Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• ASAD HUSSAIN vs A. H. MALIK AND ANOTHER1973 P Cr. L J 84 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-11Read full judgment →
• ANWAR S. MUHAMMAD ALI vs ABDULLAH S. MOHOMED ALI AND 4 Other1973 PLD Karachi 615 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-21Read full judgment →
• ANSAR AHMAD vs KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH ITS1973 PLD Karachi 302 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-13Read full judgment →
• AMSHORO vs AZIZUDDIN AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 101 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-10-26Read full judgment →
• AMIRZADA AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 211 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• AMIRALI EBRAHIMJI SHEIKHA AND Others vs SADRUDDIN AND ANOTHER1973 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-08
  ad interim injunctionbalance of convenienceenemy propertytenancy rightsspecial leave to appealirreparable loss
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan vacating an ad interim injunction that had restrained respondents from altering or dealing with disputed premises. The premises, part of a building owned by the petitioners, were tenancy rights of an enemy-firm vested in the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property and subsequently purchased by the respondents. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in vacating the ad interim injunction given that alterations had been completed and a banking business commenced. The Supreme Court held that no justification existed for interference because the balance of convenience lay with the respondents, as halting an operational banking business would cause irreparable loss, while any ultimate success by the petitioners could be remedied by restoration or compensation. The principle laid down is that where interim mandatory or prohibitory changes have been executed and a commercial enterprise commenced, the balance of convenience shifts against disrupting the ongoing activity if alternative remedies or compensation remain available upon final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad interim injunction should be vacated when the restrained party has already completed alterations and commenced business operations?
  • Does the balance of convenience lie in favor of closing an operational banking business during the pendency of a property suit?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in vacating an interim injunction when no legal error or lack of jurisdiction is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR vs THE STATETHE STATE(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),1973 P Cr. L J 205 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-06
  post-arrest bailstatutory prohibitiontransportation for lifeprivate defencequantum of sentencediscretionary bail
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from two separate bail applications before the Lahore High Court, involving offences under Sections 304 and 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether offences carrying a maximum punishment of transportation for life (or lesser imprisonment terms) strictly fall within the statutory prohibition against granting bail under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the court can evaluate the likely sentence at the bail stage. The High Court, interpreting the Supreme Court's guidance in Amir v. The State, held that while such offences generally fall within the statutory prohibition, the court is not bound solely by the maximum prescribed sentence. If the court can conclude from the available data at the bail stage that the maximum punishment of transportation for life is highly improbable or would not be entailed, the case falls outside the prohibition. Consequently, the court has discretionary jurisdiction to grant bail, treating the grant of bail as the rule and its refusal as an exception.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence punishable with transportation for life or a lesser term of imprisonment automatically fall within the bail prohibition of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a court at the bail stage assess the available data to determine if the maximum punishment of transportation for life is unlikely to be imposed, thereby taking the case out of the statutory prohibition?
  • What is the guiding rule for the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail when a case does not fall within the statutory prohibition of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• AMINUDDIN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-20
  evacuee propertyPermanent Transfer DocumentSettlement authoritiesjurisdictionclerical mistakescivil suitrepeal of rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of specific evacuee property C.S. numbers following the issuance of Permanent Transfer Documents (P.T.D.). The petitioner, having obtained an evacuee house, sought to correct the P.T.D. records because certain C.S. numbers were erroneously included in the P.T.D. issued to respondent No. 4. While the Additional Settlement Commissioner initially granted relief to the petitioner, the High Court overturned this decision, holding that the Settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction to modify a P.T.D. once issued, particularly following the repeal of Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that after the repeal of the relevant rules, Settlement authorities possess no power to correct even clerical mistakes in a P.T.D. once issued. The Court held that the petitioner's remedy, if any, lies in a civil suit in a competent court to seek a declaration regarding the correct ownership of the disputed property numbers, rather than through the Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement authorities retain jurisdiction to modify a Permanent Transfer Document after it has been issued?
  • Can Settlement authorities correct clerical mistakes in a Permanent Transfer Document after the repeal of Rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Rules?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party seeking to challenge the inclusion of specific property numbers in a Permanent Transfer Document issued to another party?
  Read full judgment →
• AMEEN TAREEN vs THE STATE Opponent1973 PLD Karachi 648 · Sindh High Court · 1973-04-14Read full judgment →
• ALLAH RAKHA SAJID vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LYALLPUR AHD Other1973 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-15
  displaced personsproperty transferindustrial concernlocus standipossessionsettlement authoritieswrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a godown located in portion 'A' of property No. 208, Lyallpur, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner sought the transfer of the entire property, claiming status as an allottee operating an industrial concern. Settlement authorities determined that portion 'A' was an industrial concern, while the disputed godown was treated as a shop. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, finding he lacked possession of the godown on the target date of December 20, 1958, and thus had no entitlement to its transfer. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that the petitioner lacked locus standi to claim the godown because he was not in possession of it. The Court held that paragraph 15(3) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, regarding the transfer of industrial concerns, did not apply to the petitioner's claim for the godown, as the property was distinct from the industrial concern he operated.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant have locus standi to challenge the transfer of a property if they cannot prove possession on the target date?
  • Can a property treated as a shop by settlement authorities be claimed under provisions governing the transfer of industrial concerns?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to remand a case to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision regarding possession?
  Read full judgment →
• ALLAH RAKHA AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 766 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-20Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 144 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-12Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DITTA AND Another vs Raja SAEED AKHTAR1973 PLD Lahore 215 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-30Read full judgment →
• ALLAH DIN vs Raja AHMED ALI AND 3 OTHERS---RESPONDENT1973 P Cr. L J 563 · Sindh High Court · 1972-07-18Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1973 PLD Karachi 427 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-29Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD AND 8 Other vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 21973 PLD Karachi 200 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-22Read full judgment →
• ALI MUHAMMAD AND 4 Others vs THE STATE-1973 PCr.LJ 961 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-21Read full judgment →
• ALI MAHMOOD vs THE STATE1973 PCr.LJ 913 · Sindh High Court · 1972-12-18Read full judgment →
• ALI AHMAD AND Another vs MUHAMMAD FAZAL AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Lahore 207 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-05
  pre-emption decreeexecution of decreelimitation periodextinguishment of titlemutationrevenue authoritiespossession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a Letters Patent Appeal concerning land ownership following a consent decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption decree becomes inoperative and extinguishes the pre-emptor's title if an application for execution is not filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Lahore High Court held that upon payment of the decretal amount, title validly vests in the pre-emptor, and the failure to execute the decree within the limitation period merely bars the remedy to seek court assistance for delivery of possession, but does not extinguish the title itself under Section 28 of the Limitation Act. The court laid down the principle that a pre-emption decree creates substantive ownership upon payment, and such title remains alive unless extinguished by law or statute, obligating revenue authorities to reflect the decree in mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emptor lose title to property if they fail to execute a pre-emption decree within the limitation period prescribed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does Section 28 of the Limitation Act apply to applications for execution of a decree?
  • Are revenue authorities bound to sanction a mutation to give effect to a civil court decree under Section 45 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • When does title to property accrue in favour of a successful pre-emptor in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• AL LAIJ BAKHSH vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 680 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-20Read full judgment →
• AKRAM KHAN vs Messrs KOHAT TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KOHAT1973 PLC 24 · Labour Court · 1972-05-15Read full judgment →
• AKBAR ALI vs THE SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 109 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-07-24Read full judgment →
• AHMED HUSSAIN KHAN vs THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1973 PLD Karachi 718 · Sindh High Court · 1973-06-18Read full judgment →
• AHMAD KHAN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 601 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-17Read full judgment →
• AHMAD DIN AND Another vs The STATE1973 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-24
  murder convictionbenefit of doubtcommutation of sentenceinterested witnessesmedical evidencesudden quarrelcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences of two brothers, Ahmad Din and Muhammad Sharif, for the murder of Ghulam Rasul under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The incident arose from a dispute regarding voter registration. The prosecution alleged that Ahmad Din struck the deceased with a gun butt, followed by Muhammad Sharif firing a fatal shot. The Supreme Court evaluated the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, noting that while some were related to the deceased, an independent witness corroborated their presence. Regarding Muhammad Sharif, the Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, finding the murder resulted from a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel rather than a planned act. Conversely, the Court acquitted Ahmad Din, granting him the benefit of doubt because the medical evidence failed to corroborate the prosecution's claim that he had struck the deceased with a gun butt, as no blunt force injuries were present on the victim's head. The appeal was thus partially allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a death sentence is appropriate when a murder occurs during a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence contradicts the specific allegations of assault made by prosecution witnesses?
  • Is the testimony of interested witnesses admissible if corroborated by independent evidence?
  • Does the absence of medical evidence regarding a specific injury attributed to an accused warrant the benefit of doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• AHMAD CORPORATION vs MESSRS THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD GRAIN AND OIL1973 PLD Karachi 361 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-16
  breach of warrantydiminution of priceSale of Goodssub-salemeasure of damagesLetters Patent Appealrecovery of price
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal was filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for the recovery of Rs. 37,898-3-3, representing the unpaid balance for rice supplied to the defendants. The defendants contended that the rice was of inferior quality and did not conform to the specifications required by the Government of Pakistan, for whom the rice was ultimately purchased, leading to rejection and price deductions. The High Court analyzed the terms of the oral contract, the quality of the goods, and the applicability of the Sale of Goods Act. The Court held that the plaintiffs were aware of the sub-sale to the Government and had agreed to supply rice conforming to Government specifications. Consequently, the supply of inferior rice constituted a breach of warranty. The Court ruled that under Section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act, the buyer is entitled to set up a breach of warranty in diminution of the price even without filing a counter-claim. Applying Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872, the Court calculated the diminution of price based on the actual loss of profit suffered by the defendants and decreed the suit in part.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a buyer who has accepted goods can set up a breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price as a defense in a suit for recovery of the price?
  • Does the rule of caveat emptor apply when a buyer places an order for supply and trusts the judgment of the seller for a specific known purpose?
  • What is the measure of damages or diminution of price under Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872 when the seller has knowledge of an intended sub-sale by the buyer?
  • Can a buyer plead diminution of price under Section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 without filing a formal counter-claim or cross-suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha SHAUKAT ALI vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-01-24
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertydisplaced personsdivisibility of houseconstructive possessionconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing writ petitions relating to the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically bungalow No. 2, Lahore. The core legal questions involved whether a claimant in direct possession has an absolute preferential right over an indirect claimant relying on a relative's constructive possession, and whether the division of the property into separate residential units by settlement authorities was lawful. The Supreme Court held that while a direct claimant generally has a preferential right in cases of active competition under the Schedule, the settlement authorities lawfully exercised their discretion in dividing the property based on its structural characteristics and independent units. The Court laid down that divisibility of an evacuee house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act depends on whether the premises consist of multiple residential units in the occupation of several persons, and such administrative decisions regarding structural division, if neither capricious nor whimsical, should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant displaced person out of possession rely on the constructive possession of a relative to claim transfer of evacuee property?
  • When does the question of divisibility of an evacuee house arise under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with the settlement authorities' decision regarding the divisibility of a house under constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• ADAM Ltd. KARACHI vs MAKTOOB AHMED Bokharl PIR MUHAMMAD1973 PLC 153 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND OTHERS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS COLLECTOR1973 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-01-30
  Customs Actsearch and seizuresmugglingconfiscationwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from nineteen civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Collector of Customs against orders of the High Court, which had declared the search and seizure of foreign cloth from the respondents' premises to be without lawful authority and directed the return of the goods. The core legal question was whether Customs Officers could circumvent the High Court's writs and the mandatory safeguards of Section 172-A of the Sea Customs Act by reseizing the goods under Section 178 of the same Act upon asserting they were liable to confiscation, without any prior determination of such liability. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that goods whose liability to confiscation has not yet been determined in proper proceedings cannot be seized under Section 178, as doing so would render the statutory safeguards in Sections 172 and 172-A nugatory. The Court laid down the principle that the phrase 'liable to confiscation' under Section 178 presupposes that the liability to confiscation has already been determined or is no longer in dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether goods whose liability to confiscation has not yet been determined in proper proceedings are liable to seizure under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act?
  • Can the statutory safeguards provided under sections 172 and 172-A of the Sea Customs Act be bypassed by resorting to section 178 of the said Act?
  • Does the phrase 'liable to confiscation' in section 178 of the Sea Customs Act require that the liability to confiscation has already been determined or is no longer in dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• ADAM AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 831 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-21Read full judgment →
• ABOO NOOR MUHAMMAD vs GENERAL IRON & STEEL WORKS LTD., KARACHI S1973 PLD Karachi 234 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-09
  temporary injunctionspecific performancecommercial contractbalance of convenienceprima facie caseirreparable lossrescission of contract
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The plaintiff filed an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing of a quantity of M.S. scrap iron, effectively seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of goods. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, irreparable loss, and a balance of convenience in their favor to justify the grant of a temporary injunction. The Court held that the application for a temporary injunction should be declined. The ratio decidendi is that where a plaintiff claims damages in the alternative, specific performance is not the appropriate remedy, and the plaintiff fails to demonstrate irreparable loss. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that in commercial contracts, the failure to perform within the stipulated time, coupled with the acceptance of a returned deposit, suggests the contract was treated as rescinded. The key principles laid down are that a temporary injunction will not be granted if the plaintiff has an adequate alternative remedy in damages, if the balance of convenience favors the defendant, and if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted when the plaintiff has an alternative claim for damages?
  • Does the acceptance of a returned deposit after the expiry of a contract period indicate that the contract was mutually rescinded?
  • Is a temporary injunction appropriate when it would effectively decide the entire suit in favor of the plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• ABID HUSSAIN vs Mst. AFSAR JEHAN BEGUM AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-08
  first appealdismissal in limineSingle Judge jurisdictionDivision BenchHigh Court Rules and Orderscivil procedureadverse possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave addresses the jurisdiction of a Single Judge of a High Court to dismiss a regular first appeal in limine. The appellant challenged the judgment of a High Court which summarily dismissed his first appeal against a trial court decree declaring respondents' title and right to possession of certain plots. The core legal question was whether a Single Judge, empowered to hear motions for admission of first appeals under specific High Court rules, possesses the authority to dismiss a first appeal in limine, or whether such dismissal requires a Division Bench pursuant to consistent court practice. The Supreme Court held that in light of the consistent practice of the High Court restricting a Single Judge's disposal of first appeal admission motions to either admission or reference to a Division Bench, a Single Judge should not depart from such practice to dismiss a first appeal in limine. Furthermore, on the merits of the case, the factual disputes precluded a summary dismissal. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the matter remanded for hearing by a Division Bench.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Single Judge of a High Court has the power to dismiss a regular first appeal in limine under the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders?
  • Can a Single Judge depart from the consistent practice of the High Court regarding the hearing of first appeals without referring the matter to the Chief Justice or Full Court?
  • Is the summary dismissal of a first appeal under Order XLI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure appropriate when the case involves complex factual and legal disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUS SAMAD vs The STATE1973 SCMR 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17
  criminal petitionmurderappreciation of evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibusbenefit of doubtocular testimonyleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court at Peshawar, which had maintained the petitioner Abdus Samad's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased Yusuf, while acquitting his co-accused brother. The core legal question concerns whether the ocular testimony of injured, close-relative witnesses, which was partially disbelieved regarding another co-accused, could sustain the petitioner's conviction, and whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court properly separated the grain from the chaff, reaffirming that the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not accepted, and that mere arguments regarding the appreciation of evidence do not warrant granting leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that partial disbelief of witness testimony does not automatically render the remainder unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is applicable in the appreciation of evidence in criminal trials in Pakistan?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained upon the testimony of injured eye-witnesses who have been partially disbelieved with regard to a co-accused?
  • Does re-agitation of pure questions of fact and the appreciation of evidence constitute a sufficient ground for granting special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUS SALAM AND 2 Other vs CROWN RADIO CORPORATION, KARACHI1973 PLD Karachi 24 · Sindh High Court · 1972-04-19Read full judgment →
• ABDUR REHMAN vs BANNU SUGAR MILLS1973 PLC 367 · Labour Court · 1972-07-10Read full judgment →
• ABDUR RAZZAQ MALIK vs THE WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1973 PLD Lahore 188 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-16
  dismissal from servicestatutory corporationdouble jeopardymaster and servantwrit jurisdictiondelegation of powerdisciplinary proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition was filed by an Accountant challenging his dismissal from service by the Chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner had previously been administered a severe warning on identical charges following a departmental inquiry. Subsequently, a second inquiry was initiated on the same charges, leading to his dismissal by the Chairman. The court examined whether the second inquiry violated the principle of double jeopardy, whether the Chairman had the jurisdiction to dismiss the petitioner, and whether the general law of master and servant applied to employees of statutory corporations. The court held that the second inquiry on the same charges was barred by the maxim 'nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa'. It further held that since the petitioner was promoted by the Authority itself, only the Authority, and not the Chairman, was competent to impose the penalty under the statutory rules. Finally, the court ruled that where statutory rules govern the terms of employment of a public corporation, the general law of master and servant does not apply, and the High Court has jurisdiction to declare an illegal dismissal void.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of double jeopardy (nemo debet bis vexari) apply to departmental disciplinary proceedings against an employee of a statutory corporation?
  • Can an officer or authority subordinate to the original appointing authority legally dismiss an employee of a statutory public corporation?
  • Does the general law of master and servant apply to employees of a statutory public corporation whose terms of service are governed by statutory rules?
  • Is a declaration of invalidity of dismissal available as a remedy to an employee of a statutory corporation under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL WAHID vs Haji ABDUR RAHIM AND ANOTHER1973 PLD Supreme Court 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-28
  trade mark rectificationphonetic similarityvisual similaritydeceptive resemblanceRegistrar discretioncommon suffixletters patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan (Karachi) dismissing in limine a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge. The dispute concerned rectification proceedings under Sections 37, 38, and 46 of the Trade Marks Act 1940, filed by the respondents (proprietors of the trade mark 'Saigon') to expunge the appellants' registered trade mark 'Daigon' on the ground of deceptive visual and phonetic similarity causing market confusion. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks had rejected the rectification application, but the High Court's Single Judge reversed that order regarding 'Daigon'. The Supreme Court held that the first syllables ('Dai' and 'Sai') were distinct, and under established trade mark law principles, where words share a common suffix, the initial syllable serves as the primary mark of distinction. The Court further affirmed that an appellate court should not lightly interfere with the Registrar's statutory discretion unless it is patently erroneous. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Assistant Registrar's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Where two trade marks share a common suffix, does the dissimilarity in their initial syllables suffice to distinguish them from causing deceptive similarity?
  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with the statutory discretion exercised by the Registrar of Trade Marks?
  • Is the mark 'Daigon' deceptively similar visually or phonetically to the mark 'Saigon' under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL SATTAR QURESHI vs CHIEF JUDGE, SMALL CAUSES COURT &1973 PLD Karachi 294 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-14Read full judgment →
• ABDUL SATTAR AND ANOTHER vs MESSRS PAKISTAN OXYGEN LTD., KARACHI1973 PLC 125 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• ABDUL REHMAN ETC. ISMAIL vs THE STATE THE STATE1973 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-18
  murderocular evidencedelay in FIRhostile witnessSection 288 CrPCdying declarationcorroboration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction and death sentences of the petitioners under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions pertained to whether alleged delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR) vitiated the prosecution case and whether non-reliance on recovery evidence and a dying statement compromised the credibility of ocular evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the convictions. The Court held that the delay was adequately explained by the immediate priority given to hospitalizing the victim and that there was no deliberate concoction. The Court established that reliable and consistent ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and statements transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, the non-reliance on recovery evidence or a dying declaration does not inherently undermine otherwise credible ocular evidence where such evidence independently proves the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alleged delay in lodging an FIR affect the prosecution case when the delay is adequately explained by the hospitalization of the victim?
  • Can a statement of a witness recorded by a committing court and transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be relied upon to corroborate ocular evidence?
  • Does the non-reliance on recovery evidence or a dying declaration invalidate a conviction supported by reliable ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RAZZAK AND 3 OTHERS vs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN THROUGH ITS1973 P Cr. L J 884 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-16Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASOOL AND 6 vs PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH THE SECRETARY, FOREST DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OP SIND, KARACHI AND 20 Other Opponents1973 PLD Karachi 606 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID vs THE STATE--.Respondent.1973 P Cr. L J 398 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-02Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID AND Others vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1973SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  rehabilitation schemeevacuee propertyallotment cancellationself-cultivationpurchase optionleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of Letters Patent Appeals by the High Court, which had earlier dismissed constitutional petitions under Article 98 of the Constitution filed against the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners were descendants of an Indian Muslim property owner who did not migrate to Pakistan, but were initially allotted land under paragraph 47 of the Rehabilitation Scheme. Upon the deletion of paragraph 47 in 1959, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a memorandum in January 1960 allowing such allottees to purchase land within certain limits, a concession later curtailed in June 1961 to land under self-cultivation. The core legal question was whether the option to purchase was restricted to allottees in self-cultivating possession as of the initial 1960 memorandum or extended to those in possession at the time of the subsequent 1961 memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent memorandum was in continuation and amplification of the first, and the use of the word 'is' in the 1961 memorandum was descriptive rather than prescriptive, thereby upholding the departmental interpretation and dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the option to purchase allotted land under the Rehabilitation Scheme was restricted to allottees who were in self-cultivating possession as of the date of the first memorandum in January 1960?
  • Whether a subsequent administrative memorandum issued in continuation of a previous one supersedes the earlier conditions or merely amplifies them?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RASHID AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 428 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-13Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RAHMAN AND 4 Other vs IFTIKHAR AHMED1973 PLD Karachi 177 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-13Read full judgment →
• ABDUL RAHIM vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COM MISSIONER, HYDERABAD AND 4 Other1973SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  settlement of propertydisplaced personearmarking listrevisional jurisdictionnatural justiceproperty transferassessment records
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a property dispute over house No. F/67-1199/1, where the appellant, a displaced person, claimed entitlement based on possession and a submitted C.H. Form. The Settlement Commissioner had transferred both the disputed house and an adjacent property to respondent No. 5, treating them as a single unit. The Additional Settlement Commissioner had previously found the properties to be distinct and that the disputed house was not included in the earmarking list, yet the Settlement Commissioner reversed this without proper justification or notice to the appellant in the revision proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's decision was based on a misconception of facts, as evidence from the Excise and Taxation Department clearly established the two properties as separate and distinct entities with different assessments and tenures. Furthermore, the Court found the transfer of both properties for the price of one to be improper. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, allowing the appellant to retain the disputed house upon payment of its valuation price.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner reverse a finding of fact regarding the distinct nature of two properties without evidence?
  • Is it permissible for a Settlement Commissioner to pass an adverse order against a party in a revision proceeding without making that party a respondent?
  • Does the High Court have the authority under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution to interfere when a lower authority's finding is based on a misconception of facts?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL QADIR vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 887 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-04Read full judgment →
• ABDUL QADIR vs Syed NAZ1R ALI AND 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 396 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1973-05-02Read full judgment →
• ABDUL NABI vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN TROUGH CHIFF SECRETARY, CIVIL SECRETARIAT, LAHORE AND Anothers1973 PLC 75 · Balochistan High Court · 1972-02-09Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MUNAF (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND Another vs THE PROVINCE OF N. W.F.P., THROUGH THE SECRETARY, IRRIGATION AND POWERS AND B & R, PESHAWAR AND 3 Other1973 PLD Supreme Court 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  public works contractschedule of ratescontract interpretationamended ratescivil suitSupreme Court of Pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan modifying a trial court decree in a suit for declaration, recovery of money, and permanent injunction relating to a public works contract. The core legal question was whether the appellants-contractors were entitled to receive payment for work executed pursuant to their contract at the original schedule of rates of 1950 or on the basis of the amended rate of 1954. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were bound by the amended rates prevalent at the time of entering into the contract, as the 1954 amendment constituted a corrected schedule correcting a double payment anomaly. However, the Court further held that for any additional work executed by the plaintiffs after 9 March 1959—when the 1954 schedule was repealed by the Provincial Government—they were entitled to payment in accordance with the un-amended 1950 schedule of rates based on Government decisions. The appeal was accordingly allowed in part.

  Questions settled

  • Are contractors entitled to payment based on the schedule of rates prevalent at the time of entering into the contract?
  • Does a subsequent repeal of an amended schedule of rates entitle contractors to un-amended rates for additional work executed after the repeal?
  • Can gratuitous administrative concessions or policy decisions made after contract execution be legally enforced in a court of law?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID vs The STATE1973 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-08
  attempted robberycriminal intimidationcriminal attemptbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant, a police constable, under Sections 393 and 398 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempted robbery. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and his companion entered a brothel armed with a knife and a revolver, ordered the inmates to stand up, and demanded they surrender their belongings for search, but fled when the inmates raised an alarm. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the actions and utterances of the accused constituted an attempt to commit robbery. The Court reiterated that a criminal attempt requires intent, an act toward commission, and failure due to circumstances beyond the offender's control. It held that the raising of an alarm by the victims was not an uncontrollable circumstance that defeated the design, and the accused took no practical steps to execute a search or robbery. Applying the principle that the interpretation more favorable to the accused must be preferred, the Court altered the conviction to criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential legal ingredients required to constitute a criminal attempt under penal law?
  • Can a conviction for attempted robbery be sustained if the accused took no practical steps to execute the robbery beyond demanding a search?
  • Is the raising of an alarm by victims considered a circumstance beyond the control of the offender for the purposes of establishing a criminal attempt?
  • Which interpretation must be preferred when the facts of an incident yield two equally possible versions?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID vs NAWAB DIN1973 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-20
  criminal proceedingsabuse of processcivil disputequashing of proceedingsmisappropriationcriminal complaint
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which quashed criminal proceedings initiated by the petitioner against his uncle under sections 406 and 418 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had determined that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and that the criminal complaint was a tactical maneuver to exert pressure on the respondent, following an interim order passed in the respondent's favor in pending civil litigation. The Supreme Court examined the timeline of the alleged misappropriation, noting that the incident occurred in 1965, yet the complaint was only filed in 1971, shortly after the respondent secured a status quo order in a Regular Second Appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of the court intended to settle civil disputes. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that criminal law should not be weaponized to coerce parties in ongoing civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed if they are initiated to exert pressure in a pending civil dispute?
  • Does a significant delay in filing a criminal complaint, following an adverse civil court order, justify the quashing of criminal proceedings?
  • Is a dispute regarding the misappropriation of compensation funds essentially civil in nature when linked to broader property litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID NIZAMI vs The STATE1973 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-05
  criminal breach of trustdefault sentencefinetransportation for lifesentencingprevention of corruption
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the legality of a default sentence of imprisonment awarded in lieu of a fine under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The appellant was convicted of criminal breach of trust by a public servant and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 24,000, with four years rigorous imprisonment in default. Leave to appeal was granted solely to examine whether the default sentence exceeded one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment provided for the offence. The core legal question turned on the calculation of fractions of punishment under section 65 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically how transportation for life is reckoned under section 57. The Court held that transportation for life is equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years, making one-fourth thereof five years. Consequently, the default sentence of four years was within legal limits. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether transportation for life is reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years when calculating fractions of terms of punishment under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a default sentence of four years imprisonment in lieu of a fine for an offence under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exceed one-fourth of the maximum period of imprisonment?
  • How is the maximum term of imprisonment calculated under section 65 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the substantive offence is punishable with transportation for life?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL MAJID AND Another vs THE STATE1973 PLD Supreme Court 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  approver testimonyaccomplice evidencecorroborationmurdercriminal conspiracyfirearms recoverytest identification parade
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the convictions of the appellants under sections 302 and 460 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, along with sentences of death and transportation for life. Leave was granted to examine whether the convictions based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver were sustainable in accordance with established legal principles for the appraisal of accomplice evidence. The Supreme Court evaluated the requirements of corroboration for approver testimony, reiterating that while an accomplice's evidence can form the basis of a conviction, rule of prudence demands independent corroboration on material particulars linking the accused to the crime. The Court held that the approver's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by independent and reliable evidence, including the recovery of a rifle at the instance of an appellant that matched cartridge empties from the crime scene, eyewitness accounts, and medical evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice form the basis of a criminal conviction under Pakistani law?
  • What is the extent and nature of corroboration required from independent sources to rely upon an approver's testimony?
  • Whether an accused can be convicted for murder in addition to an offence under section 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code arising from the same transaction?
  • Does the rejection of an approver's testimony regarding some co-accused persons necessitate its total rejection against other co-accused whose roles are supported by independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL LATIF vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI1973 PCr.LJ 1012 · Lahore High Court · 1973-04-16Read full judgment →
• ABDUL KARIM vs MUHAMMAD SHAM AND Another1973 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-23
  Specific performanceContract of saleImmovable propertyPenalty clauseTime is of the essenceVendor's defaultDiscretion of court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave challenged a High Court order affirming specific performance of a property sale contract. The core legal questions concerned whether specific performance could be enforced despite a contractual penalty clause for non-performance, and if time was of the essence, precluding the vendee from enforcing the contract due to alleged delay in payment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that specific performance is enforceable even if a contract names a sum to be paid upon breach, as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court reiterated the presumption under Section 12, Explanation, that monetary compensation is inadequate for breach of a contract to transfer immovable property. It was also held that the vendor, having failed to obtain requisite permissions and certificates, could not take advantage of his own default to argue that the vendee had failed to perform his part of the contract.

  Questions settled

  • Can specific performance of a contract be enforced even if the contract names a sum to be paid in case of its breach?
  • Is monetary compensation generally presumed to be adequate relief for the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property?
  • Can a party to a contract take advantage of their own default to argue against the enforcement of the contract?
  • Is the jurisdiction to decree specific performance discretionary, and if so, what principles guide this discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL KARIM MOOSA vs MOHINI BAI AND Other1973 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-27
  review petitionevacuee propertydisplaced personserror apparent on the face of the recordsupreme court practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether the acquisition of the property in dispute by the Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act, 1958) renders it non-evacuee property, and whether the petition warrants reconsideration and satisfies the grounds for review under Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that the legal point stands authoritatively settled by an earlier precedent of the Court and that the grounds urged do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record. The ratio decidendi is that a review petition cannot be entertained where the legal proposition has already been authoritatively determined and no apparent error exists on the record. The key principle laid down is that settled questions of law adjudicated by authoritative precedents do not furnish a ground for review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquisition of property by the Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act, 1958) makes it non-evacuee property?
  • Does a previously settled authoritative decision on a point of law warrant reconsideration in review proceedings?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record for the purposes of maintaining a review petition under Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL JABAR AND Another vs AHMAD JAN1973 PLD Karachi 289 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-20
  trademark infringementinterim injunctionunwary purchaser testpassing offregistered trade markbalance of convenienceprima facie case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This miscellaneous appeal challenged an interim injunction granted by the District Judge, restraining the appellants from infringing the respondent's registered trademark, "Koh-i-Noor Beedi No. 505." The core legal question concerned whether the appellants' use of a similar mark, "Kooh-i-Soor Biti No. 506," constituted infringement and warranted injunctive relief. The Court held that the respondent established a strong prima facie case, as the wrappers were identical in design, color scheme, and name, creating a high probability of deceiving unwary purchasers. The Court affirmed that the "unwary purchaser" test remains the standard for determining infringement. Furthermore, the Court ruled that when a strong prima facie case of infringement is established, the balance of convenience argument—claiming potential financial ruin for the infringer—cannot prevail, as a party cannot benefit from their own fraud. Additionally, the Court clarified that the mere pendency of a trademark registration application by the appellants does not preclude the registered proprietor from enforcing their exclusive rights under the law. The appeal was dismissed, and the interim injunction was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'unwary purchaser' test remain the valid criterion for determining trademark infringement?
  • Can a defendant rely on the balance of convenience to defeat an injunction when a strong prima facie case of trademark infringement is established?
  • Does the pendency of a trademark registration application by an alleged infringer bar the registered proprietor from seeking an injunction against infringement?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAQUE vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1973 P Cr. L J 945 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-28Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAQUE AND Others vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1973 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-12
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyclaimant displaced personindivisibility of propertysettlement authoritiesrevision jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee house. The core dispute involved competing claims between the petitioners (non-claimants/locals) and respondent No. 3 (a claimant displaced person) over an evacuee property. The primary legal questions were whether the Settlement Commissioner could reverse findings on the divisibility of the property without a site inspection and whether the petitioners were entitled to transfer based on alleged application forms not found on the record. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in revision to determine the property's indivisibility based on the property plan, noting that the presence of a single exit rendered it indivisible. The Court affirmed that a claimant displaced person holds preference over non-claimants for indivisible properties. Consequently, the Court upheld the transfer of the entire house to the claimant, ruling that the Settlement Commissioner’s reliance on the property plan rather than a physical inspection was sufficient to establish indivisibility.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner determine the divisibility of an evacuee property based on a property plan without a personal site inspection?
  • Does a claimant displaced person have preference over non-claimants regarding the transfer of an indivisible evacuee house?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner empowered to correct findings on property divisibility made by lower settlement authorities in revision?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HANAN vs THE STATE1973 PLD Peshawar 175 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-07-30Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID vs AZIZ BAKHSH1973 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28
  land settlementfinality of ordersdelegated powersres judicataadministrative lawallotment cancellation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the finality of administrative orders under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether an order passed by an Additional Deputy Commissioner, acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which remained unchallenged, attained finality, thereby barring subsequent proceedings regarding the same land allotment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the officer in question was duly empowered under the Act and the relevant notifications. Consequently, the Court held that because the initial order had not been challenged through the prescribed appellate or revisional hierarchy, it attained finality and could not be reopened or challenged through independent, subsequent proceedings. The key principle laid down is that once an order is passed by a competent authority exercising delegated powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and such order is not challenged within the statutory framework, it becomes final and is immune to collateral attack in subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 attain finality if not challenged in appeal or revision?
  • Can an allotment of land be challenged in subsequent proceedings if a prior order regarding the same allotment has already attained finality?
  • Are proceedings initiated after an unappealed order of a competent settlement authority legally competent?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHERA vs THE STATE-1973 P Cr. L J 291 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-14Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LARKANA AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 344 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-30
  preventive detentionmaintenance of public orderwrit jurisdictionalternative remedyvague groundspast conductmala fides
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the preventive detention of a detenu under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The petitioner argued that the detention was invalid due to the non-service of the original detention order, the vagueness of the grounds of detention, and alleged malice in fact. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the non-service of the physical order does not invalidate detention if the detenu is apprised of the authority under which they are held. The Court ruled that while preventive detention cannot be punitive, a detenu's past conduct is a valid basis for inferring a reasonable probability of future prejudicial activity. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the grounds of detention were sufficiently factual to enable the detenu to make an effective representation. Crucially, the Court held that the statutory option to make a representation to the government under Section 3(6-a) of the Ordinance does not constitute an "adequate" alternative remedy to bar constitutional writ jurisdiction, as the provision does not impose a mandatory duty on the government to consider it.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-service of a physical copy of a detention order invalidate the detention if the detenu is apprised of the authority under which they are held?
  • Can the past conduct of a person be legally used as the basis for a detaining authority's satisfaction to order preventive detention?
  • Does the statutory right to make a representation to the government constitute an adequate alternative remedy so as to bar the High Court's writ jurisdiction under the Constitution?
  • What is the test for determining whether the grounds of detention communicated to a detenu are sufficiently definite to satisfy statutory requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI AND Other1973 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20
  review petitionsettlement propertyresidential unitestoppellimitationadministrative finality
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for review of an order previously passed by the Supreme Court regarding the transfer of a property described as a guest house. The petitioner challenged the Court's earlier finding that the property constituted a single residential unit, arguing that a Settlement Commissioner had previously determined it consisted of multiple units. The Supreme Court examined the procedural history, noting that an Additional Settlement Commissioner had originally determined the property was a single unit, a decision affirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner following a spot inspection. The Court observed that the subsequent order by a Settlement Commissioner, which the petitioner relied upon, was passed in a revision petition that was time-barred and improperly interfered with a final adjudication already settled by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had previously attorned to the transferees, invoking the principle of estoppel. Finding no valid grounds for review under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court dismissed the petition, reaffirming the finality of the earlier administrative determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a review petition lie under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the petitioner merely re-argues the merits of the original decision?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner interfere with an order that has already been adjudicated up to the level of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does the principle of estoppel apply to a petitioner who has attorned to the transferees of a property?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID KHAN JATOI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 1032 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-25
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailharassmentjurisdictionsessions courtreasonable groundsmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application was filed by a Member of the National Assembly seeking pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 364 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was subsequently treated as a murder case. The applicant contended that the prosecution was part of a series of politically motivated actions intended to harass him, pointing to his prior successive arrests and detentions. The State opposed the bail, arguing that the High Court should not bypass the Court of Session, that the application was premature, and that judicial confessions of co-accused and strong motive existed. The High Court observed that while it normally requires applicants to approach the Court of Session first, special circumstances existed here as the police had surrounded the High Court to prevent the applicant's entry. Finding that the material currently available did not constitute reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was guilty of a non-bailable capital offence, the Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, reserving the State's right to apply for cancellation if fresh evidence of tampering or abscondance emerged.

  Questions settled

  • Under what exceptional circumstances can the High Court directly entertain an application for pre-arrest bail without the applicant first approaching the Court of Session?
  • What standard of proof or material must be present for a court to find 'reasonable grounds' to deny bail in offences punishable with death or transportation?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed where the police attempt to block an applicant's physical access to the court premises?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMID JATOI vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 514 · Sindh High Court · 1972-11-20Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMEED vs GHULAM KADIR MEMON AND Another1973 P Cr. L J 809 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-19Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HALEEM KHAN vs MESSRS SIND OBSERVER & MERCANTILE STEAM PRESS1973 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-03-02
  Adverse possessionEvacuee propertyInterruption of possessionPermissive possessionAcquiescenceProperty disputeEviction suitTitle by adverse possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case concerns a property dispute over premises on Bunder Road, Karachi. The respondents purchased the property in 1946. Following the Hindu owners' migration, the petitioner occupied the premises in 1948 without authorization. The property was declared evacuee property in 1953, and the petitioner applied for its transfer, receiving a P.T.O. in 1960 and a P.T.D. in 1963, having paid rent to the Settlement Authorities. Subsequently, the Custodian declared the property non-evacuee in 1967, leading to the cancellation of the petitioner's P.T.D. The respondents then filed an eviction suit, where the petitioner raised a claim of adverse possession. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had perfected title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decision that the adverse possession claim failed. The court held that the period during which the property was treated as evacuee property and the petitioner occupied it permissively as a licensee of the Custodian, having applied for its transfer and paid rent, interrupted the continuity required for adverse possession. Consequently, the 12-year period for perfecting title was not completed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the treatment of a property as evacuee property interrupt a claim of adverse possession?
  • Can a person claim adverse possession if they have applied for the transfer of the property as evacuee property and paid rent to the Custodian Authorities?
  • Is occupation of a property declared evacuee property considered permissive when the occupant applies for its transfer?
  • Does the period during which property is in the lawful possession of the Custodian count towards perfecting title by adverse possession?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAKIM vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION Etc.S1973 SCMR 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-17
  settlement lawssecond revisiondisplaced personsappurtenant quarterconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a quarter attached to a bungalow under settlement laws. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to entertain a second revision petition under amending laws, whether appurtenant quarters must be specifically named in claim forms, and the application of revised settlement schemes. The Supreme Court held that pending revision proceedings were duly saved by Ordinance XIII of 1962, that a house under the statute includes appurtenant quarters even if occupied by others without separate mention in the form, and that subsequent settlement schemes cannot override transfers finalized prior to their enforcement. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the settlement authorities and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pending revision proceedings before the Chief Settlement Commissioner were saved by Ordinance XIII of 1962?
  • Does an application for the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 require the specific mention of appurtenant quarters occupied by others?
  • Can a revised settlement scheme affect property transfers that were finalized prior to its enforcement?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAFIZ AND Another vs MUZAFFAR KARIM1973 PLD Karachi 252 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-29Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAFEEZ KHAN vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 797 · Sindh High Court · 1972-08-24Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GRAFFAR vs MESSRS SHER ALI, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ALIBHOY E.1973 PLC 172 · Labour Court · 1972-12-12Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHAYOOR KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 119 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-24Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHANI vs THE GOVERNMENT OP PUNJAB THROUGH THE CHIEF1973 PLC 66 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1972-08-09Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHANI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-Opponents1973 P Cr. L J 261 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-04Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHAFOOR vs THE STATE AND 5 OTHERS-1973 P Cr. L J 1050 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-21Read full judgment →
• ABDUL GHAFFAR vs THIS STATE1973 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-04
  murderdeath sentencelesser punishmentmitigating circumstanceprivate revengecriminal appealappellate discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the appellant's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Faqir Khan under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to a lesser sentence of transportation for life on the ground that he committed the murder to avenge the killing of his father, relying on the precedent in Ajun Shah v. The State. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance, particularly where the accused killed the brother of the person responsible for his father's murder rather than the actual killer, and where the attack was carried out in a premeditated manner. The key principle laid down is that while the environment and background of an offender may be considered, private revenge is not a mitigating circumstance for commuting the death penalty, and the appellate court will not interfere with the sentencing discretion exercised by the lower courts unless proper grounds are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Is private revenge considered a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence in a murder case?
  • Whether an accused who avenges his father's murder by killing the murderer's brother is entitled to a lesser punishment?
  • When should an appellate court interfere with the sentencing discretion exercised by the trial court and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL BARI vs CHAIRMAN, SECOND SIND LABOUR COURT KARACHI AND ANOTHER1973 PLC 159 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-09-03Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ KHAN vs MESSRS PAKISTAN CABLES LTD., KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1973 PLC 16 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-18Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ KHAN vs MESSRS PAKISTAN CABLES LTD., KARACHI AND 2 Other1973 PLD Karachi 216 · Sindh High Court · 1972-09-18Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1973 P Cr. L J 990 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-12Read full judgment →
• ZULFIQUAR ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 756 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-04Read full judgment →
• ZIA-UR-RAHMAN vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 382 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• ZIA UD DIN vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another1972 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-21
  transfer of propertydisplaced personclaimant vs localundisputed possessionsettlement schemeletters patent appealspecial leave appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal in limine regarding the transfer of a small house in Lahore. The dispute over the house was between Zia-ud-Din, a local allottee, and Ahmad Bakhsh, a claimant displaced person. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the house to Ahmad Bakhsh, holding it indivisible and preferring a claimant over a local. Successive revisions and a writ petition by the appellant were dismissed. The core legal question was whether Ahmad Bakhsh was in undisputed possession of the property and whether statutory hearing provisions under Settlement Scheme No. 1 were mandatory. The Supreme Court held that Ahmad Bakhsh was in undisputed possession and, being a claimant, was rightly preferred over the local appellant. The Court further held that paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 are directory rather than mandatory. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claimant displaced person is to be preferred over a local allottee in the transfer of an indivisible property?
  • Whether paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 are mandatory or directory provisions requiring notice?
  • Whether the possession of a displaced person sharing a disputed property can be deemed disputed without clear evidence of a licensee relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• ZARSHAD vs BAHADUR KHAN AND Other1972 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  acquittaldying statementocular evidencemedical evidencecriminal appealevidentiary infirmitiesabscondence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court acquitting three respondents who had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case rested on the dying statement of the deceased and the ocular testimony of a single witness, corroborated by the alleged abscondence of the accused. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary value of the prosecution's case, noting significant infirmities: the ocular testimony was inconsistent with medical evidence regarding the firing range, and critical evidence, including a separate dying statement, was not produced during the trial. Furthermore, the court noted the failure to bring the evidence of a deceased witness onto the record under the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was not unreasonable given these material contradictions and evidentiary gaps. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal order and dismissed the petition, affirming that appellate courts will not disturb an acquittal where the prosecution's case suffers from substantial and unexplained infirmities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between ocular evidence regarding firing distance and medical evidence regarding tattooing and blackening marks undermine the credibility of an eyewitness?
  • Can a court rely on a dying statement that was not produced during the committal proceedings or the trial?
  • Is the failure to bring the evidence of a deceased witness on record under Section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872 a material defect in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• ZARID KHAN vs GULSHER AND Another1972 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-14
  leave petitionmurderright of private defenceburden of proofbenefit of doubthostile witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a leave to appeal petition directed against an order of the Peshawar High Court which accepted respondent Gulsher's appeal and set aside his conviction and sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his aunt. The dispute arose from a minor altercation over missing onions in a field, during which the respondent allegedly threw a blow with a chhuri meant for his uncle, but it accidentally struck and killed his aunt who had intervened. The core legal question involved the evaluation of witness testimony, the burden of proof regarding the right of private defence, and whether the accused was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding that the respondent acted in the exercise of his right of private defence was not unreasonable, and reaffirmed that the onus remains on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and if a defense plea raises a reasonable possibility of its truth, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire evidence of a hostile witness should be taken into consideration to see if any part of it is worthy of belief?
  • Does the burden of proof placed on an accused under section 105 of the Evidence Act require the same heavy standard as the burden resting on the prosecution?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt if the defense plea creates a reasonable possibility that the accused acted in the exercise of the right of private defence?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAMAN KHAN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-18
  dying declarationevidentiary valuebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictioncontradictory evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant, Zaman Khan, was sentenced to transportation for life for the murder of Ahmad Riaz, while his co-accused brothers were acquitted. The prosecution's case rested solely on a dying declaration made by the deceased, as the ocular evidence provided by three witnesses was rejected by the lower courts. The core legal question was whether a conviction for murder could be safely sustained based on a dying declaration that contained material contradictions regarding the weapons used and the specific roles attributed to the three accused persons. The Supreme Court observed that the deceased's dying declaration inconsistently attributed different weapons and roles to the appellant and his co-accused. Given these discrepancies, the Court held that it was impossible to determine with certainty which assailant inflicted the fatal injury. Consequently, the Court applied the principle of benefit of doubt, ruling that since the other accused were acquitted and the dying declaration was unreliable, the appellant was also entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The conviction was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a dying declaration that contains material contradictions regarding the weapons used and the roles of the accused?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons based on the same evidence necessitate the acquittal of the remaining accused when the evidence is found unreliable?
  • Is a dying declaration reliable when it attributes different weapons and roles to the accused in different parts of the statement?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAHUR-UL-HAQUE vs EASTERN FEDERAL UNION INSURANCE Co. LTD., LAHORE1972 PLC 358 · Labour Court · 1971-07-26Read full judgment →
• ZAHUR AHMAD vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, RAWALPINDI And ANOTHER1972 PCr.LJ 706 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-13Read full judgment →
• ZAHOOR AHMAD vs THE LABOUR COURT OF SIND AND 2 OTHERS1972 PLC 78 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-03-29Read full judgment →
• ZAFRULLAH And Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 734 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-15Read full judgment →
• ZAFAR vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 344 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-26Read full judgment →
• ZABTEY KHAN vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 196 · Lahore High Court · 1968-11-21
  public servantjurisdictionCriminal Law Amendment Actforgeryvitiated trialretrialWest Pakistan Social Welfare Council
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns four criminal appeals against convictions for forgery and related offences. The central legal question was whether the appellant, a dispatcher at the West Pakistan Social Welfare Council, qualified as a public servant, thereby necessitating trial by a Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, rather than a Magistrate First Class. Upon examining the Council's constitution and administrative structure, the Court held that the Council functions as a government department, rendering the appellant a public servant. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, as the offences fell under the exclusive purview of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, which requires sanction and trial by a Special Judge. The Court established the principle that a complete lack of jurisdiction vitiates the entire proceedings, rendering them void regardless of the parties' consent or failure to raise the objection earlier. Given the significant delay of over seven years since the occurrence, the Court set aside the convictions and declined to order a retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of jurisdiction in a trial court vitiate the entire proceedings?
  • Is an employee of the West Pakistan Social Welfare Council a public servant for the purposes of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
  • Can a trial court's lack of jurisdiction be cured by the failure of the parties to raise the objection during the trial?
  • Should a retrial be ordered when a significant period has elapsed since the occurrence of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Z. D. YASMAN vs Mrs. Z. D. YASMAN1972 P Cr. L J 23 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-05Read full judgment →
• YOUSUF ALI KHAN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW vs THE WEST PAKISTAN BAR COUNCIL1972 PLD Lahore 404 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• YASIN KHAN vs THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND EX OFFICIO SETTLEMENT1972 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertycompensation poolsettlement authoritiesremandconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee property whose building had collapsed, leaving an open plot. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities properly followed government directions and determined the rights, possession, and divisibility of the property among contesting claimants. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities failed to apply their minds to the essential questions of fact regarding whether the original building constituted one house or multiple houses, who was in lawful possession, and who held preferential rights under the law and government directives. The Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with law, ensuring notice is given to all interested parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the direction of the Government to treat an evacuee property notionally as a house is binding on the Settlement Authority when dealing with a collapsed building site?
  • Can settlement authorities transfer property to claimants on compassionate grounds without determining actual possession and statutory eligibility?
  • Whether the power of the Central Government under section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 includes the selection of the person to whom property is to be transferred?
  Read full judgment →
• YAQUB KHAN vs MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 6 Other1972 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  leave to appealacquittalmurderappellate interferencemedical evidenceperversitycriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder and related charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal was perverse or unreasonable, thereby necessitating Supreme Court interference. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court erred in its finding regarding the recovery of blood-stained earth, the acquittal was supported by other plausible grounds, including doubts concerning the medical evidence, the time of the occurrence, and the absence of disinterested eyewitnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court's decision, as the findings were not considered perverse or unreasonable. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not exercise its appellate jurisdiction to interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning, taken as a whole, is plausible and not so irrational that no reasonable person could have reached it, even if specific evidentiary findings are contested.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court?
  • Does a factual error regarding the recovery of blood-stained earth automatically invalidate an acquittal judgment?
  • Is the testimony of an injured witness sufficient to sustain a conviction if the High Court finds the medical evidence and time of occurrence doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY THE FAUJI SUGAR MILLS EMPLOYEES UNION vs THE FAUJI SUGAR MILLS, TANDO MUHAMMAD KHAN1972 PLC 586 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-11-23Read full judgment →