Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD USMAN vs Mst. AMNA AND 4 Other1972 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-17
  maintenancechild custodyfamily courtrestitution of conjugal rightsconstitutional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner challenged a maintenance decree granted by a Family Court in favor of his wife and children, arguing that the decree should be set aside because he had obtained a separate order for the custody of the children from a Guardian Court. The Additional District Judge had initially set aside the maintenance decree, reasoning that enforcing it would encourage the wife to disobey the custody order. The High Court subsequently quashed the Additional District Judge's order, upholding the maintenance decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that proceedings for maintenance are distinct and separate from proceedings regarding child custody. The Court affirmed that a father remains liable to maintain his children under a valid Family Court order until custody is actually transferred. Furthermore, the Court noted that the custody order itself was currently being challenged on grounds of fraud. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in restoring the maintenance decree, as the maintenance obligation exists independently of the custody dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Are proceedings for child maintenance in a Family Court separate and distinct from proceedings regarding the custody of children?
  • Does a father's liability to maintain his children under a Family Court order persist while a custody dispute is ongoing?
  • Can a maintenance decree be set aside solely on the grounds that a separate custody order has been issued in favor of the father?
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• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 166 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN KHAN vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SEC`RETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE (REVENUE DIVISION), GOVERNMENTOF PAKISTAN ISLAMABAD AND 10 Other1972 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-16
  special leave to appealpromotionvested rightterms and conditions of servicequalifying examinationsenioritywrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court. The petitioner, an Inspector in the office of the Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, had successfully passed a qualifying examination for promotion to a Class II Post of Deputy Superintendent under a 1957 directive of the Central Board of Revenue. Subsequently, in October 1970, the Central Board of Revenue abolished the qualifying examination system, allowing senior officers who had not passed the examination to be placed senior in the eligibility list for promotion. The core legal question is whether passing a qualifying examination for promotion creates a vested right or alters the terms and conditions of service when the promotion channel is subsequently abolished by the competent authority. The Supreme Court held that passing the examination did not create any vested right to promotion, and the alteration of the promotion channel by the department did not infringe any legal right or the terms and conditions of service. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that an employee acquires no vested right to promotion or seniority merely by passing a qualifying examination under a superseded departmental policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing a qualifying examination for promotion create a vested right in an employee?
  • Can an administrative authority alter the channel of promotion without infringing the terms and conditions of service?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable to challenge the abolition of a departmental qualifying examination system for promotion?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 58 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs TAHIRUR REHMAN AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-02
  criminal appealmurder convictioninterested witnessesbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceacquittalcross-caseinherent improbability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the Peshawar High Court's order setting aside the convictions of the respondents for murder and attempted murder. The prosecution alleged that the respondents ambushed the complainant party, killing two individuals and injuring others. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the reliance on interested witnesses and the presence of significant inconsistencies in the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, noting that all eye-witnesses were inimical toward the accused and lacked independent corroboration. Furthermore, the court highlighted glaring improbabilities, such as the absence of blood at the alleged initial crime scene, the unexplained death of one of the accused, and the failure to present disinterested witnesses despite the occurrence happening in a populated area. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal, reiterating the principle that where prosecution evidence is inherently improbable and witnesses are biased, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by an accused person in a cross-case undermine the credibility of the prosecution's version of events?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution's narrative is contradicted by physical evidence, such as the absence of blood at the alleged scene of the crime?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SHARIFUDDIN AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-11
  suo motu revisionlocus standidisplaced persons propertysettlement proceedingswrit jurisdictionauction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan in a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, concerning the transfer of a composite property under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner validly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction, and whether the appellant, a local in possession of a shop who had not filed a transfer application, possessed the locus standi to maintain an appeal against an order refusing review. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner did not exercise independent suo motu jurisdiction, and that a local possessing only a right to bid at an auction has no locus standi to challenge transfer proceedings regarding other portions of the property. The Court laid down the principle that a mere right to bid at an auction does not confer locus standi to intervene in transfer proceedings or maintain an appeal where the person never claimed the property or challenged the original transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a settlement authority can be deemed to have exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction without applying its independent mind to the record?
  • Does a person possessing only a right to bid at a future auction have the locus standi to maintain an appeal against transfer orders of property?
  • Can an appellant who failed to file a transfer application or challenge the original transfer order maintain a challenge against settlement proceedings?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SADDAR DIN AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-14
  culpable homicideintention to killcommon intentionvictim compensationcriminal appealmedical evidencesentencing
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that modified the respondents' convictions from murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who attacked the deceased with sticks, possessed the specific intention to kill, necessitating a murder conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, reasoning that the use of ordinary sticks and the distribution of injuries—primarily on the legs with only one head injury—demonstrated an absence of intent to kill, although the attackers possessed the knowledge that death was a likely consequence. The Court affirmed that Section 304, Part II is the correct classification when such knowledge exists without specific intent. Furthermore, the Court invoked Section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, ruling that the trial court’s failure to award compensation to the heirs of the deceased was a legal error, and subsequently imposed a mandatory fine as compensation upon the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of ordinary sticks in an assault negate the specific intention to kill required for a murder conviction?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 appropriate when the accused has the knowledge that death is a likely result of their actions?
  • Is the provision for awarding compensation to heirs under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for the courts?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs Khawaja HABIB JOO1972 PLD Azad J & K 22 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-10-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF And Another vs Mir ABDULLAH KHAN And ANOTHER1972 P Cr. L J 2 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-06-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF And 41 Other vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 21972 PLD Lahore 858 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAM AND 3 Other vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 661 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-23
  murdergrievous hurtcommon intentionsecondary evidencepost-mortem reportnon-vital partsabatement of appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to four appellants under Section 302/34 and Sections 323/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, for the murder of Lal and injuries to an eyewitness. During the pendency of the appeal, one appellant died, resulting in the abatement of his appeal under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions pertained to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove a post-mortem report when the examining doctor was abroad, and whether inflicting multiple blunt and sharp weapon injuries confined primarily to non-vital body parts (limbs) amounted to murder under Section 302 PPC or grievous hurt under Section 325 PPC. The Lahore High Court held that secondary evidence of the post-mortem report was validly recorded under Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872 read with Section 428 CrPC. Altering the conviction from Section 302/34 to Section 325/34 PPC, the High Court held that where assailants avoid vital organs and inflict injuries primarily on limbs, intention or knowledge to cause death cannot be inferred, even if fatal internal complications unexpectedly ensue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inflicting multiple injuries on non-vital body parts without intention or knowledge to cause death constitutes murder under Section 302 or grievous hurt under Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether a post-mortem report can be proved through secondary evidence under Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872 when the medical officer has proceeded abroad and cannot be procured without unreasonable delay?
  • Whether an appeal against conviction abates in respect of an appellant who dies during the pendency of proceedings under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAKOOR MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-1972 PTD 545 · Allahabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFQAT vs THP STATE1972 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  raperobberycriminal appealreappraisal of evidenceextra-judicial confessionmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under sections 376/114 and 392/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while modifying the sentence. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and appreciation of ocular and forensic evidence in establishing the charges of rape and robbery. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below were well-founded, supported by credible ocular testimony corroborated by medical and chemical examiner reports, and further reinforced by extra-judicial confessions. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that no grounds were made out for reappraisal of evidence by this Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction for rape can be sustained on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix corroborated by forensic and medical evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappreciate evidence concurrently believed by the courts below in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether an extra-judicial confession coupled with ocular testimony is sufficient to establish guilt?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs The CHAIRMAN, UNION COMMITTEE, LAHORE and 21972 P Cr. L J 73 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 292 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFFI vs MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-16
  Lambardar appointmentadministrative measurewrit jurisdictionjusticiabilityappointment of Lambardar
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the appointment of a Lambardar. The petitioner challenged the Collector's decision to appoint a rival candidate, respondent No. 3, as Lambardar, which was upheld through the administrative hierarchy and subsequently challenged via a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, prompting the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a Lambardar creates a vested right that is justiciable through a writ petition. The Supreme Court, relying on its precedent in Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and another (1971 SCMR 719), held that the office of a Lambardar is essentially an administrative measure rather than a post to which a candidate can lay a claim as a matter of right. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition, establishing the principle that appointments to the office of Lambardar are administrative in nature and not subject to judicial interference as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of a Lambardar a matter of right that can be enforced through a writ petition?
  • Does the office of a Lambardar constitute an administrative measure?
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• MUHAMMAD SARFARAZ KHAN AND Another vs FARID KHAN AND 22 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 109 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAMIN JAN vs MESSRS FEROZSONS LABORATORIES LTD., NOWSHERA AND 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 133 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALEH vs Tim CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 21972 PLD Supreme Court 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-29
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. 1converted propertypress noteauctionhotel transferdiscretionary powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal by special leave challenged the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition, which upheld an order of the Settlement Commissioner setting aside the transfer of a converted hotel property to the appellant. The appellant's father had converted the allotted residential first floor into a hotel and built an additional floor prior to 20 December 1958. Pursuant to a press note issued under Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 with Central Government approval, converted properties could be transferred to occupants. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner auctioned the premises before deciding the appellant's timely application, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner set aside the auction and transferred the property to the appellant. The Settlement Commissioner subsequently reversed this order, holding the press note to be merely recommendatory and ineligible for locals.

  The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, holding that the press note had statutory backing under Section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and created an enforceable right. The Court restored the Additional Settlement Commissioner’s transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a press note issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner with Central Government approval under Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 creates enforceable legal rights for occupants of converted evacuee properties?
  • Can an evacuee property be treated as already disposed of when an unconfirmed auction took place without deciding a timely transfer application pending before the Settlement authorities?
  • Does the statutory limitation restricting transfers of evacuee property valued over Rs. 10,000 to locals apply to transfers authorized under Section 10(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 pursuant to approved schemes?
  • Whether the use of the word 'may' in a statutory scheme's directive precludes an applicant who satisfies all prescribed conditions from being entitled to transfer of the property?
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• MUHAMMAD SALEEM Alias NASEEM Alias CHEEMA vs The STATE1972 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-18
  murderdeath sentencelesser sentencesudden quarreltransportation for lifecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant challenged the confirmation of his death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Yunis. The core legal question was whether the extreme penalty of death was proper given the circumstances of the case, specifically the sudden quarrel, exchange of abuses, and fist blows preceding the stabbing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the conviction for murder must be maintained, the lesser sentence of transportation for life should be imposed. The key principle laid down is that where a murder is committed during a sudden quarrel preceded by an exchange of abuses and fist blows, the mitigating circumstances warrant the substitution of the death sentence with transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the extreme penalty of death is proper in a murder case arising from a sudden quarrel involving an exchange of abuses and fist blows?
  • Can the sentence of death be altered to transportation for life under mitigating circumstances involving a sudden brawl?
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• MUHAMMAD SAGHIR vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 586 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAEED vs Syed NIAZ ALI SHAH1972 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-03
  rent restrictionejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in rentrent controllertenancy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a leave petition challenging an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller acted legally in ordering the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and subsequently directing eviction due to default, despite the tenant's dispute regarding the agreed-upon rent rate. The Supreme Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was clearly established, as the petitioner admitted to executing the rent deed in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the Rent Controller was justified in ordering the deposit of rent under the relevant statutory provisions. Upon the petitioner's failure to comply with the rent deposit order, the Rent Controller had no alternative but to direct the tenant to surrender possession of the disputed property. The Supreme Court affirmed the ejectment order, dismissing the petition while granting the petitioner a two-month grace period to vacate the premises voluntarily, provided rent for that period was paid. The judgment reinforces the Rent Controller's authority to enforce rent deposit orders and ejectment upon default in established tenancies.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the authority to order ejectment when a tenant fails to comply with a direction to deposit arrears of rent?
  • Is a tenant's admission of a rent deed sufficient to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant for the purposes of rent restriction proceedings?
  • Can a tenant challenge an ejectment order based on a dispute over the rent rate after admitting to the execution of a rent deed?
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• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THE STATE1972 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  murder convictionocular testimonyforensic evidenceF.I.R. delaycriminal appealdeath sentencepolice investigation
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which confirmed the death sentence of the appellant, Muhammad Sadiq, for the murder of Said Muhammad. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sahiwal. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony, the validity of police investigation procedures, and the impact of discrepancies in the timing of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) on the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that despite the Investigating Officer's error in recording the F.I.R. time, the ocular testimony remained credible and was corroborated by medical evidence and forensic reports regarding the recovered weapon. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that procedural irregularities by the police do not automatically invalidate the entire prosecution case if the substantive evidence, including eye-witness accounts and forensic findings, remains reliable and consistent. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an error by the police in recording the time of the First Information Report automatically render the ocular testimony in a murder case false?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular testimony when the police investigation is found to be flawed or bungled?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon and forensic matching of an empty cartridge corroborate eye-witness testimony in a murder trial?
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• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs ABDULLAH1972 P Cr. L J 709 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-02-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ AND 15 Other vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Lahore 780 · Lahore High Court
  Waqf propertyChief Administrator of Auqaflease cancellationjudicial reviewalienation of WaqfMutwalliconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 challenges the cancellation of leasehold rights by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, who sought to transfer Waqf land attached to a shrine to a private trust for hospital construction. The core legal question concerns the extent of the Administrator's power to alienate Waqf property and cancel existing leases for such purposes. The Court held that the Administrator’s action was without lawful authority. It ruled that Waqf property, being dedicated to God, cannot be transferred to a private trust, as the Administrator acts merely as a manager (Mutwalli) for the benefit of the shrine. Furthermore, the lease cancellation was deemed improper because it failed to secure the best market rent and violated established leasing rules. The key principle laid down is that Waqf property must be administered strictly for the purposes of the dedication; it cannot be alienated or mismanaged at the Administrator's discretion, and any lease or transfer must comply with both statutory rules and the principles of Islamic law regarding the preservation of Waqf assets.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Administrator of Auqaf transfer Waqf property to a private trust?
  • Is the Chief Administrator of Auqaf's management of Waqf property subject to judicial review?
  • Does the Chief Administrator of Auqaf have the power to cancel a valid lease of Waqf property to facilitate a transfer to a third party?
  • What are the limitations on the power of a Mutwalli to lease non-agricultural Waqf property for a term exceeding one year?
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• MUHAMMAD RAZA vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 33 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RASHID vs Mst. NIAZAN BIBI AND 2 Other1972 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  quashment of proceedingsforgerycheatingcriminal complaintdishonest intentioninherent powers of High Court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the respondents under Sections 419 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging forgery regarding the purchase of a stamp paper for a sale deed. The respondents moved the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of proceedings. The High Court quashed the proceedings, reasoning that even if the allegations were accepted as true, no offence under Sections 419 or 468 was disclosed, as the essential element of dishonesty was absent. The Supreme Court upheld this decision. The Court held that where the purchase of a stamp paper in the complainant's name was intended to facilitate the finalization of a legitimate sale transaction for which the price had largely been paid, and where the deed could not be registered without the complainant's actual consent and signature, no criminal offence of cheating or forgery was established. The petition was dismissed, affirming that proceedings should be quashed when the alleged facts do not constitute the ingredients of the charged offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of a stamp paper in the name of a vendor by a vendee for the purpose of executing a sale deed, without the vendor's signature, constitute the offence of forgery?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the allegations, even if true, do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offences charged?
  • Is the element of dishonesty a necessary ingredient for offences under Sections 419 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• MUHAMMAD RASHAD HAYAT KHAN vs Malik KHAIR DIN AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Supreme Court 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-14
  preventive detentionbailable offencebail as of rightbreach of peaceillegal confinement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal raises the question of whether the provisions of section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, relating to bail for bailable offences, apply to a person against whom preventive action is taken by the police under sections 107 and 151 of the same Code. The appellant was arrested under sections 107 and 151, and the police station house officer refused to accept surety bonds for his release, leading to a private complaint for illegal confinement which was dismissed by the magistrate and subsequently upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a person subjected to preventive action is not a person accused of an offence within the meaning of section 496. The Court established the principle that the general bail provisions under section 496 are inapplicable to preventive detentions under sections 107 and 151, as the Code provides specific procedures for interim release and custody under section 117(3) and related provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 available to a person against whom preventive action is taken under sections 107 and 151?
  • Does a person against whom preventive action is taken fall within the expression 'person accused of an offence'?
  • Do the general bail provisions under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to proceedings under section 107/151?
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• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs N/A1972 P Cr. L J 171 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs MUHAMMAD KHAN AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  pre-emptionexchange of landletters patent appealwithdrawal of pre-emption moneyestoppellocus standileave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises from an order of a Division Bench of the High Court at Lahore which allowed a Letters Patent Appeal and dismissed the plaintiff-pre-emptor's suit for pre-emption. The petitioner had filed the pre-emption suit claiming that a transaction of exchange between the respondents was in fact a sale and a cloak to defeat his right of pre-emption. While the trial court and the first two appellate forums ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Letters Patent Bench found the transaction to be a genuine exchange involving no cash consideration. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the respondent's withdrawal of the pre-emption price during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal caused the appeal to fail on the ground of estoppel. The Supreme Court held that since no stay order regarding the withdrawal of the money was in place and the withdrawal occurred after the filing of the appeal, the respondent was not estopped from prosecuting his appeal and did not lose his locus standi. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the leave petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of pre-emption money by a vendee during the pendency of an appeal estop the vendee from prosecuting the appeal?
  • Whether an exchange of land purported to defeat a right of pre-emption constitutes a sale when no cash consideration passes?
  • Does a party lose locus standi to pursue an appeal by withdrawing deposited decretal money in the absence of a stay order?
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• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN AND 5 Others vs MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 3 Other1972 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-11
  evacuee propertysettlement commissionertransfer of propertywrit petitionletters patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, concerning the transfer and division of a disputed evacuee property among claimant displaced persons under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner's division of the property and subsequent transfer of a portion to respondent Mohammad Boota was lawful and sustainable, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the division. The Supreme Court held that the property had been validly divided by the Settlement Authorities into separate houses and that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the division, as the authorities acted within their lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not interfere with the factual division and transfer of evacuee properties by competent settlement authorities acting within their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with the division of a property made by settlement authorities acting within their lawful authority?
  • Whether an order of division passed by a Settlement Commissioner creating separate houses from a single evacuee property is open to judicial review?
  • Is a claimant entitled to the transfer of a portion of a divided property in their possession upon its reconfiguration by settlement authorities?
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• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE vs MUHAMMAD GHAFOOR1972 PLD Supreme Court 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-03
  habeas corpuspersonal libertycustody of womanrestitution of conjugal rightsSection 491 CrPCwrongful confinement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court order issued under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which directed that Mst. Surraya Begum be placed in the custody of the respondent, who claimed to be her husband. The core legal question was whether the High Court, when exercising jurisdiction under Section 491, has the authority to order the custody of a major woman to be handed over to another person against her express will. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The Court held that under Section 491, if the person produced is a major, the Court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to setting that person at liberty. The Court cannot force custody or restore the status quo ante against the person's wishes, as such actions lack legal warrant and infringe upon personal liberty. Furthermore, the Court established that even a civil decree for the restitution of conjugal rights cannot be enforced by forcibly handing over a wife to her husband, as the law provides no mechanism for such physical coercion.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the authority under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to hand over the custody of a major woman to a person claiming to be her husband against her will?
  • Can a court enforce a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by forcibly handing over the custody of a wife to her husband?
  • What is the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding a major person produced before it?
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• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ vs MESSRS HAROON INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 380 · Labour Court · 1971-08-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ GAZDAR vs ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND 31972 PLD Karachi 119 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-25
  constitutional petitionmunicipal administrationcontrolling authoritydelegation of powersconsent ordercompromisewrit jurisdictionsuppression of facts
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged an appellate order passed by the Additional Commissioner regarding the lease of a municipal plot. The petitioner's father held a temporary lease from the Municipal Corporation, and the Corporation later passed a resolution recommending a 99-year lease of the plot to the petitioner, which required approval from the Commissioner as the Controlling Authority under the West Pakistan Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. Respondent No. 4 filed an appeal, which the Commissioner transferred to the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner decided the appeal based on a compromise among the parties. The High Court held that the Commissioner, acting as the Controlling Authority under Section 111 of the Ordinance, alone had the power to examine the resolution, and this power could not be delegated to the Additional Commissioner via appeal rules, as a statute prevails over rules. However, the Court ruled that the petitioner was disentitled to discretionary relief under Article 98 of the Constitution because the petitioner had consented to the compromise order before the Additional Commissioner, subsequently abandoned the jurisdictional objection, and suppressed material facts in the writ petition. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Controlling Authority under Section 111 of the West Pakistan Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 can delegate its power of examining a municipal committee resolution to the Additional Commissioner?
  • Does a resolution passed by a Municipal Corporation recommending a lease amount to an appealable order under the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Appeals) Rules, 1960?
  • Is a party who consented to an agreed decision before a tribunal estopped from challenging that order under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the suppression of the fact that an impugned order was passed by consent disentitles a petitioner to discretionary writ relief?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 750 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-02-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM AND 3 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-21
  past maintenanceArbitration CouncilMuslim Family Laws Ordinancemaintenance allowanceex parte orderlimitation periodrevision to Collectorfamily law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  An appeal was filed by special leave against the High Court's dismissal of a constitutional writ petition challenging an Arbitration Council's maintenance order under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The Arbitration Council had awarded the wife maintenance for both past and current periods, which was later upheld by the Collector. The husband contended that past maintenance could not be granted under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, that the claim was time-barred, that the ex parte proceedings violated principles of natural justice, and that two separate orders could not be issued. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that unlike Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 does not restrict maintenance awards to future periods or the date of application; thus, past maintenance can be awarded subject to the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, ex parte proceedings were justified as the husband avoided service, and issuing separate orders for distinct periods was valid.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Arbitration Council have jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 to award past maintenance to a neglected wife?
  • Which provision of the Limitation Act 1908 governs claims for past maintenance under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can an Arbitration Council proceed ex parte where a party deliberately avoids the service of notices?
  • Is an Arbitration Council permitted to issue separate maintenance certificates for different periods of time?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND Another vs DOST MUHAMMAD1972 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  pre-emptionlimitationoral salephysical possessionappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit concerning Sufaida land measuring 10 marlas with a Kothri situated in village Bajar, Tehsil Khushab, District Sargodha. The core legal question involves the determination of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit in respect of an oral sale where time runs from the taking of physical possession under Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court and the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence regarding physical possession and that the petitioner failed to discharge the onus of proving the date on which physical possession was taken. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that the question of physical possession in oral sales is a matter of evidence and findings of fact concurred by two courts will not be disturbed lightly by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • When does time begin to run for filing a pre-emption suit in respect of an oral sale under Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act?
  • Upon whom lies the onus of proving the date on which physical possession of the land in dispute was taken in an oral sale?
  • Will the Supreme Court re-appreciate evidence regarding the date of physical possession concurrently decided by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUNIR vs BAWANI VIOLIN TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 312 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ AHMAD KHAN AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF1972 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-07
  acquittalspecial leave to appealforensic evidencebenefit of doubtmurdercriminal appealeyewitness testimony
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder charges under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on perverse or insubstantial reasoning, particularly concerning the credibility of eyewitness accounts, the validity of the FIR, and the reliability of forensic evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s reasons for acquittal were cogent and valid. The Court affirmed that the forensic matching of an empty cartridge to a weapon recovered from the respondent did not, in isolation, implicate him in the crime or establish his presence at the scene, particularly when the prosecution's primary evidence was discredited. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning is based on a sound evaluation of evidence and raises reasonable doubts regarding the prosecution's case, even if forensic evidence exists, provided that evidence does not independently establish the accused's presence or participation in the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forensic matching of a recovered weapon to an empty cartridge, in isolation, establish the presence of an accused at the scene of a crime?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court’s reasoning is found to be cogent and valid?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution's primary evidence, including the FIR and eyewitness testimony, is disbelieved by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF AHMED vs MESSRS PIONEER TRADING Co., KARACHI1972 PLC 408 · Labour Court · 1971-10-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHURSHID And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 975 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs The STATE and anothers1972 P Cr. L J 913 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHALIL KHALID vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 65 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JUMAN PATOLE And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 885 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISLAM KHAN vs Mst. RURI AND Other1972 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  transfer of propertydisplaced personsdemarcationabuse of processleave to appealwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the writ petition challenging the decisions of the Settlement authorities regarding the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Initially, the Settlement authorities divided and transferred the house to the contesting parties based on their respective possessions, an arrangement previously upheld by the High Court and left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. The petitioner subsequently approached the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to obtain a demarcation report declaring the house impartible, which the higher Settlement authorities and the High Court viewed as an improper attempt to reopen a finalized matter. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's actions constituted an abuse of the process of the court under the guise of demarcation. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party reopen a final settlement regarding the transfer of a property through a subsequent application for demarcation?
  • Whether attempting to relitigate a settled property dispute under the guise of demarcation constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQ AND Another vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE1972 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal usedefault in payment of rentsub-lettingconcurrent findings of factsecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenants and sub-tenants under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-letting, and personal use. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment on sub-letting and personal use. On appeal, the District Judge maintained ejectment on personal use and default, reversing findings on sub-letting. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' second appeal due to concurrent findings of fact regarding personal use. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that three statutory essentials under section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance were required for ejectment based on personal use. The Supreme Court held that since the lower courts considered and satisfied the first two essentials—that the landlord in good faith requires the property and does not occupy another suitable building—and the third essential was never raised before the High Court or lower forums, the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requirements under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal use?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding personal use justify the dismissal of a second appeal?
  • Can a legal plea regarding statutory essentials that was never raised before the High Court be entertained by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND Another vs The STATE1972 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  interested witnesscorroboration of evidencemurder convictioncriminal appealappreciation of evidenceriotingrecovery of incriminating articles
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellants for murder and rioting under sections 148, 302, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had acquitted three co-accused but maintained the appellants' convictions. The core legal question was whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses, deemed "interested" and partially unreliable regarding the acquitted co-accused, necessitated corroboration to sustain the appellants' convictions, and if such corroboration was adequate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while corroboration is a matter of prudence for interested witnesses, it is not required on every material particular. The Court clarified that witnesses are not rendered "false" or "accomplices" merely because some co-accused are acquitted. The Court found that the recoveries of incriminating items, including weapons and blood-stained articles, alongside the appellants' own injuries, provided sufficient corroboration to establish their guilt. The principle laid down is that the partial rejection of testimony regarding some accused does not automatically invalidate the entire evidence against others, provided sufficient independent corroboration exists to satisfy the court of the witnesses' truthfulness.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partial rejection of testimony against some co-accused render the entire evidence of interested witnesses unreliable?
  • Is corroboration required on every material particular when relying on the testimony of interested witnesses?
  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused based on lack of evidence necessitate the acquittal of all remaining accused?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ILYAS vs THE STATE1972 PLD Lahore 37 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 661 · Sindh High Court · 1971-11-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1972 PLD Supreme Court 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-09-05
  officiating appointmentpro forma promotionreduction in rankshow-cause noticecivil servicereversion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arose from a writ petition challenging an order directing the appellant to take over charge as an Assistant Director, which he contended amounted to an unlawful reduction in rank from his post as Deputy Director without a show-cause notice. The appellant argued that his appointment as Deputy Director, although temporary, was for an indefinite period and thus substantive in character. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the departmental record and affirmed the High Court's finding that the appellant's appointment was in a pro forma officiating capacity, as approved by the competent authority, notwithstanding the omission of the word 'officiating' in the gazette notification. The Court held that the government has the legal authority to terminate an officiating appointment at any time for service exigencies without a show-cause notice. A show-cause notice is only mandatory if the reversion is intended as a penalty or is made mala fide, neither of which was established in this case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the word 'officiating' in a gazette notification convert an officiating appointment into a substantive one when the competent authority only approved an officiating promotion?
  • Is a show-cause notice mandatory under the Constitution before reverting a civil servant from an officiating post to their substantive post?
  • Under what circumstances does the reversion of a civil servant from an officiating superior post to a lower substantive post amount to a reduction in rank requiring a show-cause notice?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHAN AND Others vs Maulvi BEHRAM (THROUGH HIS1972 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16
  arbitration agreementreference to arbitrationall parties interestedwaiver by conductspecial leave to appealsecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court in a regular second appeal concerning a property dispute. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration of ownership and possession, which the parties subsequently referred to arbitration during proceedings. Although the reference to arbitration was signed by only one of the plaintiffs, the co-plaintiffs actively participated in the arbitration proceedings without objection and failed to raise the issue before the trial court or in the first appeal before the District Judge. The core legal question was whether a reference to arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act is invalid ab initio if signed by only one of the co-plaintiffs, notwithstanding subsequent participation and conduct. The Supreme Court held that Section 21 does not require the agreement of all parties to be in writing, and that consent or agreement can be presumed or inferred from the conduct of the parties. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that active participation in arbitration proceedings waives formal written signing requirements by all co-parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference to arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act is void if signed by only one of the co-plaintiffs?
  • Can consent to an arbitration agreement under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act be inferred from the conduct and active participation of the parties?
  • Does Section 21 of the Arbitration Act require the agreement of all interested parties to be reduced to writing?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 682 · Lahore High Court · 1972-01-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs BASHIR AND 5 Other1972 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  acquittalappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonysite plancapital chargeleave to appealcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by a private complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's acquittal, based on a detailed re-evaluation of evidence, warrants interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the grounds raised by the petitioner merely sought a re-appreciation of evidence, which does not fall within the scope of Article 58 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's findings that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. Specifically, the Court noted that the site plan contradicted the eye-witnesses' claims, as physical obstructions such as a culvert, a canal distributory bank, and sugarcane fields rendered it impossible for the witnesses to have observed the alleged occurrence. Consequently, the Court established the principle that where eye-witness testimony is physically contradicted by the site plan and material evidence, such testimony is unreliable for sustaining a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition seeking mere re-appreciation of evidence fall within the ambit of Article 58 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can eye-witness testimony be relied upon when the site plan demonstrates that physical obstructions prevented the witnesses from observing the occurrence?
  • Is a conviction on a capital charge sustainable when the prosecution fails to reconcile material contradictions in the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN PATEL vs GAFFAR WALI MUHAMMAD AND Other1972 PLD Karachi 421 · Sindh High Court · 1972-02-21
  rent restrictionstatutory interpretationproperty taxlandlord and tenantproviso constructionfair rentfiscal burden
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These Letters Patent Appeals concern the interpretation of Section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, specifically regarding a landlord's right to recover increased property taxes from tenants. The core legal question was whether the proviso to Section 9, which limits rent increases to one-half of the tax burden, applies to both fresh taxes and increases in existing taxes, or only to the former. The Court held that the landlord is entitled to recover the full amount of the increase in existing taxes. The ratio decidendi is that the proviso creates two distinct contingencies; the limitation of 'one-half' applies explicitly only to the first contingency (fresh taxes). The absence of the qualifying phrase 'one-half of' in the second part of the proviso signifies a clear legislative intent to allow full reimbursement for increases in existing fiscal burdens. Furthermore, the Court established that where statutory language is plain, the preamble cannot be used to create ambiguity or restrict the text, and courts must avoid interpretations that render statutory words surplusage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to Section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, limit a landlord's recovery to one-half of the increase in existing taxes?
  • Can the preamble of a statute be used to override the plain language of a specific section?
  • Does the omission of a qualifying phrase in the second part of a proviso indicate a different legislative intent compared to the first part?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 3 Other vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND EX1972 PLD Karachi 632 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUMAYUN KHAN vs AKBER JAN1972 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  special power of attorneypre-emption suitcompromiseRazinamawithdrawal of suitdeclaratory suitfraud and collusiondamages against attorney
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court arose out of a declaratory suit seeking cancellation of a compromise decree. The petitioner had originally filed a pre-emption suit and appointed an attorney through a special power of attorney to conduct the suit. The attorney subsequently submitted a compromise deed (Razinama) and withdrew the suit, resulting in its dismissal. The petitioner challenged the compromise and dismissal by filing a declaratory suit alleging fraud and collusion by his attorney. While the trial court decreed the suit, the District Judge reversed the decree, and subsequent appeals before the Single Bench and Letters Patent Bench of the High Court were dismissed. The Supreme Court examined the original power of attorney and held that it explicitly empowered the attorney to compromise the suit and make necessary applications. Consequently, the attorney acted within his authority, and the dismissal of the suit was valid. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's remedy for alleged fraud lay in an action for damages against the attorney, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise and withdrawal of a suit effected by an attorney is binding on the principal when the power of attorney expressly confers the authority to compromise?
  • Can a principal challenge a court decree based on a compromise entered into by his authorized attorney on grounds of fraud without seeking damages directly against the attorney?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a litigant who claims to have been defrauded through a collusive compromise entered into by his authorized attorney acting within the scope of his power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD GULZAR vs AZAD J. & K. GOVERNMENT AND Other1972 PLD Azad J & K 101 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD GHAUS vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM AND Another1972 SCMR 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-26
  ancestral propertycustomary lawlegal necessityreversionersale deedconsiderationconcurrent findings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a second appeal regarding a suit for declaration. The suit concerned the validity of a registered sale deed of ancestral land, which the plaintiff, a reversioner, claimed was void due to lack of consideration and legal necessity, asserting that the vendor was governed by custom. The lower courts concurrently held that the property was ancestral, the parties were governed by custom, the sale lacked legal necessity, and only partial consideration was proven. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their findings regarding legal necessity and the sufficiency of consideration, given the vendor's physical and mental capacity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the vendor's physical and mental infirmity were sound. The Court established that when a vendor is proven to be a physical wreck with limited mental capacity, the burden of proof regarding the actual receipt of consideration and the prudence of the transaction—specifically regarding legal necessity—is heightened, and mere endorsement by a Sub-Registrar does not automatically validate the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the endorsement of a Sub-Registrar on a sale deed conclusively prove the passing of consideration when the vendor's mental and physical capacity is in question?
  • Can a sale of ancestral land by a person governed by custom be set aside if the vendor is found to be a physical wreck and the transaction lacks legal necessity?
  • Is the sale of ancestral land for the purpose of purchasing distant property considered an act of good management when the vendor is physically infirm?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD FAROOQ vs CHAIRMAN, ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1972 PLC 60 · Labour Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN vs ZABARDAST KHAN AND ANOTHER1972 PLD Azad J & K 7 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN vs HAIDER And 7 OTHERS1972 P Cr. L J 664 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD DIN vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1972 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  contempt of courtsettlement propertytime-barred claimwrit jurisdictionadministrative discretionpremature petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 206 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan (1972) seeking to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, and another respondent. The petitioner alleged that the respondents acted improperly by allowing a third party to file a time-barred claim form regarding a property dispute, despite a previous Supreme Court judgment directing the examination of other claimants' rights. The core legal question was whether the actions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in permitting the filing of a time-barred form constituted contempt of court. The Supreme Court held that the petition was misconceived and premature. The Court observed that the rights of the other claimants were still under inquiry pursuant to its earlier directions and that the petitioner had already challenged the Commissioner's order through a writ petition in the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that the allegations did not disclose any grounds for contempt proceedings, emphasizing that contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass or preempt ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings regarding the same subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can contempt proceedings be initiated while the underlying administrative issue is still being adjudicated by the relevant authority?
  • Is a petition for contempt of court maintainable when the petitioner has already invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court regarding the same subject matter?
  • Does the allowance of a time-barred claim form by a Settlement Commissioner constitute contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BUX And 8 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 195 · Sindh High Court · 1971-05-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BUTA And 3 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 567 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 4 Others vs NOOR AHMAD AND Other1972 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-04
  leave petitionconstitution petitionremandsettlement proceedingsinformer rightspremature petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a leave petition challenging an order of the High Court that dismissed the petitioners' Constitution petition as premature, holding that their contentions could be raised before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner pursuant to a remand order. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court rightly declined to interfere with settlement proceedings that had not yet reached final determination. The Supreme Court held that since the matter was validly remanded to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the only final determination was regarding the identity of the first informer, the High Court's refusal to interfere was correct. The key principle laid down is that constitutional petitions against intermediate remand orders in settlement proceedings are premature when the parties retain the opportunity to agitate their claims before the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Constitution petition against an intermediate remand order in settlement proceedings is premature?
  • Can parties raise their substantive contentions before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner upon remand?
  • Does an informer have a recognized standing in settlement property allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BILAL vs NATIONAL SILK AND RAYON MILLS LTD.,-- LYALLPUR1972 PLC 33 · Labour Court · 1971-01-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BHAI AND Another vs THE STATE1972 PLD Karachi 88 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 836 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-22
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionprevious enmitytainted currency notessolitary witnessburden of proofraidcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Lahore, convicting the appellant, a Labour Inspector, under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and sentencing him to six months' rigorous imprisonment for accepting illegal gratification. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conviction could be sustained solely on the testimony of a complainant with whom the appellant held proven previous enmity, in the absence of independent corroboration regarding the demand of the bribe. The Lahore High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence, holding that in corruption cases, the existence of previous enmity or hostility is of high significance as it provides a motive for a false frame-up, and it is unsafe to base a conviction on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of an interested complainant where the raiding party did not overhear the conversation. The key principle laid down is that the general burden of proving the commission of an offense always rests on the prosecution, and a conviction for bribery cannot be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of a hostile or inimical complainant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for accepting a bribe can be sustained on the solitary and uncorroborated testimony of a complainant who bears previous enmity toward the accused?
  • Does the existence of previous enmity or hostility between the complainant and the accused carry lesser weight in corruption cases than in ordinary criminal cases?
  • Can a conviction be based merely on the failure of the accused person to prove the correctness of their defence plea?
  • Is it safe to presume that money recovered during a raid was passed as illegal gratification when no witness overheard the conversation between the complainant and the accused at the time of the alleged passing of money?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MANAGEMENT OF SUTLEJ COTTON MILLS., OKARA1972 PLC 165 · Labour Court · 1971-01-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH And Another vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 96 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1972 PLC 160 · Labour Court · 1970-12-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs MUHAMMAD And 3 Others1972 P Cr. L J 856 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM ROSE vs FEDERATION OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1972 PLD Lahore 756 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM MIRZA vs Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM1972 PLD Lahore 603 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-17
  rent restrictionex parte orderinherent powersreviewfunctus officiolimitationpersona designata
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a reference to a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court to determine whether a Rent Controller, acting under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, has the power to set aside an ex parte ejectment order and whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to such an application. The majority of the Full Bench held that a Rent Controller is not a civil Court, that section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not apply to proceedings before him, and that once an order is passed under the Ordinance, the Rent Controller becomes functus officio and possesses no inherent power to review, recall, alter, or set aside his own order in the absence of an express statutory provision. The court also held that Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply to applications before the Rent Controller, and left the applicability of Article 181 open. The core legal principle established is that a Rent Controller, being a persona designata exercising quasi-judicial functions under a self-contained special statute, has no inherent jurisdiction to review or set aside ex parte orders once issued.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller appointed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 has the power to set aside an ex parte order?
  • Does section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to proceedings before a Rent Controller?
  • Whether a Rent Controller possesses inherent powers to review, recall, or vary a judicial or quasi-judicial order once passed?
  • Whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to an application for setting aside an ex parte order passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN AND 3 OTHERS vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT1972 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-27
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958transfer of propertyplinth areaallotmentsettlement of claimsdefinition of house
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The petitioners, successors of an original allottee, challenged the transfer of excess land surrounding a bungalow to a respondent, arguing they were entitled to the adjoining plot as a garden. The core legal question was whether a displaced person is entitled to receive, as part of a house transfer, land exceeding three times the plinth area of the structure. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petition. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to the excess land, as the definition of a 'house' under the relevant statute does not permit the transfer of land exceeding three times the plinth area. The principle laid down is that the statutory definition of a house strictly limits the extent of land that can be transferred alongside a residential structure, precluding claims for additional surrounding plots beyond the prescribed three-times plinth area threshold.

  Questions settled

  • Is a displaced person entitled to the transfer of land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the definition of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 allow for the inclusion of adjoining garden plots beyond the three-times plinth area limit?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND 5 Others vs The STATE1972 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-29
  benefit of doubtmurderattempt to murderdelayed FIRcriminal appealappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of the appellants under sections 302/149, 307/149, and 143 of the Pakistan Penal Code, resulting in sentences ranging from imprisonment to death as confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the place of occurrence, the improbability of night-long heavy firing without physical evidence like pellets or empties, unexplained delay in lodging the first information report, suppression of material facts by the complainant, and plausible alibi and injury evidence favoring the defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences of all appellants including an absconding appellant, and acquitted them by giving them the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution version suffers from major improbabilities, lack of corroborative physical evidence such as recovered pellets or bullet empties, suppression of material facts, and inconsistent timelines, the accused are entitled to the benefit of the doubt resulting in an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to recover pellets or empties from the place of an alleged night-long firing creates reasonable doubt regarding the place and manner of the occurrence?
  • Can an unexplained and considerable delay in lodging the first information report, coupled with a fabricated explanation of night-long firing, form the basis for acquitting the accused?
  • Whether the benefit of an acquittal granted to appearing appellants should also be extended to an absconding co-appellant to ensure complete justice?
  • Does the suppression of material facts by the complainant regarding injuries inflicted on the opposite party discredit the prosecution case?
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• MUHAMMAD ASIF vs The STATE1972 PCr. LJ 1160 · Sindh High Court · 1971-12-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASADULLAH KHAN NIAZI, SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER, BAHAWALPUR1972 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-04
  temporary injunctionreversionservice lawirreparable losscivil suitofficiating post
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, an Overseer promoted to officiating Sub-Divisional Officer, challenged his reversion to the post of Overseer by filing a civil suit for declaration and injunction. The lower courts refused to grant a temporary injunction against the reversion. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that he held a permanent position as a Sub-Divisional Officer and could not be reverted without a show-cause notice. The Supreme Court examined the dispute regarding the petitioner's status as a permanent Sub-Divisional Officer. The Court held that the lower courts were justified in refusing the temporary injunction because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable loss, as any potential grievance could be addressed through monetary compensation. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the lower courts' orders and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that temporary injunctions are not appropriate where the alleged injury is purely financial and compensable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a temporary injunction appropriate when the alleged injury is purely monetary and compensable?
  • Can an officiating employee claim a right to a permanent position without establishing the permanency of that status?
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• MUHAMMAD ARIF vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 476 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 862 · Lahore High Court · 1972-02-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMINPARACHA vs Thb STATE BANK. OF PAKISTAN1972 P Cr. L J 397 · Sindh High Court · 1971-08-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 1 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs MESSRS RAZZAK INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1972 PLC 317 · Labour Court · 1971-05-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs Ch. ABDUL MAJID1972 PLC 159 · Labour Court · 1970-12-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI And 2 Others vs The STATE1972 PCr. L J 314 · Lahore High Court · 1971-10-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALA vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 5 Other1972 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-07
  lacheswrit petitionsettlement schemetransfer of propertyexhaustion of remediescondonation of delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a portion of a building site under settlement laws, where the appellant's application for transfer was rejected without notice by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The appellant actively pursued departmental remedies through various authorities, culminating in a final dismissal by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The appellant subsequently challenged these orders through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of laches due to a supposed delay in seeking judicial review. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief on the ground of laches when the appellant was diligently pursuing statutory remedies within the department. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not be held guilty of laches as he was continuously pursuing his remedies before the Settlement authorities and approached the High Court promptly after the final order. The key principle laid down is that a party actively and continuously prosecuting administrative and statutory remedies cannot be non-suited in writ jurisdiction on the ground of laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can be charged with laches when continuously pursuing statutory remedies before administrative authorities?
  • Does an appellate authority have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after a permanent transfer deed has been issued?
  • Whether the High Court can dismiss a writ petition on the ground of delay when the final departmental order was challenged promptly?
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• MUHAMMAD AKRAM vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 5 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHOSO vs The STATE1972 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-09
  murder convictionocular testimonyinterested witnessesdeath sentencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which confirmed the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who were related to the deceased, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when challenged as interested and unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, finding the testimony of the eye-witnesses to be coherent, consistent, and trustworthy. The Court rejected arguments that the witnesses were 'chance witnesses' or that their relationship to the deceased necessitated automatic rejection of their testimony without independent corroboration. The Court affirmed that where prosecution evidence is credible and unshaken during cross-examination, it provides a sufficient basis for conviction, even in capital cases. The principle laid down is that the testimony of related witnesses is not inherently inadmissible or unreliable, provided it withstands scrutiny and is consistent with the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the ocular testimony of related witnesses inherently unreliable in a murder trial?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of consistent and coherent ocular testimony?
  • Does the failure to mention a witness in the First Information Report automatically render their testimony inadmissible?
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• MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN vs Mst. SHAHZADA BEGUM1972 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-30
  partition suitpreliminary decreedismissal in defaultOrder IX Rule 8civil procedurerevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a partition suit wherein the respondent obtained a preliminary decree for her share in ancestral property, which was unsuccessfully agitated up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, when the case returned for a final decree, the trial court dismissed the suit in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court later restored the suit upon an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, holding that Order IX provisions are inapplicable after a preliminary decree. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision and subsequent review. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the dismissal and the non-applicability of Order IX, Rule 8. The Supreme Court held that once a preliminary decree has been passed in a suit, the suit cannot be dismissed for default under Order IX, Rule 8, as the parties acquire fixed rights and liabilities unless the decree is varied or set aside. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that dismissal in default is without jurisdiction post-preliminary decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit be dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after a preliminary decree has already been passed?
  • Whether the provisions of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be invoked after the passing of a preliminary decree in a partition suit?
  • Does the passing of a preliminary decree create fixed rights and liabilities between the parties that subsist unless varied or set aside?
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• MUHAMMAD AKIB PALI vs MADAD ALI AND 2 Other1972 PLD Karachi 433 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKHTAR MIR And 4 Others vs The STATE1972 P Cr. L J 15 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AFZAL vs The STATE1972 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  culpable homicidesudden fightheat of passionright of private defenceexceeding self-defencemurder conviction altered
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had altered his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to one under section 304, Part II, of the same Code, reducing his sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner struck the deceased on the head with a zinc pipe following a sudden verbal altercation over a cut bamboo stick, resulting in the deceased's death. The petitioner pleaded self-defence, claiming the deceased had first struck him with a bamboo stick. The High Court applied Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code, finding the incident occurred during a sudden fight in the heat of passion, but rejected the full plea of self-defence as the petitioner had exceeded his right under section 99 by inflicting more harm than necessary. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner indeed exceeded his right of private defence by using a zinc pipe in retaliation to minor injuries, and declined to interfere with the High Court's judgment. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden fight in the heat of passion attract Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can an accused claim the right of private defence if they inflict more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence under section 99 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's alteration of a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the circumstances of a sudden altercation.
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• MUHAMMAD ABDUL MANNA N vs THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, LARKANA1972 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-15
  permanent injunctionpublic roadeasementinfructuous suitnecessary partymunicipal property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a suit for a permanent injunction filed by the appellant to restrain the Municipal Committee, Larkana, from constructing shops on a plot adjacent to the appellant's property, which the appellant claimed was a public road providing access to his premises. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge granted partial relief, ordering the demolition of one shop. The High Court subsequently set aside this order, restoring the trial court's dismissal on the grounds that the plot was the Municipality's property and the appellant failed to establish an easement. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued a common law right of passage over the plot. The Supreme Court observed that the suit suffered from fundamental defects, including the failure to implead the Provincial Government, which claimed ownership of the land, and ambiguity regarding the legal status of the plot. Furthermore, as the construction was already completed, the Court held the suit for injunction had become infructuous. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for injunction against construction on a public road require the Provincial Government to be impleaded if the Municipality claims ownership of the land?
  • Does a suit for permanent injunction against construction become infructuous once the construction is already completed?
  • Whether a private citizen can claim a right of passage over a public road without establishing a statutory easement?
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• MUHAMMAD ABBAS vs SULTAN KHAN AND 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 122 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-08Read full judgment →
• Mufti MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN1972 PLC 134 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-10Read full judgment →
• MUBARAK ALI vs Thb STATE1972 P Cr. L J 889 · Lahore High Court · 1971-12-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALAM AND 89 Others THE SECRETARY, IRRIGATION AND POWER1972 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-14
  occupier's ratecanal waterreclamation feeagricultural landstatutory notificationenhancement of rates
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, owners of agricultural lands in the SCARP-I area in the Punjab, challenged through four petitions the imposition of an enhanced occupier's rate under a Government of West Pakistan notification dated April 11, 1966, and a Reclamation Fee under a notification dated February 5, 1966. The core legal questions involved the legality of enhancing the occupier's rate despite reduced or closed tubewell water supply, and the validity of levying a Reclamation Fee under the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners continued to accept the canal water, they were legally liable to pay the enhanced occupier's rate under section 36 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873. Furthermore, the Court held that the Reclamation Fee was validly levied under section 38 of the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952, read with the relevant rules, as the value of the lands was expected to increase and had in fact immensely increased. Consequently, all petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an occupier liable to pay an enhanced occupier's rate for canal water under section 36 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 if they continue to accept the water?
  • Can a Reclamation Fee be levied under section 38 of the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act 1952 when the value of the land is merely expected to increase?
  • Do rules framed under the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 require publication in the official Gazette to have the force of law?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAKIL AAMIR GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT OF1972 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-06
  medical college admissionreserved seatsdefence forces personnelconstitutional petitionmerit preference
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals arise from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan regarding the admission of candidates to the First Year M.B., B.S. Course in the Dow Medical College, Karachi, for the academic year 1971-72 against seats reserved for children of Defence Forces Personnel. The core legal question concerned whether the instructions and procedures laid down by the Commander-in-Chief could override the substantive merit and preference provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the prospectus instructions of Dow Medical College. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals on the basis of a mutually agreeable formula proposed by the Chief of the Naval Staff, whereby the rival candidate, Miss Naseem Kausar Arbab, was nominated for admission to the Naval seat for the subsequent academic year 1972-73, while preserving the existing admission of the appellant Muhammad Shakil Aamir for the year 1971-72. The key principle established relates to the resolution of conflicting criteria governing reserved institutional admissions through administrative accommodation without disturbing settled admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether instructions framed by military authorities can override substantive provisions of a college prospectus regarding reserved seats?
  • Can an admission dispute for an academic year be resolved by nominating the aggrieved candidate for a reserved seat in the subsequent academic year?
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• Mst. ZOHRAN AND 4 Others vs ABDUS SATTAR AND Another1972 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-12
  quashment of proceedingsprivate complaintpolice investigationcriminal proceduremala fidedischarge of accused
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated via a private complaint. The petitioners were initially investigated by the police for offences under sections 364 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but were found innocent and the case was cancelled. Subsequently, the respondent filed a private complaint regarding the same allegations. The Magistrate, after recording preliminary evidence, issued summonses to the petitioners. The petitioners sought quashment under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that the police investigation report exonerating them precluded further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that a private complaint is not barred simply because the police previously discharged the accused or cancelled the case. The Court affirmed that unless the petitioners demonstrate that the complaint is mala fide or the charges are demonstrably false, the Magistrate is entitled to proceed based on the preliminary evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no legal defect or sufficient grounds to warrant the quashment of the ongoing criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police report finding the accused innocent and cancelling a case legally bar the filing of a private complaint for the same offence?
  • Under what circumstances can a Magistrate proceed with a private complaint after the police have submitted a report of innocence?
  • Is the quashment of criminal proceedings justified solely on the ground that the police previously investigated and discharged the accused?
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• Mst. ZAREEFA BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN1972 PLD Azad J & K 14 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-08-31Read full judgment →