Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Punjab AHMAD NAWAZ QURESHI vs SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB,\1971 PLC 97 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-08Read full judgment →
- PUNHOON AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1013 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-09Read full judgment →
- PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD AND Another vs MALIK ASGHAR KHAN1971 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-03Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent, a government servant, challenging his reversion from the post of Forest Ranger to his original rank of Forester. The respondent sought a declaration that his reversion was void and applied for a temporary injunction, which was rejected by the trial court and the District Judge but granted by a Single Judge of the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court was justified in granting the interim injunction. The Court reiterated the three basic requirements for granting temporary injunctions: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. It held that granting temporary injunctions to government departments in service matters disrupts administrative functioning and should be avoided unless compelling reasons exist. Furthermore, no irreparable injury could be shown as any loss could be compensated monetarily if the respondent succeeded. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the trial court's rejection of the injunction.
Questions settled- What are the three basic considerations that must be satisfied for the grant or refusal of a temporary injunction?
- Can a temporary injunction be granted in a service matter where the alleged injury can be adequately compensated by monetary damages?
- Does the balance of convenience favor granting an interim injunction that disrupts the administrative arrangements of a government department?
- PROVINCE OF SID THROUGH DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD HASHIM1971 PLD Karachi 793 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These seven revision petitions filed by the Province of Sind are directed against a common appellate judgment of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Hyderabad, which had set aside the trial court's order and granted interim injunctions restraining the government from reverting the respondent-plaintiffs from officiating Sub-Divisional Officers to their substantive posts of Overseers. The core legal questions involve whether the reversion of officiating government servants amounts to a reduction in rank and whether temporary injunctions should be issued against government departments in service matters disrupting administrative arrangements. The High Court accepted the revision petitions and restored the trial court's order refusing injunctions, holding that officiating appointments are tentative stop-gap arrangements and their reversion does not constitute a reduction in rank. Furthermore, the court held that the balance of convenience does not favor issuing temporary injunctions against government departments in service matters, as any potential injury can be remedied by monetary compensation if the suits ultimately succeed.
Questions settled- Whether the reversion of a civil servant from an officiating higher post to a substantive permanent post amounts to a reduction in rank?
- Does an ad hoc or officiating appointment for a number of years confer any legal right or lien to hold the higher post on a regular basis?
- Whether a subordinate court acts illegally and with material irregularity under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by ignoring binding precedents of the High Court and Supreme Court?
- Under what circumstances should a temporary injunction be granted against a government department in service matters affecting administrative arrangements?
- PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN--Defendant., THE EAST PAKISTAN PROVINCIAL1971 PLD Dacca 235 · Dacca · 1970-04-28Read full judgment →
- PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN vs SAMIRUDDIN AND Other1971 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against interim orders passed by the High Court of East Pakistan regarding stay of execution in land acquisition cases under the Town Improvement Act, 1953. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted illegally or arbitrarily by granting a stay of execution conditional upon the deposit of the entire decretal amount and costs. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court’s order was not legally defective. The Court affirmed that the filing of an appeal does not automatically operate as a stay of execution. Instead, a stay is an indulgence granted by the court, which may be subjected to reasonable conditions, such as the deposit of the decretal amount. The Supreme Court emphasized that it will not interfere with interim orders that do not finally adjudicate the rights of the parties unless such orders are shown to be wholly illegal, arbitrary, or whimsical. The practice of requiring security or deposits for stay of execution is well-established and judicially sound.
Questions settled- Does the filing of an appeal against an award or decree automatically operate as a stay of execution?
- Can a court impose conditions, such as the deposit of the decretal amount, when granting a stay of execution?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with interim orders passed by a High Court?
- PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN vs MESSRS M. AHMAD & SONS AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Province of East Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan arising from a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The underlying dispute involved a contract for works executed by the respondents, where the named arbitrator failed to act upon a request for arbitration, prompting the respondents to file an application under Sections 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for the removal of the arbitrator and the appointment of another. The trial court dismissed the application, but the High Court accepted the respondents' revision, removed the arbitrator, and remanded the case for the appointment of a new one. The Supreme Court considered whether the application was maintainable under Section 11 rather than Section 12 or Section 8. The Supreme Court held that the application was maintainable under Section 11, noted that the objection regarding the specific section could not be raised for the first time before the apex court, and declined to interfere on merits as a new arbitrator had already been appointed and entered upon the reference without objection. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an application for the removal of a named arbitrator is maintainable under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act?
- Can a legal plea regarding the maintainability under a specific section of the Arbitration Act be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere in arbitral appointment matters when a new arbitrator has already been appointed and entered upon the reference without objection?
- PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHER vs MESSRS ALLAWALA & CO. AND OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These five appeals by special leave arose from a consolidated judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which had accepted writ petitions filed by monthly tenants challenging eviction notices and police action to lock up their premises. The core legal questions involved whether the tenants' monthly tenancies were validly determined under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 by an unauthorized officer, and whether such tenants fell within the definition of "unauthorised occupants" under section 2(c) of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act 1952. The Supreme Court held that the Sub-Divisional Officer lacked the authority under the relevant Rules of Business to issue notices determining tenancies on behalf of the Provincial Government, and further held that a tenant whose initial entry was lawful does not become an "unauthorised occupant" under section 2(c) of the 1953 Act merely upon the determination of their tenancy. The key principles laid down are that executive powers and notice issuances on behalf of the government must strictly conform to the established Rules of Business, and summary eviction statutes cannot be extended to tenants whose initial occupation was lawful unless expressly provided by legislation.
Questions settled- Whether a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 issued by an officer not authorized under the Rules of Business is legally effective to terminate a government tenancy?
- Does a monthly tenant whose tenancy has been determined qualify as an "unauthorised occupant" under section 2(c) of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act 1952?
- Can the Provincial Government summarily evict lawful tenants using the machinery of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act 1952 prior to the valid determination of their tenancy?
- PROJECT MAN AGER, MESSRS AMIN JUTE MILLS LTD., CHITTAGONG vs MD.1971 PLC 97 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
- PRODIP KUMAR MAJUMDER vs MESSRS DOCTOR's CHEMICAL WORKS LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 353 · Labour Court · 1970-09-21Read full judgment →
- PRINCE RANJITSINH P. GAEKWAD AND OTHERS vs COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH1971 PTD 1077 · Gujarat High Court · 1968-10-07Read full judgment →
- Prevent: Md. Nurul Islam Khan, Chairman, M. Karim And S. A.1971 PLC 464 · Labour Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
- Present: Md. Anwar Hussain, Chairman MD. INSAR ALI AND Other vs1971 PLC 264 · Labour Court · 1970-10-31Read full judgment →
- Present: Agha Imdadally, Chairman, Muhammad Rasheed And Kasam1971PLC241 · Labour Court · 1970-11-16Read full judgment →
- PREMHARI BARMAN AND 2 OTHURS -Applicants vs THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION, EAST PAKISTAN, DACCA1971 PTD 9 · Dacca · 1970-08-05Read full judgment →
- PREMHARI BARMAN AND 2 OTHERS vs The COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION, EAST1971 PLD Dacca 219 · Dacca · 1970-08-05Read full judgment →
- POLISETTI SUBBARAIDU & Co. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, A. P.1971 PTD 144 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1967-06-28Read full judgment →
- PLANTATION CORPORATION OF KERALA vs COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL1971 PTD 617 · Kerala High Court · 1968-08-01Read full judgment →
- Pirzada KHURSHID-UZ-ZAMAN AHMED. vs THE COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR1971 PLC 5 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-12Read full judgment →
- Pir SARFRAZ AHMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, LAHORE AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-02Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenges a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which dismissed a constitutional petition against the termination of the appellant's appointment as a Notary Public. The core legal questions concerned whether a lawfully appointed Notary Public under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 could be removed without a show-cause notice, and whether the principles of natural justice applied. The Supreme Court held that the removal of a person holding a public office of profit affects their vested rights, and the power of removal must be exercised in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem, even if the statute does not expressly mention them. The ratio is that an administrative authority cannot remove an incumbent from a public office without affording an opportunity to show cause against the action. The Court laid down the principle that the right to earn a livelihood by legitimate means cannot be taken away without notice and hearing, and statutory powers of removal are coupled with a duty to act fairly.
Questions settled- Does the removal of a Notary Public attract the application of the principles of natural justice?
- Can a person holding a public office of profit be deprived of their office without being afforded an opportunity to show cause?
- Do savings provisions protecting prior appointments under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 preclude arbitrary removal by the government?
- Whether administrative authorities can introduce a new ground for removal during judicial proceedings that was not pleaded in their initial counter-affidavit?
- Pir SALEH SHAH AND 6 Others vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-31Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellants' writ petition in limine regarding agricultural lands claimed to be non-evacuee property. The core legal question concerned whether the appellants were entitled to a declaration that the disputed lands were not evacuee property despite earlier dismissed applications, subsequent inordinate delay, and the suppression of material facts. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had attempted to practice fraud by concealing the dismissal of their earlier 1948 applications when filing fresh applications in 1960 for the same lands, and that the 1960 applications were heavily barred by time as the lands had been treated as evacuee property since 1948. The Court affirmed that litigants seeking equitable relief from courts or tribunals must come with clean hands, and dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the suppression of the dismissal of earlier applications for a declaration of non-evacuee property amounts to practicing fraud disentitling a party to relief?
- Are applications filed under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, barred by time when the property was treated as evacuee property years prior?
- Does a change in the alleged status of tenancies from occupancy to non-occupancy allow a party to circumvent the finality of previous adverse orders regarding the same land?
- Pir RASHID-UD-DAULA AND 3 OTHERS vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN1971 PLD Supreme Court 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan pertained to the takeover of the shrine of Hazrat Shah Daula Sahib of Gujrat, including its mosque, offerings, and income boxes, by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959. The appellants, lineal descendants (Pirzadgan) of the saint, challenged the legislative competence of the Governor to enact the Ordinance without the President's prior instructions and asserted that the shrine's income and offerings constituted their private, inherited property based on immemorial user. The Supreme Court held that the West Pakistan Wakf Properties Ordinance, 1961 (replacing the 1959 Ordinance) was validly enacted with the President's assent and effectively validated past actions retroactively. On the merits, the Court ruled that while long-standing user of the shrine by the public established it as a public waqf, cash offerings historically appropriated as private inheritance were not waqf under Muslim law; however, the Legislature possessed valid statutory power to impress future box offerings and subscriptions with the character of waqf property.
Questions settled- Whether the Governor of a Province had the legislative competence under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1958 and the Constitution of 1956 to promulgate a provincial Ordinance touching upon subjects in the Concurrent List without the previous instructions of the President?
- Can a provincial legislature enact retrospective legislation validating actions previously taken under an earlier invalidated or repealed law?
- Whether long-standing, unrestricted public access and user of a shrine and its attached facilities can give rise to a legal presumption of dedication as a public waqf under Islamic law?
- Can voluntary offerings and cash put into donation boxes at a shrine be statutorily declared as waqf property by the legislature?
- PILANI INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER _A_ WARD, COMPANIES DIST. II AND ANOTHER1971 PTD 264 · Calcutta High Court · 1966-07-04Read full judgment →
- PANDYAN INSURANCE Co. LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 607 · Madras High Court · 1968-10-17Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD USMAN1971 PLD Lahore 27 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN vs MESSRS ADAMJEE JUTE MILLS LTD.1971 PLD Dacca 139 · Dacca · 1970-04-17Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN TOBACCO Co. LTD., CHITTAGONG vs THE CHAIRMAN, SECOND1971 PLD Dacca 262 · Dacca · 1970-08-27Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN THROUGH THE GENERAL MANAGER, PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY, LAHORE vs MESSRS GHULAM MAHBUB MUHAMMAD UMER1971 PLD Karachi 259 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-27Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN RIVER STEAMERS LTD. vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA AND ANOTHERs1971 PTD 204 · Dacca · 1970-03-12Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN RIVER STEAMERS LTD. vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Dacca 223 · Dacca · 1970-03-12Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION & WORKS, ISLAMABAD. AND Another vs H. H. AHMED1971 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against a High Court judgment that upheld a decree awarding compensation to the respondent for the use and occupation of his requisitioned house. The core legal questions addressed were whether compensation was erroneously awarded beyond the date of vacation of the premises, whether a civil suit was barred due to the existence of a special procedure under the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act, 1947, and whether a decree could be legally passed against the Secretary of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Works. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the record did not support the claim that compensation was awarded beyond the vacation date. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the civil suit was maintainable because the government had failed to appoint a Tribunal or Arbitrator to adjudicate compensation claims. Finally, the Court clarified that the Secretary was joined only in a representative capacity for the Central Government and was not personally liable under the decree. The judgment affirms that the absence of a designated statutory forum allows for civil litigation regarding compensation claims.
Questions settled- Does the existence of a special procedure under the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act, 1947, bar a civil suit for compensation if no Tribunal or Arbitrator has been appointed?
- Can a decree be passed against a government official in their representative capacity without imposing personal liability?
- Is a civil suit for compensation maintainable against the government when the statutory mechanism for determining such compensation has not been activated?
- PAKISTAN RADIO HOUSE LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 144 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-10-07Read full judgment →
- PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LTD. vs THE COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND1971 PLD Karachi 221 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- PAKISTAN CEMENT INDUSTRIES LTD., RAWALPINDI vs TEEKAYEF TRADING Co.1971 PLD Lahore 522 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil revision petition challenges an order of the Administrative Civil Judge enlarging the time for an arbitrator to make an award under an arbitration agreement. The core legal question concerns whether an unstamped arbitration agreement can be acted upon by an arbitrator and whether subsequent stamping validates prior proceedings retrospectively under the Stamp Act 1899. The Lahore High Court held that an unstamped arbitration agreement is barred from being acted upon under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, and while subsequent stamping validates the agreement from that date, it cannot retrospectively validate arbitration proceedings conducted while the document remained unstamped. The court established that 'acting upon' and 'admission in evidence' are distinct, and Section 36 does not cure the statutory bar against acting upon an unstamped document. Consequently, the revision was accepted and the impugned order setting time extension was set aside.
Questions settled- Can an unstamped arbitration agreement be legally acted upon by an arbitrator?
- Does the subsequent stamping of an arbitration agreement validate previous arbitration proceedings conducted while the document was unstamped?
- Is a civil court required to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement when an application for enlargement of time is filed under section 28 of the Arbitration Act?
- Does participation in arbitration proceedings estop a party from raising objections regarding the lack of proper stamp duty on the agreement?
- PAKISTAN AND Another vs MOHAMMAD ALI1971 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-06-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arose from a suit for damages brought by the respondent against the Railway Administration for the non-delivery of a bale of textile goods booked for transit. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the Railway Administration had proved it acted as a prudent bailee and that the loss occurred due to a running train theft. The first appellate court reversed the decision, and the High Court summarily dismissed the second appeal. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evidence and concluded that the first appellate court's findings were based on unwarranted speculation and overlooked overwhelming oral and documentary evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Railway Administration had made a full and true disclosure of all circumstances relating to the transit and successfully discharged its burden of proof as a bailee under section 72 of the Railways Act. The appeal was allowed, and the trial court's judgment dismissing the suit was restored.
Questions settled- What is the nature of responsibility of a Railway Administration in the matter of the carriage of goods under the Railways Act?
- How can a Railway Administration absolve itself from responsibility for the loss of a consignment in transit?
- Whether the High Court or appellate court can disturb concurrent or factual findings supported by ample oral and documentary evidence?
- PAHLOOMAL MOTIRAM vs ABDUL QUDDUS BEHARI AND 8 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 250 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This revision application challenged the trial court's dismissal of an application under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking the rejection of a plaint. The underlying suit alleged that the defendant obtained favorable orders from the Custodian regarding the evacuee status of property through fraud. The applicant contended that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, lacked necessary particulars of fraud, and was barred by Section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, and the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that for the purpose of rejecting a plaint, the allegations therein must be assumed true. Since the plaintiff alleged fraud, which vitiates any order, the plaint disclosed a sufficient cause of action. The Court affirmed that the trial court correctly refused to reject the plaint, emphasizing that the suit should be decided on its merits rather than through piecemeal litigation. The principle established is that a court should only reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 if, even assuming all allegations are true, the plaintiff remains disentitled to relief.
Questions settled- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the plaintiff alleges fraud?
- Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging an order of the Custodian on the grounds of fraud?
- What is the standard for determining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the allegation of fraud override the limitation bar under Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- P. Y. WONG vs DOST MOHAMMED AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 557 · Labour Court · 1970-09-12Read full judgment →
- P. VENKANNA vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MYSORE1971 PTD 1051 · Mysore High Court · 1968-10-17Read full judgment →
- P. S. S. BOMMANNA CHETTIAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 620 · Madras High Court · 1965-01-05Read full judgment →
- P. R. EASWARAN vs SIXTH INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE II, COIMBATORE1971 PTD 902 · Madras High Court · 1968-07-01Read full judgment →
- P. P. KURIAKOSE AND P. P. VARGHESE vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA1971 PTD 298 · Kerala High Court · 1968-08-20Read full judgment →
- P. N. P. THULKARUNAI & Co. vs DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, FINANCE MINISTRY1971 PTD 335 · Madras High Court · 1968-03-25Read full judgment →
- OSMAN GAZI vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS--Opposite-Parties1971 PLD Dacca 64 · Dacca · 1970-03-25Read full judgment →
- ORISSA CEMENT LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI1971 PTD 609 · Delhi High Court · 1968-10-11Read full judgment →
- OMAR FARUQUE vs MESSRS NORTH BENGAL SUGAR MILLS Co. LTD., RAJSHAHI1971 PLC 262 · Labour Court · 1970-10-31Read full judgment →
- N/A vs N/A1971 PLC 92[C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
- N_A vs In re _ ARIF NIZAMI AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 72 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arose from suo motu contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the Editor, Printer, Publisher, and Staff Reporter of a newspaper for publishing a false news item alleging that proceedings were initiated against a Supreme Court Judge. The core legal questions concerned whether such a publication constitutes contempt of court, the extent of liability of newspaper personnel, and the legal effect of an unconditional apology. The Court held that the publication constituted gross contempt by scandalizing a Judge and undermining public confidence in the judiciary. It affirmed that Editors, Printers, and Publishers are strictly liable for all content published under their control, regardless of personal knowledge, and that the author of the report is liable for negligence. The Court established that while an apology is a mitigating factor for sentencing, it does not absolve the contemners of liability or provide an absolute defense. Consequently, the Court convicted the respondents, imposing fines while acknowledging their apologies as a factor for leniency in sentencing.
Questions settled- Does the publication of a false news item suggesting a Judge is facing removal proceedings constitute contempt of court?
- Are the Editor, Printer, and Publisher of a newspaper vicariously liable for contemptuous content published in their newspaper?
- Can an unqualified apology serve as an absolute defense to a charge of contempt of court?
- Is a staff reporter liable for the publication of a false news item even if they claim the inclusion of a specific name was a mistake?
- NUSRAT Alias NUSRI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1227 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-09Read full judgment →
- NURA AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court setting aside the acquittal of the appellants by the trial court and convicting them under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing them to transportation for life for the murder of one Sohney Khan. The core legal question concerns the reliability of ocular testimony, the identification of the accused on a dark night via torchlight, the prompt lodging of the First Information Report, and the corroborative value of a weapon recovery. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appraised the evidence, noting that the testimony of independent witnesses, prompt FIR mentioning the torchlight, and the medical and recovery evidence firmly established the guilt of the appellants, while the trial court's acquittal was based on erroneous assumptions. The key principle laid down is that an acquittal based on minor omissions, such as the failure to produce a torch at the police station or speculative inferences about strained relations between co-accused, is perverse and liable to be reversed when ocular and corroborative evidence is otherwise natural and trustworthy.
Questions settled- Whether an acquittal by a trial court can be set aside by the High Court based on a correct appraisement of ocular and corroborative evidence?
- Does the failure to produce a torch at the police station at the time of lodging the First Information Report render the identification of the accused under torchlight doubtful?
- Can the testimony of independent eyewitnesses be discarded merely because they did not attempt to physically apprehend the armed culprits at the spot?
- Whether a subsequent afterthought statement regarding strained relations between co-accused is sufficient to negate a prior admission of relationship in the committing court?
- NUR MUHAMMAD AND Another vs FALAK SHER AND 3 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had set aside the convictions and sentences of the respondents for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and acquitted them. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular and circumstantial evidence in a case marked by severe pre-existing enmity between the parties and material contradictions in witness testimonies. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was justified, noting that long-standing blood feuds rendered the prosecution's narrative of the deceased willingly accompanying an accused highly improbable, and that physical obstacles such as a compound wall cast grave doubt on the eyewitnesses' ability to view the incident. The key principle laid down is that where appellate scrutiny reveals plausible reasoning, material contradictions in interested witness accounts, and reasonable doubts stemming from physical constraints and pre-existing enmity, an order of acquittal by the High Court will not be interfered with by the apex court.
Questions settled- Whether an order of acquittal passed by the High Court calls for interference when based on plausible reasoning and material contradictions in the evidence?
- How does a long-standing pre-existing enmity between the complainant party and the accused affect the credibility of the prosecution's narrative regarding the initial movement of the deceased?
- Does the existence of a compound wall obstructing the line of sight create a reasonable doubt regarding the testimony of eyewitnesses claiming to have witnessed a murder from a distance?
- NOOR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 371 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-01Read full judgment →
- NOOR MUHAMMAD GAHI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 632 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-21Read full judgment →
- NOOR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 766 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
- NOOR MOHAMMAD vs MESSRS MOONLIGIJT GLASS DECORATOR, DACCA1971 PLC 65 · Labour Court · 1970-07-31Read full judgment →
- NOOR MOHAMMAD AND Another vs Malik CHIRAGH DIN AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These petitions for Special Leave to Appeal arose from a consolidated order of the High Court dismissing criminal revisions and miscellaneous applications regarding proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning a property dispute over godowns. The core legal question was whether the initial order of the Magistrate was without jurisdiction for failing to explicitly state satisfaction regarding an apprehension of a breach of the peace, and whether attachment of the property was justified. The Supreme Court held that the existence of the necessary elements establishing jurisdiction cured any formal defect in the Magistrate's initial order, rendering it a procedural irregularity rather than a jurisdictional illegality. The Court laid down the principle that where elements founding jurisdiction genuinely exist, a Magistrate's failure to strictly comply with form or record grounds of satisfaction does not vitiate the entire proceedings. The petitions were dismissed, noting that the parties' titles should be resolved in pending civil court proceedings.
Questions settled- Does the failure of a Magistrate to explicitly state his satisfaction regarding an apprehension of a breach of the peace in an initial order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure render the entire proceedings without jurisdiction?
- Does a formal defect in the initial order of a Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiate the proceedings where the necessary jurisdictional elements exist?
- What is the effect of pending civil court proceedings on an order passed by a criminal court under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
- NIZAMUDDIN AHMAD vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenges a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which dismissed a constitutional petition filed against the refusal of a sales tax refund. The appellant, an exporter of fresh fish to West Bengal, had paid sales tax based on the duty-paid value determined under the Sea Customs Act. Subsequently, relying on a Central Board of Revenue circular that permitted treating the actual repatriated sale price as the duty-paid value, the appellant sought a refund of excess sales tax. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the application after the circular was superseded. The Supreme Court held that the Central Board of Revenue's administrative directives under the Sales Tax Act cannot alter statutory provisions or be applied retrospectively to change the definition of duty-paid value for past exports, nor can such circulars bind appellate authorities. Furthermore, the Court noted that the constitutional petition ought to have been dismissed for failure to exhaust alternative statutory remedies and for laches. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a directive issued by the Central Board of Revenue under section 5(3) of the Sales Tax Act 1951 alter the statutory definition of duty-paid value?
- Whether a circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue can be given retrospective effect to govern past exports?
- Does a directive of the Central Board of Revenue bind the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in view of the proviso to section 5(3) of the Sales Tax Act 1951?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable when the aggrieved party has failed to exhaust alternative statutory remedies of appeal and revision?
- NISAR AHMAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Haji Gul, alongside a conviction under the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. The prosecution case relied on eyewitness testimony and the recovery of a pistol from the petitioner at the scene. The petitioner denied the allegations, claiming he was falsely implicated following a prior altercation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding discrepancies in the eyewitness accounts and the ballistics report, which indicated the recovered weapon did not match the crime empties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the discrepancies raised were not material to the veracity of the witnesses and that the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts did not suffer from any flagrant disregard of legal rules. The Court reaffirmed the principle that it does not undertake a re-appreciation of evidence unless a clear legal defect is demonstrated.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court undertake a re-appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
- Is the first information report considered substantive evidence in a criminal trial?
- Does a discrepancy in the origin of crime empties necessarily invalidate eyewitness testimony?
- NIRANJAN LAL POTDAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 446 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-02-08Read full judgment →
- NIHAL CHAND KISHORI LAL vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 441 · Allahabad High Court · 1971-11-30Read full judgment →
- NESAR AHMED vs THE MANAGER, RANGPUR SUGAR MILLS, LTD., RANGPUR1971 PLC 260 · Labour Court · 1970-10-31Read full judgment →
- NEKAM GUL AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 32 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-12-09Read full judgment →
- NAZROO AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 758 · Sindh High Court · 1970-11-12Read full judgment →
- NAZIR vs AMIR DIN AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-10-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave was directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan which cancelled the bail granted to the appellant by the Sessions Judge of Lyallpur. The appellant had been accused of burglary and dacoity under the Penal Code. The High Court cancelled the bail on the sole ground that a recovery witness reported receiving threats from the appellant. However, the record showed that the alleged threats relied upon in the revision petition before the High Court were new allegations that occurred after the Sessions Judge's order and had never been presented to the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the High Court has original power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court that granted the bail should first be moved on any new grounds for cancellation. By-passing the subordinate court and raising fresh grounds for the first time in a revision petition is an improper procedure. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's cancellation order.
Questions settled- Can new grounds for cancellation of bail, which were never presented to the subordinate court that granted bail, be raised for the first time in a revision petition before the High Court?
- Should the court that originally granted bail be moved first before seeking cancellation of bail on fresh grounds?
- Does the High Court's original power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify by-passing the subordinate court when new facts arise?
- NAZIR HUSSAIN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-07Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which upheld the conviction of the appellant, a taxi driver, under Section 61 of the Excise Act of 1914, after four seers of charas were recovered from the rear seat of his taxi following the escape of his two passengers. The core legal question was whether a taxi driver's knowledge of contraband carried by passengers can be legally presumed solely from the circumstances of night travel along a lonely road without cogent evidence of guilty knowledge or mens rea. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that criminal conviction requires proof of guilty knowledge or mens rea, and no legal presumption of knowledge can be attached to a taxi driver merely because he transported passengers carrying packages at an odd hour along a less frequented road. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution must establish guilty knowledge through cogent evidence, and convictions cannot rest on conjectures, hypothetical assumptions, or absolute liability without statutory backing.
Questions settled- Whether a taxi driver can be presumed to have knowledge of contraband goods carried by passengers merely because he transported them at night along a less frequented road?
- Is it an essential ingredient of a criminal act that mens rea or guilty knowledge must be established by the prosecution before a conviction can take place?
- Does the mere finding of contraband in the back seat of a taxi suffice to prove possession and guilty knowledge on the part of the driver?
- NAZIR AHMAD AND Others vs IJAZ ALI AND Other1971 SCMR 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a dispute over agricultural land leased by the Evacuee Trust Board. The petitioners, claiming to be actual tillers, faced potential ejectment and initiated proceedings against the respondents. Following a failed writ petition, the respondents initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, leading to the attachment of the land and the appointment of a receiver by the Assistant Commissioner. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction, wherein the civil court also appointed a receiver. The petitioners sought to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 561-A and Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that the civil court's appointment of a receiver rendered the criminal court's appointment redundant. The Supreme Court declined to interfere in its special jurisdiction. The Court held that the appropriate remedy for the petitioners was not to seek quashment of the criminal proceedings, but to approach the Assistant Commissioner under Section 146(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to request the transfer of possession to the receiver appointed by the civil court.
Questions settled- Can a party seek the quashment of Section 145 CrPC proceedings when a civil court has already appointed a receiver for the same property?
- What is the appropriate remedy when a criminal court and a civil court both appoint receivers for the same disputed property?
- Does the appointment of a receiver by a civil court automatically invalidate an existing receiver appointment made by a criminal court under Section 145 CrPC?
- NAZABAT vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 148 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-06Read full judgment →
- Nawab SAADAT HUSSAIN AHD Another vs MUHAMMAD SULAMAN1971 P Cr. L J 87 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-04Read full judgment →
- NAWAB DIN vs SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, BASIC DEMOCRACIES, SOCIAL WELFARE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPART MENT, LAHORE1971 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Lahore dismissing in limine the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging his reversion from the Class II (Senior) Cadre to the Class II (Junior) Cadre of the Local Council Service. The core legal questions relate to whether the withdrawal of a provisional appointment and pay scale constitutes a reduction in rank, whether a writ petition is maintainable under Article 98 of the Constitution, and whether employees of the Local Council hold a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Province under Article 177 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a provisional appointment or provisional allowance of a pay scale pending final absorption creates no vested right, and its withdrawal does not amount to a reduction in rank. Furthermore, the Court held that Local Council employees do not hold a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Province so as to attract constitutional safeguards regarding notice, and no petition under Article 98 lay as there was no breach of terms and conditions relating to remuneration or superannuation.
Questions settled- Does the withdrawal of a provisional order allowing a higher pay scale amount to a reduction in rank?
- Whether an officiating or provisional appointment gives the appointee a vested right to the post?
- Does an employee in the service of a Local Council hold a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Centre or of a Province under Article 177 of the Constitution?
- Whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution lies against the withdrawal of a provisional appointment where no terms and conditions regarding remuneration or superannuation are breached?
- NAWAB AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 56 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-05Read full judgment →
- NAUSHER vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 811 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-04Read full judgment →
- NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI vs THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF KARACHI1971 PLD Karachi 465 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- NATIONAL BANK OF LAHORE LTD. vs CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY AND 5 Other1971 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil appeal arose from a writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the Custodian of Evacuee Property's order declaring the appellant and its property as evacuee. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the appellant had become an enemy alien under the Enemy Property (Custodian and Registration) Order 1965, thereby losing locus standi, and refused to permit the Custodian of Enemy Property to continue the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether the Custodian of Enemy Property has the legal standing to continue a pending writ petition on behalf of an enemy alien. The Court held that under Paragraph 4(2)(iv) of the Enemy Property (Custodian and Registration) Order 1965, the Custodian is expressly empowered to institute, defend, or continue any suit or other legal proceedings, which includes writ petitions. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for disposal on the merits.
Questions settled- Does the Custodian of Enemy Property have the legal authority to continue a writ petition pending on behalf of an entity that has become an enemy alien?
- Whether a writ petition falls within the scope of 'other legal proceedings' which the Custodian of Enemy Property is empowered to continue under the Enemy Property (Custodian and Registration) Order 1965?
- Can a court refuse to allow the Custodian of Enemy Property to continue legal proceedings involving enemy property on the ground that the original petitioner became an enemy alien?
- NASIRUDDIN vs THE STATE AND 5 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 555 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-20Read full judgment →
- NASIR KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 47 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-12Read full judgment →
- NARIMAN M. POSTWALA AND ANOTHER vs LABOUR OFFICER AND INSPECTOR1971 PLD Karachi 632 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This writ petition challenges an order passed by the Labour Officer and Inspector of Factories directing a dissolved firm of Chartered Accountants to pay gratuity, unavailed leave salary, and other dues to its former employees under threat of legal action. The core legal question is whether the Inspector appointed under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, possesses the statutory authority to adjudicate employment disputes and issue binding directives for the payment of dues, or whether such power exclusively vests in the Industrial Court or regular courts. The Sindh High Court held that the Inspector lacks the competence to interpret intricate statutory provisions, weigh evidence, or issue executive orders directing the payment of dues; his role is limited to inspection and initiating prosecutions, while disputes regarding entitlements and grievances must be adjudicated by the Industrial Court. The court established that an administrative Inspector cannot usurp judicial functions or order monetary payments without a formal judicial inquiry and evidence.
Questions settled- Does a Labour Inspector have the statutory power under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, to issue binding directives ordering an employer to pay termination dues and gratuity?
- Whether the determination of complex legal questions regarding the applicability of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, falls within the competence of an administrative inspector or an industrial court?
- Is a firm of Chartered Accountants covered under the definition of a commercial establishment or industrial establishment under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- What is the proper forum for an individual workman seeking redress for grievances relating to non-payment of dues under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- PINDI HAZARA MINING COMPANY vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 21971 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging a tax levied by the District Council, Rawalpindi, on the quarrying and extraction of stone and aggregate. The appellant, a mining company, contended that the local council lacked authority to impose the tax, arguing it was a central subject and that the levy constituted impermissible double taxation. Furthermore, the appellant challenged the legality of the tax, asserting that the enabling legislation, the West Pakistan Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development Act of 1958, had been repealed, leaving the levy without statutory cover. The Supreme Court held that the Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act of 1948, as adopted by President's Order No. 1 of 1964, provided the necessary legal authority for the Provincial Government to empower the District Council to impose such taxes. The Court determined that the repeal of the 1958 Act did not invalidate the tax because the 1948 Act remained in force, providing sufficient statutory backing. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the validity of the tax levy.
Questions settled- Does the repeal of the West Pakistan Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development Act of 1958 invalidate taxes imposed under it if other enabling legislation remains in force?
- Does the Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act of 1948 provide sufficient statutory authority for the Provincial Government to authorize local councils to levy mining taxes?
- Is the imposition of a local tax on mining activities considered double taxation when the lessee is already paying rents and royalties to the government?
- NARENDRA KUMAR DAS--Plaintiff vs MD. BABRU AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Dacca 281 · Dacca · 1970-04-30Read full judgment →
- NARAINDAS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1020 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
- NANI GOPAL KAR CHOWDHURY vs MESSRS SURRIDGE AND BEECHENO1971 P LC 541 · Labour Court · 1970-08-15Read full judgment →
- NAKULESWAR SIKDAR vs BARUN CHANDRA CHAKRAVORTY AND Another1971 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-29Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was challenged on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's erroneous belief that the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave commenced from the date of the signing of the decree constituted sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Court held that the petition was barred by 20 days and dismissed it, finding the explanation for the delay inadequate. The Court clarified that the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal begins to run from the date of the delivery of the judgment, not the date of the signing of the decree. While the time spent obtaining a copy of the decree may be considered for condonation, the petitioner must satisfactorily explain each day of delay. Because the petitioner failed to provide a valid explanation for the period following the receipt of the certified copy, the Court refused to condone the delay.
Questions settled- Does the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal commence from the date of the judgment or the date of the signing of the decree?
- Is a copy of the decree required to be filed along with a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Can the time spent obtaining a copy of the decree be considered for the purpose of condoning delay in filing a petition for special leave?
- NAIK MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs YAR MUHAMMAD-Complainant1971 P Cr. L J 927 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-25Read full judgment →
- NAIB SUBBDAR LAL KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 904 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-09Read full judgment →
- NAEEM FINANCE LTD. AND ANOTHER., DR. MUHAMMAD SHARIF MUTTAQI., Ch.1971 PLD Supreme Court 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This consolidated judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises out of multiple civil appeals directed against a judgment of the West Pakistan High Court passed under section 106 of the Insurance Act 1938, concerning misfeasance, misappropriation, and breach of trust by the Managing Director, directors, and third-party contractors of the Muslim Insurance Company Limited. The core legal questions involved the scope and procedure of section 106 of the Insurance Act 1938, the applicability of the Limitation Act 1908 to summary misfeasance proceedings, the status of company directors as express trustees under section 10 of the Limitation Act 1908, and the extent of liability of delinquent directors and agents. The Supreme Court held that proceedings under section 106 are in the nature of summary misfeasance inquiries governed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of High Court rules, that claims enforced thereunder must be legally recoverable and not time-barred, and that directors are not trustees under section 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 but are governed by Article 90 thereof. The Court modified the High Court's judgment by scaling down the rate of interest to 6% per annum with half-yearly rests, allowing relief regarding time-barred claims, and adjusting individual liabilities.
Questions settled- Whether proceedings under section 106 of the Insurance Act 1938 are subject to the law of limitation?
- Are directors of a company considered trustees for the purpose of section 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Which Article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to suits or applications by a principal against a managing director for neglect or misconduct?
- Whether a time-barred claim can be enforced through summary proceedings under section 106 of the Insurance Act 1938?
- NADER HUSSAIN vs MESSRS EASTERN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 537 · Labour Court · 1970-08-08Read full judgment →
- NABIR HOSSAIN Alias CHOTA ABU AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE-Opposite-1971 P Cr. L J 501 · Dhaka High CourtRead full judgment →
- N. SUNDARESWARAN vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TALC, KERALA1971 PTD 839 · Kerala High Court · 1971-09-09Read full judgment →
- N. BELLA GOWDER vs TAHSILDAR, COONOOR AND ANOTHER1971 PTD 226 · Madras High Court · 1968-02-14Read full judgment →
- MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., KARACHI vs JAM SADIK ALI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 288 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-01Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ MIRZA AND Others vs Haji RASHIDUDDIN AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns three civil petitions for special leave to appeal arising from ejectment proceedings against tenants of the Aulia Building in Karachi. The tenants (petitioners) faced two sets of ejectment applications by the landlords (respondents): one based on property reconstruction and a subsequent one based on non-payment of rent. The Rent Controller allowed both applications, and these orders were upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by a Single Judge of the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the second set of applications (for non-payment of rent) was not maintainable because an earlier ejectment order based on reconstruction was already under appeal. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting it was not raised before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court held that there is no legal bar preventing a landlord from filing a subsequent ejectment application against a tenant based on a different cause of action, even if prior proceedings are pending. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a landlord file a subsequent ejectment application against a tenant based on a different cause of action while prior ejectment proceedings are pending?
- Is a legal contention that was not raised before the High Court permissible to be raised for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 988 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-24Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD Alias MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN AND 8 Others vs Mst. HAKIM BIBI1971 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a review petition filed against the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 23rd of May 1969, which had affirmed the High Court's decision holding that the predecessor-in-title of the respondent held a life estate under a family arrangement that ripened into ownership rights upon acquisition of proprietary rights from the Government. The core legal questions revolved around whether a life estate-holder was qualified to acquire proprietary rights in the disputed land under the Government Tenants (Punjab) Act of 1893, and whether newly urged evidence regarding a revenue record entry made any difference. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the tenant holding the land at the time of the acquisition of proprietary rights was alone entitled to acquire them, and that the petition was entertainable with the presence of the junior counsel complying with the Supreme Court Rules. The key principle laid down is that a life estate-holder who is the recorded tenant at the time of acquiring proprietary rights from the Government is entitled to such acquisition, and that review petitions cannot be used to re-litigate matters already fully considered.
Questions settled- Whether a life estate-holder of land is qualified to acquire proprietary rights in the land under the Government Tenants (Punjab) Act of 1893?
- Does the presence of a junior counsel who assisted at the hearing of the appeal satisfy the requirement of Order XXVI Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules for a review petition?
- Can a review petition be entertained to re-argue points that were fully considered and adjudicated upon during the hearing of the original appeal?
- MURREE BREWERY Co. LTD. vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 317 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-06Read full judgment →
- MUREED KHAN vs MOHAMMAD KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Peshawar 28 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-10Read full judgment →
- MUNSHI MUHAMMAD AND Another IFHAMULLAH KHAN vs FAIZANUL HAQ AND Another FAIZANUL HAQ AND 2 Other M. Arif, Advocate Supreme Court Instructed By Ejaz Ahmad Khan,1971 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-30Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter involves two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by unsuccessful auction-purchasers challenging the dismissal of their writ petitions by the High Court. The core legal question was whether highest bidders in a public auction, whose bids were not finally approved by the competent authority, possess the requisite locus standi to maintain a constitutional petition against the transfer of the subject property to another party. The Supreme Court held that since the auction bids were expressly subject to approval which was ultimately withheld, the petitioners acquired no vested right or interest in the auctioned properties and thus lacked locus standi. The Court affirmed that the discretionary power of the settlement authorities to approve or reject auction bids is not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless shown to be arbitrary or fanciful. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the highest bidder in a public auction acquires any vested right in the property before the final approval of the bid by the competent authority?
- Does an auction-purchaser whose bid has not been approved possess the locus standi to challenge the transfer of the property in writ jurisdiction?
- Under what circumstances is the exercise of discretion by settlement authorities regarding the approval of auction bids amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
- MUNSHI ETC. vs BAGGA ETC.S1971 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-05Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which set aside an order dismissing a constitutional petition and remanded the case to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question involved whether the High Court correctly interfered with the orders of Settlement Authorities where an appeal was decided without addressing the critical issue of limitation and where necessary parties were not properly brought on record. The Supreme Court held that the Letters Patent Bench committed no legal defect in its judgment, affirming that the question of limitation had to be decided and that joint-allottee heirs must be formally made parties and served. The key principle laid down is that appellate authorities must determine questions of limitation and ensure all necessary parties are duly represented before disposing of matters.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate settlement authority is required to decide the question of limitation before dismissing an appeal?
- Can an appeal proceed effectively without formally bringing the legal heirs of a deceased joint-allottee on the record and serving them?
- Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case for rehearing upon finding procedural defects in the proceedings before the Settlement Authorities?
- MUNSHI AND ANOTHER--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 781 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the conviction and death sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged murder of the deceased. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, primarily comprising motive, the 'last seen together' testimony, and alleged recoveries of blood-stained garments and the deceased's belongings. The Lahore High Court examined whether the solitary circumstance of the deceased being last seen alive in the company of the accused, coupled with unreliable recoveries and indications of police fabrication in lodging the First Information Report, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The court held that where evidence shows signs of design and fabrication, and where it is not established that the deceased was killed shortly after being seen with the accused, the solitary circumstance of 'last seen together' without reliable corroborative evidence is insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and death sentences, laying down that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and the onus to explain subsequent events does not shift to the accused unless proximity of time and exclusive proximity are strictly established.
Questions settled- Whether the solitary circumstance of the deceased being last seen alive in the company of the accused is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of corroborative evidence?
- Under what circumstances does the onus of explaining the disappearance or death of the deceased shift onto the accused under Pakistani criminal jurisprudence?
- Does the discovery of a body after a significant lapse of time from when the deceased was last seen with the accused obligate the accused to account for the intervening period?
- How should courts evaluate a prosecution case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence when there are clear indications of design and fabrication in the investigative record?
- MUNICIPALCOMMITTEE, NANKANA SAHIB THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN vs ABDUL1971 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-16Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that set aside a prohibitory order issued by the S.D.M. Nankana Sahib under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, the Municipal Committee, had sought to prohibit the respondents from operating a private market for the wholesale sale of fruits and vegetables, claiming it was unauthorized. The core legal question was whether the S.D.M. was justified in invoking Section 144, Cr. P. C. to prevent the respondents' business activities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that previous disputes between the parties had been resolved through a compromise and discharge order, thereby eliminating any genuine apprehension of a disturbance of public tranquility or affray. The Court held that Section 144 cannot be used to protect the commercial interests of a municipal market against private competitors. The key principle established is that the extraordinary powers under Section 144, Cr. P. C. are reserved for preventing public disorder and cannot be utilized as a tool for regulatory enforcement or protecting municipal commercial interests.
Questions settled- Can Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to protect the commercial interests of a municipal market?
- Is an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justified when there is no apprehension of a disturbance of public tranquility?
- Does the quashing of an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude a municipal committee from prosecuting a party for operating an unauthorized market under other applicable laws?
- MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, JHELUM vs Maulvi MUHAMMAD SHAFI1971 SCMR 740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the petitioner, Municipal Committee, Jhelum, from constructing on a disputed plot of land. The trial court's temporary injunction was vacated by the District Judge, but the respondent subsequently obtained an interim status quo order from the High Court. The petitioner challenged this interim order, arguing that the respondent's second application for a temporary injunction was barred by res judicata and limitation after the dismissal of his first application for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the dismissal of an interim application for non-prosecution does not trigger res judicata. Applying Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court ruled that the procedure for suits applies to miscellaneous applications, allowing the filing of a fresh application under Order IX, Rules 3 and 4. The Court declined to interfere with the interim order but directed the High Court to decide the main revision petition within one month.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a temporary injunction application for non-prosecution bar the filing of a subsequent application on the principle of res judicata?
- Which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 govern the restoration or refiling of a miscellaneous application dismissed for default in a revision proceeding?
- Is a second application for temporary injunction competent after the first has been dismissed for failure to deposit process fees?
- MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, AGRICULTURE MACHINERY1971 PLD Karachi 733 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUNAWAR HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 14 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-28Read full judgment →