Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUMTAZ AHMAD vs MANSUR HASAN KHAN, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT1971 PLD Lahore 530 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-29Read full judgment →
• Mulla SAYED ALI vs Mulla ASMI1971 PLD Quetta 113 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-06-14Read full judgment →
• Mulla ABDULLABHAI AND 9 OTHERS vs SARIA ROPE MILLS LTD.1971 PLD Karachi 597 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-01
  winding up of companyCompanies Act 1913insolvencydebt recoverybona fide disputeabuse of processshareholder dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns four applications for the winding up of a private limited company, Saria Rope Mills Ltd., filed under Section 162 of the Companies Act, 1913. The petitioners, comprising a group of shareholders and alleged creditors, sought liquidation based on claims of fraud regarding share allotments, breach of an alleged oral agreement for board representation, and outstanding debts. The core legal question was whether winding-up proceedings could be utilized to enforce disputed oral agreements or as a substitute for civil litigation to recover debts. The Court held that winding-up proceedings are not intended to be exploited as a normal alternative to the ordinary mode of debt realization or to settle internal corporate disputes. The Court emphasized that where a debt is subject to a bona fide dispute, or where the petition is motivated by collateral purposes rather than the company's insolvency, a winding-up order is inappropriate. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, establishing the principle that winding-up is a remedy for insolvency, not a mechanism for debt recovery or dispute resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Can winding-up proceedings be used as a substitute for a civil suit to recover a debt?
  • Is a winding-up petition maintainable when there is a bona fide dispute regarding the company's liability for a debt?
  • Does an alleged breach of an oral agreement between shareholders constitute valid grounds for a winding-up order under the Companies Act 1913?
  • Must a petitioner in a winding-up proceeding prove the company's insolvency rather than merely its unwillingness to pay?
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• MUKHTAR ALI vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-28
  stolen propertyguilty knowledgepresumption of possessionEvidence Actcriminal appealdishonest retentionburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for dishonestly receiving and retaining a stolen bicycle. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s possession of the bicycle, discovered two years after the theft, warranted a conviction and whether the presumption of guilty knowledge under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872 was applicable. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding that possession of stolen property is not an offence unless accompanied by proof of guilty knowledge or reason to believe the property was stolen. The Court established that the presumption of 'recent possession' under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872 does not apply when there is a significant time lapse between the theft and the discovery of possession. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an accused cannot be convicted merely because their explanation is disbelieved; the prosecution must first establish a prima facie case of guilty knowledge. Mere possession without evidence of dishonest intent is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 411.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of stolen property constitute an offence in the absence of guilty knowledge?
  • Can the presumption under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872 be applied when there is a significant time lapse between the theft and the discovery of possession?
  • Is an accused liable to be convicted solely because the court disbelieves their explanation regarding the acquisition of property?
  • What constitutes 'recent possession' of stolen property for the purpose of invoking the presumption under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872?
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• MUKHTAR AHMAD AND 37 OTHERS vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN1971 PLD Supreme Court 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-29
  recruitment rulesspecial recruitment schemestatutory force of Governor's orderenforceability of government offerwrit jurisdictionpublic service commissioncontractual obligation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants, selected for training and subsequent appointment as Assistant Agricultural Engineers under a special scheme approved by the Governor, challenged the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition. The core question was whether the appellants, having completed the prescribed training, were required to undergo a fresh selection process by the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that the Governor's order approving the special scheme had the force of statutory rules, effectively modifying the existing recruitment rules for these specific posts. Consequently, the government’s offer of appointment, accepted by the appellants, constituted a binding and enforceable agreement. The Court ruled that the appellants, having fulfilled the conditions of their training, were entitled to appointment without appearing again before the Public Service Commission. The key principle laid down is that a Governor's order authorizing a specific recruitment method operates with statutory force, and government undertakings made pursuant to such authority are legally binding and cannot be unilaterally altered to the prejudice of candidates who have acted upon them.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Governor's order approving a special recruitment scheme possess the force of statutory rules?
  • Can a government department unilaterally impose a requirement for fresh selection by the Public Service Commission after a candidate has already been selected and completed training under a specific scheme?
  • Is an offer of employment made by the government, which is accepted by candidates who then fulfill the conditions, an enforceable agreement?
  • Can a condition in an employment offer reserving the right not to provide a job be read in isolation to negate the primary offer of appointment?
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• MUHIB GUL vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 50 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD. SHAFI vs THE DISTRICT MANAGED, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1971 PLC130 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-06-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YUSUF vs MUHAMMAD AKHTAR AND 3 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 794 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 520 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YASIN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 653 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAR vs THE STATE AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-01
  murderacquittalspecial leave to appealeye-witness reliabilitymedical evidencechance witnessesextra-judicial confession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a murder case where the High Court acquitted the respondents of charges under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a proper appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of eye-witnesses, the consistency of medical reports, and the validity of alleged recoveries and extra-judicial confessions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s judgment was well-reasoned and free from legal infirmity. The High Court correctly identified that the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses with enmity toward the accused, their testimony was discrepant, and the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's version regarding the nature of the deceased's injuries. Furthermore, the alleged motive was found implausible, and the evidence regarding recoveries and confessions was unreliable. The Court affirmed that where an acquittal is based on a sound, reasoned appreciation of evidence, it will not be interfered with. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is an acquittal by the High Court liable to be set aside if it is based on a sound and reasoned appreciation of the evidence?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's version of the occurrence?
  • Does the testimony of chance witnesses who are also inimical to the accused require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
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• MUHAMMAD YAR KHAN AND 6 Others vs I. U. KHAN, MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-03
  consolidation of holdingsland allotmentevacuee propertyBoard of Revenueconsolidation schemestatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from consolidation proceedings under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. The appellants were allotted land confirmed by the Additional Commissioner, but the Member, Board of Revenue, subsequently set aside this order, favoring the respondent, a displaced person whose allotment had been restored. The core legal question was whether the Member, Board of Revenue, possessed the authority to exclude specific plots from consolidation proceedings relating to an entire estate or sub-division. The Supreme Court held that the definition of "consolidation of holdings" does not mandate the consolidation of an entire estate or sub-division. Interpreting the relevant statutory provisions, the Court determined that the Consolidation Officer and the Collector have the discretion to exclude land from consolidation schemes for specific reasons, such as common purposes or other special circumstances. Consequently, the Court affirmed the order of the Board of Revenue, ruling that the Collector maintains absolute discretion to confirm a consolidation scheme with or without modifications, provided it aligns with the framework of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'consolidation of holdings' require the consolidation of an entire estate or sub-division?
  • Do the Consolidation Officer and Collector have the authority to exclude specific land from a consolidation scheme?
  • Is the Collector empowered to confirm a consolidation scheme with modifications?
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• MUHAMMAD YAR AND 5 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-08
  criminal appealmurderdeath sentencetransfer of statementcommitting magistratecorroborationblood-stained clotheshostile witnesses
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellants' appeal and confirmed their death sentences for rioting and committing five murders under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the admissibility and use of previous statements of prosecution witnesses made before the committing Magistrate brought onto the Sessions record under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically regarding whether such statements require confrontation under Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872 when witnesses make concessions in favor of the accused during trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where witnesses support the prosecution in examination-in-chief but resile later or make concessions, their previous statements before the committing Magistrate can be brought on record under Section 288, Cr.P.C. as substantive evidence without needing to confront them under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, provided there is independent corroboration. The key principle laid down is that previous statements properly transferred under Section 288, Cr.P.C. can be used to base a conviction when corroborated by reliable independent evidence such as blood-stained garments.

  Questions settled

  • Can previous statements of witnesses made before the committing Magistrate be brought on the record under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without complying with Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Whether a conviction can be based on statements transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when corroborated by independent evidence such as blood-stained recoveries?
  • Is confrontation under Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872 necessary when a witness supports the prosecution in examination-in-chief but makes concessions or resiles in the later part of the statement?
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• MUHAMMAD YAR AND 2 OTHERS vs CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, WEST1971 PLD Lahore 879 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs The STATE1971 SCMR 756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-18
  murderextra-judicial confessionalteration of convictionscreening of offendercircumstantial evidencerecoveriescommon intention
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of death under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mehraj Din. The core legal questions involve the reliability of extra-judicial confessions, the admissibility of contradicted motive evidence, and the legal permissibility of altering a conviction to section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 under sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a specific initial charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the circumstantial evidence and alleged extra-judicial confessions were insufficient or unreliable to sustain a conviction for murder, but that the recovery of blood-stained items and the disposal of the dead body sufficiently established an offense of causing disappearance of evidence. The Court laid down the principle that where substantive murder evidence collapses, recoveries of incriminating material can only corroborate primary proof, and where the primary murder charge fails, an accused may still be legally convicted of screening the offender under section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 pursuant to sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an extra-judicial confession made to interested witnesses and close relatives can form the sole basis of a murder conviction without natural corroboration?
  • Can recoveries of blood-stained items and the concealment of a dead body independently sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of substantive ocular or confessional evidence?
  • Is it legally permissible to alter a conviction from murder under section 302 to causing disappearance of evidence under section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code without a specific initial charge, in view of sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• MUHAMMAD YAQUB AND 13 OTHERS vs THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, LYALLPUR1971 PLD Lahore 664 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WARYAM vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 199 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMAR KHAN vs YOUSUF ARAB AND 7 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 642 · Sindh High Court · 1970-11-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL (REPRESENTED BY 4 HEIRS) vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 257 · Lahore High Court · 1967-07-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULTAN GHANI vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, THROUGH SECRETARY,1971P L C 163 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULAIMAN vs AZIZUDDIN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 1310 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE Alias ASHRAF Alias ACHHI AND 3 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-08
  interested witnesscorroborationappreciation of evidencecriminal convictionsolitary witnessmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal petition challenged the conviction and three-year sentence of the petitioner under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a criminal conviction could be legally sustained based solely on the testimony of a solitary interested witness. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there is no inflexible rule of law requiring corroboration for the testimony of an interested witness. The Court clarified that while the testimony of an interested witness must be scrutinized, it does not require the same level of corroboration as that of an accomplice. Corroboration may be derived from any circumstances of the case that satisfy the Court of the witness's veracity, specifically regarding whether innocent persons were falsely implicated. The Court emphasized that the sufficiency of corroboration depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In this matter, the witness's testimony was found credible and sufficiently supported by medical evidence regarding the injuries sustained and other corroborating circumstances, warranting no interference with the lower court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be based solely on the testimony of a solitary interested witness?
  • Does the testimony of an interested witness require the same degree of corroboration as that of an accomplice?
  • What constitutes sufficient corroboration for the testimony of an interested witness?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs Mst. GHAFURAN BIBI1971 PLD Supreme Court 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-11
  dissolution of marriageKhulapleadingsjudicial proceduresecond appealright of rebuttalfamily law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court judgment in a second appeal concerning a suit for dissolution of marriage. The trial court initially decreed the suit for dissolution based on cruelty and non-maintenance, but the first appellate court reversed this decision. In the second appeal, the High Court, despite the absence of a specific plea for Khula in the plaint, granted a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula. The core legal question was whether a court could suo motu grant a decree for Khula without the issue being pleaded or the defendant having an opportunity to contest it. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s procedure was improper. While courts possess the power to grant Khula, this right is not absolute and requires judicial satisfaction that the spouses cannot live within the limits of Allah. The Court established the principle that fundamental judicial procedure requires that a defendant be given an opportunity to rebut any case made against them; therefore, a court cannot grant relief on an unpleaded cause of action without allowing for the amendment of pleadings and the presentation of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula when such relief was not pleaded in the plaint?
  • Is the right of a wife to obtain a divorce by way of Khula an absolute right?
  • Does the granting of a decree on an unpleaded cause of action violate the fundamental principles of judicial procedure?
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• MUHAMMAD SHER vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 590 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 708 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-05
  murder referencedeath sentence commutationSection 429 CrPCocular testimonyappreciation of evidencereferee judgecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a murder conviction and a reference for confirmation of the death sentence under Section 374, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Following a split opinion between two judges regarding the appellant's guilt and the appropriate sentence, the case was referred to a third judge under Section 429, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of ocular testimony and the appropriateness of the death penalty given the evidentiary discrepancies and the lack of a clearly established motive. The referee judge held that despite the exclusion of unreliable witnesses, the consistent testimony of independent, natural eye-witnesses was sufficient to maintain the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. However, noting the absence of a proven immediate motive and the split opinion on sentencing, the court commuted the death sentence to transportation for life. The judgment established that a referee judge under Section 429 possesses the authority to independently assess the entire case, including the appropriateness of the sentence, without being bound by the sentencing views of the preceding judges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a referee judge under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have the authority to independently determine the sentence in a case of split opinion?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of independent eye-witnesses even if other prosecution witnesses are found to be unreliable?
  • Is a death sentence appropriate when the immediate motive for the crime remains unproven or speculative?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SUPERINTENDENT, NEW CENTRAL JAIL, MULTAN1971 P Cr. L J 12 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-18
  bail cancellationjudicial observationsvicarious liabilityunlawful assemblyleave to appealprejudice to prosecution
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order refusing to cancel bail granted to an accused charged with murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's generalized observations regarding the tendency of complainants in the Punjab region to falsely implicate family members of the accused. The Supreme Court held that such sweeping, generalized statements are inappropriate as they may prejudice the prosecution and mislead subordinate courts. The Court emphasized that it is the duty of the judiciary to determine the veracity of allegations based on the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case rather than relying on broad assumptions. While the Court disapproved of the High Court's remarks, it declined to grant leave to appeal due to the petitioner's delay in challenging the initial bail order. The principle laid down is that judicial observations regarding the credibility of complainants must be case-specific and avoid generalizations that could lead to a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for a court to make generalized observations about the tendency of complainants to falsely implicate family members of an accused?
  • Can a court's generalized observations regarding the credibility of complainants be treated as a yardstick for future cases?
  • Does the failure to challenge an initial bail order promptly affect the maintainability of a subsequent petition for leave to appeal against the refusal to cancel that bail?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs JALALUDDIN1971 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-25
  execution of decreetime-barred claimconciliation courtnullity of decreeexecuting court jurisdictionlimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which directed the execution of decrees passed by a Conciliation Court despite the underlying claims being time-barred. The respondent had obtained decrees from a Conciliation Court constituted under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961. The petitioner challenged the execution of these decrees in subordinate courts, arguing that the claims were time-barred, rendering the decrees nullities. While the subordinate courts agreed with the petitioner, the High Court reversed this, holding that the executing court could not decline execution on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court examined whether a decree passed on a time-barred claim constitutes a nullity that an executing court may refuse to enforce. The Court held that a decree based on a time-barred claim is not a nullity in the eye of the law. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that an executing court cannot go behind a decree to refuse execution simply because the underlying claim was time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is a decree passed by a Conciliation Court on a time-barred claim considered a nullity?
  • Can an executing court refuse to execute a decree on the ground that the underlying claim was time-barred?
  • Does an executing court have the authority to go behind a decree to determine if the claim was time-barred?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, PUNJAB, LAHORE1971 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-29
  waqf propertyalternative remedywrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictionnotification
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged a notification issued by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961, assuming control of certain land as waqf property. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to entertain the writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962-Constitution in the presence of an alternative statutory remedy. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in dismissing the writ petition because the petitioner had an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy under Section 7 of the said Ordinance to seek a declaration before the District Judge. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 will not ordinarily be exercised when an adequate alternative statutory remedy is available to resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the nature of property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962-Constitution is maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy is provided under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961?
  • Can a person aggrieved by a notification under Section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 approach the District Judge for a declaration regarding the nature of the property?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF SHAFQAT vs DIRECTOR, LABOUR WELFARE, GOVERNMENT1971 PLC 134 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF BUTT vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 4 OTHERS.1971 PLC 29 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND ANOTHER vs TAT DIN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 693 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 57 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND 2 Others vs MUHAMMAD SAFED UZ ZAMAN AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-05
  suo motu revisionretrospective legislationvalidation clausedisplaced persons claimslimitation periodconstitutional interpretationvested rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the validity of a Claims Commissioner’s order exercising suo motu revisional powers to reduce claims after the expiry of the prescribed 90-day limitation period. Initially, the appellants challenged the order on the basis that the Commissioner failed to record a finding that circumstances justified acting beyond the limitation period, as required by previous Supreme Court precedents. However, during the proceedings, the law was amended by Ordinance No. XIII of 1964, which substituted the limitation period with a fixed date and included a validation clause for past actions. The appellants contended that such retrospective legislation violated Article 2 of the Constitution of 1962. The Court held that Article 2 does not prohibit the legislature from enacting retrospective laws. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the validating clause in the Ordinance compelled the judiciary to treat the Commissioner's order as valid under the amended law, regardless of whether the Commissioner explicitly stated his reasons for exercising jurisdiction at the time. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that the Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction under the amended statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 2 of the Constitution of 1962 prohibit the legislature from enacting laws with retrospective effect?
  • Can a validating clause in an Ordinance compel courts to treat past administrative orders as valid under amended law?
  • Does the amendment to section 7 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956 by Ordinance No. XIII of 1964 validate suo motu revisions made after the previously prescribed limitation period?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 688 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-18
  death sentencemitigating circumstanceselder influenceeyewitness evidencerelated witnesssystemic delayforensic evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the decision of the High Court of West Pakistan confirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for murder. The primary legal questions raised were whether the testimony of eyewitnesses related to the deceased could sustain conviction, and whether the appellant was entitled to a lesser sentence on the grounds of acting under the influence of his older uncle or due to systemic judicial delay in disposing of the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that mere relationship to the deceased is insufficient to reject eyewitness testimony where it is consistent, detailed, and corroborated by independent witness statements and forensic ballistic evidence. The Court further held that a 26-year-old adult acting with a premeditated design cannot claim to have acted under elder influence to mitigate sentence. Finally, the Court ruled that systemic backlog and procedural delay do not constitute valid legal grounds for reducing a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be rejected solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
  • Can an adult offender aged 26 years claim mitigation of the death sentence on the ground of acting under the influence or instigation of an elder relative?
  • Does judicial delay resulting from systemic backlog constitute a valid ground for mitigating the death sentence for murder?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD BAKHSH AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 148 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-08
  res judicataconstitutional jurisdictioncivil court jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesexcess allotmentwrit petition dismissalLetters Patent Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal addressed whether the general principles of res judicata apply to bar a subsequent civil suit challenging administrative orders of settlement authorities after a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution challenging the same orders had been dismissed by the High Court. The appellants' land allotments were cancelled by settlement authorities as excess, and their writ petitions and subsequent intra-court appeals were dismissed. They then instituted civil suits resulting in conflicting judgments regarding the civil court's jurisdiction and the finality of the High Court's findings. The Lahore High Court held that where a constitutional petition is decided on the merits—even if dismissed in limine—and the High Court consciously upholds the validity of the impugned orders, that determination is final and binding on subordinate courts. Consequently, parties cannot re-agitate the matter in ordinary civil courts or raise pleas that were available to them in the constitutional proceedings but omitted. The appeals were accordingly dismissed, affirming that subordinate courts cannot reach a contrary conclusion on issues conclusively decided by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution on merits operates as res judicata to bar a subsequent civil suit on the same cause of action?
  • Does section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act bar the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts to question orders passed by settlement authorities within their statutory powers?
  • Can a party re-agitate a matter in a civil court by raising pleas that were available to them but not taken during earlier constitutional proceedings before the High Court?
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• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs Raja MUHAMMAD IQBAL1971 P Cr. L J 1066 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR AND Another vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF1971 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-03
  redemption of mortgageregistered sale deedbona fide purchasernecessary partyspecial leave to appealproperty dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which affirmed a decree for the redemption of a mortgaged shop. The dispute arose when the respondent, having purchased the shop from the original owner, sought to redeem a mortgage held by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The petitioners contested the redemption, claiming the predecessor had subsequently purchased the property. The trial court and appellate court rejected this claim, finding the respondent's purchase to be a valid, registered transaction and the petitioners' evidence of a prior purchase (an Amanatnama) to be legally ineffective, as it was executed by a third party in favor of another individual. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the document relied upon by the petitioners did not convey any interest in the property. Furthermore, the Court dismissed arguments regarding the non-joinder of necessary parties and the failure to frame a formal issue on bona fide purchase, ruling that the evidence on record sufficiently negated the petitioners' claim of ownership. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Amanatnama executed by a third party in favor of a person other than the mortgagee constitute a valid transfer of property interest?
  • Is a person who holds no interest in the disputed property a necessary party to a suit for redemption of mortgage?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit for lack of a formal issue regarding bona fide purchase if the evidence on record already disproves the underlying claim of ownership?
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• MUHAMMAD SALEEM--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 799 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAEED vs MUHAMMAD ANWAR AND Another1971 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-29
  dispute over possessioncriminal proceduresection 145 CrPCbreach of peaceremand of casespecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal stemming from a dispute over the possession of a flour mill, which triggered various civil and criminal proceedings including an action under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal question concerned the propriety of a Magistrate's order sealing a room in the disputed property during proceedings initiated by the respondent, where the petitioner had not sought relief under Section 145 and had denied any apprehension of a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case to the trial Magistrate for proper adjudication after recording evidence. The Court held that partial or unjustified interim measures such as sealing property without proper foundation under Section 145 are erroneous, and directed that observations made by the High Court shall not prejudice the rights of the parties in pending civil or criminal litigations. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate can order the sealing of a disputed property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without proper findings on an apprehension of a breach of the peace?
  • Is an order remanding a case to the trial Magistrate for fresh decision after recording evidence liable to interference by the Supreme Court when no legal invalidity is found?
  • Do observations made by a superior court in an interim revision petition prejudice the independent rights of parties in parallel civil and criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAEED MINHAS vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY1971 PLC 226 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-22
  counter-casescross-casesstay of judgmentsimultaneous trialinherent powersprocedure in criminal casesSessions trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, challenged an order of the High Court staying the pronouncement of judgment by the Sessions Court in a murder challan case until the conclusion of a pending cross-complaint case arising out of the same occurrence. The core legal question was whether cross-cases or counter-cases arising from the same incident must invariably be tried together and resolved simultaneously by the same court, and whether a Sessions Court judgment must be stayed until the conclusion of a counter-complaint case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's stay order. The Court held that while simultaneous trials of counter-cases by the same court are generally preferable to avoid conflicting findings, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not prescribe an absolute or mandatory rule. The procedure must yield to the specific facts and circumstances of each case to prevent delay and miscarriage of justice. Where the challan case trial was completed without objection and the counter-case was pending before a Magistrate competent to decide it, staying the Sessions judgment was unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a mandatory rule of law that counter-cases arising out of the same occurrence must always be tried side by side by the same court?
  • Can a Sessions Court be directed to stay the delivery of its judgment in a concluded trial pending the outcome of a counter-complaint case before a Magistrate?
  • Should a criminal case triable by a Section 30 Magistrate be committed to the Sessions Court solely to avoid a potential conflict of decisions with a cross-case?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ AND 6 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 1008 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH COMMISSIONER1971 PLC 173 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1150 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN vs Mst. KHALIDA PERVEEN1971 PLD Lahore 813 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-21
  family courtdissolution of marriagesecond appealjurisdictionCode of Civil Proceduremisdescription of courtconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This regular second appeal arose from a suit for dissolution of marriage filed by Mst. Khalida Perveen against her husband Muhammad Ramzan, which was initially dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, but decreed on appeal by the Additional District Judge. The appellant contended in the High Court that upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 in Sheikhupura, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter as an ordinary civil suit and that the second appeal was competent under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The core legal questions involved whether the courts below possessed jurisdiction as Family Courts, whether the provisions of the Family Courts Act applied to pending proceedings, and whether a second appeal was maintainable under section 100, C.P.C. The Lahore High Court held that civil judges in the district automatically became Family Court judges upon the enforcement of the Act, rendering the trial court's proceedings valid notwithstanding its misdescription as a civil court. The Court ruled that section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 expressly excludes the application of the Code of Civil Procedure, making a second appeal under section 100, C.P.C. incompetent. The appropriate remedy to challenge such proceedings lay under Article 98 of the Constitution rather than a second appeal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil judge ceases to have jurisdiction or whether proceedings become invalid when a suit is tried under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 but the judge signs the judgment using the designation of a Senior Civil Judge rather than a Judge Family Court?
  • Does a second appeal lie to the High Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an appellate decision rendered under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before a Family Court established under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ vs The STATE1971 SCMR 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  special leave to appealgrievous hurtruptured spleenquantum of sentencemedical evidencedying declaration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a 16/17-year-old boy, sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court altering his conviction from section 304 Part II to section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing him to four years' rigorous imprisonment for causing the death of the deceased by striking him with a brick. The core legal question was whether the offence fell under section 323 or section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence conclusively proved that the blows were struck with sufficient force to fracture the tenth rib and rupture the spleen, an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, thereby justifying the conviction under section 325. Furthermore, the Court held that the sentence of four years was neither illegal nor excessive given the maximum penalty, and the Court does not normally interfere with a legal sentence. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether causing a rib fracture and a ruptured spleen by striking with a brick constitutes an offence under section 323 or section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence of imprisonment passed by a lower court?
  • Whether a conviction under section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code is justified when medical evidence shows injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ vs MUHAMMAD GHAFOOR1971 PLD Lahore 343 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ MALIK vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1971 PLC 341 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-01-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ--Convict vs The STATE1971 PLD Lahore 703 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs ABDUL KHALIQ AND Other1971 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  acquittalappraisal of evidenceinterested witnessescorroborationfirst information reportplace of occurrencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, a complainant, challenged an order of the High Court refusing to set aside the acquittal of the respondents on charges including murder under the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondents attacked the deceased and injured several prosecution witnesses over a motive stemming from previous evidence given by the deceased. The defense contended that they were falsely implicated due to enmity and presented an alternative version supported by injuries on the accused persons. The Supreme Court observed several infirmities in the prosecution case, including interested ocular witnesses lacking reliable corroboration, unexplained injuries on the accused, omissions in the First Information Report regarding a dying statement and injuries, significant discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence, shifting motives, and delay in lodging the FIR. Holding that the matter boiled down to the appraisal of evidence and finding no fault with the High Court's appreciation of the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with an order of acquittal based on the appraisal of evidence when the High Court's appreciation of evidence suffers from no legal flaw?
  • Does the failure to mention injuries sustained by the accused in the First Information Report affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • What is the effect of material discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence between the First Information Report and the evidence led at trial?
  • Whether the testimony of related and interested witnesses requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND OTHERS vs EISU KHAN AND OTHERS1971 PLD (Rev.) Punjab 11 · Board of Revenue · 1969-10-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 9 Others vs THE MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 6 Other1971 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-06
  redemption of mortgagewrit jurisdictionlimitation periodacknowledgment of debtmutation entrydisputed questions of factcivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the redemption of mortgaged land, involving complex historical transactions dating back to the late 19th century. The core legal question was whether the application for redemption was time-barred and whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise writ jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition, as the case involved intricate factual disputes regarding the identity of the land and the existence of a subsisting mortgage, which were unsuitable for resolution in writ proceedings. The Court affirmed that an unequivocal acknowledgment of a mortgage in a mutation entry constitutes a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court observed that while the Redemption of Mortgaged Lands Act provides a specific appellate procedure, a civil suit remains a potential remedy if the underlying mortgage is found not to be subsisting, thereby rendering the revenue proceedings without jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the parties to pursue appropriate civil remedies if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acknowledgment of a mortgage in a mutation entry provide a fresh period of limitation under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is a writ petition the appropriate forum for resolving complex factual disputes regarding the identity of mortgaged land?
  • Can a civil suit be maintained if the proceedings under the West Pakistan Redemption of Mortgaged Lands Act 1964 are alleged to be without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Alias NAWAZA AND Another vs Mst. SAKINA AND Another1971 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-24
  bail cancellationsubsequent bailjudicial proprietytrial magistrate powercriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court cancelling the bail granted to the petitioners by the trial Magistrate. The petitioners were facing trial under section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly cutting the nose and pig-tail of the complainant, Mst. Sakina. The trial Magistrate initially granted bail, which the High Court set aside. Subsequently, after recording some evidence and proceeding on the assumption that the complainant was deliberately avoiding appearance, the trial Magistrate granted bail a second time. The High Court cancelled this second bail order, noting the erroneous assumption regarding the complainant's absence—who was actually hospitalized at the time—and citing judicial propriety. The core legal question concerned the power of the trial Magistrate to regrant bail after a previous cancellation by the High Court and the propriety of such an order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while a Magistrate's statutory power to grant bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not inherently extinguished by a prior cancellation, judicial propriety requires lower courts to refer bail matters back to the High Court under such circumstances unless material circumstances have genuinely changed. The Court also issued directions ensuring the complainant's safe escort by the police to court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial Magistrate has the power to grant bail after the High Court has previously set aside a bail order?
  • Does judicial propriety require a trial Magistrate to refer a bail application to the High Court when bail has been previously cancelled by the superior court?
  • What constitutes a valid ground for the cancellation of bail by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN vs THE STATEs1971 P Cr. L J 1028 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUNIR BUTT vs THE BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE1971 PLC 129 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-03-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MANZOOR KHAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-10
  settlement propertydemarcationlimitation periodcondonation of delaycopying agency noticeremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the appellant's writ petition regarding the transfer of a plot of land. The appellant claimed the plot as part of a property previously transferred to him under settlement laws, while respondent No. 2 also claimed it. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal was within time based on the computation of limitation for obtaining copies of judgments, and whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's order was passed on correct assumptions of fact and proper records. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was within time after accounting for the copying department's notice date and condoning delay, and found that the Settlement Commissioner's order was indeed based on incorrect factual assumptions regarding an alleged transfer order in favor of respondent No. 2. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner to re-examine the facts and decide the dispute. The key principle laid down is that administrative orders passed on fundamentally mistaken assumptions of fact without supporting record cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • How is the limitation period for filing an appeal calculated with reference to the date of notice from the copying department?
  • Whether an order passed by a Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner based on incorrect assumptions of fact and without proper record is sustainable?
  • Can a plot be transferred under the guise of demarcation proceedings if it is found to be an independent property?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 530 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 413 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationjudicial proprietymurdercommitment proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan granting bail to respondents charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, notwithstanding the prior refusal of bail by another judge of the same court on similar grounds. The core legal question concerns the propriety and legality of a High Court judge reviewing or granting a subsequent bail application after another judge of coordinate jurisdiction has refused it, absent fresh grounds. The Supreme Court held that a criminal judgment or order is not open to review under the Code, and while fresh bail applications are permissible upon the emergence of new grounds, judicial propriety and institutional harmony require that such subsequent applications be placed before the same judge who dealt with the matter earlier. The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order, allowing the respondents to remain on bail solely until the conclusion of commitment proceedings, upon which their bail would stand cancelled if committed for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is a criminal judgment or order open to review under the Code?
  • Can a judge of the High Court grant bail to an accused person after another judge of the same Court has earlier refused bail on similar grounds?
  • What is the required procedure when a fresh bail application is filed after bail has been previously refused by another judge?
  • What is the effect on bail if an accused is committed to stand trial for an offense punishable with death or transportation for life under the modified order?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 53 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1971-04-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAVED AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 665 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAHANGIR vs THE COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR DIVISION,1971 PLC 233 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs The STATE1971 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  sentence enhancementdacoityminimum sentencecriminal revisionsubstantive offenceillegal confinement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal and enhancing his sentence from three years' to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under sections 395 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, along with three constables, had been convicted of offences relating to wrongful confinement and dacoity after unlawfully entering a house, seizing cattle, and demanding a bribe. The core legal questions were whether the High Court had jurisdiction to enhance the sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code without an appeal from acquittal, and whether section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code constitutes a separate substantive offence requiring a formal appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court validly exercised its revisionary powers under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to enhance the sentence, and further held that section 397 does not create a distinct substantive offence but merely prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated forms of dacoity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to enhance a sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the absence of an appeal from acquittal?
  • Does section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code constitute a separate substantive offence or merely prescribe a minimum punishment for dacoity?
  • Can a failure by the trial court to apply the minimum sentence under section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code be treated as an order of acquittal requiring an appeal under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs MUHAMMAD SADDIQ AND 7 Other1971 SCMR 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-04
  canal water rightswarabandiaudi alteram partemtemporary injunctionadministrative lawnatural justicerevisional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allocation of canal water for agricultural purposes. The petitioner obtained sanction from the Superintending Engineer for additional water supply, leading to a re-fixing of the warabandi. Respondents challenged this order through a declaratory suit and sought a temporary injunction. The trial court granted the injunction, which was initially set aside by the District Judge but restored by the High Court. The High Court reasoned that the Superintending Engineer failed to provide notice to the respondents, violating the principle of audi alteram partem, and noted that the specific provision relied upon by the petitioner was inapplicable as no orchard existed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's decision to maintain the status quo was based on cogent grounds. The Court affirmed that even where statutory rules are silent, the principle of audi alteram partem applies when administrative actions adversely affect the rights of others, such as reducing water supply to existing shareholders, and that the trial court must decide the merits independently.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to administrative orders regarding water allocation even if the relevant rules are silent on notice?
  • Can an administrative order reducing water supply to existing shareholders be passed without providing them an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does an interim injunction order passed by a High Court in revision constitute a final decision on the merits of the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs Mian MUHAMMAD AMAULLAH1971 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-10
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentleave to appealsymbolic possessionleased landrent restriction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the respondent against the petitioner for default in rent payments regarding a building site in Lyallpur. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the District Judge reversed the decision on appeal, finding a default of four consecutive months and ordering ejectment. The High Court dismissed the subsequent second appeal, holding that the factual finding of default was unchallengeable under section 101, C.P.C. Upon a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the appellate authority failed to properly exercise its discretion by not considering the substantial investment made in erecting a building on the land. The Supreme Court held that while the expense of raising the structure is a circumstance that may be considered by the rent authorities, an ejectment order in such cases can only be executed by delivering symbolic possession of the site, leaving the landlord to pursue further legal remedies in a civil court for the removal of structures. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of default in rent by the first appellate court can be challenged in a second appeal?
  • Can the expense incurred by a tenant in erecting a building on leased land be considered by rent authorities when ordering ejectment?
  • How is an order of ejectment executed when a tenant has raised a structure on the leased site?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs Mian EJAZ AHMAD1971 PLD Lahore 30 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHTIAQ vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 839 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE vs The STATE1971 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-16
  rash and negligent drivingcriminal negligencecausing death by negligencetraffic accidentpetition for leave to appealspeeding
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which maintained his conviction and sentence under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code for causing death by rash and negligent driving, while setting aside his conviction under Section 338. The prosecution case was that the petitioner was driving a car at an excessive speed of about 70 miles per hour, ignored warnings from a passenger, lost control near a bus stop, and struck a woman carrying an infant child, resulting in the child's fatal injuries. The core legal question was whether driving at a fast speed constituted rash and negligent driving under the law. The Supreme Court held that the question of rashness and negligence is to be determined on the facts of each case, and upon concurrent findings of fact establishing that the petitioner was driving at an excessive speed without control and despite warnings, no interference was warranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that high speed coupled with a failure to control the vehicle under circumstances pedestrians are endangered constitutes rash and negligent driving.

  Questions settled

  • Does driving a motor vehicle at a fast speed amount to rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rash and negligent driving when supported by evidence?
  • Whether the determination of rash and negligent driving depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQ SHAIKH vs PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH THE CHIEF1971 PLD Karachi 490 · Sindh High Court · 1970-12-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IRFAN AZAD vs Mst. SULTANA BEGUM AND 8 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 91 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1971 PLD Supreme Court 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-09
  evacuee propertystatutory chargeunpaid vendor's lienTransfer of Property Actscaling down of chargessettlement authoritiesDisplaced Persons Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the legality of scaling down a statutory charge held by an unpaid vendor against evacuee property. The appellant, having sold land to an evacuee, sought to enforce a charge for the unpaid balance. The Custodian recognized this as a statutory charge under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Subsequently, the Settlement Authorities applied the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961, to scale down the amount, arguing the charge was subject to their regulatory powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that a charge arising by operation of law under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act is distinct from a charge created by the Custodian. The Court ruled that the power to scale down charges under the 1961 Rules applies only to charges created by the Custodian, not to statutory charges arising independently of the Custodian's actions. Consequently, the Settlement Authorities lacked the jurisdiction to reduce the appellant's claim, and the appellant was entitled to the full unpaid balance.

  Questions settled

  • Is a charge arising under Section 55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 considered a charge created by the Custodian under the Satisfaction of Charges (Evacuee Property) Rules, 1961?
  • Do the Settlement Authorities have the power to scale down a statutory charge created by operation of law under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Does a charge created by operation of law under the Transfer of Property Act 1882 possess the same characteristics as a simple mortgage for enforcement purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL SHAH AND OTHERS vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1085 · Sindh High Court · 1956-12-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ILYAS KAYANI vs THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB1971 PLC 228 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IKRAM BUTT vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 999 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IKRAM BUTT vs ASHFAQ AHMAD AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 994 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IDRIS vs THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 911 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-12
  import licensebetel nutsI.T.C. Schedulecustoms adjudicationinfructuous suitExport Bonus Schemeimport policy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns four consolidated suits challenging the detention of imported betel nuts by the Collector of Customs. The plaintiffs contended that their import licenses, issued under the Export Bonus Scheme for specific I.T.C. Schedule items, authorized the import of betel nuts. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs' licenses covered betel nuts and whether the suits remained maintainable after the Collector of Customs passed adjudication orders confiscating the goods. The Court held that the suits were infructuous because the plaintiffs failed to challenge the subsequent adjudication orders, which had already finalized the confiscation and penalties. Furthermore, the Court ruled that betel nuts were specifically classified under Item 14/5 of the I.T.C. Schedule, not the items listed in the plaintiffs' licenses. Consequently, the imports were unauthorized and in violation of the Import Policy Orders. The principle established is that specific classifications in the I.T.C. Schedule prevail over general ones, and that suits challenging detention become infructuous upon the issuance of final adjudication orders if those orders are not formally contested.

  Questions settled

  • Whether import licenses for specific I.T.C. Schedule items authorize the import of goods specifically classified under a different item?
  • Does a suit challenging the detention of goods become infructuous upon the passing of an adjudication order by the Collector of Customs?
  • Is the classification of goods in the Pakistan Customs Tariff relevant for determining the scope of import licenses under the I.T.C. Schedule?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IDREES vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1067 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN--Plaintiff vs Mst. BHAGAN AND 2 OTHERS--Defendant1971 PLD Lahore 266 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1218-- · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND OTHERS vs AHMAD KHAN AND Another1971 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-22
  review petitionpre-emptionquestion of factspecial leave to appealsecond appealsub-division of village
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for the review of an order passed by the Supreme Court dismissing a petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question involved the right of pre-emption claimed by the respondents based on their status as co-owners in a specific sub-division of a village, and whether the existence of such a sub-division was a question of fact concurrently determined by the courts below. The Supreme Court held that the existence of a sub-division was a pure question of fact determined concurrently by the lower courts, and a review cannot be granted on the grounds that counsel failed to argue or press a particular point at the original hearing which was available at the time. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be utilized as a means to re-hear a matter merely to make good the failure of counsel to argue points that could have been raised previously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of existence of a sub-division in a village is a question of fact?
  • Can a review be granted on the ground that counsel failed to argue a point available at the original hearing?
  • Whether a finding of fact concurrently determined by lower courts can be challenged in second appeal based on evidence not relied upon below?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 959 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUMAYUN vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HIDAYATULLAH vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1971 PLD Lahore 931 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAYAT AND 6 Others vs MUHAMMAD NAWAZ1971 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-13
  customary lawancestral propertyalienationlegal necessityAwan tribeburden of proofregistered sale deed
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the alienation of ancestral land by an Awan proprietor in Shahpur. The respondent challenged the sale of 1891 kanals of land by his father and step-mother to the appellants, arguing that the land was ancestral and the alienation was made without legal necessity or consent, contrary to prevailing customary law. The core legal questions involved whether the land was ancestral, the extent of the vendors' power of alienation under custom, and whether the transfer was supported by legal necessity and consideration. The Supreme Court held that while the land was ancestral and the vendors possessed restricted powers of alienation in the presence of a son, the alienation of 94 kanals was valid, as legal necessity was established and the burden of proof was mitigated by the lapse of time. However, the transfer of the remaining land was invalid, as it lacked consideration and constituted an impermissible gift under custom. The Court affirmed that registered sales are not void for non-payment of consideration, which merely creates a charge on the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-payment of consideration render a registered sale deed void?
  • Do Awans of Shahpur District possess unrestricted power to alienate ancestral property in the presence of sons?
  • Does the lapse of time affect the burden of proof regarding legal necessity for the alienation of ancestral property?
  • Can a proprietor with sons make a gift of ancestral property to a relative under customary law?
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• MUHAMMAD HANIF vs THE STATE1971P Cr. L J 1 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF CHOHAN vs THE DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES AND MINERAL1971 PLC 183 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF AND 4 OTHERS vs THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BAHAWALPUR AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 574 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAFEEZ AND ANOTHER vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SCHOOLS), DIRECTORATE1971 PLC 107 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD FAROOQ vs M. B. ABBASI1971 PLC 386 · Labour Court · 1971-01-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD FARID vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 974 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD FAQIR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 624 · Lahore High Court · 1971-11-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD EHSAN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-03
  criminal complaintcivil courtsanction for prosecutionprocedural defectcurable irregularitysummoning witnessprivate complaint
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court dismissing a revision application against a Magistrate's order rejecting objections to a criminal complaint filed by a Civil Judge under sections 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the appellant, who was merely a summons-serving witness in a civil suit fraudulently instituted in another's name. The core legal questions involved whether a civil court Presiding Officer could lodge such a complaint against a witness under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and whether the omission to examine the complainant under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not apply to a witness rather than a party, but the complaint was maintainable under the general law as a private complaint. The Court further laid down that the procedural omission to examine the complainant under section 200 was curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of prejudice or timely objection.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court Presiding Officer lodge a complaint against a witness under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code in pursuance of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the omission to examine a private complainant under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the entire criminal proceeding?
  • Is a procedural omission regarding the examination of a complainant curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no prejudice is suffered by the accused?
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• MUHAMMAD DIN AND Another vs Ch. FAZAL KARIM AND Another1971 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-21
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActTransfer of propertySettlement authoritiesResidential unitsLetters Patent appealCondonation of delayRemand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner properly exercised his discretion in transferring the entire property to one party without determining if it constituted multiple independent residential units, and whether the High Court correctly condoned the delay in the Letters Patent appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities failed to apply their minds to the factual determination of whether the building comprised independent residential units under Section 2(4) of the Act. If multiple units exist, they may be transferred separately; if not, a local occupant must yield to a refugee claimant. Because the Chief Settlement Commissioner failed to make this determination and did not comply with the High Court's remand order, the Supreme Court upheld the decision to remand the case for fresh disposal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the delay in filing the Letters Patent appeal was correctly condoned given the legislative changes regarding appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 prohibit the transfer of a portion of a house to a local if it constitutes an independent residential unit?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner required to determine whether a building consists of more than one residential unit before ordering the transfer of the entire property?
  • Can the delay in filing a Letters Patent appeal be condoned when the delay is caused by the abolition and subsequent restoration of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction?
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• MUHAMMAD CHIRAGH UD DIN BHATTI vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN1971 SCMR 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-27
  res judicatawrit jurisdictioncivil suittermination of servicemunicipal employeespecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave challenges the dismissal of the petitioner's civil suit by the Lahore High Court in second appeal, which had upheld the lower appellate court's decision. The petitioner, a former Chief Sanitary Inspector, had filed a suit challenging his termination of service ordered by the Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division. Previously, the petitioner had challenged the same termination order through a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by a Division Bench holding that the termination was competently covered by statutory provisions and cured by the Provincial Government's rejection of his representation. The core legal question was whether a subsequent civil suit is barred by the principles of res judicata when the matter has already been adjudicated upon by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the general principles of res judicata apply, barring the petitioner from re-agitating the matter through a civil suit after the issue had been finally settled by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a civil court cannot bypass or override orders competently made by the High Court in writ jurisdiction between the same parties on the same subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment passed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent civil suit between the same parties on the same matter?
  • Can a defect in form regarding the statutory authority for dismissing a municipal employee be cured by a subsequent order of the Provincial Government on representation?
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• MUHAMMAD BOOTA AND 12 Others vs Ch. FAIZ MUHAMMAD AND 8 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  criminal proceduredispossessionorder 145 CrPCreview of orderjurisdiction of magistrateimplementation of orderpetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which accepted a reference made by the Sessions Judge and set aside an order of the Additional District Magistrate. The respondent had originally filed an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, leading to a final order on 27-11-1962 declaring him entitled to possession of the disputed land. When the respondent sought implementation of this order, the Additional District Magistrate dismissed the application, holding that the order was merely declaratory and lacked land identity, effectively reviewing his own prior decision. The core legal question is whether the Additional District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to review or refuse to implement a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the Additional District Magistrate lacked the legal authority to review the final order, and that the order was properly a declaration of entitlement to possession with sufficiently identifiable land. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a magistrate cannot review a final adjudication under section 145.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional District Magistrate have the jurisdiction to review a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether an order declaring a party entitled to possession under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is merely declaratory and unenforceable?
  • Can a magistrate refuse to implement a final order under section 145 on the ground of lack of identity of land when the preliminary order and application fully set it out?
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• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs ZIA ULLAH AND OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 42 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1971-04-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AYUB vs MUHAMMAD YUSUF AND 5 Other1971 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-23
  private defenceself-defenceacquittalleave to appealmedical evidencecriminal liabilityprosecution burden
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of respondents who were originally charged with rioting and murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court and the trial court erred in accepting the plea of private defence, given the injuries sustained by the accused persons during the incident. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the prosecution failed to establish that the injuries on the accused were self-inflicted. The medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries and the physical condition of the deceased, Muhammad Yunus, rendered the prosecution's version of events implausible. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal and the acceptance of the right of private defence. The key principle laid down is that a plea of private defence is substantiated when the prosecution fails to provide a foundation for the theory that the accused's injuries were self-suffered, particularly when medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's narrative regarding the sequence of events and the capacity of the deceased to act as an aggressor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of private defence be accepted when the prosecution fails to prove that the injuries on the accused were self-inflicted?
  • Does the medical condition of a deceased person, indicating an inability to wield a weapon, invalidate the prosecution's version of the incident?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in refusing leave to appeal when the lower courts have concurrently accepted the plea of private defence based on evidence?
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