Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• WORKERS' UNION vs THE SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, KARACHI1972 PLC 42 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-04-13Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1972 PLC 29 · Labour Court · 1970-11-14Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS ADAM TEA BLENDING FACTORY, KARACHI,1972 PLC 488 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
• WORKERS' UNION vs MESSERS TAJ RESTAURANT, KARACHI1972 PLC 419 · Labour Court · 1971-12-07Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNIONS vs THE SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, KARACHI1972 PLC 117(2) · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-04-12Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION vs TRANS-OCEANIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 44 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-04-29Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION vs THE TRANS OCEANIC STEAMSHIP Co. LTD. KARACHI1972 PLC 119 · Labour Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION vs THE SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1972 PLC 46 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-04-14Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION vs MESSRS A. REHMAN TEXTILE INDUSTRIES, KARACHI1972 PLC 503 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1977-03-07Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION vs MANAGEMENT OF FIRDAUS SHOES, MURIDKE1972 PLC 16 · Labour Court · 1970-12-31Read full judgment →
• WORKERS UNION MESSRS INDUS CHEMICALS & ALKALIS LTD. vs MESSRS INDUS1972 PLC 220 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-05-31Read full judgment →
• WEST PAKISTAN WAPDA Mst. HIRAN BEGUM vs Mst. HIRAN BEGUM WEST1972 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-09
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationpotential building sitequestion of factissues framing
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding land acquisition compensation for 5 kanals and 19 marlas of land in village Sobra, Hazara, acquired for the Tarbela Dam Project. The core legal questions were whether the failure to frame a specific issue regarding the nature of the land vitiated the proceedings and whether the High Court correctly determined the market value of the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the issue framed by the High Court—regarding the objector's entitlement to a specific sum as the cost of land—was sufficiently broad to allow parties to lead evidence on the land's nature and potential. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's methodology in calculating market price by referencing comparable sales in an adjoining village while excluding agricultural land types. The Court established that the determination of market price is primarily a question of fact, and where the High Court applies sound judicial principles in its assessment, the Supreme Court will not interfere with such findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to frame a specific issue regarding the nature of land invalidate compensation proceedings if a broader issue covering the entitlement to cost is present?
  • Is the determination of the market price of acquired land considered a question of fact that precludes interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the market value of acquired land be determined based on comparable sales data from an adjoining village?
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• WAZIR MUHAMMAD And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 549 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-18Read full judgment →
• WASIDAD KHAN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE AND 3 OTHERS1972 PLC 500 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-03-29Read full judgment →
• WASIDAD KHAN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE AND 2, OTHERS1972 PLC 258 · Labour Court · 1971-12-03Read full judgment →
• WASI AHMAD RIZVI vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 3 Other1972 PLD Karachi 589 · Sindh High Court · 1972-06-02Read full judgment →
• WASHING AND DRY CLEANING WORKERS UNION vs MESSRS NEW WAY DRY1972 PLC 145 · Labour Court · 1971-04-29Read full judgment →
• WALT MUHAMMAD And Another vs Tub STATE1972 P Cr. L J 219 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
• WALI MUHAMMAD REHMAN-UD-DIN vs THE STATE THROUGH THE COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION,DERA ISMAIL KHAN AND AnotherTHE STATE THROUGH COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITIONAND Another1972 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-15
  land acquisitioncompensation valuationmarket valueoral evidencestatutory interestconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two civil petitions arising from land acquisition proceedings for the establishment of a rice factory in Dera Ismail Khan. The petitioners challenged the compensation awarded for their lands, specifically arguing that the courts below erred in disregarding a sale deed of contiguous land which indicated a higher market value. They contended that the courts improperly accepted the oral testimony of the respondent, who claimed the sale deed figure was inflated to defeat pre-emption rights. Additionally, the petitioners sought a direction for the payment of interest on the compensation differential under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court held that the valuation of land based on oral evidence is a question of fact, and the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. Regarding the interest claim, the Court held that since the statute imposes a mandatory duty on the Collector to pay interest, the petitioners' remedy lies in approaching the appropriate forum for enforcement of that statutory duty rather than seeking special leave to appeal. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the valuation of land based on oral evidence regarding the true sale price a question of fact that precludes interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant special leave to appeal for the enforcement of a statutory duty to pay interest on compensation when the law already mandates such payment?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a landowner when the Collector fails to pay interest on the difference between the Collector's award and the court-determined compensation?
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• WAHID HUSSAIN vs MESSRS COMMERCE BANK LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 273 · Labour Court · 1971-02-26Read full judgment →
• WAHEED BAIG AND ANOTHER vs MESSERS JAFFAR IBRAHIM & COMPANY LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 319 · Labour Court · 1972-02-22Read full judgment →
• VOLUNTEER HOSPITAL WORKERS' UNION vs MANAGEMENT OF VOLUNTEER1972 PLC 434 · Labour Court · 1972-05-29Read full judgment →
• UNITED ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANY, KARACHI vs NOOR GUL1972 PLC 281 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-09-28Read full judgment →
• UNITED MERCANTILE Co. (PVT.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA1972 PTD 258 · Kerala High Court · 1968-07-25Read full judgment →
• UMAR KHAN vs (1) THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT AND (2) THE DEPUTY1972 PLD Lahore 221 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-27Read full judgment →
• UMAR BAKHSH MAZARI vs THE CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  mutation of inheritancerevisional jurisdictionprinciples of natural justiceopportunity of being heardnecessary partiesland reforms
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The core legal question concerned whether an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner in revision, affecting the property rights of co-sharers and the Court of Wards without impleading them or affording them an opportunity of being heard, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that orders passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the express mandatory provisions of the relevant land reform rules cannot be maintained. The key principles laid down are that no person's rights can be adversely affected by a revisional authority without notice and a proper opportunity of hearing, and that failure to implead necessary parties renders such proceedings and resulting orders legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner without impleading necessary parties violates the principles of natural justice?
  • Does Rule 12(3) of the West Pakistan Land Reform Rules 1959 prohibit modifying an order affecting any person without affording them an opportunity of being heard?
  • Can a revisional order passed behind the back of interested parties and the Court of Wards be sustained in law?
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• TRACO CABLE COMPANY LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, ERNAKULAM1972 PTD 296 · Kerala High Court · 1968-10-17Read full judgment →
• TOWN COMMITTEE, DIPALPUR vs AHMAD DIN AND 3 Other1972 PLD Lahore 290 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-08
  withdrawal of suitformal defectpermission to file fresh suitrevision petitionestoppelmis-joinder of partiesinconsistent pleascivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition challenges an order passed by the Civil Judge, Pakpattan, allowing the respondents to withdraw their civil suit with permission to file a fresh suit. The original suit challenged the petitioner's right to recover rent and tehbazari for certain plots and shops. The trial court framed preliminary issues regarding estoppel, mis-joinder, and inconsistent pleas. Subsequently, the plaintiffs applied under Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to withdraw the suit due to formal defects, which the trial court allowed summarily. The Lahore High Court held that neither the withdrawal application nor the trial court's order specified the formal defects or demonstrated satisfaction that the suit must fail by reason of such defects. The Court clarified that issues like estoppel do not constitute formal defects and procedural irregularities like inconsistent pleas should be cured through amendment rather than withdrawal. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order and directed the trial court to decide the original suit according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can permit the withdrawal of a suit with liberty to file a fresh suit without being satisfied that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect?
  • Does a plea of estoppel constitute a formal defect under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can inconsistency of pleas be deemed a formal defect warranting the withdrawal of a suit instead of seeking an amendment?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in revision with an order permitting the withdrawal of a suit where the lower court failed to apply its judicial mind?
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• TOOR GUL vs Mst. MUMTAZ BEGUM1972 PLD Supreme Court 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-25
  vakalatnamadefective vakalatnamaomission of advocate nameex parte ordercurable irregularityeviction proceedingsappointment of pleader
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arose from eviction proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. On the hearing date, a pleader filed a vakalatnama bearing the tenant's thumb-impression and the pleader's signed acceptance, but the pleader's name was accidentally omitted from the body of the vakalatnama. The Rent Controller treated the vakalatnama as invalid, refused to allow the pleader to act, and passed an ex parte eviction order, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal including by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that procedural rules in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are enabling provisions designed to advance justice and substantial compliance is sufficient. The accidental omission of a pleader's name from the body of a vakalatnama is a mere curable irregularity rather than an invalidating defect when the intention to appoint the pleader is clear. Remanding the case, the Court set aside the ex parte order subject to the tenant depositing arrear rents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the accidental omission of a pleader's name from the body of a vakalatnama render it invalid?
  • Is the execution of a vakalatnama required to take place in the physical presence of the client and the pleader under Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court proceed ex parte without giving a pleader an opportunity to rectify a formal defect in a vakalatnama?
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• TOLOMAL AND 6 Other vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND ADDITIONAL1972 PLD Karachi 116 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-24Read full judgment →
• TIKA RAM & SONS (PVT.) LTD. vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, DISTRICT1972 PTD 227 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-11-08Read full judgment →
• THE WORKMEN vs THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN, IRRIGATION POWER, HYDERABAD AND 2 OTHERS1972 PLC 66 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-11-24Read full judgment →
• THE WEST PAKISTAN' ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION, RAWALPINDI vs THE PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION LAHORE1972 PLC 337 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-11-08Read full judgment →
• THE WEST PAKISTAN HYDRO ELECTRIC CENTRAL LABOUR UNION (READ.) vs THE CHAIRMAN, WAPDA, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS1972 PLC 384 · Labour Court · 1971-10-01Read full judgment →
• The WEST PAKISTAN BAR COUNCIL TRIBUNAL, LAHORE vs MR. YUSUF ALI KHAN, BAR AT LAW1972 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-27
  advocate licence suspensionad interim suspensionbar council tribunalultra vires ruleprofessional misconductdissolution of provincestatutory body powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the Lahore High Court's order declaring the interim suspension of the respondent advocate's licence by the West Pakistan Bar Council Tribunal to be without lawful authority. The Supreme Court examined whether the dissolution of the West Pakistan Province affected the validity of the Tribunal and whether Rule 51 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969, empowering ad interim suspension, was ultra vires the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965. The Supreme Court held that the dissolution order preserved existing laws and tribunals, including the Act and its constituted bodies, under Article 19 read with Articles 15 and 17(4) of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970. However, the Court further held that the Act only authorized suspension after a finding of guilt under Section 36, and the Bar Council, being a creature of statute with no inherent powers, could not frame rules permitting ad interim suspension. Consequently, Rule 51 was declared ultra vires the parent Act, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan under President's Order No. 1 of 1970 affected the continuity and validity of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965 and tribunals constituted thereunder?
  • Does the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1965 empower the Bar Council Tribunal to order an ad interim suspension of an advocate's licence pending an inquiry?
  • Is Rule 51 of the West Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1969 ultra vires the parent Act in so far as it authorizes the interim suspension of an advocate before a finding of guilt?
  • Can a statutory body like the Bar Council claim inherent powers to pass ad interim orders of suspension similar to those possessed by a High Court?
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• THE WAPDA ELECTRIC WORKERS' UNION, PESHAWAR vs REGISTRAR, TRADE1972 PLC 277 · Labour Court · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs TAJ DIN AND Other1972 PLD Lahore 434 · Lahore High Court · 1972-05-09Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs RASHID AHMED1972 PLD Karachi 51 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-26Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs QUDRATULLAH AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 146 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-11Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs PARIO1972 P Cr. L J 915 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
• The STATE vs NOOR MUHAMMAD And 3 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 1001 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-29Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs NAKULRAM AND Anotmut1972 PLD Karachi 351 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-11Read full judgment →
• The STATE vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI Etc.S1972 P Cr. L J 235 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• The STATE vs MUHAMMAD HASSAN And 5 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 107 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-28Read full judgment →
• The STATE vs MAHMOOD KHAN And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 240 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-26Read full judgment →
• The STATE vs IMAMUDDIN And 4 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 1127 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-28Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs GUL BADSHAH1972 PLD Peshawar 105 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-25Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs DARSHAN LAL AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 548 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-22Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs BASHIR AHMAD And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 561 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs AMIR ALI And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 429 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-09Read full judgment →
• THE STATE vs AMINULLAH AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Peshawar 92 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-12-17
  Acquittal appealMurderEye-witness testimonyCorroborationFalsus in uno falsus in omnibusMedical evidenceExpectation of life doctrineSentencingAbscondence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of two accused, Aminullah and Hidayatullah, by the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, for an offence under Section 302/34, P.P.C., concerning the murder of Atta Muhammad. The Sessions Judge had disbelieved the three eye-witnesses, who were close relatives of the deceased, primarily on the grounds that their evidence required independent corroboration due to their relationship and certain discrepancies. The High Court found the trial judge's approach palpably erroneous, holding that relationship alone does not render witnesses 'interested' without a motive for false implication, and that the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' is not applicable in Pakistan. The Court also clarified that an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal if the appreciation of evidence is perverse or foolish, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The High Court re-evaluated the evidence, preferring the convincing eye-witness account over perfunctory medical evidence, and found the accused guilty. The Court further addressed the 'expectation of life' doctrine, ruling that inordinate delay in an acquittal appeal does not universally preclude the death penalty, especially for gruesome or callous murders. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and both accused were convicted under Section 302/34, P.P.C., and sentenced to death.

  Questions settled

  • Does relationship alone make a witness 'interested' requiring independent corroboration?
  • Is the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' applicable in Pakistan?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Can direct eye-witness testimony be preferred over conflicting medical evidence?
  • Does inordinate delay in the disposal of an appeal against acquittal preclude the imposition of the death sentence?
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• The STATE vs ABDUL SATTAR And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 1102 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-11Read full judgment →
• THE STATE OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, ISLAMABAD AND 3 Others vs ABDUL QAYUM KHAN1972 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-18
  lachesacquiescencecompulsory retirementwrit jurisdictiondelay in filingwaiver of rightsservice law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court order that quashed the compulsory retirement of a government servant and directed his reinstatement with arrears. The core legal question is whether a writ petition filed three years after the impugned retirement order should be dismissed on the grounds of laches and acquiescence, particularly when the petitioner had accepted pension benefits and sought re-employment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in condoning the three-year delay, as the petitioner failed to provide a valid explanation and had actively sought and accepted retirement benefits, thereby acquiescing to the order. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of laches applies when a petitioner sleeps on their rights for an unreasonable period, causing prejudice to administrative arrangements made in the interim. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and dismissed the writ petition, establishing that acceptance of retirement benefits and a significant, unexplained delay in seeking judicial redress preclude a petitioner from challenging the legality of their compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of pension benefits and commutation after a compulsory retirement order constitute acquiescence that bars a subsequent challenge to that order?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained when it is filed after a significant delay of three years without a reasonable explanation?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a writ petition where the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that they were actively agitating the matter through departmental proceedings during the delay?
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• THE STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN THE STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN vs ISMAIL1972 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-03-08Read full judgment →
• THE SALMAN CORPORATION (REGD.), LYALLPUR vs THE SUTLEJ COTTON MILLS1972 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  bank guaranteetemporary injunctionex parte orderservice of noticesuit by or against firmsexhaustion of remediesagency agreement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant-firm filed a civil suit seeking a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondent from encashing a bank guarantee furnished as security for an agency agreement. The trial court granted a temporary injunction conditional upon the appellant providing a fresh bank guarantee. The respondent appealed this order, and the appellate court set aside the injunction after an ex parte hearing. The appellant's revision petition to the High Court was dismissed in limine, with the High Court noting the appellant failed to exhaust the remedy of seeking a rehearing under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the validity of the service of notice and the merits of the injunction. The Court held that the High Court correctly identified the failure to exhaust alternative remedies. Furthermore, the Court determined that the terms of the agency agreement explicitly authorized the respondent to call upon the bank guarantee for sums due. The Court also clarified that the specific service provisions under Order XXX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding suits by or against firms were inapplicable to the present matter. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XXX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to all suits involving firms?
  • Is it appropriate to approach the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before seeking a rehearing of an ex parte appellate order under Order XLI, Rule 21?
  • Can a principal invoke a bank guarantee if the agency agreement explicitly permits appropriation of deposit money for sums due?
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• THE REGISTRAR, TRADE UNIONS, N. W.F. P., PESHAWAR vs KARIMI INDUSTRIES1972 PLC 278 · Labour Court · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
• THE PUNJAB MINERS' LABOUR UNION vs THE WEST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL1972 PLD Lahore 489 · Lahore High Court
  locus standitrade unionwrit petitionworkmen's compensationindemnity bondmining operations
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition filed by a trade union representing registered and unregistered salt miners against management actions regarding employment reduction and compensation liability. The core legal questions involve the locus standi of a trade union to maintain a writ petition regarding individual member grievances under the Constitution, and whether the management's requirement that registered miners indemnify the management for compensation paid to unregistered miners violates the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court held that a trade union lacks locus standi to maintain a petition under Article 98 in respect of specific individual grievances of its members, and that the management's demand for indemnification is lawful under section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923, as the management remains primarily liable to pay compensation while being entitled to indemnity from the contractor or registered miner. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trade union have the locus standi under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 to maintain a writ petition in respect of specific individual grievances of its members?
  • Are unregistered miners employed as helpers by registered miners considered workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
  • Is the management of a mine entitled to seek indemnification from a registered miner for compensation paid to an unregistered miner under section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
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• THE PROVINCIAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs MESSRS Sh.1972 PLD Karachi 393 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-24Read full judgment →
• THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN (NOW PUNJAB PROVINCE) THROUGH SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN (NOW PUNJAB PROVINCE) IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND Others vs MANGLA DAM CONTRACTOR THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER1972 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-17
  contractual disputecanal water supplygovernment contractprocedural irregularityestoppelsanction of governmentwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the rate of canal water supplied by the Irrigation and Power Department to a contractor for public works construction. The core legal question was whether a contract for water supply, signed by the Divisional Canal Officer after receiving sanction conveyed by the Irrigation Secretary, was binding upon the Provincial Government, despite later claims that proper sanction was lacking. The Supreme Court upheld the Lahore High Court's decision, which found that the agreement was validly executed. The Court held that the parties had acted on the assumption of valid sanction, the agreement had been performed by both sides for nearly two years, and the government could not reopen the matter after such a duration. Furthermore, the Court noted that the government's assertion of a lack of sanction was unsupported by any affidavit from the Irrigation Secretary. The key principle laid down is that where a government contract is acted upon by both parties for a significant period, the government is estopped from challenging the validity of the contract based on alleged procedural irregularities in the sanctioning process, especially when the claim is unsubstantiated by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Provincial Government reopen a contract after it has been acted upon by both parties for a significant period?
  • Is a contract for canal water supply valid if signed by the Divisional Canal Officer following sanction conveyed by the Irrigation Secretary?
  • Does an unsubstantiated assertion in a written statement suffice to challenge the validity of a government contract?
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• THE MURREE BREWERY Co. LTD vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, WORKS DIVISION AND 2 OTHERS1972 PLD Supreme Court 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03
  Property acquisitionCapital Development AuthorityUltra viresMala fideWrit petitionJudicial reviewStatutory interpretationAcquisition schemeJurisdictionMaster Plan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court decision dismissing a writ petition against the acquisition of property by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. The core legal questions revolved around the CDA's jurisdiction, the legality of the acquisition process, and allegations of mala fide. The Supreme Court held that a writ petition is maintainable even if a statutory appeal is pending, particularly when challenging the very jurisdiction of the authority or alleging mala fide. The Court found that the acquisition was not for the purpose of the Ordinance, was in flagrant violation of its provisions, and was mala fide in law due to inconsistent reasons for acquisition, lack of a proper scheme, and the property's designation in the Master Plan as 'Open Space' rather than for the stated purpose. The Court emphasized that statutory powers of acquisition are not unlimited and must have a reasonable nexus with the Ordinance's purpose, strictly adhering to its procedural requirements. Consequently, the acquisition was declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be entertained by the High Court when an appeal under the relevant statute is pending, if the challenge is to the authority's jurisdiction or alleges mala fide?
  • Does the Capital Development Authority possess unlimited and undefined power to acquire land within Specified Areas without a reasonable reference to the purpose of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960?
  • Must an acquisition under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, be preceded by and made in pursuance of a scheme approved by the Central Government?
  • Can an acquisition be deemed mala fide in law if different reasons are given for it at different times, or if it is not in line with the Master Plan or a properly framed scheme?
  • Is strict adherence to the procedural provisions of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, required for a lawful acquisition of land?
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• THE KARACHI OMNI BUS SERVICE WORKERS' UNION, KARACHI vs THE SIND1972 PLC 308 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-06-15Read full judgment →
• THE JABEES EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MESSERS HOTEL JABEES, KARACHI1972 PLC 378 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• THE GULBAR WORKERS UNION (REGD.) vs MESSRS GULBAR, KARACHI1972 PLC 109 · Labour Court · 1971-04-23Read full judgment →
• THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AND KASHMIR, AFFAIRS (HOME AFFAIRS DIVISION), ISLAMABAD vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD1972 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  habeas corpuspreventive detentioninfructuous appealadvisory boardmootnessconstitutional interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention of the respondent under the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. The High Court had declared the detention illegal, ruling that under Section 6-A of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, the government could not detain a person beyond three months without referring the matter to an advisory board, despite arguments that Section 7(1) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, rendered such requirements ineffective. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it was brought to the Court's attention that the respondent had fled to Afghanistan following his release, rendering the matter moot. Furthermore, the Court noted that the legal landscape regarding preventive detention had been altered by the Interim Constitution of 1972, which re-introduced the requirement for advisory board references. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to engage in an academic interpretation of the conflicting provisions of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, and the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, dismissing the appeal as infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Does the flight of a respondent to a foreign jurisdiction render a pending appeal against a habeas corpus order infructuous?
  • Does the enactment of new constitutional provisions regarding preventive detention render the interpretation of repealed or superseded detention laws academic?
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• THE GENERAL SECRETARY, PROVINCIAL BUILDINGS EMPLOYEES' UNION, HYDERABAD vs THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, PROVINCIAL BUILDINGS DIVISION AND1972 PLC 285 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-09-29Read full judgment →
• THE DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., QUETTA vs MIAN MUHAMMAD1972 PLC 18 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-10-05Read full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN), LAHORE-Applicant vs MESSRS FAYYAZ BROTHERS1972 PTD 599 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-13Read full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN), LAHORE1972 PLD Lahore 792 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-13Read full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI-Applicant vs MESSRS1972 PTD 366 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KARACHI vs Massxs PLATINUM JUBILEE1972 PLD Karachi 331 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE vs MESSRS MIR1972 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29
  income tax penaltystatutory interpretationpower of approvaladvance taxtax assessmentadministrative authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the imposition of a penalty under the Income-tax Act. The assessee, a registered firm, failed to pay advance tax under Section 18-A(1) of the Income-tax Act, leading the Income-tax Officer to propose a penalty of Rs. 1,000. Under Section 28(6) of the Act, such a penalty requires the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Instead of approving or disapproving the proposed amount, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner unilaterally imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000. The core legal question was whether the statutory power to approve a proposed penalty includes the authority to alter, amend, or enhance that penalty. The High Court held that the power to approve does not encompass the power to amend the proposed penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, finding that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exceeded their authority by enhancing the penalty rather than merely exercising the power of approval. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the principle that a statutory power of approval is limited to the scope of the proposal submitted for review.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory power to approve a penalty proposed by an Income-tax Officer include the power to enhance that penalty?
  • Can an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner unilaterally increase a penalty proposed under the Income-tax Act without the power to amend?
  • Is the power to approve a proposed penalty limited to the scope of the original proposal?
  Read full judgment →
• THE COMMISSIONER AND Another vs Mian SHER MUHAMMAD1972 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  writ jurisdictionmisreading of evidenceservice rulesNaib-Tehsildarspecial leave to appealfindings of factjudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the selection of the respondent for the post of Naib-Tehsildar. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction to overturn a finding of fact regarding the respondent's eligibility, specifically whether he had completed the mandatory two-year service period as a Field Kanungo under the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court may interfere with findings of fact if they are based on a misreading of evidence, the High Court in this instance had itself misread the certificate provided by the Consolidation Officer, which showed the respondent performed Field Kanungo duties only as an additional task. However, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, exercising judicial discretion due to the significant lapse of time since the respondent's initial selection and his continued service. The key principle established is that while writ jurisdiction allows for the correction of misread evidence, such interference must be based on an accurate interpretation of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the performance of duties in addition to a primary appointment satisfy a service requirement prescribed for a specific post?
  • Can the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal despite finding an error in the High Court's judgment due to the passage of time?
  Read full judgment →
• The Collector, Mardan And 2 Other vs Mst. Taj Bibi And 14 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 197 · Peshawar High Court · -
  land acquisitionlimitation periodcollector's referencejurisdiction of courtawardexpropriatory statutestatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the scope of the District Court's jurisdiction in land acquisition references, specifically regarding the limitation period for filing objections. The core legal questions were whether a Court, upon receiving a reference from a Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has the jurisdiction to examine whether the initial objection application was filed within the statutory limitation period, and what constitutes the commencement date for the six-month limitation period under Section 18(2)(b). The Court held that once a Collector makes a reference, the Court lacks jurisdiction to go behind that reference to determine if the objection application was time-barred, as the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the specific matters referred under Section 19. Furthermore, the six-month limitation period commences from the date the Collector signs the award containing all required declarations under Section 11, and this period is not extendable. The Court established that the Land Acquisition Act is a special statute creating a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and the Court cannot review the Collector's administrative decision on limitation once a reference is formally made.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Court go behind a Collector's reference to determine if the objection application was filed within the statutory limitation period?
  • From what date does the six-month limitation period for challenging a land acquisition award under Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 commence?
  • Is the six-month limitation period for filing an objection application under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 extendable?
  Read full judgment →
• THE ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD., LAHORE vs THE LAHORE MUNICIPAL1972 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  annual value assessmentmunicipal taxationgross annual rentstatutory interpretationappellate jurisdictionCity of Lahore Corporation Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the assessment of the annual value of Faletti's Hotel, Lahore, by the Lahore Municipal Corporation for the years 1955-1959. The core legal question was whether an appeal lay to the District Judge under Section 118 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act regarding the quantum of tax, specifically concerning the basis or principle of assessment. The High Court had previously held that no appeal lay because the dispute related only to the quantum of tax rather than the principles of assessment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Assessor's determination of annual value based on 'Trade Earnings' was contrary to Section 107 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act, which mandates that annual value be based on the gross annual rent the building might reasonably be expected to let for. Consequently, the Court ruled that an appeal was maintainable under Section 118. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remanded to the Assessor for re-assessment in accordance with the law, specifically noting that the value of furniture must be included in the annual value calculation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie under Section 118 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act when the dispute concerns the basis or principle of assessment rather than just the quantum of tax?
  • Is the determination of annual value based on 'Trade Earnings' consistent with the requirements of Section 107 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act?
  • Must the value of furniture be included in the annual value assessment under the City of Lahore Corporation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• TEHMASH vs AFTAB GUL AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-13
  petition for leave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtfirearm expert reportmurderinterference with acquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the son of the deceased against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the conviction and sentences of death and transportation for life awarded to the respondents under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot the deceased in broad daylight in the presence of police officials and eyewitnesses, following which they were apprehended with their shotguns and four empty cartridges were recovered from the scene. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal of the respondents was perverse or unreasonable so as to justify interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Fire-arm Expert's report, establishing that none of the recovered empty cartridges were fired from the seized shotguns, constituted an inherent weakness going to the root of the prosecution case. The High Court was fully justified in granting the benefit of doubt to the respondents, and as the judgment was neither perverse nor unreasonable, no interference was warranted. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between ballistic evidence and eyewitness accounts regarding recovered cartridges constitute a fatal weakness justifying the grant of benefit of doubt to the accused?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment of acquittal that is neither perverse nor unreasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• TASNIM AHMED vs MESSRS PAKISTAN GUM AND CHEMICALS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 252 · Labour Court · 1971-12-01Read full judgment →
• TANZEEM-E-MULAZAMIN BALDIYAAND 2 Others vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST1972 PLC 91 · Sindh High Court · 1970-11-06Read full judgment →
• TALIB HUSSAIN And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1270 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-03Read full judgment →
• TALAH DIN AND 3 Other vs SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE, KHANEWAL AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 676 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-09Read full judgment →
• Syed SHARIFUDDIN PIRZADA TAE STATE vs SOHBAT KHAN AND 3 Other SOHBAT1972 PLD Supreme Court 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-26
  criminal appealmurderdacoityapprover evidencejudicial confessionextra-judicial confessionidentification paradefingerprint expertacquittal set aside
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These criminal appeals by special leave were directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan acquitting the respondents of charges relating to a dacoity, murder, and murderous assault committed at the residence of Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondents had been acquitted on principles consistent with the safe dispensation of justice and whether the High Court misread the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had indeed acquitted the respondents on artificial and superficial grounds and misread the material evidence, including judicial confessions, extra-judicial confessions, eyewitness testimony, fingerprint evidence, and the testimony of the approver. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal of respondent Sohbat Khan, convicted him under sections 396 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and sentenced him to transportation for life, taking into account the prolonged delay since his acquittal by the High Court. The key principles laid down include that minor omissions or discrepancies do not discredit an approver's testimony when materially corroborated, and that procedural irregularities in recording judicial confessions of a directory nature do not vitiate their voluntariness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an irregularity in complying with police custody formalities during a judicial confession vitiates its voluntariness?
  • Does a minor omission in an approver's statement compared to their confessional statement discredit their entire testimony?
  • Can an appellate court's acquittal based on a misreading of evidence be set aside by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether extra-judicial confessions corroborated by material particulars can form the basis of a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed SHABIR ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 826 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-15Read full judgment →
• Syed RIAZ AHMAD SHAH AND Another vs DAYAL.SINGH COLLEGE TRUST1972 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  execution of decreeex parte decreeevacuee trust propertyexecuting courtobstruction in executionloco standi
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking to challenge the execution of an ex parte decree for arrears of rent and ejectment passed on 7-12-1960. The core legal question is whether third-party objectors in execution proceedings can challenge the competence of the original decree-holder on the ground that management of the property vested in the Evacuee Trust Board, and whether an executing court can go behind the decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an executing court cannot go behind the decree, and third-party tenants cannot obstruct execution by raising technical objections regarding the competency of the original suit after a decree has attained finality. The court laid down the principle that executing courts are strictly barred from going behind the decree, and execution proceedings cannot be thwarted by raising extraneous or technical challenges to the original plaintiff's locus standi.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court go behind the decree?
  • Whether third-party objectors can challenge the competence of the original decree-holder during execution proceedings?
  • Can execution of a decree be obstructed on technical objections raised by tenants inducted subsequent to the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed NIZAMUDDIN vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 678 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-24
  interim custodysupardginamarevision applicationownership disputecase propertycriminal procedurediscretionary power
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application arises from a dispute over the interim custody of a taxi (supardginama) pending criminal proceedings. The petitioner, claiming ownership of the vehicle, challenged a Magistrate's order that had granted possession to the complainant, respondent No. 2, who had alleged theft. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate exercised proper discretion under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in awarding custody to a complainant who lacked an ostensible claim to the property, while the petitioner produced documentation supporting his registered ownership. The High Court held that the Magistrate's order was unjustified as the complainant had no legal claim to the vehicle, whereas the petitioner provided evidence of ownership, including registration and permit documents. The Court set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that interim custody should generally follow legal title unless compelling reasons exist otherwise. The principle laid down is that while interim custody of case property is discretionary, it must be exercised judiciously, favoring the party with the prima facie superior legal title, while simultaneously safeguarding the interests of other potential claimants through adequate security bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate have the discretion to grant interim custody of case property to a complainant who lacks an ostensible claim of ownership?
  • Is the registered owner of a vehicle entitled to interim possession of the vehicle pending the outcome of criminal proceedings?
  • Can a court impose a bank guarantee as a condition for granting interim custody of property to a claimant?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed NAUSHAB ALI vs LT. COL. MEHMOOD KHAN DURRANI1972 PLD Lahore 766 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-03Read full judgment →
• Syed NAJMUL KIBRIA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 635 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-29Read full judgment →
• Syed MUHAMMAD MUNIR (REPRESENTED BY 10 HEIRS) AND Anothbrs vs ABU1972 PLD Supreme Court 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-26
  Shia law of inheritancechildless widowsuccession to agricultural landlife estate terminationIthna'ashariSharai-ul-Islamwill by limited ownermutation proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from the dismissal in limine of a writ petition challenging mutation proceedings concerning agricultural land allotted in lieu of property left behind in India. The dispute concerned whether a childless widow governed by Shia law (Ithna'ashari) could inherit any share in her deceased husband's immovable landed property, and whether 'childless widow' refers to a woman having no child surviving the deceased at the time of succession. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under well-settled Shia law, a childless widow—defined as a widow who has no living child surviving her deceased husband when succession opens—is excluded from inheriting any share in the landed property (immovable property) of her deceased husband. The Court held that settled rules of succession founded on authoritative jurisprudential texts of Shia jurists having universal acceptance and Ijma cannot be altered by judicial reinterpretation of Quranic texts; such changes pertain strictly to the legislative domain. Consequently, her life estate terminated upon death and her bequest of the land was invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under Shia law a childless widow is excluded from inheriting a share in the immovable landed property of her deceased husband?
  • What is the legal definition of a 'childless widow' for the purposes of succession under Shia law?
  • Can the courts alter or depart from an established rule of Shia succession founded on ancient authority and consensus (Ijma) by interpreting Quranic texts anew?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed MUHAMMAD ASHRAF SHAH vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN, (SERVICES1972 PLC 518 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-11Read full judgment →
• Syed MAZHAR HUSSAIN RIZVI AND 3 Other vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST1972 PLC 572 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-11Read full judgment →
• Syed MANZOOR HUSSAIN GHAZI vs SYED EJAZ HUSSAIN SHAH, SETTLEMENT1972 PLD Lahore 743 · Lahore High Court
  court-feeLetters Patent Appealwrit petitionvested rightprocedural lawtaxing judgeretrospective effect
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference before the Taxing Judge concerns the determination of the appropriate court-fee payable on Letters Patent Appeals arising from writ petitions. The core legal question was whether the court-fee is governed by the law in force at the time of the institution of the original writ petition, based on the theory of a vested right, or by the law in force at the time of the actual presentation of the appeal. The Court held that the court-fee must be paid according to the law in force at the time of the actual presentation of the appeal. The ratio establishes that the right of appeal is distinct from the payment of court-fee, and a litigant possesses no vested right in a specific court-fee rate. Furthermore, the imposition of fees is a regulatory and procedural matter within the High Court's competence under its Letters Patent. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that the law in force at the time of the original suit's institution should apply, affirming that procedural changes regarding fees apply to all documents filed thereafter.

  Questions settled

  • Is the court-fee payable on an appeal determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the original suit or at the time of filing the appeal?
  • Does a litigant have a vested right to pay the court-fee that was prevalent at the time of the institution of the original suit?
  • Does the High Court have the power to regulate court-fees for Letters Patent Appeals under its Letters Patent?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed ISRAIL SHAH AND Another vs Sh. AMANULLAH AND Other1972 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-13
  specific performancecivil court jurisdictionland settlementrehabilitation authoritycompensation poolpermanent transfer
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of land. The core legal question was whether a civil court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance concerning land allotted to the petitioners in lieu of unsatisfied Produce Index Units, particularly when the petitioners argued the land was not permanently settled and remained within the compensation pool. The Supreme Court held that the civil court indeed had jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the land had been validly transferred to the petitioners by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, acting as a Settlement Authority under the relevant statute. Consequently, the transfer constituted a permanent settlement, thereby removing the bar on civil court jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that where land has been permanently transferred to an allottee by a competent Settlement Authority, the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding the specific performance of contracts related to such land, as it is no longer excluded by the provisions of the Land Settlement Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance regarding land transferred to an allottee by a Rehabilitation Authority?
  • Is a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner considered a 'Settlement Authority' for the purpose of land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Does the transfer of land by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner constitute a permanent transfer sufficient to vest jurisdiction in a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed GHULAM SHAH BUKHARI vs MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR1972 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  tenant ejectmentrent restrictionextension of timedeposit of rentrent controller powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a tenant's appeal by special leave against the confirmation of his ejectment order from a shop by the High Court, which upheld the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller is competent under the relevant rent restriction law to grant an extension of time for depositing rent ordered to be paid. The Supreme Court held, following its earlier precedent, that the Rent Controller has no power under the statute to extend the period fixed by him for depositing rent. The Court laid down the principle that upon the dismissal of an appeal challenging a rent deposit order, the original order of the Rent Controller stands revived, and the tenant is required to comply with it within a reasonable time without claiming a fresh statutory period for deposit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the power under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to extend the period fixed by him for depositing rent?
  • What is the effect of the dismissal of an appeal on an interim stay order regarding the deposit of rent?
  • Can a tenant claim a fresh starting point for depositing rent upon the dismissal of his appeal against a rent deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed FAYYAZ HUSSAIN QADRI, ADVOCATE vs THE ADMINISTRATOR. LAHORE1972 PLD Lahore 316 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-14
  constitutional petitiontermination of servicesmunicipal employeestatutory bodymaster and servantwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary powerdelegation of authoritylegal advisermunicipal corporation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the termination of the petitioner's services as Legal Adviser to the Municipal Corporation of Lahore. The termination order, issued by the Administrator, stated it was directed by the Government. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of constitutional safeguards to municipal employees, the competence of a writ petition in such cases, and the authority to terminate the Legal Adviser's services. The Court held that Article 177 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962, does not apply to employees of statutory corporations like Municipal Committees, as they are not civil servants of the Province. However, a writ petition is competent if the termination violates a statute or statutory rules. The Court found that the petitioner was a municipal servant appointed under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, and the Basic Democracies Order, 1959. The power to remove a Legal Adviser, after the repeal of the West Pakistan Statutory Bodies (Appointment and Removal of Legal Advisers) Ordinance, 1965, vested exclusively in the Municipal Committee or, upon its supersession, in the Administrator, who was required to exercise independent discretion and not merely act on government instructions. Consequently, the impugned termination order, not having been passed by the Administrator in the exercise of his own discretion, was declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Do the constitutional safeguards under Article 177 of the 1962 Constitution apply to employees of a Municipal Corporation?
  • Is a writ petition competent to challenge the termination of services of an employee of a statutory body if the termination violates a statute or statutory rules?
  • Does the repeal of an ordinance automatically terminate appointments made under it if the primary appointing authority is a separate statutory body?
  • Can an Administrator of a superseded Municipal Committee merely implement government instructions for removal of an employee, or must they exercise independent discretion?
  • What is the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of a Controlling Authority over a Municipal Committee under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed AZIZ-UR-RAHMAN vs Mst. HABIB BANG AND 5 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29
  settlement authoritiesevacuee propertyearmarking schemeCH FormE Formdivisibility of housespecial leave appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which had set aside orders of Settlement Authorities transferring an evacuee house to the appellant. The core legal question concerned whether the filing of an 'E' Form to participate in an earmarking scheme under Settlement Scheme No. V operated as an automatic withdrawal or cancellation of a previously filed 'CH' Form. The Supreme Court held that the making of an application in Form 'E' to join the lottery of earmarked houses operates by itself as a cancellation or withdrawal of any application made in Form 'CH', and the choice made is irrevocable. However, because lower Settlement Authorities failed to properly apply their minds to the question of whether the house was divisible, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner to determine the divisibility of the house in accordance with law and applicable regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an application in Form 'E' to participate in an earmarking scheme operate as an automatic withdrawal of a previously filed 'CH' Form?
  • Can a non-claimant displaced person in occupation of a portion of a house be transferred the entire house if it is found to be indivisible and competing claims fail?
  • Whether settlement authorities are required to independently apply their minds to the question of the divisibility of an evacuee property rather than relying solely on the assertions of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed ALI IQTIDAR SHAH DARA AND 6 Other vs THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE1972 PLD Lahore 798 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-17Read full judgment →
• Syed ABDUL QADIR SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY, BASIC DEMOCRACIES, SOCIAL WELFARE AND LOCAL BODIES DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND Another1972 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-23
  prospects of promotionterms and conditions of servicewrit jurisdictionreversiontemporary promotionconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the initial recruitment to senior Class II posts in the local council service and his reversion to a substantive post following temporary promotion. The petitioner, an Accountant in the junior Class II scale, claimed eligibility for promotion to senior Class II posts on the administrative side under the relevant rules and challenged the filling of vacancies by initial recruitment. The High Court rejected his claim regarding promotion but partially set aside the order refixing his pay without notice. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that prospects of promotion do not constitute terms and conditions of service and cannot be enforced through a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. It further held that a temporary promotion subject to government approval for rule relaxation creates no vested right. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are prospects of promotion part of the terms and conditions of service enforceable under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Can a temporary promotion made subject to relaxation of rules by the government confer a vested right to the promoted post?
  Read full judgment →
• SUPERINIENDENT OF POLICE, SPECIAL BRANCH, KARACHI AND Others vs ABUBAKAR AND Another1972 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-03
  cancellation of passportconfiscation of passportnatural justiceaudi alteram partemadministrative actionshow-cause noticewithdrawal of privilege
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal was filed by the Government against a High Court judgment declaring the confiscation and cancellation of the respondents' passports illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the principles of natural justice apply to the cancellation or confiscation of a passport issued to a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that the cancellation was invalid for failure to issue a show-cause notice or afford a hearing. The Court established that while the initial grant of a privilege or licence like a passport may lie within the State's discretion, once granted, it cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or confiscated without adhering to principles of natural justice. The grantee acquires a right to enjoy the privilege during its term, and even administrative acts affecting citizens' rights require notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.

  Questions settled

  • Do principles of natural justice apply to the cancellation or confiscation of a passport once it has been issued by the State?
  • Can the State arbitrarily revoke a privilege or licence without giving the grantee a show-cause notice and an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does an administrative act that deprives a citizen of a privilege require adherence to the rule of audi alteram partem?
  Read full judgment →
• SUNIL KRISHNA PAUL AND ANOTHER vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST1972 PTD 141 · Calcutta High CourtRead full judgment →
• SUNDARAM MOTORS (PRIVATE) LTD. AND OTHERS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1972 PTD 119 · Madras High Court · 1968-01-25Read full judgment →
• SULTAN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 435 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• SULTAN TEXTILE MILLS (KARACHI) LTD., KARACHI vs MUHAMMAD YOUSUF1972 PLD Karachi 226 · Sindh High Court
  Arbitration Actappointment of arbitratorpublic policySection 23 Contract Actillegal contractLetters Patent Appealtechnical consultancy agreement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal was filed against a Single Bench order appointing a sole arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940. The dispute arose from a consultancy agreement under which the respondent provided professional and technical assistance to obtain government sanction and cancel an adverse transfer order for a textile processing plant. The appellant resisted arbitration, contending that the agreement was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872 for being opposed to public policy, alleging it was meant to influence government officials for monetary gain. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the appointment of the arbitrator. The Court held that the contract was ex facie valid in law and that illegality cannot be presumed merely because an agent has status, skill, or influence to liaise with government departments. Whether a contract or its performance violates public policy is a mixed question of law and fact requiring concrete proof of illegal performance, which the appellant failed to establish.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement engaging a technical consultant to obtain government approvals and sanctions is void as opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Whether illegality in the performance of an ex facie valid contract can be presumed merely from the status or influence of an agent without factual proof?
  • Is the question of whether a contract or its performance violates public policy a pure question of law or a mixed question of law and fact?
  • Can a court declare a contract void on the ground of public policy in the absence of necessary pleadings and evidence when the contract is not illegal on its face?
  Read full judgment →