Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• SULTAN AND 2 Others vs Mst. BIBI1972 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03
  paternityLetters Patent Appealappreciation of evidencefinding of factcustomary lawinheritance dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for leave to appeal arose out of a suit filed by collaterals against Mst. Bibi for possession of half share of the land left by deceased Maulu, alleging that Mst. Bibi was not the daughter of Maulu's predeceased son, Khushi. The core issue before the court was whether Mst. Bibi was the legitimate daughter of Khushi. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Mst. Bibi was Khushi's daughter, but the Additional District Judge and a Single Judge of the High Court reversed this finding. On Letters Patent Appeal, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment upon re-appraising the evidence. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the Letters Patent Bench erred in disturbing a finding of fact. The Supreme Court held that since the lower appellate court discarded evidence on fanciful grounds without proper appreciation, the Letters Patent Bench was fully justified in re-evaluating the record. Finding that the judgment rested on evidence, the Supreme Court refused to re-appreciate factual evidence and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Letters Patent Bench competent to interfere with findings of fact where lower courts failed to appreciate the evidence properly?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact supported by documentary and oral evidence solely on the ground of appreciation of evidence?
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• STATE vs FATEH MOHAMMAD1972 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-17
  police custodyjudicial custodysurrender before Magistratepolice investigationcriminal procedureremand
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Lahore High Court directing that the respondent, who had surrendered before a Magistrate, be transferred from police custody to judicial custody. A case under section 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code had been registered against the respondent, who initially avoided police arrest and later surrendered before a Magistrate, who remanded him to police custody for the recovery of the weapon of offence. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is empowered to send an accused person who surrenders before him into police custody under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate is legally competent to accept the surrender of an accused and authorize his detention in police custody during a police investigation, and that an accused cannot circumvent the statutory right of the police to investigate by surrendering before a Magistrate. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, establishing that Magistrates possess the discretion to hand over an accused to police custody for investigation purposes even upon surrender.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is empowered to send an accused person who surrenders before him into police custody?
  • Can an accused circumvent the statutory right of the police to investigate by surrendering before a Magistrate?
  • Does a Magistrate have the discretion to authorize detention in police custody during a police investigation upon receiving a surrendered accused?
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• State SADU AND 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 10 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-29
  criminal revisiondacoitytest identification paraderecovery of stolen propertydelayed FIRbenefit of doubtpresumption of stolen property
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal revision under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 arose out of the convictions of petitioners Sadu and Majid under Sections 458 and 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and petitioners Jaffar, Ghausi, and Fazal under Section 411 of the same Code, stemming from an alleged nighttime dacoity. The prosecution relied primarily on test identification parade evidence and alleged recoveries of stolen property. The High Court accepted the revision petition and acquitted all petitioners. It held that the First Information Report was lodged after an unexplained delay without detailing the stolen articles or suspects' descriptions. Consequently, the subsequent recovery of common articles after more than two months could not prove they were stolen property or raise a presumption under Section 411. Furthermore, the test identification parade held one month and twenty-two days after the incident lacked evidentiary value due to inordinate delay, the accused having appeared in court without identity concealment precautions, and significant contradictions by the identifying witnesses during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a test identification parade conducted after an inordinate delay where the accused were produced in court beforehand without precautions to conceal their identity?
  • Can a conviction under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the recovered articles were of common pattern, recovered after significant delay, and not detailed in the initial First Information Report?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report combined with the absence of a list of stolen articles vitiate the prosecution's case regarding subsequent recoveries?
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• State DIL MURAD And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 154 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-10Read full judgment →
• SRI VENKATESWARA LODGE vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, HYDERABAD, AND OTHERS1972 PTD 205 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-03-25Read full judgment →
• SODAGAR vs The STATE1972 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-28
  murderdeath sentencegrave and sudden provocationmitigating circumstancescriminal appealdelay in execution
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a criminal appeal where the appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of his father following a financial dispute and a subsequent altercation. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to a reduction in sentence from death to life imprisonment on the ground of grave and sudden provocation allegedly caused by abuses and rebukes from the deceased father, and whether the prolonged delay in the execution of the sentence constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Court held that the appellant's act of leaving the scene, arming himself with a pistol, and returning to shoot the deceased negated any claim of a fit of rage or sudden provocation, and that delay in execution is a matter for executive clemency rather than judicial sentence reduction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether verbal rebukes or abuses by a father constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to mitigate the sentence for murder to life imprisonment?
  • Does the time spent by a condemned prisoner awaiting execution of the death sentence constitute a valid legal ground for appellate reduction of sentence?
  • Whether an accused who leaves the scene of a dispute and returns armed with a firearm can claim the benefit of sudden and grave provocation?
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• Smt. PANKUMARI KOCHAR vs CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, ANDHRA1972 PTD 193 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-11-25Read full judgment →
• Smt. GANESHI DEVI RAMI DEVI CHARITY TRUST vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-1972 PTD 275 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-06-11Read full judgment →
• SIR E. H. JAFFER & SONS LTD. vs MESSRS ALIJOO1972 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
• SIDH GOPALGAJANAND AND OTHERS vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL1972 PTD 40 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-11-05Read full judgment →
• SHOUKAT ALI KHAN AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI1972 PLD Karachi 94 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-14Read full judgment →
• SHERA vs The STATE and 3 otherss1972 P Cr. L J 626 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-25
  quashmentpolice investigationmagisterial inquirycause of deathcriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal miscellaneous petition was filed for the quashment of a magistrate's inquiry report and finding in a murder case. A criminal case was registered alleging that the respondents had attacked the petitioner and murdered his father. While police investigation was underway, the District Magistrate, upon an application by the accused, ordered an inquiry and disinterment of the deceased under Section 159, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The inquiring magistrate submitted a report finding the petitioner and others guilty of murder. The core legal questions were whether a magistrate can direct an investigation under Section 159, Cr.P.C. when police investigation is already in progress, and whether an inquiry under Section 176, Cr.P.C. empowers a magistrate to record findings regarding the guilt or innocence of specific persons. The Lahore High Court held that a magistrate cannot order an investigation or inquiry under Section 159, Cr.P.C. while the police are already investigating the matter, and that Section 176, Cr.P.C. limits the magistrate's inquiry to determining the cause of death without recording findings on criminal culpability. The petition was accepted and the offending findings were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a magistrate direct an investigation under Section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an investigation by the police is already under way?
  • Does the scope of an inquiry conducted under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 extend to determining the guilt or innocence of specific persons accused of an offense?
  • What are the limits of a magistrate's powers when holding an inquiry into the cause of a person's death under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• SHERA AHD 3 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 563 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-24
  quashment of proceedingsconfession of co-accusedcorroborationdelay in trialfoot-print identificationmurderrape
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition seeks the quashment of criminal proceedings against four petitioners accused of murder and rape under sections 302 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether criminal proceedings against a minor accused can be continued solely on the basis of a co-accused's confession without independent corroborating evidence, and whether delay in trial warrants quashment. The court held that delay caused by bona fide legal proceedings such as writ petitions does not justify quashing, and that a confession of a co-accused under section 30 of the Evidence Act 1872 does not constitute substantive evidence and cannot form the sole basis for a conviction. Consequently, the court quashed the proceedings against the minor petitioner due to lack of evidence, while dismissing the petition as to the remaining co-accused who faced specific incriminating material including extra-judicial confessions, foot-print identifications, and recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the confession of a co-accused under section 30 of the Evidence Act 1872 without independent corroboration?
  • Whether delay in criminal proceedings caused by pursuing writ petitions in the High Court warrants the quashment of a criminal case?
  • Does the confession of a co-accused possess the quality of substantive evidence against other accused persons?
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• SHER ZAMAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 617 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-13Read full judgment →
• SHER MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 537 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
• SHER DIL Alias SHER MUHAMMAD vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1972 PLD Lahore 164 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• SHER BAHADUR AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-11
  criminal appealmurderinterested witnesscorroborationdying statementsuppression of evidencebenefit of doubtacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the appellants' appeal and confirmed the death sentence of appellant Sher Bahadur while commuting that of appellant Shamaraz Khan to transportation for life under sections 302/34 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case rested on the solitary ocular testimony of P.W. 2 Badiuz Zaman and the dying statement of the deceased Gul Baz Khan, both of whom were interested witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the trial and appellate courts had discarded the testimony of this witness regarding three co-accused who were acquitted. The Court held that prudence required independent corroboration of the witness's testimony regarding the appellants, which was lacking, and that the belated motive and abscondence could not serve as valid corroboration. Furthermore, the dying statement was recorded in circumstances that did not exclude the possibility of prompting, and evidence suggested the suppression of an earlier statement made on the spot. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness, partly disbelieved regarding co-accused, can form the basis of conviction for other co-accused?
  • Can a dying statement recorded in the presence of interested persons without precautionary exclusion operate as reliable evidence without independent corroboration?
  • Whether the suppression of an initial statement made to the police on the spot entitles the defense to an adverse inference?
  • Does abscondence constitute valid corroboration of guilt under criminal law?
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• SHER AZAM vs FAZLE AZIM SHAH1972 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  pre-emptionsale versus exchangeagricultural landspecial leave to appealburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed a second appeal arising from the dismissal of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner sought pre-emption of a specific Khasra number, claiming that an ostensible transaction of exchange was actually a sale for cash consideration. The core legal question is whether the transaction in question constituted a sale subject to pre-emption or a genuine exchange. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence proving the payment of a cash price, and given that inequality of area and quality or joint possession do not conclusively establish a sale, the transaction must be regarded as an exchange and is therefore not pre-emptiable. The key principle laid down is that for a transaction to qualify as a sale for pre-emption purposes, there must be a proven transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid in cash, and mere circumstantial disparities or subsequent transactions cannot convert an exchange into a sale.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ostensible transaction of exchange can be treated as a sale for the purpose of pre-emption without direct evidence of cash consideration?
  • Does a disparity in the area and quality of exchanged lands give rise to an irresistible inference of a sale?
  • Can a subsequent transaction documented in a Jamabandi be utilized to determine the nature of a prior exchange transaction when not produced before the lower courts?
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• SHER AND 4 Others SHERA AND 3 Others vs THE STATE THE STATE1972 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnessescorroborationrecovery of weaponsfirst information report delaycriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentences of the appellants under sections 302/149, 148, and 324/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and related offenses. The core legal question concerns the reliability of related and interested eyewitness testimony, the necessity of corroboration as to the identity of each individual accused, and whether discrepancies in weapon recoveries vitiate the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the testimony of natural and injured eyewitnesses, corroborated by medical evidence and established motive, is fully sufficient to sustain convictions even where minor recovery evidence against a specific accused is discarded. The key legal principle laid down is that related eyewitnesses need not be corroborated on the identity of every individual accused by independent material, provided there is sufficient general guarantee of truthfulness, such as clear motive and natural presence at the scene, distinguishing them from tainted accomplices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and interested eyewitnesses requires corroboration specifically as to the identity of each individual accused?
  • Does the rejection of weapon recovery evidence against one co-accused necessarily affect the credibility of consistent eyewitness accounts implicating that accused?
  • Whether a delay in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when the informant is injured and the police station is located at a considerable distance?
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• Sheikh TAJ ALI vs Syed ABDUL HAQ SHAH1972 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11
  ejectment orderexecution proceedingsnovation of tenancytemporary injunctionrent restrictionCode of Civil Procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of an ejectment order against a tenant. The respondent landlord initiated proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, leading to a compromise order requiring the petitioner tenant to vacate the premises by a specific date. Upon failing to vacate, the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging a new tenancy agreement. While the petitioner simultaneously sought a temporary injunction to restrain execution, the lower courts dismissed this request. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the temporary injunction, viewing it as superfluous. However, the Court clarified that the petitioner's pending application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which asserts a novation of tenancy, requires a formal inquiry and evidence. The Court held that the executing court must adjudicate this pending application on its own merits before proceeding with the actual ejectment. Any prior observations by the High Court regarding the validity of the alleged new rent note shall not prejudice the final determination of the Section 47 application.

  Questions settled

  • Must an executing court decide a pending application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before proceeding with an ejectment order?
  • Does an allegation of a new tenancy agreement based on a disputed rent note require a formal inquiry and evidence before an ejectment order can be executed?
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• Sheikh MANZOOR HUSSAIN vs THE MULTAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, MULTAN1972 PLD Lahore 225 · Lahore High Court
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuetown improvementcompulsory acquisition allowancebuilding siteaverage sale price
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This consolidated regular first appeal arose out of cross-appeals filed by the Multan Improvement Trust and land-owners against the award of the Senior Civil Judge, Multan, concerning compensation for land acquired for the Shamshabad Colony housing scheme. The primary legal questions concerned the determination of the correct market value of the acquired property under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as modified by the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922, specifically regarding whether potential future building use could be considered, and whether land-owners were entitled to a 15% compulsory acquisition allowance. The Lahore High Court held that under Clause 10(3) of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922, market value must be assessed strictly according to the actual use to which the land was put at the material date, ignoring future potential development. The Court found that the land had already acquired the character of a building site based on proximate sales. The Court re-assessed the market value at Rs. 55 per marla (Rs. 8,800 per acre) and held that land-owners were statutorily excluded from claiming the 15% compulsory acquisition allowance.

  Questions settled

  • How is the market value of compulsorily acquired land determined when modified by the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922?
  • Can the future potential use of land be taken into consideration when assessing compensation under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922?
  • Are land-owners entitled to a 15% compulsory acquisition allowance when land is acquired for a town improvement trust under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922?
  • Is the overall average sale price of an entire revenue estate a proper criterion for fixing the market value of specific acquired land?
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• SHAUKAT HUSSAIN SHAH AND Another vs THE COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1972 SC M R32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal trialspecial tribunalright of audienceshow cause noticereference to tribunalordinary criminal jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal arises from an order of reference made by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, referring a case registered against the appellants under the Sea/Land Customs Act for trial by a tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, without affording the appellants an opportunity of being heard. The appellants challenged the reference via a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. Upon special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the reference was vitiated due to the lack of a pre-reference hearing and whether the Provincial Act was repugnant to the Central Sea Customs Act. The Supreme Court held, following its precedent in Home Secretary v. Jan Muhammad, that a reference of a case to a tribunal under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963 without granting the accused an opportunity to show cause is illegal. The Court accepted the appeal and directed that the case be laid before the trial Magistrate for trial in ordinary criminal jurisdiction, leaving other contentions open for the Magistrate's consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference of a case to a tribunal under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963 is illegal if made without giving the accused an opportunity to show cause?
  • Does a Provincial Act providing a different forum for trial of offences under a Central enactment give way to the Central Act to the extent of repugnancy?
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• SHAUKAT ALI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-13
  criminal leave to appealtransfer of malicesudden fightculpable homicidemurderdying declaration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, Shaukat Ali, sought special leave to appeal against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Janas Khan, where section 301 of the Pakistan Penal Code was applied as the fatal shot was intended for another person, Mehrdil. The petitioner argued that the evidence lacked strict scrutiny for a section 301 case and that the circumstances attracted Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Exception 4 was inapplicable because the act involved premeditation, was a one-sided affair without a sudden fight or quarrel, and the petitioner used a deadly weapon with the intention to cause death. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of transfer of malice under section 301 applies where a person intends to kill one individual but accidentally kills another, and Exception 4 to section 300 cannot be invoked in the absence of a sudden fight and premeditation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code are attracted where a murder is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight?
  • How does section 301 of the Pakistan Penal Code apply when an act intended to kill one person results in the death of another?
  • Does the absence of a sudden quarrel preclude the application of Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• SHAUKAT ALI vs ALTAF HUSSAIN QURESHI AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  habeas corpuscustody of wifeSection 491 CrPCkidnappingabductionabuse of processspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the custody of a woman the petitioner claimed was his lawfully wedded wife. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to restore custody where the woman was not physically present, had provided conflicting statements regarding her marriage and desire to live with the petitioner, and where the petitioner faced pending criminal charges for kidnapping. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition. The ratio is that where a woman's whereabouts are unknown and her statements are contradictory, the court cannot ascertain her free will, and it is appropriate to refuse summary relief under Section 491. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 491 proceedings should not be abused to facilitate illicit relationships or to evade criminal prosecution, and courts must consider the broader social context when exercising their discretionary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court refuse to restore custody under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged wife is not present before the court?
  • Does the pendency of a criminal case for kidnapping under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justify the refusal of a habeas corpus petition?
  • Should courts consider the potential abuse of Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for illicit purposes when deciding whether to grant relief?
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• SHAUKAT ALI KHAN AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI1972 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-21
  allotment cancellationdisplaced personstransfer of propertypossession of outhousessettlement lawC.H. Forms
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the cancellation of an allotment of a house to the petitioners. The petitioners, who were in occupation of certain outhouses attached to the property in question, had initially been allotted the house based on their possession and the filing of C.H. Forms. The allotment was subsequently cancelled on the ground that possession of outhouses did not entitle them to the transfer of the main house. The core legal question was whether the definition of 'House' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read with the Schedule to the Act, allows for the transfer of a main house based solely on the possession of its outhouses. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that possession of an outhouse does not equate to possession of the main house for transfer purposes. The Court relied on established precedents, specifically Fazlun Nisa Begum v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and Abdul Hamid Khan v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, to confirm that such possession does not confer a right to transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of an outhouse entitle a claimant to the transfer of the main house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is there a legal distinction between the possession of a portion of a main house and the possession of an outhouse for the purpose of property transfer?
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• SHARIF And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 94 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-23Read full judgment →
• SHARAF AND 8 Others vs SARDAR BIBI AND 10 Other1972 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-23
  amendment of plaintpre-emption suitpleadingscivil revisiondiscretionary power
  AI summary & questions settled

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  These petitions arise out of an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court allowing amendments to a plaint sought by the respondents in a pre-emption suit. The predecessor of the respondents had instituted a pre-emption suit in November 1959. Subsequently, the respondents filed applications under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend the plaint by substituting and adding certain Khasra numbers, which were initially rejected by the trial court. The High Court, however, allowed the revision petitions and permitted the amendments. The core legal question concerns the propriety of allowing amendments to pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include or substitute property details in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that the Code grants wide powers to courts to allow amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the High Court exercised its discretion unreasonably. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the principle that discretionary orders permitting amendments to pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 will not be interfered with unless shown to be unreasonable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court has the power to allow amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add or substitute Khasra numbers in a pre-emption suit?
  • When can an appellate or revisional court interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court regarding the amendment of pleadings?
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• SHAMSUDDIN AHMED SIDDIQUI vs MUHAMMAD AKBAR AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Supreme Court 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-29
  evacuee propertytransfer of housevaluation formulasettlement schemedisplaced personsletters patent appealspecial instructions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court in a Letters Patent appeal concerning the refusal of settlement authorities to transfer an evacuee house in Hyderabad to the appellant on the ground that its valuation exceeded Rs. 10,000, rendering the appellant ineligible as a local. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities and the High Court correctly applied the prescribed statutory formulae and special instructions for determining the evaluation price of urban evacuee property or whether valuations were enhanced arbitrarily. The Supreme Court held that the subordinate settlement authorities and the High Court failed to consider and apply the binding special instructions and specific formulae issued by the competent settlement authorities for Hyderabad town, which properly calculated the valuation to be below the statutory threshold. The Court established the principle that settlement authorities must strictly adhere to specific and binding instructions governing the evaluation of evacuee properties in preference to general or arbitrary methods, and any valuation arrived at in disregard of such special instructions is without lawful authority and cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities can arbitrarily enhance the valuation of an evacuee house without following the prescribed statutory formulae and special instructions?
  • Did the subordinate settlement authorities fail to apply the binding special instructions regarding the assessment of evacuee houses in Hyderabad town?
  • Whether the High Court and settlement authorities erred in determining the evaluation price of the disputed property above the statutory limit for locals?
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• SHAMSHIR ALI AND 11 OTHERSs vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER-1972 PTD 571 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-23Read full judgment →
• SHAMIM MUSTAFA ANSARI AND 170 Other vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB1972 PLC 590 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-01Read full judgment →
• SHAMI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 149 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-30Read full judgment →
• SHAMAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 400 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-11
  murder convictionocular evidencecriminal investigationpolice powersculpable homicidehatchet blowCode of Criminal Procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a co-villager. The incident arose from a dispute over straying cattle, resulting in the appellant striking the deceased on the head with the blunt side of a hatchet, causing fatal skull fractures. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence from interested witnesses and the legality of an investigation conducted by an Assistant Sub-Inspector rather than the Station House Officer. The Court upheld the conviction, ruling that the ocular evidence was credible despite the witnesses' connection to the deceased, as no enmity existed. Regarding the investigation, the Court held that Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not mandate investigation solely by the Station House Officer and that procedural irregularities do not vitiate a trial. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that striking a victim on the head with a heavy object constitutes murder, as the assailant is presumed to know such injury is likely to cause death.

  Questions settled

  • Does an investigation conducted by an Assistant Sub-Inspector, rather than the Station House Officer, invalidate the trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the fatal blow was delivered with the blunt side of a weapon?
  • Does an irregularity in the police investigation process vitiate the subsequent criminal trial?
  • Is ocular evidence from witnesses related to the deceased inherently unreliable in the absence of proven enmity?
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• SHAKEEL AHMAD vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 374 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-21
  kidnappingstatutory interpretationprocedural omissioncriminal appealdeath sentencelegislative intentCode of Criminal Procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction and death sentence under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the kidnapping of two minors. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the specific intent required for a Section 364-A conviction and whether the legislature's failure to include Section 364-A in the Second Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 rendered the trial void for lack of procedural framework. The Court held that the evidence failed to prove the specific intent necessary for Section 364-A, resulting in the conviction being altered to Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the sentence reduced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. Regarding the procedural challenge, the Court ruled that an unintentional drafting omission in the Second Schedule does not nullify substantive law. The key principle laid down is that courts must interpret statutes to promote their object and may supply procedural omissions to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature, preventing technical drafting errors from defeating the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the legislature to include a newly created offence in the Second Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render the trial for that offence void?
  • Can a court supply a procedural omission in a statute to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature?
  • Is the specific intent required for a conviction under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 presumed merely from the act of kidnapping a minor?
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• Shaikh MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs The STATE1972 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-10
  criminal assaultprovocationconciliation courtcognisable offenceleave to appealwrongful confinementcriminal trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, Muhammad Yaqub, sought leave to appeal against his conviction under sections 323, 504, and 342/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, handed down by the Lahore High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction and upheld on appeal, for assaulting and wrongfully restraining a retired High Court judge after the latter's dog attacked the petitioner's pet deer. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner's actions fell under a lesser offence due to grave and sudden provocation, and whether the matter ought to have been referred to a conciliation court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner acted out of anger rather than provocation, and that under Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961, the trial court had the discretion to retain and try the case rather than refer it to a conciliation court since the police had investigated cognisable offences. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an attack by a dog on a pet deer, despite the owner's attempts to restrain it, constitute grave and sudden provocation to reduce an assault to a lesser offence?
  • Does Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 deprive a criminal court of jurisdiction to try a case investigated by the police for cognisable offences?
  • Is the trial court vested with discretion under Section 18 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 to either refer a cognisable case to a conciliation court or try it itself?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAHID KHALIL vs Mum PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION1972 PLD Karachi 477 · Sindh High Court · 1963-11-27Read full judgment →
• SHAHENSHAH SHAHALAM CO-OPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD, KARACHI AND Another vs HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION1972 PLD Karachi 178 · Sindh High Court
  Letters Patent appealHouse Building Finance Corporationloan recallbreach of contractnovationwaiverestoppelcommercial indulgence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing five suits filed by cooperative housing societies against the House Building Finance Corporation. The appellant societies had obtained loans from the respondent Corporation for constructing flats, but committed fundamental breaches by failing to purchase land as agreed until loan portions were received, delaying construction, and diverting loan funds to private business purposes. Consequently, the Corporation recalled the loans under Section 29 of the House Building Finance Corporation Act, 1952. The appellants argued that a subsequent letter from the Corporation's General Manager amounted to a novation of the contract, or alternatively that the Corporation had waived the breaches. The court held that the letter did not constitute a novation and was unauthorized and spurious, having been issued without board approval by an official who later joined the appellants' employment. The court further held that waiver and estoppel were neither raised at trial nor established by the evidence, as the Corporation's delay in enforcing its rights constituted mere commercial indulgence rather than an abandonment of rights. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unauthorized letter issued by an employee of a statutory corporation can effect a novation of a loan contract without the approval of the Board of Directors?
  • Can a plea of waiver and estoppel be raised for the first time in appellate proceedings when it is a mixed question of fact and law not agitated at trial?
  • Do mere acts of indulgence by a creditor in commercial agreements amount to a waiver of legal rights or establish an estoppel?
  • Whether the diversion of housing construction loan funds to private business purposes justifies the recall of the loan by the House Building Finance Corporation?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAHBAZ--Appellant vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 868 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-06Read full judgment →
• SHAHAN And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 85 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-21Read full judgment →
• SHAHAB-UD-DIN vs Syed MUZAFFAR UD DIN1972 PLD Lahore 474 · Lahore High Court · 1969-02-07Read full judgment →
• SHAH NAWAZ vs LAL KHAN AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-21
  murderacquittaleye-witness credibilityadverse inferencerecovery evidenceburden of proofcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court erred in its assessment of eye-witness testimony, the reliability of recovery evidence, and the impact of the prosecution's failure to examine a named witness. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, holding that the High Court's findings were neither perverse nor unreasonable. The Court affirmed that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt, and discrepancies between medical evidence and witness accounts, alongside dubious recovery circumstances, justified the acquittal. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the prosecution has discretion in calling witnesses, the non-examination of a material witness can warrant an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1872. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with findings of fact unless they are shocking to the judicial conscience or based on a misapplication of evidentiary principles.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adverse inference be drawn against the prosecution for the non-examination of a material witness?
  • Does the prosecution have absolute discretion to choose which witnesses to examine without consequence?
  • Is an appellate court justified in interfering with an acquittal if the findings of fact are not perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAH NAWAZ AND 6 Others vs MUHAMMAD YOUSAF AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-14
  pre-emption suitcourt feesrejection of plaintjudicial discretionbona fide mistakecontumacycivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a revision application in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in allowing the plaintiffs to pay deficient court fees rather than rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners argued that the plaintiffs were negligent and that the plaint should have been rejected. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's discretion to allow time for payment of deficient court fees is broad and should be exercised in favor of the litigant unless there is evidence of contumacy or positive mala fides. The Court affirmed that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be read harmoniously. Since the trial court found the initial failure to pay proper fees was a bona fide mistake, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's refusal to disturb that discretionary order.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should a court exercise its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to allow the payment of deficient court fees?
  • Does the failure to pay proper court fees due to a bona fide mistake warrant the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Must the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be read together to ensure harmonious construction?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAH MUHAMMAD AND Other vs MUHAMMAD BAKHSH1972 PLD Supreme Court 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-20
  abatementabatement in totolegal representativesevacuee propertyjoint possessionindivisible decreecondonation of delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which declared a regular second appeal to have abated in toto. The dispute concerned a house claimed by the respondent as his self-constructed property, which the Custodian of Evacuee Property had declared non-evacuee. The appellants, who were refugees settled in the house, resisted the respondent's suit for possession. During the pendency of the appeals, certain appellants died, and their legal representatives were not impleaded within the statutory period. The core legal questions were whether Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 could prevent the abatement of an appeal under Order XXII, and whether the decree for joint possession was indivisible. The Supreme Court held that Order XLI Rule 4 is merely an enabling provision and does not nullify the abatement provisions of Order XXII. Since the appellants were in joint possession and the decree was indivisible, the failure to implead the legal representatives of the deceased appellants resulted in the total abatement of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prevent the abatement of an appeal under Order XXII when a necessary party dies and their legal representatives are not substituted?
  • Can an appellate court proceed to hear an appeal under Order XLI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if necessary parties are not before it?
  • What is the effect of the death of one of the co-defendants on an appeal where the decree for possession is joint and indivisible?
  Read full judgment →
• SHADI KHAN AND Another vs KHAN SAEED UD DIN KHAN, SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Other1972 PLD Lahore 262 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• SHABIR AHMED And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 310 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-09
  dacoityidentification paradestolen propertybenefit of doubtrecoveryfingerprint expertcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of five appellants under sections 395 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code for dacoity. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, armed with firearms, raided a residential house at night, caused simple injuries to the occupants, and looted cash, ornaments, and valuables. The core legal questions involved the reliability of nighttime identification parades, the sufficiency of mixing suspects, and the probative value of subsequent recoveries of stolen property and ballistic evidence. The court held that the identification parade evidence was unsatisfactory and suffered from legal and factual infirmities, warranting the acquittal of one appellant, while the recovery of stolen property and matching receipts established offences relating to stolen property for the remaining appellants. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions under sections 395 and 397, altered them to section 412 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and reduced the sentences to the period already undergone. The key principle laid down is that where identification evidence is weak or tainted, convictions for dacoity cannot be sustained, but established recoveries of stolen property can support convictions under lesser related offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade held after suspects have been shown to witnesses and taken to various places of recovery can be relied upon?
  • Does the recovery of unidentifiable silver coins alone suffice to connect an accused with the crime of dacoity?
  • Can a conviction under sections 395 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code be altered to section 412 when dacoity is not proved but possession of stolen property is established?
  Read full judgment →
• SHABBIR HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND Other1972 SCMR 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-14
  writ jurisdictionconstitutional petitiondisputed questions of factremandevacuee propertysettlement lawsappellate power
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a double-storied evacuee house under the settlement laws. The appellant and respondent occupied different portions of the property, and both claimed prior allotment and possession. The Settlement Commissioner, in a review order, held that the appellant was the prior allottee. The respondent challenged this order in the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The High Court, acting as an appellate court, went into the disputed questions of fact and reversed the finding of the Settlement Commissioner. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the High Court could properly decide a disputed question of fact in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that a court exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction does not sit as a court of appeal. Where an inferior tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction acts contrary to law, the proper course is to set aside the order and remand the case for a fresh decision rather than deciding disputed factual questions. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, while exercising its constitutional writ jurisdiction, decide disputed questions of fact as if it were a court of appeal?
  • What is the proper course of action for the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 when an inferior tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction has acted contrary to law?
  • Can findings of fact arrived at by Settlement Authorities be reversed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. SAFDAR RASHID vs Mst. RUQAYYA BEGUM AND 11 Other1972 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  review petitionleave to appealdisplaced persons propertyCentral Government powerspublic interesttransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's leave petition regarding the transfer of a disputed property. The core legal question concerns the validity of the transfer of property by the Central Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether grounds for review exist against the dismissal of the leave petition. The Supreme Court held that the review petition lacks merit because the property in dispute had been validly transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and subsequently approved by the Central Government in the public interest pursuant to section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, at a time when no property was available for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Court laid down the principle that a transfer of property approved by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, in the public interest with retrospective effect is valid, and a review petition cannot succeed on a factual premise not challenged during the initial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Government has the power under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to approve a property transfer in the public interest with retrospective effect?
  • Can a review petition be maintained on a statement of fact that was not challenged when the original impugned order was passed?
  • Does a claimant under Settlement Scheme No. VIII have a valid claim when the property was already transferred and no property was available on the date of the original transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. BARKAT ALI vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-27
  cancellation of allotmentprior noticedisplaced personlocus standiSettlement Scheme No. VIIIwrit jurisdictionLetters Patent Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential bungalow under settlement law. The Settlement Commissioner had transferred the property to the respondent as an allottee in possession and a displaced person. The petitioner challenged this transfer based on a subsequent allotment in his favour and a notification dated 9th September 1960. The High Court, in Letters Patent Appeal, dismissed the petitioner's claim and upheld the transfer to the respondent. The core legal questions pertained to the validity of an allotment issued without prior cancellation of an existing allotment, the petitioner's eligibility under the relevant notification, and his standing to challenge the respondent's transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Letters Patent Bench's decision, holding that an allotment made without cancelling a prior existing allotment and without notice is void. The Court further affirmed that a person found to have no entitlement to property lacks locus standi to challenge its transfer to another.

  Questions settled

  • Is an allotment of evacuee property valid if made without prior cancellation of an existing allotment and without notice under Section 7(2)(b) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act 1959?
  • Does a person who is found to have no lawful entitlement to property have locus standi to challenge its transfer to another party?
  • Can a finding of fact by the Settlement Commissioner regarding status as a displaced person be interfered with in writ jurisdiction if supported by evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. ALAUDDIN vs THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, THE CENTRAL EXCHANGE BANK1972 PLD Lahore 552 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-09Read full judgment →
• Sh. ALA UD DIN vs THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, THE CENTRAL EXCHANGE BANK1972 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-15
  winding upcontributory liabilitycompany liquidationunpaid call moneyshare transfer
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from winding-up proceedings of the Central Exchange Bank Limited, Lahore, wherein the Official Liquidator found the petitioner liable as a contributory for unpaid call money, uncalled liability, and interest on shares. The petitioner challenged his liability under section 184/38 of the Companies Act, disputing the transfer of certain shares and claiming credit for payments allegedly made. The High Court dismissed the application after recording evidence on all factual issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's liability as a contributory could be set aside based on disputed questions of fact regarding share transfers and uncredited payments. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the High Court regarding the delivery of share scrips, registration in company books, and the lack of credible evidence for the alleged payments were rightly decided, and found no ground for interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in company liquidation proceedings regarding contributory liability unless a substantial legal error is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding contributory liability in company winding-up proceedings?
  • Does the absence of a formal executed instrument of transfer invalidate shareholding when share scrips are delivered and the holder is registered in the company books?
  • Can a receipt issued by a dismissed employee of a bank without proof of authorization establish a valid payment against uncalled liability?
  Read full judgment →
• SEWA And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1135 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-11Read full judgment →
• Seth ESSABHOY vs SABOOR AHMAD1972 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-23
  specific performancebreach of contracttime is not of the essenceimmovable propertyreadiness and willingnesscriminal complaintfraud
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a plot of land, or alternatively for damages. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant or the respondent committed the breach of the agreement, whether time was of the essence in contracts for immovable property, and whether the filing of a criminal complaint for cheating precluded the plaintiff from seeking specific performance. The Supreme Court held that the appellant committed the breach by failing to fulfill his obligation to convert the land into residential or Sakni status as agreed, and that time is not ordinarily of the essence in contracts relating to immovable property. The Court further held that a plaintiff is absolved from proving continuous readiness and willingness to perform where the defendant has already repudiated or breached the contract, and that alleging fraud in a criminal complaint does not vitiate the contract at the option of the innocent party seeking enforcement. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time is of the essence in contracts relating to immovable property?
  • Does the filing of a criminal complaint for cheating by the purchaser indicate an unwillingness to perform the contract disentitling them to specific performance?
  • Is a plaintiff absolved from showing continuous readiness and willingness to perform where the defendant has repudiated or breached the contract?
  • Does an allegation of fraud by an aggrieved party vitiate a contract so as to preclude that party from seeking its specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, BASIC DEMOCRACIES SOCIAL1972 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  termination of servicelegal advisermunicipal corporationlocus standirepeal of ordinanceleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the termination of the respondents' services as Legal Advisers to the Lahore Municipal Corporation. The core legal questions were whether the Government of Punjab had the statutory authority to terminate the services of the Municipal Corporation's Legal Advisers after the repeal of the enabling Ordinance, and whether the Government had the locus standi to challenge the High Court's judgment when the termination was purportedly executed by the Municipal Corporation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any surviving statutory provision empowering the Government to terminate the respondents' services following the repeal of Ordinance XXXII of 1965 by Ordinance XLIX of 1969. Furthermore, the Court established that if the services were terminated by the Lahore Municipal Corporation, the Government lacked the locus standi to challenge the High Court's decision on the Corporation's behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government have the authority to terminate the services of a Municipal Corporation's Legal Adviser after the repeal of the authorizing Ordinance?
  • Can the Government challenge a High Court judgment on behalf of a Municipal Corporation if the Corporation itself does not appeal?
  • Does the Government possess locus standi to file an appeal against the reinstatement of municipal employees whose termination was executed by the Municipal Corporation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sayyed MUHAMMAD ALI SHAH BOKHARI vs Tim CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 3Other1972 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-11
  Waqf propertiesaudi alteram partemshow-cause noticenatural justiceChief Administrator of Auqafwrit jurisdictionstatutory remedy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's writ petition against the takeover of the Dargah of Syed Muhammad Ismail Shah by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf via a notification issued under Section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961. The petitioner argued that the notification violated the principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem because no show-cause notice was served prior to taking over the property. The Supreme Court considered whether Section 6 requires a prior show-cause notice before assumption of control by the Chief Administrator. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court, holding that the statutory scheme of the Ordinance deliberately dispenses with prior notice before action under Section 6. The Court held that Section 7 provides an adequate comprehensive statutory remedy before the District Court, and that the explicit statutory bar on temporary injunctions demonstrates legislative intent that management by Auqaf remain uninterrupted pending final adjudication of title.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 require a prior show-cause notice before the Chief Administrator assumes control of a property?
  • Is the rule of audi alteram partem excluded where a statute provides an ex post facto statutory remedy before a civil court?
  • Does the statutory scheme of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 permit courts to grant an injunction restraining the Chief Administrator from taking over property under Section 6?
  Read full judgment →
• SAYYED MUHAMMAD ALI SHAH BOKHARI vs CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF1972 PLD Lahore 416 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-16Read full judgment →
• SATTAR KHAN AND 3 Other vs Mst. ZAMU JAN1972 PLD Peshawar 78 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-12Read full judgment →
• SATPRAKASH RAM NARANJAN vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX1972 PTD 253 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-04-03Read full judgment →
• SARWAR vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 546 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-19Read full judgment →
• SARGHAN SHAH AND Others vs JAFFAR KHAN AND Other1972 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-20
  dispute likely to cause breach of peacepreliminary orderjurisdictionprocedural non-compliancepossession disputeleave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises from proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 concerning a disputed hillock, where a Magistrate held the land to be in possession of the respondents and restrained the petitioners from interfering. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate's failure to state the grounds of satisfaction in the preliminary order renders the entire proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the omission to state grounds in the preliminary order is a mere procedural non-compliance rather than a jurisdictional defect, provided the essential elements founding jurisdiction—namely, a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning land within the territorial limits—are fulfilled. The key principle laid down is that while statutory provisions requiring a Magistrate to state grounds of satisfaction must be followed, a failure to do so does not vitiate the entire proceedings if the foundational elements of jurisdiction exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission to state grounds in a preliminary order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 renders the entire proceedings without jurisdiction?
  • What are the essential elements necessary for the foundation of jurisdiction under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere non-compliance with a rule of procedure vitiate the entire proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar MUHAMMAD YASIN KHAN, ADVOCATE vs Raja FEROZE KHAN1972 PLD Azad J & K 46 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-08-19Read full judgment →
• SARDAR KHAN And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 906 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-30Read full judgment →
• Sardar ABDUL MAJID KHAN LASHARI vs THE ASIO AFRICAN Co. LTD.1972 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  execution of decreelimitation periodresiduary articleexecuting courtcivil revisiondismissal in default
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from execution proceedings initiated by the respondent pursuant to a decree obtained from the Chief Court of Sind in 1955 and transferred to Lahore. The petitioner judgment-debtor filed objections and subsequently an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the authority of the attorney and the legality of the decree's transfer. The executing court dismissed the application as barred by time, a decision upheld by the High Court in civil revision. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether any period of limitation applies to an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether notice is required for restoring an execution application dismissed in the absence of both parties. The Supreme Court held that the residuary Article 181 applies to applications under Section 47 for which no specific period of limitation is provided, rendering the application time-barred, and that no notice is necessary to restore an execution application dismissed in the absence of both parties. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the limitation bar.

  Questions settled

  • Does a period of limitation apply to an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Whether Article 181 of the limitation framework applies to applications under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is notice required to restore an execution application that was dismissed in the absence of both parties?
  Read full judgment →
• SAR ANJAM KHAN vs Mir AFZAL KHAN AND 14 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 37 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-09-30Read full judgment →
• SANOBAR TALKIES vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY, EXCISE1972 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29
  entertainment dutycinema classificationnatural justiceadministrative reviewspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged the classification of the petitioner's cinema house under the West Pakistan Entertainment Duty Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the failure of the Provincial Government to grant a personal hearing during a second review representation constitutes a violation of natural justice, and whether the classification was based on extraneous considerations. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had received adequate opportunity of being heard at prior stages, including a full hearing before the Member, Board of Revenue, and that natural justice does not require a personal hearing at every successive stage of administrative proceedings. The Court established the principle that in administrative review proceedings, a party cannot expect an oral hearing at each stage provided the grounds are fully set out in writing and considered by the authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the Provincial Government to grant a personal hearing during a second review representation violates natural justice?
  • Can a party in administrative proceedings claim a right to be heard at each and every stage of review?
  Read full judgment →
• SAMI AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 511 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-10Read full judgment →
• SAMAR QAND AND Another vs MUHAMMAD YOUNAS1972 PLD Peshawar 115 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-20
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionlimitationshamilat landmutationsecond appealsubstitution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from a suit for possession by pre-emption regarding agricultural land. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was barred by limitation, given prior unregistered sale deeds from 1944, and whether the plaintiff’s failure to include the shamilat (common land) share in the suit constituted fatal partial pre-emption. The High Court affirmed the lower courts' finding on limitation, concluding that the 1966 mutation represented a distinct transaction from the 1944 deeds, thus bringing the suit within the statutory period. However, the Court held that the doctrine of partial pre-emption is strictly applicable in pre-emption suits. By excluding the shamilat share from the claim, the plaintiff attempted to split the bargain, which is impermissible. The Court laid down the principle that a pre-emptor must substitute themselves for the vendee in the entire contract; they cannot pick and choose parts of the sale. Consequently, the failure to sue for the entire subject matter of the sale renders the suit incompetent, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor sue for only a portion of the land sold in a single transaction?
  • Does the exclusion of shamilat land in a pre-emption suit constitute fatal partial pre-emption?
  • Is a court required to apply the law of partial pre-emption even if the issue was not raised in the written statement?
  • Does a subsequent mutation constitute a separate transaction from prior unregistered sale deeds for the purpose of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• SALEHON and MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 2 OthersMUHAMMAD KHAN AND 21972 SCMR 310, 1977 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03
  ocular evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalextra-judicial confessionappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals arising from a multiple murder case involving six victims. The appellants, Salehon and his three sons (Muhammad, Bashir, and Ashraf), were convicted for the murders. The trial court acquitted Salehon but convicted his sons. On appeal, the High Court maintained the convictions of the sons but, due to a split decision regarding Salehon, referred his case to a third judge who convicted him. The Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of all four appellants. Regarding the sons, the Court found the ocular evidence of two witnesses, corroborated by medical evidence, recoveries of blood-stained articles, and an extra-judicial confession, sufficient to sustain their convictions. Regarding Salehon, the Court held that the ocular evidence alone was insufficient for conviction because the same witnesses had falsely implicated four other co-accused who were acquitted. Furthermore, the Court found the corroborative evidence relied upon by the third judge, specifically the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet, unreliable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals of the three sons but allowed the appeal of Salehon, setting aside his conviction and acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the ocular evidence of witnesses be relied upon for conviction if those same witnesses have been found to have falsely implicated other co-accused in the same incident?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction based solely on ocular evidence when the corroborative evidence relied upon by the lower court has been rejected by other judges in the same proceedings?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the origin of blood on recovered articles render the recovery evidence unreliable for corroboration purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• SAKARCHAND CHHAGANLAL vs CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, GUJRAT1972 PTD 636 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-10-04Read full judgment →
• SAJJAD ALI KHAN AND 2 Other vs PEER BUX G. MAHAR1972 PLD Karachi 220 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-27
  ejectmentwilful defaultRent Controller discretionlump sum rent acceptancestatutory tenancysecond appealhabitual acceptance of rent
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal under Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 arose from the dismissal of an ejectment application filed under Section 13(2)(i) of the Ordinance against the respondent tenant. The appellants contended that the respondent committed default in paying rent and argued that the statutory provision does not require 'wilful default', meaning the Rent Controller lacked discretion to refuse an eviction order once non-payment within the statutory period was established. The Sindh High Court examined Section 13(2)(i) and held that the word 'may' intentionally vests the Rent Controller with judicial discretion to refuse ejectment even where default is established, provided good grounds exist to prevent grave hardship. The Court affirmed the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts that the landlords were in the habit of periodically accepting arrears of rent in lump sum. Consequently, the High Court held that the lower courts' discretion in refusing eviction was exercised judicially and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the word 'may' in Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 confer judicial discretion on the Rent Controller to refuse an eviction order even after non-payment of rent is established?
  • Is habitual acceptance of accumulated rent in lump sum by a landlord a valid ground for exercising discretion against ordering the ejectment of a tenant for default?
  • Does Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 make an eviction order mandatory upon proof of non-payment of rent within the statutory period?
  Read full judgment →
• SAJID HUSSAIN vs Mst. SHAH SULTAN1972 PLD Peshawar 136 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-04-10Read full judgment →
• SAINDAD And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1233 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-27Read full judgment →
• SAINDAD AND 2 Others vs The STATE1972 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-08
  criminal appealmurderinterested witnessesmedical evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtocular testimony
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan maintaining the conviction and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with convictions under Section 13-D of the Arms Act. The core legal question was whether the testimony of interested eye-witnesses could be accepted without satisfactory corroboration, particularly when it conflicted with the medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence, digestion state, and injuries. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence was inconsistent with the ocular account regarding the presence of food in the stomach and the number of hatchet wounds, and that the eye-witnesses were interested and uncorroborated, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. The Court laid down the principle that material inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, coupled with the absence of independent corroboration for interested witnesses, entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt in criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence of interested eye-witnesses can be accepted without satisfactory corroboration when it is inconsistent with medical evidence?
  • Does conflict between the time of death determined by medical evidence and the prosecution's stated time of occurrence warrant the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  • Whether inconsistencies regarding the nature and number of injuries between ocular testimony and medical reports are sufficient to set aside a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• SAID KAMAL vs The STATE1972 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-13
  jail appealmurderdying declarationFirst Information Reportappellant agesentence of deathocular evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a jail appeal arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Said Kamal, for the murder of Ambar Shah. The core legal question involved the evaluation of the dying declarations—both verbal and written—and the determination of the appellant's age for the purpose of sentencing. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and held that the written dying declaration (treated as the First Information Report) and the verbal dying declaration made to natural witnesses were genuine, reliable, and sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court further held that the belatedly produced school leaving certificate regarding the appellant's age was rightly rejected by the High Court in favor of medical and judicial record assessments indicating an age of 20 years. Finding no mitigating circumstances or valid grounds for interference, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of death under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a written dying declaration incorporated in the First Information Report can form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • Can a belatedly produced school leaving certificate override medical and judicial assessments of an accused person's age for sentencing?
  • Whether verbal dying declarations made to natural witnesses immediately after the occurrence are admissible and reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• SAID JALAL AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND Another1972 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-07
  police investigationpreliminary inquirymagisterial powerscognizable casecriminal procedurequashmentstatutory duties of police
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a revisional application and holding that a District Magistrate's order directing a subordinate Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while the police were actively investigating a cognizable case was bad in law. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is competent to direct a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a cognizable case while police investigation is still underway. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where the police are carrying on an investigation and have not acted under subsection (2) of section 157 of the Code, a Magistrate cannot stop the police investigation or hold a preliminary inquiry himself or depute a subordinate Magistrate to do so. The Court laid down the principle that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary rather than overlapping, and a Magistrate cannot interfere with the statutory duty of the police to investigate cognizable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is competent to direct a preliminary inquiry under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while a police investigation is ongoing?
  • Can the judiciary interfere with the statutory right and duty of the police to investigate a cognizable offence?
  • What is the scope of a Magistrate's power under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure upon receiving a report under section 157?
  Read full judgment →
• SAID FAQIR AND 7 Other vs N. W. F. P. GOVERNMENT THROUGH HOME1972 PLD Peshawar 156 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-14Read full judgment →
• SAID AKBAR AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE And 2 Other1972 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  criminal referencecouncil of eldersnighttime identificationwrit jurisdictioncriminal law amendment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from criminal proceedings registered under sections 307 and 436 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the appellants for attempting to murder the complainants and setting fire to their chhappar. The Commissioner, Peshawar Division, referred the case to a council of elders under the relevant legal framework, noting doubts about the reliability of nighttime identification evidence in an ordinary court of law. The appellants challenged the reference unsuccessfully before the Home Secretary and subsequently via a writ petition in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner's apprehension regarding the sufficiency of identification evidence at night constituted a valid ground for making a reference to a tribunal under the applicable law. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner acted with lawful authority as the circumstances attracted rule 3(a) and rule 3(j) of the West Pakistan Criminal (Amendments) Rules, 1963, and that the ends of justice justified the reference. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's refusal to interfere.

  Questions settled

  • Whether apprehension regarding nighttime identification evidence constitutes a valid ground for referring a case to a council of elders?
  • Did the Commissioner act with lawful authority in making the reference under the West Pakistan Criminal (Amendments) Rules, 1963?
  • Was the High Court justified in declining to interfere with the reference order in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• SAHU RAJESHWAR NATH vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, C-WARD, MEERUT AND ANOTHER1972 PTD 630 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-09-04Read full judgment →
• Sahibzada ABDUL HANNA N vs ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND1972 PLD Karachi 138 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-11Read full judgment →
• SAHIB DAD vs MUHAMMAD AJAIB AND Another1972 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-04
  Muslim LawGiftDoctrine of MushaaUndivided PropertyLeave to Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the validity of a gift of undivided property, specifically raising the doctrine of mushaa under Muslim Law. The petitioner argued that the gift of an undivided share in property was invalid. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether the doctrine of mushaa renders a gift of an undivided share in property invalid under Muslim Law. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention regarding the invalidity of the gift of mushaa lacked merit. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that a gift of a share of undivided property is valid under Muslim Law. The Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine relating to the invalidity of a gift of mushaa is unadapted to a progressive state of society and must be confined within the strictest rules. Consequently, the Court found no force in the petitioner's argument and upheld the validity of the gift, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a gift of a share of undivided property valid under Muslim Law?
  • Does the doctrine of mushaa render a gift of undivided property invalid in a progressive state of society?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEEDUR REHMAN AND 10 OTHERS vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land resumptiondefault in instalmentswrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncolonization of government lands
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises out of the resumption of land purchased by the petitioners in 1950 due to default in payment of instalments. Following various administrative proceedings, the Governor of West Pakistan ordered the restoration of the land subject to conditions, which the petitioners repeatedly failed to fulfill, leading to fresh resumption orders and notices under the Colonization of the Government Lands Act. The petitioners challenged these proceedings through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed in limine on the grounds that the Governor's order was not challenged in time and that subsequent valid resumption orders stood unchallenged. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no fault in the impugned order, and dismissed the petition. The core legal question involved the validity of land resumption upon default and the challenge to long-standing administrative orders. The court held that failure to comply with conditional restoration orders and failure to timely challenge administrative or judicial decisions precludes relief under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be maintained to challenge an administrative order after a lapse of twelve years?
  • Can land be legally resumed upon default in payment of instalments under the Colonization of the Government Lands Act?
  • Does a failure to challenge a foundational administrative order bar subsequent challenges to consequential judicial orders?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEED ZAKARIA vs THE STATE AND Another1972 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-21
  criminal breach of trustsentencingrestitutionmitigation of sentencemisappropriationspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order that had convicted the appellant under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal breach of trust, reversing an initial acquittal by the trial court. The core legal question concerned the appropriate sentencing in light of the appellant's offer to make full restitution for the misappropriated funds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan maintained the conviction but exercised its discretion to modify the sentence. Holding that the appellant's commitment to repay the entire misappropriated amount warranted leniency, the Court reduced the term of imprisonment to simple imprisonment until the rising of the Court. The Court further imposed a fine of Rs. 17,000, directing that Rs. 16,600 be paid as compensation to the complainant department and the remaining Rs. 400 be paid to the State Treasury. This judgment establishes the principle that in cases of criminal breach of trust, full restitution of misappropriated funds by the accused may be considered a mitigating factor for the reduction of a custodial sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence for criminal breach of trust be reduced if the accused makes full restitution of the misappropriated funds?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to modify a sentence imposed by the High Court in a criminal appeal?
  • Is simple imprisonment until the rising of the court a permissible sentence for an offence under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• SAEED AHMAD vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY1972 PLC 525 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• SAEED AHMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 360 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-01Read full judgment →
• SAEED AHMAD And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 984 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-10Read full judgment →
• SADRUDDIN Alias SADROO vs ABDUL KHALIQ And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 278 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-21Read full judgment →
• SADIQ vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 596 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-04Read full judgment →
• SABIR MASIH vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 1186 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-30Read full judgment →
• S. SHABBIR HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT1972 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  inheritance disputefindings of factsettlement authoritiesallotmentreversionerMartial Law Regulation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a revision petition challenging a decision by the delegate Chief Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Mst. Bashiran, was the daughter of Mohar Singh and thus entitled to inherit the disputed property, and whether the claim of a reversioner, Moti, was valid. The Supreme Court held that the determination of Mst. Bashiran's status as the daughter of Mohar Singh and the status of Moti as a reversioner were pure questions of fact, which the High Court correctly declined to interfere with, as they were based on evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the allotment to the vendors under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 was invalid because the information provided by the informer was incorrect, confirming Mst. Bashiran as the sole heir. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower forums when those findings are supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by settlement authorities when those findings are based on evidence?
  • Does an allotment made under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 remain valid if the information provided by the informer is found to be incorrect?
  • Is a person who has not made a claim entitled to be considered a reversioner in property disputes before settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• S. RAM SINGH UPPAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB1972 PTD 133 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-03-27Read full judgment →
• S. MUHAMMAD JAFFAR SHAH AND ANOTHER vs The STATE1972 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-24
  misjoinder of chargesjoint trialacquittal appealrecovery of charasunlicensed armsprejudicecriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants, who were the driver and cleaner of a truck, were tried jointly for offences under section 4 of the Prohibition Act and section 19 of the Arms Act, and were acquitted by the trial Magistrate. The High Court, on an appeal by the State, set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for retrial on the ground that the offences were distinct and not part of the same transaction, thereby vitiating the joint trial due to misjoinder of charges. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the joint trial for the recovery of charas and an unlicensed weapon was illegal and vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal, noting that the recoveries occurred during the same search sequence, no objection regarding misjoinder was raised at the trial, and no prejudice was caused to either party. The Court further observed that under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a trial is not vitiated by misjoinder of charges unless prejudice is shown, thereby laying down the principle that procedural irregularities without ensuing prejudice do not invalidate a trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of charas and an unlicensed revolver from the same vehicle constitutes distinct transactions requiring separate trials?
  • Does a misjoinder of charges automatically vitiate a trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is proof of prejudice mandatory before setting aside a trial on the ground of misjoinder of charges?
  Read full judgment →
• S. M. YOUSUF vs THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  search and seizurecustoms authoritiesillegal seizurerestoration of goodswrit petitionconditional release
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which accepted the appellant's writ petition regarding the search and seizure of foreign-made textile goods by the Customs authorities, but imposed certain conditions for their release. The core legal question concerned the legality of imposing conditions upon the restoration of goods seized unlawfully by the Customs authorities. The Supreme Court held, following its previous precedent, that there was no warrant in law for the conditions imposed by the High Court upon the restoration of the seized goods. The key principle laid down is that when a search and seizure by Customs authorities is declared illegal, the seized goods must be restored to the person from whom they were taken without the imposition of extraneous conditions regarding inventory, marking, or restraint on disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court impose conditions on the restoration of goods when their seizure by the Customs authorities is held to be illegal?
  • Whether goods seized unlawfully under the Sea Customs Act can be retained by the authorities after the search and seizure is declared illegal?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs to proceed under the Sea Customs Act survive an illegal search and seizure?
  Read full judgment →
• S. M. RAFI vs THE MANAGER, ATLAS TRAVELS LTD., RAWALPINDI1972 PLC 350 · Labour Court · 1971-07-17Read full judgment →
• S. M. FARID vs MUHAMMAD EBRAHIM & Co. LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 89 · Labour Court · 1971-04-19Read full judgment →
• S. A. WAHEED vs MR. MASOOD AHMED ANSARI, MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, LAHORE1972 PLD Lahore 485 · Lahore High Court · 1969-03-27Read full judgment →
• RUSTAM KHAN AND Others vs The STATE1972 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  death sentencecommutation of sentencecriminal appealinterested witnessesmedical evidencemurderappellate interference
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentences imposed on the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The appellants challenged the convictions, arguing that the prosecution's case relied on interested witnesses and conflicted with medical evidence and other testimony. The Supreme Court, having granted leave to appeal solely on the question of sentence, declined to revisit the merits of the conviction, noting that the trial and appellate courts had already found the evidence reliable. Regarding the sentence, the Court examined whether the delay in proceedings or the nature of the motive warranted commutation of the death penalty. The Court held that the murder was a cold-blooded, unprovoked act involving lethal weapons, with no extenuating circumstances. It reaffirmed the principle that it will not interfere with a legal sentence unless a significant question of principle is involved, which was absent here. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the appellants to seek clemency from the Provincial Government regarding the delay in the conclusion of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence in the absence of a question of principle?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted solely on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to revisit the merits of a conviction when leave to appeal was granted on a limited question of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• ROSS MASOOD KHAN AND Another vs MAJOR RIAZ AHMAD AND Other1972 SCMR 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-17
  special leave to appealinterlocutory orderinspection of documentscompanies actreview petitioninterim constitutionjurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a matter arising under section 76 of the Companies Act. The impugned order directed the company to grant the respondents inspection of certain documents to prepare their rejoinder. During the proceedings, questions arose regarding the maintainability of the petition in light of statutory bars on intra-court appeals against interlocutory orders, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution to entertain special leave petitions against such orders. The Supreme Court observed that while it possesses jurisdiction under Article 186 of the Interim Constitution to entertain special leave petitions against interlocutory orders in cases of manifest perversity, grave miscarriage of justice, or lack of jurisdiction, it generally refrains from doing so as a matter of practice. Noting that a review petition was already pending before the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition while directing the High Court to consider the validity of the petitioners' specific objections regarding the scope of inspection under the Companies Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for special leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of a High Court?
  • Are shareholders entitled to a roving inspection of the entire books of account of a company under the Companies Act?
  • Whether an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case is appealable within the High Court under the Law Reforms Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• ROBERT COTTON ASSOCIATES LTD, KHANEWAL- vs Khan KARAM HUSSAIN KHAN AND 2 Othsrss1972 PLD Supreme Court 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-07
  Limitation ActMutual open and current accountRecovery suitSurety liabilityDebit and credit entriesArticle 85 Limitation Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a suit for the recovery of money advanced by a firm to an individual, secured by a surety. The lower courts dismissed the suit as time-barred, ruling that Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable because the account between the parties was not mutual, open and current, as it lacked independent obligations on both sides. The core legal question was whether the account qualified as a mutual, open and current account under Article 85. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the account was indeed mutual, open and current. The Court established that for Article 85 to apply, it is sufficient that there is an open, current account consisting of mutual items of debit and credit in the course of dealings, without requiring that the balance must shift from one side to the other or that independent obligations must arise. Consequently, the suit was deemed within the limitation period, and the matter was remanded for a decision on merits regarding the surety's liability.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes a mutual, open and current account for the purposes of Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the application of Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908 require that transactions create independent obligations on both sides?
  • Must the balance in an account shift from one side to the other for it to be considered a mutual, open and current account under Article 85 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• RIAT ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1129 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-16Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ULLAH vs The STATE1972 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29
  murderresiled witnessescriminal procedureappreciation of evidenceblood-stained recoveriesspecial leave appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan maintaining the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of transportation for life for the murder of his daughter. The core legal question involved the assessment of evidence where principal prosecution eye-witnesses resiled from their earlier statements at trial and attempted to shift blame, and the admissibility and reliability of previous statements brought on record under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly relied upon the former statements of the witnesses admitted under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as they were fully supported by medical evidence, prompt first information reports, and incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons and clothing. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous statements of witnesses who resile at the trial can be admitted and used as substantive evidence under section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
  • Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained primarily on former statements of witnesses corroborated by medical evidence and recoveries?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ULLAH AND Another vs THE SECRETARY, EVACUEE PROPERTY TRUST BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-10
  evacuee property trust boardlease cancellationwrit petitionunilateral cancellationalternative remedy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition in limine. The appellants challenged an order of the Secretary, Evacuee Property Trust Board, cancelling a lease of evacuee trust lands previously granted to them. The cancellation was purportedly made to re-auction the land in smaller lots for higher rent without notice to the appellants. The High Court had dismissed the petition assuming an alternative remedy of appeal existed. During the appeal, the Evacuee Trust Board conceded that the cancellation order should be deemed withdrawn and the appellants permitted to remain in possession for the remainder of the lease period up to Rabi 1973. The Supreme Court recorded the statement of the Board's counsel and disposed of the appeal without making any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Evacuee Property Trust Board has jurisdiction to unilaterally cancel a lease after its execution?
  • Does an alternative remedy by way of appeal lie against an order of cancellation passed by the Evacuee Property Trust Board itself?
  • Can a lease of evacuee trust land be cancelled merely to enable the Board to obtain a higher income by re-auctioning the plot in smaller lots?
  Read full judgment →
• REHMAT ALI vs THE MANAGER, LAHORE AUTOS, LAHORE1972 PLC 353 · Labour Court · 1971-08-09Read full judgment →