Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Liaqat and Another vs Liaqat and Another1982 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdercriminal conspiracyfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which cancelled the bail granted to the petitioners by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving charges of murder and rioting. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail to accused persons facing serious capital charges involving a brazen subsequent attack inside a hospital room while the deceased was under medical examination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in cancelling the bail, as the reasons advanced by the Sessions Court were flimsy and premature, and the case involved active participation in a heinous crime not warranting the concession of bail under the law. The key principle laid down is that where the material on record and the specific roles attributed to the accused in a heinous crime prima facie connect them to the offence, the grant of bail by the lower court on superficial or premature grounds is unsustainable and liable to be interfered with by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted on flimsy or premature grounds when an accused is charged with a capital offence?
  • Is a High Court justified in interfering with the discretion of a Sessions Court in granting bail if the order is based on premature findings?
  • Does a case fall under further inquiry merely because the distance to the scene of the crime is contested at the bail stage?
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• Latif and 2 Others vs Fazal Din and 2 Other1982 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-26
  limitationcondonation of delayreview applicationallotment of landsettlement claimwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the cancellation of an allotment of agricultural land. The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased claimant, had their allotment confirmed in 1957. A decade later, the first respondent challenged this allotment, leading to an order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelling a portion of the land. The petitioners' subsequent revision was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner, and their writ petition was dismissed by the High Court in 1974. Instead of filing for leave to appeal, the petitioners filed a review application, which was also dismissed. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent or time-barred review application can be excluded for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred by eighty days. It ruled that the petitioners had no valid grounds for review, and since the review application itself was filed beyond the statutory limitation period, the time spent prosecuting it could not be excluded. The court affirmed that legal advice or being misguided by counsel does not constitute sufficient grounds for condoning delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent prosecuting an incompetent or time-barred review application be excluded when calculating the limitation period for a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the fact that a party was misguided by their advocate constitute sufficient ground for condoning a delay in filing a petition?
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• Land Acquisition Collector and Others vs Hikmat Khan and Other1982 SCMR 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  land acquisitionmarket value assessmentcompensation enhancementcomparable salesleave to appealvaluation methodology
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld an enhancement of compensation awarded by an Additional District Judge for land acquisition. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in determining the market value of the acquired land by relying on compensation rates fixed for an adjacent village, Topi, due to the absence of prior sale transactions in the subject village. The petitioner contended that the valuation relied upon by the lower courts was based on prices post-dating the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the petitioner failed to raise this specific objection before the High Court and could not demonstrate that any evidence regarding the market value of the lands prior to the notification had been placed on the record. The Court affirmed that in the absence of alternative evidence or methodology, the reliance on comparable valuations from adjacent areas was not legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on compensation rates from an adjacent village to determine market value when no prior sales occurred in the subject village?
  • Is a party permitted to raise a new ground of objection regarding valuation for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• Land Acquisition Collector and Another vs Muhammad Saleem and Other1982 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-09
  land acquisitionenhanced compensationtime-barred appealSupreme Court practicemistake of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition jointly recognized by the parties' counsel as constituting a direct appeal as of right due to the subject amount exceeding Rs. 50,000, having been mistakenly filed as a petition. The core legal question addressed is whether the respondents are entitled to an enhanced rate of compensation regarding their land share as assessed by the High Court, and how to dispose of the improperly designated filing. The court held, based on the joint statement and agreement of the learned counsel for both appellants and respondents, that the respondents are indeed entitled to the enhanced rate of compensation assessed by the High Court in its order dated 1-12-1980. However, the appeal itself stands dismissed as being time-barred, with no order as to costs. The key principle laid down relates to the procedural conversion of a mistaken petition into a direct appeal when meeting the pecuniary threshold, while maintaining the application of limitation periods resulting in the dismissal of a time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition mistakenly filed in the Supreme Court be treated as a direct appeal when the statutory pecuniary threshold is met?
  • Whether an appeal agreed upon by the parties regarding enhanced compensation can still be dismissed on the ground of being time-barred?
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• Lal Dino and Others vs Deputy Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-18
  limitation perioddismissal for non-prosecutionre-admission of appealtime-barred petitionresiduary articlecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed an application for the re-admission of an appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether an application for re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by Article 168 (providing a thirty-day limitation period) or the residuary Article 181 (providing a three-year limitation period) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that the application clearly fell under Article 168, as the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal of the application as time-barred was upheld. The Court further noted that the petition for leave to appeal itself was time-barred by thirty days without sufficient cause shown for the delay. The key principle laid down is that applications for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution are strictly governed by the specific limitation period prescribed in Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908, rather than the residuary Article 181.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution fall under Article 168 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is an application for re-admission of an appeal filed more than thirty days after the dismissal for non-prosecution time-barred?
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• Kishwar Sultana and Others vs Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Sargodha and Other1982 SCMR 984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-13
  pre-emptiondisplaced personsconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factwrit petitionChashma Barragespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that set aside a decision by the Commissioner regarding the status of the petitioners as displaced persons. The petitioners, who purchased land in District Mianwali, claimed exemption from pre-emption rights on the basis that they were displaced persons affected by the construction of the Chashma Barrage, supported by a certificate issued by the Commissioner. The opposing party challenged this certificate, leading to inquiries by revenue authorities. While the Commissioner initially upheld the certificate, the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, quashed this order and directed a re-examination of the facts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court may have erred by interfering with a concurrent finding of fact made by the Revenue Authorities. The Court established that in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, a High Court should generally refrain from re-opening questions of fact that have already been determined through a proper inquiry by the competent revenue authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction re-open a concurrent finding of fact made by revenue authorities?
  • Does the status of being a displaced person from the Chashma Barrage project exempt land from pre-emption claims?
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• Khushi Muhammad vs Muhammad Yahya and Other1982 SCMR 1197 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-19
  constitutional petitionsettlement matterproduce index unitsleave to appealtransfer of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 28-6-1981, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition in a settlement matter. The petitioner held a verified claim of produce index units and had been transferred land accordingly, with a small balance remaining unsatisfied. Sixteen years later, Settlement Authorities divided a contiguous piece of land and transferred portions of it to both the petitioner and a respondent to satisfy their respective remaining produce index units. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in upholding the transfer and dismissal of the constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to make out any good ground for interference, finding that the transfer of land by the Settlement Authorities to satisfy the remaining produce index units was just and proper under the circumstances. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that discretionary interference in settlement matters will be withheld where the administrative allocation of land to satisfy verified claims is found to be just and proper.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition in a settlement matter where the transfer of land is found to be just and proper?
  • Does the possession of contiguous land create a preferential right to allotment over the adjustment of verified produce index units by Settlement Authorities?
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• Khushi Muhammad vs Muhammad Din1982 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  petition for leave to appealevacuee propertyconcurrent findings of factjurisdictionsettlement schemedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute regarding an ihata in Bahawalnagar claimed by the petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VII as evacuee property formerly owned by one Kartar Singh. The petitioner challenged the transfer of the ihata to the respondent through a declaratory suit, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Chishtian, on 24-3-1973. Subsequent appeals to the District Judge and the Lahore High Court were likewise dismissed, with concurrent findings of fact establishing that the property was never transferred to Kartar Singh. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction to decide the status of the property without referring it to the Custodian under section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a question of jurisdiction not raised in the three courts below cannot be entertained for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal, in accordance with established court practice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of jurisdiction be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by three lower courts regarding the status of property warrant interference when unchallenged on any error of law?
  • Is a civil court required to refer the question of the status of an evacuee property to the Custodian under Section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 when the point is not raised below?
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• Khushi Muhammad vs Federal Land Commission and Other1982 SCMR 866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-07
  locus standilachesconstitutional petitionland commissionerleave to appeallessee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a constitutional petition against a land commissioner's order, the existence of laches, and whether a lessee possesses the requisite locus standi to challenge such orders. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court as it suffered from an inordinate delay of nearly two years constituting laches, and furthermore, that a mere lessee of the land in dispute had acquired no proprietary rights and consequently lacked locus standi to maintain a writ petition. The key principle laid down is that a lessee without underlying proprietary rights lacks standing to challenge land resumption or administrative orders through a constitutional petition, particularly when the petition suffers from unexplained laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lessee of land has the locus standi to file a constitutional petition against an order passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
  • Does a delay of two years in filing a constitutional petition constitute laches sufficient to warrant its dismissal?
  • Is the High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition where no serious question of law has been raised?
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• Khushi Muhammad and Others vs Muqarrab Ali1982 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-27
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentconcurrent findings of factrent receiptslandlord and tenantappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment application filed by a landlord against tenants for default in payment of rent. The Rent Controller ordered the tenants' ejectment, a decision upheld by the appellate courts. Before the Supreme Court, the tenants challenged these findings, arguing that the landlord’s prior notice to vacate did not mention rent default and that the lower courts erred in rejecting rent receipts as forged, despite a handwriting expert's report regarding one receipt. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a tenant is in default of rent and the assessment of the authenticity of rent receipts are purely questions of fact. Having been concurrently decided by the lower courts, these findings were not subject to reappraisal by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, dismissed the appeal, and directed the tenants to vacate the premises within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default in an ejectment case?
  • Is the determination of the authenticity of rent receipts a question of fact that cannot be reopened in the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to mention rent default in a prior notice to vacate preclude a subsequent claim of default?
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• Khushi Mohammad vs Mohammad Din1982 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  evacuee propertyconcurrent findings of factjurisdictiondeclaratory suitsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of an ihata in Bahawalnagar. The petitioner claimed the property under Settlement Scheme No. VII, asserting it was owned by an evacuee, Kartar Singh. Following the transfer of the property to the respondent by Settlement Authorities, the petitioner filed a declaratory suit, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge. Subsequent appeals to the District Court and the Lahore High Court were also dismissed, with the High Court affirming the concurrent finding of fact that the property was never transferred to the evacuee. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction and should have referred the status of the property to the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the petition was meritless, noting that the concurrent findings of fact remained unchallenged. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain the jurisdictional objection, as it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, contrary to established practice regarding issues not agitated in the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a jurisdictional objection for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact by three lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court when no error of law is demonstrated?
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• Khurshid vs Ghulam Muhammad and Another1982 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-28
  pre-emption suitcourt fee deficiencyconstitutional jurisdictionHigh Court interferenceBoard of Revenueprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-emption suit where the plaintiffs initially affixed a deficient court fee of Rs. 2.00 upon the institution of the suit on July 17, 1974. The deficiency remained unrectified for nearly six years until January 19, 1979, shortly before the trial court passed a decree. While the appellate court remanded the matter, the Member, Board of Revenue, subsequently non-suited the plaintiffs due to the prolonged failure to pay the requisite court fee. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, reasoning that the issue of late payment of court fees could not be introduced belatedly if it had not been raised during the suit or in the memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court's interference with the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, was legally justified within the scope of its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction interfere with an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, regarding the late payment of court fees?
  • Is it permissible to raise the issue of late payment of court fees for the first time after the suit and appeal stages?
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• Khurshid Akbar vs Mian Manzur Ahmed and Another1982 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-01
  pre-emptionstay orderappellate decreereasonable timedeposit of pre-emption moneycivil revisionsuspension of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the claim, ordering the deposit of pre-emption money by a specific date. The appellate court suspended the decree's operation, including the deposit requirement, during the pendency of the appeal. Upon the dismissal of the appeal, the appellate court did not extend the time for deposit. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of time or a "reasonable time" to deposit the money after the appeal's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that while an appellate stay order suspends the time for performance, the dismissal of the appeal restores the original decree. Consequently, the unexpired period for performance revives from the date of the appellate order. The pre-emptor must perform the act within this remaining time, failing which the suit is liable to be dismissed. The Court affirmed that the appellant failed to deposit the money within a reasonable time after the appeal's dismissal, thus justifying the dismissal of the suit. The principle established is that stay orders revive the original time limit upon the appeal's conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suspension of a pre-emption decree by an appellate court automatically extend the time for depositing the pre-emption money?
  • What is the effect of an appellate court's dismissal of an appeal on the time limit for performance fixed by the trial court?
  • Is a pre-emptor entitled to a 'reasonable time' to deposit pre-emption money if the appellate court fails to fix a new date upon dismissing the appeal?
  • Can a court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower appellate court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the extension of time for deposit?
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• Khurshid Ahmad and Others vs Fajar Ali1982 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-14
  pre-emption suitcourt-feedeficiency in court-feerevenue recordprocedural lapseplaintiff's obligationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the decision of the first appellate court in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit should be penalized for a deficiency in court-fee payment when that deficiency arose from an error by revenue officials in calculating net profits, and whether the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty under procedural law. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, dismissing the petition in limine. The holding established that where a plaintiff acts in good faith and complies with the court's directions regarding court-fee payments, they cannot be penalized for deficiencies resulting from the errors or lapses of revenue officials in preparing the necessary statements of net profit. The Court emphasized that it is the obligation of the trial court to provide clear, positive directions for making up any deficiency in court-fee, and that a plaintiff should not suffer for administrative mistakes beyond their control.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit liable for a deficiency in court-fee caused by an error in the revenue official's calculation of net profits?
  • Does Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require the court to pass a positive direction for making up a court-fee deficiency?
  • Can a suit be dismissed for a court-fee deficiency when the plaintiff has complied with the court's directions to pay the amount as calculated by revenue records?
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• Khurshid Ahmad and Another vs Sultan Khan and Other1982 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  dismissal for defaultrevision petitionreview applicationsufficient causenon-appearancepre-emption suitlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' review application concerning a previously dismissed revision petition. The revision petition had been dismissed for default due to the petitioners' non-appearance on the scheduled date of hearing. The petitioners sought to challenge both the dismissal of the revision petition and the subsequent dismissal of their review application, which had attempted to re-argue the merits of the original revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had demonstrated sufficient cause for their non-appearance and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the review application. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' assumption that the case had been adjourned to the following week rather than the specific date fixed by the court did not constitute sufficient cause for absence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a review application cannot be utilized to re-argue the merits of a case already decided. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot serve as an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's mistaken assumption regarding the date of a hearing constitute sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Can a review application be used to re-argue the merits of a revision petition that was dismissed for default?
  • Is a review application maintainable when the underlying revision petition was dismissed for default due to the petitioner's absence?
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• Khan Ahmad Saleem Ali Muhammad vs The State the State and Abdul1982 PLD Supreme Court 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-25
  murderappreciation of evidenceconfirmatory circumstanceadmission of presenceacquittalbenefit of doubteye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected petitions arise out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning an incident involving firing and a subsequent scuffle resulting in one death and multiple injuries. The core legal question revolves around the appreciation of ocular evidence, the sustainability of convictions based on testimony of injured and independent witnesses, and the value of an accused's admission of presence as a confirmatory circumstance. The Supreme Court held that while contradictions in the testimony concerning the second part of the incident justified acquittals for that portion, the eyewitness testimony regarding the initial firing was credible and sufficiently corroborated, particularly in respect of the appellant Khan Ahmad whose presence and participation were admitted. Consequently, the conviction of Khan Ahmad under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was upheld with a lesser sentence, while the conviction of Saleem was set aside due to lack of independent corroboration. The key principle laid down is that an accused person's admission of presence and participation at the scene can serve as a strong confirmatory circumstance supporting eyewitness testimony, even when other parts of the prosecution case suffer from suppression of origin.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person's admission of presence and participation at the crime scene can serve as a confirmatory circumstance to support eyewitness testimony?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on eyewitness testimony when the prosecution has suppressed the real origin of the incident?
  • Whether contradictions in the statements of witnesses regarding a distinct portion of an occurrence justify giving the benefit of the doubt and acquitting the accused involved therein?
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• Khalilur Rahman vs Mst. Azmat Sultana Etc.1982 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06
  leave to appealrevision petitioncase decidedproduction of documentsinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-plaintiff sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his revision petition against the trial court's refusal to permit him to produce documents and witnesses at the trial, relying on the precedent that such an interlocutory order did not constitute a "case decided" for the purpose of revision. The core legal question was whether the refusal to allow the plaintiff to produce evidence relied upon at the time of filing the suit, and before issues were framed, amounted to "a case decided" making a revision petition competent, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted an examination of whether the order constituted a "case decided" and whether the High Court was powerless to remedy the wrong and principle violated. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted with directions regarding security and record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal by a trial court to allow the production of documents and witnesses relied upon at the time of filing the suit constitutes "a case decided" under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a revision petition competent against an interlocutory order denying a party the right to produce evidence at the trial before issues are framed?
  • Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors or legal wrongs committed by trial courts regarding the right of hearing and evidence?
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• Khalid Zaman vs The State1982 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12
  criminal revisionattempt to murderconcurrent findingsleave to appealsentence appropriatenessidentification of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Khalid Zaman against the dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence for an offence under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, having been sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine for causing an abdominal injury to the complainant, challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt and the nature of the injury were sustainable. The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence took place in a well-lit environment, facilitating identification, and that the prosecution witnesses consistently supported the complainant's account of the attack. Finding no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the three courts below, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction and the sentence awarded were appropriate given the circumstances of the case and the dangerous nature of the injury inflicted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a criminal revision petition?
  • Is an abdominal injury caused by a knife blow considered a dangerous injury for the purpose of Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Khalid Mahmood and Others vs Ch. Ghulam Muhammad1982 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-02
  evacuee trust propertypermanent transfer deedstatutory validationsettlement lawejectment proceedingsrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the validity of a permanent transfer deed for an evacuee property in Lahore. The property was transferred to the respondent in 1959, and a permanent transfer deed was issued in 1964. Although subsequent proceedings determined the property was evacuee trust property, no specific order was ever passed to cancel the respondent’s permanent transfer deed. The petitioners challenged the respondent's ejectment application, arguing that the deed was invalid. The High Court, in second appeal, held that the deed remained operative and was protected by statutory provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that while the property was indeed evacuee trust property, the permanent transfer deed had not been cancelled by any competent authority. The Court ruled that under Section 10(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, such transfers made prior to June 1968 were validated, regardless of the property's trust status. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the permanent transfer deed remained valid and effective.

  Questions settled

  • Does a permanent transfer deed for evacuee property remain valid if no specific order for its cancellation is passed, even if the property is later declared evacuee trust property?
  • Does Section 10(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 validate permanent transfer deeds issued prior to June 1968?
  • What is the effect of Sections 31 and 32 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 on previous orders made by settlement authorities?
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• Khair Din vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-14
  corruptionillegal gratificationhostile witnessraidtainted currency notesperjuryappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal in a corruption matter. The petitioner, a Food Inspector, was convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a depot-holder. The core legal question involved the correct appreciation of evidence, particularly where the complainant turned hostile at the trial while the raiding magistrate and police officers fully supported the prosecution case, and the accused made a self-incriminatory initial statement. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the disinterested raiding magistrate and police officers, corroborated by the contemporaneous statements and recovery of tainted currency notes, firmly established the guilt of the petitioner, despite the hostile turn of the complainant. The court dismissed the petition and further directed the trial court to consider prosecuting the hostile complainant for perjury to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a raiding magistrate and police officers is sufficient to sustain a conviction under corruption laws when the complainant turns hostile?
  • Can a conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be maintained based on the immediate post-occurrence statement of the accused?
  • Is it appropriate for the court to direct the prosecution of a witness for perjury when they brazenly resile from their previous statements at trial?
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• Khadim Shah Zahir Shah and Others vs President, Special Military1982 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-02
  Special Military CourtMartial LawWrit JurisdictionDeath SentenceCriminal ProcedurePardonRight to CounselLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted of dacoity and murder by a Special Military Court, challenged their convictions through writ petitions in the Peshawar High Court, which were dismissed. The petitioners subsequently filed criminal petitions for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concern the jurisdiction of the Special Military Court to try offences under ordinary law, the legality of transferring cases directly to military courts at the investigation stage, the procedural validity of granting pardons by military courts, and the court's duty to appoint counsel when defence counsel withdraws. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised significant legal issues regarding the validity of the trial, thereby granting leave to appeal. The Court dismissed one petition as infructuous due to the conclusion of the trial and the filing of a subsequent writ petition. It further ordered that the death sentences awarded to the petitioners remain unexecuted pending the final disposal of the appeal. The judgment establishes that substantial questions regarding the procedural and jurisdictional limits of Special Military Courts warrant appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition for leave to appeal become infructuous if the underlying trial concludes and a subsequent writ petition is filed?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to stay the execution of a death sentence pending the disposal of an appeal?
  • Do contentions regarding the jurisdiction of a Special Military Court and procedural irregularities in trial constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal?
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• Khadim Hussain and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08
  murderocular testimonyballistic expert reportblood feudcriminal appealFIR delayappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants challenged the conviction, citing discrepancies in eyewitness testimony regarding the number of shots fired, the failure to mention crime empties in the First Information Report (FIR), the validity of the Ballistic Expert’s report, and a delay in lodging the FIR. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in eyewitness accounts, such as the number of shots fired in quick succession, do not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses. The Court further ruled that the failure to mention crime empties in the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution. Regarding the Ballistic Expert's report, the Court established that under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, such reports are admissible; if a report is perceived as deficient, the defense must challenge it during the trial to allow for rectification, and cannot raise such objections for the first time at the appellate stage. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy in the number of shots fired by an accused in eyewitness testimony necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can an objection to the sufficiency of a Ballistic Expert's report be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
  • Is the failure to mention the recovery of crime empties in the First Information Report fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report automatically render the prosecution's case doubtful?
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• Kh. Muhammad Aslam and Others vs Ch. Muhammad Akram and Other1982 SCMR 918 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-15
  partitioncompromisejoint propertysettlementex parte orderwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a dispute between two brothers regarding the partition of a jointly transferred house. Initially, both parties filed a joint application for partition, which was accepted by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner based on an agreed mode of partition. Subsequently, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner issued an ex parte order effecting a fresh partition, which was challenged by the respondent. While the respondent's appeal and revision failed, the High Court accepted his writ petition, holding that the partition originally agreed upon and effected by compromise between the two brothers was binding on them. On further petition, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the factual controversies raised did not warrant interference and that the partition approved by the High Court based on the parties' compromise was just, proper, and legally binding.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a partition of property effected by mutual compromise between co-owners is legally binding on them?
  • Can a settlement authority unilaterally alter a partition scheme previously agreed upon by the parties through a joint application?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's decision in a writ petition when the grounds raised relate primarily to factual controversies?
  Read full judgment →
• Karamat Hussain and Others Abdul Sattar and Others vs Province of the Punjab and Other Raza Ali and 3 Other1982 SCMR 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-07
  service lawpolice disciplineleave to appealdismissal from serviceshow-cause noticeArticle 212deputationmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a Service Tribunal judgment upholding the dismissal of police officers who refused to comply with transfer orders to the Federal Security Force. The petitioners contended that their dismissal was illegal due to procedural flaws, including the use of loudspeakers for show-cause notices, and alleged discriminatory treatment compared to colleagues who were reinstated. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' defiance of transfer orders could be justified as a protest and whether the dismissal process violated natural justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that members of a disciplined force are obligated to obey orders first and seek redress through appropriate legal forums afterward. The Court found the petitioners' defiance unjustified and the procedural objections untenable, as the petitioners themselves had refused to accept service. The Court further ruled that the case did not involve a substantial question of law of public importance, a prerequisite for granting leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a member of a disciplined force can justify the defiance of a transfer order on the ground of unfulfilled assurances of absorption?
  • Is the service of a show-cause notice via loudspeaker legally valid when the employee refuses to accept the notice?
  • Does the dismissal of a police officer for refusing a transfer order constitute a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Karam Elahi vs The State1982 SCMR 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12
  murdercriminal petitionocular testimonycredibility of witnessmotivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by Karam Elahi against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Fateh Khatoon, which resulted in a sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine enhanced under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns the credibility of an eye-witness belonging to a lower socio-economic status ('Mueen') and the sufficiency of ocular testimony corroborated by eye-witnesses to sustain a murder conviction despite the rejection of a recovery weapon and a motive primarily attributed to an acquitted co-accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the testimony of a witness cannot be discredited merely on the ground of social status or alleged influence, especially when no material contradictions exist and the witnesses have no motive for false substitution. The key principle laid down is that the status of a witness as a 'Mueen' does not inherently render them untruthful, and ocular testimony from natural witnesses, if reliable and consistent, remains sufficient to uphold a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the status of a witness as a 'Mueen' render their testimony regarding a murder occurrence inherently incredible?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the alleged weapon recovery is disbelieved?
  • Does the absence of a direct motive ascribed to a specific accused invalidate an otherwise reliable eyewitness account of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd vs National Industrial1982 PLD SC 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-01
  Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Actspecified authorityregulate wages and conditions of serviceadjudication of disputestermination of servicere-instatementpenal consequences
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, by special leave, arise from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing constitutional petitions challenging orders of re-instatement passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission in favor of employees whose services were terminated or who were dismissed for misconduct. The core legal question was whether the power of a "specified authority" to "regulate" wages and other conditions of service under section 6(1) of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, and rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1962 includes the power to adjudicate individual employment disputes and order re-instatement. The Supreme Court held that the power to "regulate" does not encompass the power to adjudicate disputes or provide a forum for resolving grievances regarding termination, discharge, or dismissal. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory scheme of the Act is penal in nature, where violations of rules or directions are punishable as offences through specific mechanisms under sections 6(2) and 7, and the specified authority cannot assume judicial or adjudicatory functions to redress individual service grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to regulate wages and conditions of service under section 6(1) of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 include the power to adjudicate individual employment disputes?
  • Can a specified authority under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 entertain a petition for re-instatement and pass orders thereon?
  • Whether the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 provide a forum for adjudicating service grievances or treat violations as penal offences under section 7?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamal Din vs Settlement Commissioner Etc.S1982 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19
  Permanent Transfer Deedsettlement authoritiessuo motu revisionfunctus officioleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal challenging orders relating to the transfer of a shop under settlement laws. The transfer was originally finalized and a Permanent Transfer Deed (P. T. D.) was issued in 1968. Subsequently, in 1974, the Settlement Commissioner annulled the transfer in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction without notice to the P. T. D. holders, prompting writ petitions that were dismissed by the High Court. The core legal question is whether settlement authorities retain the jurisdiction to re-open a matter and cancel a transfer after a P. T. D. has been issued, particularly in view of conflicting precedents regarding the effect of the deletion of rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961. The Supreme Court noted a clear conflict in its past judgments as to whether deletion of rule 7 foreclosed the jurisdiction to uncover fraud and illegalities, and consequently granted leave to appeal in both petitions for reconsideration of the point involved. The key principle centers on the finality of a P. T. D. and the extent of the functus officio status of settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement authorities could, after the P. T. D. had issued, re-open the matter?
  • Does the deletion of rule 7 of the Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961 foreclose the jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities to uncover cases of fraud and illegalities?
  • Do Settlement authorities become functus officio after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Kaley Khan vs Mst. Zaitoon Begum1982 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-18
  special leave to appealevictiondefault in payment of rentpersonal needconcurrent findings of factrent receipts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, District Judge, and the High Court, ordering his eviction from the disputed property on grounds of default in rent payment and personal need of the landlady. The core legal question involves whether the lower forums misread and improperly construed the rent receipts produced by the tenant to establish payment. The Supreme Court held that upon examination, the receipts themselves demonstrated that the tenant was indeed a defaulter in the payment of rent. The court concluded that the case rested entirely on concurrent findings of fact and presented no merit, thereby dismissing the petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Do rent receipts showing non-payment constitute valid proof of default under rent laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Kaley Khan vs Jamia Masjid Akse Jamil1982 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12
  ejectmentrent controlstriking off defenceprofessional negligenceduty of counselleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a tenant. The Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent, but upon the tenant's failure to comply, the tenant's defence was struck off, and an eviction order was passed. Subsequent appeals and a constitutional petition filed by the tenant were dismissed by the lower courts and the High Court, respectively. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent could be excused on the grounds that his counsel had temporarily left the courtroom with permission and was unaware of the order passed during his absence. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the counsel's absence did not absolve the tenant of his liability. The Court affirmed the principle that it is the professional duty of counsel to ascertain the status of proceedings and orders passed in their cases, and failure to do so constitutes negligence attributable to the client. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the temporary absence of a counsel from the courtroom excuse a client's failure to comply with a court order for rent deposit?
  • Is a client bound by the negligence of their counsel in failing to ascertain the status of court proceedings?
  • Can a tenant avoid the consequences of an eviction order for non-payment of rent by claiming ignorance of the underlying deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Kala vs The State1982 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-20
  leave to appealself-defensereappraisal of evidenceinterested witnessescriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Kala, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld his conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner killed the deceased, Isa, following a dispute over marital exchanges. The petitioner admitted to the occurrence but pleaded the right of self-defense, claiming the deceased attacked him first, and presented medical evidence of injuries sustained during the incident. The trial court and the High Court rejected the defense version, relying on the testimony of the deceased's family members. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the lower courts failed to adequately consider the defense version and the medical evidence regarding the injuries sustained by the accused. Furthermore, the Court observed that the incident occurred in a public bazaar, yet only interested witnesses were relied upon. Finding merit in the contentions regarding the improper evaluation of evidence, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to allow for a full reappraisal of the case evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a reappraisal of evidence warranted when lower courts fail to properly evaluate a defense version supported by medical evidence?
  • Does the reliance solely on interested witnesses for an occurrence in a public place necessitate a closer scrutiny of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal Butt vs Mst. Nighat Ara and Another1982 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  territorial jurisdictionfamily courtdissolution of marriagepreliminary issueintra court appealmatrimonial suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute where the petitioner challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court at Lahore to try a suit for dissolution of marriage. The petitioner contended that the marriage occurred in Gujranwala, where the parties resided, and thus the Lahore court lacked jurisdiction. The petitioner sought to have the issue of jurisdiction decided as a preliminary issue before the trial proceeded on the merits. The trial court, the High Court, and the Intra Court Appeal bench all rejected this plea, reasoning that the evidence required to establish the court's territorial jurisdiction was inextricably linked to the evidence required to prove the cause of action on the merits. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld these decisions, affirming that when the evidence for a jurisdictional issue overlaps significantly with the evidence for the merits of the case, it is appropriate for the court to try both issues together rather than deciding jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Family Court required to decide the issue of territorial jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before proceeding to the merits of the case?
  • Can a court decline to treat jurisdiction as a preliminary issue when the evidence for jurisdiction and the evidence for the merits of the suit are the same?
  Read full judgment →
• Javaid Iqbal vs The State1982 SCMR 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14
  capital sentencequantum of sentencejuvenile offendermitigating circumstancesprovocationreduction of sentencelife imprisonmentcompensation to heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the sentence of death awarded to a juvenile offender convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a schoolmate. The appellant had fired a single gun shot at three schoolmates following an altercation and mutual exchange of abuses. The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate the evidence regarding the appellant's age and the presence of provocation. A school certificate placed his age at 14 years and 9 months, which was supported by witness testimony and improperly rejected by the trial court. Furthermore, although the provocation was neither grave nor sudden enough to reduce the offense to culpable homicide under Exception 1 to Section 300, PPC, the presence of provocation short of grave and sudden, along with the appellant's young age and single-shot attack, warranted mitigation of sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment, awarded compensation under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., and granted the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Can provocation that falls short of being grave and sudden be considered as a mitigating factor to reduce a sentence of death to life imprisonment?
  • Whether an unrefuted school certificate establishing the young age of an accused can be displaced solely by a trial judge's visual impression of the accused's age?
  • Does a general exchange of verbal abuses prior to a fatal incident constitute a relevant factor when determining the appropriate sentence in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad vs Mst. Zubaida Begum1982 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-11
  tenant compensationimprovements on demised premisesevictiontransfer of propertyleave to appealrented land
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant running a barber shop, sought leave to appeal against the concurrent orders of the courts below rejecting his claim for compensation for improvements made to the demised premises upon being ordered to be evicted. The core legal question was whether a tenant is entitled to compensation for improvements made to rented property without the landlord's express consent and which do not enhance the property's value, or under the equity of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant was not entitled to compensation as the improvements were made for his own business benefit over twenty years without benefiting the landlord or being made with consent, and that Section 51 does not apply to tenants. The key principle laid down is that the equity of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is limited to persons who believe themselves to be absolutely entitled to the property improved, and does not extend to tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant entitled to compensation for improvements made to a rented shop without the landlord's express consent?
  • Does Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to a tenant seeking compensation for improvements?
  • Whether the equity conferred by Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is available to a person who is not absolutely entitled to the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamal Din and Another vs Ramzan and Other1982 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02
  review petitionabsence of counselAdvocate-on-RecordSupreme Court of Pakistancivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition seeking reconsideration of an earlier judgment dated 27-10-1981 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1973. The core legal question revolves around whether the absence of the arguing counsel at the time the case was called, and the alleged failure to call the case properly as claimed by the Advocate-on-Record, constitute sufficient grounds for reviewing a judgment. The Supreme Court held that the review petition lacks merit, observing that the case was duly called out in the courtroom where the Advocate-on-Record was present, and that responsibility for failing to argue the appeal rested with the petitioners' counsel and Advocate-on-Record. The court established the principle that an Advocate-on-Record present in court must actively signify presence or seek to argue when a case is taken up, and the subsequent arrival of the arguing counsel after the decision is rendered does not warrant a review of the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of the arguing counsel at the time an appeal is called furnish a valid ground for review of the judgment?
  • Is an Advocate-on-Record present in the courtroom responsible for ensuring the case is defended or argued when taken up by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Jalal Din, Wali Muhammad vs Hakeern Chiragh Din Etc. Hakeem Chiragh1982 PLD Supreme Court 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-20
  pre-emptiondeficient court-feelimitationextension of timespecial leave to appealpreferential right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four petitions for special leave to appeal arising from pre-emption suits concerning agricultural land sold on January 20, 1966. The primary question before the court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay and extend time for making good a deficient court-fee where the plaintiff had obtained extensions through false statements and cheating, and whether the plaintiff possessed a preferential right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the institution of an insufficiently stamped plaint is not a valid institution within the meaning of Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908, and the High Court rightly declined to extend time to save the suit from limitation given the plaintiff's conduct. Furthermore, the Court held that a plaintiff who is merely a landowner has no preferential right of pre-emption against a vendee who is also an owner in the estate without additional grounds of preference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed all petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the institution of an insufficiently stamped plaint a valid institution within the meaning of section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff claim a preferential right of pre-emption as a landowner against a vendee who is also an owner in the estate without additional grounds of preference?
  • Will an appellate court interfere with the High Court's refusal to extend time for making up a deficient court-fee obtained through false statements?
  Read full judgment →
• Jai Gopal and Others vs Mst. Sardar Begum and Other1982 SCMR 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-16
  legitimacyinheritanceevacuee propertyconversion to Islamjoint Hindu familyquestion of factmental capacity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions challenging the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the legitimacy of Mst. Sardar Begum as the daughter of Jai Gopal alias Budhan Sain. The core legal question was whether the respondent was the legitimate daughter of the deceased, born after his conversion to Islam, and consequently entitled to inherit his estate. The High Court had previously affirmed the trial court's decree in her favor, relying on findings that the deceased had converted to Islam, married the respondent's mother, and that the respondent was his legitimate child. The petitioners challenged these findings, arguing a lack of legal evidence, misapplication of evidentiary rules regarding statements of relationship, and the deceased's alleged incapacity to marry due to insanity. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence on record to support the respondent's case, including testimony from credible witnesses. The Court affirmed that the issue was one of fact, and as the lower courts had properly evaluated the material, no grounds existed for interference. The petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding legitimacy?
  • Does the statement of a witness regarding the existence of a relationship satisfy the requirements of Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act 1872 if made after the dispute arose?
  • What is the impact of a conversion to Islam on the status of a member of a joint Hindu family regarding property ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaffar Ali vs Sh. Muhammad Ali1982 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-20
  leave to appealmisrepresentationabuse of processtemporary injunctionspecific performanceaffidavitexecuting court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that refused to grant a temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance. The core legal question concerned whether a petitioner, who had engaged in clear misrepresentation before an executing court regarding the status of proceedings in the Supreme Court, remained entitled to seek relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner had filed a false affidavit and made verbal representations to the executing court claiming a stay order had been issued, when in fact no such order existed at the time. Consequently, the Court held that such conduct constituted an abuse of the process of the court. The ratio established is that a litigant who engages in deliberate misrepresentation and misleads a lower court regarding the status of pending Supreme Court proceedings disentitles themselves from the right of audience and relief before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed to prevent the abuse of the court's process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a false affidavit regarding the status of Supreme Court proceedings before an executing court constitute an abuse of process?
  • Can a petitioner who misleads a lower court regarding the existence of a Supreme Court stay order be denied a hearing in the Supreme Court?
  • Is a litigant who engages in deliberate misrepresentation before a lower court entitled to seek discretionary relief from the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Israr Hussain vs The State1982 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-18
  murderocular testimonyapprehension at the spotcriminal petitionleave to appealreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and sentence for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involves the reliability of ocular testimony and corroborative evidence in a criminal trial where the accused was apprehended at the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court held that minor inconsistencies in the statements of eye-witnesses do not detract from their veracity, and the natural presence of witnesses along with prompt apprehension at the spot with a blood-stained weapon establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact based on credible ocular testimony supported by medical evidence and prompt recovery will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor inconsistencies in the testimony of eye-witnesses are sufficient to discard their evidence?
  • Does the previous conviction of an eye-witness automatically render their testimony untrustworthy?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise the evidence concurrently believed by the lower courts in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail vs Barkat Ali and Other1982 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  allotment of landagricultural landdouble allotmentconstitutional petitionleave to appealsettlement of claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondents, declaring the subsequent allotment of agricultural land in the petitioner's favor to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The core legal question was whether the disputed land, which had been previously allotted to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest in satisfaction of a verified claim, was available for fresh allotment to the petitioner. The petitioner contended that the predecessor-in-interest had transferred her entire claim to another district, thereby releasing the land. However, the Supreme Court found that the factual findings of the Settlement Commissioner contradicted this, showing that only a portion of the claim was transferred while the disputed land remained settled in the estate. The Supreme Court held that since the land had been validly allotted earlier and was not available, the subsequent allotment to the petitioner was invalid. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land already allotted to a claimant in satisfaction of a verified claim can be validly re-allotted to another person as available land?
  • Does the partial transfer of a claimant's verified units to another district render the land already settled in the original district available for fresh allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ismail and 5 Others vs Mst. Umar Bibi and 12 Other1982 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-06
  res judicatarejection of plaintamendment of plaintbelated amendmentdiscretionary powercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a Regular Second Appeal in limine. The petitioners had filed a suit for a declaration of land ownership, which was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds of res judicata, as an earlier inter partes decree existed regarding the same subject matter. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their belated application to amend the plaint to challenge the earlier decree on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the amendment application, filed after the close of evidence, was significantly delayed and would have necessitated reopening the entire action on a new plea not previously pressed. The Court found the trial court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the amendment application to be neither illegal nor improper. Consequently, as the earlier decree remained intact, the plea of res judicata was correctly upheld, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court reject an application for amendment of a plaint that is filed after the close of evidence?
  • Does an existing inter partes decree regarding the same subject matter operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit?
  • Is the dismissal of a belated amendment application considered an improper exercise of judicial discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Club vs Muhammad Aslam and Other1982 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29
  disciplinary proceedingsdismissal from servicereasonable opportunitynatural justicecharge-sheetinquiry reportindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a constitutional petition challenging the dismissal of a Bar Clerk by the Islamabad Club. The respondent was dismissed following an inquiry that found him guilty of the original charge of holding union meetings during working hours, as well as additional serious misconduct not specified in the initial charge-sheet. The High Court set aside the dismissal, ruling that the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the extraneous findings and that no second show-cause notice was provided. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that an order of dismissal is vitiated when it is based on findings extraneous to the original charge-sheet without providing the employee a reasonable opportunity to rebut those specific findings. The Court emphasized that while it did not definitively rule on the necessity of a second show-cause notice in all cases, the respondent must be furnished with the inquiry report and allowed to explain any findings not included in the original charge before punishment is imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of dismissal based on findings extraneous to the original charge-sheet violate the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to defend?
  • Is an employee entitled to receive a copy of the inquiry report when the findings include matters not contained in the original charge-sheet?
  • Does the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 apply to the Islamabad Capital area?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Ahmad Raja Etc and Anotherrespondent Haji Abdul Hameed1982 PLD Supreme Court 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-13
  no-confidence motionlocal governmentstatutory interpretationadministrative lawelection lawtenure of office
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three consolidated appeals challenging a common order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of local councils against whom motions of no-confidence were initiated. The core legal question was the interpretation of Section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, specifically regarding the timing and frequency of no-confidence motions against elected local government officials. The appellants argued that the statutory provisions imposed strict temporal restrictions on such motions and that prior administrative rejections of no-confidence requisitions created vested rights preventing subsequent attempts. The Supreme Court held that the statute clearly permits a no-confidence motion after the initial six-month period from the assumption of office. The Court clarified that the statutory restrictions on intervals apply to subsequent motions and that an administrative rejection of a requisition for a meeting does not constitute a 'moved and rejected' motion that would bar future attempts. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the legal requirements for moving no-confidence motions had been satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Can a motion of no-confidence be moved against a Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a local council before the expiry of six months from the date of assumption of office?
  • Does the administrative rejection of an initial requisition for a no-confidence meeting bar subsequent requisitions for the same purpose?
  • What is the correct interpretation of the interval requirements for no-confidence motions under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-25
  land allotmentrevenue recordinterpolation of recordquestions of factsettlement disputecivil petition for special leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of land comprising Khasra No. 892 situated in Kamonki. The petitioner claimed an earlier allotment dated 21-4-1962, whereas respondent No. 3 was allotted the same land on 27-4-1965 based on a Patwari report. The core legal question involved the factual determinations of whether the petitioner was a genuine allottee and whether the revenue record had been interpolated or forged in his favour. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Settlement Commissioner regarding the interpolation of the revenue record and the lack of a valid prior allotment must be accepted as correct and cannot be interfered with in leave proceedings. The Court further held that a previous litigation which proceeded on an unagitated assumption of the petitioner's status could not alter the binding factual findings. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can findings of fact regarding the interpolation of revenue records be interfered with by the Supreme Court in leave to appeal proceedings?
  • Does an unagitated assumption in a previous writ petition regarding land allotment status affect subsequent proceedings on distinct factual issues?
  • Are concurrent factual determinations by a Settlement Commissioner binding upon superior courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad Khan vs Shafiq Khan and 2 Other1982 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-06
  bail cancellationmurder casecommon objectcriminal petitionSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents by the Lahore High Court in a murder case registered under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in granting bail to the respondents by distinguishing their roles from those of other co-accused, and whether they shared a common object under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion improperly in distinguishing the case of the respondents from the co-accused who allegedly fired the fatal shots. Regarding the allegation that the respondents abused the privilege of bail by threatening prosecution witnesses, the Court held that such grounds should first be brought before the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the observation that the complainant could approach the High Court on the fresh ground of abuse of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted by the High Court can be cancelled by the Supreme Court without approaching the High Court first on new grounds?
  • Does firing in the air without hitting the deceased warrant a distinction in bail matters from co-accused who fired fatal shots?
  • Can allegations of threatening prosecution witnesses be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court in a bail cancellation matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal vs The State1982 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-13
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionpre-concertmurdervicarious liabilitydelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, armed with a stick, along with three co-accused armed with firearms and a hatchet, attacked and killed the deceased while he was asleep, and subsequently stole money from his pocket. The petitioner argued for bail on the grounds that he was only armed with a stick, no blunt weapon injury was found on the deceased, and he was young. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a co-accused who did not inflict the fatal blow but acted in pre-concert and played an active role in the crime is entitled to bail. The Court held that the lack of a blunt weapon injury does not exculpate the petitioner given the prima facie evidence of pre-concert and his active role in robbing the deceased. Furthermore, the Court ruled that his age (17/18 years) and potential trial delay did not justify bail. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an injury attributed to a weapon carried by a co-accused exculpate them from liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the purposes of bail?
  • Can a co-accused claim bail on the ground of minor age if they were 17 or 18 years old at the time of the offense?
  • Is the likely delay in the trial of a murder case, by itself, a sufficient ground for granting bail to an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ud Din Ahmed Siddiqui vs Federation of Pakistan and Another1982 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12
  compulsory retirementservice tribunalmala fideMartial Law Regulation 114service recordappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's challenge to his compulsory retirement from service as a P.C.S. Officer under Martial Law Regulation 114. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground that the appellant failed to prove mala fide against the President of Pakistan, the competent authority, despite allegations of personal enmity against the then Governor of the Punjab. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, upon finding no mala fide against the competent authority, was relieved of its obligation to examine the merits of the retirement order based on the appellant's service record. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent set in Muhammad Israr Nabi v. Province of Punjab, held that the Tribunal erred by failing to examine the case on its merits. The Court ruled that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate body, is obligated to review the service record and relevant material to determine if the retirement was justified, regardless of the failure to prove mala fide. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and the case remanded for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove mala fide against the competent authority relieve a Service Tribunal of its duty to examine the merits of a compulsory retirement order?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to examine the service record of an employee when reviewing a compulsory retirement order under Martial Law Regulation 114?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmad Khan vs Secretary, Establishment Division Etc.S1982 SCMR 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09
  service lawsenioritydisciplinary proceedingsreduction in rankservice tribunalleave to appealrestoration of rank
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order dismissing the petitioner's challenge to his seniority fixation. The petitioner, a civil servant, had been subjected to a major penalty of reduction in rank for three years. Upon the expiry of this period, he was restored to his original grade. The core legal question concerned whether such restoration automatically entitled the civil servant to retain his original seniority, or if the disciplinary authority could deny it. The Service Tribunal had dismissed the petitioner's appeal, finding that the competent authority had specifically decided against allowing seniority for the period of punishment, in accordance with the Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1930. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the legal arguments regarding the interpretation of restoration versus re-promotion and the interplay of relevant disciplinary rules were raised before or considered by the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court declined to allow the petitioner to introduce these new points at the appellate stage and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner permitted to introduce new legal arguments in the Supreme Court that were not urged before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the failure to raise specific legal contentions before the Service Tribunal preclude their consideration in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Indus Valley Construction Company Ltd. vs Comentation Intrafor1982 SCMR 1127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-18
  arbitration agreementcorporate veilseparate legal entityestoppelpleadingsSection 20 Arbitration Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside an order directing the filing of arbitration agreements under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application on the premise that a third, non-impleaded company was a party to one of the agreements, thereby rendering the proceedings incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was erroneous because the respondent had explicitly admitted in its pleadings that it was a party to the agreement in question, thereby estopping it from later asserting that the agreement was with a third party. Furthermore, the Court noted that the High Court failed to address the undisputed existence of an earlier arbitration agreement between the parties. The Court reaffirmed that while the principle of separate legal entity is established, courts may pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances. Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's order directing the filing of the agreements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party that admits to being a signatory to an agreement in its pleadings later deny its liability by claiming the agreement was with a third party?
  • Is it necessary to implead a third party in proceedings under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 when the respondent has already admitted to being bound by the agreement?
  • Does the principle of separate legal entity prevent a court from looking behind the corporate veil when the respondent has admitted to the contract?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 in its entirety if one of the arbitration agreements is undisputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Indrias Jausph vs The State1982 SCMR 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-26
  post-arrest bailleave to appealfraudrecruiting agentsEmigration OrdinancePassports Actcriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the High Court's order dated 20-12-1981, which dismissed his application for post-arrest bail. The petitioner, along with his co-accused, was accused of fraudulently collecting Rs. 1,50,000 from the complainant party on the pretext of arranging visas for employment in Singapore while claiming to be recruiting agents. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court committed any legal error or violated established legal principles in refusing bail to the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had duly applied its mind to the case and provided valid reasons for its order, noting that police investigations revealed the money was handed over directly to the petitioner. Finding no violation of legal principles to justify interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court order refusing bail where the High Court has exercised its discretion with proper application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order refusing bail when the High Court has properly applied its mind to the facts?
  • Does direct receipt of fraudulently collected funds by an accused justify the refusal of post-arrest bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah vs Additional Deputy Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09
  land allotmentconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appealJammu and Kashmir refugeedelay in challenging order
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of a land allotment. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner could successfully challenge the land allotment cancellation after a prolonged delay and whether being a Jammu & Kashmir refugee grants any preferential right over another refugee. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, affirming the High Court's findings that the cancellation order passed in 1957 remained unchallenged and that the petitioner could not validly claim preference over another Jammu & Kashmir refugee. The key principle laid down is that failure to challenge a cancellation order in a timely manner precludes subsequent legal recourse, and a refugee status identical to that of a contesting party confers no preferential claim without specific statutory backing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge an unchallenging land cancellation order after an inordinate delay?
  • Does the status of a Jammu & Kashmir refugee confer a preferential right to land allotment over another refugee?
  • Will a petition for special leave to appeal be maintained against a well-reasoned High Court judgment based on concurrent factual findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Masih vs Chief Land Commissioner and Another1982 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-26
  land reformscultivating tenantallotment of resumed landconstitutional petitionleave to appealrevenue records
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition upholding the concurrent findings of the Land Commission authorities. The petitioner claimed the benefit of paragraph 15 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977, seeking allotment of resumed land as a cultivating tenant. The core legal question was whether the petitioner fulfilled the mandatory statutory requirement of being recorded in the revenue records as being in cultivating possession during Kharif 1976 and Rabi 1975-76. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish cultivating possession during the crucial crops as required by law, rendering his claim untenable. Furthermore, the Court held that new and contradictory grounds raised for the first time before the apex court, challenging the legality of the resumption and the vires of the law, could not be entertained. The petition was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal refused, laying down that revenue record entries regarding cultivating possession are foundational for statutory land allotment claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant claiming land allotment under paragraph 15 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977 must be recorded in cultivating possession during the crucial crop seasons?
  • Can a petitioner raise new and contradictory grounds regarding the vires of a statute for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a person challenging land resumption properly forfeit the right to claim allotment under the same statutory framework?
  Read full judgment →
• In Re : Professional Conduct of Two Lawyers in Civil Miscellaneous1982 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02
  professional conductcontempt of courtunconditional apologyobjectionable languageadvocate misconductpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  These original proceedings arose from Civil Petition No. 55 of 1982 and an accompanying civil miscellaneous application for an interim stay, drawn and filed by Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Chahal, Advocate, and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate-on-Record. During the hearing of the stay application, the presiding Judge noted certain objectionable words and phrases in the pleadings—such as "miserably failed," "one-sided," "lack of good faith," "perverse," "arbitrary," and "without a look"—which prima facie showed contempt, rancour, and an attempt to ridicule the High Court. Consequently, show-cause notices were issued to both respondents. At the subsequent hearing, numerous Advocates of the Lahore High Court appeared along with the respondents, stating that the respondents were genuinely sorry and apologetic. The respondents tendered unconditional apologies, begged to be pardoned, and submitted written apologies alongside proposed amendments to delete the objectionable phrases and an undertaking to be careful in the future. The Supreme Court accepted the apologies in the interest of the smooth administration of justice and discharged the show-cause notices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether use of contemptuous and rancorous language against a High Court judge in pleadings amounts to professional misconduct warranting show-cause notices?
  • Can contempt proceedings be dropped upon the tendering of a genuine and unconditional written apology by the erring advocates?
  Read full judgment →
• Imam Bakhsh vs The Collector and Other1982 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  land resumptionlease conditionsrectifiable breachconstitutional petitiondepartmental findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the resumption of state land. The petitioner challenged the resumption of his land, which occurred due to his failure to cultivate the required area and pay the lease dues (lagan). The core legal questions were whether the mandatory notice required under the lease conditions was served, and whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to rectify the breach under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the finding regarding the issuance and service of notice was a factual determination by the departmental authorities and the High Court, which showed no misreading of evidence. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner had failed to cultivate the land for a significant period, rendering the breach unrectifiable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no legal error in the lower courts' decisions. The judgment reinforces the principle that factual findings by departmental authorities, when affirmed by the High Court and free from misreading, are generally not subject to interference in appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with factual findings regarding the service of notice when such findings have been affirmed by the High Court?
  • Does the failure to cultivate land for a long period constitute an unrectifiable breach under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  • Is a notice of breach sufficient to satisfy the requirement of providing an opportunity to rectify a default under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din vs Mirza Mubarik Ali and 2 Other1982 SCMR 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-22
  settlement lawrevisional jurisdictionsuccessor in officefinality of orderswrit jurisdictionDisplaced Persons Actauction cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that declared an order by a Settlement Commissioner illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether a successor Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to review and set aside a final revisional order passed by their predecessor regarding the cancellation of an auction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the impugned order dated 22-7-1971 was passed without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the revisional order dated 24-7-1965 had attained finality and could not be reopened by a successor in office. Furthermore, the Court noted that Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, had been repealed by Ordinance II of 1962, thereby stripping the Settlement Commissioner of the legal authority to interfere with the earlier final order. The principle laid down is that a statutory officer lacks the inherent power to review or set aside a predecessor's final order in the absence of explicit statutory authority, especially after the relevant revisional powers have been repealed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successor Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to review or set aside a final order passed by their predecessor?
  • Can an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner be sustained if the statutory power of revision has been repealed?
  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge an order if their application for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII remains pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilahi Bux vs The State1982 SC MR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-09
  criminal appealeyewitness testimonyperjurycorroborationmedical evidenceprivate complaintreasonable doubtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for murder and related offences. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eyewitness testimony when the prosecution witnesses have materially contradicted their initial statements and the FIR by filing a subsequent private complaint introducing a new version of events. The Supreme Court held that the convictions could not be sustained. The Court observed that the prosecution witnesses had deliberately perjured themselves by shifting their narratives, and the medical evidence regarding the gunshot distance contradicted the eyewitness account. The Court established the principle that where prosecution witnesses have deliberately perjured themselves and the prosecution’s case is tainted by dishonest investigative practices, such as false recoveries, the court cannot rely on their testimony without unimpeachable and wholly independent corroboration. Since such corroboration was absent and the prosecution’s version was fundamentally compromised, the Court set aside the convictions, emphasizing that the prosecution cannot expect the court to sift grain from chaff when the entire testimony is unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when prosecution witnesses have materially contradicted their initial statements in a subsequent private complaint?
  • Is medical evidence regarding the distance of a gunshot sufficient to discredit eyewitness testimony that contradicts the physical findings?
  • Under what circumstances must a court require unimpeachable independent corroboration for the testimony of prosecution witnesses who have perjured themselves?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Elahi vs Messrs Butt Engineering Industries and Another1982 SCMR 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-27
  industrial relationstermination of employmentgrievance procedureworkmanJunior Labour Courtlimitation periodstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, specifically regarding the scope and limitation period for challenging the termination of employment. The appellant, a workman, challenged his dismissal before the Junior Labour Court, which granted relief. The High Court, however, quashed this order, holding that Section 25-A(6) only applied to terminations occurring within two months preceding the enactment of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court rejected this restrictive interpretation. The Court held that Section 25-A(6) provides an independent remedy for aggrieved workmen, dispensing with the grievance procedure required under subsections (1) to (4) of Section 25-A. The Court clarified that the provision is not limited to a specific two-month window preceding the Ordinance but applies to terminations generally, subject to the prescribed limitation periods. By including alternative limitation periods—two months from the enactment or two months from the termination—the statute clearly contemplates causes of action arising after the enactment. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside, restoring the Labour Court’s decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 apply only to terminations occurring within two months preceding the enactment of the Ordinance?
  • Is the grievance procedure prescribed in subsections (1) to (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 applicable to cases of termination governed by subsection (6)?
  • What is the correct interpretation of the limitation periods provided in Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad, Etc vs University Town Committee, Phshawar and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-17
  local governmentadministrator powersalienation of propertyunauthorized salestatutory interpretationcivil suitadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's suit for a declaration regarding the validity of a land sale. The petitioner purchased a plot from the Administrator of the University Town Committee, Peshawar, which was subsequently cancelled by the Committee. The core legal question was whether the Administrator possessed the unilateral authority to sell Committee property without a formal resolution or authorization. The Supreme Court held that the Administrator is not synonymous with the Committee and lacks independent power to alienate Committee property. The Court affirmed that the Administrator's executive functions are subordinate to the Committee and subject to Government oversight and the University Town Committee Rules, 1974. The principle laid down is that an Administrator of a local body cannot exercise powers of alienation of property independently of the Committee, and any such unauthorized contract is voidable. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the absence of other members does not automatically vest plenary powers in the Administrator absent specific statutory authorization. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Administrator of a local committee possess the inherent power to sell committee property without a resolution from the committee?
  • Can an Administrator exercise plenary powers of a committee simply because other committee members have vacated their offices?
  • Is a contract entered into by an Administrator without lawful authority subject to cancellation by the committee?
  • Are the executive powers of an Administrator under the North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance III of 1972 subject to the oversight of the committee and the government?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06
  criminal appealmurdercompromisemitigating circumstancereduction of sentencedeath sentenceimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Iftikhar Ahmad, who was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, with the conviction and sentence subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased, entered into without any financial compensation, can be treated as a mitigating circumstance to warrant the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that a compromise even without compensation constitutes a valid mitigating circumstance that can be taken into account for reducing a sentence. Consequently, the court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted the prayer, and reduced the appellant's death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the fines under the relevant sections. The key principle laid down is that a genuine compromise between the parties, regardless of the absence of monetary compensation, serves as a sufficient mitigating factor for sentence reduction in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased be treated as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death?
  • Is a compromise valid for sentence reduction even if it is made without any financial compensation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim and Another vs The State1982 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12
  post-arrest bailmurdercommon intentionjudicial discretionspecial leave to appealbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which had previously dismissed the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a murder case. The petitioners, Ibrahim and Pervez, were charged with the murder of Noor Elahi in furtherance of a common intention. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant bail was legally infirm or warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the refusal to grant bail in cases involving offences punishable with death or transportation for life is a matter of judicial discretion, subject to the limitation that bail is generally not to be allowed. The Court emphasized that in bail proceedings, courts are not required to probe into the merits of the case but should instead focus on the material placed before them. Finding no infirmity in the impugned order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court required to probe into the merits of a case when deciding a bail application for offences punishable with death or transportation?
  • Does the refusal to grant bail in a murder case constitute a matter of judicial discretion for the trial court?
  • What is the limitation on the discretion of a court to grant bail for offences punishable with death or transportation?
  Read full judgment →
• Hirjina Salt Chemicals (Pak.) Ltd International Bonemel Industries1982 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-17
  market feedharatbasic democraciesultra viressale of goodsmanufacturing processquid pro quoconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil appeals directed against a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing constitutional petitions challenging the imposition of market fees (dharat) on salt works and bone-crushing factories by the Union Council Gharo. The core legal questions concern whether rule 4 of the West Pakistan Union Council Dharat (Market Fees) Rules, 1961, is ultra vires the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, by extending the definition of 'market' to premises used for manufacturing goods for sale; whether the levy constitutes a fee or an unconstitutional tax; whether local councils are barred from levying fees on salt under constitutional provisions; and whether bone crushing constitutes manufacturing. The Supreme Court held that rule 4 is intra vires because sales occur at the manufacturing premises when goods are separated from bulk and appropriated under the Sale of Goods Act, that sufficient quid pro quo exists through municipal services, that the levy is a market fee rather than a central duty on salt, and that bone crushing amounts to manufacturing. The appeals were dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rule 4 of the West Pakistan Union Council Dharat (Market Fees) Rules, 1961 is ultra vires the Basic Democracies Order, 1959 for including manufacturing premises within the definition of a market?
  • At what point does a sale occur for the purposes of market fee levy under the Sale of Goods Act when goods are manufactured at a factory and agreements are concluded elsewhere?
  • Whether the levy of market fees on premises where salt is manufactured constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment upon the central legislature's power to levy duty on salt?
  • Does the process of crushing raw bones into powder constitute the manufacture of goods for the purposes of market fee rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Bakhsh and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07
  criminal appealacquittalfugitive from justicedismissal of appealappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the conviction of multiple appellants. The core legal question addressed by the Court pertains to the merits of the appellants' convictions and the procedural status of one appellant who is a fugitive from justice. The Court, in its order, accepted the appeals of Hayat Bakhsh, Muhammad Afzal, and Allah Bakhsh (son of Sikandar), resulting in their acquittal and immediate release, provided they are not required in any other legal matter. Conversely, the Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant Allah Bakhsh (son of Muhammad Bakhsh) on the specific ground that he is a fugitive from justice. The judgment establishes the principle that the appellate court may decline to entertain or dismiss an appeal filed by a convict who remains a fugitive from justice, while simultaneously granting relief to co-appellants whose convictions are found to be unsustainable upon review.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed if the appellant is a fugitive from justice?
  • Are co-appellants entitled to acquittal if their convictions are found to be unsustainable despite the fugitive status of another co-appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12
  constitutional petitionsettlement authoritiesproperty divisiondiscretionary powerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the transfer of a property divided into separate units by settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns the extent of the Settlement Authority's jurisdiction to divide a property into separate units and whether such division is amenable to interference under constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities possess the jurisdiction to divide a property, and the matter of division lies within their discretion, which ordinarily should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the division of property by settlement authorities is a matter of administrative discretion and will not be disturbed under Article 199 unless shown to be without lawful authority, particularly when the allocation is fair, just, and achieves rehabilitation of multiple parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Authority have the jurisdiction to divide a property into separate units?
  • Should a High Court interfere with the division of property by settlement authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Is the division of property by settlement authorities subject to interference if it is substantially fair and just?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Din vs Khadim Hussain and Other1982 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-10
  criminal appealsentence reductionfamily honourmurdersupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, father of the deceased, sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained the respondents' convictions under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but reduced their death sentence to imprisonment for life on the ground that the crime was committed to vindicate family honour. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of the respondents from death to imprisonment for life based on the motivation of family honour. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court committed no violation of any principle of law in reducing the sentence, noting that the prosecution's own First Information Report established that the respondents suspected the deceased of having illicit connections with their sister. The Court laid down the principle that it does not interfere with a legal sentence where no principle of law has been violated and the reduction is based on mitigating circumstances such as the vindication of family honour.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life when the crime is committed for the vindication of family honour?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence passed by the High Court when no principle of law has been violated?
  Read full judgment →
• Hari Kishan Mehra vs Custodian, Evacuee Property and Other1982 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-03-03
  evacuee propertyjurisdiction of custodianabatement of proceedingslife estatepartition awardproperty status
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property concerning properties originally belonging to one Dhanpat R.I. The core legal questions involved whether revision proceedings abated upon the death of the original applicant, whether the Custodian had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the personal status of the appellant and his brothers, whether the Custodian could make declarations regarding properties outside the specific scope of the initial application, and whether certain properties were protected under Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the revision did not abate, that the Custodian possessed jurisdiction to determine the status of the parties as it was directly in issue, but that the Custodian exceeded his jurisdiction by extending declarations to properties other than the specific premises (No. 4-Chamberlane Road) raised in the original application. The Court laid down that while Custodian authorities have wide powers to determine evacuee status and property character, an adjudication must be confined to a proper lis and cannot extend to properties never brought into issue without conscious expansion of scope and compliance with statutory cutoff dates.

  Questions settled

  • Does a revision proceeding before the Custodian abate upon the death of the original applicant when the legal representatives are already parties to the proceedings?
  • Can the Custodian authorities adjudicate upon the evacuee status of individuals when the question is expressly raised and framed as an issue in the inquiry?
  • Does the Custodian have jurisdiction to issue declarations regarding properties that were never mentioned in the initial application or brought into issue during the proceedings?
  • Are properties protected under Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, if they were treated as evacuee property prior to the relevant statutory date?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid and Other vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1982 PLD SC 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-11-14
  urban agricultural landsuo motu reviewallotment of landrefugee claimsDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actcolourable exercise of jurisdictionretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of urban agricultural land to refugees. The appellants, temporary allottees of land in Chishtian, challenged the classification of the land as urban, which rendered them ineligible for confirmation of their claims. Following a series of administrative orders and writ petitions, the land was confirmed in favour of the respondents. A subsequent order by a Chief Settlement Commissioner, which had favoured the appellants, was later set aside by his successor in a suo motu review, restoring the land to the respondents. The appellants challenged this, arguing the review was without jurisdiction and relying on a proviso to Supplementary Scheme No. 11. The Supreme Court held that the initial order favouring the appellants was a nullity, as it was a colourable exercise of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the respondents' allotment was lawful at the time it was made, as the land was urban agricultural property and the appellants' reliance on the subsequent proviso was misplaced due to its lack of retrospective effect. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Chief Settlement Commissioner exercise suo motu review powers to set aside an order passed by a predecessor that is found to be a nullity?
  • Does a proviso added to a settlement scheme have retrospective effect on allotments already confirmed?
  • Is an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner that constitutes a colourable exercise of jurisdiction considered a nullity in the eyes of the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Halim Ali and Others vs Dilbar Muhammad and Other1982 SC M R170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-25
  restoration of appealdismissal in defaultcause listsufficient causecounsel negligenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order refusing to readmit an appeal dismissed in default. The petitioners argued that their newly engaged counsel were not listed in the cause list, which only displayed the name of their former counsel, Sh. Nasir Ahmad. The core legal question was whether the omission of the new counsel's names from the cause list constituted 'sufficient cause' for non-appearance and restoration of the appeal. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from precedent where a counsel's name was wrongly printed. It held that because the case particulars were correctly listed and the former counsel's name appeared, the new counsel had a duty to be vigilant and track the case. The Court affirmed that the High Court's refusal to readmit the appeal was not an illegal, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of discretion. The principle laid down is that where a case is correctly listed, the failure of newly engaged counsel to notice the case, despite the presence of the former counsel's name on the cause list, does not constitute sufficient cause for restoration of an appeal dismissed in default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of a new counsel's name from the cause list, when the case particulars and former counsel's name are correctly listed, constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Is the negligence of counsel in failing to note a case in the cause list a valid ground for the readmission of an appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to readmit an appeal if the discretion was not exercised illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali and Other vs Deputy Commissioner/Election Tribunal Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-04
  election petitionmaterially affected resultlocal government electionsetting aside electionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition against the setting aside of their local council election by the Election Tribunal. The core legal question is whether an Election Tribunal can declare an election void as a whole without a positive finding that the irregularities committed had materially affected the result of the election. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a required finding under the relevant rules that the result of the election had been materially affected, the Tribunal's order setting aside the election is bad in law, and the High Court had misread the Tribunal's findings on uncast votes. The court laid down the principle that an election cannot be validly set aside without a clear, evidence-based finding that the proven irregularities materially affected the election outcome, failing which it improperly disenfranchises voters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Election Tribunal can set aside an election without a finding that irregularities materially affected the result?
  • Is an order of an Election Tribunal sustainable if it fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 21 of the Local Council (Election Petitions) Rules 1979?
  • Does setting aside an election without a clear finding on material effect amount to disenfranchising genuine voters?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakeemuddin and Others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner1982 SCMR 967(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21
  land allotmentreview applicationwrit petitionres judicataspecial leave to appealrehabilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking special leave to appeal against the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 168-R of 1970 by the High Court, which had upheld the refusal of departmental authorities to interfere with land allotment proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether repetitive challenges and review applications are maintainable after the underlying dispute has already been conclusively determined and foreclosed by a previous judgment of the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that once litigation between the parties stands foreclosed by a prior High Court judgment, subsequent rounds of applications and writ petitions merely reiterating rejected pleas are incompetent and rightly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that re-agitating settled matters through successive collateral proceedings is an abuse of the judicial process and will not be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party maintain a review application or subsequent writ petition after their challenge to the same order has already been dismissed by the High Court?
  • Whether repetitive litigation of settled land allotment disputes is permissible under the law?
  • Does the High Court rightly decline to interfere with departmental orders when the underlying controversy is already foreclosed by a prior judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakam Din vs Muhammad Jamil and 14 Other1982 SCMR 1734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-29
  usufructuary mortgageanomalous mortgageredemption of mortgagerestitution of landmortgage deed interpretationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a Constitutional Petition regarding a restitution order issued under the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act 1964. The core legal questions were whether the mortgage in dispute was a usufructuary mortgage, thereby permitting restitution under the Act, and whether the Act itself was ultra vires the Constitution of 1962. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was indeed usufructuary in nature. The Court reasoned that the mere existence of a clause allowing interest to be added to the principal, rather than creating personal liability for the mortgagor, does not convert a usufructuary mortgage into an anomalous one. The key principle laid down is that the classification of a mortgage under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 depends on the specific phraseology and the intention of the parties as evidenced by the entire deed, rather than isolated clauses regarding interest demands.

  Questions settled

  • Is a mortgage usufructuary if the deed provides for interest to be added to the principal rather than creating personal liability for the mortgagor?
  • Does the inclusion of a clause allowing a mortgagee to demand interest convert a usufructuary mortgage into an anomalous mortgage?
  • Whether the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act 1964 is ultra vires the Constitution of 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Sh. Fazal Elahi (Represented by His Heirs) vs Sh. Muhammad Ayub1982 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-07
  ejectmenturban rent restrictionmaterial impairment of building valuesecond appealconcurrent findings of factcommercial conversiontenancy purpose
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby a second appeal filed by the respondents under section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was accepted and the appellants were ordered to be ejected from the disputed premises. The core legal question involved whether the tenant had materially impaired the value and utility of the building by constructing cabins, bathrooms, and latrines, and whether the High Court erred in altering concurrent findings of fact under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court held that since the premises were let out for running a hotel with the landlord's knowledge, structural changes necessary for that purpose were implicit, and the landlord failed to prove that the tenants caused actual material damage. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's ejectment order was set aside, establishing that structural modifications inherent to the agreed commercial purpose of a tenancy do not ipso facto impair the value or utility of the building.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the construction of cabins and bathrooms in premises let out for running a hotel materially impairs the value and utility of the building?
  • Can a High Court alter concurrent findings of fact under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the absence of a substantial error or defect?
  • Does a landlord who knowingly lets out premises for a specific commercial purpose like a hotel retain the right to object to structural changes inherent to that purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Yaqub and Others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner1982 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-06
  locus standiillegal occupationevacuee propertysettlement departmentauction of landpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, refugees from India, illegally occupied Government land in Multan and subsequently shifted to another site, which they also occupied illegally while constructing shops thereon. They challenged the auction of the land to the seventh respondent through various departmental forums, culminating in a dismissed revision petition and a subsequently dismissed writ petition by the High Court, leading to the present petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved the petitioners' locus standi to challenge the auction and whether they had filed valid transfer application forms for the property. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked locus standi because their first departmental appeal had been dismissed for default and they had failed to prove that they ever filed claim forms or transfer applications within the prescribed dates. The key principle laid down is that unauthorized occupants of government or evacuee land who fail to file prescribed transfer applications or maintain proper appellate remedies have no locus standi to challenge subsequent auctions or departmental transfers of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized occupants of government land who fail to file transfer application forms within the prescribed date have the locus standi to challenge an auction of the property?
  • Does a party whose first departmental appeal is dismissed for default and who files a second appeal instead of seeking restoration have a valid locus standi to maintain a revision petition?
  • Can a party challenge concurrent findings of settlement authorities regarding the non-filing of claim forms without producing documentary evidence to the contrary?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Munir vs Administrator, Residual1982 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-23
  settlement schemelocus standileave to appealconstitutional petitiontransfer of propertyurban settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition in an urban settlement matter. The core issue was whether the petitioner possessed the requisite locus standi to challenge the transfer of a land lot under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and Settlement Scheme No. IX, given that the lot had already been transferred to another applicant prior to the petitioner's application. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that on the date the petitioner submitted his application form under Settlement Scheme No. IX, the disputed land was not available for transfer as it was already validly transferred by order of the Settlement Department. Furthermore, procedural objections regarding the format of the prior application were deemed unavailing as they were neither raised by the department nor presented before the High Court. Consequently, the leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person have locus standi to seek transfer of property under a settlement scheme if the property has already been transferred to another applicant?
  • Can a party raise a new factual or procedural objection for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Khan Muhammad and 4 Others vs Sh. Muhammad Muzaffaruddin1982 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-05
  mosque administrationscheme of managementpublic trustconcurrent findings of factleave to appealex-officio appointmentsnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the administration and management of a mosque constructed on government land in Ghalla Mandi, Jaranwala. The respondents initiated a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to establish a scheme for the mosque's administration. The trial court found insufficient evidence regarding the financing and management of the mosque but proceeded to appoint a Board of Management comprising various ex-officio government officials without specifying a religious requirement for these appointees. On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court's findings of fact, concluding that the respondents had successfully discharged their burden of proof. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that there was no concurrent finding of fact, that material documents were ignored, that irrelevant considerations influenced the decision, and that a necessary party—a registered body controlling the mosque—was not impleaded. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the case required a fuller examination, and ordered the continuation of interim management arrangements pending the final adjudication of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for the administration of a mosque can be maintained under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court appoint ex-officio government officials to a mosque management board without requiring them to be Muslim?
  • Does the failure to implead a registered body exercising control over a mosque constitute a defect in a suit filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Karim Bakhsh vs Muhammad Inam Ullah and Other1982 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-28
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedcompensation poolproperty resumptionsettlement authoritycustodian of evacuee propertytransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's second appeal regarding the ownership of an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authority could lawfully resume a property after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) due to the transferee's failure to pay an alleged charge created by the Custodian. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was correct. The Court reasoned that upon the issuance of the P.T.D., the property ceased to be part of the Compensation Pool, thereby divesting the Custodian and Settlement Authorities of jurisdiction to create charges against or resume the property. Furthermore, the Court established that a P.T.D. cannot be declared void simply because a portion of the transfer price remains unpaid; such outstanding amounts must be recovered through standard legal processes rather than property resumption. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the property had vested absolutely in the transferee upon the issuance of the P.T.D. free from subsequent encumbrances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Settlement Authority resume an evacuee property after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed remove a property from the Compensation Pool?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed be declared void solely on the basis of unpaid transfer price?
  • Is a Custodian's order creating a charge against a property binding on a transferee who was not a party to the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Kadir Bux Anisuddi N M. Iqbal Bajwa Noor Khan Choudhry vs Provi_ef1c6a581982 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-03
  limitation periodservice tribunaldepartmental appealcivil servantsstatutory interpretationbeneficial constructionwaiting period
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan raised a common question of law regarding the computation of the limitation period for filing appeals before the Sind Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, read with Section 23 of the Sind Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core issue was whether the 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal before the Tribunal begins to run from the date of communication of the original departmental order (allowing a 90-day exclusion for departmental remedies, totaling 120 days), or whether it commences only after the expiry of the 90-day waiting period following the filing of a departmental appeal. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court held that the 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal before the Tribunal commences only after the expiry of the 90-day waiting period from the date on which the departmental appeal, application, or representation was preferred. The Court laid down the principle that the right to appeal to the Tribunal only accrues upon the expiration of the statutory waiting period, and limitation cannot run against a person until they are legally permitted to file the action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 commence from the date of communication of the original order or after the expiry of the 90-day waiting period?
  • Can a period of limitation begin to run against a civil servant before the legal right to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal has fully accrued?
  • How should a conflict between a literal and a beneficial interpretation of a limitation provision in a remedial service statute be resolved?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Fazal Karim vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-10
  striking off defencedefault in rent deposittenant evictionnatural justicerent controller proceedingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the striking off of a tenant's defence and consequential eviction under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, due to non-compliance with a rent deposit order. The core legal question concerned whether the tenant was afforded a proper opportunity of showing cause before his defence was struck off. The Supreme Court held that the tenant and his counsel were duly aware of the proceedings and offered an explanation, satisfying the requirements of natural justice, and that Rent Controllers are not required to conduct full-fledged trials or record formal evidence when deciding on default under Section 13(6). The petition was dismissed as the lower authorities acted within their lawful authority, establishing the principle that summary inquiries suffice for default proceedings under rent restriction laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant is entitled to an opportunity of showing cause before his defence is struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to conduct a full-fledged trial or frame issues when considering the striking off of a defence?
  • Can a High Court interfere in its writ jurisdiction with an order of a Rent Controller that is based on a proper evaluation of facts and without material irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Fazal I Manan vs The State1982 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-02
  illegal miningmining concessionconcurrent findings of factcriminal revisionleave to appealstatutory applicability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction for illegal mining of emeralds under the N.-W.F.P. Mining Concession Rules, 1976. The petitioner, along with others, was accused of extracting emeralds from land beneath his house in Mangora, District Swat. The trial Magistrate convicted the petitioner, and the Sessions Judge maintained the conviction on appeal. The High Court affirmed these findings, though it reduced the sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Mining Concession Rules were inapplicable to the specific locality of Mangora and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court reviewed the relevant notifications and confirmed that the Rules were indeed applicable to the area. Regarding the merits, the Court found that the concurrent findings of fact by the three lower courts were free from legal infirmity. Consequently, the Court held that the conviction and sentence were lawful and proper, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Are the N.-W.F.P. Mining Concession Rules, 1976 applicable to the locality of Mangora, District Swat?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Mohkam Ud Din vs Settlement Commissioner (L) and 2 Other1982 SCMR 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-21
  Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actmukhbari applicationres judicatasettlement proceedingsfraud and misrepresentationspecial leave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which quashed proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could utilize the provisions of the Act to reopen property disputes that had already been adjudicated against him by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The High Court found that the petitioner, having failed in previous contests, was attempting to relitigate settled matters through a mukhbari application without demonstrating any fraud or misrepresentation by the respondents. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition in limine. The Court affirmed the principle that proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, are to be used sparingly and only when the Settlement Authorities are satisfied, upon examination of the record, that they have been defrauded. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the High Court's order, noting that the facts did not warrant such intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party use a mukhbari application to reopen property disputes already decided by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Under what circumstances should proceedings under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 be initiated?
  • Is it improper to initiate proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Hasan Muhammad and 2 Other vs Abdul Hameed and 2 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14
  pre-emptionagricultural landurban immovable propertywaiver of rightmunicipal limitscourt-fee deficiencystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals arising from suits for pre-emption of agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the pre-emptor had waived their right of pre-emption through conduct and whether the administrative inclusion of the suit lands within the municipal limits of Abdul Hakim Town transformed them into "urban immovable property," thereby exempting them from pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the pre-emptor’s mere presence at a sale transaction does not constitute a waiver, as waiver requires a conscious and intentional relinquishment of a legal right. Regarding the property's character, the Court held that the mere administrative inclusion of agricultural land within municipal limits does not automatically convert it into "urban immovable property." The Court established the principle that "agricultural land" remains distinct from "urban immovable property" under the Act. Unless evidence demonstrates that the land has lost its agricultural character through actual development or changed usage, it remains subject to pre-emption, regardless of its administrative classification within an urban area.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a pre-emptor at a sale transaction constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Does the inclusion of agricultural land within municipal limits via notification automatically convert it into 'urban immovable property' for the purposes of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a court grant an extension of time for making up a deficiency in court-fee under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What constitutes 'waiver' of a statutory right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Abdul Rahman vs Said Muhammad and Othrrss1982 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-01
  private streetcompromise decreeownership disputeregistration of documentssecond appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of a private street, which was the subject of cross-suits filed by the petitioner and the respondent. Both parties sought declarations of ownership and perpetual injunctions against the other. The trial court dismissed both suits, and the District Judge subsequently dismissed the petitioner's appeal while accepting the respondent's appeal, relying on a prior compromise between the parties. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal in limine, affirming that the previous compromise effectively transferred the disputed property to the respondent and did not require registration. The core legal question was whether the lower courts correctly interpreted the prior compromise regarding the ownership of the lane and whether it precluded the petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the lower courts correctly interpreted the previous compromise as divesting the petitioner of any title to the lane. The Court declined to examine technical arguments regarding the applicability of specific procedural rules, concluding that the lower courts had reached a correct and just decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise entered into during court proceedings regarding property ownership require registration if the property value exceeds Rs. 100?
  • Can a prior compromise decree be interpreted to divest a party of title in subsequent litigation concerning the same property?
  Read full judgment →
• Hadiat Ullah vs Habib Ullah1982 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17
  evictionpersonal usebona fide requirementadditional evidenceconcurrent findings of factrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the Lahore High Court, which ordered the eviction of a tenant from a shop on grounds of personal use by the landlord. The core legal questions involved whether the appellate court correctly disallowed the introduction of additional evidence regarding the landlord's son's alleged possession of another shop, and whether the landlord's requirement for personal use was bona fide. The Supreme Court upheld the eviction order, affirming that the additional evidence could have been produced before the Rent Controller with due diligence and was therefore inadmissible at the appellate stage. Furthermore, the Court noted that the shop in question was merely rented, rendering the evidence irrelevant. Regarding the bona fide nature of the landlord's requirement, the Court held that this is a question of fact determined concurrently by the lower courts, and in the absence of any misreading or omission of evidence, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can additional evidence be introduced at the appellate stage if it could have been produced before the Rent Controller with due diligence?
  • Is the question of whether a landlord's requirement for personal use is bona fide a question of fact that can be challenged in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or omission of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs Settlement Commissioner Etc.S1982 SCMR 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-22
  evacuee propertycomposite buildingPermanent Transfer Deedsettlement authoritiesproperty transferhorizontal divisionDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of the roof of an evacuee shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, a transferee of a shop, challenged the correction of his Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) and Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.), which excluded the shop's roof from his transfer. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities could correct transfer documents to align with the actual transfer order and whether the transfer of a shop in a composite building inherently includes the roof. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities possess the power to specify the division of composite buildings, whether horizontally or vertically. The Court affirmed that the appellant’s rights were limited to the shop itself, and the roof formed part of the residential portion transferred to the respondent. It was further held that correcting transfer documents to reflect the original transfer order is permissible and does not constitute an unauthorized amendment. The principle established is that transferees of ground-floor shops have no rights beyond the ceiling unless specifically demarcated, as roofs may constitute part of the upper residential tenement.

  Questions settled

  • Can Settlement authorities correct a Permanent Transfer Order to align it with the original transfer order?
  • Does the transfer of a shop in a composite building automatically include the roof of that shop?
  • Do Settlement authorities have the power to divide composite buildings horizontally or vertically for transfer purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Khan vs Senior Civil Judge, Malakand and Other1982 SCMR 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-23
  rent restrictionevictionpersonal requirementbona fidelandlord-tenant relationshipconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge ordering the petitioner's eviction from a shop. The eviction was sought on the ground of the landlord's personal, bona fide requirement. The petitioner contended that the landlord's claim was mala fide, citing a prior notice to renew the agreement, and disputed the landlord's ownership of the property due to the lack of a registered exchange deed. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the landlord failed to prove the necessity of the shop and questioned the competency of the Rent Controller to adjudicate the matter. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, noting that the Rent Controller had thoroughly evaluated the evidence. The Court held that the petitioner's own actions, specifically depositing rent in the landlord's name, established the landlord-tenant relationship and ownership. Finding no merit in the challenges to the concurrent factual findings regarding the bona fide personal requirement, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge the landlord's ownership after having previously deposited rent in the landlord's name?
  • Does the existence of a prior notice to renew a tenancy agreement preclude a landlord from subsequently seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord in a rent case?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib vs Sardar Ali and Other1982 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-29
  land allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actacquiescencewrit jurisdictionlachescancellation of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that restored an allotment of land previously cancelled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The dispute arose from the allotment of land to the respondent's predecessor, Ali Muhammad, based on his entitlement claim. The petitioner, who had been a party to earlier proceedings, failed to challenge an initial order dated 24-2-1960 which recognized the respondent's preferential right to the land. Years later, the petitioner sought to challenge the allotment by alleging calculation errors regarding the land's classification, leading the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to cancel the respondent's allotment in 1970. The High Court subsequently quashed this cancellation, finding that the original classification was correct and that the petitioner's challenge was procedurally barred. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having acquiesced to the 1960 order, could not subsequently challenge the resulting allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the cancellation order was untenable as it relied on incorrect information regarding the land's classification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has acquiesced in an earlier order regarding land allotment subsequently challenge the allotment by laying information under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Is an order cancelling a land allotment tenable if it is based on incorrect information regarding the classification of the land?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Shah and Others vs Raffat Pasha Ahd Other1982 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-09
  consolidation proceedingsarbitration awardpartition of joint propertyfraud allegationsrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from consolidation proceedings where the parties referred the question of consolidation of their holdings to arbitration, resulting in an award and a subsequent partition of joint property by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The petitioners challenged the partition alleging fraud regarding thumb impressions on blank papers and failure to implement the award, but their appeals and revisions were successively dismissed by the Collector, Additional Commissioner, and the Member, Board of Revenue. The core legal question addressed is whether consolidation matters of this nature can be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940, and whether the alleged award holds any legal validity. The Supreme Court held that such matters cannot be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940, rendering the purported award invalid, and further found no evidence supporting the allegation of fraud. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the decision of the Lahore High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a matter regarding the consolidation of holdings be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Is an award rendered in consolidation proceedings without legal backing under the Arbitration Act, 1940 enforceable?
  • Whether concurrent findings regarding the validity of consolidation proceedings can be interfered with in the absence of record support for allegations of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Khan vs Mst. Razia Begum and 2 Other1982 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-16
  civil revisionjoint propertypartitionconcurrent findings of factpleadingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision application arising from concurrent findings of lower courts in a property dispute. The core legal question involved whether the lower courts and the High Court erred in their revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by affirming that the disputed property was joint property belonging to the common ancestor of the parties and subject to partition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts—supported by the petitioner's own pleadings and pedigree table acknowledging the common ancestor—suffered from no jurisdictional error warranting interference. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact based on admissions in pleadings cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of any jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding joint property can be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party challenge a finding of joint ownership when their own pleadings and pedigree table establish that the land belonged to a common ancestor?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Alias Gulzari vs The State1982 SC M R254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13
  bail cancellationcircumstantial evidencecriminal appealmurder casejudicial discretionrecovery of incriminating articles
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Sheikhupura, in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in cancelling bail based on the circumstantial evidence presented against the accused. The prosecution's case relied on testimonies from witnesses who allegedly saw the petitioner in the company of the deceased shortly before the murder, observed the petitioner fleeing the scene in a confused state, and evidence regarding the recovery of the deceased's personal belongings, including a purse and wrist watch, as well as a blood-stained weapon and clothing from the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision to cancel bail was correct, noting that prima facie circumstantial evidence existed against the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's exercise of discretion, finding no grounds for interference, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion to cancel bail when prima facie circumstantial evidence exists?
  • Is the recovery of a deceased person's belongings and blood-stained items from an accused sufficient to justify the cancellation of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad Pirzada vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and 21982 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-05
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in rent depositstriking off defencerent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's ejectment from a rented property. The landlord had filed an ejectment application against the tenant, an advocate, who was directed by the Rent Controller under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance to deposit monthly rent before the 15th of every succeeding month. During the proceedings, the landlord applied to strike off the tenant's defence for delayed deposits of rent. The Rent Controller found the tenant defaulted by one day for several months without good excuse, struck off his defence, and ordered ejectment. The appellate court and the High Court dismissed the tenant's subsequent challenges. The core legal question was whether a delay of one day in depositing rent under a court order warrants striking off the defence and ejectment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner, being an advocate, could not plead misunderstanding of the deposit deadline, distinguishing the case from precedent where default was minor and isolated. The key principle established is that default in complying with rent deposit orders, even by a single day without valid excuse, especially by a legally trained tenant, justifies striking off defence and ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay of one day in depositing rent under a court order justify striking off the defence?
  • Can an advocate plead misunderstanding of a clear court order regarding monthly rent deposit deadlines?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition against an ejectment order warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Gullan and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-19
  private defensecriminal trespasscommon intentionmurderexcessive forcejudicial confessionculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of three appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a trespasser. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants acted in the exercise of their right of private defense of person and property, and whether the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 applied to the co-accused. The Supreme Court held that while the initial entry of the deceased into the compound constituted criminal trespass, the appellant Gullan exceeded the right of private defense by inflicting excessive, cruel, and vindictive injuries on a prostrate, immobilized victim, thereby forfeiting the protection of Exception 2 to Section 300. Consequently, Gullan’s murder conviction was upheld. However, the Court acquitted the two sons, finding their actions were limited to the scope of private defense and that they lacked the requisite common intention for murder. The key principle laid down is that the right of private defense is strictly limited to the necessity of the situation; it does not extend to inflicting disproportionate harm once the threat has ceased.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defense extend to inflicting harm disproportionate to the threat posed?
  • Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be inferred where there is no evidence of premeditation or concert?
  • Does the right of private defense persist after a trespasser has been immobilized?
  • When does an act of killing fall under Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulab Khan vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissjoner, Rawalpindi1982 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16
  evacuee propertysettlement schemeauction purchaseravailable propertyfinality of orderslocal claimant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of evacuee property. The petitioner, a local, sought the transfer of a property in Rawalpindi, which had been auctioned to respondents in 1960. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of the property despite failing to challenge the initial rejection of his claim form in 1960 and whether the property could be considered 'available' for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII after it had already been auctioned. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's failure to challenge the initial rejection of his claim form precluded subsequent claims. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the property was not 'available' for transfer under the Settlement Scheme because it had already been transferred via auction, and the subsequent status of that transfer remained sub-judice. The Court established that a claimant cannot bypass the finality of an unappealed administrative order by invoking subsequent schemes, nor can they claim property as 'available' while the validity of a prior transfer is still under judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant who fails to appeal the rejection of an initial claim form subsequently rely on later settlement schemes to claim the same property?
  • Does property transferred via auction to a third party qualify as 'available property' under Settlement Scheme No. VIII while the validity of that auction transfer is still sub-judice?
  • Does a misdescription of property as a 'shop' instead of a 'house' in a High Court order constitute a material error if the claimant's underlying claim was already barred by the finality of an earlier unappealed order?
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• Gulab Din vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division Lahore and Other1982 SCMR 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-14
  settlement matterwrit petitionleave to appealproperty divisionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a writ petition concerning the settlement and division of a 54 feet long verandah attached to a property in Chawinda, District Sialkot, which was transferred in portions to the petitioner and respondent No. 3. The core legal question was whether the High Court or this Court should interfere with the equal division of the verandah made by the Settlement Authorities. The Supreme Court held that since the Settlement Officer possessed the jurisdiction to divide the disputed area, and the matter was a petty dispute not involving any substantial question of law, interference was unwarranted. The Court laid down the principle that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to examine the factual correctness or propriety of a minor property division made by a competent settlement authority acting within its jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a factual property division made by a Settlement Officer having jurisdiction?
  • Does a petty dispute not involving any question of law warrant interference in writ jurisdiction?
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• Gul Sahib Din and Other vs Malik Sultan Jan and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-18
  withdrawal of suitformal defectrevisional jurisdictioncivil procedureremand of caseappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute where the petitioners sought a declaration of ownership regarding land, claiming long-standing possession. After their initial suit was dismissed, they appealed to the Additional District Judge, who permitted them to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file a fresh suit. The respondents challenged this withdrawal order in the Peshawar High Court via a civil revision. The High Court set aside the withdrawal order, finding that the application for withdrawal lacked specific details regarding the 'formal defects' necessitating such withdrawal, and remanded the case for a decision on the merits. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that an application for withdrawal must specify the formal defects justifying the withdrawal. The Court held that vague assertions of formal defects are insufficient to warrant permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh one, thereby emphasizing the necessity of procedural precision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application for the withdrawal of a suit under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require the specification of formal defects?
  • Can a High Court interfere with an appellate court's order allowing the withdrawal of a suit under its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is a vague and general assertion of formal defects sufficient to grant permission to withdraw a suit with the liberty to institute a fresh one?
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• Gul Muhammad vs Mst. Fatima Bibi and 7 Other1982 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  leave to appealevictionpersonal requirementbona fide needwrit petitionrent controllerpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate court directing the eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of the respondent-landlord's personal requirement. The core legal question raised was whether the failure to explicitly use the expressions 'good faith or bona fide' in the pleadings, framed issues, and the Rent Controller's order vitiated the eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court held that technicalities regarding the specific wording of the pleadings do not warrant interference in writ jurisdiction when both lower forums and the landlord were conscious of the legal requirement and the substance of the plea was duly raised. The court affirmed the refusal of the High Court to exercise its constitutional writ jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, granting one month's time to vacate the premises upon a voluntary undertaking. The key principle laid down is that the absence of specific formulaic terminology in pleadings does not invalidate eviction proceedings where the substance of the legal requirement for bona fide personal need has been substantially satisfied and considered by the lower authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to use the exact expressions good faith or bona fide in pleadings vitiates an eviction order based on personal requirement?
  • Does the High Court properly refuse to exercise writ jurisdiction where concurrent findings of fact on personal requirement are recorded by lower forums?
  • Whether technical flaws in pleadings justify interference by the Supreme Court when lower authorities are conscious of the legal requirements?
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• Government of the Punjab and, Othersapplicants_Respondents vs Saleem Hussain Gardezi1982 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-18
  service appealstay orderinadvertent omissionrectification of orderstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the respondent sought clarification regarding the status of a stay order that had been granted previously but was inadvertently omitted from the subsequent leave order. The core legal question was whether the court could rectify an inadvertent omission in its own order to ensure the continuation of a stay of proceedings. The court held that, in the interest of justice, it possesses the inherent power to rectify such inadvertent omissions. Consequently, the court ordered that the stay order, originally granted on November 1, 1981, shall remain in force until the final decision of the appeal. The court also addressed and refused a request for an early hearing of the appeal. The principle laid down is that the court may exercise its authority to correct clerical or inadvertent omissions in its orders to prevent prejudice to the parties and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court rectify an inadvertent omission in a leave order regarding the continuation of a stay?
  • Does a stay order granted prior to the acceptance of a leave petition automatically continue if it is inadvertently omitted from the leave order?
  • Is the court empowered to extend a stay order in the interest of justice during the pendency of a service appeal?
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• Government of Pakistan vs Haji Zain Khan and Other1982 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-21
  interim stayexecution of decreeland acquisition compensationcivil appealsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil miscellaneous applications filed by the respondents seeking modification or recall of an interim stay order granted by the Supreme Court, which had stayed the execution of a High Court decree concerning land acquisition compensation originally dating back to 1969. The respondents prayed for permission to execute the decree upon furnishing a bank guarantee or, alternatively, to recover half the decretal amount on personal security, alongside requests for an early hearing on the existing record and dispensation of concise statements. The core legal question involved whether the interim stay against the execution of the decree ought to be modified or recalled to allow execution or partial recovery during the pendency of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit one for modifying or recalling the interim stay order, thereby refusing the request to execute the decree. However, the Court granted liberty to the respondents to withdraw the compensation amount already deposited in Court without prejudice to their rights in the appeal, while directing the preparation of paper books, filing of concise statements, and expediting the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim stay order restraining the execution of a decree should be modified or recalled upon the request of the decree-holder?
  • Can respondents be permitted to withdraw a compensation amount deposited in court during the pendency of an appeal without prejudice to their rights?
  • Is a case appropriate for dispensing with paper books and concise statements when an appeal involves substantial questions of law?
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• Government of Pakistan Brig. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi vs Brig. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi and Other the Government of Pakistan and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-07
  merger agreementacceding state propertysuccessionprimogenituremuslim personal lawact of stateameer of bahawalpurconstitutional instrument
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals arising from a Lahore High Court decision concerning a writ petition that challenged the Devolution and Distribution of Property (Ameer of Bahawalpur) Order, 1969. The late Ameer of Bahawalpur's personal properties were distributed by the Central Government among his legal heirs, prompting the eldest son and successor to the Ameerate to claim exclusive ownership of all personal properties under the rule of primogeniture, backed by the Bahawalpur Merger Agreement of 1954. The core legal questions involved whether the Merger Agreement acted as a constitutional instrument shielding customary succession, whether the Central Government's distribution order was valid under the Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961, and whether personal properties could be segregated for the office of the Ameer outside Muslim personal law. The Supreme Court held that personal properties are distinct from personal rights, the Merger Agreement did not guarantee customary succession to private property, and the private property of the late Ameer must devolve upon all legal heirs strictly in accordance with Muslim Law (Shariat). The Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the High Court's remand to the Central Government for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Instrument of Accession or Merger Agreement executed by a Ruler of an acceding state constitute an Act of State barring municipal court jurisdiction?
  • Does the guarantee of succession according to the law and customs of the Bahawalpur State under the Merger Agreement extend to private and proprietary properties?
  • Are personal rights and proprietary rights synonymous under jurisprudence so as to include property within personal privileges and dignities?
  • Can the Central Government distribute the private property of a deceased Ruler outside the rules of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) under the Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961?
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• Government of Baluchistan vs Muhammad Safdar1982 PLD Supreme Court 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-21
  service tribunalcivil servantremoval from serviceremand orderexhaustion of remediesres judicatadisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Baluchistan Services Tribunal, which had set aside the respondent's removal from government service and declared him to be in service for a specific period. The core legal questions concerned whether the Tribunal's previous order of remand was valid, whether the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to reinstate a civil servant due to restrictions on determining 'fitness' for a post, and whether the respondent failed to exhaust departmental remedies. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s initial order was a valid remand, not a final dismissal, and the government, having failed to challenge that remand earlier, could not contest it subsequently. The Court clarified that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review removal from 'service' is distinct from decisions regarding 'fitness' for a specific 'post' under the relevant statute. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument regarding the failure to exhaust departmental remedies, noting the matter had been properly remanded and adjudicated. The petition was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's authority to review disciplinary removals and the validity of its remand procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of a civil servant from 'service' fall within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, or is it barred as a decision regarding 'fitness' for a post?
  • Can a government department challenge a remand order issued by a Service Tribunal after having complied with that order and participated in the remanded proceedings?
  • Is a show-cause notice that fails to provide specific allegations against a civil servant sufficient to sustain an order of removal from service?
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• Ghulam. Yasin vs Secretary, Local Government Punjab and Othbrs1982 PLD Supreme Court 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-30
  local government electiondisqualification of candidatecontractor disqualificationstatutory interpretationretrospective effectPunjab Local Government Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the disqualification of the appellant as a Councillor of the Bhalwal Municipal Committee. The appellant had been disqualified under Section 21(h) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, for holding a contract with the same municipal committee. Following the enactment of Ordinance IV of 1981, which omitted clause (h) of Section 21, the appellant contended that his disqualification was removed retrospectively. The core legal question was whether the legislative amendment effectively removed the disqualification for contractors of the local council where they were candidates. The Supreme Court held that while clause (h) was indeed omitted, the disqualification was effectively preserved through a newly added proviso to clause (f) of Section 21. This proviso explicitly maintained the disqualification for individuals holding contracts with the local authority where they sought election. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, establishing the principle that the omission of a specific disqualification clause does not automatically remove the disability if the substance of that disqualification is retained within other provisions of the amended statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of clause (h) of Section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, by Ordinance IV of 1981, remove the disqualification of a candidate holding a contract with the local council?
  • Does the proviso to clause (f) of Section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, as amended by Ordinance IV of 1981, disqualify a candidate who holds a contract with the local council where they are standing for election?
  • Can a disqualification be considered effectively retained in a statute even if the specific clause creating it is omitted, provided it is incorporated into a new proviso?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Province of Punjab1982 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-16
  ad hoc appointmentservice tribunaltermination of serviceregularization of serviceone month noticecomposition of tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Chief Officer of the Municipal Committee, Chishtian, sought leave to appeal against a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed his challenge to the termination of his ad hoc employment. The petitioner argued that his appointment, despite being labeled ad hoc, had become regular due to the permanent nature of the post and the duration of his service. He also challenged the authority of the Tribunal's Chairman to hear the matter singly. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Regarding the composition of the Tribunal, the Court held that Section 3(A) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, as amended by Ordinance No. XI of 1980, explicitly authorized the Chairman to act singly. On the merits, the Court affirmed that an ad hoc appointment made without following recruitment rules does not become regular merely by the passage of time. While acknowledging the failure to provide the mandatory one-month notice for termination, the Court held this entitled the petitioner only to one month's pay in lieu of notice, rather than reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman of the Punjab Service Tribunal hear and dispose of an appeal acting singly?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment automatically become regular by the mere passage of time?
  • What is the remedy for an ad hoc employee whose services are terminated without the mandatory one-month notice?
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• Ghulam Rasul vs The State And 4 Other1982 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-09
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailcolumn No. 2investigation reportmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for the cancellation of bail granted by the Lahore High Court to respondents Nos. 2 to 5 in a criminal case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail to co-accused persons who were either placed in column No. 2 of the police report by the investigating officer or were attributed simple injuries, as opposed to the main accused who allegedly inflicted the fatal blows. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the principles applied by the High Court judges in granting bail were unexceptionable, particularly given that sufficient weight must be attached to the result of an investigation when an accused is placed in column No. 2, and that the participating co-accused were only attributed minor or simple injuries. The key principle laid down is that bail is properly granted to co-accused individuals who are placed in column No. 2 upon investigation or whose specific roles involve only simple injuries, distinguishing them from the principal offender.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sufficient weight should be attached to the result of an investigation when an accused is placed in column No. 2 for the purpose of bail?
  • Should bail be refused to co-accused persons who are attributed only simple injuries while the fatal blow is assigned to another accused?
  • Are the principles for granting bail to co-accused properly satisfied when their specific roles involve minor or simple injuries?
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