Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Sajjad Ghani Syed and another vs Ch. Asghar Ali and others2020 PLJ SC 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-25
  remandconsent orderproperty disputecivil appealjudicial recusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from civil petitions challenging judgments passed by the Islamabad High Court regarding a property dispute. Upon the unanimous request of the parties, who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the impugned judgments and the remand of the case, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them. The Court set aside the impugned judgments dated 26.04.2019 and 17.09.2019 and remanded the case to the Islamabad High Court for a fresh decision. The Supreme Court directed that the matter be heard by a judge other than the one who originally decided the case, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court. Furthermore, the Court ordered the District Administration of Islamabad, specifically the Assistant Commissioner, to take possession of the disputed property pending the final outcome of the High Court proceedings. The High Court was directed to decide the matter expeditiously before the commencement of summer vacations, with the parties ordered to appear before the High Court on a fixed date.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court remand a case to the High Court for a fresh decision based on the consent of the parties?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct the Chief Justice of a High Court to nominate a different judge for a remanded case?
  • Can the Supreme Court order the District Administration to take possession of disputed property pending the final outcome of High Court proceedings?
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• Sajid vs Samin ur Rehman (deceased) through his father Gul Jawab KhanPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 145, 2021 P S c (Crl.) 115, 2021 SCMR 138, 2020 SCP 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirytwo versionsgeneralized FIRcriminal liabilitybail not jail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application by the Peshawar High Court in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given that the FIR contained generalized allegations without specific attribution of injuries, and the case involved two competing versions of the incident. The Supreme Court held that the case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' as contemplated by Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court observed that the prosecution failed to specify which accused caused which injury, the medical evidence regarding one deceased was inconclusive, and the petitioner's own version of the incident had been recorded. The key principle laid down is that where an FIR is generalized and fails to attribute specific acts to the accused, and where there are two versions of the occurrence, the case warrants further inquiry, entitling the accused to the concession of bail under the principle of 'bail, not jail'.

  Questions settled

  • Does a generalized FIR that fails to attribute specific injuries to individual accused persons entitle the accused to bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Can criminal liability be shifted to an accused merely because co-accused are absconding?
  • Does the existence of two versions of an occurrence bring a case within the ambit of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Saima Ashiq Javed vs State through Attorney General of Pakistan2020 SCMR 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-02
  pre-arrest bailfinancial scammisappropriation of public fundsabsconsiongender ground for bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought judicial protection through leave to appeal against the refusal of pre-arrest bail by the High Court in a case involving a major financial scam and misappropriation of public funds amounting to Rs.57.6 million through bogus pensionary payments, where her bank account was allegedly used to channel embezzled amounts and she had been declared an absconder. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, particularly on the ground of her gender and disputed transactions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to make out a case for judicial protection or establish mala fide on the part of the prosecution, and further ruled that the law does not confer immunity from arrest on account of gender alone in the face of a prima facie nexus to a serious crime and conduct demonstrating absconsion. Leave to appeal was accordingly declined.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law confer immunity from arrest on account of gender in criminal cases?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the accused has been declared an absconder?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail merely on the basis of denials and explanations regarding documented bank transactions?
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• Safdar Abbas and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 198, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 513, 2020 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-03
  Qatl-i-amdprivate complaintvicarious liabilityindependent corroborationacquittalsafe administration of justicecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a private complaint regarding the murder of Muhammad Bukhsh on April 5, 2008. The petitioners, real brothers, were convicted under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the evidence, which had been disbelieved regarding the majority of the co-accused who were identically placed, could sustain the conviction of the petitioners without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court observed that the roles assigned to the acquitted co-accused and the petitioners were inextricably linked and could not be bifurcated. Finding the motive non-specific, investigative conclusions inconsistent with the complainant's case, and recoveries inconsequential, the Court held that no objective distinction could be drawn to isolate the petitioners' guilt. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, holding that it is unsafe to maintain a conviction based on substantially flawed evidence that failed to distinguish between the roles of acquitted and convicted parties.

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• Saeed Zaman vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  bailconditional bailcash depositsurety bondfinancial scamCode of Criminal Procedureequality before lawinterlocutory arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an order of the Islamabad High Court that granted bail to the petitioner in a financial scam case subject to a condition requiring him to deposit Rs.5.16 million (the allegedly siphoned amount) in cash alongside furnishing a surety bond. The legal issue was whether a court can impose a condition of depositing the alleged defrauded amount as a prerequisite for granting bail. The Supreme Court held that bail is an interlocutory arrangement aimed strictly at securing the attendance of the accused at trial. Under Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, courts can only demand conscionable bail bonds from the accused or sureties, and the Code does not envisage cash deposits of the disputed amount, which can only be determined upon final adjudication of evidence. The Court ruled that imposing such onerous, unaffordable financial conditions amounts to withholding bail relief and violates equality before the law. Consequently, the High Court's conditional bail order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant bail subject to the condition of depositing the amount allegedly siphoned off or defrauded by the accused?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 permit demanding a cash deposit as a condition for granting bail in a criminal case?
  • What is the statutory scope and purpose of requiring bonds under Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can bail relief be conditioned on financial requirements that depend upon the divergent financial capacities of an accused?
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• Sadiq Ullah and another vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-27
  terrorismspecial jurisdictionAnti-Terrorism Actpersonal vendettacriminal trialjurisdiction of courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition challenging the trial of the accused for the murder of a medical student before a Special Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the murder, despite its brutal nature and the public shock it caused, constituted 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby justifying trial in a special jurisdiction rather than a regular court. The Supreme Court held that while the intensity of brutality and loss of life are tragic, they do not, by themselves, bring a violent act within the purview of 'terrorism.' The Court clarified that terrorism is a distinct phenomenon aimed at achieving ends beyond the settlement of personal scores. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments, holding that the case did not meet the criteria for special jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that personal vendettas or murders, regardless of their brutality or the public fear they generate, do not automatically qualify as terrorism unless they involve the specific elements contemplated by the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the brutality of a murder or the resulting public shock automatically bring an act within the definition of 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can a murder motivated by a personal score be tried in a special court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What is the distinction between a violent crime and an act of terrorism for the purpose of determining trial jurisdiction?
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• Sadiq Ali vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 170, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 823, 2020 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-04
  homicideocular accountinjured eyewitnessprompt FIRmedical evidencerecovery of weaponsubstitution theoryleave to appeal declined
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction for homicide and assault, but altering his death penalty to imprisonment for life. The prosecution case was that the petitioner attacked his son-in-law (and nephew) and the complainant with a knife following a dispute at a kiosk, resulting in the victim's death and injuries to the complainant. The core legal questions pertained to whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through the ocular account, prompt reporting, medical evidence, and recovery of the blood-stained weapon, and whether the petitioner's defense plea of false implication and substitution was plausible. The Supreme Court held that the daylight occurrence was promptly reported, medical examinations fully matched the timeline, and the presence of the injured eyewitness was incontrovertible. Concluding that the defense's substitution theory was preposterous and unsupported, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of guilt and dismissed the petition, declining leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured eyewitness corroborated by an independent witness and medical evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for homicide?
  • Can a defense plea of false implication and substitution be accepted when unsupported by evidence and contradicted by prompt reporting and medical findings?
  • What evidentiary value is attached to the prompt lodging of an FIR and immediate medical examination in ruling out deliberation and consultation?
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• Sadiq Ali vs StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-04
  criminal petitionhomicidemurder convictionappreciation of evidenceocular accountmedico-legal evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a conviction for homicide and assault. The petitioner was accused of murdering his son-in-law, Kashif Ali, and injuring the complainant, Shoukat Ali, following a dispute over tea and underlying familial animosity. The trial court convicted the petitioner, sentencing him to death for murder and one year of rigorous imprisonment for assault. The High Court maintained the convictions but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The petitioner challenged these findings, arguing that the prosecution's evidence was unreliable, particularly regarding the recovery of the weapon and the motive. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the occurrence was a daylight event reported with promptitude, supported by consistent medico-legal evidence and an independent eyewitness. The Court held that the presence of the injured complainant at the scene and the forensic confirmation of the recovered weapon linked the petitioner to the crime. Consequently, the Court rejected the theory of substitution and the petitioner's plea, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of an injured complainant and an independent witness in a daylight occurrence?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon from an accessible place necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the theory of substitution credible when the complainant himself has sustained injuries during the occurrence?
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• Saddam Hussain vs The State through A.G. Islamabad and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-12
  police investigationprofessional trainingconstitutional dutyinvestigation handbookpolice negligencecriminal justice reform
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a criminal petition involving concerns regarding police investigation standards and the conduct of an Investigating Officer. The Supreme Court addressed the necessity for professionalizing police investigations, emphasizing that investigation is a specialized field requiring rigorous training. The Court directed the Inspector General of Police, Islamabad, to ensure that Investigating Officers are fully trained and equipped. A key directive issued by the Court mandates the immediate preparation of a comprehensive handbook on crime investigation, incorporating practical applications, case law, and the use of modern investigation kits and computerized data. This handbook must be updated annually. Furthermore, the Court underscored the constitutional duty of the State and its functionaries, particularly the police, to safeguard the life and property of citizens. The Court directed that any police official found negligent or involved in criminal activities must face strict departmental action and criminal prosecution. The petition itself was ultimately withdrawn by the petitioner to pursue a fresh bail application upon the submission of the final challan.

  Questions settled

  • Is the investigation of a crime considered a specialized subject requiring specific training for police officers?
  • Does the State have a constitutional obligation to protect the life and property of its citizens through police functionaries?
  • What are the requirements for police departments regarding the creation and updating of investigation handbooks?
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• Rizwana Altaf vs Chief justice, High Court of Sindh through its Registrar2020 PLC (C.S.) 1244, 2020 SCMR 1401, 2021 PLJ SC 15, 2020 SCP 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-09
  probationer judgedispensing servicesmisrepresentationconcealment of factscivil servantprobationary periodjudicial servicebar enrollment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of an appeal by the Sindh Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which had upheld the dispensing of the petitioner's services as a Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate during her probationary period under Rule 9(2) of the Sindh Judicial Service Rules, 1994. The core legal question was whether the competent authority could dispense with the services of a probationer judge without a regular inquiry upon discovering deliberate concealment of past government employment and misrepresentation regarding her status as a practicing advocate. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's deliberate withholding of information in her job application regarding her ongoing employment as a primary school teacher and her improper procurement of a High Court advocate license justified the termination of her probationary service. The Court laid down the principle that the services of a probationer can be validly dispensed with on the basis of undeniable material regarding concealment and misrepresentation without the necessity of conducting a regular departmental inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of a probationary judge can be dispensed with without conducting a regular inquiry when there is undeniable material of concealment and misrepresentation?
  • Does past misrepresentation regarding enrollment as an advocate and concealment of government employment justify the termination of a judicial officer during probation?
  • Can past administrative irregularities in the appointment of other individuals be invoked under the principle of discrimination to retain a tainted appointment?
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• Rehman Ullah alias Insaf vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 224, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 490, 2020 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-22
  post-arrest bailmurderfugitiveforensic matchcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Rehman Ullah alias Insaf, seeking post-arrest bail in a murder and firing case. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given the incriminating evidence against him. The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence took place in daylight, the FIR was lodged promptly, and the petitioner was specifically named as the principal accused with attribution of effective and ineffective firing. Furthermore, the Court noted that eye-witnesses supported the prosecution case, medical evidence corroborated the ocular account, a motive was established, a firearm recovered from the petitioner matched crime empties and a bullet from the deceased, and the petitioner had remained a fugitive from law for three years before his arrest. Holding that prima facie reasonable grounds existed to believe the petitioner's involvement, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, establishing the principle that fleeing from justice for a prolonged period, combined with consistent ocular and forensic corroboration, disentitles an accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused who remained a fugitive for a prolonged period entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the recovery of a firearm matching crime empties and a bullet from the deceased constitute prima facie reasonable grounds of involvement?
  • Whether prompt lodging of an FIR naming the accused with specific attribution of firing supports the refusal of bail?
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• Regional Tax Officer, Peshawar vs Safeer Jan2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-05
  Income TaxGift transactionsBanking channelsDeemed incomeBook entriesTax assessmentIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in favor of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s receipt of funds, characterized as gifts from partners in a firm, constituted taxable income under Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, due to the transactions not being conducted through banking channels. The Department argued that the failure to use banking channels for these gifts triggered the deeming provision of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, applies specifically to loans, advances, or gifts received in cash. In this instance, no actual cash exchange occurred; rather, the partners authorized the respondent to withdraw amounts from their respective shares in the firm, reflected through book entries. The Court determined that the provision was not attracted because no actual transfer of funds took place. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the lower forums correctly interpreted the law regarding the non-applicability of Section 12(18) to these specific book-entry transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 apply to transactions involving book entries where no actual cash is exchanged?
  • Is a gift transaction between partners of a firm subject to the banking channel requirements of Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 if no cash transfer occurs?
  • Can an authorization to withdraw funds from a partner's share in an Association of Persons be classified as a cash gift under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
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• Regarding,Combating,the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Coved -19):, In the matter of vs N/A2020 P SC 1084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-13
  COVID-19freedom of movementexecutive authorityfundamental rightspublic health emergencysuo motuinter-provincial movement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the suo motu proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the state's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The core legal questions addressed were the constitutionality of executive orders restricting inter-provincial movement and the adequacy of provincial measures in sealing specific areas without comprehensive support systems. The Court held that the executive authority lacks the power to restrict the fundamental right to freedom of movement through administrative orders, emphasizing that such restrictions must be imposed through legislation. Consequently, the Court struck down an executive order by the Government of Punjab that prohibited inter-provincial movement. Furthermore, the Court expressed concern over the lack of planning in Sindh regarding the sealing of Union Councils, specifically noting the absence of provisions for essential supplies and medical support for residents. The judgment establishes the principle that executive actions infringing upon fundamental rights, such as the freedom of movement, are ultra vires unless supported by specific legislative enactment, and underscores the state's positive obligation to provide adequate protection and resources to frontline healthcare and sanitary workers during a public health emergency.

  Questions settled

  • Can the executive authority restrict inter-provincial movement through an administrative order without legislative enactment?
  • Does the state have a constitutional obligation to provide protective equipment and support to frontline medical and sanitary staff during a pandemic?
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• Regarding Colossal Losses Incurred by Pakistan Railways_ In the matter of vs N_a2020 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-09
  Pakistan RailwaysKarachi Circular RailwayCPECpublic safetyinfrastructure managementadministrative accountabilityjudicial oversight
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the operational failures and infrastructure challenges facing Pakistan Railways, specifically regarding the Main Line-I (ML-I) project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR). The Court addressed the status of the ML-I project, noting its pending approval by ECNIC, and identified critical bottlenecks hindering the KCR, specifically near Urdu University and Nazimabad, which require immediate intervention by the Government of Sindh. The Court directed the Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, to facilitate the removal of these obstructions and ensure the construction of necessary railway crossings. Furthermore, the Court expressed grave concern over the frequent accidents and mismanagement within Pakistan Railways, attributing these issues to dilapidated infrastructure and incompetent personnel. Consequently, the Court mandated that the Government of Pakistan undertake a comprehensive overhaul of the Railways' administration and operations to ensure public safety and protect state property. The Court ordered the submission of progress reports from both the Government of Sindh and the Government of Pakistan through the Planning Commission to monitor compliance with these directives.

  Questions settled

  • What specific actions are required from the Government of Sindh to facilitate the operationalization of the Karachi Circular Railway?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct the Government of Pakistan to overhaul the administrative structure of Pakistan Railways?
  • What is the expected timeline for the submission of reports regarding the operational improvements of Pakistan Railways?
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• Raza and another vs The State and others2020 P SC (Crl.) 922, 2020 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-25
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurdersentence conversionghairat killinghonor killingfirst pleaadmissibility of evidenceQanun-e-Shahadat Orderculpable homicide not amounting to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had converted a death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment. The core legal question revolved around the appropriate conviction and sentence, specifically whether the petitioner's plea of acting under 'ghairat' (honor) due to an alleged attempt of rape on his sister by the deceased, consistently raised during investigation and trial, warranted a lesser charge. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's consistent first plea, found correct by the Investigating Officer and admissible under Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, established that the occurrence took place due to an act of the deceased that enraged the petitioner. Consequently, the Court converted the sentence from imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) PPC to 10 years imprisonment under Section 302(c) PPC, maintaining the compensation amount. The complainant's petition for enhancement of sentence was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consistent first plea of an accused, raised during investigation and trial, be considered for reducing a murder charge?
  • Is the first plea of an accused admissible in evidence under Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a sentence under Section 302(b) PPC be converted to Section 302(c) PPC if the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation related to 'ghairat'?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an accused's first plea regarding their state of mind at the time of an occurrence?
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• Raza and another vs The State and 2 others2020 PLD Supreme Court 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-25
  criminal petitionmurder convictiongrave and sudden provocationfirst version of accusedadmissibility of statementSection 161 Cr.P.C.Section 162 Cr.P.C.Qanun-e-Shahadat Orderbenefit of doubtquantum of sentenceSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that converted a death sentence for murder under Section 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the admissibility and evidentiary value of an accused's "first version" statement made to the police during investigation, particularly in light of Article 27, Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and Section 162 Cr.P.C. The Court held that an accused's statement to the investigating officer is covered by Section 161 Cr.P.C. and is relevant and admissible if used by the accused in their own favour, not being barred by Article 38 QSO or Section 162 Cr.P.C. It clarified that Article 27 QSO has little relevance for such statements. Applying the principle that a reasonable possibility of the defence plea being true benefits the accused, and considering the consistent plea of grave and sudden provocation, the Court converted the conviction from Section 302(b) PPC to Section 302(c) PPC, sentencing the petitioner to 10 years rigorous imprisonment while maintaining compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statement made by an accused to a police officer during investigation covered by Section 161 Cr.P.C.?
  • Is the first version statement of an accused made to a police officer relevant and admissible if used by the accused in their own favour, despite the bars in Article 38 QSO and Section 162 Cr.P.C.?
  • Does Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, apply to determine the relevancy of an accused's first version statement to an investigating officer?
  • Does the reasonable possibility of a defence plea being true benefit the accused?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) PPC be converted to Section 302(c) PPC if grave and sudden provocation is established?
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• Rana Zahid Hussain Khan vs Raja Taleh Saeed Khan, etc2020 P SC 1439, 2020 PLJ SC 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-10
  nomination paperseducational qualificationsfalse statementmis-declarationelection appealconstitutional jurisdictionfake degree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court that allowed constitutional petitions and rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for election to the National Assembly. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner made a false statement or mis-declaration regarding his educational qualifications in his nomination papers and affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the record established the petitioner's degrees from Punjab University and the University of Balochistan were either cancelled or fraudulent, and that his assertion of being a graduate constituted a willful mis-declaration. The petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that making a false statement or mis-declaration regarding educational qualifications in nomination papers justifies disqualification and the rejection of candidature, and the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction can properly review and set aside orders accepting such nomination papers when based on clear documentary evidence of fake credentials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can reject nomination papers in its constitutional jurisdiction when a candidate makes a false statement regarding educational qualifications?
  • Does a candidate who relies on cancelled or unverified educational testimonials make a mis-declaration in nomination papers?
  • Can leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution be granted against a well-reasoned judgment upholding the rejection of nomination papers for fake credentials?
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• Rana Allah Ditto vs The State and two others2020 SCP 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-25
  grave and sudden provocationfirst version of accusedadmissibility of police statementSection 162 CrPCQanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984criminal appealquantum of sentencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the petitioner for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of the 'first version' statement made by an accused to a police officer during investigation, and whether a plea of grave and sudden provocation could mitigate the sentence. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution proved the act of killing, the petitioner’s consistent plea of grave and sudden provocation—supported by the investigating officer's admission—created a reasonable possibility of truth. The Court ruled that an accused’s statement to the police is admissible when used in the accused's own favor, as it is not barred by Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 or Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 302(b), convicted the petitioner under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to ten years' imprisonment, establishing that reasonable doubt arising from a plausible defence plea entitles the accused to benefit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statement made by an accused to a police officer during investigation admissible if used by the accused in his own favor?
  • Does the bar in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prevent an accused from relying on their own statement made to the police?
  • Does a reasonable possibility that a defence plea is true entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) based on a plea of grave and sudden provocation?
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• Raja Muhammad Nadeem vs The State and another2020 PLD Supreme Court 282, 2020 SCP 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-07
  Omnibus bail ordersCOVID-19 pandemicJurisdiction of High CourtSuo motu jurisdictionSection 561-A Cr.P.C.Article 199 of the ConstitutionEn masse release of prisonersBail cancellationSection 401 Cr.P.C.Constitutional framework
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned the legality of omnibus orders issued by various High Courts for the en masse release of under-trial prisoners and convicts in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The core legal question was whether High Courts possessed the jurisdiction, particularly under Article 199 of the Constitution or Section 561-A Cr.P.C., to issue such blanket directions, circumventing established statutory bail and release procedures. The Supreme Court held that High Courts lacked the jurisdiction to issue wholesale directions for prisoner release. It clarified that suo motu jurisdiction is not conferred on High Courts under Article 199, and Section 561-A Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to interfere with procedural courses or as a substitute for statutory remedies. The Court emphasized that judicial actions must remain within the legal framework, even in extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, the impugned orders and bails granted thereunder were set aside, and actions taken by Provincial Governments under Section 401 Cr.P.C. were declared unlawful. The Court, however, approved specific categories of prisoners for release, aligning with existing legal provisions for individual consideration.

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• Raja Khurram Ali Khan vs Tayyaba Bibi (minor) daughter of Muhammad2020 PLD Supreme Court 146, 2020 P SC (C rl.) 144, 2020 SCP 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-10
  criminal appealsentence enhancementjurisdictionHigh CourtSupreme Courtcruelty to childchild abusecausing hurtscreening offenderchild witnessevidentiary valueburden of prooflegal burdenevidential burdenacquittal appealcomplete justiceArticle 187 of ConstitutionSection 411-A Cr.P.C.Qanun-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan adjudicated three criminal appeals challenging a High Court judgment that enhanced sentences and set aside acquittals related to the ill-treatment of a minor housemaid. The core legal questions revolved around the High Court's jurisdiction to enhance sentences passed by its Single Bench in original criminal jurisdiction, the sufficiency of evidence for conviction under Sections 328-A, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), and 201 PPC, and the principles governing appeals against acquittal and the evidential value of child victim testimony. The Court held that a Division Bench of the High Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 411-A Cr.P.C. or its revisional/inherent powers to enhance sentences passed by a Single Bench, as the latter is not an 'inferior court'. The State's proper remedy for sentence enhancement is a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court maintained the convictions of Mst. Maheen Zafar for offences under Sections 328-A, 337-A(i), and 337-F(i) PPC, and Raja Khurram Ali Khan for Sections 328-A and 201 PPC, finding the prosecution had discharged its 'legal' burden of proof and the trial court erred in discarding the child victim's testimony. The Court set aside the High Court's sentence enhancement due to jurisdictional infirmity but, invoking Article 187 of the Constitution for 'complete justice', issued notice to the accused for potential sentence enhancement.

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• Raja Arshad Mehmood vs Mst. Maliha Malik and others2020 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-08
  transfer of caserecusal of judgesbail cancellationconstitutional petitionsupreme court powersinterest of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an accused facing trial for homicide and murderous assault before an anti-terrorism court, sought the withdrawal and transfer of his pending constitutional petition and bail cancellation application from the Islamabad High Court to another High Court under Article 186-A of the Constitution. The transfer was requested on the ground that multiple judges of the Islamabad High Court, including the Chief Justice, had previously recused themselves from hearing allied matters connected to the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that while powers of transfer under Article 186-A are exercised most sparingly and cautiously only in extraordinary situations, the successive recusals of three out of four available judges left virtually no option to constitute a proper Division Bench without prejudicing the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that it was expedient and in the interest of justice to withdraw the subject petitions from the Islamabad High Court and transfer them to the Peshawar High Court for disposal in accordance with law, thereby allowing the constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court transfer a case from one High Court to another under Article 186-A of the Constitution in extraordinary situations?
  • Does the repeated recusal of multiple judges of a High Court justify the transfer of a case to another High Court to secure the ends of justice?
  • Are powers of case transfer under Article 186-A to be exercised sparingly and cautiously rather than in run-of-the-mill cases?
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• Rahat and Company thr. Syed Naveed Hussain Shah (formerly partner)2020 CLD 872, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 366, 2020 SCP 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-08
  Competence to file suitCompany lawBoard resolutionArticles of AssociationRule of indoor managementRatification of unauthorized actCivil Procedure CodeDelegation of authorityJuristic personPleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the competent institution of a suit by a company, specifically whether a board resolution was necessary for authorization. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the suit was competently filed. The Court approved the distinction between two rules: the "general rule" (derived from Australasia Bank) applies when the defendant is a third party, where the rule of indoor management is applicable. In such cases, only an examination of the company's Articles of Association to ascertain the directors' power to delegate is required, and a specific board resolution for filing the suit is not strictly necessary. The "special rule" (from Khan of Mamdot) applies when the defendant is an "insider" (e.g., a director), where due notice of the board meeting and a valid resolution are essential. The Court disapproved of the Sindh High Court's attempt in United Bank to reconcile these distinct principles. For future guidance, courts should generally refrain from framing issues on board resolutions in third-party cases, instead requiring production of Articles of Association. Tentatively, a defect in authorization can be cured by subsequent ratification.

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• Province of the Punjab through Secretary School Education, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others vs Mst. Nagras Parveen and others2020 SCMR 1519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-24
  ad hoc appointmentseniorityregularizationcivil serviceservice tribunalPunjab Civil Servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the claim of respondents, initially appointed as ad hoc Secondary School Teachers in 1995, to have their seniority reckoned from the date of their initial ad hoc appointment rather than the date of their subsequent regularization in 2012. The core legal question was whether service rendered on an ad hoc basis counts towards seniority upon regularization. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, ad hoc service does not confer any right to seniority. The Court emphasized that ad hoc appointments are temporary and do not count towards seniority in the grade. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court reaffirmed that seniority for regularized ad hoc employees must be reckoned only from the date of their regularization. Consequently, the Court set aside the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had granted the respondents seniority from their initial date of ad hoc appointment, clarifying that the statutory framework and consistent judicial precedent preclude such claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does service rendered on an ad hoc basis count towards seniority upon regularization?
  • From what date is seniority reckoned for an employee whose services were regularized after an initial ad hoc appointment?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment confer any right to seniority in the grade under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
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• Province of Punjab through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore, etc vs Muhammad Arif, etc2020 P SC 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject-based employmentvested rightsservice lawPunjab Regularization of Service Act 2018
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Appeals filed by the Province of Punjab against a Lahore High Court judgment that directed the regularization of contract employees hired for the 'Punjab Irrigated Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project' (PIPIP). The core legal question was whether project-based contract employees, whose appointments were time-bound and tied to specific development projects, were entitled to regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting regularization. The Court ruled that the respondents, being project employees, were expressly excluded from the scope of the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018, by Section 2(c). The Court emphasized that there is a qualitative and conceptual distinction between general contract employees and project-based employees. It further held that project management retains the prerogative to determine the necessity of retaining staff for project extensions, and no vested right to regularization exists for project-based appointees whose contracts are explicitly time-bound and subject to automatic termination upon project completion. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees appointed to time-bound development projects entitled to regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018?
  • Does a contract employee in a government project have a vested right to demand contract extension or regularization?
  • Does the definition of 'contract employee' under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018, include persons appointed to project-based posts?
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• Province Of Punjab through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore and others vs Muhammad Arif and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-14
  project employeesregularization of servicecontractual employmentPunjab Regularization of Service Act 2018vested rightstime-bound projectpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were filed by the Province of Punjab against a High Court judgment that upheld the regularization of contractual employees appointed under a World Bank-assisted project (PIPIP). The primary legal issue was whether contractual employees appointed specifically for time-bound development projects are entitled to regularization of service under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act 2018. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's orders. The Court held that there is a conceptual and qualitative distinction between contract employees in regular government departments against sanctioned posts and those appointed for time-bound projects. Under Section 2(c) of the Punjab Regularization of Service Act 2018, project employees are explicitly excluded from the scope and benefit of regularization. Furthermore, contractual terms stipulating automatic termination upon project completion or expiration of tenure are binding, creating no vested right for employees to demand extension or regularization. The Court also held that issued directions to regularize individuals whose contractual employment had already ended was unlawful, as their termination constituted a past and closed transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Are contractual employees appointed under time-bound development projects entitled to regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act 2018?
  • Does a contractual project employee have a vested right to seek extension of contract or regularization of service upon the expiry of the project term?
  • Can directions for regularization of service be lawfully issued for employees whose contracts have already terminated prior to filing a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Province Of Punjab through Executive District Officer (Education)2021 PLJ SC 145, 2020 P SC 526, 2020 SCMR 490, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-23
  gender discriminationrecruitment policyequal opportunityjudicial reviewadministrative policyconstitutional rightsfemale employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the Province of Punjab against a High Court judgment that directed the appointment of a female candidate as an Educator in a Government Boys High School. The candidate had been denied the position based on a departmental policy prohibiting the appointment of female candidates to Boys High/Higher Secondary Schools. The core legal question was whether a recruitment policy restricting female employment in specific educational institutions based solely on gender, despite the candidate's qualifications, constitutes valid classification or unlawful discrimination. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the policy was discriminatory and lacked a rational basis. The Court emphasized that gender-based restrictions, unsupported by objective criteria, violate constitutional guarantees of equality. The ratio establishes that administrative policies cannot override constitutional commands, particularly those ensuring equal opportunity and the full participation of women in national life. The Court affirmed that policies inherently flawed, retrogressive, and discriminatory are subject to judicial review and cannot be shielded under the guise of administrative discretion or policy-making authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative recruitment policy restrict the appointment of female candidates to boys' schools solely on the basis of gender?
  • Is an administrative policy that is inherently discriminatory and inconsistent with constitutional commands subject to judicial review?
  • Does the denial of employment to a qualified female candidate based on gender violate the constitutional right to equality of opportunity?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Executive District Officer (Education)2020 P SC 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  gender discriminationrecruitment policyconstitutional equalityjudicial reviewpublic service appointmentequal opportunitywomen's participation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the Province of Punjab against a High Court judgment directing the appointment of a female candidate as an Educator in a Boys High School. The candidate had been denied the position based on a departmental policy prohibiting female appointments in Boys High/Higher Secondary Schools. The core legal question was whether a recruitment policy restricting female employment based solely on gender, while excluding them from specific educational institutions, violates constitutional protections against discrimination. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the policy lacked rational basis and constituted gender-based discrimination. The Court reasoned that the policy was retrogressive and failed to meet the test of intelligible differentia. The key principle laid down is that administrative policies cannot override constitutional commands; specifically, policies that discriminate against women in public service appointments solely on the basis of sex are unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that the State is mandated to ensure full participation of women in national life and that any policy inconsistent with these constitutional guarantees is subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative recruitment policy that discriminates against female candidates solely on the basis of sex be sustained?
  • Does the constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity in public service prohibit policies that restrict female employment in specific educational institutions?
  • Is a policy that is inconsistent with constitutional commands regarding gender equality immune from judicial review?
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• Province of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and other vs Farasatullah and others2020 SCMR 1629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-15
  M.Phil allowanceequivalence certificateHigher Education Commissionservice matterterms and conditions of serviceinterpretation of notificationintelligible differentia
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the judgments of the Peshawar High Court directing the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to grant an M.Phil allowance to employees holding degrees equivalent to M.Phil, such as LLM and MS in Agriculture, based on equivalence certificates and letters issued by the Higher Education Commission. The core legal question was whether holders of degrees deemed equivalent to M.Phil by the Higher Education Commission are automatically entitled to an allowance specifically restricted by government notification to actual M.Phil degree holders, and whether the Higher Education Commission possesses the mandate to dictate financial benefits based on academic equivalence. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of the notification unambiguously limited the allowance to holders of M.Phil degrees and that the Higher Education Commission's mandate is strictly limited to determining academic equivalence without any authority to recommend or direct financial allowances. The Court further held that differentiating between actual M.Phil degree holders and holders of equivalent degrees does not constitute unconstitutional discrimination. The appeals were consequently allowed and the High Court judgments were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether holders of degrees declared equivalent to M.Phil by the Higher Education Commission are automatically entitled to an M.Phil allowance granted specifically by notification to M.Phil degree holders?
  • Does the Higher Education Commission have the legal mandate to direct or advise the government on the payment of allowances based on academic equivalence?
  • Whether the refusal of a provincial government to grant financial allowances given by other provinces constitutes actionable discrimination under the law?
  • Can a High Court read additional words into an unambiguous administrative notification while exercising writ jurisdiction?
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• Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others vs Farasatullah and others2021 PLJ SC 92, 2021 P SC 141, 2020 SCMR 1629, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-15
  M.Phil allowanceservice matterHigher Education Commissionintelligible differentiastatutory interpretationwrit jurisdictionequivalence certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that directed the provincial government to extend an M.Phil allowance to employees holding degrees deemed equivalent to M.Phil, such as LLM. The core questions were whether the government notification granting the allowance to M.Phil holders could be expanded to include equivalent degrees, and whether the Higher Education Commission possesses the authority to mandate such financial benefits or interpret government notifications. The Supreme Court held that the notification was clear, unambiguous, and restricted to M.Phil degree holders. The Court ruled that the Higher Education Commission lacks the statutory mandate to dictate financial policy or interpret government notifications, as its authority is limited to academic equivalence. The Court established that courts cannot read additional words into clear government notifications, and that administrative decisions regarding financial incentives for specific qualifications are matters of policy that do not constitute discrimination, provided there is an intelligible differentia between the classes of employees. Furthermore, one province's policy decisions cannot be cited as grounds for discrimination against another province.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Higher Education Commission have the authority to mandate the payment of financial allowances to government employees?
  • Can a court read additional categories into a government notification that is clear and unambiguous on its face?
  • Does the grant of a specific allowance to M.Phil degree holders, while excluding holders of equivalent degrees, constitute discrimination?
  • Is a decision by one province regarding service terms and conditions binding on another province under the principle of non-discrimination?
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• President, All Pakistan Women Association, Peshawar Cantt vs Muhammad Akbar Awan and others2020 PLJ SC 209, 2020 P SC 975, 2020 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-21
  Leave to appealConstitutional petitionInterlocutory orderStatutory barEjectment petitionImpleadmentRent controlCantonments Rent Restriction ActJurisdictionPiecemeal litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court considered petitions for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment, which had dismissed constitutional petitions challenging an interlocutory order of the Additional Rent Controller. The Additional Rent Controller's order allowed the impleadment of a party in ejectment proceedings. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition could be invoked to challenge an interlocutory order when a specific statutory bar against appeal existed, particularly under Section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, refusing leave to appeal. It held that an interlocutory order, which does not finally decide the lis, cannot be challenged by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court when the statute expressly bars an appeal against such orders. The Court emphasized that allowing such challenges would negate the legislative intent of curtailing delays and piecemeal litigation, rendering the statutory bar redundant. Constitutional jurisdiction, being equitable and discretionary, should not be exercised to defeat or bypass valid statutory provisions.

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• Povince Of Punjab through Executive District Officer (Education)2020 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-23
  gender discriminationpublic employmentrecruitment policyconstitutional rightsequality of opportunityjudicial revieweducators appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the denial of an appointment to a qualified female candidate as an Educator in a Government Boys High/Higher Secondary School based on a recruitment policy that barred female candidates from holding such posts in boys' high schools. The respondent successfully challenged the departmental decision before the High Court, which directed her appointment, and an Intra Court Appeal by the Province was subsequently dismissed. The core legal question was whether a recruitment policy restricting female educators from serving in boys' high/higher secondary schools is constitutionally valid and immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that gender-based restrictions in public employment unsupported by objective, rational foundations violate constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. The Court laid down the principle that administrative policies manifestly inconsistent with constitutional commands, particularly those discriminating against women in public employment, are subject to judicial review and cannot override fundamental constitutional rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a recruitment policy restricting female candidates from appointment in boys' high and higher secondary schools is discriminatory?
  • Can an administrative policy that violates constitutional commands regarding gender equality be subjected to judicial review?
  • Does a restriction based solely on gender in public employment qualify as a reasonable classification?
  Read full judgment →
• Phoenix Security (Pvt.) Limited vs Pir Muhammad and others2020 PLJ SC 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-31
  labour lawsecurity guardsovertime wagesweekly holidaysstatutory interpretationindustrial relationscontract of employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal challenging a High Court order regarding the payment of wages for weekly holidays and overtime to security guards. The core legal questions were whether security guards fall under the exclusion of 'watchmen' in the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969, and whether employees governed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, are entitled to double wages for overtime and weekly holidays in the absence of specific contractual or statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the term 'watchman' is synonymous with 'security guard,' thereby excluding the respondents from the application of the 1969 Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court ruled that in the absence of evidence establishing a contract, custom, or usage for double wages, and given that the 1968 Ordinance does not mandate such rates, the respondents' claims were unsustainable. The key principle laid down is that definitions in one labour statute cannot be imported into another unless expressly provided, and claims for specific wage rates must be substantiated by contract, custom, or statutory entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Are security guards considered 'watchmen' for the purpose of exclusion under the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can the definition of 'wages' from the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 be imported to interpret provisions of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is an employer required to pay double the rate of wages for overtime and weekly holidays in the absence of a specific contract, custom, or statutory provision?
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• Pakistan Railways through Chairman, Islamabad and another vs Sajid2020 SCMR 1664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  regularization of servicetemporary labour appointmentproject postsservice lawcontractual employeesdaily wage workersPakistan Railways
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns service appeals filed by Pakistan Railways challenging a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that directed the regularization of Temporary Labour Appointment (TLA) workers. The core legal question was whether these TLA workers, employed as gatekeepers at level crossings, were 'project employees' excluded from regularization policies, or permanent employees entitled to the benefits of the Regularization Policy, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the work—maintaining level crossings—is permanent, as these crossings exist as long as trains operate. The Court rejected the Railways' contention that the funding arrangement with other government departments constituted a 'project' of limited duration, noting that the employment was continuous, spanning over a decade, and that the workers were trained and uniformed by the Appellants. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the workers were entitled to regularization under the 2012 policy, as their roles were not temporary project-based positions, and the exclusion criteria for project employees did not apply to their permanent, ongoing functions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees hired for level crossing maintenance under funding agreements with other departments qualify as 'project employees' excluded from regularization?
  • Does the lack of formal appointment letters preclude TLA workers from claiming regularization when their continuous employment is admitted by the employer?
  • Are TLA workers who have served for over a decade in permanent roles entitled to the benefits of the Regularization Policy, 2012?
  • What constitutes a 'project' for the purpose of excluding employees from regularization policies in the context of government service?
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• Pakistan Railways through Chairman Islamabad and another vs Sajid2021 PLJ SC 117, 2021 P SC 1028, 2020 SCMR 1664, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  regularization of servicetemporary labour appointmentproject postsservice lawPakistan Railwayscontractual employeesdaily wage workers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by Pakistan Railways against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment directing the regularization of Temporary Labour Appointment (TLA) workers, specifically gatekeepers employed at level crossings. The core legal question was whether these employees, whose salaries were funded by other government departments under specific agreements, were employed against 'project posts' and thus excluded from the benefits of the Regularization Policy, 2012. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the nature of the work—operating level crossings—is permanent, not project-based, as the necessity for such services persists as long as trains operate. The Court rejected the argument that the funding arrangement constituted a temporary project, noting the continuous, long-term employment of the respondents. The key principle laid down is that the classification of a post as a 'project post' requires the undertaking to be for a limited duration with a defined objective; where the function is inherently permanent and continuous, such as the maintenance of level crossings, employees cannot be denied regularization on the pretext of being temporary project staff.

  Questions settled

  • Does the funding of employee salaries by third-party government departments for level crossing maintenance classify the posts as 'project posts'?
  • What constitutes a 'project' in the context of determining eligibility for regularization of service?
  • Are Temporary Labour Appointment (TLA) workers who have served continuously for over a decade entitled to regularization under the Regularization Policy, 2012?
  Read full judgment →
• Owais Shams Durrani and others vs Vice Chancellor, Bacha Khan2020 PLC (C.S.) 1002, 2020 PLJ SC 367, 2020 P SC 1345, 2020 SCMR 1041, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-29
  contract employmentregularization of servicetermination of servicevested rightconstitutional jurisdictiontemporary postsuniversity employeesdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Peshawar High Court regarding the termination of contract employees at Bacha Khan University. The petitioners, appointed as Upper Division Clerks on a contract basis, sought regularization of their services and challenged their termination after several extensions. The core legal question was whether contract employees appointed under the Vice Chancellor's emergency powers have a vested right to regularization. The Supreme Court held that the initial appointments were made under Section 11(5)d of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, which restricts the power to create temporary posts and make appointments to a maximum of three years without further extension. The Court observed that the petitioners were appointed without a transparent competitive process or advertisement. It was further held that contract employment does not confer a vested right to regularization, especially when the statutory power authorizing the appointment has exhausted itself by operation of law. The Court also rejected the plea of discrimination based on other universities' practices, noting each university is governed by its own statutes.

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• Obidullah and another vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another2020 SCMR 1970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-29
  bail cancellationfurther inquirycriminal petitiontentative assessmentsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents by the trial court and upheld by the High Court in a criminal case involving allegations of abetment and conspiracy, specifically carrying the main accused to the crime scene and having alleged relationships or contact with the accused. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in granting and maintaining bail to the accused respondents pending trial based on tentative assessments of the record and statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that no case for interference with the concession of bail was made out, as the tentative conclusions regarding the evidence and statements called for further inquiry under the law. The key principle laid down is that where the involvement of an accused requires further inquiry based on tentative assessment at the bail stage, appellate interference with the grant of bail is unwarranted, leaving the prosecution to establish guilt during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted by the High Court warrants interference by the Supreme Court when the case falls within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Can mere contact or alleged relationships with accused persons serve as sufficient grounds for the cancellation of bail?
  • Is a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient to deny bail when it does not implicate the accused directly in the crime?
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• Nouman Khan alias Roman vs The State and others2020 SCMR 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirysection 164 statementmurdercriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, challenges the order of the Peshawar High Court whereby post-arrest bail was refused to the petitioner in a case arising from FIR No. 524 registered under sections 302, 200, 201, 202, and 203 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was connected to the alleged offence through sufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant the denial of bail, particularly given that he was not named in the initial FIR and was subsequently implicated through a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without details of the source. The Supreme Court held that the statement lacked specific details of the source of information and, in the absence of any other legally admissible piece of evidence connecting the petitioner to the crime, the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant subject to furnishing surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lacking details of the source of information constitute sufficient legally admissible evidence to deny post-arrest bail?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can a petitioner not named in the initial FIR be refused bail solely on the basis of a subsequent general implication without corroborative evidence?
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• Noor Muhammad vs Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar Bench2020 P SC 729, PTCL 2020 CL. 176, 2020 PTD 523, 2020 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-29
  customs referencelimitationcondonation of delayconfiscation of vehicletampered chassisleave to appealsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's Customs Reference as time-barred. The underlying dispute arose from the confiscation of a vehicle and contraband medicines by Customs authorities, which were found to be non-duty paid with a tampered chassis. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the confiscation before the Deputy Collector, the Collector of Customs (Appeals), and the Customs Appellate Tribunal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that conflicting forensic reports existed regarding the vehicle's chassis and sought condonation of an eleven-month delay in filing the Customs Reference, citing the illness of his Special Attorney. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to rebut the forensic findings before the lower fora and that the argument regarding contradictory reports was an afterthought. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the explanation for the eleven-month delay was neither convincing nor plausible, failing to constitute sufficient grounds for condonation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that unexplained, significant delays in legal proceedings cannot be condoned without valid justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an eleven-month delay in filing a Customs Reference can be condoned based solely on the illness of a Special Attorney?
  • Can a party raise a new factual argument regarding contradictory forensic reports for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not raised before lower fora?
  • Does the failure to rebut forensic evidence regarding a tampered chassis before lower adjudicatory bodies preclude a party from challenging such findings in a Customs Reference?
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• Noor Islam vs Ghani Ur Rehman and another2020 SCMR 310, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-05
  identification paradecriminal appealrobberyimpersonationbenefit of doubtacquittalre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentences under sections 392, 419, 420, and 170 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had been upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question revolved around the reliability and sufficiency of an identification parade and circumstantial evidence to sustain a criminal conviction for robbery and impersonation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the identification parade suffered from severe legal infirmities, delayed execution, and lack of foundational safeguards, rendering it a weak piece of evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to recover any stolen currency or incriminating items, failed to trace vehicles or co-accused, and left crucial gaps in the investigative chain unexplained. The key principle laid down is that an identification parade conducted with substantial procedural flaws and unsupported by corroborative evidence is insufficient to safely base a criminal conviction, and doing so constitutes a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade conducted long after the incident without proper procedural safeguards can form the sole basis for a criminal conviction?
  • Does the absence of recovery of stolen property and incriminating evidence weaken the prosecution's case significantly?
  • Is a conviction sustainable under the law when the foundational evidence suffers from multiple unexplained infirmities and creates a miscarriage of justice?
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• Noor Bakhsh vs The State2020 SCMR 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-01
  post-arrest bailfugitive from lawreasonable groundsmurderdiscretionary reliefcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Noor Bukhsh, sought post-arrest bail in a case arising from an incident on 29.9.2013 where he allegedly shot Abdul Qayyum, resulting in spinal injuries and subsequent death nearly six years later, leading to the substitution of Section 324 with Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail despite being a fugitive from law for over five years and in the presence of reasonable grounds connecting him to the offense under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having stayed away from law as a fugitive for a prolonged period, disentitled himself to discretionary bail concessions, and reasonable grounds existed connecting him to the crime. The court laid down the principle that a fugitive from law for a long period disentitles themselves from the discretionary concession of bail, and that a crime report supported by witness statements and medical evidence constitutes reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 precluding further probe for bail purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner who remains a fugitive from law for a prolonged period disentitle himself to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the substitution of Section 324 with Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 upon the injured person's death warrants the grant of bail in the presence of reasonable grounds?
  • Does a crime report supported by witness statements and medical evidence constitute reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to deny bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Hussain vs The State through Advocate-General of Azad Jammu &2020 P SC (Crl.) 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtacquittal of co-accusedsodomyOffence of Zinaidentical evidencenon-appealing co-convict
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the maintenance of the appellant's conviction for offences under the Azad Penal Code and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985. The core legal question was whether a non-appealing co-convict is entitled to the benefit of an acquittal granted to a co-accused by the Supreme Court when the prosecution evidence against both is identical and the case against the co-accused was found to be unproven. The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the same relief as the co-convict, noting that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the co-accused, and the appellant's circumstances—including his inability to pursue the appeal earlier due to military service—did not preclude him from seeking justice. The key principle laid down is that where the role of co-accused is identical and the evidence is the same, the benefit of an acquittal granted to one convict on the basis of insufficient evidence must be extended to the other, even if the latter did not initially appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a non-appealing co-convict be granted the benefit of an acquittal awarded to a co-accused on the same set of evidence?
  • Does the failure to file an appeal due to circumstances beyond one's control preclude a convict from seeking the benefit of a co-accused's acquittal?
  • Is a convict entitled to acquittal when the prosecution evidence against him is identical to that of a co-accused who has already been acquitted by the appellate court?
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• Niamatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2020 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-09
  Article 184(3) jurisdictionencroachment removalamenity landurban planninglocal government autonomypublic interest litigationKarachi civic infrastructure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the systemic collapse of civic infrastructure and widespread illegal encroachment on public and amenity lands in Karachi. The core questions involve the authority of the Supreme Court to intervene in urban planning and encroachment issues under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the legality of administrative actions by provincial authorities, and the validity of stay orders granted by the High Court regarding public land. The Court ordered the immediate removal of encroachments from railway lands, parks, playgrounds, and footpaths, mandating the restoration of these areas for public use. It stayed construction on disputed commercial projects and directed the Sindh Government to restore the functional autonomy of local government bodies as per the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013. The Court held that it is not bound by High Court stay orders when addressing illegalities on public land under its Article 184(3) jurisdiction, emphasizing that amenity lands cannot be commercially exploited and that public rights to civic infrastructure supersede private interests.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the power under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to override High Court stay orders concerning illegal encroachments on public land?
  • Can private individual disputes be entertained by the Supreme Court under its Article 184(3) jurisdiction?
  • Are provincial governments permitted to usurp the statutory powers and functions of local government bodies established under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013?
  Read full judgment →
• Nehal vs The State and another2020 SCMR 2053, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 1032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-02
  post-arrest bailrapefalsely implicatedmedical certificateleave declinedcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a bail matter where the petitioner sought pre-trial or post-arrest relief after being accused of violating the prosecutrix at gunpoint inside her home and threatening to upload her pictures on the internet. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, given the incriminating medical evidence, prompt reporting, and corroborative circumstances connecting him to the crime. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's injuries corresponded with the time of the occurrence, and the investigative conclusions coupled with the prosecutrix's statement constituted reasonable grounds under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, precluding his release on bail as no further probe was required. The Court laid down the principle that consistent medical evidence, prompt reporting, and lack of mala fide on the part of the complainant outweigh assertions for bail in heinous offenses like rape.

  Questions settled

  • Whether reasonable grounds exist under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to refuse bail to an accused charged with rape?
  • Does a medical certificate indicating injuries sustained at the time of the occurrence constitute corroborative evidence against an accused seeking bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by lower courts in refusing post-arrest bail when no further probe is required?
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• Nazir Ahmed Shaikh and others vs National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and others2020 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-17
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureau referencemunicipal land leasecorruption allegations
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from criminal petitions seeking pre-arrest and post-arrest bails by accused individuals, including a former municipal official, an accounts officer, and a private beneficiary, who were arrayed in a National Accountability Bureau reference. The core accusation involved attempts to allegedly dole out in perpetuity a valuable piece of municipal land at a ridiculously low rate through a municipal resolution, following a previous remand by the High Court for fresh consideration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the transaction was not a one-man show, the land continued to vest in the local council, and the remainder signatories of the resolution had not been proceeded against, detaining the petitioners or keeping them behind bars would be harsh and inexpedient while trial was ongoing. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals and granted pre-arrest and post-arrest bails to the petitioners, while directing the relevant provincial secretary to vigilantly secure the proprietary rights and interests of the local council regarding the land in question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted to accused public functionaries and private beneficiaries allegedly involved in attempting to lease municipal property at low rates?
  • Does the fact that municipal land continues to vest in the local council influence the grant of bail in accountability cases?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail once granted should be confirmed when the prosecution has the opportunity to prove allegations during the trial?
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• Nazeem Ullah and others vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 202, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 498, 2020 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlprohibitory clauseconscious possessioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, challenges the order of the Peshawar High Court whereby the petitioners were refused post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail when the recovered narcotic substance was found in a common area and the issue of conscious possession required determination at trial. The Supreme Court held that since the alleged offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the question of conscious knowledge and possession of the narcotics is to be settled during trial, the petitioners have made out a case for bail. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and admitted the appellants to post-arrest bail, laying down that offences outside the prohibitory clause where conscious possession is debatable warrant the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a case involving the recovery of narcotics from a common area where conscious possession is questionable be considered for post-arrest bail?
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• National Saving Central Directorate, Islamabad through its DG & another vs Muhammad Farooq Raja2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 135, 2020 SCP 240, PLD 2021 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-02
  dual nationalityBahbood Saving Certificatelocus poenitentiaepromissory estoppellegitimate expectationpublic functionaryadministrative lawvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the eligibility of a dual national to participate in the 'Bahbood Saving Certificate Scheme.' The respondent, a Pakistani national holding dual citizenship with Denmark, invested in the scheme, which was subsequently challenged by the National Saving Centre on the grounds of ineligibility due to dual nationality. The core legal question was whether the authority could retrospectively disqualify the respondent and recover profits after the investment had been accepted and benefits disbursed. The Supreme Court held that the authority had a duty to scrutinize eligibility prior to accepting the investment. Once a right has accrued to a citizen, the authority cannot unilaterally withdraw it, particularly when the citizen acted in good faith. Invoking the principles of locus poenitentiae, promissory estoppel, and legitimate expectation, the Court affirmed that the authority was precluded from acting detrimentally against the respondent due to its own prior failure to verify eligibility. The petition was dismissed, upholding the respondent's entitlement to the scheme's benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority retrospectively disqualify a citizen from a financial scheme after accepting their investment and disbursing benefits?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent an authority from withdrawing a benefit once a right has accrued to a citizen?
  • Is a dual national eligible to participate in the Bahbood Saving Certificate Scheme?
  • Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply to prevent government functionaries from acting detrimentally against citizens who acted in good faith based on the authority's representations?
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• National Accountability Bureau through Chairman vs Shabbir Ahmed Malik2020 PLJ SC 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Voluntary ReturnNational Accountability OrdinancePlea Bargainarrears of land revenuecriminal proceedingsaccountability referencevitiation of settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that quashed National Accountability Bureau (NAB) references against respondents who defaulted on payments under a Voluntary Return (VR) settlement. The core legal question was whether such default allows NAB to recover the outstanding amount as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, or whether the default vitiates the settlement, allowing NAB to resume criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that a VR settlement under Section 25(a) is a one-time facility strictly contingent upon the full deposit of the determined amount. Unlike a Plea Bargain, which creates a debt recoverable under Section 33E, a VR settlement is not a long-term repayment arrangement; failure to pay the full amount renders the settlement void, thereby allowing NAB to proceed with investigations. The Court established that Section 33E is inapplicable to VR defaults. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the references were restored, with the Court noting that partial payments may be adjusted against future liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does default in payment under a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, allow the National Accountability Bureau to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue?
  • Does a Voluntary Return settlement under Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, constitute a binding agreement if the full determined amount is not deposited?
  • Is there a legal distinction between a Voluntary Return under Section 25(a) and a Plea Bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, regarding the recovery of outstanding amounts?
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• National Accountability Bureau through Chairman vs Muhammad2020 PLC (C.S.) 448, 2020 PLJ SC 243, 2020 P SC 219, 2020 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  Compulsory retirementUnauthorized absenceExtraordinary leaveDisciplinary proceedingsMisconductService lawGovernment employeeNAB
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns disciplinary proceedings initiated by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against an Upper Division Clerk for continuous unauthorized absence from duty, resulting in compulsory retirement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the major penalty of compulsory retirement could be sustained when the same office order also directed the treatment of the unauthorized absence as extraordinary leave (EOL) without pay. The Islamabad High Court had set aside the compulsory retirement, but the Supreme Court allowed NAB's appeal. The Supreme Court held that the treatment of unauthorized absence as EOL without pay, often for the purpose of settling an employee's dues, does not nullify or render redundant a major penalty of compulsory retirement imposed after due application of mind to the employee's misconduct. The Court clarified that Rule 9(3) of the Revised Leave Rules, 1980, which allows for retrospective grant of EOL, is intended for genuine cases where a major penalty might be too harsh, not to automatically condone misconduct where a penalty has been validly imposed.

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• National Accountability Bureau thr. its Chairman, Islamabad vs Shabbir2020 SCP 6, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 193, 2020 P SC 240, 2020 PSC (Crl.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-08
  Voluntary ReturnNational Accountability OrdinancePlea BargainArrears of Land RevenueCriminal ProsecutionAccountability CourtNAB References
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenge a High Court judgment that quashed National Accountability Bureau (NAB) references against public office holders. The core legal question was whether default in payment under a Voluntary Return (VR) settlement, pursuant to Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, vitiates the settlement, thereby permitting NAB to resume criminal proceedings, or whether NAB is restricted to recovering the unpaid amount as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that a VR settlement is a one-time facility strictly contingent upon the full deposit of the determined amount. Consequently, any default or partial payment vitiates the settlement, rendering it void and allowing NAB to proceed with investigation and prosecution. The Court clarified that Section 33E is inapplicable to VR defaults, as it pertains to Plea Bargain arrangements or court-determined sums, not voluntary settlements. The key principle laid down is that VR is a voluntary, one-time facility requiring full deposit; failure to pay terminates the settlement, reviving the NAB's authority to prosecute the accused for the underlying offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does default in payment under a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 vitiate the settlement?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau recover unpaid amounts from a defaulted Voluntary Return settlement as arrears of land revenue under Section 33E of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Is a Voluntary Return settlement under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 a one-time facility requiring full deposit of the determined amount?
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• Nasrullah Khan and another vs Mst. Khairunnisa and others2020 SCMR 2101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  limitationrejection of plaintfraudulent transfergift deednon-joinder of necessary partybarred by timecause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent decisions of the lower courts rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as being barred by time. The appellants, claiming to be donees of the disputed property through a registered gift deed executed in 1980, filed a suit in 2008 seeking a declaration that a subsequent sale deed dated 1985 and related transfers were fraudulent, void ab initio, and of no legal effect. The core legal questions involved the computation of the period of limitation, knowledge of the transactions, and the legal effect of non-joinder of a necessary party. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was hopelessly barred by time as the cause of action accrued to appellant No. 2 in 1985 upon execution of the sale deed, and to appellant No. 1 in 1991 upon attaining majority. The Court laid down that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and State interest to ensure diligence and prevent stale claims, and that the omission to implead the attorney who executed the disputed sale deeds—who was a necessary party—was fatal to the plaintiff's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit filed in 2008 challenging a sale deed executed in 1985 is barred by limitation when the plaintiff attained majority in 1991?
  • Does the non-joinder of the person who executed the disputed sale deed as an attorney render the suit fatal?
  • Whether the law of limitation is a mere technicality or is founded upon public policy and State interest?
  • Can a party claim ignorance of a registered gift deed and a subsequent sale transaction for nearly two decades to bypass the law of limitation?
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• Naseer Khan vs Said Qadeem and others2020 SCMR 293, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  proclaimed offendersection 512 Cr.P.C.fair trialright to cross-examineremand of casemurder trialun-cross-examined statementcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted the respondent's appeal against his conviction and sentence for murder, setting them aside and remanding the case for a fresh trial with an opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses whose statements were previously recorded under section 512, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, son of the deceased, challenged this remand. The Supreme Court observed that the initial proceedings declaring the respondent a proclaimed offender were flawed and bogus, rendering the subsequent section 512 Cr.P.C. proceedings legally infirm. Furthermore, under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, fair trial is a fundamental right, and an un-cross-examined statement generally does not qualify as substantive evidence for conviction when the accused becomes available during trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to remand the matter to ensure a fair trial and afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses was just and proper, emphasizing that procuring witness attendance in a State case is the responsibility of the State. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an un-cross-examined statement of a witness recorded under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be relied upon as valid evidence for recording a conviction when the accused subsequently appears before the court?
  • Does the introduction of Article 10A in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 make a fair trial a fundamental right requiring the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses?
  • Whose responsibility is it to procure the attendance of prosecution witnesses in a criminal State case where witnesses are residing abroad?
  • Can proceedings undertaken to declare an accused a proclaimed offender be treated as bogus if they fall short of legal requirements, thereby affecting subsequent proceedings under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Najeeb Ullah vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 124, 2020 SCMR 1241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal petitionpolice investigationbail granted
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing him post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 289 dated 30.08.2019 under sections 324, 334, 34, 337-A(ii), and 337-F(v) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered at Police Station Jandanwala, District Bhakkar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's case warranted the grant of post-arrest bail under the principle of further inquiry. The Supreme Court observed that according to successive police investigations, the petitioner was found to be empty-handed and did not cause any injury, and nothing was recovered from him during the investigation. Holding that the petitioner had been behind bars since 14.11.2019 and his case fell within the ambit of section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as calling for further inquiry, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the appellant subject to furnishing appropriate bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case where police investigations conclude that the accused was empty-handed and caused no injury fall within the scope of further inquiry for bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when nothing is recovered from him and he has been behind bars for a significant period?
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• Najaf Iqbal vs Shahzad Rafique2020 CLD 1427, 2020 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-06
  summary suitnegotiable instrumentspresumption of considerationdishonored chequerecovery suitrebuttal of presumptionhandwriting expert
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution arose from a summary suit for recovery of Rs. 700,000/- filed under Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. based on a dishonored cheque. The appellant-defendant, a former employee of the respondent, contended that the cheque was part of a lost wallet/chequebook and that the respondent failed to prove the underlying transaction involving mobile SIMs and cards. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed this on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a statutory presumption of consideration attaches to negotiable instruments. The Court held that since the appellant admitted the cheque belonged to his account and failed to produce a handwriting expert to dispute his signatures after the bank manager testified to 'insufficient funds' and 'payment stopped' as reasons for dishonor, the presumption remained unrebutted. The Court further clarified that once the instrument's execution is established, the plaintiff is not required to prove the underlying transaction details in the same manner as a regular civil suit.

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• Naimatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation Of Pakistan2020 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-07
  encroachmentamenity plotpublic parkvoid ab initiopublic auctiontrust propertyultra viresdemolition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose under the Supreme Court of Pakistan's original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, concerning the removal of encroachments, preservation of public amenities, and the legality of land allotments in Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether the Government of Sindh could regularize or lease public land for commercial/residential purposes without a public auction, and whether the Board of Trustees of the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) possessed the statutory authority to allot, lease, or sell port land to its employees for housing societies. The Supreme Court held that under Section 10-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912, any disposal of public land for commercial purposes without an open auction is void ab initio. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the KPT Act 1886 does not authorize the Board of Trustees to alienate trust land for private housing, declaring all such leases to its employees ultra vires and void. The Court ordered the demolition of illegal structures, restoration of public parks, and the cancellation of unlawful allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Is the disposal of public land for commercial purposes by the government valid without holding an open auction under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
  • Does the Board of Trustees of the Karachi Port Trust have the statutory authority under the Karachi Port Trust Act 1886 to allot or lease port land to its employees for residential housing societies?
  • Can the Supreme Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, cancel lease and allotment transactions of public functionaries that are found to be ultra vires and void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Naimatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2020 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-13
  amenity plotsload-sheddingelectricity supplycollective punishmenturban planningland usecivil miscellaneous applications
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of Civil Miscellaneous Applications (CMAs) and Human Rights Cases heard by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding various civic, utility, and land-use disputes in Karachi. The court addressed issues ranging from the management of electricity supply by K-Electric—specifically regarding load-shedding practices, overcharging, and collective punishment through area-wide power disconnection—to the unauthorized use of amenity plots for private commercial purposes, such as marriage halls. The court held that the practice of disconnecting electricity for an entire area due to individual consumer default is unjustifiable and requires Federal Government intervention. Regarding land use, the court reaffirmed that amenity plots must be reserved strictly for public purposes and cannot be utilized for private commercial ventures. Furthermore, the court dismissed several applications for non-prosecution, withdrawal, or because they had become infructuous due to prior court orders or demolition actions. The court emphasized the necessity of proper land usage and directed relevant authorities, including the Commissioner Karachi, to submit reports on pending grievances to ensure compliance with urban planning and utility regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an electricity provider disconnect power to an entire area due to the default of individual consumers?
  • Is the use of an amenity plot for a private marriage hall a valid legal use?
  • Should a petitioner approach the High Court for the execution of a judgment previously passed by that same High Court?
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• Naimatulla Khan Advocate and others vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2020 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-21
  Karachi Circular Railwaysright to lifepublic transportationencroachment on railway landPakistan Railwaysconstitutional obligationsArticle 184(3)housing societies on public land
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan exercised its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution regarding the stalled revival and operation of the Karachi Circular Railways (KCR) and widespread illegal encroachments on Pakistan Railways land. Addressing severe public transportation deficits in Karachi, the Court examined key constitutional fundamental rights and statutory limitations under railway legislation. The Court held that the right to safe, humane, and dignified public transportation is an integral component of the fundamental right to life under Article 9, interconnected with Articles 14, 15, 18, 25, 37, and 38. It held that the State and its organs cannot abdicate this mandatory constitutional obligation by indefinitely delaying projects through bureaucratic paperwork or external dependency. Furthermore, interpreting the Railways Act 1890, Railway Board Ordinance 1959, and Railway Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, the Court held that railway land can only be utilized for railway operations and infrastructure. The Court held that converting railway land into private housing societies or allowing private allotments for employees is strictly impermissible under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution encompass the provision of public transportation by the State?
  • Can land acquired or reserved for Pakistan Railways be converted into a private housing society for railway employees under the Railways Act, 1890?
  • Does the Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution remain bound by interim orders of a High Court obtained through misrepresentation or fraudulent documents?
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• Nadar Wali vs Sumaya Gul and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 677, 2020 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-03
  cognizance of offencesforged documentsfamily court proceedingswritten complaintcriminal procedureremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside the acquittal of the petitioner and remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether the trial court could take cognizance of offences involving forged documents used in judicial proceedings without a written complaint from the concerned court, as mandated by statute. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could not take cognizance of the offences under section 195(1)(b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure without the requisite written complaint from the concerned court, and remanding the case for trial on unrelated offences was unjustified. The key principle laid down is that where a statute bars taking cognizance of certain offences without a formal written complaint from the relevant court, proceeding with trial without such a complaint is a nullity, and the proper legal course is for the concerned court to file the necessary written complaint.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court take cognizance of offences related to forged documents produced in judicial proceedings without a written complaint from the concerned court?
  • Whether remanding a case for trial on offences not made out or committed during court proceedings is legally sustainable?
  • What is the proper legal remedy when a trial court lacks cognizance for want of a statutory written complaint?
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• NAB through its Chairman vs Muhammad Shafique2020 P SC 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  compulsory retirementunauthorized absenceextraordinary leavedisciplinary proceedingsmisconductadministrative discretionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a government employee, was compulsorily retired by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) following a 66-day unauthorized absence. The High Court set aside this penalty, reasoning that because the office order imposing the retirement also treated the absence as extraordinary leave (EOL) without pay, the penalty was legally inconsistent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if this treatment of absence invalidated the major penalty. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the treatment of unauthorized absence as EOL without pay is merely an administrative mechanism to settle dues and does not condone the underlying misconduct or nullify a major penalty imposed for that same misconduct. The Court clarified that the power to grant EOL retrospectively under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980 is discretionary and not automatic. Furthermore, the Court established that an administrative order imposing a major penalty for misconduct remains valid even if it contains a superfluous or redundant clause treating the period of absence as EOL, as the latter does not constitute a penalty or condonation of the unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Does treating a period of unauthorized absence as extraordinary leave without pay automatically condone the misconduct of the employee?
  • Can an administrative order imposing a major penalty for misconduct coexist with a direction treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave?
  • Is the power to grant extraordinary leave retrospectively under the Revised Leave Rules 1980 mandatory or discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Mangla View Resort(Pvt.) Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue,PTCL 2020 CL. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-19
  long-term contractsincome taxpercentage of completion methodburden of prooftaxable profitconstruction contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the applicability of Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which governs the taxation of profits derived from long-term contracts. The appellant, a private company, challenged the tax authorities' application of the 'percentage of completion method' for calculating profits on construction contracts that extended beyond a single tax year. The core legal question was whether the appellant's contracts fell within the definition of 'long-term contracts' under Section 36, thereby necessitating the use of the percentage of completion method for tax purposes. The Court held that because the appellant failed to produce the relevant contractual documents to substantiate its claim that the contracts did not meet the criteria for long-term status, the burden of proof was not discharged. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower authorities' decisions. The key principle laid down is that the taxpayer bears the onus of producing the necessary record to establish that a contract falls outside the ambit of Section 36, and in the absence of such evidence, the court will not speculate on the applicability of the provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie with the taxpayer to produce contractual records to demonstrate that a contract falls outside the scope of Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • What constitutes a long-term contract for the purposes of profit calculation under Section 36 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the determination of costs allocated to a long-term contract a question of fact that precludes re-appraisal by the Supreme Court?
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• M/s Shahid Gul and Partners vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,PTCL 2021 CL. 647, 2020 SCP 242, 2021 PCTLR 17, 2021 PSC 156, 2021 PTD 299, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001deductible business expensedepreciationcapital expenditurestructural improvementstax assessmentcost of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the tax treatment of land costs and depreciation for a taxpayer engaged in the construction and sale of commercial property. The core legal questions were whether the cost of land constitutes a deductible business expense under Section 20 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and whether depreciation is permissible on improved land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the taxpayer's claims as premature due to non-registration of property sales, noting that the Ordinance does not mandate such registration for expense deductibility. The Court ruled that the cost of land incurred for business purposes is a deductible expense under Section 20(1), provided it is not excluded by Section 21. Furthermore, while depreciation is allowable on structural improvements to land under Section 22, the Court clarified that the cost of the underlying land itself must be excluded from the depreciation base pursuant to Section 22(13)(b). Consequently, the Court restored the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), affirming the taxpayer's right to these deductions and depreciation allowances.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cost of land incurred for the construction and sale of commercial property a deductible business expense under Section 20(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 require the registration of property sales for the cost of land to be accepted as a deductible business expense?
  • Can a taxpayer claim depreciation on the cost of land itself under Section 22 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the exclusion of capital expenditure under Section 21(n) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 bar the deduction of land costs incurred for business purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Khurshid Soap & Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd represented through2020 P SC 1448, 2020 SCP 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Gas Infrastructure Development Cessfee vs taxlegislative competenceres judicataconstitutional validityquid pro quoMoney Billinfrastructure development
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutional validity of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2015, which imposed a cess on industrial and commercial natural gas consumers to finance transnational pipeline projects. The core legal question was whether the levy constitutes a fee or a tax, and whether the Act was enacted within the Parliament's legislative competence. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the Act is a valid fee-imposing enactment, distinct from the invalidated 2011 Act, and was correctly passed under Article 70 of the Constitution. The Court rejected the plea of res judicata, noting that conflicting High Court decisions on a legislative enactment's validity require a uniform determination by the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Parliament's power to enact such legislation under Entry 54 read with Entry 27 of the Federal Legislative List. While upholding the Act, the Court issued specific directions regarding the recovery of arrears and suspended the Federal Government's power to charge the cess until collected revenues are utilized for the specified infrastructure projects, emphasizing that the levy's purpose must be realized to maintain its character as a fee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2015 constitutes a fee or a tax under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to conflicting High Court judgments regarding the constitutionality of a federal legislative enactment?
  • Can the legislature enact a law with retrospective effect to validate a levy previously declared unconstitutional by a court?
  • Does the use of terms 'levied' and 'charged' in a statute automatically render it a tax-imposing enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Habib & Company and others vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited2020 PLD Supreme Court 227, 2020 PLJ SC 254, 2020 P SC 284, 2020 SCP 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-19
  Civil Review PetitionExecution proceedingsAuction saleObjection petitionOrder XXI Rule 90 CPCMandatory depositSale confirmationLeave to appealCode of Civil ProcedureSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Review Petition sought review of a Supreme Court order refusing leave to appeal against a High Court judgment. The core legal questions involved the mandatory nature of depositing 20% of the auction price with an objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), and whether a court is required to *suo motu* set aside an auction without an objection petition or evidence of irregularity. The Petitioners also contended that a later reversal of the original decree should invalidate a confirmed sale. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the second proviso to Order XXI, Rule 90 CPC mandates the deposit of 20% of the auction price for an objection petition to be entertained, with the court's discretion limited to the *amount* of security. A later deposit does not cure initial non-maintainability. The Court also found no merit in the argument that a Banking Court must automatically set aside a sale without substantiated grounds of irregularity or fraud, affirming that a confirmed sale becomes absolute, protecting third-party purchasers.

  Read full judgment →
• M/s Cherat Cement Co. Ltd, Nowshera vs Federation of Pakistan thr. M/o2021 P C T L R 274, 2021 P SC 309, 2021 SCP 10, 2020 SCP 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• M/s Al-Khair Gadoon Ltd vs The Appellate Tribunal etc2020 [M] C L R 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-08
  central excise dutyshow cause noticead valorem assessmentretail price assessmentprocedural irregularityappellate jurisdictiontax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the Islamabad High Court's dismissal of a tax appeal regarding the validity of show cause notices issued by the Revenue for alleged evasion of Central Excise Duty. The core legal questions were whether the citation of a wrong section of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in a show cause notice vitiates the entire proceedings, and whether the High Court correctly declined to address the appellant's arguments. The Supreme Court held that citing an incorrect provision of law in a show cause notice does not automatically invalidate the proceedings, provided the authority had the power to act and the notice contained sufficient facts to allow the assessee to meaningfully prepare a defense without prejudice. The Court emphasized that technical non-observance of procedural rules or misdescription of law should not deny relief if the court otherwise possesses jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower judgments and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal to determine the mixed questions of law and fact, including the applicability of the contested excise provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the citation of a wrong provision of law in a show cause notice automatically vitiate the entire recovery proceedings?
  • What is the test for determining whether a show cause notice containing a wrong legal provision is legally valid?
  • Can a court exercise jurisdiction even if the wrong provision of law is invoked in the underlying proceedings?
  • Is it appropriate for an appellate court to decide mixed questions of law and fact that were not previously adjudicated by the tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• M/o Information Technology and Telecommunications, Islamabad vs CM2020 PLD Supreme Court 551, 2021 PLJ SC 43, 2021 P SC 275, 2020 SCP 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-22
  telecommunication servicesnational securitydelegated legislationpolicy directivecellular suspensionemergency powersultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that declared a 2009 policy directive issued by the Ministry of Information Technology ultra vires, on the basis that it conflicted with Section 54(3) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996. The core legal question was whether the power to suspend cellular services for national security reasons under Section 8(2)(c) of the Act is subservient to or controlled by the emergency powers granted under Section 54(3). The Supreme Court held that the two provisions operate in distinct spheres: Section 54(3) is a reactive, emergency-based power triggered by a formal Proclamation of Emergency, whereas Section 8(2)(c) allows for pre-emptive, localized, and temporary security measures. The Court ruled that the policy directive does not contravene Section 54(3) but rather complements the Act by addressing security threats that do not rise to the level of a national emergency. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, affirming that the exercise of delegated authority under Section 8(2)(c) must be evaluated based on reasonableness and fairness under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 54(3) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 control or limit the exercise of power under Section 8(2)(c) of the same Act?
  • Is the suspension of cellular services under the policy directive of 26.12.2009 contingent upon a formal proclamation of emergency under Article 232 of the Constitution?
  • Must a licensee exhaust administrative remedies before challenging the exercise of delegated power under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 in a court of law?
  • What is the legal test for determining the validity of an executive instrument issued under Section 8(2)(c) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State and another2020 KLR Supreme Court 224, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-09
  narcotic possessionforensic reportprotocolburden of proofcriminal convictiongas chromatography-mass spectrometrydirectory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from the conviction of the petitioner for possession of 1460 grams of Charas, an offense under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner challenged his conviction, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court, primarily arguing that the forensic report was flawed due to a lack of 'protocol' as required by precedent and the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysis) Rules, 2001. The core legal question was whether the forensic report satisfied the mandatory procedural requirements for testing and analysis. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the forensic report, which detailed the use of analytical balance, chemical spot tests, and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry, sufficiently met the required standards of 'protocol.' The Court established that the term 'protocol' refers to a record of experimental observations, which the report provided. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysis) Rules, 2001, is directory in nature, and the burden of proof does not require the prosecution to satisfy artificial or far-fetched adversarial demands.

  Questions settled

  • Does a forensic report detailing the use of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry satisfy the 'protocol' requirement under the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysis) Rules, 2001?
  • Is Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysis) Rules, 2001, mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can an accused person summon a forensic expert to clarify specific details of a test report if the report is deemed sufficient?
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• Murad Khan vs The State2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 414, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 629, 2020 SCMR 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-14
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substanceschemical examination reportprolonged incarcerationdrug trafficking
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Murad Khan, who was charged under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 600 grams of heroin from a vehicle he was driving. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the recovery and the duration of his incarceration. The Supreme Court observed that while heroin was recovered, the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory regarding the chemical analysis remained awaited. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offense fell under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, which carries a maximum punishment of seven years. Considering the petitioner had been incarcerated since November 2015, the Court held that keeping him in custody for an indefinite period served no useful purpose. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the appeal, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the chemical examination report from the Forensic Science Laboratory is still awaited?
  • Does the maximum punishment prescribed for an offense under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 influence the grant of bail for an accused who has been incarcerated for a significant period?
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• Munir Hussain and another vs State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-05
  Qatl-i-Amdappreciation of evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonyacquittal appealcommutation of sentencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal challenging a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction of the petitioner for Qatl-i-Amd while commuting his death sentence to life imprisonment, and simultaneously dismissed the complainant's appeal against the acquittal of a co-accused. The core legal questions concern the consistency of the prosecution's ocular account with the medical evidence, specifically regarding the trajectory of gunshot wounds sustained by the deceased while riding a motorbike, and the validity of the co-accused's acquittal in light of the alleged shared motive and active participation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to both sides to examine these contentions. The court's decision to grant leave indicates that the findings of the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence, the alignment of medical and testimonial evidence, and the culpability of the co-accused require further judicial scrutiny. The key principle highlighted is the necessity of reconciling ocular testimony with physical evidence to ensure the conviction rests on a reliable foundation, particularly when the prosecution's narrative of the occurrence is challenged by the physical positioning of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the ocular account of an incident and the medical evidence regarding the trajectory of injuries warrant a re-evaluation of the conviction?
  • Can a co-accused be acquitted when the prosecution alleges a shared motive and active participation in the commission of the crime?
  • Is the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment justified when the prosecution's narrative of the crime is challenged by the physical circumstances of the occurrence?
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• Munir Akhtar @ Munir Ahmad vs The State2021 P S c (Crl.) 119, 2021 SCMR 298, 2020 SCP 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-08
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceocular accountabscondencemurder convictionsentence modificationcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment for a double murder conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts had properly appreciated the evidence, particularly regarding the ocular account, the motive, and the forensic evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, declining to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that the prosecution had successfully established the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as the ocular testimony of the witnesses was consistent, corroborated by medical evidence, and supported by the petitioner's prolonged abscondence. The Court affirmed that the High Court’s decision to convert the death sentence to life imprisonment was appropriate and legally sound. The judgment reinforces the principle that where concurrent findings of fact are supported by consistent ocular and medical evidence, and the prosecution’s case is established without reasonable doubt, there is no scope for interference by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ocular account of witnesses corroborated by medical evidence suffice to establish guilt in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact when the prosecution has established the case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Is prolonged abscondence of an accused a relevant factor in evaluating the prosecution's case?
  • Did the High Court correctly exercise its discretion in converting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Munir Ahmad vs The State2021 P S c (Crl.) 123, 2020 SCMR 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-27
  murderous assaultocular evidencecommon objectunlawful assemblyabsconsioncriminal appealpolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction for a murderous assault on a police contingent, resulting in the death of a police constable. The core legal question was whether the prosecution's case, which relied on ocular evidence, could sustain a conviction despite the acquittal of twelve co-accused and a negative forensic report regarding the weapon. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment. The Court held that the ocular testimony of police witnesses remained consistent and credible, establishing the occurrence of the encounter and the petitioner's role. The Court clarified that the acquittal of co-accused by the trial court, based on the absence of specific harm caused by them, did not undermine the culpability of the petitioner or the established common object of the unlawful assembly. Furthermore, the Court established that admissions made during cross-examination are binding and that a flawed acquittal of co-accused does not automatically vitiate the conviction of a principal offender when the evidence otherwise positively establishes guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused in an unlawful assembly case automatically vitiate the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • Can admissions made during cross-examination be used to contradict a defense theory of darkness at the scene of the crime?
  • Does a negative forensic report regarding a weapon necessarily exonerate an accused when other evidence establishes guilt?
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• Muneer Ahmad Sheikh and another vs The Director General, NAB, Karachi2020 P SC 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailaccountabilityselective prosecutionmerit-based appointmentscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for bail—one for post-arrest bail and one for pre-arrest bail—filed by petitioners accused of maneuvering the appointment of their relatives in the Sindh Technical Education Vocational Training Authority by bypassing merit. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite prima facie evidence of their involvement in the alleged crime, given that other similarly situated individuals had not been arrested or prosecuted. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail. The Court observed that while the petitioners had a prima facie role in the offense, the accountability process appeared lopsided, as other accomplices and those who exonerated the petitioners in departmental inquiries were not held accountable. Furthermore, the Court noted that a co-accused with an identical role had already been granted pre-arrest bail without challenge. The Court established the principle that accountability laws must be applied uniformly across the board, regardless of the status, stature, or station of the individuals involved, to avoid selective and unjust prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail appropriate when the accountability process is applied in a lopsided or selective manner?
  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused with an identical role justify the grant of bail to other similarly situated accused?
  • Should accountability laws be applied without regard to the status or stature of the individuals involved?
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• Mukhtar Alam vs Fazal Nawab and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 630, 2020 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-11
  criminal appealdeath sentenceconfessional statementcommutation of sentenceocular evidenceforensic evidenceSection 382-B Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the appellant's confessional statement, the reliability of the ocular evidence, and the appropriateness of the death penalty given the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the prosecution's case supported by a signed confession, positive forensic evidence (FSL report), and consistent ocular testimony. However, the Court exercised its discretion to modify the sentence. Noting that the prosecution failed to examine key witnesses present at the scene and that the complainant suppressed the motive, the Court held that the death penalty was not warranted. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that while a conviction may be sustained on corroborated evidence and a valid confession, the imposition of the death penalty requires a higher threshold of certainty regarding the circumstances and motive, which, if suppressed or unclear, may justify a reduction in sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained when the prosecution fails to examine all material witnesses present at the scene of the crime?
  • Does the suppression of the motive for a murder by the complainant justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is a confessional statement valid if the accused fails to deny their signature during the recording of their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mukaram vs The State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 266, 2020 SCMR 956, 2020 SCP 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-06
  post-arrest bailabsconsiongeneralized allegationfurther inquirycriminal appealfirearm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Section 302/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the generalized nature of the allegations, the recovery of only a single empty casing despite claims of indiscriminate firing, and the lack of specific attribution of the fatal injury to the petitioner, notwithstanding his four-year absconsion. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, converting the petition into an appeal and allowing it. The Court reasoned that the allegation of indiscriminate firing was undermined by the recovery of only one empty casing and the fact that the deceased sustained only one injury, making the accusation generalized. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that absconsion per se is insufficient to deny bail in the absence of evidence linking the accused to an overt act contributing to the commission of the offence, especially when no recovery was made during physical remand.

  Questions settled

  • Is absconsion alone sufficient grounds to refuse bail in the absence of an overt act contributing to the offence?
  • Does a generalized allegation of indiscriminate firing, where only one injury is sustained, entitle an accused to the benefit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be denied solely on the basis of absconsion when no incriminating recovery has been made from the accused during physical remand?
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• Muhammad Zubair and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  abduction for ransomcriminal appealacquittalbenefit of doubttest identification paradeappreciation of evidenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against the convictions and sentences of the appellants for the abduction and murder of the deceased for ransom. The appellants were convicted by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the inconsistencies in the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with significant doubts, including unexplained delays in the registration of the FIR, the implausible conduct of the complainant in paying ransom, the failure of witnesses to identify the appellants in a test identification parade, and the lack of authentication for the ATM photograph and the rent deed. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's evidence is self-destructive, contradictory, and fails to inspire confidence, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction, necessitating the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of some prosecution witnesses to identify the accused in a test identification parade render the testimony of other witnesses unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's evidence regarding the genesis of the case and the recovery of incriminating material is contradictory and lacks authentication?
  • Is a photograph generated by a CCTV camera admissible as proof of identity without evidence linking the subject to the specific transaction or bank records?
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• Muhammad Yasin and another vs The State through P.G. Punjab and others2020 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-14
  post-arrest baildouble homicidedelayed autopsyindependent corroborationacquittaleyewitness credibilitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double homicide and terrorism case where the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and several co-accused launched a coordinated firearm assault, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and injuries to others. The trial court acquitted most co-accused, leaving only the petitioner convicted, which was upheld with a modified sentence by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan analyzed the evidence and noted a significant delay in the autopsy of one deceased despite the promptness claimed in the crime report, suggesting potential post-consultation fabrication. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to produce the injured eyewitnesses, and the primary witnesses were disbelieved regarding an identically placed acquitted co-accused. The Court held that where witnesses are disbelieved regarding co-accused assigned similar roles, their testimony requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction against the remaining accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in conducting an autopsy can cast doubt on the promptness of a First Information Report and suggest post-consultation fabrication?
  • Can a conviction be safely maintained on the testimony of witnesses who have been disbelieved regarding identically placed co-accused without independent corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary effect of the prosecution's failure to produce injured eyewitnesses during a criminal trial?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The State2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 65, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 65, 2020 SCMR 853, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-21
  explosive substancehand grenadesanti-terrorismconstructive possessioncriminal convictionrecovery of ammunitionSection 340 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged his conviction for the possession of four hand grenades and four detonators, which resulted in sentences under the Explosive Substance Act 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the recovered items constituted "explosive substances" or merely "arms," and whether the prosecution sufficiently established the petitioner's possession and nexus with terrorism. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the recovered grenades and detonators clearly fall within the definition of "explosive substance" under Section 2 of the Explosive Substance Act 1908, as they are materials intended to cause explosions. The Court further noted that the prosecution's evidence was consistent and confidence-inspiring. Crucially, the Court emphasized that the petitioner failed to avail himself of the opportunity to testify under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to rebut the allegations, rendering his defense evidence an afterthought. The principle laid down is that items capable of causing explosions, including grenades and detonators, are classified as explosive substances, and a failure to testify in one's own defense significantly weakens the rebuttal of prosecution evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Do hand grenades and detonators fall within the definition of 'explosive substance' under the Explosive Substance Act 1908?
  • Does the failure of an accused to testify under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 impact the credibility of their defense?
  • Can possession of explosive materials by a member of a proscribed organization trigger the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others2020 P SC 1166, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-13
  Oral saleMutationFraudMisrepresentationDeclaration suitLimitationFiduciary relationshipIlliterate womenOnus of proofRevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that restored a trial court's decree for declaration, which had sought confirmation of title and cancellation of an oral sale mutation. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of an oral sale mutation involving illiterate village ladies and a fiduciary relationship, the applicability of limitation, and the evidentiary value of admissions made by vulnerable parties. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appellant (brother) failed to prove the alleged oral sale transaction and the mutation, which was found to be a result of fraud and misrepresentation. The Court held that illiterate village women, akin to Parda Nasheen ladies, require independent and objective advice for transactions against their interest, with full understanding of its implications. It was further established that mere attestation of a mutation does not prove a sale, and the onus lies on the beneficiary to prove all ingredients of the transaction. Transactions resulting from fraud or misrepresentation cannot be protected by limitation, as each adverse entry in the revenue record provides a fresh cause of action.

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• Muhammad Waheed vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another2020 SCMR 2066, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsodomyprohibitory clausemedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the cancellation of his post-arrest bail by the Peshawar High Court, arising from a case involving an alleged assault amounting to sodomy upon a minor child within the precincts of Police Station Daraban, District D.I. Khan. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the available material, including medical evidence confirming a bleeding rectum and seminal stains, constituted reasonable grounds bringing the case within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby justifying the High Court's order recalling the bail. The Court laid down the principle that where medical evidence strongly supports the commission of a heinous offence against a minor, the tentative assessment of evidence by the High Court in cancelling bail is unexceptionable, and freedom once granted may be recalled when the initial grant was based on a manifest error regarding the statutory prohibition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence showing penetration constitutes reasonable grounds to bring a case within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court cancel bail granted by an Additional Sessions Judge when the initial grant of bail suffers from a manifest error?
  • Whether the tentative assessment of evidence by the High Court in a bail cancellation matter is open to exception when supported by medical reports?
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• Muhammad Uzair Jamal vs The State and another2021 P S c (Crl.) 174, 2020 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-22
  unsound mindmental incapacitydepressive illnesssuspension of trialcriminal liabilitySection 84 PPCSection 465 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, accused of murdering a young woman at her home, challenged the dismissal of his application filed under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, claiming mental incapacity to stand trial. The petitioner argued that he suffered from mental ailments and was unable to defend himself. The Supreme Court examined the medical reports, which diagnosed the petitioner with 'Depressive Illness,' and evaluated the circumstances of the crime, noting the premeditated nature of the attack. The Court held that 'Depressive Illness' is not a recognized legal ground for suspending a trial or claiming incapacity under the law. The Court emphasized that for an accused to claim immunity or suspension of proceedings due to unsoundness of mind, the condition must be such that it renders the accused incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is contrary to law, as per Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. Finding no evidence of such incapacitating lunacy, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the trial must proceed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a diagnosis of 'Depressive Illness' constitute a valid ground for suspending a criminal trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the legal standard for an accused to claim immunity from prosecution based on unsoundness of mind under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when an accused raises a plea of mental incapacity to stand trial?
  • Can an accused demand the suspension of trial proceedings based on vague assertions of mental ailments without demonstrating incapacitating lunacy?
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• Muhammad Tariq vs Afzal Hussain2020 SCP 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-12
  suo motu noticefundamental rightsmisuse of public propertybar politicspublic importanceconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose during the hearing of a civil petition for leave to appeal when an adjournment was sought owing to the elevation of the petitioner's counsel as Advocate General Punjab. Concurrently, an officer of the Court raised concerns regarding the involvement of the Advocate General in bar politics and the participation of the Prime Minister of Pakistan in a partisan function held at a public venue using public resources. The Supreme Court observed that these issues engaged fundamental rights and public importance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court initiated separate proceedings by taking suo motu cognizance of the matter, issuing notices to the Advocate General Punjab, the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General for Pakistan, PEMRA, the authority operating the Convention Centre, and various bar councils. The Court directed the constitution of a separate file and placed the matter before the Chief Justice for the constitution of an appropriate bench.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can take suo motu notice under Article 184(3) of the Constitution regarding the misuse of public offices and state property for political purposes?
  • Can public buildings and official positions such as the Prime Minister and the Advocate General be utilized for partisan political functions?
  • Does the involvement of the Advocate General in bar politics affect the integrity of statutory disciplinary bodies like the Provincial Bar Council?
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• Muhammad Sultan vs Muhammad Raza & othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 25, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 1014, 2020 SCMR 1200, 2020 SCP 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-12
  transfer of trialjurisdiction and venueextra-judicial killingensued consequencescriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the petitioner seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, whereby the trial of a private complaint concerning the extra-judicial killing of the petitioner's son was transferred from the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Talagang, District Chakwal to the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Lahore. The core legal question revolved around the determination of proper jurisdiction and venue for the trial of an offence involving acts committed in different jurisdictions and the interpretation of sections 177 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the actual murder and ensuing consequences occurred within Lahore, and witnesses and post-mortem examinations were also located there, the High Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction to transfer the trial under the exceptions provided in section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court laid down that where an offence involves acts done and consequences ensuing in different local limits, the court within whose jurisdiction the consequence ensues has proper venue and jurisdiction to try the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Which court has the proper jurisdiction and venue to try an offence where acts are committed in one local limit and the consequences ensue in another?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in transferring a criminal trial from one district to another under section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 based on the place of the ensued consequence of the crime?
  • Does section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 extend the limits of venue for a criminal trial where an offence is established by reason of an act done and its resulting consequences?
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• Muhammad Siddique (deed) thr. L.Rs. etc. vs Mst. Noor Bibi (decd) through L.Rs. etc2020 P SC 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  revenue hierarchyexhaustion of remediesnecessary partiesproper partiessuit for declarationmutationcivil jurisdictionspecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision against a decree in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The petitioners had filed a suit challenging various revenue orders regarding mutation of land without first exhausting the appellate remedies available within the revenue hierarchy. The Supreme Court held that where a special remedy is provided under the law, such as the appeal and revision process under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, it cannot be bypassed by filing a direct civil suit. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that in suits challenging registered documents or public acts, the Provincial Government and relevant public functionaries are necessary or proper parties under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to ensure effective adjudication and prevent fraud. Finally, the Court reiterated that a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is intended to declare pre-existing rights rather than create new ones. The petition was dismissed as the petitioners failed to establish their pre-existing rights or exhaust the statutory revenue remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit challenging revenue orders competent without first exhausting the remedies available under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Are the Provincial Government and relevant public functionaries necessary or proper parties in a suit challenging a registered document or mutation?
  • Can a party create new rights through a decree in a suit filed under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Does the non-impleadment of proper parties in a civil suit constitute a serious irregularity?
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• Muhammad Siddique (Deceased) through LRs and others vs Mst. Noor Bibi2020 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-16
  suit for declarationexhaustion of remediesrevenue hierarchymutationproper partynecessary partypublic functionariespre-existing rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the petitioners challenging various revenue orders and mutations dating back to 1964. The trial court initially decreed the suit, but the appellate court and the High Court subsequently dismissed it. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, laid down several key principles. Firstly, it held that where a special remedy is provided under the law (specifically the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967), it must be exhausted before approaching civil courts; bypassing the revenue hierarchy renders a civil suit incompetent. Secondly, the Court emphasized that under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the CPC, the Provincial Government and relevant public functionaries are proper parties in suits challenging public documents or mutations to ensure effective adjudication and prevent fraud. Finally, the Court reaffirmed that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, only allows for the declaration of pre-existing rights and cannot be used to create new rights.

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• Muhammad Siddique (decd) through L.Rs. etc vs (Mst.) Noor Bibi (decd)2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil suitrevenue hierarchyexhaustion of remediesnecessary partiesnon-impleadmentdeclaratory suitpre-existing rightsmutation challenge
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing the petitioners' civil revision against the concurrent dismissal of their declaratory suit regarding mutations and revenue orders. The core legal questions involved the competency of a civil suit challenging revenue hierarchy orders without exhausting remedies under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, the necessity of impleading the Provincial Government and public functionaries when challenging public documents under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the scope of a declaratory suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a civil suit is incompetent when special statutory remedies within the revenue hierarchy remain unexhausted, that non-impleadment of relevant public functionaries creates a serious defect, and that a suit under Section 42 only declares pre-existing rights rather than creating new ones.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit challenging revenue hierarchy orders competent before exhausting available remedies under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Does the non-impleadment of the Provincial Government and relevant public functionaries create a serious defect in a suit challenging a registered document or attested mutation?
  • Can a party create fresh rights by filing a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
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• Muhammad Shoaib Ahmed vs The Controller General of Accounts, Islamabad2020 PLC (C.S.) 1021, 2020 SCMR 1018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-13
  service appealdisciplinary proceedingsregular inquirysuperannuationdismissal from serviceequal treatmentservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a service matter concerning the dismissal of a Senior Auditor for alleged misconduct involving a workplace lockdown. The appellant and four other employees were dismissed or compulsorily retired without a regular inquiry. Upon appeal, the Federal Service Tribunal set aside the penalties for the four co-employees, directing the department to hold regular inquiries. However, the Tribunal treated the appellant differently, converting his dismissal to compulsory retirement solely because he had reached the age of superannuation. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s superannuation justified denying him the same relief of a regular inquiry afforded to his similarly situated colleagues. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s case was on all fours with his co-employees, and the fact of superannuation did not provide a valid legal basis for disparate treatment. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment regarding the appellant, remanding the matter to the department to conduct a regular inquiry and pass appropriate orders within four months. The decision reinforces the principle that disciplinary proceedings must be applied consistently regardless of an employee's superannuation status.

  Questions settled

  • Does the attainment of the age of superannuation preclude a government employee from being granted a regular departmental inquiry in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is a service tribunal justified in treating similarly situated employees differently based solely on the superannuation status of one of the employees?
  • Can a penalty of dismissal from service be upheld if imposed without conducting a regular inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and 2 others vs The State and others2020 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-16
  murdercriminal appealbenefit of doubtcontradictionsdelay in FIRacquittalfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder trial where the petitioners were convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of Ahmad Ali. The trial court convicted one petitioner to death and another to life imprisonment, which the High Court maintained while altering the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting significant discrepancies and improvements in the complainant's statements regarding the number of firearm injuries, an unexplained delay in recording the crime report despite police presence at the medical facility, failure to recover the deceased's weapon, and the unnatural circumstances of multiple assailants targeting a single victim. Concluding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a shadow of doubt, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions and improvements in the complainant's statement regarding firearm injuries are sufficient to create doubt in a murder case?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording the crime report when police were already present cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Whether convictions for murder can be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish the presence of eyewitnesses beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Shabbir etc vs The State2020 SCMR 1206, 2020 SCP 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-23
  criminal appealmurderreappraisal of evidenceocular accountmedical evidencemitigating circumstancesentence conversionimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the convictions of the appellants under Section 302(b) and other provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while converting their sentences from death to imprisonment for life on three counts for the murder of three persons, alongside convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 being set aside. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular evidence, medical corroboration, and alleged discrepancies in witness statements in a case involving multiple murders committed out of previous enmity and revenge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of the injured eye-witness and other prosecution witnesses was natural, consistent, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, and that the High Court had already rightly exercised leniency by converting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The key legal principles laid down include that minor discrepancies not shattering the core prosecution story do not warrant interference, and that antecedent circumstances and motive, while not amounting to grave and sudden provocation, can serve as a mitigating factor in determining the quantum of sentence in revenge-fuelled murders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to discard the entire prosecution case if the core narrative remains intact?
  • Can previous enmity and the background of a revenge-fuelled murder be considered as a mitigating circumstance for converting a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether the testimony of an injured eyewitness whose presence is natural and unimpeachable is sufficient to sustain a conviction despite the acquittal of a co-accused on grounds of identity?
  • Does the lack of proof regarding a specific motive invalidate an otherwise solid prosecution case established through consistent ocular and medical evidence?
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• Muhammad Sarwar vs Mumtaz Bibi and others2020 P SC 704, 2020 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-03
  oral giftgift mutationinheritancepardanashinfraudonus of proofMajlis-e-Aamdeclarationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration and possession filed by two sisters (Respondents) against their brother (Petitioner) regarding their father’s land. The Respondents alleged that the Petitioner fraudulently recorded a gift mutation in his favor while they were kept in the dark as pardanashin ladies. The core legal question concerned the validity of the oral gift and the subsequent mutation, particularly given the disputed date of the father's death. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the Petitioner failed to specify the date, time, and place of the alleged gift or name the witnesses present during its execution. The Court observed that under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, mutations must be sanctioned in Majlis-e-Aam to prevent fraud, which was not done. Furthermore, documentary evidence (Death Certificate) proved the father had died months before the mutation was entered. The Court reaffirmed that the onus to prove a gift lies on the beneficiary, who must establish all essential ingredients through cogent evidence and produce material witnesses, failing which an adverse inference under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order may be drawn.

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• Muhammad Saleem Khan vs MCB Bank Limited2020 CLD 737, 2020 KLR Supreme Court 312, 2020 P C T L R 1216, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-03
  banking recovery suitstatement of accountstatutory certificationBankers' Books Evidence ActFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinanceleave to appealdocument verification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a Banking Court's dismissal of a recovery suit filed by a bank. The Banking Court had dismissed the suit, alleging non-compliance with Section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, specifically regarding the certification of the statement of account under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891. The core legal question was whether the bank's statement of account met the statutory certification requirements. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court erred in its finding. The Court observed that the statement of account contained a verification note at the end that substantially incorporated the language of Section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the law does not require certification on every single page of the account statement, provided the document is verified at the end and initialed. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the Banking Court was directed to expedite the proceedings. The Court declined to address the applicability of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, as it was unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 require that every page of a statement of account be individually certified?
  • What constitutes sufficient certification of a statement of account under Section 2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  • Can a Banking Court dismiss a recovery suit based on a finding that the statement of account was not duly verified when the verification note substantially complies with the law?
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• Muhammad Ramzan alias Jani vs The State and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 123, 2020 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-05
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecriminal appealbail as ruleconcession of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the Lahore High Court's order refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under sections 337-F(v), 337-L(2), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the nature of the alleged offences. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court observed that the offences charged against the petitioner do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that in cases where the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception. Finding no extraordinary circumstances to justify the denial of bail, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to the furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal an exception for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of extraordinary circumstances warrant the grant of bail when an offence is outside the prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Rafique and Others vs Manzoor Ahmad and Others2020 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-17
  specific performanceagreement to selladmitted factsdiscretionary reliefburden of proofcontract law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell filed by the respondent against the original vendor. During the suit's pendency, the vendor transferred the property to his wife, who subsequently sold it to the petitioners. Although the trial court dismissed the suit, the Additional District Judge decreed it, and the High Court upheld that decision. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, primarily arguing that the agreement to sell was not properly proved and that specific performance is a discretionary relief that should have been withheld. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the original vendor admitted to the execution of the agreement in his written statement, formal proof of the agreement was unnecessary. The Court reaffirmed the principle that admitted facts do not require formal proof. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the argument that specific performance should be withheld, concluding that the lower appellate forums correctly exercised their discretion based on the established facts and pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admitted fact in a written statement require formal proof in a suit for specific performance?
  • Is the relief of specific performance a matter of right or is it discretionary?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of appellate forums regarding the grant of specific performance when no error is shown?
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• Muhammad Rafique and others residents of Muaza Mari Mitru, Tehsil Mailsi, District Vehari vs Manzoor Ahmad and others residents of Muaza Mari Mitru, Tehsil Mailsi, District Vehari2020 P SC 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performanceagreement to selladmission in pleadingsdiscretionary reliefsubsequent purchaserproof of agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The plaintiff filed the suit against the original vendor, who admitted the execution of the agreement to sell in his written statement. During the pendency of the proceedings, the vendor purported to gift the property to his wife, who subsequently sold it to the present petitioners. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the first appellate court decreed it in favor of the plaintiff, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent appeal. The core questions before the Supreme Court were whether the agreement to sell required formal proof when its execution was not denied in pleadings, and whether specific performance ought to be withheld as a discretionary relief. The Supreme Court held that an admitted fact need not be formally proved. Finding no basis to withhold discretionary relief, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell require formal proof in evidence if its execution is not denied by the vendor in the written statement?
  • Whether a fact admitted in the pleadings needs to be formally proved by the party relying upon it?
  • Can the discretionary relief of specific performance of an agreement to sell be withheld without establishing specific grounds justifying such refusal?
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• Muhammad Rafique alias Neela and another vs The State and others2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 369, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 173, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-06
  murdercriminal petitionre-appraisal of evidencedoctrine of abundant cautionpartial acquittalcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the petitioner Muhammad Rafique alias Neela's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with an altered sentence of imprisonment for life for the murder of Nazim Hussain, while acquitting his co-accused brothers and upholding the acquittal of his father. The core legal question was whether the High Court could lawfully maintain the conviction of the principal accused based on ocular and medical evidence after acquitting the co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of abundant caution permits the partial acquittal of co-accused based on minor injuries without necessitating the rejection of the entire prosecution case against the principal offender. The court laid down the principle that the acquittal of some accused does not invalidate the reliable and corroborated evidence establishing the guilt of the remaining principal accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused mandates the acquittal of the principal accused relying on the same evidence?
  • Can the doctrine of abundant caution be applied to sustain a conviction while acquitting other co-accused?
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• Muhammad Rafique alias Neela and another vs State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-06
  murderdoctrine of abundant cautionfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusappreciation of evidencerecoveryleave to appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal filed by both the convict and the complainant against a High Court judgment. The convict challenged the confirmation of his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arguing that after the acquittal of three co-accused, the same prosecution evidence could not be relied upon to convict him. Conversely, the complainant sought the restoration of the convict's death sentence and the reversal of the co-accuseds' acquittals. The core legal question was whether the acquittal of co-accused based on the doctrine of abundant caution invalidates the entire prosecution evidence against the primary accused who was assigned a specific fatal role. The Supreme Court dismissed all petitions and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that the application of the doctrine of abundant caution to acquit co-accused does not automatically destroy the entire volume of evidence if it remains sufficient to prove the central charge against the primary accused beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused under the doctrine of abundant caution require the rejection of the entire prosecution evidence against the primary convict?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the same evidence that was deemed insufficient to convict co-accused who played minor or distinct roles?
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• Muhammad Noman Munir vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-10
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesprohibitory clausepolice witnessessocietal apathystatutory presumption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Noman Munir, sought post-arrest bail after being apprehended by police with 1380 grams of cannabis and 7 grams of heroin. The lower courts had previously denied his bail request. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the absence of public witnesses and the quantity of the narcotics placed the case in a category warranting bail. The Supreme Court examined whether the possession of these narcotics invoked the statutory prohibition against bail and addressed the evidentiary value of police witnesses in the absence of public witnesses. The Court held that the quantity of narcotics fell squarely within the prohibition of Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, thereby barring bail. Regarding the lack of public witnesses, the Court observed that societal apathy often prevents public participation in police operations and affirmed that police functionaries are competent witnesses whose acts are statutorily presumed to be intra vires. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' refusal of bail and declined to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of 1380 grams of cannabis and 7 grams of heroin attract the prohibitory clause of Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Can the absence of public witnesses in a narcotics case be excused by societal apathy?
  • Are police functionaries considered competent witnesses whose acts are statutorily presumed to be intra vires in narcotics cases?
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• Muhammad Nawaz and others vs Sakina Bibi and others2020 SCMR 1021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-15
  gift mutationoral giftinheritancefraudbona fide purchaserdeclaration suitSecundum allegata et Probataequity
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment resolves a dispute involving a challenge to a gift mutation (No. 452) allegedly executed by Ghulam Muhammad in favor of his three sons, to the exclusion of his daughters. The daughters (Respondents) filed a suit for declaration, asserting the mutation was fraudulent. The trial court decreed the suit, finding the gift unproven. On appeal, the first appellate court upheld the decree but protected the interest of minor purchasers who had bought 6 kanals 9 marlas from one of the sons. The High Court subsequently set aside this protection. The Supreme Court held that the beneficiaries of an oral gift must prove the essential ingredients: offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, along with the specific time, date, and venue of the transaction. Having failed to do so, the gift was void. However, the Court modified the High Court's judgment to protect the bona fide purchasers for value without notice. It ruled that the land sold should be adjusted against the fraudulent son's eventual inheritance share to prevent him from benefiting from his own fraud while ensuring equity for the purchasers.

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• Muhammad Mumtaz vs Mehtab and another2020 SCMR 200, 2020 P SC 844, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-02
  Qatl-i-amdjuvenile offenderretracted confessionsentence enhancementcircumstantial evidencecriminal appealmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition for enhancement of sentence filed by the complainant against a juvenile offender, Mehtab, who was convicted of the Qatl-i-amd of his schoolmate. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Peshawar High Court subsequently altered the conviction to Section 302(c) and reduced the sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the sentence of ten years was inadequate and required enhancement in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's case relied heavily on the respondent's retracted judicial confession, which detailed that the deceased had repeatedly sexually assaulted the respondent, leading to the fatal incident. The Court held that the respondent's confession must be accepted in its totality, noting that the deceased was not entirely blameless. Given the circumstances and the fact that the respondent had already served the full sentence, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Should a retracted judicial confession be accepted in its totality when it provides the primary narrative of the crime?
  • Does the fact that a convict has already served the entire sentence influence the Supreme Court's decision to enhance a sentence?
  • Can the conduct of the deceased be considered a mitigating factor in a case of Qatl-i-amd?
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• Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad and others vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-24
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationunlawful assemblycriminal petitionconduct of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in a case involving charges of forming an unlawful assembly, causing injuries inside the complainant's home, and subsequent registration of multiple First Information Reports during the pendency of ad interim bail. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to pre-arrest bail despite their subsequent conduct involving repeated violence and failure to furnish bail bonds as directed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition fails and leave is declined, noting that pre-arrest bail is designed to protect the innocent from abuse of process and cannot be used to stifle investigation or shield those whose conduct before the courts is far from enviable. The key principle laid down is that the equitable relief of pre-arrest bail is discretionary and will be denied to accused persons who abuse the process or fail to maintain proper conduct during proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted to accused persons who fail to maintain proper conduct and repeatedly violate the terms of interim relief?
  • Does the equitable remedy of pre-arrest bail extend to individuals attempting to stifle the investigative process?
  • Whether failure to furnish bail bonds as directed by the court justifies the refusal of pre-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Miskeen vs District Judge Attock, etc2020 P SC 198, 2020 SCMR 406, 2020 SCP 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-15
  Specific PerformanceAgreement to SellVoid AgreementExecution ProceedingsObjection to DecreeFraudMisrepresentationLack of JurisdictionLimitationRestitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of an application under Section 12(2) CPC and objections to execution proceedings. The original suit sought specific performance of an agreement to sell land, which lacked specific property description and sale consideration. The appellant, a subsequent purchaser of the property, filed objections to the execution of the decree and later an application under Section 12(2) CPC, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and lack of jurisdiction. The lower courts dismissed these remedies, often on grounds of limitation or misapplication of legal principles. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by decreeing specific performance based on a void agreement and by dismissing competent applications. It emphasized that the jurisdiction to grant specific performance is discretionary and must adhere to sound judicial principles, requiring strict compliance with provisions like Section 29 of the Contract Act, 1872, and Order VII Rule 3 CPC. The Court set aside all impugned orders, remanding the matter for fresh adjudication of the objections and the Section 12(2) CPC application based on pleadings and existing evidence, with consideration for restitution under Section 144 CPC if the decree is unsustainable.

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• Muhammad Mansha vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others2021 PLJ SC 249, 2020 SCMR 1069, 2020 P SC 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-22
  banking courtretrospective applicationalienation of assetsexecution proceedingspast and closed transactionregistered instrumentjudgment-debtor
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of an application by a Banking Court, which had ordered the attachment and sale of a property to satisfy a decree. The core legal question was whether the restriction on the alienation of assets by a judgment-debtor under Section 23(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could be applied retrospectively to a transaction completed before the Ordinance's enactment, and whether that provision applied to decrees passed under the repealed Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that the provision is not retrospective and cannot invalidate a past and closed transaction. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 23(2) applies only to judgments pronounced by a Banking Court established under the 2001 Ordinance, not those under the repealed Act. The Court established the principle that statutes altering substantive rights do not apply to past events or pending actions unless expressly stated, and that registered documents operate from the time they would have commenced to operate had registration not been required.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 23(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 apply to judgments passed under the repealed Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997?
  • Can the restriction on the transfer of assets by a judgment-debtor under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 be applied retrospectively to transactions completed before its enactment?
  • From what date does a registered document operate under the Registration Act 1908?
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