discretion was exercised improperly or without valid legal basis.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by a lower court when valid and cogent reasons are provided?
  • Is a party entitled to an interim injunction to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee pending the disposal of a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. (Now National Bank Of Pakistan) vs Bahawalpur Cotton Company And Other1986 SCMR 1364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-02
  leave to appealdismissal in defaultnon-prosecutiondate of hearingrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a First Appeal from Order, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner bank's suit for recovery of approximately three-quarters of a crore rupees in default. The core legal question is whether a date fixed merely for the appearance of summoned defendants and potential arguments on an amendment application constitutes a 'hearing' for the purposes of dismissing a suit in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the proper interpretation of 'hearing' require detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution was legally sustainable under the cited provision. The key principle laid down is that a date set only for procedural steps such as service of defendants and preliminary arguments does not necessarily constitute a date of hearing warranting penal dismissal for default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a date fixed for the appearance of summoned defendants and arguments on an amendment application constitutes a 'hearing' under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a suit be validly dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on a date not fixed for hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhoo vs Mst. Khadija And Another1986 SCMR 1359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-16
  condonation of delaylimitationleave to appealappellate discretiontime-barred appealincapacity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal on the grounds of it being time-barred by 127 days. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, based on the petitioner's claim of illness. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's finding that the petitioner failed to provide reliable material to substantiate that the alleged illness rendered him incapacitated to the extent of being unable to file the appeal within the prescribed limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion soundly and provided valid, logical reasons for rejecting the application for condonation of delay. Consequently, the Court found the High Court's order unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that the appellate court's discretion to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, will not be interfered with when it is based on sound reasoning and a lack of evidence regarding the alleged incapacity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide reliable evidence of incapacity justify the refusal to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary order rejecting an application for condonation of delay if the order is based on sound reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahauddin Bhai vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner1986 SCMR 1037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-14
  evacuee propertyallotment of landauction of landsettlement schemeverified claimwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Peshawar High Court regarding the auction of agricultural land. The petitioner, a refugee claimant, had been allotted land in District D.I. Khan in lieu of his verified claims. Subsequently, a portion of this allotted land was treated as 'available unallotted land' and auctioned off to private respondents under Scheme II of 1976 framed pursuant to the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Law (Repeal) Act 1975. The core legal question is whether the disputed land could be legally regarded as 'available' for disposal through auction on the date it was transferred. The Supreme Court held that since the land had already been validly allotted to the petitioner and his claim verified, it did not constitute unallotted land under the relevant scheme and was thus outside the scope of disposal. The auction and subsequent orders were declared void and without legal effect. The key principle laid down is that evacuee land previously and validly allotted against verified claims does not fall within the definition of unallotted land available for auction under settlement schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land previously allotted against a verified claim can be treated as unallotted land available for auction under Scheme II of 1976?
  • Does the failure of an allottee to appear in person before a Deputy Settlement Commissioner justify dismissing an application challenging an auction when valid representation exists?
  • Whether settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to auction land that has already been permanently settled in favor of a claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• Babu Khan vs Amanat Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08
  leave to appealland inheritanceevacuee landMuslim Law of Inheritancerehabilitation and settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 22nd June 1977 of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal concerning a land inheritance dispute. The core legal question involved the correct distribution of shares in property left by the last male owner and allotted in Pakistan against verified claims following the death of multiple family members during disturbances. The Supreme Court considered the petitioner's contention based on a principle of Muslim Law of Inheritance regarding simultaneous deaths and the Digest of Muhammadan Law by Bailee. The Court held that the parties were correctly allocated shares in accordance with the applicable law relating to evacuee land under the Laws of Rehabilitation and Settlement, and that the petitioner failed to show any contravention of the relied-upon Muslim Law principles. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the distribution of evacuee land inheritance under the Laws of Rehabilitation and Settlement was defective in this case?
  • Does the simultaneous death of heirs contravene the established principles of Muslim Law of Inheritance regarding progeny shares?
  Read full judgment →
• Azizur Rahman And Others vs Muhammad Nawaz1986 SCMR 136(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-04
  pre-emptioninheritance of rightpersonal rightsuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the nature of the right of pre-emption. The core legal question presented is whether the right of pre-emption is an inheritable right that devolves upon heirs, or whether it constitutes a purely personal right that expires if not exercised by the original holder during their lifetime. The dispute arose when the respondent filed a suit for possession by pre-emption, claiming a superior right derived from his deceased father. While the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, the appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the right did not devolve. The High Court subsequently accepted the respondent's revision petition. Upon reviewing the contentions, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to definitively determine whether the right of pre-emption is inheritable under Muslim Law and the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, or if it remains a simple personal right.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right of pre-emption an inheritable right under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • Does the right of pre-emption devolve upon heirs if the original holder dies without exercising it?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ur Rehman And Others vs Ghulam Rasul And Other1986 SCMR 1274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-17
  evacuee propertyland allotmentwrit jurisdictionfinality of administrative ordersrehabilitation and settlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of agricultural land in Village Jaitheke, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot, originally belonging to an evacuee. The respondent, Guru Bakhsh Singh, who remained in Pakistan after his father and brother migrated to India, sought his one-half share of the property. Following various administrative proceedings, the Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) ordered the allotment of this share to the respondent. Although the land had been previously allotted to other parties, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner subsequently ordered the cancellation of those allotments to satisfy the respondent's entitlement, a decision upheld by the Member, Board of Revenue. When the petitioners challenged these cancellations via writ petitions, the High Court dismissed them, noting that the administrative orders had attained finality. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that the matter had reached a final conclusion and that the cancellation of the prior allotments could not be reopened or reviewed through writ jurisdiction, as the administrative decisions had become binding and final against the parties involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative order regarding land allotment that has attained finality be reopened through writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to challenge an administrative order against one party render that order final and binding against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Azad Khan Alias Azadai vs The State1986 SCMR 1171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealmurder convictionacquittal reversalsite plansubstantive evidencecorroborative evidencemedical evidenceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside an acquittal order by the Sessions Judge, Bannu, and convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s acquittal, based on alleged discrepancies in the site plan and the perceived unnatural conduct of witnesses, was legally sound. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's conviction. The Court held that a site plan does not constitute substantive evidence unless a witness is confronted with it to demonstrate a contradiction with their earlier statement. Furthermore, the Court ruled that minor inconsistencies regarding witness behavior or the positioning of parties do not undermine the prosecution's case when the testimony is corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the murder weapon. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts may reverse acquittals when the trial court's reasoning relies on trivial discrepancies rather than the substantive weight of the prosecution's evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a site plan considered substantive evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court reverse an acquittal order?
  • Does the recovery of a murder weapon corroborate eyewitness testimony?
  • Can minor discrepancies in witness statements regarding the positioning of parties invalidate a murder conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Attaullah Khan vs Jawaid Haider Kazmi And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-24
  anticipatory bailbail cancellationleave to appealcriminal procedureattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the respondents by the Sind High Court in a case registered under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents, thereby warranting interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order of the High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity or justification for interference, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary grant of pre-arrest bail by a high court unless a clear legal infirmity or lack of justification is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the grant of anticipatory bail by the High Court under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code without a showing of legal infirmity?
  • Can a complainant successfully seek cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted by the High Court if no legal infirmity is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs The State1986 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  criminal leave to appealbail applicationmurderjudicial discretionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the High Court dated 31-8-1985, which had dismissed his bail application in a criminal case registered under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly exercised its judicial discretion in refusing post-arrest bail to the accused. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and examining the impugned order, the Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit one for interference with the discretionary order passed by the High Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the lower court's refusal to grant bail. The key principle laid down is that the apex court will ordinarily not interfere with the discretionary exercise of judicial power by the High Court in bail matters unless a compelling ground for interference is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's exercise of judicial discretion in dismissing a bail application?
  • Is bail to be granted in a case falling under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as a matter of course?
  Read full judgment →
• Ataur Rehman Khan vs Dost Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-17
  proprietary rightsescheatmutation entriesrevenue recordsdeclaratory decreewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition challenging an order of the Board of Revenue. The dispute concerns land originally held by an occupancy tenant who acquired proprietary rights, which the State later treated as escheated State land and sold to the appellant. Meanwhile, private claimants obtained a civil court declaratory decree regarding the property based on a will and adoption, leading the Board of Revenue to cancel the land grant to the appellant. The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, holding that mutation entries are not title documents and cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that entries in revenue and mutation records are not title deeds and only serve evidentiary value, and that complex questions of title and the effect of a declaratory decree cannot be properly adjudicated within writ jurisdiction, which is reserved for courts of general jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in a mutation register and revenue records constitute documents of title?
  • Can questions of title and the effect of a declaratory decree be properly adjudicated in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the deposit of the amount of Malkana immediately vest proprietary rights with the transferee regardless of incorporation in revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Ur Rahman vs Mushtaq Ahmad Qureshi Through His Legal Heirs1986 SCMR 1082 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-14
  ejectment applicationpersonal requirementfraudCode of Civil ProcedureSind Rented Premises Ordinancelandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an ejectment order granted in favor of a landlord on the grounds of personal requirement. The petitioner sought to challenge the final judgment by alleging that the deceased landlord had committed fraud by misrepresenting his ownership of another property during the initial proceedings. The petitioner invoked Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, contending that the appellate court should have entertained an application to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud. The Supreme Court examined the evidence presented, specifically documents regarding property ownership dated years after the landlord’s death. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud, as the evidence did not demonstrate that the landlord possessed other suitable accommodation at the time of the ejectment application. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions without determining the legal question of whether Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to proceedings under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, as the factual foundation for such a claim was entirely absent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce evidence during trial that could have been obtained with due diligence entitle a party to reopen a case based on fraud?
  • Does the possession of other immovable property by a landlord necessarily disprove a claim of personal requirement for rented premises?
  • Can a judgment be challenged on the grounds of fraud under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without establishing a factual basis for the alleged fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad vs The State1986 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  rash and negligent drivingsingle witness testimonyreappraisal of evidencerevisional jurisdictioncriminal convictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition in limine regarding his conviction under sections 304-A and 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, a bus driver, was convicted for rash and negligent driving resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to another. The core legal question was whether the testimony of a single injured eye-witness, when other witnesses were declared hostile, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, and whether the High Court erred in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, affirming that the statement of a single witness, if qualitatively sufficient, is legally adequate to support a conviction. The Court refused to interfere, noting that the petitioner's arguments merely sought a reappraisal of evidence already examined by lower courts, which does not constitute a valid question of law. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of a single witness may qualitatively suffice for conviction, and the Supreme Court will not re-evaluate evidence already satisfactorily appraised by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of a single witness be sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction?
  • Does a request for the reappraisal of evidence already examined by lower courts constitute a valid question of law for the Supreme Court?
  • Is a conviction based on the testimony of a single witness legally valid when other witnesses have been declared hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad vs Karim Bakhsh1986 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-22
  pre-emptionwaiversecond appealquestion of lawadmitted facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against an order of the High Court which dismissed a pre-emptor's suit after finding that the circumstances of the case amply supported an inference of waiver against him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as a pre-emptor, could be considered to have abandoned his right through waiver, and whether the High Court could interfere with findings in a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly examined the matter because the legal inference arising from admitted facts regarding waiver amounts to a question of law rather than a pure question of fact, thereby justifying interference in second appeal. The Court laid down the principle that the determination of whether admitted facts constitute a waiver of a right is a question of law open to examination in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inference of waiver can be drawn from admitted facts in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can a finding regarding waiver based on admitted facts be examined in a second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Farooq And Other1986 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-15
  acquittalbenefit of doubtinterested witnessesappreciation of evidencecorroborationleave to appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted two respondents previously convicted of murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence by rejecting the testimony of prosecution witnesses and granting the respondents the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court examined the High Court's findings, which determined that the alleged eye-witnesses were interested witnesses requiring corroboration that was not provided, and that the presence of a third witness was doubtful as he was not named in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding no error of law or violation of settled principles of evidence appreciation in the High Court's judgment. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses are deemed interested and lack necessary corroboration, and where the presence of additional witnesses is doubtful, the appellate court is justified in extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused, leading to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court acquit an accused if the prosecution witnesses are found to be interested and lack corroboration?
  • Is the testimony of an eye-witness who was not named in the First Information Report liable to be excluded on grounds of propriety and safety?
  • Does the failure to point out an error of law or violation of settled principles of evidence appreciation justify the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam Khan vs Karim Bakhsh (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs And Other1986 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-10
  pre-emptiontenantleave to appealMisl-e-Haqiatpossessionprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a High Court judgment that denied the petitioner's right to pre-empt a sale based on their status as a tenant. The core legal questions presented for the Court's consideration involve whether the High Court erred in its reliance on the precedent established by the Shariat Bench in Haji Naimatullah Khan and another v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Law (PLD 1979 Pesh. 104) to disqualify the petitioner from exercising the right of pre-emption. Furthermore, the Court is tasked with determining whether the High Court failed to properly evaluate the petitioner's actual possession of the property, particularly in contrast to the official entries recorded in the Misl-e-Haqiat, at the time of the sale and during the subsequent enforcement of the pre-emption right. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, directing that the appeal be heard on the existing record while permitting the parties to submit additional documentation, and ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession pending the final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the decision in Haji Naimatullah Khan and another v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Law (PLD 1979 Pesh. 104) preclude a tenant from exercising the right of pre-emption?
  • Should actual possession be considered superior to entries in the Misl-e-Haqiat when determining the right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad vs The State1986 SCMR 1204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-15
  criminal appealinstigationgrievous hurtconcurrent findingssentence reductionappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the conviction of the appellant under Section 326 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the evidence on record was of sufficient quality to sustain the appellant's conviction for instigating the principal offenders who inflicted grievous injuries on the complainant. The trial court and the appellate court concurrently accepted the testimony of the prosecution witnesses attributing the role of instigation to the appellant. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any error in the lower courts' appraisal of evidence, the concurrent findings regarding guilt must be maintained. However, considering the passage of approximately nine years since the incident, the Court adopted a lenient view regarding the substantive sentence, reducing it to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine and the sentence in default thereof. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with the specified modification to the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence of instigation is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 326 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the courts below in the absence of an error in the appraisal of evidence?
  • Whether the passage of a long period of time in litigation can be a ground for reducing the substantive sentence while maintaining the conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Arbab Fazalur Rehman Khan And Others vs Collector, Acquisition1986 SCMR 1118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-16
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationadjoining villagesreference to civil courtcompulsory acquisition charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the determination of compensation for land acquired in villages Tehkal Bala and Achini Payan for establishing industrial estates. The Land Acquisition Collector had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,000 per acre. Upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Senior Civil Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 16,000 per acre based on evidence of sales and awards in adjoining villages, as no sales had occurred in the acquired villages due to statutory bans. The High Court reversed this decision and restored the Collector's award, drawing comparisons to land prices in Punjab colony districts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on irrelevant considerations and its rejection of proper evidence of neighboring transactions was unjustified. The Court laid down the principle that where direct evidence of sales in the acquired locality is absent due to legal restrictions, reliable evidence of sales and market values in adjacent villages is legally relevant and admissible for assessing fair compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evidence of sales in adjoining villages is admissible for determining market value when no sales have taken place in the acquired village?
  • Can the High Court set aside a well-reasoned assessment of land compensation by a civil court based on irrelevant considerations?
  • What is the proper method for assessing market value under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when the local area lacks recent sale transactions?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwarul Haq And Others vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  land allotmentdisplaced personsfinality of ordersrehabilitation commissionerres judicataadministrative review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to displaced persons following the partition of the sub-continent. The core legal question was whether the appeal filed by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Gul Muhammad, against the allotment of land to the appellants' predecessor, Fateh Muhammad, was dismissed or allowed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner on 12-7-1956. The Supreme Court found that the record, including the respondents' own previous admissions in revision proceedings, conclusively established that the appeal was dismissed on 12-7-1956, rendering that order final. The Court held that the subsequent administrative attempts to cancel the appellants' long-standing, confirmed allotment based on a misrepresentation that the 1956 appeal had been allowed were legally invalid. The Court affirmed that once an allotment is confirmed and an appellate order rejecting a challenge to it attains finality, subordinate authorities lack the jurisdiction to reopen the matter or review such orders. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the Settlement authorities and the High Court, restoring the appellants' title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative authority has the jurisdiction to review or set aside a final order passed by a predecessor in interest?
  • Can a party rely on a misrepresented appellate order to seek the cancellation of a confirmed land allotment?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner attain finality if not challenged further?
  • Is an allotment of land, once confirmed and maintained by appellate authorities, subject to reopening based on subsequent misrepresentations of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Masih vs Ghulam Masih And Other1986 SCMR 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-07
  condonation of delaytime-barred petitionappeal against acquittalenhancement of sentencelimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the convictions of the respondents in a murder case. Specifically, the High Court had converted the convictions of two respondents from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304 Part-I, and altered the convictions of two other respondents from Section 302 to Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in reduced sentences. The petitioner sought to challenge these acquittals under Section 302 and requested an enhancement of the sentences. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was filed with a delay of 207 days. Upon reviewing the application for condonation of delay, the Court found the provided grounds unconvincing. The Court held that in cases involving appeals against acquittal, the threshold for condoning delay is significantly higher, requiring very strong grounds which were absent in this instance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition on the sole ground that it was time-barred, without addressing the merits of the conviction modifications.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay of 207 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal generally condonable without strong grounds?
  • Does the standard for condoning delay differ in cases involving appeals against acquittal compared to other matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Khan And Another vs Mst. Hashmate And Other1986 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertysettlement lawsrural evacuee buildingcharacter of landconstitutional petitionfinality of adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the appellants were lawfully entitled to the transfer of a rural evacuee building site under Settlement Scheme No. VII based on long-standing possession since 1951, and whether the Lahore High Court was justified in dismissing their constitutional petition. The core legal questions involve the finality of prior adjudications by competent settlement authorities, the determination of the character of land under the relevant settlement laws, and the extent of interference permissible in findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to challenge earlier adverse orders of the settlement hierarchy, and that the character of the land is determined by its actual use rather than the original intention of its sale. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the High Court's judgment that factual findings regarding the nature of land cannot be lightly disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the character of land under settlement laws is determined by the intention of its sale or its actual use?
  • Can revenue authorities alter the nature of land previously determined by competent settlement authorities?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the nature of land recorded by settlement authorities can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Hussain vs Allah Bux1986 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-09
  Benami transactionremand ordercivil revisionappellate jurisdictionleave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his revision petition. The dispute originated from a civil suit regarding the title and possession of urban property, which the respondent claimed was a Benami transaction. Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the appellate court reversed this, finding the transaction Benami. A subsequent High Court remand order directed the appellate court to record additional evidence specifically regarding whether the respondent paid the sale consideration through cheques, stipulating that the respondent's claim would succeed only if such payment was proven. Upon remand, the appellate court found the entire price was paid, though partly by cash, and upheld the Benami finding. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's subsequent revision, rejecting the argument that the appellate court exceeded the remand order's scope. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the case requires examination of whether a court can exceed the specific limits of a remand order and whether a party can succeed by setting up a case inconsistent with their initial oral testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court exceed the specific limits prescribed by a remand order?
  • Is a party precluded from challenging the correctness of a remand order if they participated in proceedings pursuant to it?
  • Can a party succeed in a claim by setting up a case that contradicts their own initial oral testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ansar Ahmed vs Jawed Salahjee1986 SCMR 1695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-02
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementdefault in electric chargeslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which set aside the eviction order passed against the respondent-tenant by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had initially ordered eviction on the grounds of default in electric charges and the landlord's bona fide personal requirement for his large family. The High Court reversed this decision, holding that the personal requirement plea lacked bona fides because a portion of the premises had been utilized to run a hosiery factory and a son occupied another portion that fell vacant during the proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in reversing the Rent Controller's finding on personal requirement based on a misapprehension of facts regarding the timing of the hosiery factory's establishment and the sufficiency of the remaining accommodation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the evidence and factual appreciation warranted consideration on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in reversing a Rent Controller's finding of bona fide personal requirement based on the establishment of a business in a portion of the premises?
  • Does the availability of additional accommodation falling vacant during ejectment proceedings negate the landlord's claim of insufficient residential space for a large family?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan vs The State1986 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-17
  murderdeath sentenceacquittalpetition for leave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  Amir Khan and his brother Dilawar Khan were tried for the murder of Walayat Khan. The trial court convicted Amir Khan and sentenced him to death while acquitting Dilawar Khan. The High Court dismissed Amir Khan's appeal and confirmed his death sentence, and also dismissed the State's appeal against Dilawar Khan's acquittal. Both Amir Khan and the complainant filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding the guilt of the convict and the propriety of the co-accused's acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in appreciating the evidence or applying legal principles, finding the reasoning unexceptionable. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, affirming both the conviction and the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court erred in confirming the death sentence of the petitioner?
  • Whether the acquittal of the co-accused was erroneous and caused a miscarriage of justice?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the appreciation of evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan And Others vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-02
  leave to appealmurdersuppression of injuriesenmityappraisal of evidenceco-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the death sentence of petitioner Amir Khan for murder but acquitted his co-accused of the murder charge while sentencing them to time served for attempted murder. The prosecution's case was that the accused party launched an armed attack due to prior enmity, resulting in one death and injuries to others. The petitioner argued that the prosecution suppressed a material circumstance, namely, that two individuals from the accused party had sustained significant firearm injuries during the same occurrence, which were not mentioned in the First Information Report. The High Court had dismissed these injuries as insignificant or self-suffered. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine whether the suppression of injuries on the accused party affected the credibility of the prosecution's case, and to reappraise the evidence regarding the culpability of all the accused. Bailable warrants were issued for the acquitted co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution's failure to explain or mention significant firearm injuries sustained by the accused party during the same occurrence?
  • Can injuries on the accused party be summarily dismissed as self-suffered without proper medical and evidentiary analysis?
  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused on a murder charge requires reappraisal by the appellate court when a cross-case and suppressed injuries are established?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Hussain Shah (Deceased Through Legal Heirs) And Others vs Umra1986 SCMR 800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-08
  limitation actcondonation of delayregular second appealtrial court judgmentsufficient causecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses twelve petitions for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of Regular Second Appeals by the Lahore High Court as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the trial Court's judgment—made mandatory to file along with a second appeal under a Lahore High Court amendment to Order XLII, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure—can be excluded or condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that although such time cannot be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the mandatory requirement to file the trial Court's judgment constitutes 'sufficient cause' under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the entire period spent in obtaining that copy, and no further daily explanation of delay is required once that period is allowed. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeals, set aside the High Court's dismissal, condoned the delay, and remanded the matters for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the trial Court's judgment required under High Court rules can be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is an appellant required to explain each day's delay after obtaining the necessary copy of the trial Court's judgment for a second appeal?
  • Does an amendment to the High Court rules requiring a copy of the trial Court's judgment have the effect of amending the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Abdullah Khan And Others vs Col. Muhammad Attaullah Khan1986 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-24
  land disputepre-emptionJamabandiAala MalkiatAdnaa MalkiatKhasra numbersleave to appealland entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal regarding a land dispute involving the accurate calculation of land area and ownership rights following a pre-emption decree. The core legal question is whether the total land area sold by the original owner, Ram Singh, and subsequently pre-empted, was correctly calculated, or if the respondent erroneously double-counted specific land parcels as both Aala and Adnaa Malkiat, thereby depriving the petitioners of their rightful entitlement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioners presented an arguable case. The Court observed that the Khasra numbers in the sale deed and the pre-emption decree consistently supported the petitioners' contention that the total land area was 6,638 Kanals and 4 Marlas, suggesting the respondent's calculation was flawed. The Court established that where documentary evidence, such as Khasra numbers in sale deeds and judicial decrees, consistently defines the extent of land transferred, such evidence must be reconciled to determine the correct entitlement, preventing the erroneous deprivation of property rights based on flawed administrative record corrections.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party double-count land area by classifying the same parcel as both Aala and Adnaa Malkiat in a property dispute?
  • Does the consistency of Khasra numbers in sale deeds and pre-emption decrees establish the total land area transferred?
  • Is a correction of Jamabandi entries based on a review application valid if it contradicts the established land area in a pre-emption decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanat Ali vs The State1986 SCMR 1558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-18
  abductionkidnappingappreciation of evidencedetermination of agebirth certificatecriminal revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a criminal revision petition and upholding the conviction of the petitioner under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner had abducted and raped the victim, who was under sixteen years of age. While the appellate court acquitted the petitioner of the rape charge, it maintained his conviction for abduction based on a finding of fact regarding the victim's age, supported by a birth entry certificate rather than medical opinion. The core legal question concerned the proper appreciation of evidence regarding the victim's age as between the birth certificate and medical testimony. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no legal infirmity in preferring the birth certificate over the medical evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a birth entry constitutes reliable evidence of age.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a birth certificate can be preferred over medical opinion for determining the age of a victim in a criminal case?
  • Does the conviction under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustain when the victim is proved to be under sixteen years of age?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding age appreciation based on documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain And Another Muhammad Hussain vs Additional District1986 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar vs The State1986 SCMR 1549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-16
  leave to appealcross-versionmurderself-defencemedical evidencereappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Allah Yar against the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court, which maintained his conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the confirmation of his death sentence for the murder of Mohabat. The core legal question involves determining the plausibility and correctness of competing versions of a cross-firing incident where both the prosecution and the defence presented identical timelines and motives, but each claimed the other was the aggressor, alongside contentions regarding medical evidence and weapon ballistics. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that it is a fit case to consider whether the defence version was reasonably possible and whether the High Court's reasons for rejecting it were correct, thereby necessitating a reappraisal of the evidence. The key principle laid down is that where cross-versions exist with identical circumstances and disputed aggression, the appellate court must carefully weigh the plausibility of both accounts and the medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to reappraise evidence when both prosecution and defence present competing versions of a cross-firing incident?
  • How should competing versions of an occurrence with identical timelines and motives be evaluated by the court?
  • Does a single gunshot wound penetration through a body necessarily indicate the use of a rifle rather than a shotgun under specific ballistic and medical parameters?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar Khan vs Mst. Sardar Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 1957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-10
  Colonization of Government Lands ActSection 19consent decreecollusion and fraudLetters Patent Appealtenancy rightsproprietary rightslimitation abandoned
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over tenancy land originally governed by the Colonization of Government Lands Act. The petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest had obtained a consent decree in 1935 against a deceased tenant's widow for half of the tenancy land without obtaining permission under Section 19 of the Act, and subsequently acquired proprietary rights from the Government. Following the widow’s death, the original tenant’s legal heir challenged the consent decree on grounds of fraud and collusion. Concurrent findings held that the decree was a collusive and void transfer executed in violation of statutory restrictions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued limitation and contended that the subsequent Government conveyance protected his title. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that limitation, having been abandoned before the Letters Patent Bench, could not be entertained. Furthermore, because the subsequent Government sale was solely premised on the void and collusive consent decree, setting aside the decree entirely demolished the basis of the transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation be entertained by a higher appellate forum if it was abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate forum?
  • Whether a consent decree transferring tenancy rights without statutory permission under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act is void for collusion and fraud?
  • Does a subsequent grant or sale of proprietary rights by the Government remain valid if the underlying consent decree upon which it was based is declared void and set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar Alias Yara And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1110 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidencecriminal petitionconvictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Allah Yar alias Yara and others against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which convicted the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether it is appropriate to reappraise evidence and reverse concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below in a petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is not proper to enter into the exercise of reappraising evidence and reversing findings of facts under the circumstances. The petition was accordingly dismissed as having no force. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact of lower courts in criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence on the record in a petition for leave to appeal against conviction?
  • Can findings of fact arrived at by the courts below be reversed by the Supreme Court through a re-examination of evidence in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Wasaya vs Sarfraz Hussain And Another1986 SCMR 1699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-26
  transfer of criminal caseleave to appealfair trialjudicial biaswitness productioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which rejected the petitioner's application to transfer a criminal trial pending under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from the court of an Additional Sessions Judge in Multan. The petitioner, a complainant, sought the transfer on grounds that the trial record was not being maintained faithfully and that the presiding judge had improperly influenced the District Attorney to abandon certain witnesses, thereby creating an apprehension of an unfair trial. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the allegations regarding the maintenance of the record were raised for the first time in the transfer application. Furthermore, the Court held that the decision to produce or abandon witnesses lies within the discretion of the District Attorney, and such actions cannot be attributed to judicial influence without evidence. Finding the petitioner's apprehensions unjustified, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that the grounds presented did not warrant the transfer of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal trial be transferred based on allegations of improper record-keeping raised for the first time in a transfer application?
  • Does the decision of a District Attorney to abandon certain witnesses constitute evidence of judicial influence by the presiding judge?
  • What is the standard for justifying the transfer of a criminal case based on an apprehension of an unfair trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Sialkot And Another1986 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07
  settlement proceedingstransfer of propertyremand directionsexcess areaauction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court arising from settlement proceedings concerning the transfer of a disputed property plot. The core legal question was whether the recalled excess area could be transferred to the appellant instead of being put to auction. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner failed to fully follow the remand directions of the Additional Settlement Commissioner regarding the disposal and demarcation of the balance area. Holding that the appellant was entitled to the balance area in accordance with the remand directions and settlement schemes, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed that the excess area be disposed of in favour of the appellant against his form.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recalled excess area could be transferred to the petitioner instead of being put to auction?
  • Did the Deputy Settlement Commissioner act in violation of the directions given by the Additional Settlement Commissioner in the remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha And Others vs Boota Khan1986 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-04
  pre-emptioncourt-feevaluation of suitrejection of plaintlimitationnet profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which remanded a pre-emption suit after setting aside the trial court's dismissal of the suit as time-barred for deficiency in court-fees. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption suit could be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 where a plaintiff paid substantial court-fee based on a calculation of net profits, but the trial court later determined a higher valuation based on figures provided by the revenue authorities and the defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal both on merits and as barred by time, holding that where substantial court-fee has been paid and a genuine calculation was made, a discrepancy in valuation between the parties does not warrant the rejection of the plaint. The Court applied the principles established in prior precedents regarding court-fee calculations in pre-emption suits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit can be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for deficient court-fee when the plaintiff has paid substantial court-fee based on a calculation of net profits?
  • Does a discrepancy between the plaintiff's and defendant's calculations of net profits for court-fee valuation render the suit liable to dismissal as time-barred?
  • Whether an appeal filed 137 days beyond the period of limitation is liable to dismissal on the ground of being time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha And 3 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-16
  grievous hurtcommon intentionmisapplication of sectionprejudice to accusedsentencingblunt weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the convictions and sentences of the petitioners for their involvement in a violent attack on the complainant, Akhtar Jillani. The petitioners were originally convicted by a Magistrate for attempted murder and other offences, but the High Court altered the conviction to causing grievous hurt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners' conviction under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code was legally sustainable given that the grievous injuries were inflicted by blunt weapons, rather than sharp-edged instruments as required by that section. The Supreme Court held that while the petitioners' contention regarding the misapplication of Section 326 was technically correct—as that section pertains to sharp-edged weapons—no prejudice was caused to the petitioners. The sentences imposed were well within the maximum limits prescribed for the appropriate offence of causing grievous hurt under Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the sentences were not excessive given the brutality of the attack.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained if the grievous injury was caused by a blunt weapon?
  • Does a conviction under an incorrect section of the Pakistan Penal Code warrant interference if the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum punishment for the correct offence?
  • Is the conviction of an accused under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code legally valid when the injury was caused by a blunt weapon rather than a sharp-edged instrument?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State1986 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-31
  criminal appealleave to appealdeath sentencemurderappraisal of evidencecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed from jail by Allah Ditta, who was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death for the murder of his cousin Walidad, committed due to a motive arising from a matrimonial dispute. The core legal questions involve the proper appraisal of ocular and circumstantial evidence for the safe administration of criminal justice, particularly in light of an antecedent murder charge involving the petitioner arising from the same transaction or background, and whether the death penalty is warranted under such circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal after condoning an 11-day delay due to the capital nature of the sentence and the petitioner's incarceration, holding that the complex factual background and features of the case require a thorough examination and reappraisal of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 satisfy the accepted principles for the safe administration of criminal justice based on the provided evidence?
  • Whether the sentence of death is appropriately imposed in a case where the accused has a complex background involving a simultaneous or antecedent murder allegation?
  • Whether delay in filing a jail petition for leave to appeal can be condoned when the petitioner is sentenced to death and incarcerated?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Khadim Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-17
  bail cancellationleave to appealdiscretionary powerNikahnamaOffence of Zinacriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had refused to cancel the bail granted to the respondents. The respondents were accused in a case registered under Section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The Sessions Judge had initially granted bail, finding it difficult to reject a Nikahnama registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, at that preliminary stage of the proceedings. The High Court declined to interfere with this exercise of discretion, noting that the lower court's order did not suffer from any illegality. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the arguments presented by the petitioner to be identical to those previously raised before the High Court. Agreeing with the reasoning of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower court in granting bail. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision to maintain the bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court should interfere with the discretion of a Sessions Judge in granting bail when no illegality is shown?
  • Can a court at the bail stage reject a registered Nikahnama under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta Khokhar And Others vs The Province of Punjab And Another1986 SCMR 1293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-06
  land acquisitionhousing schemeFederal Capital Territoryprovincial lawsleave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, concerning the acquisition of 50 acres of land in village Gangal under Section 3 of the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973 for an Area Development Scheme. The petitioners challenged the acquisition on the ground that the land fell within an area covered by a presidential directive altering the boundaries of the Federal Capital Territory, whereas the High Court held the provincial acquisition valid in the absence of a formal notification under Section 3 of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. The Supreme Court considered whether land subject to a presidential directive regarding the Federal Capital Territory could validly be acquired under provincial legislation. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine this legal question alongside other grounds, maintaining the interim relief subject to future orders under relevant laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land situated in an area designated to form part of the Federal Capital Territory under a presidential directive can be acquired under a provincial housing statute?
  • Whether a formal notification under Section 3 of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 is necessary to bar land acquisition under provincial law?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And Others vs Malik Ijaz Hussain1986 SCMR 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-13
  alternative remedyexhaustion of remedieswrit jurisdictionland reformsrevisional jurisdictionfederal land commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two consolidated civil petitions for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court concerning land surrendered under the Land Reforms Regulation. The core legal question is whether the High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition directly challenging an order of the Additional Chief Land Commissioner on the ground that the petitioners failed to exhaust the alternative remedy of a revision before the Federal Land Commission. The Supreme Court held that while the availability of an alternative remedy does not absolutely bar the High Court from entertaining a writ petition, the High Court is not bound to entertain it and may legitimately refuse to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction when an adequate alternative remedy has not been exhausted. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction is properly withheld where an aggrieved party bypasses an available, adequate statutory remedy such as a revision before a specialized appellate or supervisory body.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to exercise the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Land Commission constitutes a sufficient ground for dismissing a writ petition?
  • Does the failure to have recourse to a revisional remedy necessarily operate as a bar to the invocation of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the High Court bound to entertain a writ petition when an adequate alternative remedy remains available to the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And Others vs Ataullah Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  pecuniary jurisdictionpre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrevision petitionconstitutional petitionjurisdictional defectrejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that declared a District Judge's order to be without lawful authority due to a lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The underlying dispute involved a pre-emption suit where the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to make up a deficiency in court-fee, a decision challenged by the defendant-vendees in revision before the District Judge. The District Judge accepted the revision and rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court subsequently set aside the District Judge's order, ruling that the revision was incompetent because the subject matter exceeded the District Judge's pecuniary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the District Judge lacked the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The Court further noted that the petitioners' arguments regarding the contumacious conduct of the plaintiffs were insufficient to override the jurisdictional defect. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, reinforcing the principle that orders passed without pecuniary jurisdiction are void.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Judge have the authority to entertain a revision petition when the subject matter of the suit exceeds their pecuniary jurisdiction?
  • Can an order passed by a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction be sustained on the basis of acquiescence by the parties?
  • Is a High Court's declaration that a lower court's order was without lawful authority due to jurisdictional defects legally sound?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And Another vs The Province of Sind1986 SCMR 1324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04
  service tribunaldepartmental inquirycompulsory retirementpolice misconductbias and dictationjoint board of inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal dismissing appeals filed by two police personnel against their compulsory retirement from service. The appellants, a Police Constable and an Assistant Sub-Inspector, were involved in an altercation with two Air Force officers during Eid shopping patrol duties, leading to a preliminary investigation by a Joint Board of Inquiry and subsequent departmental proceedings where they were found guilty of misconduct. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the departmental inquiry and subsequent findings were vitiated because the Air Force Base Commander had directed that severe disciplinary action be taken, thereby allegedly depriving the police authorities of independent discretion. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' case was not prejudiced by bias or dictation, as formal charge-sheets were served, proper inquiry proceedings with opportunities for defense were conducted in compliance with the Inspector-General of Police's orders, and dissent within the Joint Board of Inquiry demonstrated independent functioning. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental disciplinary proceedings are vitiated when a preliminary inquiry report contains recommendations by a military authority for severe action?
  • Did the Service Tribunal err in failing to consider whether departmental authorities acted under the dictation of external authorities?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere under Article 212 of the Constitution with the quantum of punishment awarded in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta And 2 Others vs Taj Din And 3 Other1986 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-24
  declaratory suitsale of landgift deeddelivery of possessionColonization of Government Lands Actproprietary rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over land ownership between the original owner's alleged vendees and donees. The core legal questions were whether the sale agreement violated Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, and whether the respondents' suit for a declaration of ownership was properly framed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. It held that the sale agreement was valid because the necessary sanction from the competent authority had been obtained, thereby satisfying the requirements of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. Furthermore, the Court determined that the gift deed in favor of the appellants was invalid due to the absence of delivery of possession. The Court affirmed that a suit for declaration is maintainable where the plaintiff has established a valid sale and possession, and that technical defects in the form of a suit do not necessarily invalidate the proceedings when the substantive rights of the parties are clear and the sale is legally sanctioned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of delivery of possession render a gift deed invalid?
  • Is an agreement to sell land void under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, if the necessary sanction has been obtained?
  • Can a suit for declaration be maintained to establish proprietary rights in land?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dee vs Hashmat1986 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-02
  permanent injunctionproperty disputeprivacy rightsencroachmentcivil revisionpleadingssettlement of displaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision regarding a suit for permanent injunction. The dispute concerned the respondent's construction of a wall and placement of a door between two adjacent houses transferred under the Settlement of Displaced Persons laws. The petitioner sought an injunction, alleging the construction infringed upon his property and privacy. The trial court initially decreed the suit based on a Local Commissioner's report, but the Appellate Court reversed this, finding the construction occurred within the respondent's own boundaries and caused no actionable injury to the petitioner's privacy. The High Court affirmed this, noting the wall was an extension of an existing structure and that the petitioner's claim regarding encroachment on his land was not pleaded in the original plaint. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no evidence of a real grievance or legal injury caused by the respondent's actions. The petition was dismissed as the petitioner failed to demonstrate any infringement of rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of land encroachment in a revision petition if it was not pleaded in the original plaint?
  • Does the construction of a door in a wall, which does not encroach on a neighbor's land, constitute an actionable infringement of privacy?
  • Is a party entitled to an injunction if they cannot demonstrate a real grievance or legal injury resulting from the respondent's actions?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad vs Muhammad Khan1986 SCMR 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  pre-emptionorder of successionMuslim Lawresiduarydistant kindredsuperior rightleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the petitioner, the sister's son of the vendor (a distant kindred), challenged the superior pre-emption right decreed in favor of respondent No. 1, the vendor's brother's son (a residuary). The core legal question was whether the order of succession under Muslim Law determines the priority of pre-emption rights under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, holding that under Section 15(b) thirdly of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, the right of pre-emption is determined by the order of succession. Because a residuary excludes a distant kindred from inheritance under Muslim Law, the respondent possessed a superior right of pre-emption over the petitioner. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the analogy of inheritance is directly applicable to pre-emption claims under the relevant statutory provision when the vendor is a Muslim.

  Questions settled

  • Does a residuary under Muslim Law possess a superior right of pre-emption over a distant kindred under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Is the order of succession under Muslim Law applicable to determine the priority of pre-emptors under Section 15(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bux Muhammad Ashraf And Others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamic Republic of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh And Others vs Mst. Irshad Begum And Other1986 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01
  compromise decreefraud and misrepresentationpower of attorneylimitation periodbona fide purchaserleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld decisions setting aside a compromise decree obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had appointed an attorney, who subsequently sold land and entered into a compromise decree with the petitioners. In 1983, the respondents filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the 1971 decree. The trial court, district court, and High Court all ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that the attorney lacked valid title at the time of the purported sale and that the decree was vitiated by fraud. The Supreme Court considered whether the application under Section 12(2) was time-barred and whether the petitioners were bona fide purchasers. The Court held that since the decree was secured through fraud, limitation ran from the date of knowledge under Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908, making the application timely. The Court affirmed that an attorney without title cannot pass a better title, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is within time when filed within the period prescribed from the date of knowledge of fraud under section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can an attorney pass a better title to a property than what he has matured in his own name?
  • Whether a decree obtained through fraud and misrepresentation can be set aside upon an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh And 4 Others vs Dr. Waheed (Abdul Waheed)1986 SCMR 1677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-17
  landlord and tenantevictionrent controllerjural relationshippetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sind High Court dated 9-12-1985, which set aside an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller against the respondent. The core legal question was whether a relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties to warrant an order of eviction under rent laws. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had correctly found that no agreement of tenancy or rent receipt was produced, and the Rent Controller's finding of a landlord-tenant relationship was presumptive and without evidence. During the hearing, the respondent maintained that he was the owner of the property by purchase and not a tenant, prompting the petitioners' counsel to seek permission to withdraw the petition to pursue a fresh suit or proceedings in a competent court of law. The Supreme Court granted permission and dismissed the petition as withdrawn, thereby upholding the principle that an owner of a property is not necessarily a landlord under rent law unless the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is duly established by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether every owner of a property is necessarily a landlord within the meaning of rent law vis-a-vis a person occupying the property?
  • Is it necessary to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant by producing an agreement of tenancy or rent receipts in eviction proceedings?
  • Can a Rent Controller's finding on the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship be sustained in the absence of evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz vs Ghulam Muhammad And Another1986 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-23
  pre-emptionwaiverleave to appealpleadingsquestion of factappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a decree in a pre-emption suit. The petitioner, who had purchased land, contested the suit filed by the respondent on grounds including lack of superior pre-emption rights and waiver, alleging the respondent participated in sale negotiations. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, noting that the issue of waiver was not pressed by the petitioner. The petitioner failed to challenge this finding in the first appellate court, and the memorandum of appeal did not reference the plea of waiver. The core legal question is whether the Supreme Court should grant leave to examine a plea of fact that was abandoned or not pressed in the lower courts. The Court held that it is not a fit case to grant special leave to examine pleas that were dropped in the courts below. The principle laid down is that a party cannot seek to re-agitate or introduce pleas of fact in the Supreme Court that were explicitly abandoned or not pursued during the trial and appellate stages.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of waiver in the Supreme Court if that plea was not pressed in the trial court or the first appellate court?
  • Is the question of whether a party participated in sale negotiations a question of fact?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to examine pleas that were dropped in the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad And Another vs Maulvi Noor Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-24
  oral gifthibaunregistered acknowledgmentrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factregistration of documentsdelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding an alleged oral gift of land. The core legal questions involve the admissibility of an unregistered document acknowledging an antecedent oral gift, the necessity of registration for such documents, and the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction in interfering with concurrent findings of fact. The trial and appellate courts had dismissed the plaintiff's suit, finding the oral gift unproven and the acknowledgment document inadmissible for want of registration under the Registration Act. The High Court, however, reversed this, relying on the acknowledgment document and oral testimony to establish the gift and possession. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's findings appeared to contradict the record regarding the location of the property and that the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact regarding possession and the validity of the gift warranted further judicial scrutiny, particularly concerning the bona fide nature of subsequent purchasers.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unregistered document acknowledging an antecedent oral gift require registration under the Registration Act 1908?
  • Can a High Court in civil revision interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the possession of property?
  • Are bona fide transferees for valuable consideration without notice protected under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Hasan vs The State And 4 Other1986 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-20
  petition for leave to appealacquittalbenefit of the doubtocular testimonymedical conflictmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 26-11-1981, whereby the respondents were acquitted of the charge under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reversing their conviction by the Sessions Judge, Dadu. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction and granting the benefit of the doubt based on admitted enmity and a conflict between the medical evidence and the ocular testimony. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly granted the benefit of the doubt to the accused as such doubts accrued from the prosecution case itself, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court when the benefit of the doubt is founded on legitimate weaknesses inherent in the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment based on the benefit of the doubt?
  • Does a conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony justify setting aside a conviction?
  • Can admitted enmity between parties form a basis for granting the benefit of the doubt in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-13
  interested witnessocular testimonymedical evidence contradictioncriminal appealcorroborationacquittalcapital offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of four appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question is whether the convictions can be sustained given significant contradictions between the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, particularly regarding the nature and location of injuries, and whether the testimony of 'interested' witnesses requires independent corroboration. The Court held that the prosecution witnesses were not independent and their testimony was intrinsically unreliable due to irreconcilable conflicts with the medical report, such as the absence of injuries mentioned in the F.I.R. and the improbability of the described attack sequence. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution failed to provide independent corroboration for these interested witnesses. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is contradicted by medical evidence and the witnesses are hostile or interested, such testimony lacks intrinsic soundness and cannot form the basis of a conviction in a capital case without strong, independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital offence be sustained solely on the testimony of interested witnesses when it contradicts medical evidence?
  • Does the existence of strong enmity between parties necessitate independent corroboration of ocular testimony?
  • Is the testimony of an eye-witness intrinsically unreliable if the number and nature of injuries described are inconsistent with the medical report?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to provide corroborative evidence for interested witnesses in a murder case warrant acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bakhsh vs Administrator, Thal Development Authority And Other1986 SCMR 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-30
  land allotmentresumption of landconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealThal Development Authoritymaterial conditions of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which upheld the resumption of land allotted to the petitioner by the Thal Development Authority. The land was resumed on 20 November 1958 due to the petitioner's failure to fulfill material conditions of allotment, specifically regarding cultivation, residency, payment of boring test fees for a tube-well, and payment of the first advance installment. The petitioner challenged these findings through a civil suit, an appeal, and a revision petition, all of which were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the lower courts' factual findings were incorrect. The Court held that the issues raised were purely factual in nature. Reaffirming the principle that the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a clear omission or misreading of evidence, the Court found no such error. As the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or provide evidence contradicting the defaults, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of misreading or omission of evidence?
  • Can an allottee challenge the resumption of land based on non-fulfillment of material conditions without proving compliance with those conditions?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar And Others vs Syed Tanweerul Hassan And Other1986 SCMR 1042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-01
  evictionreconstructiongood faithbona fide requirementCantonment Rent Restriction Actlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions for leave to appeal filed by tenants challenging a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed their constitutional petitions against eviction orders. The respondent-landlords sought eviction under Section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 to demolish the existing premises and construct a new building. The Rent Controller initially rejected the eviction applications, finding a lack of good faith because the Cantonment Board had not issued a notice for reconstruction and the landlords had previously enhanced the rent. The District Judge reversed this, holding that no such notice was required and that the landlords' plea was supported by a proper sanction from the Cantonment Board. The High Court affirmed the eviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that the Rent Controller erred by relying on extraneous factors such as the duration of the tenancy and past rent increases. The Court ruled that where a landlord obtains the necessary sanction from the competent authority to reconstruct and develop the property, the requirement is bona fide and justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord seeking eviction for reconstruction under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 must prove a notice was issued by the Cantonment Board to the tenants indicating that a new construction was required?
  • Does the past enhancement of rent by a landlord, or the long duration of a tenancy, constitute valid legal evidence of mala fides to defeat an eviction application for reconstruction?
  • Is a landlord's requirement for reconstruction considered bona fide and reasonable if they have obtained the proper sanction from the competent authority to substantially develop the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad vs Faiz Ahmad1986 SCMR 1343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-01
  pre-emptionspecial oathrelinquishment of rightburden of proofleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the appellate court's decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned the effect of a disputed relinquishment document regarding pre-emption rights, where the respondent had previously denied its execution and taken a special oath on the Holy Quran in a separate litigation, leading to that prior suit being decreed in his favour. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not rely on the same disputed document in the subsequent pre-emption suit after the respondent had successfully denied its execution through a special oath agreed upon by the parties in the earlier proceedings. The Court established that a party who disputes a document and successfully negates its execution through a special oath binding on the parties cannot be held bound by that same document in collateral proceedings, and the concurrent findings regarding the lack of proof of the document do not warrant interference. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party rely on a document in a pre-emption suit whose execution was previously denied by the opposing party and resolved through a special oath on the Holy Quran in a prior proceeding?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the lack of proof of a relinquishment document warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the taking of a special oath regarding the non-execution of a document in one suit affect its admissibility and proof in subsequent litigation between the same parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Al Samrez Enterprise vs The Federation of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  customs duty exemptionvested rightsretrospective operationfiscal statutecontractual obligationsimport licencetax notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the retrospective application of a government notification withdrawing customs duty exemptions. The appellants imported goods relying on a 1972 notification granting duty exemptions. Before a subsequent notification on 11 June 1977 raised these duties, the appellants had concluded a binding contract and initiated import procedures. The Customs authorities, relying on Section 30 of the Customs Act 1969, demanded the enhanced duty based on the date of the Bill of Entry. The core legal question was whether the government could retrospectively withdraw tax exemptions to affect transactions where binding contractual obligations had already been established. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had acquired a vested right to the exemption upon entering into binding commitments. The Court ruled that executive notifications cannot be given retrospective effect to impair vested rights or destroy contractual obligations already accrued. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, affirming that the exemption granted under the earlier notification remained applicable to the appellants' transaction, as the subsequent withdrawal could not retroactively invalidate the rights established prior to its issuance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government notification withdrawing a tax exemption be applied retrospectively to transactions where binding contractual obligations were already established?
  • Does the grant of a tax exemption under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 create a vested right that cannot be destroyed by a subsequent executive notification?
  • Does Section 30 of the Customs Act 1969, regarding the rate of duty at the time of the Bill of Entry, override vested rights acquired through prior contractual commitments?
  Read full judgment →
• Al Haj S.M. Noor & Sons vs Begum Zeenat Sultan Khan1986 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-24
  rent matterevictionfrivolous applicationsupreme court petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the order of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal in a rent matter. The core legal question is whether a party who chose not to contest their appeal on merits before the High Court, instead seeking and being granted time to vacate the premises, can subsequently challenge the dismissal of that appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition is frivolous and the petitioner has no right to challenge the High Court's orders on merits after failing to contest the appeal below. The key principle laid down is that a litigant who abandons a challenge on merits and obtains an extension of time to vacate cannot turn around and file a petition against the consented or uncontested dismissal order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge an appellate order on merits before the Supreme Court when they chose not to contest the appeal on merits before the High Court?
  • Does a party who requested and was granted time to vacate the premises have the right to subsequently challenge the eviction order?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhter Muhammad Alias Akhtran vs Sir Ajuddin1986 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-09
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court regarding the eviction of a tenant from a shop premises on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal requirement of the landlord. The Rent Controller had ordered eviction for default in rent but rejected the claim for personal requirement. The High Court set aside the eviction order, holding that the tenant should not be evicted for default given the circumstances and conduct of the parties, and dismissed the landlord's claim regarding personal requirement based on section 13(3)(c) of the Ordinance. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's finding on the issue of default, noting that the evidence indicated rent was collected on a yearly basis and particulars of default were inadequately proven, thereby dismissing the appeal on default. However, regarding the issue of personal requirement, the Supreme Court found the High Court's judgment sketchy and lacking discussion of evidence, and accordingly remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on that issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can be evicted on the ground of default in rent when the landlord's conduct and past practice show that rent was collected on a yearly basis?
  • Can an appellate court's sketchy finding on the issue of personal requirement of premises be sustained without discussion of the evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's finding on default in rent when the finding is otherwise sustainable despite unconvincing reasoning?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali vs Qazi Javed Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-08
  acquittalrevision petitionprivate complainantArms Actwrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition challenging an order of acquittal passed under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The respondent had been acquitted in a case under the Arms Act by a Magistrate, relying on findings from a separate murder trial. A private complainant filed a revision petition, which was initially dismissed by the Sessions Judge on the grounds that a private complainant lacks the standing to file a revision in State cases. While the High Court subsequently held that the revision was competent and that the Magistrate erred in relying on findings from the murder trial, it ultimately dismissed the writ petition, concluding that the acquittal order under Section 249-A was justified because the prosecution failed to produce evidence. The Supreme Court, noting that the case involves a matter of general impression, granted leave to appeal. The Court directed that this appeal be heard alongside the pending appeal related to the murder case, allowing parties to file additional documents if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private complainant file a revision petition in a State case?
  • Is it permissible for a Magistrate to rely on findings from a separate murder trial when deciding an acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court pass an order of acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali And Others vs Chief Administrator of Auqaf1986 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-10
  Auqaf DepartmentWaqf propertyspecial leave to appealshrine incomestatutory remedyproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had disposed of three regular second appeals concerning the ownership and income of a shrine's donation boxes. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who were engaged in litigation over the property, could still pursue their claims after the Auqaf Department had formally taken over the property via official notifications issued in 1960 and 1964. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was correct, affirming that the property had been validly taken over by the Auqaf Department under the relevant statutory framework. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioners must pursue their remedies regarding the disputed property and the deposited income through the specific legal channels provided under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance. The key principle laid down is that once property is legally acquired by the Auqaf Department under valid notifications, claimants must seek redress through the statutory forums established by the governing Waqf legislation rather than continuing civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can claimants pursue remedies for property taken over by the Auqaf Department through civil litigation?
  • Does the taking over of property by the Auqaf Department via official notification require claimants to seek redress under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Aijaz Alias Jajji And Another vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03
  murdercriminal petitionleave to appealcommon intentionsentence reductiondeath penaltyself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal petitions arising from a judgment of the High Court concerning a murder trial. The primary petitioner, Aijaz alias Jajji, sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Muhammad Yousaf, while the complainant filed a petition against the acquittal of certain co-accused and the reduction of sentences of others. The core legal question revolved around whether the conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code was sustainable and whether the petitioner was entitled to a lesser sentence of imprisonment for life given the absence of a pre-planned attack and the nature of the occurrence over a trivial matter. The Supreme Court held that the co-accused were rightly acquitted or given altered convictions by the High Court due to lack of a pre-concerted attack, and dismissed the complainant's petition. However, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the primary petitioner solely to consider the question of reducing his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The key principle laid down is that the absence of pre-concert or premeditation in a sudden altercation over a trivial matter may warrant a re-examination of the appropriateness of the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code where no pre-planned attack was established?
  • Does a sudden altercation over a trivial matter without pre-concert justify the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether an accused who delivered a single fatal blow during a sudden scuffle is entitled to a lesser sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahsanul Haq And Another Ahsanul Haq And Another vs Naurang And Another Riasat Ali And Other1986 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-05
  evacuee landallotmentdisplaced personssettlement schemepreferential rightfirst come first served
  Summary & questions settled

  These two connected appeals arise out of identical facts concerning rival claims for the allotment of evacuee land by displaced persons. The core legal question was whether claimants whose unsatisfied land units were transferred to an estate earlier in point of time possess a preferential right to the allotment of land over those whose claims were transferred later, under the relevant settlement laws and instructions. The Supreme Court held that the principle of 'first come first served' is inherent in the application of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme instructions as a requirement of fair play and equity to prevent arbitrary power by settlement authorities. The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and established the principle that earlier arrival and transfer of claims to an estate gives a preferential right to the allotment of available land over later-arrived claims, provided both parties are non-allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the arrival and transfer of unsatisfied land claims to an estate earlier in point of time give a claimant a preferential right to land allotment over later claims?
  • Whether the principle of first come first served applies to the disposal of land in non-congested districts under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Can settlement authorities arbitrarily choose claimants for the purpose of settlement irrespective of the date when their claims were received by transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahsan Kausar And Others vs Ahmad Zaman Khan1986 SCMR 1799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-21
  amendment of plaintOrder VI Rule 17possessionmandatory injunctionoral applicationlimitationmultiplicity of suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the respondent seeking a mandatory injunction and mesne profits regarding a parcel of land whose title had already been settled in his favor. At the stage of final arguments, the trial court noted that the suit was in substance for possession and allowed an oral prayer by the respondent to amend the plaint to include the relief of possession under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court affirmed this exercise of discretion in revision. The Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred in allowing an oral prayer for amendment without a formal written application, and whether such an amendment was impermissible due to potential limitation issues. The Supreme Court held that procedural rules serve the administration of justice and a formal written application is not mandatory for correcting formal defects where cause of action facts are already pleaded. It further held that adding an additional prayer without changing the fundamental character of the suit is permissible at any stage to avoid multiplicity of litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal written application strictly required for a court to allow an amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court permit an amendment adding a prayer for possession to a suit without altering the basic character and cause of action of the suit?
  • Does the potential bar of limitation against a original prayer preclude the court from granting permission to amend the plaint to include an additional relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Bakhsh vs The District Judge/Election Tribunal and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-10
  election petitionpeasant seatstatutory interpretationdisqualificationlocal government electionpersonal cultivationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an Election Tribunal's decision to declare the petitioner's election to a District Council peasant seat void. The core legal question was whether the petitioner qualified as a "peasant" under the definition provided in the Punjab Local Government (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1983, specifically regarding his occupation as a commission agent and the requirement for personal cultivation of land for maintenance. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Election Tribunal and the High Court, determining that the petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory criteria because he derived his livelihood from a commission agent's business and did not personally engage in cultivation for his maintenance. The Court held that the statutory definition of "peasant" implies a continuous requirement of personal cultivation for maintenance as a condition precedent. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, refused to reappraise the evidence, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'peasant' under the Punjab Local Government (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1983 require continuous personal cultivation of land for maintenance?
  • Can a candidate who derives livelihood from a commission agent's business qualify as a 'peasant' under the Punjab Local Government (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1983?
  • Is the requirement of personal cultivation for maintenance a condition precedent for qualifying as a 'peasant' for election purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Afzal Hussain And Others vs Ghulam Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  land allotmentsettlement lawGhair Mumkin Abadiconstitutional jurisdictionlimitationspecial leave to appealequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that declined to interfere with orders passed by Settlement authorities regarding the allotment of agricultural land. The core dispute arose when respondents claimed that a portion of the land allotted to the petitioners' predecessor was actually 'Ghair Mumkin Abadi' (residential area) occupied since 1947, and thus ineligible for agricultural allotment. The Additional Settlement Commissioner excluded the residential area from the allotment, a decision upheld by the Settlement Commissioner and subsequently the High Court. The petitioners contended that the allotment was finalized years prior and that the land was agricultural. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to interfere under its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the lower authorities had properly addressed the limitation issue by condoning the delay and that the decision to protect existing residential occupants was equitable. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no justification for interference, affirmed the High Court’s reasoning, and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 when the impugned orders are based on equity and justice?
  • Can an allotment of agricultural land be challenged on the ground that the land is actually Ghair Mumkin Abadi?
  • Does the condonation of delay by a Settlement Commissioner in an allotment dispute constitute a valid exercise of discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Muhammad Azhar And Other1986 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-17
  consolidation proceedingsrevenue officersBoard of Revenuewrit petitionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition filed against the final order of the Board of Revenue dated 9-8-1977 concerning consolidation proceedings in village Kot Daska, District Sialkot. The core legal question involves the propriety of interfering with concurrent revenue authority decisions regarding a consolidation scheme confirmed in 1971. The Supreme Court held that no grounds existed for re-examining the matter or interfering with the High Court's order, particularly as the High Court's decision was duly based on established precedents of this Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings and orders of revenue authorities and the High Court in consolidation matters where the decision correctly relies on settled judicial precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of the High Court upholding a decision of the Board of Revenue in consolidation proceedings?
  • Does a consolidation scheme confirmed by revenue authorities warrant re-examination by the Supreme Court when the High Court's judgment is based on established precedents?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-24
  leave to appealmurdercommon intentioncriminal appealacquittalconviction alteration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partly allowed a criminal appeal by altering one co-accused's conviction from murder to hurt while maintaining the death sentence and murder conviction of the other petitioner, Abdul Rashid. The prosecution case alleged that the accused persons demanded money for tube-well water, took away the complainant's goats as security, and subsequently inflicted fatal knife and stick blows on Muhammad Hanif when he intercepted them. The trial court had convicted both accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The High Court removed the application of Section 34 regarding the co-accused Riaz Ahmad. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the legality of the High Court judgment and whether accepted principles of criminal justice administration were followed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is attracted when co-accused act with different weapons and intentions?
  • Does the High Court judgment warrant interference when accepted principles of criminal justice administration are overlooked?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against both conviction and partial acquittal arising from the same criminal transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04
  abatementwrit petitionfinality of orderslegal representativesettlement and rehabilitationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition on the ground of abatement following the death of a respondent. The appellant, an allottee of disputed property, challenged the cancellation of his allotment by a Settlement Commissioner. After the death of the contesting respondent, Ghulam Farid, the High Court initially ruled in 1972 that the petition had not abated. However, a subsequent order in 1973 by a different judge held that the petition had abated due to the failure to implead legal representatives. The Supreme Court addressed whether the second order could nullify the earlier, final order regarding abatement. The Court held that the order dated 18th October 1972, which determined that the petition had not abated, had attained finality. Consequently, the subsequent order dated 6th December 1973 could not legally nullify the earlier decision. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, restored the 1972 ruling, and remanded the case to the High Court for a decision on merits, establishing the principle that a court cannot ignore or contradict a prior, final order passed in the same proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court in a subsequent order nullify a prior, final order passed in the same proceedings regarding the abatement of a petition?
  • Does a writ petition abate if no legal representative is impleaded for a deceased respondent when the property in dispute may vest in the State?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid vs Ahmad Din1986 SCMR 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-21
  rejection of plaintdismissal in defaultmaintainability of suitprocedural barrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute concerning the maintainability of a subsequent suit following the dismissal of a prior suit in default. The petitioner challenges a High Court order that allowed a revision petition, arguing that the respondent approached the court with unclean hands by withholding information regarding the previous dismissal. The core legal question is whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on averments made in the memorandum of appeal, and whether a subsequent suit is barred under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the previous suit was dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the substantial points raised regarding the applicability of these procedural bars and the scope of judicial discretion in revision proceedings require further consideration. The Court held that the matter warrants a full hearing to determine if the lower courts were legally justified in rejecting the plaint based on the procedural history of the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on averments made in the memorandum of appeal?
  • Does the dismissal of a previous suit under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit under Order IX, Rule 9?
  • Is a revision petition maintainable if the petitioner has approached the court with unclean hands?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahman vs The State1986 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23
  Zinaabductionleave to appealHudood lawsconcurrent sentencescriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Abdul Rahim, challenging his conviction for abduction and Zina. The petitioner and two co-accused were initially charged with abduction for the purpose of Zina and committing Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The trial court convicted the petitioner under sections 16 and 10(2) of the Ordinance, 1979, and section 466 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting the co-accused. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court maintained the convictions under the Ordinance but acquitted the petitioner of the charge under section 466 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against this decision. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court to be correct and legally sound. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower appellate court, thereby upholding the findings regarding the petitioner's culpability for the offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for abduction and Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 can be sustained when co-accused are acquitted?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed on merits despite a significant delay in filing?
  • Does the acquittal of a charge under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 affect the concurrent running of sentences imposed under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum And Another vs Mst. Husn Ara1986 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-11
  ejectment proceedingsrent controllerremand orderprocedural negligencerestoration applicationeviction orderopportunity to produce evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller erred in law by closing the petitioners' evidence and passing an eviction order after the petitioners repeatedly failed to appear or produce evidence, despite a remand order from the High Court directing the case to be disposed of on merits. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller acted correctly, noting that the petitioners were given multiple opportunities to present their case but remained negligent. The Court affirmed that the findings of fact regarding the petitioners' negligence and the lack of sufficient cause for their absence, as determined by the lower courts, were not subject to interference. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot claim a denial of opportunity when they have been granted multiple chances to produce evidence but have failed to act diligently, and that the Supreme Court will not re-examine concurrent findings of fact regarding procedural negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim denial of opportunity to produce evidence when they have repeatedly failed to appear before the Rent Controller despite multiple adjournments?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding a party's negligence in pursuing a case subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the authority to close a party's side of evidence after repeated absences and failure to comply with court directions?
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• Abdul Majid and Others vs Musthaq Ahmad and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-15
  arrears of rentrent controllersurety bondexecution of ordersinterim securityurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed the question of whether arrears of rent could be calculated and recovered by the Rent Controller pursuant to a security furnished under an interim order of the High Court, or if a separate civil suit was required. The appellant-tenant and his surety challenged the execution proceedings, arguing that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to order security for arrears of rent and that such orders were unexecutable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the order of the High Court requiring security for arrears of rent had attained finality between the parties when leave to appeal was earlier refused, precluding a second round of challenge. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that appellate authorities and the High Court possess co-extensive powers with the Rent Controller under the relevant statutory provisions and the Code of Civil Procedure to direct the deposit of rent or the furnishing of security. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can arrears of rent be calculated and recovered by the Rent Controller pursuant to a security furnished under an interim order of the High Court?
  • Whether an order of the High Court requiring the furnishing of security for arrears of rent is executable under section 17 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does an appellate court hearing a second appeal under the rent restriction law possess the power to order the deposit of rent or the furnishing of security for the same?
  • Does the principle of finality prevent a party from challenging an interim security order in a subsequent round of litigation after leave to appeal has been refused?
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• Abdul Latif Qureshi And Another vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate1986 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar Khan vs Dr. Muhammad Qabil Khan1986 SCMR 1389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-08
  non-prosecutionadjournmentrented premisesrestoration of appealdiscretionary powereviction order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the Sind High Court dismissing an appeal against an eviction order for non-prosecution. The appellant challenged the High Court's refusal to adjourn the hearing and its subsequent dismissal of an application for readmission of the appeal. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted arbitrarily in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution when the appellant's counsel sought an adjournment on the ground of illness, and whether the subsequent refusal to restore the appeal was justified. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion was exercised properly. The Court found that the medical certificate provided was suspect due to the delay in its production and that the counsel holding the brief was only present to request an adjournment, not to argue the case. Consequently, the dismissal for non-prosecution was upheld. The key principle laid down is that a court is competent to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the counsel present is only authorized to seek an adjournment and not to prosecute the merits of the case, particularly where prior conduct suggests an attempt to delay proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court competent to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the counsel present is only holding a brief for the limited purpose of seeking an adjournment?
  • Does the failure to produce a medical certificate at the time of an adjournment request justify the court's subsequent refusal to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution if the appellant's counsel fails to demonstrate sufficient cause for absence?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Abdul Ghani1986 SCMR 1857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  default in payment of rentwilful defaulterrent restrictionejectment petitionlandlord and tenantlump sum rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 20-10-1985, which set aside the Rent Controller's order directing the eviction of the respondent-tenant. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent constituted a wilful defaulter in the payment of rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, given that the landlord had established a consistent practice of accepting rent in lump sum after irregular intervals. The Supreme Court held that where the landlord himself adopts a practice of receiving rent in lump sums spanning several months without objection, his conduct furnishes sufficient justification for treating the tenant not as a wilful defaulter. The court affirmed the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, laying down the principle that a landlord's established course of conduct in accepting irregular lump sum payments precludes them from successfully alleging wilful default against the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can be held to be a wilful defaulter when the landlord has a established practice of accepting rent in lump sums after irregular intervals?
  • Does the acceptance of rent in lump sum by the landlord disentitle him from seeking eviction on the ground of default?
  • Can unilateral conditions printed on the back of rent receipts bind the tenant when the tenancy agreement is oral and unaccepted by the tenant?
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• Abdui: Rehman Wahla vs DR. Sher Dil Batra1986 PLD Supreme Court 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-10
  summary suitleave to defendlimitationservice of summonsrevisional jurisdictionprocess serverfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a money suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court granted the defendant leave to appear and defend, finding that service of summons was effected on 12-10-1982, making the application timely. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reversed this finding by relying on an undated process-server report subsequently filled with the date 7-10-1982, thereby dismissing the application as time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by interfering with a finding of fact that suffered from no material irregularity. Upon examining the original record, the Supreme Court found clear evidence of overwriting on the process-server's report and verified that the authentic date of service was indeed 12-10-1982. The Court held that the provisions of Order V Rules 16 and 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, requiring signatures and identification, are salutary safeguards to prevent fraud and must be strictly complied with. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a trial court's finding of fact regarding the date of service of summons under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of any material irregularity?
  • Whether the requirement under Order V Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a process-server to obtain the signature of the person served is a mere technicality or a mandatory safeguard?
  • How should a court resolve a discrepancy between an undated process-server report and a subsequent verification on oath regarding the actual date of service of summons?
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