Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Zaheer Ahmad Khan vs Government of Pakistan and Others1984 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17
  misconductdisciplinary proceedingsinquiry reportprocedural irregularityprejudiceservice lawcompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified the petitioner's penalty from dismissal from service to compulsory retirement. The petitioner, a Population Officer, was dismissed for misconduct after attending an unauthorized meeting of employees in defiance of official instructions. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Inquiry Officer to supply the petitioner with a copy of the inquiry report vitiated the dismissal order, and whether the finding of misconduct was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that while the failure to provide the inquiry report was an irregularity, it did not cause prejudice to the petitioner, as he was fully aware of the charges and had defended himself against them. Furthermore, the Court declined to re-examine the factual determination regarding the unauthorized nature of the meeting. The key principle laid down is that a procedural irregularity, such as the non-supply of an inquiry report, does not invalidate disciplinary proceedings if the delinquent employee suffered no prejudice and had adequate opportunity to defend the charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to supply an inquiry report to a civil servant automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can a court interfere with a finding of fact regarding the unauthorized nature of a meeting in a service matter?
  • Is a disciplinary order invalid if the employee suffered no prejudice from a procedural irregularity?
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• Zafar Iqbal and Others vs The State1984SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-14
  appellate jurisdictiontrial court jurisdictionHudood Ordinanceleave to appealconviction under Penal CodeFederal Shariat Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the petitioners' convictions under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were originally charged under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, but the trial court acquitted them of that charge while convicting them of the lesser offence under the Penal Code. The core legal questions were whether an Additional Sessions Judge possessed the jurisdiction to convict for an offence under Section 354, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the Federal Shariat Court had the appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Session is competent to try offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by virtue of Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, read with Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. Consequently, the Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the trial court and the appellate authority of the Federal Shariat Court, refusing leave to appeal on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional Sessions Judge have the jurisdiction to convict an accused for an offence under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the original charge was under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when that conviction was rendered by a court trying an offence under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the Court of Session competent to try offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 pursuant to Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Yousuf Din vs The State1984 SCMR 1507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-03
  criminal appealquantum of sentencestolen propertygovernment propertymitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Yousuf Din, was convicted by the Special Judge (Central) Anti-Smuggling and Anti-Corruption, Peshawar, for an offense under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000, with a default clause of six months' imprisonment. Following the dismissal of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, the appellant sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, specifically challenging the quantum of the sentence imposed. Upon review of the record and the arguments presented, the Supreme Court observed that the stolen property in question belonged to the Government. Finding no mitigating circumstances to justify a reduction or interference with the sentence, the Court upheld the conviction and sentence as legal and appropriate. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that the sentence imposed by the trial court was commensurate with the offense involving state property.

  Questions settled

  • Is interference with a legal sentence justified when the stolen property belongs to the Government and no mitigating circumstances exist?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence imposed under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of mitigating factors?
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• Yasmin Anjum vs Government of Sind and Others1984 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-28
  medical college admissionpermanent residence certificatedomicile certificateconstitutional petitionpleading requirementsacademic questionsadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition filed by a candidate seeking admission to the first-year M.B., B.S. class. The petitioner's application was rejected by the Selection Board due to her failure to produce a Permanent Residence Certificate and a domicile certificate of her parents, as mandated by the Prospectus of the Medical Colleges in Sind for the academic year 1982-83. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the rejection based on these procedural failures and whether the petitioner could challenge the validity of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971, for the first time during arguments. The Supreme Court held that the failure to produce the required Permanent Residence Certificate was a sufficient ground for rejection, rendering other arguments academic. The Court further established that constitutional challenges to the validity of statutory rules require specific pleadings in the original petition to allow the government an opportunity to respond, and cannot be raised for the first time during oral arguments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge the vires of statutory rules for the first time during oral arguments without specific pleadings in the constitutional petition?
  • Is the failure to produce a mandatory Permanent Residence Certificate a valid ground for the rejection of a medical college admission application?
  • Does a court need to address contentions regarding the reasonableness of specific admission rules if the application was already validly rejected on other grounds?
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• Wazikan (Represented by Her Legal Heirs) vs Muhammad Asghar and Others1984 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-23
  inheritance disputereview petitionnewly discovered evidencepartition suitcivil revisionappellate decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the inheritance and ownership of a house in Rawalpindi, originally owned by one Allah Diya, who died issueless in 1964. His widow, Mst. Waziran, sold the property to the petitioner, Faqir Muhammad. The respondent, Muhammad Asghar, claiming to be the nephew of the deceased, filed a suit for partition and possession. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, the appellate court reversed this decision. The petitioner subsequently sought a review of the appellate judgment based on a newly discovered document, which was rejected by the Additional District Judge and the High Court on the grounds that the document was already in the petitioner's possession and knowledge. The Supreme Court examined the petition, finding that the document in question failed to establish the respondent's relationship as a nephew to the deceased. Consequently, the Court held that the review petition lacked merit, affirmed the High Court's reasoning, and dismissed the petition, upholding the finality of the appellate court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the document relied upon was already in their possession and knowledge?
  • Can a review petition be maintained when the applicant fails to demonstrate that the evidence was not available or discoverable with due diligence during the original proceedings?
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• Water & Power Development Authority vs Naeem Trading Company, Government Contractor R1984 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-17
  arbitrationrevocation of arbitratorextension of timecivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing WAPDA's civil revision in an arbitration matter. The respondent-company entered into a contract with WAPDA containing an arbitration clause under which an arbitrator was appointed to resolve disputes. Due to the arbitrator's failure to make an award within the stipulated time and lack of progress, the respondent applied to the civil court for revocation of the arbitrator's authority and appointment of a new one, which the civil court allowed. WAPDA's civil revision before the High Court was subsequently dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether leave to appeal should be granted when the petitioner alleged the respondent was solely responsible for the delay. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was also partly responsible for the failure to conclude the matter within time by not applying for an extension under the relevant statute, it was not a fit case for granting leave. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a party alleging delay by the opposite side is itself partly responsible for failing to seek an extension of time under the Arbitration Act?
  • Can the authority of an arbitrator be revoked for failing to make an award within the specified time?
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• Waqar Azeem vs The State1984 SCMR 1509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-20
  suspension of sentenceinterlocutory ordercriminal appealappreciation of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the refusal of the Lahore High Court to suspend his sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 pending the disposal of his appeal. The High Court had declined relief on the ground that the contentions raised by the petitioner's counsel required a deeper appreciation of evidence, which was impermissible at the interlocutory stage. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to suspend the sentence. The Supreme Court held that there were no sufficient grounds to interfere with the discretionary interlocutory order passed by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not lightly interfere with interlocutory orders regarding the suspension of sentences where deeper appreciation of evidence is required.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to suspend a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the contentions raised require a deeper appreciation of evidence?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order of the High Court declining to suspend a sentence in the absence of good grounds?
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• WAPDA through Its Chairman vs Muhammad Ayyub Qureshi and 121984 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-17
  service lawseniority listcause of actionpast and closed transactioncurrent chargeservice tribunal jurisdictionpromotion date
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against a Service Tribunal judgment. The respondent, initially appointed as an Assistant Accountant, held the current charge of Junior Accountant from 1964 and was regularly promoted in 1966. He sought to have his regular promotion and seniority ante-dated to 1964. After previous unsuccessful litigation and a rejected claim before the Service Tribunal, the respondent challenged a 1977 provisional seniority list, arguing it provided a fresh cause of action to relitigate his promotion date. The Tribunal allowed his claim. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying significant questions of law regarding whether a provisional seniority list can revive a past and closed transaction, whether the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction over matters originating before July 1, 1969, and whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the authority's power to apply promotion rules. The Court suspended the Tribunal's order pending the final appeal, emphasizing the need to determine if the seniority list could legitimately reopen settled disputes regarding promotion dates and departmental authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a provisional seniority list confer a fresh cause of action to challenge a promotion date that was previously the subject of a final, closed order?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim regarding a departmental order passed prior to July 1, 1969?
  • Can a departmental authority apply new promotion eligibility rules to an employee who was not yet regularly appointed to the higher post at the time the rules were framed?
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• Wali Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Sargoha and Another1984 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-19
  evacuee propertyland settlementallotment of landproposal for allotmentconfirmation of landrehabilitation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment and confirmation of evacuee agricultural land between two competing claimants. The primary legal question addressed is whether a subsequent allotment and confirmation of land can override an earlier subsisting proposal for allotment in favor of another party under the relevant rehabilitation scheme. The Supreme Court held that a proposal is an essential statutory step toward allotment and confirmation, and in the presence of a prior subsisting proposal in favor of one party, the same land cannot be validly proposed and subsequently allotted to another without the earlier proposal being lawfully cancelled or withdrawn. The Court concluded that the allotment based on the subsequent proposal must yield to the earlier proposal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings that favored the respondent's prior proposal and subsequent implementation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere proposal for the allotment of land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme create a preferential right over a subsequent proposal?
  • Can the same parcel of land be validly proposed and allotted to a second party while a prior proposal in favor of another party remains subsisting?
  • What is the legal effect of a proposal under paragraph 64 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme in the process of land confirmation?
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• Wali Muhammad vs Me State1984 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-08
  murderocular testimonychance witnessmotivearrest at the spotcriminal appealappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Wali Muhammad, under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Feroze Din. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the evidence against the appellant had been assessed in consonance with established principles. The prosecution case was supported by ocular testimony, immediate apprehension of the appellant at the spot with a blood-stained weapon, and corroborative police testimony. The core legal questions involved the assessment of ocular evidence, the effect of delay in recording the F.I.R., the presence of chance witnesses, and the significance of the absence of motive. The Supreme Court held that the appraisal of evidence by the High Court was correct, finding the ocular testimony reliable and the technical objections regarding the F.I.R. and absence of motive inconsequential in the presence of unimpeachable direct evidence. The appeal was dismissed, but the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure was granted to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of motive is inconsequential when unimpeachable ocular evidence is available against the accused?
  • Does a delay in recording the first information report vitiate the trial when supported by substantive ocular evidence?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses be relied upon when their presence at the scene is satisfactorily explained and they have no motive to falsely implicate the accused?
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• Wali Muhammad vs Khalil Ahmed and Others1984 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-11
  leave to appealmurdersudden quarrelinterested witnessesdelayed statementacquittalalteration of convictionocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Wali Muhammad against the judgment of the High Court, which had acquitted three respondents (Khalil Ahmad, Bashir Ahmad, and Shadi Khan) of murder charges and altered the conviction of the fourth respondent (Niaz Ahmad) from section 302/34 to section 304, Part I, P. P. C., while maintaining his conviction under section 324 P. P. C. The trial court had previously convicted all four respondents for murder and causing injuries. The High Court excluded the ocular testimony of related eye-witnesses due to their relationship with the deceased and a delay in recording their statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, relying instead on an independent witness and finding the incident to be the result of a sudden quarrel. The Supreme Court considered contentions that the High Court erred in rejecting related eye-witness testimony despite the complainant's injuries and prompt F.I.R., and that medical evidence contradicted the finding of a single assailant and a sudden quarrel. Finding the contentions require consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and issued bailable warrants against the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in excluding the evidence of eye-witnesses merely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Does a delay in recording statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrant the wholesale rejection of related eye-witness accounts without cogent explanation?
  • Whether the evidence sufficiently established a sudden quarrel to justify altering a conviction from section 302 to section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Wali Muhammad and others vs Settlement Commissioner and others1984 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-07
  leave to appealdouble allotmentforgery and fabricationdoctrine of lis pendenssettlement revisionland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 24-1-1982 concerning the cancellation and subsequent restoration of a land allotment. The core legal question involved the validity of an allotment claimed to be a forgery and the rights of vendees from subsequent allottees. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that a finding of fact by the Settlement Commissioner established that the petitioners had tampered with the relevant revenue records and contrived to obtain a double allotment to create ambiguity, while the original allotment in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents was valid. Furthermore, the court held that transfers in favour of the petitioners took place pending allotment and were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, with proper notice having been given. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the allotment could not be interfered with, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that where an allotment is reinstated based on a finding of fact that the contesting party manipulated records to create a double allotment, and transfers are affected by lis pendens during pending proceedings, such allotment remains protected and immune from interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment can be set aside on the ground of double allotment when the contesting party is found to have manipulated records to create ambiguity?
  • Are transfers made pending allotment proceedings hit by the doctrine of lis pendens?
  • Whether vendees from subsequent allottees with notice acquire a valid title when the underlying allotment is found to be a result of record tampering?
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• Walayat and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-23
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencymedical evidencecriminal appealbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the bail applications of the petitioners, Walayat and Abbas, in a case involving charges under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal for final disposal. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the same relief of bail as a co-accused, Riaz, who had previously been granted bail by the High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the case of petitioner Abbas was analogous to that of Riaz, as both were alleged to have inflicted simple injuries with a hatchet. Regarding petitioner Walayat, the Court examined the post-mortem report and determined that the alleged hammer blow to the ankle was not supported by medical evidence, as no such injury was found on the deceased. Consequently, the Court held that both petitioners were entitled to bail on the principle of consistency and lack of incriminating medical evidence, allowing the appeal and granting bail accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail if their case is similar to a co-accused who has already been granted bail?
  • Does the absence of medical evidence supporting an alleged injury entitle an accused to bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal for final disposal?
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• Wal1 Muhammad vs Pakistan and others1984 SCMR 1563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-01
  Trade Organisations OrdinanceConstitutional PetitionLeave to AppealTrade AssociationStatutory InterpretationLicensing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a Constitutional Petition challenging the status of the Karachi Timber Merchants Group under the Trade Organisations Ordinance, 1961. The core legal question was whether the Group qualified as a trade organisation under Section 2(12) of the Ordinance, thereby necessitating mandatory licensing and registration. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court’s determination—that the Group failed to meet the statutory criteria—appeared prima facie incorrect upon review of the Group's Memorandum and Articles of Association. The Court indicated that an association formed to represent specific trades in a specific area, which prohibits dividend payments and is capable of incorporation as a limited company, satisfies the statutory definition of a trade organisation. Consequently, the Court determined that the legal interpretation of the Ordinance regarding the Group's status was a matter of general public importance requiring further examination by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an association formed to represent specific trades in a specific area qualify as a trade organisation under the Trade Organisations Ordinance, 1961?
  • What are the criteria for an association to be classified as a trade organisation under Section 2(12) of the Trade Organisations Ordinance, 1961?
  • Is an association that prohibits the payment of dividends to its members and is capable of being formed as a limited company eligible for registration under the Trade Organisations Ordinance, 1961?
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• Waja Muhammd Hussain vs Mir Muhammad Ha Mza and 3 Others1984 SCMR 1002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-10
  election disputenatural justicenomination papersdisqualificationappellate authorityrehearinglocal government election
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the election to the Union Council Khudabadan, District Panjgur, Baluchistan. The respondent's nomination paper was initially rejected by the Returning Officer due to a prior conviction. On appeal, the Commissioner, Makran Division, upheld the disqualification, relying on new allegations made orally by the Deputy Commissioner that the respondent continued to instigate students, despite acknowledging the respondent had received a pardon. The High Court set aside the Commissioner's order, finding it violated the principles of natural justice because the respondent was not given an opportunity to refute these new allegations. The core legal question was whether the High Court, upon finding a violation of natural justice, should have merely set aside the order or directed a rehearing. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court correctly identified the violation of natural justice, it erred by not ordering a rehearing. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Commissioner to rehear the appeal, ensuring the respondent is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend against the allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate authority violate the principles of natural justice by relying on new allegations against a candidate without providing them an opportunity to refute such allegations?
  • When a court finds an administrative order void for violating natural justice, is the appropriate remedy to set aside the order entirely or to direct a rehearing?
  • Does a pardon for a criminal conviction remove the disqualification stigma for the purpose of contesting local government elections?
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• Waheed Shah and Others vs Haji Shahzada and Others1984 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  property titleadverse possessionancestral propertydocumentary evidenceconcurrent findingsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition concerning a dispute over the title of property in suit, wherein the petitioners claimed ownership either through adverse possession or as ancestral property. The core legal question revolved around whether the document Exh. 1/2 dated 1st October, 1967, which lacked specific property boundaries, could validly be held to refer to the suit land and support the concurrent findings of the lower courts against the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the absence of boundaries in the document was not fatal, as the lack of settlement in the area and corroborating oral testimony established that the document referred to the land in dispute. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The key principle laid down is that a lacuna in the description of property within a document can be cured by oral testimony and surrounding circumstances where no official settlement exists in the area.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of boundaries in a document regarding property is fatal to its applicability when supported by oral testimony?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts regarding property title be disturbed when the deficiency in property description is made good by oral evidence?
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• W.P.I.D.C. through Sugar Mills, Bannu vs Mst. Nasreen Khan and others1984 SCMR 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuecompound interestcourt-feeeminent domain
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four appeals arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding compensation for land acquired for an agricultural farm and a sugar mill. The core legal questions involved the lawfulness of granting compound interest under the West Pakistan (Amendment) Act III of 1969 for acquisitions occurring prior to the Act, the justification for increasing compensation rates to Rs. 300 per Kanal for sugar mill land, and the legality of awarding departmental charges. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. Regarding interest, the Court noted the issue was settled by prior precedent (Nishat Sarhad Textile Mills v. Sher Ahmad Khan). Regarding compensation, the Court held that the High Court’s determination of market value was based on concrete evidence of sales and contained no legal infirmity. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that compensation for the agricultural farm land was properly limited to the amount claimed by the respondents, as they had restricted their claim due to court-fee constraints. The appeals were dismissed as lacking merit, upholding the High Court's findings on valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court award compensation exceeding the amount specifically claimed by the parties in their pleadings?
  • Is the determination of market value by the High Court based on evidence of sales subject to interference if no legal infirmity is shown?
  • Does the West Pakistan (Amendment) Act III of 1969 apply to land acquisition proceedings initiated before its enactment?
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• Vicechancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore and Others vs Muhammad Zahur Nasir1984 SCMR 1585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-10
  university disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceexamination malpracticeleave to appealdomestic inquiryparental authorityjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a student, was disqualified for three years by the University of the Punjab for examination malpractice involving forged result entries. The respondent challenged this disqualification in the Lahore High Court, which set aside the order, holding that the Disciplinary Committee violated the principles of natural justice by failing to disclose the names of University staff involved in the forgery, thereby denying the respondent a fair opportunity to defend himself. The University filed a petition for leave to appeal, contending that the High Court’s reliance on University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmad was misplaced in light of subsequent jurisprudence. The petitioners argued that the respondent’s status as the beneficiary of tampered records raised a presumption of guilt, sufficient for domestic disciplinary proceedings, and that such parental authority inquiries should not be reviewed under the same strict norms as judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the principles of natural justice were satisfied and whether the High Court’s standard of judicial review for domestic disciplinary findings was appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a university disciplinary committee to disclose the names of staff involved in examination forgery to the accused student violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is a presumption of guilt arising from a student being the beneficiary of tampered examination records sufficient to sustain disciplinary action?
  • To what extent should a judicial forum review the findings of a university disciplinary committee acting as a parental authority?
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• Umrao Ali through his legal heirs and 2 others vs Noor Elahee1984 SCMR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-30
  condonation of delaylimitationletters patent appealcounsel's mistakeappellate jurisdictionprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether a delay in filing an appeal, caused by a counsel’s erroneous legal advice regarding the proper forum for challenging a Single Judge’s order, constitutes sufficient grounds for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a counsel's mistaken impression or wrong legal advice does not automatically provide a valid basis for condoning delay. The Court held that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to condone the delay was not erroneous, as the petitioners failed to provide a cogent explanation for how the counsel was misled. The key principle laid down is that while the Supreme Court may occasionally entertain direct petitions against a Single Judge's order, doing so is discouraged as it undermines the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent, and a mere assertion of a bona fide mistake by counsel is insufficient to excuse procedural delays.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's erroneous legal advice regarding the proper appellate forum constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act?
  • Can a party bypass the Letters Patent Appeal jurisdiction of the High Court by filing a direct petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a Single Judge's order?
  • Is the discretion exercised by a High Court in refusing to condone a delay based on a counsel's mistake subject to interference if no cogent basis for the mistake is provided?
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• Umer Din and Another vs Muhammad Hanif and Another1984 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-28
  execution proceedingsobjection petitionspecific performancefrivolous litigationagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the dismissal of an objection petition filed in execution proceedings concerning a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell a house. The house had been transferred to Mst. Rafiqan by the Settlement Department against claims belonging to her and her two sons, Umer Din and Hakeem-ud-Din (the petitioners). After the failure of successive appeals and petitions up to the Supreme Court by Mst. Rafiqan, the decree-holder sought execution, prompting the petitioners to file an objection petition. The trial court, additional district judge, and High Court successively dismissed the objection and subsequent challenges. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners could successfully obstruct the execution of the final decree. The Supreme Court held that the objection petition was entirely frivolous and filed by the sons merely to prolong litigation and retain possession of the disputed property. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that frivolous objections in execution proceedings designed to delay execution will not be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an objection petition filed by family members in execution proceedings can be maintained to obstruct the execution of a final decree for specific performance?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing a frivolous objection petition in execution proceedings?
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• Umer Ahad alias Muhammad Rafique vs Sarfraz Khan and Another1984 SCMR 1033(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-15
  restoration of petitionnon-appearancebail cancellationdetermination of agejuvenile jurisdictiontentative observationsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a miscellaneous petition seeking the restoration of his dismissed Leave Petition, which had been dismissed for non-appearance. Finding the petitioner's explanation satisfactory, the Supreme Court restored the petition and proceeded to hear it on merits. On merits, the petitioner challenged the High Court's finding regarding his age, determined on the basis of a Medical Board report rather than a municipal birth certificate, in a bail cancellation matter relating to a murder case. The Supreme Court held that observations made by the High Court in a bail matter regarding the accused's age are merely tentative in nature and do not prejudice the trial. The Court ruled that it remains open to the petitioner to raise the question of his age and the jurisdiction of the court before the trial court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed with the said observation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a leave petition dismissed for non-appearance be restored upon the petitioner's explanation?
  • Are observations regarding the age of an accused made in a bail matter tentative in nature?
  • Is an accused entitled to raise the question of his age and trial court jurisdiction before the trial court despite prior observations by the High Court in bail proceedings?
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• Umar Din and others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner (MBR), Lahore1984 SCMR 1480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-20
  evacuee propertyallotment of landwrit jurisdictionfactual inquirycompensation pooldisplaced personsrehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to specific agricultural land previously allotted to a displaced person, Abdul Azim Khan. The core legal question was whether an order dated 13th March 1960, which cancelled a portion of the original allotment, was genuine or forged/ante-dated. If genuine, the land reverted to the Compensation Pool and was validly allotted to the respondents; if forged, the land would have been subject to surrender under the Scrutiny of Claims (Evacuee Property) Regulation (MLR No. 89) and available to the petitioners as sitting tenants. The Rehabilitation and Settlement Commissioner, following an inquiry, determined the 1960 order was genuine, validating the respondents' allotment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the determination of the genuineness of a document is a factual inquiry that cannot be re-examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that the High Court, in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction, will not conduct factual inquiries to determine the authenticity of disputed documents, particularly when such findings have been established by the competent departmental authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction conduct a factual inquiry to determine the genuineness of an order passed by a revenue authority?
  • Does land cancelled from an original allotment due to inferior quality revert to the Compensation Pool?
  • What is the legal status of land surrendered under the Scrutiny of Claims (Evacuee Property) Regulation (MLR No. 89)?
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• Tradax Ocean Transportation S. A. and 2 Others vs The Muslim1984 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-28
  unpaid sellerstoppage in transitperishable commodityinterim salereceivercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arose from a common judgment of the Sind High Court regarding the interim custody and disposal of a cargo of soyabean oil on board the vessel M. V. Sonja, which was detained following a recovery suit filed by a bank against a company and its directors. The petitioners, claiming to be unpaid sellers who had exercised a right of stoppage in transit, challenged the High Court's order directing the sale of a portion of the cargo pending the adjudication of their claims. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in ordering the sale of a perishable commodity before the final determination of the intervenors' ownership claims. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court acted within its lawful jurisdiction under the relevant procedural rules to order the sale of perishable goods to prevent loss and price escalation, while fully safeguarding the sale proceeds for the rightful claimants. The Court established that an appellate court or trial court possesses adequate powers to order the interim sale of perishable goods pending suit adjudication, provided the interests of rival claimants to the sale proceeds are preserved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the power to order the interim sale of perishable goods pending the adjudication of rival ownership claims?
  • Does an unpaid seller's right of stoppage in transit preclude the court from ordering the sale of goods subject to speedy and natural decay?
  • Can a high court pass orders affecting intervenors who were given an opportunity to be heard even if not formally impleaded as parties in the appeal?
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• Tmdin vs The State1984 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19
  rapemurderacquittal appealre-appraisement of evidencejoint trialHudood OrdinanceSection 342 examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Shariat Court judgment that reversed an acquittal and convicted the appellant for rape under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 and murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the competence of a trial court to try offences under both special and general laws in a single transaction, the legality of an appellate court further examining an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the criteria for interfering with an acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was competent to try both offences together under Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Offence of Zina Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an appellate court may re-examine an accused to ensure justice and is empowered to set aside an acquittal where the trial court’s reasoning is speculative, ignores relevant evidence, or results in a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court simultaneously try offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if committed in the same transaction?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to further examine an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances is an appellate court justified in setting aside an order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Sarwar Khan and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-23
  acquittalsection 249-Aleave to appealtrivial offenceprosecution evidencesummoning of witnessescriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The State sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which declined to interfere with an order of acquittal recorded under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case registered under Sections 427 and 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court rightly acquitted the respondents due to the failure of the prosecution to produce evidence after numerous adjournments. The Supreme Court observed that while the trial court failed to properly follow the procedural prerequisites of Section 249-A, including hearing the prosecutor and forming a formal opinion that the charge was groundless or that there was no probability of conviction, leave to appeal should still be refused because the case involved trivial property damage falling under the general exception of Section 95 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court laid down guidelines regarding the enforcement of witness attendance through coercive measures, the necessity of examining reasons for non-service of summons, and the mandatory requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing to the prosecutor or complainant before passing an acquittal order under Section 249-A.

  Questions settled

  • What are the procedural requirements for recording an order of acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal order based on the triviality of the offence under Section 95 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What steps must a trial court take when prosecution witnesses fail to appear in response to summons?
  • Is it mandatory to afford an opportunity of hearing to the prosecutor or complainant before recording an acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• The State vs Abdul Majid and Others1984 SCMR 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  prohibitionhaddtazirdrinkingcognizable offencepolice investigationarrest safeguardscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed multiple criminal appeals and petitions concerning offences under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of 'drinking' under Article 11, the mandatory nature of Rule 6 of the Punjab Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules, 1979, the scope of police powers of arrest and investigation under Article 12 and Article 16 of the Order, and whether procedural non-compliance vitiates a trial. The Court held that the offence of drinking includes being found in a state of drunkenness and is not restricted to the actual act of drinking witnessed live; that Rule 6 of the Rules applies to Excise Officers rather than police officers; and that procedural lapses or failure to strictly observe safeguards under Article 12(1) render the officer liable under Article 12(2) but do not vitiate the trial or affect the court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the State appeals were allowed and remanded, while certain individual appeals were dismissed with modifications to sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the offence of drinking under Article 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 is restricted to being found in the actual act of drinking or includes being found in a state of drunkenness?
  • Whether Rule 6 of the Punjab Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules, 1979 applies to police officers or is restricted to Excise and other competent non-police officers?
  • Does a breach of the arrest safeguards contained in Article 12(1) of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 vitiate the trial and render the court's cognizance illegal?
  • Whether an offence under Article 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 committed at a private place is a cognizable offence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary to Government of Punjab, Education Department, Lahore and Another vs Noor Muhammad Khan1984 PLD Supreme Court 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-14
  service tribunalqualifying servicepensioncivil servantdeputationfederal and provincial servicecompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal setting aside the retirement of the respondent civil servant under section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, on the ground that he had not completed twenty-five years of service qualifying for pension. The core legal question was whether service rendered under the Central Government, where the employee was not on deputation and was paid from the Federal Consolidated Fund, could be counted towards service qualifying for pension under the provincial rules, and whether total length of service is synonymous with service qualifying for pension. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Rule 2.1 of the West Pakistan Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963, qualifying service must be under the provincial government and paid from the Provincial Consolidated Fund, and that service under the Central Government without deputation does not count. The key principle laid down is that 'total service' and 'service qualifying for pension' are distinct, and inter-governmental service rendered without formal deputation cannot be clubbed for pensionary benefits unless explicitly authorized by the applicable pension rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service rendered under the Central Government can be counted towards service qualifying for pension under the provincial government without a formal deputation?
  • Is the expression 'service qualifying for pension' synonymous with 'total service' under the civil servants law?
  • Does time spent on service paid out of the Federal Consolidated Fund qualify for pension under Rule 2.1 of the West Pakistan Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of the Punjab and Others vs Syed Muhammad Akram1984 PLD Supreme Court 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24
  service tribunalmartial law instructionrule relaxationad hoc appointmenttehsildarjurisdiction barprovisional constitution order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court is directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal setting aside the removal of the respondent from the post of Tehsildar. The respondent had been appointed as a 'B' Class Tehsildar candidate in relaxation of rules due to an exemplary service record. Following a change in government, Martial Law Instruction No. 21 mandated the review of all appointments made through rule relaxation, leading to the respondent's reversion. The Service Tribunal accepted the respondent's appeal, holding that his appointment required no rule relaxation because the restrictive service requirement stood abolished by subsequent rules, thus excluding him from Martial Law Instruction No. 21. The core legal question was whether the respondent's appointment required rule relaxation, thereby attracting Martial Law Instruction No. 21 and rendering the Review Board's action immune from judicial review under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in interpreting the abolition rules, confirming that a rule relaxation was indeed necessary and that the removal order was protected from challenge. The appeal was allowed, though the Court recorded a concession by the Board of Revenue to consider the respondent for future promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of specific service experience under the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962 stood abolished by rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Change in Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of Classes) Rules, 1974?
  • Whether an appointment made in purported exercise of powers of relaxation of rules falls within the purview of Martial Law Instruction No. 21 as an ad hoc appointment?
  • Whether an order passed by a Review Board under Martial Law Instruction No. 21 is immune from being called in question in any court under Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981?
  Read full judgment →
• The Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and Another vs Muhammad Shoab1984 PLD Supreme Court 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictionmaster and servantstatutory bodyservice matterstermination of serviceeducational institutionstatutory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals challenging the Peshawar High Court's decisions to set aside the termination of a Head Clerk and a Senior Master from Cadet College, Kohat. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its writ jurisdiction to reinstate employees of a statutory body where no violation of statutory rules or regulations was established. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was unjustified. The Court affirmed that while an employee of a statutory body may invoke writ jurisdiction if their service conditions are governed by statutory rules, such jurisdiction is not available where the relationship is governed merely by internal instructions or where no statutory provision has been violated. The Court clarified that the 'master and servant' theory applies when statutory fetters are absent. Furthermore, the Court found that the respondents failed to demonstrate any violation of statutory provisions or rules in their removal. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, holding that in the absence of statutory violations, the High Court lacks the authority to interfere in the service matters of such institutions.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee of a statutory body invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court if their service conditions are not governed by statutory rules?
  • Does the 'master and servant' theory apply to employees of a statutory body when no statutory fetters on the power of dismissal exist?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a statutory body in the absence of a violation of any statutory provision or rule?
  • Does the mere fact that an institution is established under a statute automatically make all its employees holders of a 'public office' for the purpose of writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• The Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore vs Alam Ali and others1984 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-06
  compromise decreesection 12(2) CPCrejection of plaintpermanent injunctionWAPDAbar to suitcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a suit for permanent injunction filed against WAPDA to restrain them from installing electricity poles and lines over the respondents' land without paying compensation for mango trees. A compromise decree was passed based on admissions and statements of WAPDA officers. Subsequently, WAPDA filed an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 challenging the decree as collusive and fraudulent, and arguing a lack of authority. The executing court dismissed the application, but the District Judge in revision set aside the decree and rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Lahore High Court declared the revisional order without lawful authority and remanded the matter, leading to the current petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the suit was barred by law under the Telegraph Act 1885 and the WAPDA Act 1958. Holding that the mere authority to install lines without prior compensation does not bar the civil suit, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the statutory provisions do not operate as an absolute legal bar to the cognizance of a suit for permanent injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise decree be challenged under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of want of authority?
  • Whether the provisions of the Telegraph Act 1885 and the WAPDA Act 1958 operate as a legal bar to the maintenance of a suit for permanent injunction against WAPDA?
  • Is a revisional court competent to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while hearing a revision against an order under section 12(2) CPC?
  Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Development Authority vs The Commissioner, Lahore1984 SCMR 746 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-10
  land acquisitionregistration of sale deedcompensation awarddoctrine of relation backtransfer of propertyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over compensation for land acquired by the Lahore Development Authority (LDA). The LDA acquired land on June 22, 1976, under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. On June 19, 1976, the original owner executed a sale deed for a portion of this land in favor of a third party, which was subsequently registered on June 23, 1976. The Commissioner awarded compensation to the vendee, a decision the LDA challenged, arguing that the vendor lacked title to transfer the property after the acquisition date. The High Court dismissed the LDA's petition, relying on Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which dictates that a registered deed takes effect from the date of execution. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that registration of a deed after the transferor has lost interest in the property is legally permissible, as the transaction relates back to the earlier date of execution. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, confirming that Section 47 creates no bar to such registration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale deed registered after the acquisition of the subject property by a statutory authority remain valid?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 regarding the date of operation of a registered deed?
  • Can a vendor transfer title to property after it has been acquired by a development authority?
  Read full judgment →
• The Cooperative Zenith Industries Ltd., D. G. Khan vs Mst. Qayyuman and Others1984 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-20
  land acquisitioncompany acquisitionurgency provisionsright of hearingstatutory preconditionnotificationobjections
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an interested party whose land is proposed to be acquired for a company is entitled to a hearing during an inquiry under section 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land in question was notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, along with urgency provisions under section 17, which excluded the application of section 5-A objections. The trial court decreed the landowners' suit declaring the acquisition void due to non-compliance with statutory preconditions. The District Judge allowed the appeal, but the High Court restored the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the powers under section 17 to exclude section 5-A cannot be invoked prior to obtaining the previous consent of the Government and executing the agreement with the company as mandated by section 39. The Court established that failure to comply with these statutory prerequisites vitiates the entire acquisition proceedings, thereby preserving the landowners' right to file objections and be heard under section 5-A.

  Questions settled

  • Can urgency provisions under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 be invoked before complying with the requirements of sections 39 and 40?
  • Whether the failure to execute an agreement with the company prior to issuing a notification under section 6 vitiates the entire land acquisition proceedings?
  • Does the exclusion of section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 remain valid if the initial notification under section 17 is issued before obtaining the Government's consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasaduq Hussain vs The ST a Te1984 SCMR 1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-17
  murderleave to appealocular evidencecircumstantial evidenceappreciation of evidencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, carrying a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine. The prosecution's case rested on the petitioner allegedly killing the deceased in a servant quarter, motivated by resentment over the deceased divorcing the petitioner's sister. The conviction was based on the ocular testimony of the deceased's brother and circumstantial evidence, including the petitioner's arrest near the crime scene with the weapon. The petitioner challenged the reliability of the eyewitness and alleged discrepancies in the arrest circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, after reviewing the record, held that both the trial court and the High Court had appreciated the evidence in full accord with well-settled legal principles. Finding no justification for interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in the manner of an accused's arrest soon after a crime are sufficient to discard reliable ocular and circumstantial evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained primarily on the ocular testimony of a single close relative of the deceased supported by circumstantial evidence?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Din and 101 Others vs The Chief Land Commissioner and OthersP LD 1984 Supreme Court 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land reformsstate landresumption of landtenants' rightssale schemeproprietary rightsland commission jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a series of civil appeals raising common questions of law concerning whether State land surrendered by grantees under various Land Reforms Regulations, notably the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959, is available for disposal by sale to tenants in cultivating possession or under subsequent sale schemes. The Supreme Court examined the legal nature of State-owned land leased to grantees, which upon surrender or resumption reverts directly to the Government rather than vesting in the Land Commission for disposal under the Land Reforms Regulations. The Court held that proprietary interests of the Provincial Government remain untouched and unaffected by the Land Reforms Regulations, and the Land Commission lacks jurisdiction to dispose of such State-owned reverted lands to tenants under its sale schemes. Consequently, cultivating tenants cannot legally claim transfer or purchase rights over such State land from the Land Commission. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether State land surrendered by grantees under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 is available for disposal by sale to cultivating tenants by the Land Commission?
  • Does the Land Commission have jurisdiction over the proprietary interests of the Provincial Government in State-owned lands leased to grantees?
  • Are cultivating tenants entitled to claim the purchase of State land resumed from lessees under the provisions of the Land Reforms Regulations or related sale schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Hussain vs The State1984 SCMR 1503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  murderdeath sentenceinjured witnesseyewitness testimonycriminal petitionmedical corroborationparricide
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the murder of his father and mother, as well as a conviction for a murderous assault on his sister-in-law. The core legal question involved the reliability of eyewitness testimony, including an injured witness, in establishing the petitioner's guilt for patricide, matricide, and assault over a land dispute. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through credible eyewitness accounts and supporting medical evidence. The court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, establishing that the testimony of an injured eyewitness, corroborated by medical evidence and unaffected by any false implication motive, is sufficient to maintain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder without independent corroboration?
  • Can a death sentence be upheld on the basis of concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts when eyewitness and medical evidence corroborate each other?
  • Does a family dispute over property provide sufficient motive for murder when established by credible prosecution evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Tahirulhassan Zaidi vs Mst. Nusrat Tahirulhassan and Others1984 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  dower debtconcurrent findingsconstitutional petitionsupreme courtappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-payment of a dower debt. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding a disputed bank transaction for the payment of dower could be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where the trial court and the appellate court concurrently found upon an appraisal of evidence that the bank transaction representing the payment of dower was fake and that the wife was not the recipient, such concurrent findings of fact are unexceptionable and cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the superior courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on appreciation of evidence in constitutional petitions unless such findings are shown to be suffering from any grave illegality or jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the payment of dower be challenged in a constitutional petition?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact affirmed by the High Court based on an appraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mustafa Ali vs The Settlement and Claims Commissioner, Lahore1984 SCMR 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-19
  verification of claimsjoint claimreview applicationacquiescencedisplaced personssettlement claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by Syed Mustafa Ali against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of his review application by the Settlement and Claims Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the appellant's applications for a pro rata share in a joint claim could be treated as independent miscellaneous applications rather than applications for review of a past order, particularly when he had acquiesced in the initial verification order and failed to challenge it through statutory remedies. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's subsequent applications effectively sought to set aside the earlier final order in which he had acquiesced, and he could not claim the benefit of enhanced verification achieved solely by other co-sharers who had diligently pursued their legal remedies. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a party cannot bypass statutory remedies or benefit from the vigilance of others without pursuing timely legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for a pro rata share in a joint claim can be treated as an independent application rather than a review of a previous order?
  • Can a claimant who acquiesced in an initial verification order claim the benefit of an enhanced valuation achieved solely through the diligence of co-sharers who pursued legal remedies?
  • Whether a review application filed beyond the statutory limitation period is maintainable under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Mashooq vs Mst. Nafis Fatima and Others1984 SCMR 1138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-30
  Constitution petitiondowermaintenanceIddat periodconcurrent findings of factfamily court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the Sind High Court, which had upheld concurrent findings of the lower courts granting a divorced wife decrees for dower and maintenance during the Iddat period. The core legal questions involved whether concurrent factual findings regarding dower and maintenance could be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction, and whether pleas regarding the legality of the marriage, raised for the first time without being pleaded in the petition, could be considered. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on evidence by the lower courts are unexceptionable and cannot be challenged in a Constitution petition, and that pleas not raised in the petition or in the original family proceedings cannot be entertained. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to reopen concurrent findings of fact based on evidence, nor to entertain new factual pleas not raised in the pleadings below.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding dower and maintenance be challenged in a Constitution petition?
  • Whether a party can raise new pleas regarding the legality of a marriage for the first time in a Constitution petition without pleading them in the petition or before the trial court?
  • Are findings of fact based on evidence by lower courts open to interference under constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mueen Uddin vs Saeeda Parveen1984 SCMR 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01
  landlord and tenantcollateral impeachmentvoidable decreerent restrictionjurisdiction of rent controllercivil court decreeeviction proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction order under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller or an appellate authority, acting under the Ordinance, possesses the jurisdiction to collaterally impeach a civil court decree on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the appellate authority exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the civil decree a nullity. The Court affirmed that a decree obtained by fraud is voidable, not void, and remains operative until set aside by a competent court of plenary jurisdiction. Consequently, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, being tribunals of limited jurisdiction, cannot disregard such a decree in collateral proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while a Rent Controller must determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship as a foundational fact, they cannot challenge the validity of a civil court decree establishing title, as such decrees are binding until formally rescinded or recalled in appropriate proceedings before a competent court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller or appellate authority under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 collaterally impeach a civil court decree?
  • Is a decree obtained by fraud void or voidable?
  • Does a tribunal with limited jurisdiction have the power to disregard a decree passed by a court of plenary jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Masood Hussain Zahidi vs Aziz Ahmed1984 SCMR 945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-01
  rehabilitation settlement schemeallotment of landmaximum limitdeputy rehabilitation commissionerfirst come first servedagricultural landevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition concerning the allotment of agricultural land in Chak No. 44/NB, Sargodha. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Commissioner/Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in fixing a maximum limit of 12 1/2 acres for land allotments in the estate, thereby curtailing the appellant's adjustment of his full claim, and whether paragraph 11 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme or the principle of 'first come first served' applied. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Commissioner's order limiting allotments was not issued under paragraph 11 of the Scheme—which applies to rateable distribution when temporary allotments cannot be satisfied—but was a valid exercise of administrative power to account for local conditions and accommodate multiple claimants on valuable land near the town, pursuant to the broader objectives of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The Court further held that the principle of 'first come first served' was inapplicable given the competent authority's power to regulate allotments equitably. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner is competent to fix a maximum limit on land allotments in an estate independently of paragraph 11 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Does paragraph 11 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme apply to estates where land was not previously open to temporary allotment?
  • Can a claimant enforce a vested legal right to obtain land to the extent of his full entitlement in a particular area to the detriment of other claimants?
  • Is the principle of 'first come first served' applicable to land allotments under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme where authorities regulate distribution based on local conditions?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Irshad Ali Shah vs Mst. Rahim Bibi and Others1984 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-28
  temporary injunctioninterim reliefregularization of possessiongovernment policybalance of conveniencearguable caseunauthorized occupant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order granting a temporary injunction in a suit regarding the possession of a government plot. The core legal question was whether the respondent, an alleged unauthorized occupant, established a prima facie case for interim relief based on a government policy allowing for the regularization of unauthorized possession. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting the injunction. The Court reasoned that the respondent’s claim was grounded in a specific government policy letter, and since she was in physical possession with existing construction, the lower courts erred in dismissing her application solely on the basis of her status as an unauthorized occupant without considering the regularization policy. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence to rebut the respondent's claim regarding the timing of her possession. The key principle laid down is that where a government policy provides for the regularization of unauthorized possession, such policy must be considered when determining the balance of convenience for interim relief, and an arguable case exists if the occupant’s claim aligns with such policy criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction to an unauthorized occupant if a government policy exists for the potential regularization of such possession?
  • Does a stranger to a suit have the right to file an appeal against an order if they are adversely affected by it?
  • Is the status of an occupant as a trespasser sufficient grounds to deny equitable relief when a government policy for regularization is invoked?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Iqbal Samie and others vs Jam Gul Muhammad and another1984 SCMR 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-09
  specific performanceMartial Law Regulation 64land alienationestoppelapprobate and reprobatepre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal question was whether the agreement to sell was void under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 due to alleged violations regarding land holdings and whether the respondents were estopped from asserting the validity of the transaction due to their prior pleadings in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the transaction did not violate Martial Law Regulation No. 64 as the alienor intended to divest himself of his entire holding. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument of estoppel, noting that the respondents had consistently maintained the validity of the transaction. The Court affirmed that the High Court's assessment of the facts and law was correct, emphasizing that the timing of the transactions did not render them invalid when the clear intent was a simultaneous divestment of the entire holding. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell land violate Martial Law Regulation No. 64 if the alienor intends to divest himself of his entire holding?
  • Can a party be estopped from asserting the validity of a transaction based on their pleadings in a prior, separate pre-emption suit?
  • Does the timing of mutation entries for separate land transactions invalidate them under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 if the intent is simultaneous divestment?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghulam Hussain Shah vs Syed Sadiq Hussain Shah and others1984 SCMR 1419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-10
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIDisplaced Persons ActProperty TransferRural PropertyPhysical OccupationAllottee Rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop located in Mauza Gheela Khurd, Tehsil and District Rawalpindi, between a petitioner in actual physical occupation and a respondent who is the allottee. Both parties sought the transfer of the property under Settlement Scheme No. VII, framed pursuant to the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Settlement Department initially ruled in favor of the petitioner based on his undisputed physical occupation. However, the High Court overturned this decision, determining that the petitioner's possession was merely permissive and thus inferior to the rights of the allottee. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether a person in actual physical occupation possesses a superior entitlement to the transfer of rural property compared to an allottee, specifically interpreting the provisions of paragraph 3 of Settlement Scheme No. VII regarding the disposal of rural properties in minor villages. The Court ordered the continuation of an existing interim order pending the final adjudication of this legal question.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person in actual physical occupation of a rural property have a superior entitlement to its transfer over an allottee under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • How should paragraph 3 of Settlement Scheme No. VII be interpreted regarding the transfer of rural properties in minor villages?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Gama Shah vs Zahoor Qureshi and 5 Others1984 SCMR 1004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  acquittalofficial sanctioncriminal complaintleave to appealpolice protectionSection 265-K acquittalprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a complainant in a criminal case against police officers, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that refused to grant leave to appeal against an acquittal. The Sessions Judge had acquitted the respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, concluding that the prosecution was barred by the lack of prior sanction required under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that there was no likelihood of conviction based on the available evidence. The petitioner argued that the acquittal was premature as only two witnesses had been examined by the Sessions Judge and that the initial High Court finding of a prima facie case precluded such an acquittal. The Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings and found that the Sessions Judge had extensively analyzed the evidence and the conduct of the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge correctly determined that the respondents' actions were protected under Section 197 and that conviction was unlikely. Consequently, the Court found no legal error in the High Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if it determines that the prosecution lacks the mandatory sanction required by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 premature if only a portion of the prosecution witnesses have been examined?
  • Does a prior High Court finding of a prima facie case in a revision petition preclude a trial court from subsequently acquitting the accused under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Syed Amjad Ali and Others vs Mian Brothers & Co. and Others1984 SCMR 961 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-08
  public auctionproperty demarcationsettlement lawcontractual interpretationauction bid-sheetproperty identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the scope of property auctioned by the Settlement Department. The petitioners, having purchased 'Chopra Building' (Property No. S-19-R-67) at a public auction, sought possession of an additional workshop, claiming it was part of the auctioned property. The Settlement Commissioner, however, determined that the workshop in question was a distinct property (No. S-19-R-67-A) and not included in the auction. The Lahore High Court upheld this finding, relying on the auction notice, property plans, and municipal records which clearly demarcated the two properties. The Supreme Court examined the auction bid-sheet and supporting documentation, finding that the bid was explicitly for Property No. S-19-R-67. The Court held that the petitioners were contractually bound by the specific property description and number auctioned. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the petitioners could not claim a separate property (No. S-19-R-67-A) that was not part of the original auction contract.

  Questions settled

  • Does an auction bid for a specific property number include adjacent properties not explicitly described in the auction notice?
  • Can a purchaser of property at a public auction claim possession of land that is separately numbered and distinct in municipal records?
  • Is a purchaser bound by the property description and number provided in the official auction notice and bid-sheet?
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• Syed Ali Shah and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-07
  murder convictionocular testimonyabscondencecorroborationcriminal appealinterested witnessappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the wife of the first appellant. The core legal questions were whether the ocular testimony of a single witness, present at the scene, was sufficient to sustain a conviction despite allegations of interest, and whether the abscondence of the accused provided adequate corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the conviction. The Court held that the ocular testimony was natural, credible, and independent, as the witness had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants. The Court established that abscondence, particularly when an accused fails to attend the funeral of their spouse, constitutes significant corroborative evidence of guilt. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that where ocular testimony is found to be truthful and the witness's presence at the scene is undisputed, it can sustain a conviction even if other pieces of evidence, such as the recovery of a weapon from a co-accused, are excluded or found inconclusive.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of ocular testimony if the witness is found to be independent and credible?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person following a murder provide sufficient corroboration to support a conviction?
  • Is the failure to recover a weapon from the accused fatal to the prosecution's case when other evidence is present?
  • Can a spouse's failure to attend the funeral of the deceased be considered as evidence of abscondence?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Akhtar Abbas vs Mushtaq Ahmad and Others1984 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-04
  evacuee propertytransfer of evacuee housesettlement schemeauction-purchaserlocal occupantlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee house valued at Rs. 12,000 under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question involves determining whether the auction-purchaser or the local occupant was legally entitled to the transfer of the property under the applicable settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities and the High Court correctly determined that the local occupant was entitled to the transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, rendering the subsequent auction of the house invalid and leaving the auction-purchaser without locus standi. The key principle laid down is that where an evacuee property is rightfully transferable to a local occupant under the operative settlement scheme, a prior auction-purchaser acquires no enforceable right or locus standi in the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a local occupant is entitled to the transfer of an evacuee house under Settlement Scheme No. VIII over an auction-purchaser?
  • Does an auction-purchaser have locus standi to challenge the transfer of an evacuee house when the property was improperly put to auction?
  Read full judgment →
• Swat Corn Products Ltd., Sakhakot, Malakand vs Firm Mir Wali Khan &1984 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  interest on decretal amountbreach of contractsale of goodsrecovery of pricecivil procedureequitable jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five civil petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed trial court decrees awarding the respondents (foodgrain merchants) the price of goods supplied to the petitioner (a limited company), along with interest. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to claim interest on the outstanding amounts in the absence of an express contractual agreement, and whether the courts below erred in awarding such interest. The Supreme Court observed that the respondents had supplied goods to the petitioner, and the lower courts had concurrently found the respondents entitled to the claimed amounts based on evidence. The Court held that while a seller suing for damages for breach of contract may face restrictions regarding interest, the respondents here were suing for the price of goods sold and delivered. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitions, affirming the lower courts' decisions to award interest from the date of the institution of the suits until recovery, as the findings were supported by the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a seller recover interest on the price of goods sold in the absence of an express contract?
  • Does Section 61(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 allow for interest on the price of goods from the date of tender?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to interest on the decretal amount from the date of the institution of the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer, Province Building Circle, Building1984 SCMR 1450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-19
  compulsory retirementapprobate and reprobatecontrolling authorityPunjab Service Tribunalleave preparatory to retirementSub-Engineer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had set aside an order of compulsory retirement passed against a Sub-Engineer upon completion of 25 years of service. The appellant department contended that the respondent was a permanent Sub-Engineer whose competent appointing and removing authority was the Superintending Engineer under the relevant delegation of power rules. The department further argued that the respondent's temporary posting as an officiating S.D.O. in his own pay and grade did not alter his substantive status or controlling authority. Additionally, the department highlighted that the respondent had requested and enjoyed one year of leave preparatory to retirement after the retirement order. The Supreme Court examined the appointment order and relevant statutory provisions, holding that the review and retirement order passed by the competent Superintending Engineer under Section 12(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 was valid. The Court further ruled that having availed the leave benefits, the respondent could not approbate and reprobate. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a temporary posting of a civil servant in their own pay and grade alter their substantive status or competent controlling authority?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a retirement order after applying for and enjoying leave preparatory to retirement benefits under the principle of approbate and reprobate?
  • Is an order of retirement passed under Section 12(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 by the competent authority valid after completion of 25 years of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Mahmood and others vs Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue, Lahore and others1984 SCMR 1254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-23
  pre-emptionpreferential righttenant possessionKhasra Girdawariconcurrent findingsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal are directed against the judgments and orders of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dismissing writ petitions concerning a pre-emption matter. The core legal question revolves around whether the pre-emptor possessed a preferential right of pre-emption as a tenant on the relevant dates—namely the date of sale, the date of the suit, and the date of the decree—under section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, read with paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation (MLR 115) of 1972. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower revenue authorities and the High Court regarding the tenant's continuous possession of the land for over a decade were unexceptionable, as no misreading of evidence was established. The key principle laid down is that concurrent factual determinations regarding possession and tenancy in pre-emption suits, supported by Khasra Girdawari entries, will not be interfered with in leave to appeal proceedings unless misreading of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is required to possess a preferential right on the date of sale, the date of suit, and the date of decree?
  • Does paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation (MLR 115) of 1972 form part of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities and the High Court regarding tenancy and possession without proof of misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmad vs Malik Aman and another1984 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-19
  bail cancellationnon-appearance of accusedcriminal procedurebailable warrantsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed with special leave of the Supreme Court, challenged an order granting bail to the respondent in a case involving Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a subsequent order by the Peshawar High Court refusing to cancel that bail. The respondent failed to appear before the Supreme Court despite being served with bailable warrants. The Court declined to adjudicate the cancellation of bail on the merits of the underlying criminal case in the respondent's absence. However, the Court held that bail may be cancelled due to the accused's failure to ensure their appearance before the Court. Consequently, the bail previously granted by the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate was cancelled. The Court clarified that this order did not preclude the respondent from filing a fresh bail petition before the Sessions Court, which would then be decided on its own merits in accordance with the law as amended.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be cancelled by an appellate court due to the accused's failure to appear?
  • Does the cancellation of bail by an appellate court for non-appearance bar the accused from filing a fresh bail application in the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Suhail Jute Mills Ltd. Other. vs Federation Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1984 (CL.) 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17
  customs dutysurchargeexempt areaplant and machineryleave to appealtax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition for leave to appeal concerning the legality of levying a 5% additional customs duty as a surcharge on the value of imported plant and machinery. The core legal question revolves around whether the said surcharge could be imposed under section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982, notwithstanding a specific Notification dated 26th of June, 1982 issued under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, which exempted the import of plant and machinery intended for installation in exempt areas such as Noshehra from such surcharges and additional customs duties. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine this question, confirmed the earlier interim order subject to conditions regarding the deposit of interest on the bank guarantee, and directed that the appeal be heard at an early date. The key principle entails interpreting the scope of statutory exemption notifications issued under customs laws vis-a-vis subsequent or general taxing provisions under finance ordinances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether 5% additional customs duty as surcharge can be levied on the value of plant and machinery pursuant to section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982?
  • Does a notification issued under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 exempting the import of plant and machinery in exempt areas override the levy of additional customs duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Sufi Siddique Akbar vs Secretary, F.W.L. and Fisheries, Punjab1984 SCMR 1416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-12
  service appeallimitationcivil servantdepartmental appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a civil servant against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal on the ground of limitation. The core legal question concerns the determination of the correct starting point for limitation in a service appeal where the petitioner challenged a departmental order regarding his scale of pay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the special order passed on 5-6-1978 correctly served as the starting point for agitating the grievance, and subsequent delayed representations could not bridge the long gap of limitation. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision on limitation as unexceptionable and dismissed the petition without entering into the merits. The key principle laid down is that repeated departmental representations do not extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the starting point for limitation in a service appeal involving a departmental grievance?
  • Do repeated departmental representations extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Su Bhanu Ddin vs Director, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, G.H.Q., Rawalpindi1984 SCMR 1233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-11
  service tribunallimitationcondonation of delayselection gradedepartmental representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment and order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's service appeal before the Tribunal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation after the communication of the departmental order regarding his claim for a selection grade as a Stenographer. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed as the petitioner failed to file his appeal before the Tribunal within 30 days of the receipt of the order of the Ministry of Defence and did not file any application for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that statutory limitation periods for service appeals must be strictly adhered to, and an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period without an application for condonation of delay is incompetent and liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal filed beyond the period of thirty days from the communication of the departmental order is barred by limitation?
  • Is it mandatory to file an application for condonation of delay when an appeal is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Su a LI H Oon vs The State1984 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-03
  criminal petitionstolen propertyconvictionreappraisal of evidencerevisionpossession of stolen goods
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had resulted in a sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment by a Magistrate, and was subsequently upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge and the Lahore High Court in revision. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in appreciating the evidence and sustaining the conviction where the petitioner failed to offer a reasonable explanation for possessing stolen articles and falsely alleged enmity with the Investigating Officer. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that sufficient legal evidence sustained the conviction, noting the lack of any claim of ownership or reasonable explanation regarding the stolen property, and the falsehood of the alleged enmity. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that concurrent findings based on legal evidence regarding possession of stolen property without a plausible explanation will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal petition where concurrent findings of guilt have been rendered by the lower courts?
  • Does a conviction under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 stand when the accused fails to give a reasonable explanation for possession of stolen articles?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Sh. Salim Ali Chairman, Ali Brother & Company Lahore, AlongwithPTCL 1984 (CL) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  smugglingcustoms dutyimport policycriminal proceedingsquashing of proceedingsjob-lotstock-lot
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three criminal appeals against a High Court judgment that quashed proceedings against respondents accused of importing ammunition in contravention of the Import Policy Order, 1974. The prosecution alleged that the imported ammunition was of 'job-lot' or 'stock-lot' quality, which was prohibited, thereby constituting smuggling under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established that the goods were indeed prohibited 'job-lot' or 'stock-lot' items, and whether the Special Judge, Customs, had jurisdiction to try the matter as smuggling. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove that the ammunition was of the alleged prohibited quality. Prosecution witnesses admitted the goods were brand new and in original packaging, and the definition of the prohibited terms was not established by any official notification. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to substantiate its allegations on merit. The appeals were dismissed, and the Court observed that no case remained for adjudication, allowing the respondents to seek the release of their goods from the Customs Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the import of goods alleged to be of 'job-lot' or 'stock-lot' quality without a specific notification defining such terms constitute smuggling under the Customs Act 1969?
  • Can criminal proceedings be sustained when the prosecution fails to provide evidence that the imported goods fall within a prohibited category?
  • Is the High Court empowered to quash criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution's case lacks evidentiary support?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Muhammad Yaqub Khan1984 SCMR 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-01
  criminal appealacquittallimitationcondonation of delayforest offenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court acquitting the respondent of an offence under section 9 of the N.-W. F. P. Hazara Forest Act, 1936, and setting aside his conviction by the trial Magistrate. The core legal question concerned whether the petition, barred by limitation, warranted condonation of delay and whether interference on merits was justified against the acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by limitation by 15 days due to a mistake by the State, and since the respondent had acquired a valuable right to liberty, no sufficient ground existed for condonation of delay. Furthermore, upon examining the impugned judgment, the Court found it unsuitable for interference on merits. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principle that delay by the State in filing appeals against acquittal will not be condoned lightly, particularly when valuable rights of liberty have accrued to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against an acquittal can be entertained when it is barred by limitation?
  • Will a mistake on the part of the State constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing a criminal petition?
  • Is interference warranted against an acquittal where the respondent has acquired a valuable right to liberty?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Abdul Majid and Others1984 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-15
  Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Orderdrinking offencecognizable offencearrest procedureprocedural irregularitycriminal trialmedical examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple appeals concerning the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of "drinking" as an offence under Article 11, the applicability of Rule 6 of the Punjab Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules, 1979, to police officers, and the consequences of non-compliance with the arrest procedure mandated by Article 12(1) of the Order. The Court held that the offence of drinking is not restricted to the act of consumption in the presence of witnesses but includes being found in a state of intoxication. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Rule 6, which required forwarding arrested persons to a Prohibition Officer, did not apply to police officers, who possess independent powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Regarding Article 12(1), the Court ruled that while police must follow the prescribed medical examination procedure before arrest, failure to do so renders the officer liable but does not vitiate the trial or the court's jurisdiction. The principle established is that procedural irregularities in arrest do not automatically invalidate a subsequent criminal trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of drinking under Article 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, require the accused to be caught in the act of drinking?
  • Does the failure of a police officer to follow the arrest procedure in Article 12(1) of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, vitiate the trial?
  • Are police officers required to forward arrested persons to a Prohibition Officer under Rule 6 of the Punjab Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules, 1979?
  • Is the offence of drinking under Article 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, restricted to consumption in a public place?
  Read full judgment →
• State through National Bank of Pakistan vs Mumtaz Ahmad and Others1984 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-29
  locus standipublic prosecutorcomplainant's counselconduct of prosecutionspecial judgecriminal law amendmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order passed by the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of a Special Judge that dismissed an application filed by the counsel for the complainant-Bank to recall and re-examine prosecution witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a corruption trial under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a private complainant's counsel has the independent locus standi to file applications and conduct prosecution proceedings independently of the Public Prosecutor under section 6(1) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that criminal prosecution is a matter for the State and that under the applicable statutory framework, the person conducting the prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. The counsel for the complainant may only assist the Public Prosecutor and cannot act independently or possess an independent status, avoiding confusion from multiple prosecutors. The key principle laid down is that while a complainant's counsel can assist, the active conduct of prosecution vests exclusively in the Public Prosecutor unless the State appoints the private counsel as a Special Public Prosecutor.

  Questions settled

  • Does a complainant's counsel have the independent locus standi to file applications and conduct prosecution before a Special Judge without the Public Prosecutor?
  • Whether the counsel for a private complainant can act independently of the Public Prosecutor under section 6(1) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
  • Can a private counsel be permitted to conduct prosecution in place of a Public Prosecutor if appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor by the State?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and Others1984 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17
  customs dutysurchargeexemption notificationimport of machineryFinance Ordinancetax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the imposition of a 5% additional customs duty, characterized as a surcharge, on the value of imported plant and machinery. The core legal question presented is whether this surcharge can be validly levied under Section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982, notwithstanding a prior Notification dated 26th of June, 1980, issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969. The 1980 Notification had specifically granted an exemption from such additional customs duties for plant and machinery intended for installation in designated exempt areas, such as Noshehra. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the interplay between the subsequent Finance Ordinance and the earlier exemption notification. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court confirmed the interim order previously passed, directing that interest payable on the bank guarantee provided by the petitioner must remain deposited in the bank until the final decision of the appeal. The Court further ordered an early hearing of the appeal on the existing record, granting parties liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a 5% additional customs duty be levied on plant and machinery under the Finance Ordinance 1982 if such machinery was previously exempted by a notification under the Customs Act 1969?
  • Does a notification issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 exempting machinery from customs duty prevail over a subsequent surcharge imposed by the Finance Ordinance 1982?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj vs The State1984 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murdercapital sentenceocular evidencechance witnessmedical evidence conflictwithholding independent witnessacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Hajran. The core legal question pertained to whether the ocular evidence was sufficient and trustworthy to sustain a capital conviction, given allegations of pre-statement consultation, interested/chance witnesses, non-examination of an independent witness, and conflict with medical evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The Court observed that the primary eye-witness admitted to pre-statement deliberation at the police station before charging the appellant, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. Additionally, the presence of chance witnesses was unconvincing, the sole independent witness was withheld, and medical findings regarding the contents of the deceased's stomach and bladder directly contradicted the claim that she was returning after answering the call of nature. The Court held that deliberate consultation, unexplainable chance witnesses, and sharp medical contradictions create reasonable doubt entitling the accused to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 PPC be sustained where eye-witnesses deliberate and consult at the police station prior to recording their statements?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a chance witness who resides far from the place of occurrence and fails to offer a plausible reason for his presence?
  • Does a material conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the state of the deceased's body create reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Din vs Suba (through His Legal Heirs)1984 SCMR 722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-16
  evictionpersonal needfree dispensarylandlord and tenantcharitable purposerent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave addresses whether the establishment of a free dispensary constitutes a valid ground for the eviction of a tenant under rent restriction law. The appellant sought the eviction of the respondent tenant from residential premises to set up a free dispensary for poor people. The Rent Controller and the first appellate court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court reversed this decision, holding that opening a free dispensary is a charitable object for public benefit and does not fall within the scope of landlord's personal need under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory ground permitting eviction for the landlord's own occupation requires physical possession and personal use by the landlord or their dependents, which cannot be extended to running a charitable free dispensary for others. The principle laid down is that a landlord cannot seek ejectment for a charitable purpose under the guise of personal need unless the requirement is directly co-related to the landlord's own physical occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the setting up of a free dispensary a ground recognised for eviction under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can the personal need of a landlord for eviction be extended to encompass charitable activities for the public benefit?
  • Does the requirement of 'his own occupation' under the rent restriction law include running a dispensary for poor people?
  Read full judgment →
• Sind Alkalis Ltd. vs Presiding Officer, Ivth Sind Labour Court, Karachi1984 SCMR 712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-22
  territorial jurisdictionindustrial relationslabour courtcoram non judicewaiver of objectionprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addressed whether Labour Court No. IV, Karachi, lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance filed by an employee against his employer, Sind Alkalis Limited. The employee, who worked at the company's factory in Landhi (within the jurisdiction of Labour Court No. IV), was transferred and subsequently dismissed. The company argued that only Labour Court No. V, where the Head Office was located, possessed jurisdiction. The Supreme Court observed that the company failed to raise the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction in its reply statement or at the commencement of proceedings. Instead, the company fully participated in the litigation, cross-examined witnesses, and produced evidence on the merits. Given this inordinate delay and the advanced stage of the proceedings, the Court declined to adjudicate the abstract question of whether the proceedings were coram non judice. Consequently, the Court rescinded the leave to appeal previously granted, resulting in the automatic dismissal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court after fully participating in the proceedings on the merits?
  • Does the location of a factory versus the location of a Head Office determine the territorial jurisdiction for an application under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Hayat vs Superintendent of Police Sahiwal and others1984 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-25
  pro forma promotionadverse remarksannual confidential reportservice tribunalpolice officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a police inspector seeking pro forma promotion after the expunction of certain adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pro forma promotion when his adverse remarks for the year 1978 were only partially expunged. The Supreme Court held that according to the applicable departmental instructions contained in the Government of the Punjab circular letter, where adverse remarks are only partially expunged, an official is not entitled to pro forma promotion. The court accordingly dismissed the petition, establishing the principle that partial expunction of adverse remarks disentitles a civil servant to pro forma promotion under the governing administrative rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is entitled to pro forma promotion when their adverse remarks are only partially expunged?
  • Does the partial expunction of adverse remarks preclude the grant of pro forma promotion under the administrative circulars governing Punjab civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Siddique Khan and 2 Others vs Abdul Shakur Khan and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  deficient court-feepre-emption suitlimitationmemorandum of appealcontumacymala fidesvested right of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two civil appeals by special leave arose from judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning pre-emption suits, specifically addressing the payment of deficient court-fees and the resulting impact on limitation. The core legal questions involved whether the court-fee payable on an appeal is governed by the law in force at the time of the institution of the suit or the appeal, whether the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(b) and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals by virtue of section 107(2), and whether an appeal or suit can be dismissed as time-barred due to deficient court-fee without first affording an opportunity to make good the deficiency, unless there is contumacy or positive mala fides. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that court-fees on appeals are leviable according to the law prevailing at the time of filing the appeal as part of regulatory procedure, and that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(b) and (c) apply equally to memoranda of appeals via section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court laid down that a court is legally bound to afford an opportunity to supply deficient court-fees, and the question of limitation must not be factored into the exercise of discretion under section 149 unless the party is guilty of contumacy or positive mala fides.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(b) and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals by virtue of section 107(2)?
  • Whether the court-fee leviable on an appeal is governed by the law in force at the time of the institution of the suit or at the time of the filing of the appeal?
  • Whether a court is legally bound to afford an opportunity to supply deficient court-fees before rejecting a plaint or memorandum of appeal?
  • Can considerations relating to the law of limitation be taken into account when exercising discretion under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for granting time to make up a deficiency in court-fee?
  Read full judgment →
• Shouki alias Shoukat and Another vs The State and Another1984 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-10
  bail cancellationstatutory delayunder-trial prisonerco-accusedcriminal procedureright to bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order cancelling the bail of two appellants, Shouki alias Shoukat and Shafi Muhammad, who were facing trial for murder. The core legal question was whether the statutory delay provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which denies bail if the delay is occasioned by the act or omission of the accused, applies collectively to co-accused or must be assessed individually. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the co-accused as a single unit. The ratio is that the 'act or omission' causing delay must be attributed to the specific accused seeking bail; the conduct of a co-accused cannot deprive an individual of the statutory benefit of bail if that individual is not personally responsible for the delay. Consequently, the Court restored bail for the appellant who was not responsible for the delay but upheld the cancellation for the appellant whose own counsel's frequent absences caused the trial to be delayed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act or omission of a co-accused in delaying a trial deprive other co-accused of the statutory benefit of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should the conduct of an accused regarding trial delay be assessed individually or collectively when determining eligibility for bail?
  • Can an accused claim that trial delay caused by their counsel's frequent absence is not attributable to their own act or omission?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Mst. Anwari Begum and others1984 SCMR 1407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-18
  Settlement Scheme No. 8property resumptiondemand noticesubstituted servicetransfer of propertyprocedural due process
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the resumption of property under Settlement Scheme No. 8. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner’s resumption of property due to non-payment was lawful, given the procedural irregularities in serving the demand notice and the subsequent resumption order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court’s decision that the resumption was invalid. The Court established that statutory demand notices must be served via registered acknowledgment-due cover, with substituted service permissible only after the failure of this primary method. Furthermore, any report of refusal of service must be properly witnessed. The Court emphasized that a transferee retains the right to satisfy payment obligations even after a resumption order, provided the property has not been transferred to a third party. Crucially, the resumption order itself must be served upon the transferee to be effective. Because the Settlement authorities failed to follow these mandatory procedural requirements, the resumption of the property was deemed without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is substituted service of a demand notice permissible without first attempting service via registered acknowledgment-due cover?
  • Does a transferee have the right to make payment for property after a resumption order has been passed?
  • Must a resumption order be served upon the transferee to be considered valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and Another vs Rana Badar Munir and Others1984 SCMR 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05
  pre-emptiondisplaced personstemporary allotmentcivil court jurisdictionleave to appealevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal addresses the competency of a suit for pre-emption concerning land allotted to displaced persons from Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The trial court and the Additional District Judge initially held that civil courts lacked jurisdiction over such suits, citing the specific scheme for temporary allotment of rural evacuee agricultural land to Jammu and Kashmir displaced persons. However, the High Court reversed this decision, relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in Haji Sultan Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddiq, which it interpreted as allowing pre-emption in such cases. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the High Court misapplied the precedent, as the Supreme Court had actually ruled that no right of pre-emption exists regarding sales by temporary allottees because they lack a saleable interest in the land. The Supreme Court found that the contention regarding the High Court's misapplication of binding precedent required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court correctly interpreted the legal position regarding the pre-emption of lands held by temporary allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for pre-emption competent in respect of land allotted to displaced persons from Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  • Do temporary allottees of land under the Scheme for the Temporary Allotment of Rural Evacuee Agricultural land possess a saleable interest sufficient to support a claim of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Hassan vs Muhammad Nawaz and Another1984 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-14
  murderacquittalappreciation of evidenceimprovements in testimonypetition for leave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 2-11-1982, whereby respondent Muhammad Nawaz was acquitted of the charge of murdering Wazir Hassan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appraisal of evidence and rejection of the eye-witnesses' testimony was perverse, illegal, or contrary to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court held that the appraisal of evidence by the High Court was unexceptionable and proceeded on well-established principles for the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, noting that the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses suffered from material contradictions and improvements that rendered their credibility doubtful. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's appraisal of evidence in a criminal appeal warrants interference by the Supreme Court when it is based on well-established principles?
  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained on the testimony of eye-witnesses whose evidence contains material contradictions and improvements?
  • Does the presence of discrepancies between the first information report and the deposition at trial affect the credibility of an eye-witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Baz vs Amir Khan and 3 Others1984 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  leave to appealacquittalmurdermedical evidenceocular testimonyinterested witnessesmotivecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court in a murder case involving charges under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondents ambushed and murdered the deceased over a motive relating to the abduction of a female relative. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court reversed the decision and acquitted them. The Supreme Court evaluated the record and upheld the acquittal, finding that the ocular testimony of the interested witnesses was contradicted by medical evidence. Specifically, the presence of ant-bites and the condition of the deceased's internal organs indicated the body remained unattended for a considerable time and that the incident occurred at a different hour than claimed. Furthermore, the prosecution's motive story stood discredited by the statement of the alleged abductee. The Supreme Court concluded that the occurrence was unwitnessed and the eyewitnesses were not present, making it an unfit case for granting leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony contradicted by medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence and condition of the dead body is sufficient to sustain an acquittal?
  • Can an eyewitness account given by close relatives be relied upon without independent corroboration when the medical facts falsify their presence at the scene?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against acquittal maintainable when the High Court's appreciation of evidence regarding a doubtful motive and unwitnessed crime is well-reasoned?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Bahadar Khan vs Qazi Islamuddin and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-16
  civil revisionjurisdictionevacuee propertyPermanent Transfer Deedsettlement authoritiesrevisional powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, having purchased two shops in an auction and obtained a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, filed a civil suit claiming ownership of an adjacent third shop, asserting it was structurally part of the same unit. The Municipal Committee contested the suit, claiming ownership of the third shop. The trial and first appellate courts decreed the suit based on structural unity and pre-partition records. The High Court, in revision, reversed this, holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction as the property was evacuee property not yet disposed of. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan clarified that while civil courts have jurisdiction to determine title derived from a PTD, they cannot go behind the PTD to modify or interfere with the orders of the settlement authorities. The settlement authorities had treated the shops as separate units, and the civil court could not rewrite the PTD based on structural features. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the suit, finding that the lower courts committed a jurisdictional error amenable to correction under revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court go behind a Permanent Transfer Deed issued by settlement authorities to modify or alter the division of properties?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to determine the identity or extent of a property transferred under a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Whether an erroneous decision by a subordinate court that results in it exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law is amenable to correction in civil revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali vs The State1984 SCMR 815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-09
  review petitiondeath sentencemurder convictioncommon intentionappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by Sher Ali against a Supreme Court judgment that upheld his conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner, along with co-accused Gul Nawaz, was convicted for the murder of Fazal-ur-Rahman and causing injury to a prosecution witness, Shirin Jan. While the appellate court had previously commuted the death sentence of the co-accused, Gul Nawaz, to life imprisonment on the basis that he did not fire at the deceased, the petitioner's death sentence was maintained due to direct evidence of his involvement in the fatal shooting. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's conviction and sentence warranted review in light of the evidence presented. Upon re-examining the testimony of the eye-witness, Shirin Jan, the Court found that the evidence clearly established the petitioner's role in firing at the deceased, distinguishing his culpability from that of the co-accused. Consequently, the Court held that the previous findings were sound and dismissed the review petition, affirming the original conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the evidence of an eye-witness identifying a specific accused as the shooter justify maintaining a death sentence while commuting the sentence of a co-accused?
  • Can a review petition be dismissed if the findings of the original judgment are based on consistent eye-witness testimony?
  • Is a delay in filing a review petition excusable when the matter involves a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali vs Mst. Kalsoom Begum and others1984 SCMR 1245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-14
  concurrent findings of factfraudulent sale deedrevision petitionleave to appealregistered deed presumptionlack of considerationcivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition challenging concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts regarding the validity of a sale deed. The respondent, a widow, had filed a civil suit challenging a sale deed of her property to the petitioner, alleging fraud, lack of consideration, and non-execution. Both the trial court and the district judge, upon re-examining the evidence, concluded that the sale deed was fraudulent, lacked consideration, and was not executed by the respondent. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision, finding no misreading of evidence or legal defect. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the lower courts failed to properly weigh the presumption of validity attached to a registered deed and misconstrued evidence regarding rent. The Supreme Court held that the case turned on concurrent findings of fact, which were supported by evidence. Finding no misreading of evidence or misapplication of law, the Court affirmed that it would not interfere with such concurrent findings in its appellate jurisdiction, and consequently refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading of evidence or misapplication of law?
  • Does a registered sale deed create an irrebuttable presumption of validity when challenged on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration?
  • Is a revision petition maintainable against concurrent findings of fact where no misreading of evidence is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Afzal Khan and Others vs Haji Razi Abdullah and Others1984 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedsettlement lawspast and closed transactioncoram non judicejurisdictionproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property, specifically a shop originally designated as Property No. 353. The respondent had acquired the entire property through a valid Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued in 1969. Years later, after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws, the petitioner sought and obtained an order from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferring a portion of this property (designated as 353-A) to him under Settlement Scheme No. 1 of 1976. The Peshawar High Court set aside this transfer, holding that the authorities lacked the competence to reopen a past and closed transaction involving a valid P.T.D. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that once a P.T.D. is issued and the settlement laws are repealed, the settlement authorities lack jurisdiction to review or reopen such transactions. The Court held that the subsequent transfer order was coram non judice and wholly incompetent, as there was no surviving jurisdiction to adjudicate upon or alter the finality of the property transfer after the repeal of the governing statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities reopen a past and closed transaction involving a valid Permanent Transfer Deed after the repeal of the settlement laws?
  • Does the repeal of settlement laws extinguish the jurisdiction of authorities to review previous property transfers?
  • Is a transfer order issued by settlement authorities regarding property already covered by a valid Permanent Transfer Deed legally competent?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Ali vs Sheikh M. Mashkoor Anwar1984 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-02
  ejectmentevacuee propertylandlord and tenantLahore Improvement Trusttransfer of propertySettlement DepartmentP.T.O.
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the ejectment of the respondent from a property, claiming ownership as a transferee from the Settlement Department holding a P.T.O. The respondent contested this, arguing the property was acquired by the Provincial Government under the Shah Alam Gate Development Scheme, rendering the Settlement Department's transfer illegal. Lower courts dismissed the petitioner's ejectment application, relying on precedent that such acquired property was immune from transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner appealed, arguing that a prior undertaking by the Lahore Improvement Trust in a separate writ petition entitled him to compensation or transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the petitioner lacked the status of a landlord because the property was not validly transferable by the Settlement Department. However, the Court clarified that the High Court's dismissal of the second appeal did not preclude the Lahore Improvement Trust from independently considering the petitioner's case for property transfer, provided he met the conditions set by the Central Government's acquisition sanction and the Trust's own resolutions and practices.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property acquired by the Provincial Government for a development scheme be transferred by the Settlement Department?
  • Does the possession of a P.T.O. (Provisional Transfer Order) automatically confer the status of a landlord for ejectment purposes if the underlying transfer is legally invalid?
  • Does the dismissal of a second appeal by the High Court preclude a statutory body from independently considering a claim for property transfer based on prior undertakings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs Collector, Muzaffargarh and 2 Others1984 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-22
  service tribunalleave to appealreduction in rankefficiency and discipline rulesdepartmental proceedingsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Qanungo, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 15-11-1976. The petitioner had been dismissed from service departmentally, which was later converted by the Commissioner into reversion from Qanungo to Patwari. The Service Tribunal partially accepted the petitioner's appeal by converting the reduction in rank to the lowest of the scale of Qanungo, noting he never held the rank of Patwari. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Tribunal failed to address other grounds on the merits and erred in substituting the penalty itself. The Supreme Court held that it is reasonable to infer unpressed grounds were abandoned, and that the Service Tribunal, as an appellate forum, acted lawfully in examining the case and granting permissible relief. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can substitute an illegal departmental penalty with an appropriate order permissible under the law?
  • Whether grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal but not addressed by the Tribunal can be presumed to have been not pressed?
  • Can a civil servant be reverted to a post lower than the one he initially held?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Hussain vs The State1984 SCMR 1487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21
  murdereye-witness credibilityinquest reportrecovery of weaponsentence mitigationcriminal appealsolitary witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder and sentence of death. The core legal questions concerned the credibility of the solitary eye-witness, the appellant's alleged production of the crime weapon, and whether the omission of the eye-witness's name in the inquest report and police proceedings undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction, affirming that the eye-witness was natural and credible, and that the recovery of the blood-stained knife from the appellant was sufficiently established by the testimony of the investigating officer. However, the Court modified the sentence, holding that because the murder occurred during a heated affray involving multiple individuals where the appellant acted under the influence of his elders and delivered a single blow, the death penalty was not warranted. The Court laid down the principle that an inquest report under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not substantive evidence and does not require the mandatory inclusion of eye-witness names to validate the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Is an inquest report prepared under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 substantive evidence of the occurrence?
  • Does the failure to mention an eye-witness in the inquest report or police proceedings automatically invalidate their testimony?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of the solitary statement of an eye-witness?
  • Does the fact that an accused acted under the influence of elders during an affray constitute a ground for mitigating a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Al1 vs The Commissioner and 2 others1984 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-21
  service appeallimitationleave preparatory to retirementsuperannuationservice tribunaltime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by a Superintendent in the Office of the Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, who sought leave preparatory to retirement (L.P.R.) before attaining the age of superannuation. Following the enhancement of the retirement age under the Interim Constitution, the petitioner applied for the cancellation of his L.P.R., which was refused by the competent authorities, culminating in a final order by the Board of Revenue. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal, Lahore, which was dismissed as time-barred due to the absence of any application for the condonation of delay. The core legal question was whether the appeal before the Service Tribunal was barred by limitation and whether a final order had been passed by the competent authority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Commissioner had indeed passed a final order and that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was patently time-barred without an application for condonation of delay, thereby upholding the Service Tribunal's decision and dismissing the petition. The key principle laid down is that failure to file an appeal within the prescribed limitation period without seeking condonation of delay justifies its dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal without an application for condonation of delay can be entertained when patently time-barred?
  • Does a refusal of representation by higher authorities extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharif Ahmad and Others vs Chairman, Federal Land Co M Ission1984 SCMR 605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-11
  constitutional petitionaggrieved partyland reformstransposition of partiesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition in a land reforms case on the ground that the purchasers of land were not an "aggrieved party". The core legal question was whether purchasers of land from a vendor whose sales were not denied are considered an aggrieved party entitled to challenge orders of the Federal Land Commission regarding land reforms. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the petition in limine without examining the merits, noting that the purchasers as well as the seller—who was permitted to be transposed as a petitioner—were indeed aggrieved parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to the High Court for a decision on the merits subject to the payment of costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether purchasers of land from a vendor in a land reforms case constitute an aggrieved party entitled to file a constitutional petition?
  • Can a respondent in a constitutional petition be transposed as a petitioner by the appellate court?
  • Whether a constitutional petition against land reform orders can be dismissed in limine on the ground of locus standi without examining the merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharbat Khan and Others vs Haji Lal Gul and Others1984 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-02
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationtribal areasconstitutional petitionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan which dismissed a constitutional petition against the cancellation of bail granted to the petitioners. The criminal case arose from a violent clash in the tribal area of District Zhob resulting in murders and injuries, subsequently referred to a Tribunal under Ordinance II of 1968. The petitioners were initially granted bail by the President of the Tribunal, but this order was set aside by the Additional Commissioner and upheld by the Board of Revenue and the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting that the Additional Commissioner had ignored a previous material order of the Commissioner and failed to apply an independent mind regarding the change of circumstances and the lack of ocular testimony against the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Commissioner exercised jurisdiction illegally by ignoring material considerations. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and confirmed the bail granted to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate authority can cancel bail by ignoring material orders and circumstances on the record?
  • Can bail be granted when there is an absence of direct ocular testimony against the accused and their complicity requires further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Shahpur Jan. vs The Auditorgeneral of Pakistan and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-29
  civil servantconfirmationstatutory guaranteedepartmental memorandumservice lawregular promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a civil servant, challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had dismissed his appeal regarding his non-confirmation as an Assistant Superintendent. The appellant, having been promoted on a regular basis and having rendered satisfactory service, was denied confirmation due to a departmental memorandum issued by the Auditor-General of Pakistan, which prohibited the confirmation of any official against the post of Assistant Superintendent. The core legal question was whether such a departmental memorandum could override the statutory right to be considered for confirmation. The Supreme Court held that the memorandum was illegal and invalid because it rendered nugatory the statutory guarantee provided under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court established the principle that departmental instructions or circulars cannot override or negate explicit statutory rights conferred upon civil servants. Consequently, the Court declared the memorandum without lawful authority and of no legal effect, ruling that the appellant was entitled to be considered for confirmation in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental memorandum override a statutory right to be considered for confirmation granted under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Is confirmation to a post a legal right that can be enforced against a departmental policy prohibiting such confirmation?
  • Does a civil servant promoted on a regular basis have a right to be considered for confirmation after rendering satisfactory service?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Pervez Khan vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministary of Defence and Another1984 SCMR 1052(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-12
  service tribunalcivil servantdisciplinary actionpetition for leave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging a disciplinary action and a finding of fact by a Service Tribunal that the petitioner was not a civil servant, rendering his service appeal incompetent. The core legal question is whether the petitioner qualified as a civil servant capable of maintaining a service appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that in the absence of any material establishing the scale of pay, the order of appointment, or any subsequent transfer of the petitioner as a civil servant, there was no legal justification to interfere with the factual finding reached by the Tribunal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the burden lies upon the claimant to provide material particulars such as pay scale and appointment orders to substantiate their status as a civil servant when challenging a Service Tribunal finding.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person challenging a Service Tribunal's finding must provide material evidence such as pay scale and appointment orders to prove civil servant status?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact reached by a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Khan vs The State1984 SCMR 1161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-27
  mitigating circumstancesquantum of sentencedeath penalty commutationconfessional statementprovocationmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court, was directed solely at the quantum of sentence imposed upon the appellant, Shahzada Khan, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, a decision upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was appropriate given the mitigating circumstances presented in the appellant's confessional statement. The appellant argued that the deceased had persistently teased and humiliated him, creating a simmering provocation. While the High Court had discounted this motive, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to provide evidence contradicting the appellant's version of events. The Court held that the persistent annoyance and humiliation caused by the deceased constituted a significant mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, further imposing a fine of Rs. 10,000 to be paid as compensation to the heirs of the deceased. The principle established is that where a confession is relied upon for conviction, the mitigating circumstances contained therein cannot be arbitrarily excluded if not contradicted by other evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on a confessional statement for conviction while arbitrarily excluding the mitigating circumstances contained within the same statement?
  • Does persistent teasing and humiliation by a deceased person constitute a mitigating circumstance sufficient to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the death penalty mandatory in a murder case where the prosecution fails to provide evidence contradicting the motive presented by the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahbaz Khan Jakhrani vs Lal Beg Jakhrani and Others1984 SCMR 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-09-12
  murderocular testimonymedical evidencematerial improvementacquittalspecial leave to appealcriminal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted respondents of murder charges, setting aside their convictions under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the ocular testimony of prosecution witnesses and the subsequent ballistic evidence, which the trial court had relied upon to convict the respondents. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence. The High Court had identified material improvements and inconsistencies in the witnesses' statements—specifically regarding the deceased's food intake and the distance from which shots were fired—made to align their testimony with medical findings. The Supreme Court affirmed that these discrepancies cast serious doubt on the veracity of the witnesses, rendering the crime likely unwitnessed. Furthermore, the Court noted deficiencies in the investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment of evidence was sound and did not warrant interference, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can appellate courts reject ocular testimony if it is inconsistent with medical evidence?
  • Does the making of material improvements in witness statements to align with medical findings justify the rejection of such testimony?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution witnesses' account of the crime is found to be unreliable and inconsistent with the circumstances on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Kishwar and Another vs Ikramullah and Another1984SCMR 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  murder convictiondying declarationappreciation of evidenceleave to appealcriminal justicesudden affairsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding a murder conviction. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting one co-accused while maintaining the conviction of the other, and whether the reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment for the primary convict was legally justified based on the evidence. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the High Court’s analysis of the evidence was proper and unexceptionable. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly identified exaggerations and embellishments in the prosecution's case, properly appraised the evidence regarding the single fatal injury, and correctly characterized the incident as a sudden affair rather than a planned attack. The principle established is that where evidence is partially disbelieved regarding one accused or the genesis of an occurrence, it does not automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case against other accused, provided the court can safely separate the credible evidence from exaggerations to ensure the administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court partially rely on evidence to convict one accused while acquitting another based on the same set of facts?
  • Does the presence of a counter-report necessitate the rejection of the prosecution's case?
  • Is it legally permissible to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment when the court finds the incident was a sudden affair without previous planning?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Hussain vs Abdul Qayum and mums1984 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  co-sharerpartition of landalienation of propertyjoint holdingvendee rightsundivided khata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the partition of land and the rights of a vendee purchasing specific land from a co-sharer. The core legal question was whether a vendee who purchases specific field numbers from a co-sharer in possession can claim ownership and partition of that specific land if it exceeds the vendor's share, or if such rights are subject to adjustment during partition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that a co-sharer in possession may alienate specific land for consideration, but the vendee's rights are limited to the vendor's overall entitlement in the joint property. The key principle laid down is that a vendee of a co-sharer in an undivided khata is clothed with the same rights as the vendor, no more and no less. Consequently, if the specific land purchased exceeds the vendor's share, the vendee's rights remain subject to adjustment during the partition of the joint holding, ensuring other co-sharers are not prejudiced.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer in possession alienate specific field numbers to a vendee?
  • Are the rights of a vendee purchasing from a co-sharer subject to adjustment during partition proceedings?
  • Does a vendee of a co-sharer acquire greater rights in the property than the vendor possessed?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafqat Nasreen vs Amir Fatima1984 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-11
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in payment of rentpersonal requirementopportunity of hearingcross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Sind High Court upholding the ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to cross-examine the respondent-landlord and lead evidence, rendering her case undefended. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was unexceptionable as the record demonstrated that the Rent Controller had granted multiple opportunities to the petitioner for cross-examination and evidence, which she failed to avail. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where a party fails to avail of repeated opportunities granted by the trial forum to lead evidence or conduct cross-examination, a grievance of being condemned unheard or left undefended is legally untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can claim denial of a fair hearing when multiple opportunities to cross-examine the landlord and lead evidence were provided but not availed?
  • Is an ejectment order passed after concurrent findings regarding default in rent and personal requirement liable to interference when procedural defaults are attributable to the tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafqat Ali vs Settlement. Commissioner (Lands) and Another1984 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-07
  inheritance disputecustomary lawlife estaterehabilitation settlement schemejamabandi entriesmaintenance rightslimited owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a land settlement inheritance dispute involving the estate of a deceased widow, Mst. Majid-un-Nisa. The appellants claimed that the deceased held the land merely for maintenance under Customary Law, asserting their right as reversioners of her husband, Ulfat Ali Khan. Conversely, the respondents maintained she was a limited owner. The Rehabilitation Commissioner, relying on jamabandi entries, treated the deceased as a limited owner and determined inheritance shares accordingly. The High Court upheld this decision, rejecting the appellants' plea regarding maintenance. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the deceased held the land as a life estate or for maintenance and whether the inheritance shares were correctly calculated. The Court held that the High Court's interpretation of jamabandi entries as establishing a 'life estate' was legally sound. Furthermore, the Court found no factual basis for the maintenance plea and noted that the appellants failed to establish the necessary conditions for correcting the inheritance shares. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether jamabandi entries can be interpreted to establish a life estate rather than a maintenance arrangement in land settlement cases?
  • Does a sonless widow under the Customary Law of Ambala District hold land only for maintenance?
  • Can inheritance shares be corrected in a settlement scheme without establishing the factual basis for the death of a predecessor in interest?
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• Sh. Muhammad Rafique vs Mian Nadir Jang Bahadur and others1984 SCMR 1226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-23
  evictionlandlord and tenantestoppeladmissionrent controlconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a constitutional petition dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an eviction order against the appellant passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Additional District Judge. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having previously admitted the respondent's status as landlord in earlier litigation and documentary evidence, could subsequently challenge the Rent Controller's jurisdiction by claiming the property belonged to the Custodian of Enemy Evacuee Property and denying the landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was estopped from denying the respondent's title or the landlord-tenant relationship due to his own prior admissions. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, noting that the respondent's evidence regarding the relationship remained unrebutted. The key principle laid down is that a tenant who has previously admitted the landlord's title and the existence of a tenancy relationship in legal proceedings or documents is precluded from later denying that relationship or the landlord's title in eviction proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant deny the landlord's title after having previously admitted the landlord-tenant relationship in earlier proceedings?
  • Is a tenant estopped from challenging the Rent Controller's jurisdiction when they have previously acknowledged the landlord's status?
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• Sh. Abdul Rashid and Others vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1984 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-06
  settlement and rehabilitationurban propertyallotment of landpossession-based transferleave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an urban settlement dispute concerning the transfer of a plot of land. The petitioner, who was in possession of a portion of the plot, contended that the entire plot had been allotted to him and that the settlement authorities were legally obligated to transfer the whole plot to him, irrespective of the actual possession held by others. The respondent No. 2 was in possession of another portion, and the remaining part of the plot had been ordered for auction. The High Court had previously affirmed the findings of the settlement authorities. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's claim of being allotted the entire plot was factually incorrect based on the findings of the lower forums. The Court held that the settlement authorities' decision to transfer the plot based on actual possession was legally sound and free from infirmity. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding allotment and possession, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities are legally obligated to transfer an entire plot to a claimant regardless of actual possession if the allotment was not for the entire plot?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding allotment and possession in a settlement case?
  • Is the transfer of urban property by settlement authorities based on actual possession legally permissible?
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• Sh. Abdul Majeed vs United Bank Ltd.1984 SCMR 1434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-06
  recovery of loansleave to defendconditional leavebanking suitacknowledgment of liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a suit for recovery of a loan brought by the respondent bank against the petitioner under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The trial court granted the petitioner leave to defend the suit conditionally upon depositing the entire suit amount, a condition upheld by the High Court after dismissing the petitioner's writ petition and subsequent regular first appeal upon failure to deposit. The core legal question is whether the trial court's discretion to make the grant of leave to defend conditional upon depositing the entire suit amount was properly exercised. The Supreme Court held that given the undisputed encashment of loan cheques and the petitioner's written acknowledgment of liability, the imposition of the condition was justified and within the trial court's discretion, warranting no interference. The key principle laid down is that the imposition of conditions for granting leave to defend a recovery suit is within the trial court's discretion, which will not be interfered with when supported by clear evidence of loan disbursement and acknowledgment of liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conditional leave to defend a recovery suit can be made subject to the deposit of the entire suit amount?
  • Is the imposition of conditions for granting leave to defend within the discretion of the trial court?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained against the dismissal of a regular first appeal in a banking recovery suit where liability is acknowledged?
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• Shahna Khan vs Aulia Khan and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  pre-emption suitlimitationcourt fee deficiencyrejection of plaintextension of timenet profitsrelation back doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court and High Court dismissed the plaint as barred by limitation due to the late supply of deficient court-fees. The plaintiff had filed the suit on the last day of limitation without court-fees, undertaking to pay upon calculation of net profits, and subsequently applied to deposit the calculated court-fee. The lower courts held that the suit was deemed filed only when court-fees were supplied, which occurred after the limitation period expired.

  The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments, holding that presenting a plaint before the expiry of limitation saves the suit from being time-barred under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908. Where court-fees are subsequently supplied pursuant to an order or application under Order VII Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the payment relates back to the date of initial presentation. Dismissal on the ground of limitation for late court-fee supply was held erroneous, and the trial court's failure to exercise discretion under Section 149 CPC stemmed from a misapprehension of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the late supply of court-fees under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 render a pre-emption suit barred by limitation if the plaint was originally presented within time?
  • Can a court reject or dismiss a suit as time-barred for non-payment of court-fees without first requiring the plaintiff to supply the deficient court-fees under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a plaintiff required by law to obtain and submit a statement of net profits prior to filing a pre-emption suit within the limitation period?
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• Secretary, Central Board of Revenue vs Dewan Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi1984 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-24
  excise dutyproduction capacity taxman-made fibre yarncotton yarndouble taxationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition by the Federal Government is directed against a short order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dated 18-11-1976, which held that excise duty on the manufacture of man-made fibre yarn cannot be imposed on machinery already assessed to production capacity tax for manufacturing cotton yarn, as it amounts to double taxation. The core legal question concerns the validity of such imposition of excise duty under the relevant entries and notifications. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter, noting that the question raised needs detailed examination, and suspended the operation of the impugned order pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether excise duty can be imposed on the manufacture of man-made fibre yarn by machinery already assessed to production capacity tax in respect of cotton yarn?
  • Does the simultaneous imposition of production capacity tax and excise duty on the same plant or machinery amount to double taxation?
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• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Excise and Taxation1984 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-04
  ad hoc appointmentservice rules relaxationMartial Law Instructionreversionservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, an Administrative Officer in the Agriculture Department, was appointed as an Excise and Taxation Officer in 1976 through the exercise of the Governor's power to relax service rules. Following the 1977 regime change, Martial Law Instruction No. 21 was promulgated, requiring the scrutiny of ad hoc appointments made during the previous regime. The respondent's appointment was reviewed by the Public Service Commission, which deemed him ineligible, leading to his reversion to the Agriculture Department. The Punjab Service Tribunal subsequently set aside this reversion, ruling that the respondent's appointment, made via the Governor's power of relaxation, was not an ad hoc appointment within the scope of Martial Law Instruction No. 21. The Provincial Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that Martial Law Instruction No. 21 explicitly deems appointments made via the relaxation of rules as ad hoc. Pending the final decision, the Court ordered the suspension of the respondent's relief from his parent department, directing his reinstatement and payment of salary in the Agriculture Department.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment made through the relaxation of service rules fall under the definition of an ad hoc appointment under Martial Law Instruction No. 21?
  • Can an appointment made in the purported exercise of the power of relaxation of rules be deemed an ad hoc appointment for the purposes of scrutiny?
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• Secretary Finance, Government of Punjab, Lahore and Others--1984 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  service tribunalleave to appealterms and conditions of servicedissolution of corporationpay revisionupgradation of postsseniority
  Summary & questions settled

  Three petitions for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution were filed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question involved the extent of protection of terms and conditions of service regarding pay and status for erstwhile employees of the dissolved Agricultural Development Corporation under Presidential Order No. 5 of 1972, and whether they were entitled to the same pay revisions and upgradations as their counterparts in the Agriculture Department. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in setting right the manifestly unjust treatment meted out to the respondents by equating them in pay scale and status with those holding identical pay scales in the Agriculture Department, and that prospects of promotion do not constitute a vested right in service. The key principle laid down is that transferred employees protected under dissolution orders are entitled to fair and non-discriminatory treatment in pay revisions at par with identical counterparts in the receiving department, without being prejudiced by their erstwhile corporate origin.

  Questions settled

  • Whether erstwhile employees of a dissolved corporation are entitled to parity in pay revisions and upgradations with identical counterparts in the receiving department?
  • Does an employee have a vested interest or right in the stages and prospects of promotion?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction by granting relief to rectify discriminatory pay scale treatments for transferred civil servants?
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• Sattar Khan vs Rashid Khan and Others1984 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-27
  murderculpable homicidesentence enhancementgrave and sudden provocationacquittalcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the acquittal of two co-accused and for the enhancement of the sentence of Rashid Khan, who was tried for the murder of Ali Aksar. The trial court convicted Rashid Khan under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life, while acquitting the co-accused. On appeal, the High Court altered his conviction to section 304-1 of the Pakistan Penal Code and reduced his sentence to four years' rigorous imprisonment, while dismissing the complainant's revision for sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court evaluated the petition and noted that the High Court rightly relied upon the accused's statement regarding grave and sudden provocation arising from the deceased's illicit relations with the accused's wife near his house. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in converting the conviction and awarding the modified sentence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as having no force.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on the accused's version of grave and sudden provocation?
  • Can a petition for the enhancement of a sentence be maintained when the lower courts have properly appreciated the evidence and circumstances of the case?
  • Is an accused's statement regarding self-defence and provocation to be accepted in its entirety when relied upon for altering a conviction?
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• Sarfraz Khan vs Muhammad Khan and 2 others1984 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-04
  enhancement of sentencelife imprisonmentdeath penaltydismissal in limineleave to appealcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a criminal revision petition filed by the complainant for the enhancement of the respondents' sentence from life imprisonment to death for murder. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in dismissing the revision petition for sentence enhancement in limine while the convicts' appeals against their conviction and sentence were still pending, and whether the case warranted the normal penalty of death. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order of the High Court did not call for any interference and refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that discretionary orders of the High Court regarding the dismissal of sentence enhancement revisions will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court where no legal infirmity is found.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition for enhancement of sentence can be dismissed in limine while appeals against conviction are pending?
  • Does a pre-planned murder necessarily warrant the imposition of the death penalty in every case?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court declining to enhance a sentence?
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• Sardar Muhammad and Others vs The State1984SCMR 714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-18
  criminal appealocular testimonymedical evidencecommon intentionleave to appealconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, filed by Sardar and Dildar, challenged their convictions for the murder of Muhammad Ali and the injury of Saeed Ahmad. Leave to appeal was initially granted on the contention that medical evidence contradicted ocular testimony, specifically arguing that injuries attributed to Dildar’s .12 bore pistol were inconsistent with the nature of the wounds found on the deceased, which allegedly resulted from rifle fire. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution’s version alongside the medical reports. The Court found that while the deceased may not have sustained .12 bore injuries, the evidence confirmed Dildar’s active participation and presence alongside Sardar throughout the incident. Furthermore, the Court noted that the injured witness, Saeed Ahmad, did sustain pellet injuries consistent with Dildar’s weapon. Consequently, the Court held that Dildar was correctly convicted under the principle of common intention. Finding no discrepancy between the medical evidence and the ocular testimony, the Court concluded that the initial leave to appeal was granted on a misunderstanding of the evidence. The leave to appeal was therefore recalled, and the convictions were maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of specific weapon injuries on a deceased person necessarily contradict ocular testimony when other evidence confirms the accused's presence and participation?
  • Can an accused be convicted under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the specific weapon attributed to them did not cause the fatal injury?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when medical evidence corroborates the injuries of a surviving victim despite discrepancies regarding the deceased?
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• Sardar Muhammad and others vs The Province of Punjab and others1984 SCMR 1415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-12
  interim injunctioncanal water rightsdeclaratory suitrevision jurisdictionres judicataprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the refusal of lower courts to grant an interim injunction in a civil suit. The petitioners, canal water users, had repeatedly challenged the sanctioning of extra water to other respondents through various legal avenues, including writ petitions and an Intra Court Appeal, all of which were unsuccessful. In their subsequent declaratory suit challenging the Canal Officer's order, they sought an interim injunction. The High Court dismissed their revision in limine, finding that the petitioners' water share had not been reduced and that the lower courts' refusal to grant the injunction was neither improper nor illegal. The Supreme Court, upon review, found no grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that where a party fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of injury or reduction in rights, the refusal of an interim injunction by lower courts is legally sustainable and does not warrant interference in revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party repeatedly challenge the same administrative order through successive litigation after previous challenges have failed?
  • Is the refusal of an interim injunction by lower courts subject to interference in revision when the petitioner fails to show a reduction in their rights?
  • Does the dismissal of a writ petition regarding water rights preclude a subsequent declaratory suit challenging the same administrative order?
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• Sardar Muhammad and Others vs Mst. Barkat Bibi and Others1984 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  pre-emptioncontiguityco-sharerwater channeladditional evidencesuperior right
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a suit brought to pre-empt the sale of land on the basis of a superior right of contiguity. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it, holding that the defendant's competing claims based on an unregistered exchange document and a collusive decree were invalid. In second appeal, the High Court summoned a revenue patwari, examined revenue records, and dismissed the suit upon finding that both parties were co-sharers in an adjoining water channel recorded as 'mahazi malikan', thereby defeating the pre-emptor's claim of superior contiguity. The petitioners challenged the Supreme Court's decision, arguing against the High Court's recording of additional evidence. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners failed to object and cross-examined the patwari before the High Court, the objection could not be raised. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a co-owner of a contiguous water channel can defeat a pre-emption claim based on contiguity. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-owner of an adjoining water channel can defeat a pre-emptor's claim based on contiguity?
  • Can a party object to the recording of additional evidence by the High Court when they failed to object and cross-examined the witness during the proceedings?
  • Does unpartitioned co-ownership in a contiguous property grant equal status to defeat a pre-emption suit?
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