Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• REGISTRAR, TRADE UNIONS, KARACHI vs ATTA MUHAMMAD1972 PLC 111 · Labour Court · 1971-04-15Read full judgment →
• REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, SIND vs MUHAMMAD RAZZAK1972 PLC 427 · Labour Court · 1972-04-06Read full judgment →
• REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNION, KARACHI vs HAJJI MUHAMMAD AND 9 OTHERS1972 PLC 147 · Labour Court · 1972-05-14Read full judgment →
• REDI GUL vs MIAN GUL AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-11Read full judgment →
• RASHID AHMED vs MESSRS BUXLEY PAINTS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 300 · Labour Court · 1972-02-07Read full judgment →
• RASHID AHMED ANSARI vs THE SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE DIVISION, LAHORE AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11
  property resumptionsettlement schemetransfer priceauctionlocus standimisrepresentationfinality of orders
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns the cancellation of a property transfer order and subsequent auction of a bungalow due to the petitioner's failure to pay the transfer price. The petitioner was transferred half of a bungalow in Lahore but failed to pay the balance price within the prescribed time despite receiving multiple demand notices under Settlement Scheme No. 8. Consequently, the property was resumed, and the resumption order became final under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as the petitioner failed to challenge it. The petitioner subsequently sought extensions through misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, including the prior resumption of the property. The property was eventually auctioned to a third party. The petitioner's appeals and subsequent writ petitions were dismissed due to lack of locus standi and the finality of the resumption order. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the petitioner's failure to comply with payment obligations and his subsequent concealment of facts precluded any relief, as the property had been validly resumed and auctioned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to pay the transfer price within the prescribed time under Settlement Scheme No. 8 render a property liable to resumption?
  • Can a petitioner who has failed to challenge a resumption order under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, later seek relief after the property has been auctioned?
  • Does the concealment of material facts in an application to a Settlement Commissioner disentitle a party to relief?
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• RASHID AHMAD vs THE STATE1972 PLD SC 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-10
  criminal jurisdictionsanction for prosecutionpublic servantcoram non judicedefalcationmandatory statutory conditionCantonment Board
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the appellant's conviction for defalcation while employed as a Cashier at the Wah Cantonment Board. The core legal question was whether the Special Judge could validly take cognizance of the case without the mandatory sanction required under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. The Supreme Court held that the sanction obtained from the Executive Officer was invalid as the appropriate authority was the Central Government. The Court established that where a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction—such as a valid sanction—is not fulfilled, the entire proceedings are rendered illegal and coram non judice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that jurisdictional defects may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal. Regarding the appellant's status, the Court determined that because his appeal against dismissal was still pending, he remained a public servant for the purposes of the sanction requirement. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded for trial following the procurement of proper legal sanction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take cognizance of a criminal case against a public servant without the mandatory sanction required by the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
  • Is a trial conducted without the required statutory sanction for prosecution illegal and void?
  • Can an objection regarding the lack of mandatory sanction for prosecution be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
  • Does a public servant whose appeal against dismissal is pending remain a public servant for the purpose of requiring sanction for prosecution?
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• RANJHO And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. LJ 768 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-11Read full judgment →
• RAMZAN vs Ch. MUHAMMAD ASLAM, MAGISTRATE I CLASS, SAHIWAL AND 31972 PLD Lahore 809 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-22Read full judgment →
• RAMZAN AND 24 Others vs Mst. TOBI AND 9 Other1972 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-13
  leave to appealremandsettlement commissionerconstitutional petitionrevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises from an order of the Settlement Commissioner remanding a property dispute case to the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner for a fresh decision regarding the parties' claims and the exact date of death of the original property holder, Mst. Naji. A Lahore High Court Single Judge dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition, declining to interfere with the remand order because it allowed the petitioners to establish their claims lawfully and prevented them from retaining excess shares. The Supreme Court evaluated the contentions that the High Court should have exercised its discretion upon finding parts of the proceedings flawed or out of time. The Supreme Court held that no fault lay with the High Court's refusal to interfere since the matter remained pending on remand and the petitioners could still advance their case in the fresh inquiry. Consequently, the leave petition was dismissed, with the clarification that prior observations shall not prejudice the petitioners' claims during the remand proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction against a remand order when the matter has not yet been finally decided?
  • Does an order of remand passed by a Settlement Commissioner warrant interference if it affords both parties full opportunity to establish their claims?
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• RAM NARAIN & BROTHERS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1972 PTD 340 · Allahabad High Court · 1969-02-20Read full judgment →
• Raja HABIB AHMAD KHAN vs THE INCOME TAX OFFICER1972 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  income-tax assessmentex parte assessmentsubstituted servicealternative remedywrit jurisdictionservice of notice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which challenged ex parte income-tax assessments. The petitioner contended that the ex parte proceedings were unlawful due to improper service of notices and that the assessment was invalid because the notification reconstituting the charges of Commissioners of Income-tax was signed by a 'second Secretary' instead of a Member or the Secretary to the Board. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's representative had previously accepted service and subsequently avoided it, justifying substituted service by affixation. On the administrative challenge, the Court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that a 'second Secretary' did not fall within the description of 'Secretary to the Board' under the relevant rules. Furthermore, the Court held that the writ petition was maintainable as the petitioner had already elected to pursue an alternative statutory appeal, and simultaneous remedies should not be permitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte income-tax assessment is valid if service of notice is effected by affixation after the assessee's representative avoids service?
  • Does a notification signed by a 'second Secretary' satisfy a rule requiring the signature of 'the Secretary to the Board' in the absence of evidence to the contrary?
  • Can a petitioner simultaneously pursue a constitutional writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 while a statutory appeal on the same matter is pending?
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• Raja HABIB AHMAD KHAN vs The INCOME TAX OFFICER, HAZARA CIRCLE, ABBOTTABAD1972 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  ex parte assessmentsubstituted serviceincome taxconstitutional petitionspecial remedyjurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court arising from a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which challenged an ex parte income-tax assessment order. The core legal question was whether the Income-tax Officer validly effected substituted service and had jurisdiction to pass an ex parte assessment after the assessee's authorized representative returned a notice with an endorsement that the assessee was away for Haj. The Supreme Court held that the return of the notice with such an endorsement amounted to a refusal to accept service, thereby justifying substituted service under the relevant procedural rules. The Court laid down the key principle that where a statute creates a special right or liability along with a special remedy, that specific remedy must be exhausted, and constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 cannot be invoked as a substitute for statutory appeals or revisions where an order is merely irregular rather than wholly without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the return of a notice with an endorsement that the assessee has gone for Haj amount to a refusal to accept service justifying substituted service?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 be treated as a substitute for statutory appeal or revision?
  • Does an irregularity in procedural service render an income-tax assessment order wholly without jurisdiction?
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• RAJ KHAN AND 5 Others vs FAZAL HUSSAIN AND 5 Other1972 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-12
  limited ownerrefugee land allotmentreversionary rightsgift validitymutationcivil court jurisdictionShariat law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave concerns the nature of the estate held by a female refugee widow who received land allotments in Pakistan in lieu of property inherited from her husband in India. The core legal question was whether such a widow acquired an absolute interest in the allotted land or held it as a limited owner, thereby restricting her power to alienate the property. The Supreme Court, following its precedent in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Mohammad Shaffi, held that the widow did not acquire an absolute interest. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision, which had erroneously relied on a now-overruled Full Bench judgment. The Court further rejected the respondents' argument regarding the civil court's lack of jurisdiction, noting that the gift was only completed upon the attestation of mutation in 1959. The Court held that the gift was valid only to the extent of the widow's legal share under Shariat law, as she held the property as a limited owner, and restored the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a female refugee widow acquire an absolute interest in land allotted to her in Pakistan in lieu of property inherited from her husband in India?
  • When is a gift of land considered complete under Mohammadan Law for the purpose of determining civil court jurisdiction?
  • Can a respondent raise a new plea regarding the lack of jurisdiction of civil courts for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • To what extent is a gift of land made by a limited owner valid after her demise?
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• RAIS AHMAD vs Mian ABDUL JABBAR AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 711 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-09
  ejectmentcompromise orderbuilding reconstructionCantonments Rent Restriction Actletters patent appealrent controller jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a Letters Patent Appeal arising from the dismissal of a writ petition against an ejectment order. The appellant-tenant challenged an order of the Rent Controller passed on the basis of a compromise agreement whereby the appellant agreed to vacate the premises for reconstruction upon an undertaking that a new shop would be provided upon completion. The core legal questions involved whether a Rent Controller is bound to follow the Code of Civil Procedure in recording compromises, whether a subsisting building sanction is mandatory at the time of the ejectment order, and whether an appeal lies against a consent order. The Lahore High Court held that the Rent Controller is not bound by strict civil procedure codes when conducting inquiries under rent restriction laws, that the expiration of a building sanction period during pending litigation does not invalidate the ejectment order provided initial sanction was obtained, and that no appeal lies against an order passed on compromise. The key principles laid down include that Rent Controllers possess wide discretionary inquiry powers akin to executive officers, and that a tenant consenting to an order waives the necessity of formal proof regarding the landlord's grounds for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Rent Controller bound to follow the Code of Civil Procedure when recording a compromise between landlord and tenant?
  • Does the expiration of the validity period of a building sanction during the pendency of eviction proceedings render the ejectment order illegal?
  • Whether an appeal is competent against an order passed by a Rent Controller on the basis of a compromise between the parties?
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• RAHMAN AND Another vs THE STATE AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 534 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-07Read full judgment →
• RAHIMULLAH vs DISTRICT JUDGE AND SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 60 · Sindh High Court · 1970-11-06Read full judgment →
• RAHADUR vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 685 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• RAGHUBIR SARAN vs O. P. JAIN, ADDITIONAL MUNSIF (1), BULANDSHAHR, AND OTHERS1972 PTD 432 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-07-12Read full judgment →
• R.PHOTO vs MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 6 Other1972 PLD Karachi 360 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• R. B. RAM RATTAN PREM NATH vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1972 PTD 147 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-03-11Read full judgment →
• QUTAB KHAN vs SAIN SULTAN AND 3 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 142 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-02Read full judgment →
• Qazi ASADULHAQ vs Miss R. A. MONEY AND 7 Other1972 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-02-21
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyCentral Government approvalcustodian of evacuee propertysettlement commissionerdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the status of property in Abbottabad, initially occupied by the appellant, which was claimed as evacuee property. The central legal question involved the determination of the property's status and the validity of its transfer to the respondents. The Deputy Custodian initially declared the property evacuee property, but the Custodian, Lahore, later modified this, holding that only the shares belonging to the sons of the original owner (who resided in India) constituted evacuee property, while the daughters' shares did not. During the appeal, the Government of Pakistan produced a letter confirming that the Central Government had exercised its powers to approve the transfer of the property to the respondent, Miss R. A. Money. The Supreme Court held that the Central Government possesses the authority under the relevant statute to approve such transfers and direct the Chief Settlement Commissioner to execute necessary sale documents. The principle laid down is that the Central Government holds the statutory power to approve the disposal of evacuee property otherwise than under the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Central Government have the power to approve the transfer of evacuee property otherwise than under the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner be authorized to execute sale documents for evacuee property upon approval by the Central Government?
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• QADIR KHAN vs BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN LAHORE AND 13 Other1972 S CM R 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  public auctionauction publicityrevenue authoritieswrit petitiondiscretionary jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over a plot of land auctioned by the Revenue authorities and purchased by the appellant. The auction was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, but subsequently set aside by the Additional Commissioner upon an appeal by a third party on the ground of lack of due publicity under the rules. The Board of Revenue upheld this decision, and the High Court summarily dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The core legal question was whether the revenue authorities and the High Court properly evaluated the validity of the auction and the sufficiency of its publicity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the revenue authorities were justified in setting aside the auction upon finding it was not properly conducted, and that the High Court rightly declined to interfere with a fair and reasonable order under its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that concurrent administrative determinations regarding procedural irregularities in public auctions warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under constitutional jurisdiction with an order of revenue authorities setting aside a defective public auction?
  • Did the revenue authorities properly evaluate the sufficiency of publicity for the auction of the disputed plot?
  • Whether an auction conducted without complying with the requirements regarding notice and publicity under the relevant rules is liable to be set aside?
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• QADIR BAKHSH vs The STATE and 14 otherss1972 P Cr. L J 982 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-12Read full judgment →
• PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE1972 PLC 327 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-19Read full judgment →
• PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE1972 PLD Lahore 699 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-19
  workman dismissalinquiry reportsecond show-cause noticenatural justiceindustrial disputeStanding Orders Ordinancereinstatementwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition arose from an order passed by the West Pakistan Labour Appellate Tribunal upholding an Industrial Court award that reinstated a workman dismissed by the Punjab Road Transport Corporation. The core legal questions involved whether an employer who initiates an independent inquiry against an employee for misconduct must supply a copy of the inquiry report to the employee and issue a second show-cause notice before ordering dismissal, and whether failure to do so vitiates the dismissal order under the applicable labor laws. The Lahore High Court held that where an employer chooses to hold an inquiry and relies upon its adverse findings, principles of natural justice and the requirements of clause (4) of Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, make it mandatory to provide the employee with a copy of the inquiry report and an opportunity to explain those findings through a second show-cause notice. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer is legally bound to supply a copy of the inquiry report to an employee when the inquiry findings are used against him for dismissal?
  • Does the failure to issue a second show-cause notice before dismissing a workman following an adverse inquiry report vitiate the dismissal order under clause (4) of Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an objection regarding the maintainability of an application under section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction when it was abandoned or not argued before the lower tribunals?
  • Whether the principles of natural justice require that an employee be given an opportunity to explain adverse findings recorded by an inquiry officer before an order of dismissal is passed.
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• PUNJAB PROVINCE AND 2 Other vs MUMTAZ KHAN1972 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-23Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, IRRIGATION, COMMUNICATION & WORKS DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND 2 Other vs ALLAH DITTA1972 PLD Karachi 8 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-04
  suit for accountsarbitrary valuationcourt feesburden of proofcontractor claimextra workcivil appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This first appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the First Class Sub-Judge, Hyderabad, which decreed the respondent-contractor's suit for recovery of money for extra and additional work done under a contract. The core legal questions involved whether a plaintiff can arbitrarily value a claim for accounts and whether an agent or a contracting party can maintain a suit for accounts against a principal or employer when the exact sum claimed is known. The Sindh High Court held that a plaintiff cannot arbitrarily value a claim for accounts or declaratory relief, and that a suit for accounts is an equitable remedy not available on a purely contractual relationship unless a special fiduciary relationship like agency exists, and even then, only in exceptional circumstances where the exact sum is unknown. Since the respondent was fully aware of the details of his claim and failed to produce primary documentary evidence such as account books, vouchers, or receipts to prove the extra expenditure, the Court set aside the trial court's judgment, dismissed the respondent's suit, and allowed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff value a claim for accounts or declaratory relief arbitrarily for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction?
  • When is a suit for accounts maintainable between contracting parties or between an agent and a principal?
  • Does a failure by a party to produce primary documentary evidence such as account books and vouchers warrant an adverse inference against that party?
  • Can an agent maintain a suit for accounts against their principal when the exact sum claimed is fully known to the agent?
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• PRINCE GHULAM MUHAMMAD KHAN vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1972 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-09-13
  urban garden allotmentrehabilitation schemeproduce index unitsacreage entitlementtemporary urban schemedisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the cancellation of an urban garden allotment known as "Dholandas Garden" in Hyderabad. The core legal question was whether the allotment and entitlement of urban garden lands should be determined on the basis of produce index units or on an acreage basis under the relevant rehabilitation schemes and Supplementary Scheme No. 2. The Supreme Court held that urban lands and gardens are excluded from the main Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and that under Supplementary Scheme No. 2 read with the Temporary Urban Scheme, allotments in municipal towns like Hyderabad are governed by acreage equivalents corresponding to the class of area left behind in India, rather than produce index units. The Court laid down that courts must apply the correct governing law regardless of whether it is expressly cited by the litigants, and that urban garden entitlements must be assessed on an acreage basis according to prescribed scales rather than produce index units.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allotment of urban garden lands is governed by produce index units or by verified acreage under the rehabilitation laws?
  • Does the main Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme apply to urban lands and urban gardens?
  • Whether it is the duty of the court to apply the correct statutory law even if not specifically drawn to its attention by the parties?
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• PREMIER CLOTH MILLS LTD., LYALLPUR vs THE SALES TAX OFFICER, INVESTIGATION CIRCLE II, LAHORE AND Another1972 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-07
  sales tax assessmentlegislative competenceretrospective operationwrit jurisdictionlimitation periodimposition of penaltyremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This certificated appeal challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant-company's writ petition in limine regarding a sales tax assessment and penalty for the assessment year 1955-56. The core legal questions involved the constitutional validity and continued force of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, the limitation period for framing assessments, and the legality of imposing a penalty without a hearing. The Supreme Court held, following precedent, that the Federal Legislature's temporary power to enact laws on a subject does not limit the prospective or retrospective operation of laws enacted within that timeframe, thereby upholding the validity of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. However, because the High Court declined to address the remaining issues concerning limitation and the imposition of penalties, the Supreme Court set aside the order and remanded the case back to the High Court to determine whether the assessment was barred by time under Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and whether the penalty was lawfully imposed without affording an opportunity of being heard.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sales Tax Act 1951 lapsed after 31st March 1952 due to the time-limited power of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act 1935?
  • Can a legislature with a time-limited power enact laws with prospective or retrospective operation beyond that specified time period?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction on issues going to the root of the assessment authority's jurisdiction, such as limitation and lack of notice?
  • Is an assessment framed after the lapse of the prescribed statutory period legally valid?
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• POPULAR INDUSTRIES COMMERCIAL AGENCIES, KHAIRPUR vs KHAIRPUR TEXTILE1972 PLD Karachi 617 · Sindh High Court · 1972-05-17Read full judgment →
• Pirzada GHULAM MUHAMMAD SHAH vs Messrs CHASHLUM CONTRACTORS, KUNDIAN1972 P Cr. L J 348 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• PIRANO vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 165 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-23
  criminal appealunlicensed armsconvictionexamination of accusedarms ordinance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 13-E of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment for possession of an unlicensed gun. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained when the prosecution failed to demand the production of a licence and omitted to put incriminating questions regarding the absence of a licence to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that keeping a gun is not an offence by itself unless the person in possession fails to produce a licence upon demand, and that any circumstance weighing with the court for determining guilt must be put to the accused for an explanation. The court laid down the principle that failure to question the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the lack of a licence vitiates the conviction, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mere possession of a gun an offence under the law without proof of the absence of a licence?
  • Whether failure to question the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the lack of a licence renders a conviction unsustainable?
  • Must the prosecution demand the production of a licence before a person can be penalized for possessing an unlicensed weapon?
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• Pir ABDUL HAMID vs NABI BAKSH And 9 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 865 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• PHULAIL KHAN SHAH WALL SHAH WALL vs THE STATE THIS STATE1972 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murder convictionocular evidenceacquittal appealretrialmedical evidencecriminal appealdeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction and death sentence of appellant Phulail Khan for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while simultaneously setting aside the acquittal of co-appellant Shah Wali and ordering his retrial. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of ocular evidence despite alleged inconsistencies with medical reports regarding firing distances, and the propriety of the High Court's interference with an order of acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Phulail Khan, finding the ocular testimony credible and corroborated by motive and physical evidence, including recovered bullet casings. Regarding Shah Wali, while the Court acknowledged the High Court's authority to review acquittals, it held that ordering a retrial after a significant lapse of time—nearly four years since the occurrence and subsequent acquittal—would be an exercise in futility and unjust. Consequently, the Court dismissed Phulail Khan's appeal but set aside the order for Shah Wali's retrial, effectively acquitting him due to the passage of time and potential unavailability of witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal based on conjecture or unreasonable grounds?
  • Does the passage of a significant period of time between the occurrence of an offense and a proposed retrial justify setting aside an order for retrial?
  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses rendered unreliable solely because medical evidence does not explicitly confirm the firing distance alleged by the witnesses?
  • Can statements made before a committing court be relied upon as substantive evidence if not brought on record under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• PERVEZ WAHEED vs PUNJAB PROVINCE THROUGH COLLECTOR, DISTRICT1972 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  civil revisioninterim injunctionrevisional jurisdictionTakavi loanjudicial discretionrecovery proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court in civil revision proceedings, which modified a trial court's grant of an interim injunction. The petitioner challenged recovery proceedings initiated by revenue authorities regarding a Takavi loan. The High Court had maintained the injunction but imposed conditions requiring the early disposal of the suit and the furnishing of security for the disputed amount. The core legal question was whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, possessed the authority to vary the terms of an interim injunction granted by a trial court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court acted within its legal authority. The Court affirmed that under revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has full powers to correct errors committed by lower courts and to ensure that judicial discretion is exercised in accordance with sound legal principles. Consequently, the imposition of conditions, such as requiring security and directing the expedited disposal of a suit, was deemed reasonable and within the High Court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to vary the terms of an interim injunction granted by a trial court while exercising revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a High Court impose conditions, such as the furnishing of security, when maintaining an interim injunction in revision?
  • Is the imposition of a condition for the early disposal of a suit by a revisional court considered a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion?
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• PATRICIA ANNE PATEL vs GERALD COWLING PATEL1972 PLD Karachi 444 · Sindh High Court · 1971-10-11
  dissolution of marriageDivorce Act 1869confirmation of decreeprincipal civil Court of original jurisdictionDistrict Court Karachipecuniary jurisdictionadulterydesertion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This reference before the High Court of Sindh concerned the confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 17 of the Divorce Act 1869, granted to a Christian wife by the Additional District Judge, Karachi. A preliminary jurisdictional question arose regarding whether the District Court of Karachi possessed competence as the 'principal civil Court of original jurisdiction' under Section 3 of the Divorce Act 1869, given its limited pecuniary jurisdiction under local enactments. Analyzing the legislative history of the Sind Courts Act 1926, the Karachi Courts Order 1956, and the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962, the High Court held that within the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction (and for matters incapable of pecuniary valuation, such as a plain divorce petition), the District Court of Karachi functions as the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. On the merits, finding uncontradicted evidence of desertion and adultery without collusion, the High Court confirmed the decree dissolving the marriage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the District Court of Karachi constitute the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for entertaining divorce petitions under Section 10 of the Divorce Act 1869 despite limits on its pecuniary jurisdiction?
  • Can an omission in a statute designating a court as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction be resolved by literal construction and examining statutory context?
  • Which court has original civil jurisdiction over divorce petitions under the Divorce Act 1869 in Karachi when no specific pecuniary valuation is attached to the suit?
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• PANNA LAL BABU LAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1972 PTD 501 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-11-28Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN TOBACCO Co. LTD., CHITTAGONG vs THE CHAIRMAN, SECOND1972 PLC 190 · Dacca · 1970-08-27Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN TANNERIES LTD. (UNDER LIQUIDATION), LAHORE vs Sardar HIDAYAT1972 PLD Lahore 880 · Lahore High Court · 1972-03-06
  land acquisitionevacuee propertycompensation poolsettlement authoritieseminent domaindelegated powerswinding up
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns revision petitions challenging an order passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which declared the acquisition of land by the government for Pakistan Tanneries Ltd. invalid and ordered its resumption into the "Compensation Pool." The core legal question was whether the government could validly acquire evacuee property under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and whether the Settlement authorities possessed the jurisdiction to resume such land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The Court held that the acquisition proceedings were valid and that the evacuee property laws did not prohibit the government from acquiring such property for public purposes. Consequently, the Court ruled that the land ceased to be evacuee property upon its valid acquisition, rendering the Settlement authorities' resumption order without lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that the acquisition of evacuee property by the government under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 constitutes a valid exercise of sovereign power that is not barred by evacuee property legislation, and such property is not subject to the jurisdiction of Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquisition of evacuee property by the government under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 constitute a prohibited transfer under evacuee property laws?
  • Do Settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to resume land that has been validly acquired by the government for a public purpose?
  • Does Section 11(2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 empower the Chief Settlement Commissioner to resume land from occupants who do not hold a valid allotment under the Act?
  • Is the acquisition of evacuee property by the government subject to the prior approval of the Central Government under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949?
  Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN SHALL OIL COMPANY LTD., CHITTAGONG vs WORKERS' UNION1972 PLC 3 · Labour Court · 1970-08-10Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN NATIONAL OILS LTD, CHITTAGONG vs WORKERS ASSOCIATION AND 23 OTHERS1972 PLC 1eat · Labour Court · 1970-07-18Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS AND 2 Other vs CHAIRMAN, SIND LABOUR COURT No. 1, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1972 PLC 299 · Sindh and Balochistan High Court · 1971-09-21Read full judgment →
• PAK CIGARETTE LABOUR UNION vs MESSRS PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY1972 PLC 150 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-05-31Read full judgment →
• PAINTEX LIMITED, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD AZIM1972 PLC 361 · Labour Court · 1971-08-03Read full judgment →
• P. RM. S. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1972 PTD 422 · Madras High Court · 1968-09-11Read full judgment →
• P. D. H. LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES & WORKERS' UNION vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE1972 PLC 536 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-27Read full judgment →
• P. C. DWADESH SHRENI & Co. LTD. vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, ALIGARH1972 PTD 440 · Allahabad High Court · 1966-04-27Read full judgment →
• PLD 1958 Lah. 4,68 K [Karachi] ABDUL WAHID And 3 Others--Appellants vs1972 P Cr. L J 250 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ORIENTAL INVESTMENT CO, (PVT.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY1972 PTD 181 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• OPAL LABORATORIES LTD., KARACHI vs WORKERS UNION1972 PLC 83 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-03-27Read full judgment →
• OKARA BUS SERVICE Ltd., OKARA vs JAN MUHAMMAD And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 358 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-09Read full judgment →
• OFFICIAL TRUSTEE vs CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY1972 PTD 509 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-09-25Read full judgment →
• OFFICER-IN-CHARGE (COURT OF WARDS), HYDERABAD vs COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, A. P1972 PTD 552 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-11-26Read full judgment →
• NUR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE And 2 Other1972 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  condonation of delaylimitationpetition against acquittalmurder casetime-barred petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the petitioner against a judgment of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court acquitting two respondents of a murder charge. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was barred by time by three days. Considering the issue of limitation in petitions challenging acquittals, the Court held that delay cannot be condoned unless it is demonstrated that the petitioner was prevented from filing the petition within time due to some specific act of the acquitted respondents. Finding that no such act by the acquitted respondents was alleged in the petitioner's application for condonation of delay, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition against acquittal can be condoned without proving an act of the acquitted respondent that precluded timely filing?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court condone delay in a petition challenging an acquittal judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• NUR MUHAMMAD AND 13 Others vs ABAD MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 5 Other1972 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-04
  rehabilitation schemeFard-e-Haqiatland allotmentdue processex parte orderreview petitiondisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated from a petition for special leave against a Lahore High Court order that invalidated an Officer on Special Duty's decision to reduce the respondents' verified land entitlement. The respondents, displaced persons, had their land entitlement verified at 4,236 units. Following an ex parte reduction of this entitlement by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, the Officer on Special Duty initially restored the original verification. However, upon a third review petition filed by the petitioners years later, the Officer reduced the entitlement to 2,968 units without notice to the respondents. The High Court set aside this reduction, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the reduction of verified entitlement without notice to the affected parties was legally invalid. The Court held that the Rehabilitation Scheme mandates specific procedures for verifying objections to Fard-e-Haqiats, and any grievance regarding excess land allotment must be pursued through the competent Settlement authorities under section 11 of the relevant Act, rather than through arbitrary review orders lacking due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Officer on Special Duty reduce a verified land entitlement without providing notice to the affected party?
  • What is the proper procedure for challenging an alleged excess land allotment under the Rehabilitation Scheme?
  • Does a third review petition filed years later without notice to the respondent constitute a valid exercise of authority?
  Read full judgment →
• NUR AHMAD vs MUHAMMAD JAN KHAN AND 3 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 164 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-07-19
  Letters Patent Appealland acquisitionapportionment of compensationco-sharerbona fide transfereetransfer of propertycourt fee
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a judgment of a learned Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, concerning the apportionment of compensation for acquired land. The appellant claimed a share of the compensation on the basis of a sale deed executed by a co-sharer, Mst. Sadri. The reference court and the Single Judge dismissed the claim, holding that the vendor had already alienated more than her share of the joint property and thus lacked saleable title in the disputed land at the time of the sale, and that the appellant had notice of this. The Peshawar High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is competent without a fitness certificate, and that the special law of the Letters Patent overrides general appellate provisions. On merits, the Court held that a transferee claiming protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act must act in good faith and take reasonable care, and that exclusive possession by other co-sharers serves as notice. Furthermore, a claimant in land acquisition proceedings must affirmatively establish title or possession to receive compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is competent against the judgment of a Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act without obtaining a certificate of fitness?
  • Does a co-sharer who has already alienated more than her total share in joint property retain any saleable interest to convey to a subsequent transferee?
  • Whether exclusive possession of a disputed property by other co-sharers constitutes sufficient notice to put a subsequent transferee on inquiry regarding title under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Does a reference court under the Land Acquisition Act have the jurisdiction to inquire into the title of an objector claiming apportionment of compensation?
  Read full judgment →
• NOORALI BANA AND 9 Others vs THE PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH THE CHIEF1972 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-09
  temporary injunctionstatutory review powerbalance of convenienceirreparable injurycivil suitadministrative proceedingsland records
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an intra-court appeal by the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan. The petitioners sought a temporary injunction to restrain the Deputy Commissioner, Karachi, from exercising his statutory power to review a predecessor's order regarding land ownership entries in the register of Haq Qabza, while a civil suit for declaration and injunction concerning the same land was pending. The core legal question was whether the court should grant an injunction to halt administrative proceedings when the subject matter is also under civil litigation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing the injunction. The Court reasoned that the Deputy Commissioner possessed a statutory right of review and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents. Furthermore, the Court established that no irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners, as they retained the right to challenge any adverse administrative order in a civil court, thereby precluding the necessity for judicial interference at the interlocutory stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain a Deputy Commissioner from exercising statutory review powers over land records while a related civil suit is pending?
  • Is a temporary injunction appropriate when the applicant has an alternative remedy to challenge an adverse administrative order in a civil suit?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit automatically bar administrative authorities from exercising statutory powers of review?
  Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 614 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-16Read full judgment →
• NOOK NABI AGHA vs THE STATEPLD. 1972 Karachi 292 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• NOOK MOHAMMAD vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND), LYALLPUR AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-13
  land settlementproduce index unitsfindings of factspecial leave to appealstatutory amendmentretroactivitydisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a petition filed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner sought an enhancement of Produce Index Units, claiming that the initial description of his allotted land as 'Ghair Mumkin' was incorrect and should have been 'Ghair Mumkin Reg'. The High Court declined to interfere, holding that the matter involved findings of fact, and that the petitioner suffered no actual loss, as the Fard-e-Haqiat remained unamended. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner further argued that a 1972 amendment to Section 30 of the Act entitled him to pursue appellate or revisional remedies. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the High Court correctly refused to re-examine findings of fact. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on the 1972 amendment, noting that the High Court proceedings had concluded well before the amendment was enacted. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with factual determinations and that statutory amendments do not apply retroactively to concluded litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact in a petition under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does a statutory amendment enacted after the conclusion of legal proceedings apply to those proceedings?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to an enhancement of Produce Index Units if the Fard-e-Haqiat has not been amended?
  Read full judgment →
• NIZAMUDDIN vs The STATE1972 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  death sentencemitigating circumstancesextreme youthpremeditated murdercriminal appealsentencing discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a conviction for murder and the subsequent confirmation of a death sentence by the Lahore High Court. The appellant challenged the propriety of the death sentence, arguing that he was a youth of 17 years at the time of the incident and had acted under provocation, citing extreme youth as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the Investigating Magistrate had assessed the appellant's age as 20 years, thereby rejecting the claim of extreme youth. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of provocation, characterizing the attack as a brutal and premeditated act involving five fatal knife blows. The Court held that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the death sentence was appropriate. Regarding the appellant's plea for sentence reduction based on the passage of three years since the prosecution, the Court clarified that such considerations fall within the purview of executive authorities rather than the judiciary. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the passage of time since the commencement of prosecution constitute a valid legal ground for an appellate court to reduce a death sentence?
  • Is the claim of extreme youth a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence when the accused is assessed to be 20 years old?
  • Can an appellate court consider a plea for sentence reduction based on the passage of time, or is this a matter for the executive authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• NIAZ AHMAD vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1244 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-10Read full judgment →
• NIAMAT ALI vs MESSERS GHAFOOR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 269 · Labour Court · 1972-01-22Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH ITS1972 PLC 539 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-25Read full judgment →
• R. VALSALA AMMA vs COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX, KERALA1972 PTD 592 · Kerala High Court · 1983-10-04Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 920 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN vs FAUJI TEXTILE MILLS, JHELUM1972 PLC 32 · Labour Court · 1970-12-05Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN Alias RANJHA vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, SAHIWAL AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 836 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-14Read full judgment →
• NAWAZ ALI SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 2 Othm1972 PLD Karachi 483 · Sindh High Court · 1971-09-15Read full judgment →
• NAWAB DIN Alias BABOO vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 712 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-25Read full judgment →
• NAWAB ALI Alias NAWABI vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 532 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-22Read full judgment →
• NAUSHER And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 695 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-12Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL TRADING COMPANY vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST1972 PTD 1 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-04-25Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL MILLS LABOUR UNION (REGD.) vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL1972 PLC 420 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1972-05-24Read full judgment →
• NARIMAN M. POSTWALA Ands vs LABOUR OFFICER AND INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES, KARACHI AND 5 OTHER1972 PLC 205 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-27Read full judgment →
• MUZAFFAR ALI vs THE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, KARACHI1972 PLC 432 · Labour Court · 1972-05-25Read full judgment →
• MUTTALI vs The STATE1972 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-02
  murderdying statementbenefit of the doubtocular testimonycriminal appealuncorroborated evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Muttali, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Nazir Ahmad, handed down by the trial court and upheld by the High Court, while four co-accused were acquitted. The core legal question was whether a criminal conviction can be safely sustained solely upon an uncorroborated oral dying statement deposed by a court witness, particularly when the primary ocular testimony has been discarded and the recovery evidence is rendered unreliable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The ratio laid down is that where eye-witnesses are disbelieved, recoveries are doubtful, and the circumstances surrounding an alleged oral dying statement—such as the severity of injuries precluding speech and the absence of corroboration—fail to satisfy the test of probability, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction on solitary, uncorroborated testimony, thereby giving the accused the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an oral dying statement when eye-witnesses have been rejected?
  • Whether the recovery of blood-stained articles in the absence of respectable local witnesses can serve as valid corroboration?
  • Is a conviction safe under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when medical evidence casts doubt on the injured person's ability to speak?
  Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 933 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-19Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AKHGAR vs DARAYA MINWALA And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 1098 · Sindh High Court · 1972-01-31Read full judgment →
• MUSHTAQ AHMAD AND Another vs CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB1972 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  evacuee propertylife estateCustodian of Evacuee Propertypartitionland revenueejectmentdeclaration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition dismissed by the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, concerning the status of land as evacuee property. The petitioners' late father had obtained land under an agreement executed in 1942 by a life-estate holder, a non-Muslim who later migrated to India upon Partition and died in 1949. The petitioners sought a declaration under evacuee property laws that the land was not evacuee property and that they could not be ejected. The core legal questions were whether property treated as evacuee property by Rehabilitation authorities could be declared non-evacuee property based on a life tenant's pre-Partition agreement, and whether such agreement survived the life tenant's death. The Supreme Court held that the property was rightly treated as evacuee property and that any agreement entered into by the life-estate holder became ineffective upon her death in 1949, requiring restoration of possession to the Custodian Department. The Court dismissed the petition, noting that any independent succession claims as collaterals could be adjudicated before the Custodian.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement creating a tenancy or right to remain in possession granted by a life-estate holder survive the death of the life-estate holder?
  • Does property belonging to a non-Muslim who migrated to India after Partition automatically become evacuee property upon her death in India?
  • Can a occupant retain possession of evacuee property against the Custodian Department based on a pre-Partition agreement executed by a deceased life-tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• MUNIRUDDIN QIDWAI AND 2 Other vs KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Karachi 521 · Sindh High Court · 1972-04-13Read full judgment →
• MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, AGRICULTURE MACHINERY1972 PLC 247 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-18Read full judgment →
• MUMTAZ ALAM DURRANI vs Mian MUHAMMAD AYOOB AND 3 OTHERS1972 PLC 148 · Labour Court · 1971-05-11Read full judgment →
• MUKHTARAN AND Other vs (1) Mst. NUR BEGUM AND (2) CHIEF SETTLEMENT1972 PLD Lahore 282 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUKHA AND Others vs RIFAT PASHA SHEIKH, C. S. P., MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE AND Other1972 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-28
  abatementlegal representativeswrit petitionconsolidation proceedingslimitationdeceased partynullity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging consolidation proceedings on the ground that the writ petition had abated as a whole due to the failure to bring the legal representatives of several deceased parties on record within time. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition as abated and whether delay in bringing legal representatives on record could be condoned without a proper and timely application under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the petition, as proceedings against dead persons are a nullity and applications for substitution were excessively delayed without sufficient cause. The key principle laid down is that the penal provisions regarding abatement and limitation apply when legal heirs of deceased parties are not brought on record within the prescribed period, rendering a petition against dead persons a nullity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a writ petition abate when the legal representatives of deceased parties are not brought on record within time?
  • Whether filing a writ petition against dead persons renders the proceedings a nullity?
  • Is the High Court justified in disregarding a belated oral or written application under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• MUJTABA HUSSAIN vs Mst. ATHER JEIIAN And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 351 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD /MURAD AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-10
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyinterested witnessesballistic reportcorroborative evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which affirmed the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as their sentence under Section 13(d) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The petitioners challenged the convictions on the ground that the prosecution relied on interested oral testimony of relatives and doubtful recoveries of a gun and empty cartridge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular evidence was reliable, supported by disinterested testimony, and corroborated by independent evidence, including ballistic expert report matching the empty cartridge to the petitioner's recovered gun, fitting shoes, and abscondence. The Court reaffirmed that testimony of related witnesses can be relied upon where no prior enmity exists and independent corroboration is present.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses related to the deceased be relied upon to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of prior enmity?
  • Is corroborative evidence, such as a matching ballistic expert report and recovery of belongings from the crime scene, sufficient to uphold a murder conviction based on oral testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSUF vs THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER1972 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  Constitution petitionLand reformsJoint holdingsManagement of agricultural landSuppression of material factsSub judiceDelegated legislation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order dismissing a Constitution petition concerning the management of joint agricultural land holdings. The core legal question was whether a Land Commission letter, directing that joint holdings be leased to the highest bidder, constituted a valid amendment to the Land Reforms (Appointment of Managers of Impartible Joint Holdings) Rules, 1964, or a valid order under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation. The Supreme Court held that while the letter failed to qualify as a valid rule amendment under paragraph 6 of the Regulation due to the absence of government sanction, the Land Commission possessed broad residual powers under paragraph 4(5) of the Regulation to address unforeseen difficulties. However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant failed to disclose material facts, specifically that the underlying dispute was sub judice and that he had previously withdrawn revisional applications following a compromise. The judgment affirms that constitutional relief is discretionary and may be denied where a petitioner suppresses material facts or where the underlying matter remains sub judice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Land Commission letter directing the leasing of joint holdings be considered a valid amendment to the Land Reforms (Appointment of Managers of Impartible Joint Holdings) Rules, 1964, without government sanction?
  • Does the Land Commission possess the power under paragraph 4(5) of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation to issue orders for matters not explicitly provided for in the Regulation?
  • Is a Constitution petition liable to be dismissed if the petitioner fails to disclose that the underlying dispute is sub judice?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs TAJAMMAL HUSSAIN AND 6 Other1972 PLD Lahore 565 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF KHAN KHATTAK vs S. M. AYUB AND 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 151 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-08
  stay of electionElection Tribunalbye-electionspecial jurisdictioninherent powersSection 151 CPCconstitutional obligationcasual vacancy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from an application by Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak praying to stay the implementation of an Election Tribunal order declaring his election to N.W. 1 (Peshawar-1) void, and to direct the Election Commission to suspend the bye-election process pending final disposal of his appeal before the High Court. The applicant argued that stay powers are inherent in appellate jurisdiction or exercisable under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court rejected the application, holding that its appellate jurisdiction under Section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970 is special and strictly limited to the statutory provisions, which do not confer stay powers or extend the general appellate powers of Section 151 CPC. Furthermore, Article 248(3) of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1972 creates a mandatory constitutional obligation on the Election Commission to fill casual vacancies within sixty days, superseding any contrary statutory provisions and prohibiting stay orders that would dislocate the constitutional election timetable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court possess inherent or statutory power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to stay the implementation of an Election Tribunal order while exercising special appellate jurisdiction under the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970?
  • Can the High Court issue a stay order postponing a bye-election where the Constitution mandates that a casual vacancy in an Assembly must be filled within sixty days?
  • Does an appeal under Section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970 automatically operate as a stay of the Election Tribunal's order?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF KHAN AND Others vs PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY1972 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  review petitiondeclaratory decreeexecution of decreewrit jurisdictionseniority disputecivil service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for the review of an order passed by the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioners, railway guards, sought a review arguing that the court was under a misconception regarding the dates of certain judicial decisions concerning their seniority. The core legal question was whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 is an appropriate legal remedy for enforcing a declaratory decree or resolving a seniority dispute, and whether an alleged error of date in the previous judgment warranted a review. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the writ jurisdiction was indeed misconceived for enforcing a declaratory decree or determining service seniority, and that the chronological error pointed out by the petitioners had no material bearing on the core decision. The principle laid down is that a party cannot use constitutional writ jurisdiction as a substitute for execution proceedings to enforce a declaratory decree or to settle service seniority disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of a declaratory decree?
  • Can service seniority disputes be resolved through constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a minor chronological error in a judgment that has no material bearing on the outcome warrant the review of the order?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs ALHAMRA RESTAURANT, KARACHI1972 PLC 439 · Labour Court · 1972-05-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YASIN vs The S FATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 181 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAMIN vs MESSRS CAPITAL PRINTING PRESS, KARACHI1972 PLC 270 · Labour Court · 1972-01-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WASIL vs MANAGER OF WAQF PROPERTIES AND 2 Other1972 PLD Lahore 425 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WARRAYAM vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE1972 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03
  Lambardari appointmentRevenue estateWrit jurisdictionAdministrative discretionHereditary officeWest Pakistan Land Revenue RulesFinding of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the appointment of a Lambardar for Chak No. 124/9-L, Sahiwal. The petitioner, the eldest son of the deceased Lambardar, challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4, arguing that the office should have been hereditary. The core legal questions were whether the revenue estate was owned chiefly by the State, thereby invoking Rule 19(1) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, and whether the High Court could interfere with the Revenue authorities' discretion in selecting a Lambardar under its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the estate's ownership by the Government was conclusive and not subject to interference in writ proceedings. Consequently, the appointment was governed by Rule 19, which does not mandate hereditary succession. The Court affirmed that the selection of a Lambardar lies within the discretion of Revenue authorities, and such administrative decisions are not amenable to interference under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of a Lambardar in an estate owned chiefly by the Government subject to hereditary succession?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the ownership of a revenue estate be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with the discretionary selection of a Lambardar by Revenue authorities under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD vs RAZ GUL1972 PLD Peshawar 146 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD vs GHAUS AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-01
  acquittalcriminal appealright of private defencesuppression of injuriesaggressionprosecution evidencetwo versions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the High Court's acquittal of respondents who had been convicted by the trial court for murder and causing injuries. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in overturning the convictions based on the prosecution's failure to prove aggression and the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution evidence itself indicated the complainant party had confronted the accused as they passed by, seeking an encounter. The Court held that the mere fact that the complainant party sustained more injuries does not automatically establish them as the victims of aggression, especially when the prosecution suppressed the injuries sustained by the accused in the initial report. The Court affirmed the High Court's view that the defence version could not be ruled out and that the prosecution's case was undermined by its own evidence and the suppression of material facts. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, ruling that the High Court's decision was based on a valid assessment of the evidence and did not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a complainant party sustained more injuries than the accused automatically establish the accused as the aggressor?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution suppressing injuries sustained by the accused in the First Information Report?
  • Can an appellate court uphold an acquittal when the prosecution's own evidence supports the possibility of the defence version?
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