Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Sardar Khan vs Senior Member (Establishmfnt) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore1982 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-13
  Leave to appealService lawRemoval from serviceAcquittalHonourable acquittalDepartmental inquiryEfficiency and Discipline RulesCorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service. The petitioner, an Assistant in the Board of Revenue, was apprehended in a trap, convicted under Section 161, Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and subsequently removed from service by the Board of Revenue while his appeal against conviction was pending. Although the High Court later acquitted him, the Full Board dismissed his departmental appeal, finding it time-barred and his acquittal not honourable, citing his bad service record. The Service Tribunal upheld this decision, applying Rule 7.3(a) of the Civil Service Rules Punjab. The petitioner contended that Rule 9(a) of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, invoked for his removal, was inapplicable after his conviction was set aside, necessitating a full inquiry. The Supreme Court found that the questions raised, being purely of law and its application to the facts, required authoritative interpretation. Therefore, leave to appeal was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be removed from service under Rule 9(a) of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules if their conviction, which led to the removal, is subsequently set aside?
  • Does an acquittal by a higher court automatically render a departmental action based on the original conviction invalid, requiring a fresh inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules?
  • What is the legal implication of an 'unhonourable acquittal' on departmental proceedings, particularly concerning removal from service, under the Civil Service Rules Punjab?
  • Is Rule 7.3(a) of the Civil Service Rules Punjab, which deals with pay during suspension based on honourable acquittal, applicable for upholding an order of removal from service?
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• Muhammad Saleh vs Muhammad Shafi1982 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-07
  ejectment applicationrent restrictionwaiver by conductrestoration of suitstriking off defenceinterlocutory orderslandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute regarding an ejectment application. The core legal questions were whether the restoration of an ejectment application, previously dismissed in default, revives an interlocutory order for rent deposit under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, and whether a landlord’s delay in seeking to strike off a tenant’s defense for non-compliance constitutes a waiver of that right. The Supreme Court held that upon the restoration of a suit or application, all ancillary and interlocutory orders passed prior to the dismissal are automatically revived with retrospective effect. Furthermore, the Court held that mere inaction or silence by a landlord in enforcing the right to strike off a defense does not amount to waiver by conduct. To establish waiver, there must be clear and decisive evidence of acquiescence beyond mere delay. The Court affirmed that the tenant’s failure to comply with the rent deposit order rendered their defense liable to be struck off, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the restoration of an ejectment application dismissed in default revive an interlocutory order for rent deposit?
  • Does a landlord's mere delay in seeking to strike off a tenant's defense constitute a waiver of the right to enforce compliance with a rent deposit order?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
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• Muhammad Saleem Khalid vs Secretary to Government of Punjab1982 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-10
  nationalization of educational institutionsnational pay scalessteno-typistservice tribunalcivil servantpay scale determination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of a degree college nationalized under Martial Law Regulation No. 118, sought classification as a Head Clerk and entitlement to the corresponding pay scale. The matter reached the Service Tribunal, which held that the petitioner was not a Head Clerk based on the staff list handed over to the Department. However, documents supplied by the Principal and acquittance rolls established that the petitioner was employed and drawing salary as a steno-typist. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the undisputed record, converted the petition into an appeal, and accepted it. The Court held that an employee nationalized under the martial law regulation is entitled to the pay scale corresponding to their actual established post. The Court laid down that where records confirm employment in a specific capacity such as a steno-typist, the employee must be granted the pay scale applicable to that post, notwithstanding the rejection of a higher claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee nationalized under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 is entitled to the pay scale of the post established by institutional records?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition into an appeal when the record undisputedly establishes entitlement to a specific pay scale?
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• Muhammad Saeed and Another vs Shaukat Ali1982 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-29
  time-barred petitioncondonation of delaylimitation periodSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition filed against an order of the High Court dated 2-4-1980 passed in Writ Petition No. 949-R/79, which had remanded a case for fresh decision. The primary legal question addressed by the court is whether the petition, having been filed 36 days beyond the period of limitation, can be entertained after condoning the delay based on the time spent obtaining copies and the grounds presented in the application. The Supreme Court held that the petition is barred by time, observing that even if the entire time spent in obtaining the relevant copies is excluded, the petition remains time-barred, and the application fails to satisfactorily explain each day of the delay as required by law. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must satisfactorily explain each and every day of the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition filed beyond the period of limitation can be entertained without explaining each day of the delay?
  • Does the time spent in obtaining relevant copies automatically extend the period of limitation if the petition remains barred even after excluding such time?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Rafiq and Other1982 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-27
  post-arrest bailmurderdiscretion of High Courttentative assessmentpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to respondents accused of murdering the petitioner's nephew, Ashiq Hussain. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail in a murder case where the First Information Report alleged the victim was caught committing adultery with the first respondent's wife inside the respondents' house. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail was justified given the circumstances disclosed in the First Information Report, declining to interfere with the impugned order. The key principle laid down is that observations made in a bail order are strictly of a tentative nature and shall not prejudice the trial court, which must independently decide the case based on the evidence presented before it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretion of the High Court in granting post-arrest bail when the First Information Report discloses mitigating circumstances?
  • Do observations made by a superior court in a bail order affect the merits of the case during the trial before the Sessions Court?
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• Muhammad Sadiq and Another vs Mst. Ghulam Sakina and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-05
  occupancy tenancywidow estatecustomary lawalienationreversionary rightsproprietary rightslocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed the validity of a gift of land made by a widow holding a limited estate as an occupancy tenant and whether the conversion of occupancy rights into proprietary rights under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887 enlarged her powers of alienation. The core legal questions involved whether the parties were governed by custom regarding succession and alienation, whether the acquisition of proprietary rights freed the widow from prior limitations, and whether reversioners had the locus standi to challenge the alienation. The Supreme Court held that the last male holder was governed by custom, that the widow remained a limited owner whose estate did not enlarge into an absolute estate with unrestricted powers of alienation upon the conversion of the tenancy, and that potential heirs possessed the right to challenge invalid alienations. The Court established that the statutory conversion of an occupancy tenancy into proprietorship does not abolish the traditional limitations on a widow's life estate or her husband's reversionary incidents until succession opens under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a widow holding an occupancy tenancy as a limited owner acquires unrestricted powers of alienation upon the conversion of the tenancy into proprietary rights under section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887?
  • Do potential heirs and reversioners have the locus standi to challenge an alienation made by a limited owner of an occupancy holding?
  • Does the statutory conversion of an occupancy tenancy into proprietorship extinguish the pre-existing limitations on a widow's life estate?
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• Muhammad Ramzan vs Ch. Muhammad Saeed and Other1982 SCMR 987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-02
  evictionrent controldefault in payment of rentpersonal need of landlordconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against concurrent findings of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings regarding the tenant's default in rent payment and the landlord's personal need for the property warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the case was concluded by findings of fact. The Court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of legal principles that would justify the Supreme Court's intervention in factual controversies. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in rent matters where no error of law or misreading of evidence is established by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default and personal need in rent control matters?
  • Is a petition for special leave to appeal maintainable where no violation of legal principles is demonstrated?
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• Muhammad Ramzan vs Allah Ditta and Other1982 SCMR 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-08
  criminal revisiondismissal in defaultinherent powers of High Courtrestoration of petitionacquittalabuse of processnon-prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the complainant arises from an order of the High Court dismissing his second revision petition against the acquittal of the respondents, after his first revision petition had been dismissed in default for non-appearance. The core legal questions examined by the Supreme Court were whether a criminal revision petition can be dismissed in default without a decision on merits, and whether such a dismissed petition can subsequently be restored and re-heard by the High Court under its inherent powers. The Court held that while the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain an express provision for dismissing a criminal revision petition in default, courts possess the inherent power and justification to do so to prevent the abuse of process. Furthermore, the Court held that an order dismissing a revision in default is not a judgment within the meaning of section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and therefore the High Court has the inherent power under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restore and re-hear such a petition in appropriate and deserving cases where sufficient cause is shown. However, since the appellant failed to provide any explanation for his absence or for the inordinate delay of over a year in filing the subsequent petition, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal revision petition can be dismissed in default without being decided on merits?
  • Can a criminal revision petition dismissed in default be restored and re-heard by the High Court?
  • Does section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the High Court from recalling or reviewing an order dismissing a revision petition in default?
  • Can the inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to restore a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
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• Muhammad Rafique vs The State1982 SCMR 1047 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  suspension of sentencesuspension of convictionreinstatement in serviceanti-corruptioncriminal appealbail pending appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced to imprisonment along with confiscation of property, filed an appeal before the Lahore High Court where his sentence was suspended for bail. Subsequently, he filed a miscellaneous application seeking suspension of the conviction itself to secure reinstatement in service. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the taint of conviction remains until the appeal is accepted and acquittal is granted. The core legal question was whether suspension of a sentence under the Code of Criminal Procedure automatically entitles a convicted public servant to suspension of conviction and reinstatement in service. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the mere suspension of a sentence does not set aside the conviction or automatically entitle a convicted person to reinstatement in service, and the proper remedy is to seek an early hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suspension of a sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically result in the suspension of the conviction?
  • Is a convicted government servant entitled to reinstatement in service merely because his sentence has been suspended pending appeal?
  • Does the taint of a criminal conviction continue to exist until the appeal against it is accepted and the accused is acquitted?
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• Muhammad Rafiq vs The State1982 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-09
  murderdying declarationpartial reliance on dying declarationcorroborationcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court which maintained the conviction of the petitioner for murder while acquitting a co-accused. The petitioner and his co-accused were tried for murder, where the trial court convicted both based on eye-witness testimony, motive, and a dying declaration, sentencing the petitioner to death. On appeal, the High Court discarded the eye-witnesses and the first dying declaration, but relied partially on a second dying declaration to uphold the petitioner's conviction while reducing his sentence to imprisonment for life, and acquitted the co-accused by disbelieving the remaining portion of that same dying declaration. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in splitting a single dying declaration to convict one accused without corroborative evidence while acquitting the co-accused based on the disbelieved portion. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine this question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is justified in relying on a portion of a dying declaration to convict an accused while discarding the remaining portion regarding a co-accused?
  • Is independent corroboration required when a conviction is based solely on a portion of a dying declaration?
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• Muhammad Nawaz vs Divisional Forest Officer Jauharabad and 21982 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24
  civil servicedismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryex parte proceedingsservice tribunalfindings of factleave to appealevasion of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by a former Forest Guard against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which upheld his dismissal from service. The petitioner was dismissed following departmental proceedings for a flagrant breach of discipline after failing to participate in the inquiry or respond to show-cause notices. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that he was denied a fair hearing and proper notice of adjourned inquiry dates due to severe illness. The Punjab Service Tribunal had recorded evidence and found that the petitioner intentionally evaded notice, fabricated pleas of illness, and moved between locations to submit medical certificates to avoid proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal were supported by the material on record and raised no question of law of public importance. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal's factual findings under Article 212(3) and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 with pure findings of fact recorded by a Service Tribunal?
  • Does purposeful evasion of departmental inquiry notices by a civil servant invalidate an order of dismissal passed following ex-parte proceedings?
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• Muhammad Nawaz (Represented by His Heir) vs Ministry of Finance1982 SCMR 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-13
  abatement of appealcivil servantright to suelegal representativespay fixationservice appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Services Tribunal, Islamabad, which held that an appeal filed by a civil servant regarding pay fixation and salary recovery abated upon the death of the appellant. The deceased appellant had sought to challenge the reduction of his substantive pay and the subsequent refixation of his salary upon promotion. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal, ruling that the right to sue was personal to the civil servant and extinguished upon his death. The petitioners, as legal representatives, contended that the claim for recovery of emoluments constituted an inheritable right, allowing them to continue the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting that the issue of whether such service-related proceedings abate upon the death of a civil servant is a matter of public importance and a question of first impression, granted leave to appeal to determine whether the right to sue for salary arrears survives for legal representatives.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal filed by a civil servant regarding salary recovery and pay fixation abate upon the death of the appellant?
  • Is the right to sue for the recovery of salary arrears inheritable by the legal representatives of a deceased civil servant?
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• Muhammad Naseem vs The State1982 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-01
  bailinsanity pleaunsound mindcriminal procedurejudicial discretionfraud on court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant bail to an accused charged under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, having been in custody for over four months, sought bail on the grounds of the ordinary nature of the offense and a plea of continuous insanity. The Supreme Court rejected the argument regarding the ordinary nature of the offense, noting that the petitioner had disentitled himself to discretionary relief by attempting to defraud the Sessions Court during earlier bail proceedings. However, regarding the plea of insanity, the Court held that the lower courts had failed to properly conclude the inquiry required under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that when a plea of insanity is raised with supporting material, it is in the public interest for the court to examine it. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition but granted the petitioner liberty to file a fresh application specifically invoking the provisions of Section 466, Cr. P. C. for the court to determine whether to release the accused on security or order detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does an attempt to defraud the court regarding bail history disentitle an accused to discretionary relief on the merits?
  • Is it in the public interest for a court to examine a plea of insanity when raised with supporting material during bail proceedings?
  • Can an accused person raise a plea of insanity under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 even after a previous bail application was withdrawn?
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• Muhammad Naseem vs Azmat Khan1982 SCMR 1132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-06
  ejectmentpersonal needurban arealandlord and tenantwrit jurisdictionrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal need concerning a house in Rawalpindi. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the Additional District Judge reversed this decision. On a constitutional petition, the Lahore High Court set aside the appellate order and restored the eviction order, holding that the landlord's former house was in Islamabad rather than the urban area of Rawalpindi, and that residing in a relative's house not owned by the landlord does not bar a claim for personal need under the relevant rent restriction law. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's view, finding no legal infirmity in the reasoning. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner two months to vacate upon certain conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord residing in a house owned by another person, such as their mother, is barred from seeking the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal need?
  • Does owning a house in Islamabad preclude a landlord from seeking eviction of a tenant from a property situated in the urban area of Rawalpindi under rent restriction laws?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a landlord's bona fide personal requirement based on the duration of previous displacement by a development authority?
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• Muhammad Mohsin vs The State1982 SCMR 1023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30
  Leave to Appealcriminal appealmurdereye-witness testimonycorroborationinimical witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court which dismissed his appeal and upheld his conviction in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of two allegedly inimical eye-witnesses whose presence at the spot was disputed. The Supreme Court held that the case warranted a re-examination of the evidence regarding the reliability and lack of corroboration of the eye-witness testimony. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions in detail.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of inimical eye-witnesses whose presence is disputed?
  • Does the absence of corroborative evidence for eye-witness accounts warrant a re-examination of the evidence by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal?
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• Muhammad Mobin Siddiqui vs Mst. Shahzadi Begum and 2 Other1982 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-16
  rent controllandlord and tenantlocus standipreliminary issueejectment applicationinterlocutory orderright of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing the petitioner's second appeal in a rent case. The core legal question was whether a person, whose claim to be a tenant was rejected by the Rent Controller via a preliminary issue, retained the locus standi to appeal against the final ejectment order passed against the original tenant. The Rent Controller had previously determined that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent landlady. The petitioner failed to appeal this preliminary finding, which effectively removed him as a party to the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having failed to challenge the adverse preliminary order, ceased to be a party to the ejectment case and therefore lacked the standing to appeal the subsequent final ejectment order. The Court affirmed that an interlocutory order deciding a fundamental issue of status, such as the existence of a tenancy, must be challenged immediately if it effectively terminates a party's involvement in the proceedings, rather than waiting for the final judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person whose claim of tenancy is rejected in a preliminary finding by a Rent Controller retain the right to appeal the final ejectment order?
  • Is an order deciding a preliminary issue of the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship considered a final order for the party against whom it is decided?
  • Can a party who has been effectively removed from proceedings by a preliminary order challenge the final judgment in the case?
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• Muhammad Latif vs Qamar UN Nisa and Other1982 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-09
  maintenance allowancestay of executiondiscretionary orderwrit petitionspecial leave to appealfamily court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to stay the execution of a maintenance order while admitting a writ petition for regular hearing. The petitioner, the father of the respondent, challenged previous orders that had enhanced the respondent's maintenance allowance from Rs. 50 to Rs. 150 per month, despite the respondent having attained majority and choosing to reside separately. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its discretion by refusing to grant a stay of execution regarding the maintenance order during the pendency of the writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's refusal to grant a stay was a discretionary order. The Court reasoned that such interim orders are subject to final determination upon the ultimate disposal of the writ petition, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal impropriety in the High Court's exercise of its discretion to deny the stay of execution pending the final adjudication of the underlying writ proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court's refusal to grant a stay of execution on a maintenance order during the pendency of a writ petition a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
  • Can a maintenance order be challenged on the grounds that the beneficiary has attained majority and resides separately?
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• Muhammad Jalil Siddiqui vs Director, Education, Sargodha Region1982 SCMR 864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-01
  service lawsenioritytransfer on requestdissolution of One Unitgovernment serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the determination of his seniority. The petitioner, a government servant transferred from the Quetta Region to the Rawalpindi Region in 1971, challenged the condition imposed in his transfer order that required him to forego his previous seniority and be placed at the bottom of the seniority list. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's transfer was a consequence of the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan (One Unit), thereby entitling him to seniority protection under specific government circulars, or whether it was a voluntary transfer at his own request, subject to standard seniority forfeiture rules. The Supreme Court held that the transfer was clearly made at the petitioner's own request, not due to the dissolution of One Unit. Consequently, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming the principle that government servants transferred at their own request are treated as fresh recruits for seniority purposes, rendering the petitioner ineligible for the seniority benefits he sought.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant transferred at their own request retain their previous seniority?
  • Are transfers made at the request of an official considered part of the allocation process following the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan?
  • Can a government servant claim seniority benefits based on circulars intended for the allocation of personnel during the dissolution of One Unit if their transfer was voluntary?
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• Muhammad Islam Khan vs Cantonment Board, Kohat1982 SCMR 1056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-14
  ejectmentcivil court jurisdictionforfeiture of leasedenial of titletransfer of propertyleave to appealcompensation for improvements
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a decree for the ejectment of the petitioner from a shop owned by the Cantonment Board, Kohat. The core legal questions involved whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment suit, whether a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 was mandatory despite the tenant's denial of the landlord's title, and whether the petitioner was entitled to compensation for improvements made to the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction and that the petitioner had explicitly agreed in writing not to claim compensation for improvements. Furthermore, the Court established that a tenant's denial of the landlord's title operates as a forfeiture of the lease, thereby dispensing with the requirement for a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioner two months to vacate the premises upon payment of occupation charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's denial of the landlord's title dispense with the requirement for a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Can a tenant claim compensation for improvements to a property if they have previously agreed in writing not to do so?
  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to entertain an ejectment suit against a tenant of a Cantonment Board property?
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• Muhammad Ishaq vs Secretary to Government of Punjab Etc.1982 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-21
  service tribunalpromotionreversiongame watcherjurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, directed against the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his reversion from the post of Game Inspector to Game Watcher. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's promotion as Game Inspector outside his home division violated the applicable service rules, and whether the lack of a personal hearing vitiated the order setting aside his promotion. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's promotion was contrary to the governing rules restricting promotion to vacancies within the candidate's own division, the promotion was void ab initio and rightly set aside, and the absence of a hearing did not prejudice a claim lacking legal foundation on merits. The Court established the principle that promotions made in violation of mandatory territorial or divisional service rules are illegal and create no vested rights, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a promotion made in violation of divisional service rules can be sustained?
  • Does the failure to afford a hearing vitiate an order setting aside an illegal promotion?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against a Service Tribunal's decision upholding a reversion?
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• Muhammad Ishaq and Another vs Nur Ahmad and 5 Other1982 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-09
  murderocular testimonyrelated witnessesballistic expertrecoveryacquittalpetition for special leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld the conviction and sentence of Nek Muhammad under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a Naib Tehsildar, while acquitting his co-accused Zahur and Nur, and dismissing the complainant's petition against the acquittal of Shah Behram. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony from close relatives, the evidentiary value of weapon recoveries corroborated by a ballistic expert, and the requirement of independent corroboration for accused persons facing previous hostility and motive. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of related eye-witnesses, whose presence was natural and who harbored no prior enmity against the principal offender, was reliable and sufficiently corroborated by ballistic evidence matching the recovered pistol with the crime empty. However, regarding the co-accused linked through prior enmity and motive, independent corroboration was rightly deemed necessary by the High Court. The petitions were accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that related eye-witness testimony is credible against an accused when natural and uncontradicted by prior animosity, whereas co-accused implicated via background hostility require independent corroborative evidence for conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses who are closely related to the deceased be relied upon in a murder trial despite the absence of previous enmity?
  • Whether independent corroboration is necessary for sustaining the conviction of co-accused persons who are linked to the crime through previous hostility and motive?
  • Does the match between a recovered weapon and a crime-scene empty shell provided by a ballistic expert furnish sufficient corroboration for a conviction?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1982 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-21
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiontrap witnesssanction for prosecutionspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Iqbal, sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification) Act or Act II of 1947 for accepting illegal gratification. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular evidence during a trap raid, the sufficiency of the defence plea regarding false implication, the tenability of raising a belated objection to the sanction for prosecution for the first time before the Supreme Court, and the quantum of sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the demand and seizure of tainted currency notes were based on solid ocular testimony properly corroborated by a Magistrate, that a belated objection regarding prosecution sanction not raised below cannot be entertained, and that the sentence imposed was commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The key principle laid down is that an objection regarding the validity of prosecution sanction must be raised at the trial stage to afford an opportunity for rectification and cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, and that unexplained possession of tainted currency notes during a validly executed trap is sufficient to sustain a corruption conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the validity of prosecution sanction be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the trial Court or the High Court?
  • Whether the unexplained possession of tainted currency notes in a trap case is sufficient to establish the charge of accepting illegal gratification?
  • Is a sentence of fine with default imprisonment commensurate with the offence of accepting a bribe under the anti-corruption laws?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and Another vs The District & Sessions Judge, Faisalabadand 4 Other1982 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-05
  pre-emptionsubstitution of legal representativesheritable rightright to sueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order dismissing a pre-emption suit. The original pre-emptor, Tahir Saleem, filed a suit to pre-empt a sale of land made by his father, Rehmat Ali. During the pendency of the suit, Tahir Saleem died unmarried and without children. His brothers, Muhammad Iqbal and Ghulam Sarwar, sought to be substituted as plaintiffs. The trial court allowed the substitution, but on revision, the District Judge held that in the presence of the father, the brothers were not legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff, causing the right to sue to abate. The High Court affirmed this view. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether a deceased pre-emptor can be legally represented by his real brothers in the presence of the father who was the vendor, and whether remote heirs can maintain a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor who dies during the pendency of a pre-emption suit can be legally represented by his real brothers in the presence of his father who is the vendor?
  • Does the right to sue for pre-emption survive upon the death of the original pre-emptor when his immediate heir is disqualified from maintaining the suit?
  • Are remote heirs competent to maintain a suit for pre-emption if nearer heirs do not sue?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Inayat vs Fazal Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 666(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  evacuee propertynon-evacuee propertypresumption of truthJamabandirevenue recordsleave to appealDeputy Custodian
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a decision of the High Court concerning the status of land as evacuee or non-evacuee property. The petitioner contends that the High Court failed to consider previous orders dated 21-3-1957 and 6-4-1968 issued by the Deputy Custodian, which declared one-half of the subject land to be non-evacuee property. The petitioner argues these orders remained legally operative and were never set aside. Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the relevant Jamabandi entries, supported by a corresponding mutation, carried a presumption of truth under the Land Revenue Act, which remained unrebutted. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in ignoring these prior administrative determinations and the evidentiary value of the revenue records. The Supreme Court, finding that the points raised regarding the factual and legal aspects of the matter require deeper consideration, granted leave to appeal. The decision establishes that prior administrative declarations regarding property status and the presumption of truth attached to revenue records are material factors that must be addressed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior order by a Deputy Custodian declaring land as non-evacuee property remain legally operative if it has not been set aside?
  • What is the evidentiary weight of Jamabandi entries under the Land Revenue Act?
  • Can a High Court decision be challenged for failing to consider existing administrative orders and revenue record entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran vs Gohar Rehman and Another1982 SCMR 1068 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdertentative assessmentSupreme Court review of bail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special lease to appeal filed against the Peshawar High Court's order granting bail to the accused, Gohar Rehman, who was charged under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Khushal Khan through fatal stick blows during a land dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting bail by observing that the offence might not fall under section 302 due to the weapon used and lack of proven intent to kill. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court's observation regarding the applicability of section 302 was incorrect, appellate interference with bail discretion is unwarranted unless the discretion was exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that discretionary orders granting bail by a superior court will not be set aside merely because the apex court disagrees with certain observations made regarding the tentative assessment of the charge, provided the overall discretion was not exercised arbitrarily.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with bail granted by the High Court when the discretion was not exercised capriciously or arbitrarily?
  • Does causing death by giving stick blows necessarily exclude the application of section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim and 2 Others vs Province of Punjab and Other1982 SCMR 1183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-24
  Intra-Court AppealmaintainabilityColonization of Government Lands ActLaw Reforms Ordinance 1972proprietary rightswrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from three civil petitions for leave to appeal assailing the dismissal of Intra-Court Appeals (ICAs) by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, as well as the underlying orders of a Single Judge dismissing writ petitions concerning the grant of proprietary rights over land leased under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912. The core legal question was whether an Intra-Court Appeal is maintainable against an order passed in writ jurisdiction when the underlying grievance arises from proceedings under an Act that itself provides for appeal, revision, or review. The Supreme Court held that since the orders of the authority under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912 were appealable, revisable, and reviewable under that Act, an Intra-Court Appeal was expressly barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the ICAs and refused leave to appeal. The governing principle reaffirmed is that where an original statutory remedy of appeal, revision, or review is available, an Intra-Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 is barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 against a decision concerning an order that is subject to appeal, revision, or review under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs The State1982 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-23
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationpre-arrest baildisclosure of factsvicarious liabilitydiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail by the High Court. The petitioner, accused of offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code, was initially denied pre-arrest bail by both the Sessions Court and the High Court. Subsequently, he was granted post-arrest bail by the Sessions Court, which the High Court later cancelled on the grounds that the petitioner had approached the court with 'dirty hands' by failing to disclose the prior rejection of his pre-arrest bail application. The core legal question was whether the failure to disclose the rejection of a pre-arrest bail application constitutes sufficient grounds to cancel post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail and post-arrest bail are governed by entirely different legal principles, and the rejection of the former does not inherently impact the merits of the latter. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the bail, establishing the principle that the suppression of a prior failed pre-arrest bail application is not a dispositive factor for cancelling post-arrest bail, as the two remedies operate on distinct legal bases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to disclose the rejection of a pre-arrest bail application constitute sufficient grounds to cancel post-arrest bail?
  • Are the legal principles governing pre-arrest bail and post-arrest bail identical?
  • Does the rejection of a pre-arrest bail application have a bearing on the merits of a post-arrest bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Hussain and Other1982 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-07
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIallotmenttransfer of propertyleave to appealpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute over an evacuee house situated in Multan, which had been in the continuous occupation of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, Sondhey Khan, since prior to January 1, 1961. The core legal question concerns whether the property automatically transferred to the occupant under Settlement Scheme No. VII and whether subsequent abandonment affects such acquired title. The Supreme Court held that since Sondhey Khan was in possession of the house up to January 1, 1961, the property stood automatically transferred to him free of charge by virtue of paragraph (4) of Chapter 5 of Settlement Scheme No. VII, and any subsequent abandonment did not detract from his already acquired title, rendering it immune to interference by settlement authorities. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing that statutory transfer of evacuee property to long-term occupants creates an indefeasible title unaffected by subsequent vacation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an evacuee property automatically transfer to an occupant in possession before the crucial date of January 1, 1961 under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Does the subsequent abandonment of a house by an occupant detract from a title already acquired under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Can settlement authorities interfere with a property title once it has automatically vested in an occupant under the relevant settlement scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Haji Chaudhry Umar Bakhsh and AnotherPLD .1982 Supreme Court 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-21
  rent restrictionejectmentpersonal usetransferee-landlordnotice of transferdefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent matter where the tenant (petitioner) challenged his eviction, which had been ordered by the Rent Controller and upheld by the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether a transferee-landlord is required to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the Rent Restriction Ordinance upon the tenant before filing an ejectment application on the ground of personal use. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the requirement of notice under Section 13-B is strictly limited to protecting a tenant against allegations of default in the payment of rent. The Court affirmed that where an ejectment application is based on grounds other than default in rent payment, such as personal use, the provisions of Section 13-B are not applicable. The key principle laid down is that the statutory notice requirement regarding the transfer of ownership of premises serves solely to prevent default claims and does not affect ejectment proceedings initiated on other grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is a notice under Section 13-B of the Rent Restriction Ordinance mandatory for an ejectment application based on personal use?
  • Does the failure to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the Rent Restriction Ordinance invalidate an ejectment application filed on grounds other than default in rent payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and Others vs Shahab Din and Other1982 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-20
  subsistence holdingvoid transactionpari delictomutation cancellationdeclaration suitland alienation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a suit for declaration filed by the petitioners, who had purchased 48 kanals 16 marlas of land from the respondents' deceased father. The transaction was subsequently cancelled by the revenue authorities on the ground that it violated Martial Law Regulation No. 64, as it constituted a sale of a part of a holding that was less than a subsistence holding. The petitioners sought a declaration of ownership, but all courts below held the sale to be void under Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that the sale should be saved under the doctrine of pari delicto, contending that since both parties were equally at fault, the party in possession should not be disturbed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where both parties are in pari delicto, the court must refuse to assist either party, and the plaintiff's suit must fail. Consequently, the decisions of the courts below dismissing the suit were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sale of land that violates the subsistence holding restrictions under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 is void ab initio?
  • How does the doctrine of pari delicto apply to a suit for declaration where both parties are equally at fault in entering into an illegal transaction?
  • Can a party in possession of land under a void transaction resist eviction or seek a declaration of ownership on the basis of being in pari delicto?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and Others vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1982 PLD Supreme Court 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schemeexcess allotmentresumption of landallottee's option to surrenderbona fide purchaserre-verification of claimDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the cancellation and resumption of excess allotted land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. An allottee was initially allotted 167 kanals and subsequently sold 80 kanals to the appellants. Upon departmental re-verification, the allottee's entitlement was found to be lower, necessitating the resumption of excess area. The Settlement authorities permitted the allottee to exercise an option, pursuant to which he surrendered the parcel previously sold to the appellants. The appellants challenged this surrender, asserting fraud, lack of authority to extend an option, and seeking protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that absent evidence of fraud or deliberate misrepresentation, the Settlement authorities possessed the discretion to grant the allottee a choice in surrendering excess land. Furthermore, the authorities were under no statutory obligation to protect third-party purchasers where the initial excess allotment arose from an innocent error rather than fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Can Settlement authorities permit an allottee to choose which parcel of land to surrender when excess allotment is resumed absent fraud?
  • Are Settlement authorities legally bound to protect third-party purchasers from an allottee when resuming excess allotted land?
  • Does an inadvertent or erroneous initial verification of an allotment claim automatically amount to fraud disentitling an allottee from exercising an option of surrender?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and 2 Another vs The Settlement Commissioner And Another1982 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  locus standiallotment of landRehabilitation Guzara Schemewrit petitiondiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging the allotment of land made in favour of the respondent in 1963. The core legal question was whether the petitioners possessed the requisite locus standi to challenge the said allotment on the basis of an alleged prior allotment under the Rehabilitation Guzara Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to establish their locus standi, as they neither paid the conditional costs imposed by the High Court nor produced any relevant documents or material to substantiate their interest or possession in the disputed land. The key principle laid down is that discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction will be refused when a party fails to comply with procedural orders of the court and neglects to place foundational evidence of their legal right or interest on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner who fails to pay conditional costs and produce relevant documents lacks locus standi to challenge a land allotment?
  • Will the Supreme Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution when the petitioner fails to place necessary evidence on record?
  • Does a party challenging a settlement authority's order need to prove a preferential right or interest in the disputed property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Husain vs Mushtaq and Another1982 SCMR 237(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-27
  bailfurther inquirycriminal procedurepetition for leave to appealdismissal on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in holding that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. In the absence of any representation on behalf of the petitioner at the hearing, the Court examined the matter on merits, including the First Information Report, the bail application, and the impugned order. The Supreme Court held that the conclusion reached by the High Court was fully justified and accordingly dismissed the petition as being without merit. The key principle laid down is that where a criminal case falls within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the grant of bail by the High Court is warranted and unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of bail is justified when a criminal case falls within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal against an order granting bail be decided on merits in the absence of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon vs District Food Controller and Other1982 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-16
  Depot HoldersMartial Law Instruction No. 22Provisional Constitution Order 1981Ouster of JurisdictionFoodstuffs Distribution
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves multiple civil petitions challenging the termination of the petitioners' appointments as Depot Holders under Martial Law Instruction No. 22. The core legal questions are whether Martial Law Instruction No. 22 constitutes a 'rule' within the meaning of Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, and whether actions taken thereunder are immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that Martial Law Instruction No. 22 is a complete and self-contained code whose provisions possess the requisite precision and generality to be equated with statutory rules under Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. Consequently, orders of cancellation passed pursuant thereto are immune from challenge in the High Court and the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that executive or administrative instructions issued under martial law that are expressed with precision and generality acquire the status of rules and fall within the protective ouster clauses of constitutional indemnity provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Martial Law Instruction No. 22 has the status of a rule within the meaning of Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981?
  • Does Martial Law Instruction No. 22 operate as a complete code independent of the West Pakistan Foodstuffs Distribution Order, 1967?
  • Whether actions taken under Martial Law Instruction No. 22 are immune from challenge before the superior courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Manzoor and Other1982 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  bailcommon intentionappreciation of evidencemedico-legal reportfurther inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to two respondents accused of murder. The prosecution alleged that the respondents held the deceased, enabling a co-accused to inflict thirteen injuries with a sharp-edged weapon. The High Court granted bail, reasoning that the nature of the injuries on the deceased's hands was inconsistent with the allegation that he was being held by two persons, thus warranting further inquiry. The petitioner argued that the High Court improperly appreciated evidence at the bail stage and ignored the common intention alleged in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while courts should not conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence during bail proceedings, they must evaluate the available material, including medical reports. The Court affirmed that the High Court was justified in tentatively assessing the respondents' specific roles based on the medical evidence, and that concluding the application of common intention required further inquiry was legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court prohibited from considering medical evidence when deciding a bail application?
  • Can a court form a tentative conclusion regarding the role of an accused in a criminal transaction during bail proceedings?
  • Does the evaluation of evidence regarding the application of common intention constitute an improper appreciation of evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif Chaudhry vs Muhammad Fayyaz Etc.S1982 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-16
  Provisional Transfer OrderPermanent Transfer DeedSettlement CourtsRehabilitation Departmentleave to appealejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent decisions of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's claim regarding a disputed property. The core legal question concerns the validity of a subsequent Provisional Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed issued in respect of property already subject to an earlier Provisional Transfer Order. The Supreme Court held that since the first Provisional Transfer Order issued to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was earlier in time and never challenged before the Settlement Courts, the Rehabilitation Department lacked the authority to issue a subsequent Provisional Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed to the petitioner, rendering the petitioner's documents invalid in law. The Court affirmed that an earlier unchallanged transfer order takes precedence, leaving the petitioner with no valid claim to the property, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent Provisional Transfer Order issued for a property have any legal validity when an earlier Provisional Transfer Order for the same property exists and remains unchallenged?
  • Whether the Rehabilitation Department has the authority to issue a second Provisional Transfer Order in respect of a property already transferred via an earlier Provisional Transfer Order?
  • Does a Permanent Transfer Deed issued on the basis of a later and invalid Provisional Transfer Order confer valid ownership rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hamiduddin vs Feroz Ahmed and Another1982 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-09
  default in rentevictionillegal sublettingadvance rentwaiver of lease conditionsecond appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Sind High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts ordering the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from commercial premises in Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether the tenant committed a default in the payment of rent by failing to pay in advance as per the lease agreement, and whether he had illegally sublet the premises without the landlords' written consent. The Supreme Court held that the tenant was indeed a defaulter and had illegally sublet the premises, as the acceptance of delayed lump-sum rent payments did not establish a practice to waive the advance payment condition. The Court affirmed the eviction orders, laying down the principle that a landlord's acceptance of occasional delayed payments does not constitute a waiver of the contractual obligation to pay rent in advance, and dismissed the petition while granting the tenant four months to vacate the premises upon continued payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of occasional delayed rent payments by a landlord constitute a waiver of a lease condition requiring rent to be paid in advance?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts regarding default in rent and illegal subletting be successfully challenged in a second appeal without strong legal grounds?
  • Whether illegal subletting of demised premises without the written consent of the landlord constitutes a valid ground for eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Halim vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27
  settlement lawspecial leave to appealrevival of appealadministrative jurisdictionwithdrawal of appealproperty transferinsanity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the transfer of a property under settlement laws. The core legal question is whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner possesses the jurisdiction to revive an appeal that was previously dismissed as withdrawn by the appellant, particularly when the revival is based on a claim of the appellant's insanity at the time of withdrawal. The petitioner contends that the withdrawal was voluntary and that the finding of insanity was unsupported by medical evidence, rendering the subsequent revival of the appeal and the transfer of the property to the respondent without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, finding that these submissions raise substantial questions regarding the limits of administrative authority and the evidentiary basis for reviving proceedings, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the validity of the subsequent transfer orders is contingent upon the legality of the initial order reviving the appeal, thereby necessitating a deeper examination of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's powers in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the legal competence to revive an appeal that has been dismissed as withdrawn?
  • Can an order reviving a previously withdrawn appeal be sustained in the absence of unequivocal evidence of the appellant's insanity at the time of withdrawal?
  • Are subsequent administrative orders dependent on the validity of an initial order that is alleged to be without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Feroz and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09
  murderconcurrent findingsinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponsmedical evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, which convicted the petitioners for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the testimony of interested eye-witnesses and the recovery of blood-stained weapons, despite the petitioners' arguments regarding the witnesses' relationship to the deceased, previous enmity, and the timing of the recoveries while in police custody. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which found the eye-witnesses to be truthful and corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of weapons stained with human blood, were not open to interference. The Court affirmed that the medical evidence regarding the time of death supported the prosecution's version of events, negating the defense's claim of a different time of occurrence. The key principle laid down is that where lower courts have concurrently accepted the credibility of related eye-witnesses supported by independent circumstantial evidence, the appellate court will not interfere with such findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of eye-witnesses?
  • Does the relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable in a murder trial?
  • Is the recovery of blood-stained weapons from an accused in police custody admissible if corroborated by independent evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farid Khan vs Haji Mir Zaman Khan1982 PLD Supreme Court 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26
  ejectmentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantmale childrenWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a second appeal concerning the ejectment of a tenant from a shop in Mansehra. The respondent-landlord sought the ejectment of the appellant on the grounds of default in rent and personal requirement, specifically stating he needed the premises 'brai zaroorat khangi'. While the Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application, the District Judge allowed it on the ground of personal requirement, which was upheld by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the need of the shop for the respondent's grandson fell within the expression 'for the use of any of his male children' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court held that when the landlord's statement is read as a whole, the premises were required for his own personal use to support his deceased son's child, rendering the academic controversy regarding the interpretation of the word 'children' unnecessary. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of a rented shop for the use of a landlord's grandson is covered by the expression 'for the use of any of his male children' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the term 'khangi' in an ejectment application signify personal or own use by the landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Deen Malik and Another vs Iind Additional District Judge, Karachi and Other1982 SCMR 1223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-12
  interim custodyguardians and wardsfamily courts actright of appealforum of appealleave to appealcustody of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court upholding an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, which had set aside an interim custody order passed by a Family Judge under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The core legal question concerns the competency and forum of appeal against interim orders passed by Family Courts in matters of guardianship and custody, specifically in light of the interaction between section 14 and section 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and the subsequent enactment of the Guardians and Wards (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980. The Supreme Court noted a prior precedent holding that the right of appeal is governed by section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. However, the Court held that the contentions raised regarding the statutory redundancy and effect of the 1980 amending Ordinance on section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, raise a serious question of law requiring re-examination of the earlier precedent. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and modified the interim stay to regulate visitation rights for the mother.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal lies against an interim order passed under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, by a Family Court?
  • Does section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, exclusively govern the right and forum of appeal in guardianship and minor custody matters?
  • What is the effect of the Guardians and Wards (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, on the interpretation and applicability of section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, in proceedings before Family Courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Ghulam Akbar1982 SCMR 1018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionagricultural landland reforms regulationrevenue recordleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 18-4-1982, which reversed the District Judge's order and restored the trial court's decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether a small plot purchased ostensibly for residential purposes, part of which continues to be used for agriculture and is reflected in the revenue records, can serve as a valid basis for a pre-emption claim, and whether the validity of the underlying sale under Martial Law Regulation 115 can be questioned in pre-emption proceedings. The Supreme Court held that since a portion of the land remains under agricultural use and the revenue record shows seasonal crops, and further noting that only the competent authority under M.L.R. 115 can examine the validity of a sale, the pre-emption suit was rightly decreed. The court laid down that the law of pre-emption is one of substitution, and questions regarding the violation of land reforms regulations cannot be adjudicated collaterally in pre-emption suits by civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit be maintained on the basis of ownership of land partly used for residential purposes and partly for agriculture?
  • Whether a civil court hearing a pre-emption suit can examine the validity of a sale transaction under Martial Law Regulation 115?
  • Is the law of pre-emption considered a law of substitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir and Another vs Muhammad Shafi1982 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-28
  rent restrictionejectment proceedingsappealability of ordersrent controllermisquoting of statutory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a civil petition for special leave to appeal arising from rent restriction proceedings regarding premises in Sialkot, where a saw mill and timber stall were operated. The respondent landlord sought the ejectment of the petitioner tenant, initially for personal residential use and subsequently for business purposes. Following multiple rounds of litigation before the Rent Controller and appellate authorities, an ejectment order was eventually passed against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged this order before the Supreme Court, contending that the Rent Controller's decision was passed under Section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, which the petitioner argued rendered the order non-appealable. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the underlying application was filed under Section 13 for ejectment. The Court clarified that the nature of the application determines the applicable legal provision, and the mere erroneous citation of Section 14 by the Rent Controller did not remove the order from the scope of Section 13, which governs ejectment proceedings and allows for appeals. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the erroneous citation of Section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance in an ejectment order render the order non-appealable if the application was filed under Section 13?
  • Does the nature of the application or the section cited by the Rent Controller determine the appealability of an ejectment order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashi R vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-08
  murdersentencingmitigation of sentenceIslamic Jurisprudencecompensationpardongrave and sudden provocationdeath sentencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal, granted special leave, challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment upholding the appellant's conviction and death sentence under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, for the murder of his first cousin. The appellant, a disappointed suitor, killed the deceased after she refused to elope. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that Exception 1 to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code, was inapplicable as the provocation, though grave, was not sudden, and the victim was not the provocateur. The Court also rejected the argument for a lesser sentence based on the appellant being a dejected suitor or inflicting a solitary blow. However, the Court found considerable force in the plea for mitigation based on Islamic Jurisprudence, noting that the deceased's parents had accepted compensation and pardoned the appellant. The Court held that where statutory law grants discretion in sentencing, Islamic principles, including those concerning compensation and pardon, can guide the court. Consequently, the death sentence was set aside, and the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for life, with the fine also remitted due to the compensation settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can the acceptance of compensation and pardon by the aggrieved party be a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can Islamic Jurisprudence and principles guide judicial discretion in sentencing where statutory law is silent or allows for discretion?
  • Does Exception 1 to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code, apply if the provocation was grave but not sudden, or if the victim was not the person who gave the provocation?
  • Is the infliction of a solitary fatal blow a universal mitigating factor for a lesser sentence in murder cases?
  • Can the conduct of the deceased's parents, leading to the appellant's desperation as a dejected suitor, be a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh Etc. vs Muhammad Hussain Etc.1982 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-18
  civil revisionscope of revisional jurisdictiongift versus willconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of the lower courts determining that a disputed document executed by the deceased was a will rather than a gift, resulting in the dismissal of the petitioners' suit to the extent of two-thirds and the dismissal of their subsequent civil revision by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in interfering with concurrent factual and legal findings under revisional jurisdiction, and whether the document constituted a gift or a will. The Supreme Court held that the civil revision before the High Court was incompetent because section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not empower the High Court to interfere with a subordinate court's decision merely due to a difference in opinion on questions of fact or law, unless there is a jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity. Furthermore, upon examining the document, the Court affirmed that it was indeed a will. The key principle laid down is that the High Court cannot utilize revisional jurisdiction to correct mere errors of fact or law or erroneous construction of documents by subordinate courts where jurisdiction has been lawfully exercised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the conclusions of a subordinate court on questions of fact or law?
  • Does section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorize the High Court to correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts?
  • Whether a document designated as a gift constitutes a will upon proper construction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azini vs Ch. Sikandar Khan Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11
  ejectmentreconstructionrent restrictionalternative accommodationjurisdiction of Rent Controllertenancy agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding an ejectment order. The petitioner-tenant sought to enforce a contractual covenant requiring the landlord to provide alternative accommodation prior to the reconstruction of the premises, a condition initially imposed by the Rent Controller but subsequently removed by the District Court. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction under the Rent Restriction Ordinance to enforce a contractual condition requiring a landlord to provide alternative accommodation to a tenant before commencing reconstruction, despite such a requirement not being explicitly provided for in the statute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Rent Controller lacks the jurisdiction to enforce such a condition. The Court reasoned that eviction proceedings are strictly governed by the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and since the statute does not mandate the provision of alternative accommodation prior to reconstruction, the Rent Controller cannot impose such a condition, regardless of the private agreement between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to enforce a contractual condition requiring a landlord to provide alternative accommodation to a tenant prior to the reconstruction of the premises?
  • Are eviction proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance governed exclusively by the provisions of the Ordinance itself?
  • Can a Rent Controller impose conditions on an eviction order that are not explicitly authorized by the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1982 SCMR 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-07
  criminal appealmurder convictionmitigation of sentencejuvenile offendereye-witness testimonyleave to appealcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Aslam, was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, for the murder of his uncle, Mehdi Hassan, and sentenced to death, a conviction subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court, arguing that the testimony of eye-witnesses required independent corroboration due to alleged infirmities. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge to the conviction, finding the testimony of a key eye-witness, Abdul Sattar, credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction. However, the petitioner further contended that his age at the time of the occurrence (15-16 years) and the motive—avenging the murder of his father, which he believed was committed by the deceased—warranted a mitigation of the sentence. Relying on the precedent established in Ajun Shah v. The State, the Court found substance in the argument regarding the sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, but strictly limited the scope of the proceedings to the question of the appropriate sentence, leaving the conviction undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a single credible eye-witness?
  • Does the young age of an offender and the motive of avenging a father's murder constitute valid grounds for mitigating a death sentence?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to grant leave to appeal limited solely to the question of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Khuda Dad1982 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-03
  pre-emptionlimitationKhasra Girdawaripresumption of correctnessrevenue recordGirdawar Kanungopossession
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals arose out of two pre-emption suits filed by the appellant to challenge land sale transactions executed in favour of the respondent-vendee. The suits were instituted on 14-3-1970, whereas the vendee claimed to have acquired physical possession of the land prior to the attestation of mutations. The core legal question was whether the suits were barred by limitation, which turned on whether entries made in the Khasra Girdawari by the Girdawar Kanungo carried a presumption of correctness regarding the date of change in physical possession. The District Judge and the High Court held that the suits were time-barred based on the revenue record entries showing possession in Rabi 1968. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that while entries in the Khasra Girdawari do not carry the same statutory presumption as annual revenue records under the Land Revenue Act, a presumption of correctness and regularity arises under Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1872 when such entries are made by official record-keepers acting in the ordinary course of duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entry in the Khasra Girdawari made by a Girdawar Kanungo in the ordinary course of official duty carry a presumption of correctness under Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Whether entries in the Khasra Girdawari carry the same statutory presumption of truth as annual revenue records under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Can a suit for pre-emption be held time-barred on the basis of unrebutted revenue entries showing physical possession taken by the vendee more than a year prior to the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Etc. and Muhammad Asghar vs The State1982 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26
  murderleave to appealeye-witness testimonymedical evidencemotiveSection 382-B CrPCrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against their conviction for murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence, specifically the reliability of eye-witnesses, the significance of medical evidence regarding the time of death based on the presence of faecal matter, and the impact of alleged discrepancies in recovery witness testimony. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was well-founded based on the consistent eye-witness testimony, established motive, and medical evidence confirming the use of two distinct weapons. The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments, clarifying that the presence of faecal matter does not definitively contradict the time of death without specific analysis of quantity, and that minor discrepancies in recovery witness testimony do not undermine the entire prosecution case. Furthermore, the Court affirmed its discretion to deny the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in cases involving severe violence. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of faecal matter in the intestines of a deceased person necessarily disprove the time of death alleged by the prosecution?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on eye-witness testimony and motive even if recovery evidence is contested?
  • Is the court required to grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in all murder cases?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between recovery witnesses regarding the location of joining the investigation invalidate the recovery evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and Others vs Ijaz Ahmad and Other1982 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-02
  pre-emptionleave to appealdismissal in liminecontumacious conductregular first appealdelay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed in limine a regular first appeal arising from a suit for possession through pre-emption. The trial court had previously decided the suit against the petitioners under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, due to their repeated failure to adduce evidence despite multiple adjournments. While the Supreme Court acknowledged the general legal principle that a regular first appeal should not typically be dismissed in limine, it declined to interfere in this specific instance. The Court held that the petitioners' conduct before the trial court was contumacious and represented a deliberate attempt to delay proceedings. Furthermore, the High Court had reviewed the available record, including the shajra nasab, which established the respondents' superior right of pre-emption. Consequently, the Supreme Court determined that the case was not a fit one for the grant of leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the lower court's decision based on the petitioners' obstructive behavior and the merits of the underlying pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regular first appeal be dismissed in limine if the appellant's conduct in the trial court was contumacious?
  • Does the failure to adduce evidence despite multiple adjournments justify a decision under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to grant leave to appeal if a High Court dismisses an appeal in limine despite the existence of a valid legal argument?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and Muhammad Afzal vs The State the State1982 SCMR 928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and Another vs The State and 3 Other1982 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-24
  criminal appealcorroborationeyewitness testimonyplea of alibihostile witnessinterested witnessattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, originating from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, addressed the sufficiency of corroboration for eyewitness testimony in an attempted murder case under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolved around whether the testimony of interested and hostile witnesses could sustain a conviction without independent corroboration, particularly when an independent eyewitness contradicted the prosecution's version and an accused established a plea of alibi. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was justified in setting aside the convictions, finding that the ocular account was tainted by deep-seated enmity, uncorroborated by reliable recoveries, and directly contradicted by a disinterested witness whose testimony had been improperly brushed aside by the trial court. The key principle laid down is that corroborative evidence in criminal trials must specifically point to the participation of the particular accused, and testimony from interested witnesses cannot form the basis of a conviction when contradicted by reliable independent evidence and unshaken pleas of alibi.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an interested and inimical eyewitness can be accepted without independent corroboration?
  • Does the recovery of empty pellets from the crime scene constitute sufficient corroboration to identify individual assailants?
  • What is the legal standard of proof required when an accused raises a plea of alibi?
  • Can a prosecution witness be legally declared hostile without being properly confronted with their previous police statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Alias Chhachhi vs The State1982 SCMR 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-28
  murdercapital punishmentcommutation of sentenceocular evidencemotivecriminal appealcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant for the murder of Muhammad Miskeen, for which he was sentenced to death by the trial court, with a subsequent fine imposed by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question concerned the reliability of ocular testimony identifying the appellant at the scene and whether the sentence of death should be commuted to life imprisonment given the appellant's motive of avenging his brother's murder, which occurred when the appellant was a child. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular evidence credible and the arrest of the appellant at the scene with the weapon of offense established. However, applying the principle laid down in Ajun Shah v. The State, the Court held that where a murder is committed out of a long-standing obsession to avenge a family member's death, a lesser penalty is appropriate. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment and increased the fine to Rs. 25,000, payable as compensation to the heirs of the deceased under the relevant criminal procedure provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a long-standing obsession to avenge a family member's murder constitute grounds for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is ocular testimony sufficient for conviction when the accused is apprehended at the scene of the crime with the weapon of offense?
  • Can an appellate court enhance the sentence of fine imposed by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf- vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07
  criminal appealconvictionsentenceappellate jurisdictionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had recorded convictions and sentences against the appellant, Muhammad Ashraf. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court were sustainable in law. Upon consideration of the case, the Supreme Court, acting according to the opinion of the majority of the bench, dismissed the appeal. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions and sentences previously recorded by the High Court. The judgment serves as a final adjudication confirming the lower court's findings of guilt and the associated sentencing, effectively concluding the appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to uphold convictions and sentences recorded by the High Court in an appeal?
  • What is the effect of a majority opinion in an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1982 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-17
  pre-arrest bailabuse of processspecific performancecivil litigationcriminal prosecutionforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing to confirm pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery. The petitioner had filed a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property, after which the defendants registered an F.I.R. against him for forgery under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the criminal prosecution, initiated while the civil suit regarding the genuineness of the agreement was sub judice, constituted an abuse of process justifying pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the criminal case appeared to be a tactic to exert pressure on the petitioner regarding the civil dispute. Furthermore, the High Court erred by refusing bail based on procedural deficiencies rather than addressing the merits of the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and confirmed the petitioner's bail. The judgment establishes that initiating criminal proceedings to pressure a party in a pending civil suit constitutes an abuse of the process of law, warranting the grant of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initiation of criminal proceedings during the pendency of a civil suit regarding the same subject matter constitute an abuse of process?
  • Is the failure to produce a document before the High Court sufficient grounds to deny pre-arrest bail when the document is already part of the judicial record?
  • Can a criminal prosecution be used as a tool to exert pressure on a party involved in a civil dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Abdul Hameed and Other1982 SCMR 237(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-08
  evictionlandlord and tenantcontumacious conductnotice of transferconstitutional jurisdictionpersonal needdefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an eviction order. The petitioner, a tenant, contested his eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and the landlord's personal need for the property. The core legal questions were whether the tenant could challenge the landlord's title after receiving a notice of transfer under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, whether the service of such notice was legally sufficient in a tenancy-in-common scenario, and whether the finding of personal need was reviewable. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's conduct in depositing rent in the name of the previous landlord, despite formal notice of transfer, was contumacious. The Court affirmed the eviction, ruling that a tenant cannot unilaterally challenge the title of a transferee landlord, especially after acknowledging the notice by depositing rent. Furthermore, the Court held that findings of fact regarding personal need by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction are not subject to review in constitutional jurisdiction, and a tenant who acts upon a notice cannot later challenge its service.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant unilaterally challenge the title of a transferee landlord after receiving a formal notice of transfer?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding personal need by a Rent Controller reviewable in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a tenant who acts upon a notice of transfer subsequently challenge the validity of its service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Qadri vs Principal, King Edward Medical College1982 PLD Supreme Court 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-11
  medical college admissionimprovement of markssuppression of factsfalse affidavitunclean handswrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal, which had upheld the dismissal of a writ petition relating to the cancellation of the petitioner's admission to King Edward Medical College, Lahore. The petitioner had repeatedly appeared in the F.Sc. (Pre-medical) examination across multiple educational boards to improve his marks, ultimately securing admission based on marks obtained from the Sargodha Board after failing to disclose his prior appearances and submitting a false affidavit to the college authorities. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's concealment of facts, submission of a false affidavit, and non-compliance with rules regarding improvement of marks justified the cancellation of his admission and the refusal of constitutional relief. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner made false statements and withheld material facts regarding his academic history, thereby coming to court with unclean hands and disentitling himself to discretionary relief. The court laid down the principle that the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court will not be exercised in favour of a litigant who attempts to secure admissions or relief through misrepresentation and falsehood.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate seeking admission to a medical college is required to disclose prior intermediate examinations passed from different educational boards?
  • Does the submission of a false affidavit regarding past academic attempts disentitle a petitioner from invoking the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether the High Court's refusal to grant relief under its writ jurisdiction to a petitioner with unclean hands is legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Khan vs Mst. Pahmida Khanum1982 PLD Supreme Court 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-14
  ejectmentdefault in rentextension of timestay orderrestoration of original orderrent controllerdefence struck off
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning ejectment proceedings initiated on the grounds of default in rent and personal requirement. The core legal question revolves around whether a Rent Controller is competent to extend the time for depositing arrears of rent after an unsuccessful appeal against an interim deposit order under rent restriction laws, and how the time period for deposit is computed following the vacation of a stay order. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller has no authority to extend the time upon the dismissal of an appeal; rather, it is only the Appellate Court that may grant reasonable time. Upon the dismissal of an appeal, the original deposit order is restored, and the tenant must perform the act within the remaining balance of the originally allotted time after excluding the period covered by the stay. The key principle laid down is that the dismissal of an appeal revives the original order, and any unexpired time for compliance resumes from the date of the appellate decision, while the original forum cannot independently enlarge such time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller extend the time for depositing arrears of rent after an appeal against the deposit order has been dismissed?
  • What is the effect of the dismissal of an appeal on the time originally fixed for the performance of an act whose operation was stayed?
  • Whether a tenant's defence can be struck off for failing to deposit rent within the remaining balance of the original time limit after an unsuccessful appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and Others vs Board of Revenue and Other1982 SCMR 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09
  constitutional petitionlease extensionGovernment landCholistan areadisputed questions of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, numbering two hundred and seventy-two, sought leave to appeal against the judgments of the Lahore High Court dismissing their constitutional petitions. They claimed to be lessees of Government land under the ten years scheme promulgated under section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act of 1912 and sought extension of their leases based on a policy letter dated 25-5-1976. Their claims were dismissed by the High Court because the policy expressly excluded Cholistan area allotees and they failed to place copies of their pending applications on record. The Supreme Court observed that the genuineness of the alleged leases and allotments involved disputed questions of fact which could not be scrutinized in constitutional jurisdiction, and that the High Court rightly declined to issue directions in the absence of necessary documents. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the impugned order suffered from no legal infirmity and refused leave to appeal, laying down that disputed questions of fact regarding the genuineness of land allotments cannot be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding the genuineness of land allotments be examined in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether a constitutional petition can be maintained for the disposal of pending applications without establishing entitlement and placing relevant documents on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-09
  rapeZinasolitary witnesscorroborationcriminal appealappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the offence of rape under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question is whether a conviction can be sustained based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix when that testimony is riddled with material contradictions, lacks corroboration, and is directly refuted by the prosecutrix's own husband, who appeared as a defence witness. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was inherently improbable and relied on unreliable testimony. The Court found that the lower courts misread the evidence and drew incorrect inferences. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case rests on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix that is inherently absurd and contradicted by other evidence, including the testimony of the complainant's own husband, such evidence cannot form the basis for a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix when that testimony is inherently improbable and contradicted by other evidence?
  • Does the testimony of a husband contradicting the prosecutrix's version of events undermine the prosecution's case in a Zina charge?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the lower courts have misread the evidence and drawn incorrect inferences from the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aqeel Ahmad Siddiqi vs Government of Pakistan And Other1982 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-31
  condonation of delaylimitation periodtime-barred petitionspecial leave to appealintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed an Intra Court Appeal, thereby upholding a previous order that dismissed a constitutional petition. The petition before the Supreme Court was significantly delayed, being filed 38 days late against the Division Bench order and 261 days late against the Single Judge order. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing a medical condition supported by a certificate. The Supreme Court examined the application and found it insufficient. The Court held that the medical certificate did not justify the delay because evidence on record demonstrated that the petitioner was actively attending to the case and obtaining certified copies during the period of alleged illness. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide an explanation for the delay covering each day of the limitation period. Consequently, the Court rejected the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred, affirming the principle that a party seeking condonation must explain each day of the delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is a medical certificate sufficient to condone a significant delay in filing an appeal if the record shows the petitioner was otherwise active in the case?
  • Does the law require an applicant seeking condonation of delay to explain each day of the limitation period?
  • Can a petition be dismissed as time-barred if the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the entire duration of the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwer through His Legal Representative vs Abdul1982 SCMR 1120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-18
  urban rent restrictionstriking off defencedefault in rentlandlord and tenantestoppel of tenantevacuee propertyejectment application
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan upholding the striking off of the appellant tenant's defence in rent proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller was justified in striking off the appellant's defence for non-payment of rent without first deciding the additional issue regarding the maintainability of the ejectment application following intermediate changes in the property's transfer status. The Supreme Court held that since the tentative rent-fixing order had attained finality and the appellant admitted being inducted as a tenant by the respondent, the appellant was estopped under section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 from denying the respondent's title as landlord. Consequently, upon the appellant's default in paying subsequent rent, the Rent Controller had no alternative under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance but to strike off the defence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller is bound to decide an additional issue regarding the maintainability of an ejectment application before striking off a tenant's defence for non-payment of rent?
  • Can a tenant who was inducted by a landlord subsequently repudiate the landlord's title in view of section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872?
  • What is the consequence under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 when a tenant fails to comply with a final tentative rent deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aman and 2 Others vs Atta Muhammad and Another1982 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27
  constitutional petitionland settlementreviewremand ordernatural justicediscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition relating to a land settlement dispute. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners were condemned unheard during review proceedings and whether a remand order could be reviewed after statutory powers of review were withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the absence of a hearing at the initial stage of granting permission to review was inconsequential when a full hearing was afforded during the actual review proceedings, and that an illegal remand order passed without hearing can be recalled without amounting to a review. Furthermore, the Court held that petitioners whose own conduct involves delay, default, and misrepresentation are not entitled to discretionary constitutional relief. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether absence of hearing at the time of granting permission to review vitiates the subsequent review order when a full hearing was provided?
  • Does recalling an illegal remand order passed without affording an opportunity of hearing amount to a review?
  • Is a petitioner guilty of delay, default, and misrepresentation entitled to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1982 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-27
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancespremeditationdying declarationsingle blowcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased by inflicting a single knife blow, resulting in a death sentence confirmed by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted solely to consider whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a reduction of the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether a single fatal blow resulting from a sudden altercation over a petty matter, following a brief interval, constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence. The Supreme Court held that no extenuating circumstances existed, noting that the appellant left the scene, armed himself with a knife, returned after half million minutes demonstrating premeditation, and intentionally targeted a vital organ (the chest). The court upheld the conviction and the death sentence, dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single knife blow given after a brief interval constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to life imprisonment?
  • Does returning armed with a weapon after an initial altercation demonstrate premeditation precluding leniency in sentencing?
  • Can a dying declaration corroborated by independent eye-witnesses sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Muhammad Ali and Another1982 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-12
  post-arrest bailconspiracy to murderdirect evidencedelay in FIRjudicial discretionappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent, who was accused of conspiracy to abduct and murder the husband of his co-accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in granting bail, given the arguments regarding the lack of direct evidence and the delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the High Court had correctly identified the absence of direct evidence and the significant delay in reporting the incident, which cast doubt on the prosecution's case at the prima facie stage. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error in the High Court's reasoning or the exercise of its judicial discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the bail order was justified and declined to interfere, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not disturb a bail order unless the lower court's discretion was exercised arbitrarily or erroneously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in granting bail when there is no direct evidence against the accused?
  • Does a significant delay in lodging an FIR constitute a valid ground for granting bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a bail order granted by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Manzoor Ahmad and Other1982 SCMR 1186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-14
  sudden fightculpable homicideacquittalcriminal liabilityappreciation of evidencewater rights disputeException IV to Section 300
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Lahore High Court’s acquittal of respondents in a case involving a fatal altercation over water rights. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's case due to minor infirmities, and how to determine criminal liability in a sudden, unplanned fight where both parties sustained injuries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to discharge its duty to analyze the evidence and circumstances. The Court determined the incident was a sudden fight, invoking Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rather than premeditated murder. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittals, convicting the respondents under Section 304 and Section 308, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that in cases of sudden fights or where direct evidence is incomplete, courts must not be deterred by the narrative's incompleteness. Instead, they must perform an onerous duty to draw reasonable inferences from established facts, the nature of injuries, and surrounding circumstances to ascertain criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden, unplanned fight over water rights fall under Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a court required to determine criminal liability based on circumstantial evidence and injuries when direct evidence is incomplete or conflicting?
  • Can an appellate court convict an accused for a lesser offense under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 after setting aside an acquittal for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Khan vs Ayaz Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-04
  settlement operationsconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factwrit petitiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning whether a property in Multan was a house or a shop under settlement operations. The petitioner's father had obtained a P.T.O. for the property, but it was subsequently treated as a shop and auctioned to private respondents. Following previous remand proceedings by the Supreme Court to determine the nature of the property, the Settlement Commissioner found that the property was indeed a shop situated in a commercial area, a finding upheld by the High Court in a writ petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with a concurrent finding of fact regarding the classification of the property. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact by the Settlement Commissioner, based on evidence including admissions and commercial usage, was within his exclusive jurisdiction and unassailable in constitutional jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with a finding of fact given by the Settlement Commissioner regarding the nature of a property?
  • Does a finding that a disputed property is a shop rather than a house preclude its transfer under the Settlement Scheme when the claimant already holds another shop?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs The State1982 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-07
  murderous assaultgrievous injurymedical evidencesentence reductionleave to appealcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a murderous assault. The petitioner raised two primary arguments: first, that the evidence regarding the grievous nature of the injury was flawed because the doctor who performed the X-ray examination was not examined; and second, that the sentence should be reduced due to the five-year duration of the trial. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate the claim regarding the medical evidence, noting that the High Court had correctly relied on the testimony of the examining doctor who confirmed the injury was grievous upon X-ray examination. Furthermore, the Court observed that this specific plea regarding the medical evidence was not raised before the High Court. Regarding the sentence, the Court found no merit in the request for reduction, noting the petitioner remained on bail throughout the proceedings. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the trial duration did not warrant sentence mitigation under these circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new plea regarding the sufficiency of medical evidence in a leave to appeal petition if it was not raised before the High Court?
  • Does the duration of a trial justify a reduction in sentence if the accused remained on bail throughout the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and 3 Others vs The State1982 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-17
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidenceocular testimonyinterested witnessescriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for murder. The petitioners were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge for the murder of Zafar, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution's ocular evidence, which relied heavily on interested witnesses and contained inherent improbabilities, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when the defence version appeared plausible. The Court observed significant inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative, including the unnatural conduct of the accused in dragging the victim to his own village before attacking him, and the suspicious presence of eye-witnesses at the scene. Furthermore, the Court noted a discrepancy between the alleged use of hatchets and the absence of incised injuries on the deceased. Finding substantial weight in the petitioners' contentions regarding the reliability of the evidence and the plausibility of the defence version, the Supreme Court held that this was a fit case for a comprehensive reappraisal of the entire evidence and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a case fit for leave to appeal when the prosecution's narrative contains inherent improbabilities regarding the conduct of the accused?
  • Does the absence of specific injury types (e.g., incised wounds) corresponding to alleged weapons (e.g., hatchets) justify a reappraisal of evidence?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal based on the plausibility of a defence version when the prosecution's ocular evidence is challenged as unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Javed and Others vs Settlement Authority, Settlement Circle II, Lahore and Other1982 SCMR 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  composite propertytransfer of propertysettlement proceedingsremand orderdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the transfer of a composite property comprising a residential portion and multiple shops under settlement laws. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the entire building as a residential unit to the petitioners. Upon appeal by certain shop occupants, the Additional Settlement Commissioner remanded the matter for a fresh spot inspection to determine if the property constituted a single unit under the second proviso to section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons Act. Following prolonged delays, a subsequent inspection in 1971 led to the property being treated as separate units, transferring the residential portion and one shop to the petitioners while disposing of the remaining shops. The Settlement Commissioner and subsequently the High Court dismissed the petitioners' challenges. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the remand order lawfully directed the determination of the property's nature under section 2(12) of the Act and that the petitioners had no entitlement to portions properly classified as separate independent shops.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a composite property consisting of a residential portion and shops can be treated as a single residential unit under the Displaced Persons Act?
  • Does a remand order directing spot inspection properly invoke the second proviso to section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons Act?
  • Do occupants of a residential portion have locus standi to challenge the independent transfer of separately classified shops in a composite building?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar vs Ch. Muhammad Iqbal and Another1982 SCMR 1014 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  ejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshiprent restrictiondefinition of landlordconcurrent findings of factcondonation of delaylimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the respondent, who managed property owned by his wife, qualified as a 'landlord' under the relevant rent legislation, and whether the petitioner’s denial of the landlord-tenant relationship was contumacious, thereby justifying eviction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the respondent's status as a landlord were not subject to reappraisal in the current proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, noting that the petition was also time-barred, and the application for condonation of delay was unconvincing. The key principle laid down is that under the definition of 'landlord,' the term is not restricted to the 'owner' of the property; rather, any person entitled to receive rent is clothed with the status of a landlord, regardless of legal ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'landlord' under rent restriction laws require the person to be the legal owner of the property?
  • Can a person who manages property for another and collects rent be considered a 'landlord'?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship subject to reappraisal by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the application for condonation of delay fails to provide convincing grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar and 8 Another vs Mst. Said Bano and 8 Other1982 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19
  partition suitremandex parte decreerevisional jurisdictionadmissibility of evidenceestoppelinterpretation of counsel statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a partition suit concerning a property (Haveli) claimed by the plaintiffs through inheritance. Following an ex parte decree against one defendant, Fordil, the proceedings were set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision. The trial court subsequently decided in favor of the plaintiffs, a decision upheld by the District Court and the High Court. The appellants challenged the reliance on pre-remand evidence, arguing that such evidence was legally non-existent post-remand and that a counsel's statement dated 11-4-1977, which purportedly accepted the pre-remand evidence, was misread. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the counsel's statement by the High Court, which encompassed both pre-remand and post-remand stages, was reasonable and not subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court established that parties cannot adopt divergent positions at different stages of the same litigation to challenge the admissibility of evidence they previously acquiesced to. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the admissibility of pre-remand evidence in a fresh trial if they previously acquiesced to its use?
  • Does a counsel's statement made during post-remand proceedings, which is ambiguous, allow for a reasonable interpretation by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Are parties permitted to take divergent positions regarding the admissibility of evidence at different stages of the same litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad vs Wazir Din and Other1982 SCMR 400(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11
  settlement of propertyevacuee propertyleave to appealcomparative meritremandstatus quopossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two civil petitions for leave to appeal arising from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the transfer of portions of a residential property (Property No. 680/38, Lahore Cantt) under settlement laws. The petitioner, Muhammad Ahmad, challenged the High Court's decision which had remanded the case regarding one respondent (Rahim Bakhsh) to the Officer notified under the Evacuee Properties and Displaced Persons (Repeal) Act, 1975, for a comparative merit assessment, while simultaneously rejecting the petitioner's appeal against another respondent (Wazir Din). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, upon remand, the merits of all three occupants should be evaluated collectively by the same authority to prevent conflicting decisions and to determine if all occupants could be accommodated, given their long-standing possession of the property for over 30 years. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession, conditional upon the petitioner depositing monthly rent with the Rent Controller where ejectment proceedings were pending.

  Questions settled

  • Should the merits of all occupants of a property be considered by the same authority upon remand to avoid conflicting decisions?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to determine if multiple occupants can be accommodated in a single property based on long-term possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1982 SCMR 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-24
  murderinterested witnesseye-witness testimonycorroborationabscondencecriminal appealrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the testimony of eye-witnesses, who were related to the deceased, required independent corroboration in the absence of proven enmity, and whether the recovery of the weapon could be relied upon when the recovery witnesses were also eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound. It ruled that the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased does not render them 'interested witnesses' requiring corroboration if no enmity exists between them and the accused. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the testimony of an independent eye-witness, supported by medical evidence (showing close-range firing) and the appellant's abscondence, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The principle laid down is that in the absence of enmity, the testimony of related eye-witnesses is credible, and substitution of the real culprit is a rare occurrence, especially when the accused is known to the witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of eye-witnesses to a deceased person automatically render them interested witnesses requiring independent corroboration?
  • Can the recovery of a weapon be used to corroborate the testimony of an independent eye-witness if the recovery witnesses were also eye-witnesses to the crime?
  • Is the abscondence of an accused after an occurrence a valid factor to support the prosecution's version of events?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs Additional District Judge and Other1982 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-31
  rent evictiondefault in payment of rentbona fide personal requirementconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appeallandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against concurrent orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's default in rent payment and the landlord's bona fide personal requirement for the property justified interference by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the case was concluded by factual findings and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error of law in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. However, the Court granted the petitioner one month to vacate the premises, subject to the undertaking that the petitioner would voluntarily surrender possession and continue to pay rent during this period. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in rent matters unless a clear violation of law or misappreciation of evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default and bona fide personal requirement in a rent case?
  • Can a tenant be granted additional time to vacate premises after the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs Abdur Rauf and 2 Other1982 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-17
  ejectmentnon-payment of renturban rent restrictionlandlord and tenantspecial leave to appealPermanent Transfer Deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner for non-payment of rent in respect of a shop situated in Sialkot. The respondents landlords filed an ejectment application under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, which was allowed by the Rent Controller and subsequently upheld by the District Judge in appeal and a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in second appeal. The core legal question concerns the liability of the tenant to pay rent when claiming co-ownership, and whether eviction was lawfully ordered. The Supreme Court held that since the respondents proved regular transfer of the property from the Settlement Department along with a Permanent Transfer Deed and service of notice, and the petitioner failed to substantiate any claim of co-ownership or payment of rent, the concurrent eviction orders by the lower forums were fully justified. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a tenant who fails to prove any proprietary interest or pay rent despite being a proven tenant of regular transferees is lawfully liable to eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant denying the landlord's title and claiming co-ownership without evidence is liable to eviction for non-payment of rent?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower rent forums regarding default in rent payment open to interference without record support?
  • Whether regular transferees holding a Permanent Transfer Deed from the Settlement Department are entitled to seek ejectment of a defaulting tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Mir vs Mst. Fakhar Jehan Beguni Etc.S1982 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-21
  settlement authoritiesres judicatacivil suitlimitationevictionexclusive jurisdictionJammu and Kashmir refugee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision petition in limine. The petitioner, a Jammu and Kashmir refugee, had engaged in protracted litigation regarding the transfer of a property in Rawalpindi. Following unsuccessful challenges to the Settlement Authorities' decisions through constitutional petitions and appeals, the petitioner filed a civil suit in 1976 seeking a declaration that the settlement orders were null and void and requesting an injunction against eviction. The petitioner argued that his status as a refugee protected his possession and that the cause of action was recurring. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings before the Settlement Authorities had conclusively determined the issues of possession and property divisibility, matters within their exclusive jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the petitioner had already exhausted his remedies and that the civil suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and limitation. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, reinforcing that finality in settlement proceedings cannot be circumvented by subsequent civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit be maintained to challenge the final orders of Settlement Authorities regarding property possession and divisibility?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a civil suit that attempts to re-litigate issues already decided by Settlement Authorities and upheld in constitutional petitions?
  • Is a claim of recurring cause of action valid when the underlying dispute regarding property transfer has been conclusively determined by a competent tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Malik vs Government of Pakistan And Other1982 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  Service Tribunalnon-prosecutionservice of noticequestion of factcompulsory retirementrestoration of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal for non-prosecution following his compulsory retirement under Martial Law Regulation 114. The petitioner sought restoration of the appeal, claiming he had not been served with notice. The Service Tribunal rejected this application, finding that notice had been duly served via registered post to the petitioner's counsel's office, as evidenced by a signed acknowledgment receipt. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the individual who signed the receipt was no longer employed by the counsel's firm at the time of service, thereby invalidating the notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the question of whether the individual was an employee at the time of service was a question of fact. The Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's finding of fact, noting that the petitioner's argument regarding the individual's employment status was implausible given the circumstances of the delivery and receipt of the notice.

  Questions settled

  • Is the question of whether a notice was properly served on a counsel's office a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact made by the Service Tribunal regarding the service of notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Khan vs Superintendent of Police, Mianwali and 21982 SCMR 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-20
  service lawpolice servicedismissal from servicedelegation of powersadministrative tribunalconstitutional interpretationefficiency and discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, challenged his dismissal from service by the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Mianwali, arguing that under previous judicial precedent, only the Deputy Inspector General (D.I.G.) possessed the authority to dismiss him. The Punjab Administrative Tribunal had previously dismissed his appeal, citing his failure to raise this jurisdictional issue before the departmental appellate authority as required by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974. The core legal question was whether the S.P. was competent to dismiss the appellant given the constitutional and statutory framework in force at the time. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was lawful. It reasoned that the 1962 Constitution, specifically Article 177(1)(a), permitted removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority if expressly empowered. Such delegation existed under the Police Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim of procedural violation regarding the consideration of the appellant's explanation, ruling that the appellant failed to submit his explanation within the specified timeframe, thereby waiving his right to have it considered prior to the dismissal order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority if expressly empowered by delegation rules?
  • Does the failure to submit an explanation within the specified time limit preclude a claim that the disciplinary authority failed to consider the explanation?
  • Do Police Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958, supersede other service rules regarding the authority to dismiss police personnel?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and Others vs Ghulam Muhammad and Other1982 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-30
  constitutional petitionclean hands doctrinesuppression of material factsdiscretionary jurisdictionsettlement authoritieswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petition on the ground of suppression of material facts and failure to approach the court with clean hands. The core legal question is whether the High Court rightly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to dismiss a writ petition where the petitioners deliberately concealed the initiation and subsequent dismissal of parallel proceedings before the Settlement Authorities concerning the same subject matter. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the non-disclosure of such relevant ongoing and concluded proceedings intended to secure a favourable order constitutes suppression of material facts. The key principle laid down is that a party invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court must make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts, including parallel proceedings, and failure to do so justifies the dismissal of the petition on the ground of unclean hands without interference by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be dismissed for concealing parallel proceedings initiated before Settlement Authorities?
  • Does the failure to disclose the dismissal of an application before Settlement Authorities amount to coming to court with unclean hands?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary dismissal of a writ petition suffering from suppression of material facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-10
  murderidentification paradeevidentiary value of identificationeyewitness testimonyrecovery of crime weaponcapital punishmentre-hearing of appealCriminal Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court convicting the appellants for the murder of Muhammad Arif, resulting in sentences of death and life imprisonment. Leave to appeal was granted to determine whether the courts below could lawfully rely on the identification of the appellants by the sole eyewitness, P.W. Rahim Khan, given allegations that the suspects were shown to the witness in police custody prior to the formal identification parade. The Supreme Court observed that although the subsequent formal identification parade before a Magistrate lost evidentiary value due to earlier exposure at the police station, identification parades are merely corroborative and not substantive evidence. The Court held that the direct dock identification by the eyewitness was fully reliable, as the witness had spent considerable time in close contact with the assailants in sufficient light, promptly described them in the First Information Report, and had no motive for false implication. The identification was further corroborated by recoveries of incriminating items, including the deceased's snatched bag with purchase receipts and a knife. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade constitutes substantive evidence or merely serves as corroborative material to substantive dock evidence?
  • Whether the substantive dock identification by an eyewitness can be relied upon to sustain a conviction when the formal identification parade is defective or rendered valueless due to prior exposure of the accused in police custody?
  • Whether the failure to hold a statutory identification parade is fatal to the prosecution when the accused's identity is otherwise established through direct and corroborative evidence?
  • Whether Judges who originally heard an appeal are required to participate in its rehearing after the initial judgment is recalled due to an administrative omission to circulate it to the fourth member of the Bench?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah Etc. vs The State1982 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-16
  bailleave to appealcriminal procedureprima facie casediscretionary jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court rejecting their application for bail in a criminal case registered under Section 394 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of attempting to take forcible possession of a plot of land, inflicting dang blows, and removing valuables. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail on the grounds of a supplementary statement by the complainant favoring a co-accused and alleged discrepancies in the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the evidence collected prima facie supported the prosecution case and declined to interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as no question of violation of a principle of law relevant to a bail matter arose. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail when no principle of law has been violated?
  • Does a supplementary statement favoring a co-accused automatically entitle other co-accused petitioners to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mufti Sanaullah and Another vs Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha Ahd 81982 PLD Supreme Court 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-13
  vote of no confidencePunjab Local Government Ordinance 1979limitation periodChairman local councilwrit petitioninterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from two writ petitions dismissed by the Lahore High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (as amended by Ordinance IV of 1981). The appellants, former Chairmen of local councils, challenged no-confidence motions passed or initiated against them after the expiry of six months from their assumption of office. They argued under Section 31(3) that a no-confidence motion is barred if not moved within thirty days following the initial six-month period after assuming office. The core legal question was whether the thirty-day limitation window in Section 31(3) applies to the initial motion of no-confidence or only to second and subsequent motions. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, holding that the word 'interval' in Section 31(3) applies solely to second and subsequent motions of no-confidence to protect officeholders from continuous uncertainty. The court established that no such thirty-day restriction applies to the first motion, which may be moved anytime after the initial six months elapsed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the thirty-day time limit under Section 31(3) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 apply to a first motion of no-confidence against a Chairman?
  • Whether the term 'interval' in Section 31(3) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 refers to the initial six-month period following the assumption of office?
  • Can a first motion of no-confidence be moved at any time after the expiry of the initial six months from the date of assumption of office under Section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mufti Hasan Ud Din and Others vs Sheikh Aftab Ahmed and Other1982 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-15
  land allotmentsettlement commissioneroccupancy rightswrit jurisdictionfailure to appearevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition against an order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Commissioner had cancelled the petitioners' land allotment on the grounds that they failed to establish their entitlement or a verified claim, despite having been granted adjournments to substantiate their case. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that they were denied a reasonable opportunity to establish occupancy rights and that the Commissioner failed to examine the record. Furthermore, they argued they were entitled to a first offer of sale under the proviso to subsection (1) of section 3 of Ordinance XV of 1974. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioners were responsible for their own failure to appear and substantiate their claims. The Court affirmed that the petitioners' failure to attend hearings and provide evidence justified the cancellation of the allotment, and the request for a first offer of sale was not a valid ground to declare the impugned order without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a party to appear and substantiate their claim before a Settlement Commissioner justify the cancellation of a land allotment?
  • Can a party claim a right to the first offer of sale under Ordinance XV of 1974 if they failed to establish their underlying entitlement to the property?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner without lawful authority if the party failed to attend the hearing to prove their case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarak vs The State1982 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-29
  murderocular evidenceballistic expertforensic delaycorroborative evidencewitness credibilitycapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions were whether the conviction could be sustained based on the testimony of a single witness, Mauj Ali, and whether the recovery of the weapon and crime-empty, despite a three-month delay in forensic submission, constituted reliable corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that the testimony of a natural witness, who was present at the scene and lacked personal enmity, was sufficient to establish guilt, even if other witnesses were partially discredited regarding the involvement of a co-accused. Furthermore, the Court held that a delay in sending forensic evidence to a Ballistic Expert does not automatically invalidate the recovery unless specific suspicious circumstances suggest tampering or substitution. The key principle laid down is that the reliability of forensic evidence is determined by the presence or absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the recovery, rather than solely by the duration of the delay in forensic analysis.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the solitary testimony of a natural witness?
  • Does a delay in sending a crime weapon and empty cartridge to a Ballistic Expert automatically render the forensic report unreliable?
  • Does the failure to record a witness's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 undermine their credibility?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Ali Khan and 4 Other vs Anjuman Islamia Punjab, Lahore1982 PLD Supreme Court 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24
  Letters Patentdifference of opinionreferee judgede novo hearingdivision benchappellate jurisdictionwaqf
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the creation of a Waqf Fi-Sabil-Illah. The initial Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, heard the Regular First Appeal but recorded differing opinions. Instead of formulating the points of difference for reference to a third Judge to resolve the impasse, a third Judge declined to hear the case on procedural grounds, leading the Chief Justice to constitute a fresh Division Bench to hear the appeal de novo as a first appeal in the ordinary course. The core legal question was whether the second Division Bench had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the entire appeal afresh, ignoring the opinions of the first Bench. The Supreme Court held that under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, when a Division Bench is equally divided, only the specific points of difference must be referred to a referee Judge. The final decision must be based on the majority opinion of all Judges who heard the case, including those who first heard it. Consequently, bypassing the original opinions and ordering a de novo hearing before a new Bench was illegal and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Chief Justice has the jurisdiction to constitute a fresh Division Bench to hear an appeal de novo when the original Division Bench is equally divided in opinion?
  • What is the correct procedure to be followed under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court when the Judges of a Division Bench differ in opinion?
  • Does a referee Judge have the jurisdiction to decide the entire case or is their jurisdiction confined strictly to the points of difference referred to them?
  • Can the opinions of the Judges who first heard a case be ignored or bypassed in the final determination of an appeal where a difference of opinion has occurred?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina Rauf Butt and Other vs Malik Aziz Ahmad and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-18
  property transferre-auctioncancellation of transferSettlement Scheme No. VIIIlis pendensDisplaced Persons Actrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the cancellation and subsequent re-auction of property transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner could extend the time for payment of the transfer price under paragraph 3-A of Settlement Scheme No. VIII, despite the property having been re-auctioned. The High Court had quashed the order, finding the re-auction barred the extension. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the original transferee had filed an application for extension within the prescribed thirty-day period. Because this application was pending, the property was not legally available for re-auction, analogous to the principle of lis pendens. Consequently, the re-auction was premature, and the Settlement Commissioner retained the authority to grant the extension. The key principle laid down is that where a timely application for extension of payment is filed by a defaulter, the property cannot be validly re-auctioned until that application is adjudicated, as the pending application creates a legal bar similar to lis pendens against the disposal of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an application for extension of time to pay transfer price create a bar against the re-auction of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise the power to extend the time for payment of transfer price under Settlement Scheme No. VIII if the property has been re-auctioned?
  • Is a re-auction of property valid if it occurs while an application for extension of time for payment of the transfer price is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahida Yousaf vs Mst. Iftikhar Akhtar1982 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-11
  ejectmentrent controlbona fide requirementremandappellate jurisdictionHigh Court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which upheld an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The respondent landlady had sought the petitioner's ejectment from a shop on grounds of default and bona fide personal requirement. While the Rent Controller ordered eviction based on bona fide requirement, the District Judge remanded the case, erroneously believing the tenant's cross-examination was not recorded. Upon the landlady's appeal, the High Court correctly identified that the cross-examination had been recorded and, rather than remanding the case again, proceeded to decide the merits of the eviction order itself. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to decide the merits of a case directly rather than remanding it to the lower appellate court upon correcting a factual error. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its legal authority. The principle established is that the High Court has the power to decide a matter on its merits directly, rather than remanding it to the court below, particularly when the record is sufficient for such a determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to decide a case on its merits instead of remanding it to the lower appellate court upon correcting a factual error?
  • Is the High Court empowered to determine the merits of an eviction case directly when the record is sufficient for such a decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tamkeen Khatoon vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division1982 SCMR 767 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-03
  excess landsettlement authoritiesPermanent Transfer Deedleave to appealplinth areaservant quarters
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner, who occupied servant quarters of a transferred bungalow and claimed excess land attached thereto. The core legal questions involve whether an occupant of servant quarters is entitled to claim excess land, and whether the formula prescribed for calculating the transferable area of a house and its appurtenant land was correctly applied by the settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine whether the calculations of the settlement authorities suffered from an error patent on the face of the record, how the prescribed formula under the settlement scheme applies to excess land, and whether the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P. T. D.) bars such claims. The key principle laid down is that where an arguable question regarding the erroneous calculation of excess land transferable under settlement laws arises, leave to appeal is warranted for a comprehensive final hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an occupant of servant quarters attached to a bungalow is entitled to claim the transfer of excess land appurtenant to the property?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed preclude an aggrieved party from challenging the incorrect calculation of excess land transferred?
  • How should the plinth area and appurtenant open space be calculated under the prescribed formula for properties transferred under settlement laws?
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• Mst. Surraya Bibi vs Abdur Rashid1982 SCMR 892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-08
  child custodyminor welfareguardian and wardcompromise decreefather custody rightleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, former wife of the respondent, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the Guardian Judge's order directing the custody of their minor son Ghulam Farid to be restored to the respondent father upon attaining the age of seven years, pursuant to a prior compromise decree. The core legal question concerned whether the welfare of the minor was properly considered, given the father's alleged lack of livelihood and the child's established bonding with the mother. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both lower courts duly considered the welfare of the minor alongside personal law and the compromise, finding no material on record to disentitle the father from custody. The Court laid down the principle that while the welfare of the minor remains paramount, a father is entitled to custody of a male child after a particular age under personal law unless compelling adverse circumstances are established on record. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the welfare of a minor is adequately considered when custody is restored to the father in accordance with a compromise and personal law?
  • Does a father lose his right to the custody of his minor son merely due to allegations regarding his source of livelihood and the whereabouts of his relatives?
  • Is a mother bound by a pre-existing compromise regarding the transfer of a minor child's custody upon attaining a specific age?
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• Mst. Sughran and Others vs Ehsanul Haq Bhalli, Additional District1982 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08
  ejectment petitionlandlord and tenant relationshipremand orderrebuttal evidencewrit jurisdictionpleadingstenancy forfeiture
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding an ejectment order. The core legal dispute arose from an ejectment petition where the Rent Controller initially found no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The appellate court reversed this, allowing the landlord to produce additional documents. Following a High Court remand order to allow the petitioners to produce evidence in rebuttal, the landlord withdrew the documents. Consequently, the appellate court proceeded to decide the appeal based on existing evidence, again finding the relationship of landlord and tenant existed and ordering ejectment. The petitioners challenged this in the High Court, arguing they were denied the opportunity to produce rebuttal evidence and that notice under the Transfer of Property Act was required. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of the documents rendered the rebuttal issue moot and that the plea regarding notice was not raised in the initial pleadings. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding the petition meritless as the denial of tenancy was incompatible with claims of rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea regarding the necessity of notice under the Transfer of Property Act if such a plea was not taken in the initial reply to the ejectment application?
  • Does the withdrawal of additional documents by a landlord during a remand hearing negate the requirement to provide the opposing party an opportunity to produce rebuttal evidence?
  • Is a tenant's denial of the landlord-tenant relationship compatible with a claim of having paid rent?
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• Mst. Sughra Bibi vs Hakam Aleem And 5 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-06
  customary lawnon-ancestral propertydaughter's successionlimited estateabsolute ownershipRiwaj-i-AamRattigan's Digest
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal examines whether a daughter succeeding to the non-ancestral self-acquired property of her father under customary law takes an absolute estate or merely a limited life interest. The appellant, a daughter, claimed absolute ownership of agricultural land left by her father in Gujranwala District, which was contested by collaterals. The trial court and District Judge decreed the suit in favor of the daughter, holding her to be the full owner, but the High Court reversed this, holding that she took only a limited estate terminable on marriage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and restored the judgments of the lower courts. The Court held that under Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law and the specific entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam of Gujranwala District (particularly Question and Answer No. 49), daughters succeeding to self-acquired property acquire full proprietary rights with powers of absolute alienation, rather than a restricted life interest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a daughter succeeding to the self-acquired property of her father under customary law takes an absolute estate or a limited life interest?
  • Do entries in the Riwaj-i-Aam and Customary Law regarding female succession apply to non-ancestral property unless expressly specified?
  • Does a daughter holding non-ancestral property under customary law lose her estate upon marriage?
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• Mst. Sarwar Sultana vs Muhammad Nawaz and Other1982 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-02
  Letters Patent Appealcertificate of fitnessretirement of judgeSupreme Court of Pakistaninterpretation of statuteshardship
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for a certificate of fitness under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, following the in limine dismissal of her regular appeal by a learned Judge of the High Court who subsequently retired. The core legal question was whether a judge other than the one who passed the judgment can issue a certificate of fitness for a Letters Patent Appeal when the original judge has retired. The Supreme Court held that on the plain language of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, the certificate of fitness could only be granted by the specific Judge who passed the judgment, and upon that Judge's retirement, the right to obtain such a certificate lapsed. The Court laid down the principle that the clear and unambiguous wording of a statutory provision or jurisdictional clause cannot be judicially rewritten or expanded on grounds of hardship.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judge other than the one who passed the judgment grant a certificate of fitness under clause 10 of the Letters Patent after the retirement of the original judge?
  • Whether the clear and unambiguous language of clause 10 of the Letters Patent can be construed flexibly to prevent hardship?
  • Does the right to seek a certificate of fitness under clause 10 of the Letters Patent survive the retirement of the judge who delivered the judgment?
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• Mst. Sardaran vs Mst. Majidan Begum1982 SCMR 1100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-24
  guardian and wardwelfare of minorsappointment of guardianmother as guardianpaternal auntremarriage of motherguardianship of person and property
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals through special leave challenge a High Court judgment that set aside a Guardian Judge's order and appointed the paternal aunt as guardian of the person and property of the minors in preference to their mother. The core legal question concerned whether the welfare of the minors lay with their mother, who had remarried a stranger, or with their paternal aunt, who was also married to a stranger. The Supreme Court held that other things being equal, the welfare of the minor is best served by entrusting guardianship to the real mother, especially where the aunt was similarly situated regarding marriage to a stranger and failed to enter the witness box. The Court laid down that the disqualification of a mother's remarriage to a stranger loses significance when the competing claimant is equally connected to a stranger, and the primary consideration remains the paramount welfare of the minors, taking into account their age, living arrangements, and the involvement of adult brothers in overseeing their upbringing and property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the remarriage of a mother to a stranger disqualifies her from being appointed as the guardian of her minor children in preference to a paternal aunt who is also married to a stranger?
  • Does the welfare of minor children lie in appointing their real mother as guardian when both competing claimants are equally situated regarding marriage outside the prohibited degree?
  • Can the order of a Guardian Judge appointing a mother as guardian be legally set aside without strong or sufficient justification regarding the welfare of the minors?
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• Mst. Sardaran and Others vs Mst. Badshah Begum1982 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-12
  civil remandremand orderCode of Civil Procedureappellate court powersdeclaration suitgift deed cancellationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partially allowed an appeal against a remand order in a civil suit concerning a declaration and cancellation of a registered gift deed procured through alleged fraud. The core legal question revolves around the propriety and legality of successive remand orders passed by lower appellate courts and whether the High Court was justified in converting a remand order under Order XLI, Rule 23-A into one under Order XLI, Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted with substantial merit in converting the remand order to enable the first appellate court to decide the appeal on merits upon receipt of findings on limitation, ensuring that parties' rights of objection and appeal remain unaffected under the procedural framework. The Court laid down that appellate courts must provide clear reasoning when remanding matters and that procedural mechanisms like Order XLI, Rule 25 C.P.C. may be appropriately utilized by High Courts to cure vague remand orders and prevent protracted litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in converting a remand order under Order XLI Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 into one under Order XLI Rule 25?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case without specifying the exact defects in the form of the suit or recording clear reasoning?
  • Does a remand under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 adversely affect the parties' right of appeal?
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• Mst. Sameeri vs The Deputy Commissioner, Kasljr and Ss1982 SCMR 1091 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22
  nomination paperselection disputelocal council electionprocedural irregularityrejection of nominationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a challenge to the restoration of a candidate's nomination papers for a local council election. The core legal questions were whether the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner was time-barred, whether it was improperly instituted due to the absence of a certified copy of the original order, and whether the Deputy Commissioner failed to conduct an inquiry into the genuineness of signatures on the nomination papers. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's challenge, noting that the Assistant Commissioner failed to provide the required copy of the rejection order to the respondent or the Deputy Commissioner, as mandated by the Punjab Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979. Furthermore, the High Court found that the Assistant Commissioner had rejected the nomination papers without conducting any inquiry. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no grounds for interference, as the procedural failures by the Assistant Commissioner justified the Deputy Commissioner's intervention. The judgment affirms that procedural lapses by election officials can invalidate the rejection of nomination papers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Returning Officer to provide a copy of an order rejecting nomination papers invalidate the rejection?
  • Can an election appeal be entertained if the original order was not accompanied by a certified copy due to the official's failure to provide one?
  • Is a Returning Officer required to conduct an inquiry before rejecting nomination papers based on allegations of bogus signatures?
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• Mst. Safia Bibi vs Mst. Aisha Bibi1982S C M R 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  fraud and misrepresentationcompromise decreerecall of orderSection 12(2) CPCwrit petitionpower of attorneyjurisdiction of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing the petitioner's application to recall a previous order, which had disposed of a writ petition based on an alleged compromise. The petitioner contended that the compromise was fraudulent, having been entered into by an unauthorized person posing as her attorney. The core legal question was whether the High Court was obligated to inquire into these allegations of fraud and misrepresentation rather than directing the petitioner to seek alternative remedies. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing to adjudicate the matter. The Court established that, pursuant to Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a party challenging the validity of a judgment, decree, or order on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction must seek redress by filing an application before the court that passed the order, and is expressly barred from filing a separate suit for this purpose. Consequently, the High Court was required to hold an inquiry into the petitioner's allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require a court to inquire into allegations of fraud or misrepresentation regarding its own orders?
  • Can a party challenge a judgment or order on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation by filing a separate suit?
  • Is a court obligated to adjudicate an application challenging an order based on fraud, or can it direct the applicant to seek other legal remedies?
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• Mst. Saeeda Bano, Etc. vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-12
  settlement of propertyP.T.D.leave to appealremand orderproperty transferright to be heardnullity of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute concerning the transfer of a basement portion (Portion 'E') of property No. S-31-R-147. The property was initially auctioned, and the petitioners, Mst. Saeeda Bano, etc., emerged as the highest bidders, subsequently receiving a P.T.O. and a P.T.D. A third party, Masood Ali, later sought to have the letter 'E' substituted for 'G' in a previous Settlement Commissioner's order, effectively transferring a different property to him. The High Court, upon reviewing a writ petition, remanded the matter to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision based on an alleged agreement between parties. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the Settlement Commissioner's order was a nullity as they were not impleaded in the revision proceedings, and that their P.T.D. was obtained without fraud or misrepresentation, precluding the reopening of the transfer. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding merit in the petitioners' contentions that the order passed without impleading the affected parties was legally flawed and that the finality of the P.T.D. should be protected.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner pass an order affecting property rights without impleading the parties in possession?
  • Is a property transfer evidenced by a P.T.D. liable to be reopened in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Does a High Court's remand order based on an alleged agreement between parties supersede the requirement to address the legality of the original impugned order?
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• Mst. Sabira Begum and Others vs Fazal Din and Other1982 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  evacuee propertydeed of associationProvisional Transfer OrderSettlement Departmentconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property house in Lahore, which was originally allotted to the private respondents through an NCH form, while the petitioners claimed rights based on an alleged deed of association with the deceased Abdul Hamid and a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) issued in his favour. The core legal question was whether a deed of association and a P.T.O. issued without the formal approval and independent order of the competent Settlement Authorities could be sustained, and whether the Lahore High Court properly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in setting aside the Settlement authority's order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that merely filing an agreement of association is insufficient unless both parties appear before the proper authority to admit it and the competent authority formally accepts it. The petition was dismissed, affirming that settlement authorities are not bound to act upon an association unless it is formally approved according to settled practice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a deed of association for the transfer of evacuee property is valid without the formal approval and acceptance of the competent Settlement Authorities?
  • Can a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) be sustained when it is not supported by any underlying order or approval of the Settlement Department?
  • Does the High Court exceed its constitutional jurisdiction by setting aside an order of a Settlement Commissioner that is contrary to the established practice regarding deeds of association?
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• Mst. Roshni vs Muhammad Munir and Other1982 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11
  pre-emptionallotment of landconfirmed allotteerefugee landpermanent rightstransferable rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant, who claimed a superior right of pre-emption over land sold by her mother, a refugee from East Punjab, to the respondents. The land had been allotted and subsequently confirmed in the mother's favour. The trial court decreed the suit, finding that the mother held permanent, transferable rights in the land. However, the first appellate court and the High Court dismissed the suit, holding that the sale was not pre-emptiable because the statutory provisions conferring permanent rights on allottees were inserted after the sale. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that even under the unamended provisions of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958, a confirmed allottee possessed permanent, transferable rights. The Court ruled that the sale of such confirmed land is indeed pre-emptiable, and set aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale of land confirmed in favour of an allottee under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 is subject to pre-emption?
  • Whether an allottee of land has permanent and transferable rights under the unamended Sections 15 and 16 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can a new objection regarding mortgaged rights under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 be raised for the first time on appeal if it was not pleaded in the written statement?
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