Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THP STATE1971 P Cr. L J 123 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD TASLEEM1971 PLD Lahore 139 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM NAZ vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 192 · Sindh High Court · 1968-11-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-30
  post-conviction bailjudicial discretionspecial leave to appealcriminal appealdelay in disposal of appeals
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against an order of the High Court, Lahore, which refused bail to the petitioners following their conviction by a Section 30 Magistrate under sections 326/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a five-year rigorous imprisonment sentence. The petitioners' appeal was admitted for hearing, but bail was denied. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in refusing bail, given the potential for the petitioners to serve a significant portion of their sentence before the appeal is heard due to court congestion. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion improperly, as there was no reason to believe the appeal would not be disposed of within a reasonable timeframe. The Court affirmed that criminal appeals should generally be resolved within one to two years. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on merits, though the Court granted the petitioners liberty to re-apply for bail to the High Court if the appeal remains pending after one year.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere congestion of court work justify the grant of bail to a convict pending appeal?
  • Can a convict re-apply for bail if their appeal remains pending beyond a specified period?
  • Is the refusal of bail by the High Court after admitting an appeal subject to interference if discretion was exercised properly?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs The STATE1971 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-02
  murdercriminal appealeyewitness testimonysolitary witnessappreciation of evidencetransportation for life
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This jail appeal arises from a judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan, which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and reduced his sentence from death to transportation for life. The prosecution alleged that the appellant stabbed the deceased to death due to a family enmity arising from the deceased's abduction of the appellant's cousin. Special leave was granted by the Supreme Court to re-examine the evidence. Although the lower courts and the Supreme Court expressed doubts regarding certain prosecution evidence—including the testimony of one eyewitness and the recovery of the weapon—the Supreme Court evaluated the remaining testimony of an independent, natural eyewitness, Riaz Ali. The core legal question centered on the reliability of this solitary eyewitness testimony and whether a conviction could be sustained thereon without corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the solitary testimony of a natural and truthful witness, free from enmity or bias, is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction without corroboration. The key principle laid down is that the uncorroborated testimony of a single reliable and natural eyewitness, if found entirely trustworthy, forms a legally sound basis for upholding a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction for murder be based upon the solitary testimony of an eyewitness?
  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a natural eyewitness requires independent corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the omission of the assailant's name in an initial hospital report affect the credibility of a natural eyewitness to the occurrence?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 610 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-06
  Letters Patent Appealejectmentstatutory tenancydefault in rentholding overrent agreement terms
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from an order dismissing a second appeal against an ejectment order passed due to default in payment of rent. The tenant, who continued in possession of the demised shop after the expiration of an eleven-month lease agreement, contended that upon expiry of the lease, he became a statutory tenant under Section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, thereby making the statutory sixty-day period for rent payment applicable rather than the advance payment clause in the expired lease. The Lahore High Court held that while the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 do not govern statutory tenancies, a tenant continuing in possession after lease expiration remains subject to the original terms and conditions of the agreement, including the mode and time of rent payment. Consequently, the tenant was bound by Section 13(2)(i) of the Ordinance, requiring payment within fifteen days of the agreed date. The Court also held that factual pleas under Section 13-A cannot be raised for the first time in a Letters Patent Appeal without evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of a lease agreement remain bound by the terms and conditions regarding the mode of payment in the expired lease under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Which default period under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 applies to a statutory tenant where the expired lease specified the due date of rent?
  • Can a plea regarding non-compliance with Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 be raised for the first time in a Letters Patent Appeal?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF MIR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1307 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 985 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND ANOTHER vs THE FACTORY MANAGER, NATIONAL1971 PLC 301 · Labour Court · 1970-09-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 25 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASHIQ vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 778 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ARSHAD vs THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (HQS.), IRRIGA--1971 PLC 67 · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AQIL KHAN vs AKHTAR HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 864 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-11
  Fatal Accidents ActLimitation ActSection 7 Limitation ActQuantum of damagesMotor vehicle accidentLetters patent appealDependency claim
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a decree for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, following a fatal motor vehicle accident. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1908, and the correct calculation of damages. The Court held that the suit was not time-barred. It affirmed that Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to claims under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, because dependents are 'jointly entitled to institute a suit' for procedural necessity, even if their substantive interests are distinct. Consequently, the minority of some claimants saved the limitation period for all. Regarding damages, the Court reduced the award by recalculating the deceased's monthly income based on actual salary rather than speculative future earnings. Furthermore, the Court rejected the application of a 'scaling down' factor for lump-sum payments, noting the absence of a rigid rule requiring such deductions. The judgment clarifies that the right to sue under the Fatal Accidents Act is a statutory right that cannot be defeated by the inaction of a representative.

  Questions settled

  • Does the minority of some claimants save the limitation period for all dependents under Section 7 of the Limitation Act 1908 in a suit under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855?
  • Are dependents in a Fatal Accidents Act suit 'jointly entitled to institute a suit' within the meaning of Section 7 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Should a 'scaling down' factor be applied to damages awarded in a lump sum under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855?
  • Can a court rely on a post-mortem report to determine the age of a deceased person for the purpose of calculating damages?
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• MUHAMMAD ANWARUL HAQUE vs THE STATE1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 23 · Board of Revenue · 1971-03-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs COLLECTOR, JHANG AND OTHERS1971 PLC 182 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-01-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs ADMINISTRATOR, DOW MEDICAL COLLEGE, KARACHI1971 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  medical college admissionrural seatsdefinition of rural areawrit petitionleave to appealequity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had rejected the petitioner's challenge to the admission of respondents 3 and 4 to the Dow Medical College, Karachi, against tagged rural seats. The core legal question was whether Model Colony, having been included in the Malir Cantonment in 1965, ceased to be a rural area under the admission instructions. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an area within cantonment or municipal limits does not automatically strip it of its rural character if its population meets the census criterion and residents pursue agricultural pursuits. Furthermore, the petition was hit by laches and equity as the respondents had already been attending classes since January 1970 without a stay order. The petition was dismissed with observations that the college authorities might consider the petitioner favorably for the next session.

  Questions settled

  • Does an area cease to be a rural area for college admissions merely because it is included within cantonment limits?
  • Can a candidate displace admitted students who have been attending classes without an interim stay order?
  • What constitutes a rural area under the admission instructions based on population and census?
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• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs ADMINISTRATOR DOW, MEDICAL COLLEGE, KARACHI1971 PLD Karachi 726 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN vs THE PUNJAB PROVINCE (Now WEST PAKISTAN1971 PLD Lahore 989 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 799 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 944 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIN SHAD vs MUHAMMAD AKRAM Alias HAZARD AND 4 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 1291 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIN AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-02
  culpable homicidemurdercumulative injuriescommon intentioncriminal liabilitypremeditated attack
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased, who succumbed to injuries sustained during an ambush. The appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the appellants' actions constituted murder despite the absence of a single fatal injury, and whether the cumulative effect of multiple non-fatal injuries could sustain a conviction under Section 302. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was correct. The Court determined that while no individual injury was sufficient to cause death, the appellants' premeditated, merciless beating—resulting in thirteen injuries, including six fractured ribs—demonstrated an intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the offence fell under the third clause of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The principle laid down is that where multiple injuries cumulatively cause death, the offence may constitute murder under Section 302, even if no single injury is individually fatal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 be sustained when no single injury caused by the accused was individually sufficient to cause death?
  • Does the cumulative effect of multiple non-fatal injuries satisfy the requirements of Section 300, clause thirdly, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a premeditated, merciless beating sufficient to establish the intention to cause bodily injury likely to result in death?
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• MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1070 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs SAFAR UDDIN1971 PLC 352 · Labour Court · 1970-09-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs BAHADUR1971 PLD Rev. (Punjab) 42 · Board of Revenue · 1971-08-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI Alias MAHNA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 222 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND 6 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 528 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND 3 Others vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1299 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKHTAR vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 1081 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKHTAR vs GHULAM SAR WAR AND OTHERS1971 PLD (Rev.) Punjab 13 · Board of Revenue · 1969-07-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AFZAL vs THE PRINCIPAL, PAKISTAN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF1971 PLC 343 · Labour Court · 1971-03-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AFZAL AND 8 OTHERS vs Haji FAZAL-UL-HAQ AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-18
  pre-emptionequitable set-offdeposit of purchase-moneycosts adjustmentpre-emption decree
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the West Pakistan High Court dismissing a civil revision petition in a pre-emption matter. The trial court had decreed the respondents' pre-emption suit conditional upon depositing a specific purchase price by a certain date. The respondents deposited an amount that fell short by thirty-four paisas, but claimed entitlement to adjust this minor shortage against the costs awarded to them under the same decree. The core legal question is whether a pre-emptor is entitled to deduct a shortage in the pre-emption money by setting it off against the costs awarded in the same decree. The Supreme Court held that the pre-emptor-decree-holder is entitled to apply the doctrine of equitable set-off, allowing the deduction of costs awarded under the decree from the purchase price to be deposited. The court affirmed that principles of equity, justice, and good conscience apply to pre-emption suits, and cross-demands arising out of the same transaction permit such a set-off.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is entitled to deduct a shortage in the pre-emption money against the costs awarded to him under the same decree?
  • Does the doctrine of equitable set-off apply to pre-emption suits where cross-demands for purchase-price and costs arise out of the same transaction?
  • Whether failure to deposit a nominal fraction of the pre-emption money due to a shortfall covered by awarded costs warrants the dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
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• MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH vs MUHAMMAD AKBAR AND Another1971 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-10
  review petitionlimitationcondonation of delaycertificate for leave to appealsufficient causeSupreme Court Rules
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the dismissal of a petition for special leave to appeal, which had been dismissed as time-barred by 115 days without an application for condonation of delay. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate under sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the High Court could be excluded as of right or if each day of delay after refusal must be explained with sufficient cause. The Supreme Court held that the time spent in the High Court can only be excluded as sufficient cause under the relevant rules and does not grant an automatic extension of limitation as a matter of right under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, requiring explanation for every day of delay once limitation has expired. The key principle laid down is that the exclusion of time spent in obtaining a certificate from the High Court is not a matter of right for computing limitation before the Supreme Court, and unexplained delay after the refusal of such a certificate warrants the dismissal of a time-barred petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent in pursuing an application for a certificate in the High Court can be excluded as of right when computing limitation for a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is a petitioner required to explain the delay for each day after the refusal of a certificate by the High Court when the period of limitation has already expired?
  • Does the exclusion of time under the Supreme Court Rules operate in the same manner as section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• MUHAMMAD ABDUL LATIF vs CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF WEST1971 PLC 19 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-11-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ABDUL GAFUR AND ANOTHER vs THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, BUILDING DIRECTORATE,1971 PLC 364 · Labour Court · 1970-10-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ABBAS Alias BASSA AND 9 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 9 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-13Read full judgment →
• MUGHALA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1324 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-24Read full judgment →
• Mufti MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN1971 PLD Lahore 756 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-10Read full judgment →
• MUBARAK ALI vs MESSRS EAST PAKISTAN TRADERS, DACCA1971 PLC 316 · Labour Court · 1970-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZUHRA BEGUM vs Syed SAJJAD HUSSAIN AND 7 Other1971 SCMR 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-25
  evacuee propertydeed of associationsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealquestion of factfraud and misrepresentation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions involved conflicting deeds of association executed regarding the transfer of an evacuee property in Lahore, the competence of the High Court to investigate allegations of fraud not raised before the settlement authorities, and the raising of a mixed question of fact regarding revisional powers for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the execution of the deed of association was rightly concluded by the Settlement Commissioner, that the High Court was not the proper forum to investigate fresh allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and that a question of fact regarding revisional powers not agitated below cannot be urged for the first time. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, laying down that factual inquiries and new pleas not raised before lower forums cannot be entertained by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is the proper forum for investigating into the genuineness of a deed of association tainted with alleged fraud when such evidence was not produced before the settlement authorities?
  • Can a question of fact regarding whether a Settlement Commissioner was competently invested with revisional powers be allowed to be urged for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Mst. ZOHRA vs THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BAHAWALNAGAR AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 944 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZARDAR BEGUM vs SULTAN MAHMOOD AND 5 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-17
  colonization of government landscolony land inheritancecustomary lawlimited estatetenancy rightsoriginal tenantproprietary rightsmutation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This certificated appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the inheritance of Crown land granted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether grand-daughters of the original tenant inherited a limited estate under customary law terminable upon marriage, or whether they held the land as independent grantees under the statute. The Supreme Court held that succession to colony lands is exclusively governed by the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, rather than customary law. The Court ruled that the appellant acquired the tenancy rights either as a nominee/fresh grant by the Collector or via a valid transfer consented to by the Collector under Section 19, making her a tenant in her own right and subsequently an absolute owner upon acquiring proprietary rights. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the respondents' suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether succession to colony lands granted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 is governed by customary law or the provisions of the Act?
  • Does a female grantee of colony land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 hold a limited estate terminable upon marriage?
  • Can a female holding tenancy rights under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 become an absolute owner upon the acquisition of proprietary rights?
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• Mst. ZAMRO JAN AND 5 Others vs FATEH KHAN AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-14
  evacuee propertywrit jurisdictionletters patent appealmortgage redemptionnew pleasettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns civil petitions challenging the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court regarding the redemption of mortgaged lands. The petitioners, successors-in-interest to a sub-mortgagee, contested the jurisdiction of settlement authorities, arguing that the property in dispute was not 'evacuee property' under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, as it had not been treated as such prior to 1st January 1957. The Supreme Court examined whether this specific legal contention regarding the status of the property was properly raised before the lower courts. The Court held that because the petitioners failed to raise the issue of the property's status in their original writ petitions, the Letters Patent Bench was justified in disallowing the argument at the appellate stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that new points of fact or law not pleaded in the initial writ jurisdiction cannot be introduced in Letters Patent Appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new point of law or fact in a Letters Patent Appeal that was not pleaded in the original writ petition?
  • Does the failure to raise a specific contention in a writ petition preclude the appellate court from considering it?
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• Mst. ZAITOON BEGUM AND 2 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD ILYAS AND 6 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 143 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-06
  adjournmentclosing of evidenceremandlimitationprocedural illegalitycivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The matter arises from second appeals filed against an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, which had set aside the trial court's dismissal of two consolidated suits for declaration and possession regarding wakf properties. The trial court had refused an oral request for an adjournment by the plaintiffs, closed their evidence, and immediately proceeded to dismiss the suits as time-barred by relying on unproved documents on the record, purporting to act under Order XVII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in summarily dismissing the suits under Order XVII, rule 3 or rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without proceeding properly with the further progress of the suit or evaluating evidence legally. The Lahore High Court held that neither provision justified the trial court's procedure, as rule 3 did not apply where time had not been specifically granted for the act defaulted, and the trial court erred in treating unproved documents as evidence and failing to follow the correct sequential steps of a trial. The appeals were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can dismiss a suit under Order XVII rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when no time was specifically granted to the party for the act resulting in the default?
  • What is the distinction between proceeding with the suit forthwith under Order XVII rule 1(3) and proceeding to decide the suit forthwith under Order XVII rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court rely upon documents as evidence when they have neither been formally tendered, produced, nor proved by any party?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside a trial court's order that prematurely terminates a suit without following proper procedural steps?
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• Mst. UMERUNNISA vs FATEH ALI AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 553 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. TEHSEEN AKHTAR vs MAHMOOD-UL-HASSAN1971 PLD Lahore 875 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-13
  revisional jurisdictionfamily courts actexclusion of code of civil procedurerestitution of conjugal rightsprompt dowercrueltyconstitutional jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition arises out of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent-husband against the petitioner-wife, which was decreed conditionally upon payment of prompt dower by the Family Court and upheld in appeal by the District Judge. The petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The core legal questions involved were whether a revision petition is maintainable against appellate orders passed by a District Judge under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, given the exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure by section 17 of the said Act, and whether interference was warranted under Article 102 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 regarding the definition of cruelty. The High Court held that orders of the District Judge passed either as a Family Court or as an appellate court under the Act are not subject to its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further declined to interfere under constitutional jurisdiction as the subordinate court acted within the bounds of its authority. The key principle laid down is that the exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure under section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 applies equally to appellate proceedings before the District Judge under the Act, rendering such orders non-revisable under section 115 of the Code.

  Questions settled

  • Whether orders passed by a District Judge in appeal under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 are subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does the exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure by section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 apply to appellate proceedings before the District Judge?
  • When can the High Court interfere with the orders of a subordinate court under Article 102 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 regarding the interpretation of cruelty under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939?
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• Mst. TAIYABA KHATOON vs MOHAMMAD FARIDUDDIN1971 PLD Karachi 747 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-18
  ejectmentdefault in rentjudicial discretioninterlocutory ordermerger of orderslandlord and tenantsecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves two connected second appeals arising from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the grounds of default in rent payment, personal need, and damage to the property. The core legal questions relate to whether an interlocutory order merges into the final order, and whether the Rent Controller or appellate court possesses the discretion to excuse a proved default in rent payment under section 13(2). The court held that an interlocutory order concerning the striking off of a defence merges in the final order, and that once a statutory default in rent payment under section 13(2)(i) is established, the Rent Controller and first appellate court have no discretion to excuse the breach or disregard the statutory requirements. Consequently, the High Court accepted the landlord's appeal, ordered the tenant's ejectment, and dismissed the tenant's appeal as infructuous, establishing the principle that judicial discretion under rent restriction laws must be exercised strictly within the confines of statutory guidelines.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller merge into the final order disposing of the main ejectment application?
  • Whether the Rent Controller or the first appellate court has the discretion to excuse a proved default in the payment of rent under section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • What is the true import and scope of the word 'may' in section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a failure to pay rent for a single month within the statutory grace period be excused by the court as a gratuitous failure?
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• Mst. TAHIRA BEGUM vs Ch. MATIULLAH AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 866 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-02
  territorial jurisdictionfamily courtmaintenancedowercause of actionwrit petitioniddat
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of two connected writ petitions arising from a family court suit filed by a wife against her husband for the recovery of dower money and past maintenance. The Family Court decreed the dower claim but dismissed the maintenance claim for lack of territorial jurisdiction, which decisions were upheld in appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the Family Court at Lahore possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit for maintenance under rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, given that the marriage was solemnized at Lahore and the deserted wife resided there during and after the divorce. The Lahore High Court held that since the marriage took place at Lahore and the deserted wife resided there during the Iddat period, a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of Lahore under rule 6(a), making the maintenance suit entertainable there. The Court laid down that the fact of marriage forms an essential part of the cause of action in a maintenance suit, and a deserted wife may institute such proceedings where she ordinarily resides or where part of the cause of action arises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Family Court at Lahore has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit for maintenance where the marriage was solemnized in Lahore and the deserted wife resided there during the Iddat period?
  • Does the fact of marriage constitute a material part of the cause of action in a suit for maintenance by a wife?
  • What is the proper course of action for a Family Court Judge who finds that he lacks territorial jurisdiction in respect of a specific claim in a plaint?
  • Can findings of fact regarding the payment of dower money be successfully reopened and reappraised in constitutional writ jurisdiction?
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• Mst. SUGHRABAI AND 10 Others vs FIDA HUSSAIN MOHAMMADALIKERAI AND Another1971 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-14
  promissory noteillegal considerationpugreegoodwillrecovery of moneyappreciation of evidencesecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a suit for the recovery of money based on a promissory note. The original plaintiff alleged the defendant borrowed money, while the defendant contended the promissory note was executed for 'pugree' (a premium for possession of premises), which he argued was illegal consideration. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the High Court reversed this, finding the consideration was indeed for 'pugree' and thus unenforceable. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, specifically noting that while the plaintiff argued the consideration was for the 'goodwill' of a shop, the evidence indicated the amount was for the possession of the premises. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding, concluding that the promissory note was based on illegal consideration (pugree) and that the High Court's appreciation of evidence was correct. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a promissory note executed in consideration of 'pugree' (premium for possession of premises) enforceable in law?
  • Does the definition of 'goodwill' in law require evidence of the use of a firm's name and reputation?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with findings of fact if they are based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHAH JEHAN BEGUM vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 5 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 920 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. SARDARAN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1137 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. SARDAR BEGUM AND ANOTHER vs Mst. BAGGI AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 6 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1970-10-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. SAJIDA SULTANA AND ANOTHER vs MESSRS EASTERN TRADERS AND 31971 PLD Karachi 109 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-31
  suit for accountscompromise decreeminor's interestlawful agreementvoidable contractprocedural lawcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a suit for accounts filed by a widow and her minor child against a firm. The defendants sought to record a compromise agreement under Order XXIII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, claiming the dispute was settled. The plaintiffs opposed this, arguing the agreement was voidable due to fraud and, crucially, that it violated Order XXXII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as no prior leave of the court was obtained for the minor's participation. The court addressed whether such an agreement constitutes a lawful agreement under Order XXIII, Rule 3. The court held that Order XXXII, Rule 7 is a mandatory provision designed to protect minors' interests, and failure to obtain prior leave renders the agreement voidable. Consequently, such an agreement cannot be deemed lawful for the purposes of recording a compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3. The court affirmed that the judiciary must remain vigilant in protecting minors' rights, and thus, the defendants' application to record the compromise was dismissed, as the agreement was not binding.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise agreement involving a minor be recorded under Order XXIII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without prior leave of the court under Order XXXII, Rule 7?
  • Is an agreement that violates Order XXXII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 void or voidable?
  • Does the court have inherent power under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to refuse to record a compromise that is voidable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SAID BIBI vs THIS STATE1971 P Cr. L J 39 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. REHMAT BIBI vs MOHAMMAD ALI1971 PLD Lahore 151 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. RAZIA SULTANA vs ALI AHMAD KHAN AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-22
  oral giftconcurrent findings of factsecond appealleave to appealinheritanceproperty dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a second appeal concerning a property dispute. The core legal question involves the validity of an alleged oral gift inter vivos of the disputed property by the original owner in favour of the petitioner, versus a registered sale deed executed by the respondent's vendor who claimed as the sole heir of the original owner. The trial Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court concurrently found against the petitioner, holding that the oral gift was not established, that the property was validly sold to respondent No. 1, and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-existence of the oral gift were well-founded based on documentary evidence and that no interference was warranted. The key principle laid down is that a superior court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in second appeal unless jurisdictional defects or perversity are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of an oral gift?
  • Does an oral gift inter vivos require supporting evidence of delivery of possession and attornment of tenants to be valid?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained against concurrent findings of fact established by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. RAZIA SHAFI vs MAJOR M. S. MALIK1971 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-01
  transfer of caseterritorial jurisdictionguardianshipcivil procedurepending proceeding
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal addresses whether an application for transfer under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is incompetent when based on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court of institution. The appellant sought the transfer of a guardianship proceeding from Rawalpindi to Lahore, asserting the Rawalpindi court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that an application for transfer is competent only if the court of institution is competent to try the matter. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that before a proceeding can be withdrawn or transferred from a court, it must be validly and duly pending in that court, and a court lacking initial jurisdiction cannot form the basis of a valid transfer under section 24. The Supreme Court affirmed the settled principle established by the Privy Council that a superior court cannot order the transfer of a case unless the court from which the transfer is sought possesses jurisdiction to try it. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application for transfer under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure incompetent if the court in which the proceeding was instituted lacks jurisdiction?
  • Does the word 'pending' in section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure mean duly pending before a court having jurisdiction?
  • Can a case be transferred from a court that has no initial jurisdiction to entertain it?
  • What is the appropriate forum for raising an objection as to the place of suing and territorial jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. RABLA BIBI vs ZILLADAR KHAN AND 3 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 523 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. QAISAR KHATOON AND 12 OTHERS vs Maulvi ABDUL KHALIQ AND ANOTHER (BOTH REPRESENTED BY HEIRS)1971 PLD Supreme Court 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  customary lawpersonal lawMuhammadan Lawonus of proofancestral propertyself-acquired propertyWajib-ul-ArzRiwaj-i-Amspecial leave to appealinheritance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal transferred to the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Section 9 of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1949, arose from an inheritance dispute involving the estate of Maulvi Abdul Aziz. The plaintiffs claimed succession under Muhammadan Law, while the respondents contended that the family was governed by custom excluding female heirs, or alternatively under a will. The trial court dismissed the suit under customary law, but after multiple remands, the High Court affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court first overruled a preliminary objection regarding the appeal's competency, holding that it retained full jurisdiction and discretion to grant special leave. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872, the burden of proving a custom displacing personal law rests strictly on the party asserting it. Furthermore, entries in a Wajib-ul-Arz or Riwaj-i-Am recorded in general terms apply presumptively only to ancestral property, not self-acquired property. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, applying personal law to the deceased's self-acquired properties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction under the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1949, to grant special leave to appeal in transferred state matters lacking a formal High Court certificate of fitness?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, when custom is pleaded in derogation of personal law?
  • Do customary rules recorded in a Wajib-ul-Arz or Riwaj-i-Am presumptively apply to non-ancestral or self-acquired property unless specifically stated?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. NOOR BIBI vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 895 · Sindh High Court · 1971-06-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. NAWAB BIBI vs Mst. RAFIQ BANO1971 PLD Supreme Court 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  sale deed validityregistration of documentsdirectory vs mandatory provisionstransfer of propertyincome-tax certificateleasehold transferbreach of covenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns the validity of a sale deed for a house in Lahore, challenged by the appellant on grounds of non-compliance with income-tax certification requirements, non-payment of the full purchase price, and lack of permission from the Lahore Improvement Trust for the transfer of the leasehold interest. The core legal question was whether the failure to obtain an Income-tax No-Objection Certificate under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Pakistan) Ordinance 1947 renders the registration of a sale deed void. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 3 are directory rather than mandatory. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance does not expressly invalidate registrations made in contravention of Section 3, and that the statute provides alternative mechanisms for tax recovery. Furthermore, the Court held that non-payment of the balance of the purchase price does not render an executed conveyance void, and that an assignment of a lease in breach of a covenant against transfer is valid between the parties, even if it might give the lessor a right of re-entry. The principle established is that statutory requirements for public duties, where non-compliance does not expressly nullify the act, are generally directory.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to obtain an Income-tax No-Objection Certificate under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Pakistan) Ordinance 1947 invalidate the registration of a sale deed?
  • Does the non-payment of the balance of the purchase price render an executed sale deed void?
  • Is a transfer of leasehold interest made in breach of a covenant requiring the lessor's consent void between the parties to the transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. KHUDIJA BEGUM vs THE STATE AND OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 19 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1969-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. KHUDEJA vs JEHANGIR KHAN AND 37 Other1971 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-14
  declaratory suitrevenue recordsmutationcustomary lawlimited ownerinheritancesecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a second appeal dismissed in limine by the High Court, which had upheld the lower appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's declaratory suit. The plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership in land, claiming that the appellant's father had predeceased his own father, thereby disentitling the appellant to inherit. The core legal question was whether the appellant's father predeceased his father and whether revenue entries and mutation records showing independent succession by the widow could be displaced without proper evidence. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate Court's finding that the father predeceased was based on no evidence, and that the widow had succeeded her husband in her own right as a limited owner under customary law, with the property devolving upon the Shariat law heirs upon her demise. The key principle laid down is that revenue entries carrying a presumption of truth cannot be displaced by mere self-serving oral assertions without documentary proof, and limited estates held by widows devolve upon the last full owner's heirs under the Muslim Personal Law Amendment Act of 1950.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can be permitted to amend a plaint to fundamentally change the nature of the suit regarding the date and fact of a predecessor's death?
  • Do revenue records and mutation entries carry a presumption of truth that requires substantial evidence to displace?
  • How does the Muslim Personal Law Amendment Act of 1950 govern the succession of property held by a limited owner under customary law upon her demise?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. JANNA T BI vs ISHTIAQ BAIG AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 1322 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. IMAM HUSSAIN BIBI vs MUHAMMAD LATIF AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 727 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. HALEEMA BIBI vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1971 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-20
  evacuee propertyspecific performancesuo motu revisioncustodian of evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order declaring a civil court decree in her favour to be illegal and resuming the disputed evacuee land. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner validly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction within the prescribed limitation period, whether the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner acted within his competence as a Settlement authority, and whether a civil court decree obtained without the mandatory prior permission and subsequent confirmation of the Custodian of Evacuee Property was executable against evacuee property. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's intervention was within the statutory nine-month period, that the officer acted as a competent Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and that the civil court decree was corum non judice and unexecutable as the Custodian had refused permission and the decree lacked confirmation. The Court laid down the principle that evacuee property cannot be subjected to court decrees or alienations without strict compliance with statutory requirements, including prior permission and confirmation by the Custodian of Evacuee Property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner can exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under the Land Settlement Act to declare a civil court decree illegal?
  • Does a civil court decree obtained without the prior permission and subsequent confirmation of the Custodian of Evacuee Property hold any legal sanctity regarding evacuee land?
  • Whether an order passed by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner who also functions as a Deputy Settlement Commissioner is amenable to revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAJRAN BIBI vs HABIB AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  acquittalleave to appeallimitationdelay in filingcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court, which set aside the convictions and sentences awarded under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns whether the delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal can be condoned, thereby placing acquitted persons back in jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by limitation by 29 days and that no satisfactory reason or valid ground was shown for the delay. The Court affirmed the established principle that time will not ordinarily be extended in petitions against acquittal to avoid placing acquitted persons in jeopardy out of time, and noted that the respondents were entitled to raise the limitation objection since they were not heard when leave was initially granted. Consequently, the Supreme Court recalled the leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can time be extended for filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal when the petition is barred by limitation?
  • Are respondents entitled to raise an objection regarding limitation at the hearing stage if they were not heard when leave to appeal was originally granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAJRA vs ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (JUDICIAL), KARACHI1971 PLD Karachi 563 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. GULSHAN AND ANOTHR vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER -1971 P Cr. L J 1279 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 498 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. FIRDOUS FATIMA vs THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 843 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATEH BIBI vs AHMAD KHAN AND 6 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 171 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-26
  pre-emptionlis pendensco-ownersuperior right of pre-emptionsubsequent vendeeintegrity of bargain
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents for possession of agricultural land. The land was originally sold by mutation, and subsequently parts of it were transferred, leading to the plaintiffs filing a suit for pre-emption on the ground of being co-owners against strangers and a co-owner who had associated a stranger in the purchase. During the pendency of the suit, the entire land was re-sold to the appellant, Mst. Fateh Bibi, who was herself an owner in the estate by inheritance. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit, holding that the subsequent re-sales were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and not bona fide. The core legal question is whether the doctrine of lis pendens bars a subsequent re-sale of pre-empted property made during the pendency of a suit to a person having a pre-existing equal or superior right of pre-emption. The Lahore High Court held that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to a transfer effected during the pendency of a pre-emption suit to a person possessing a pre-existing right of pre-emption equal or superior to that of the plaintiff, provided the transaction is genuine. The court laid down that a pre-emptor cannot defeat an ultimate purchaser who acquires the property within the period of limitation in assertion of a pre-existing, non-inferior right of pre-emption, as such a transaction does not offend the rule of lis pendens. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the plaintiffs' suit dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens apply to a transfer of property made during the pendency of a pre-emption suit to a person possessing a pre-existing right of pre-emption equal or superior to that of the plaintiff?
  • Does a co-owner lose their right of pre-emption by associating with a stranger in a purchase transaction?
  • Can a subsequent vendee successfully defend their title against a pre-emptor on the ground of a pre-existing right of pre-emption acquired within the period of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FARIDA PARWIN vs QADEERUDDIN AHMAD SIDDIQI1971 PLD Karachi 118 · Sindh High Court · 1970-01-26
  deferred dowerdissolution of marriagefamily court decreejurisdiction of civil courtarbitration councilsupervisory jurisdictionconstitutional petitionremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a second appeal and a revision application challenging an appellate judgment that had set aside and remanded both a suit for the recovery of deferred dower and a suit for a declaration that a previous family court decree of dissolution of marriage was a nullity. The core legal questions concern the maintainability of a civil suit challenging a family court's dissolution decree, the effect of non-compliance with procedural timelines under family laws, and the scope of the High Court's revisional and supervisory jurisdiction over Family Courts and District Courts. The court held that a civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging a dissolution decree when the statutory procedure for conciliation and notice under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and West Pakistan Family Courts Act has been complied with, and that the 90-day period for a decree to become effective runs from its receipt by the Chairman irrespective of directory delays in transmission. Furthermore, while a standard civil revision does not lie against appellate orders under the Family Courts Act, the High Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 102 of the Constitution to correct jurisdictional errors. The key principles established relate to the finality of family court decrees, the directory nature of transmission timelines, and the application of constitutional supervision to subordinate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking a declaration that a family court's decree for the dissolution of marriage is a nullity?
  • Does the delay in sending a certified copy of a dissolution decree to the Chairman beyond the prescribed seven days render the decree ineffective?
  • Whether a revision application is maintainable before the High Court against an appellate judgment of the District Court under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  • Can the High Court exercise judicial control over subordinate courts by invoking the supervisory powers under Article 102 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BIBI RAHMANIA AND 14 OTHERS vs GOVERNMENT THROUGH DIRECTOR, NORTH REGIONAL RESEARCH LABORATORIES AND COLLECTOR, PESHAWAR AND 13 OTHERS1971 PLD Peshawar 191 · Peshawar High Court
  land acquisitionreference to courtlimitation periodtime-barred applicationjurisdiction of reference courtcompensation award
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This first appeal arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Peshawar, dismissing a reference application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as time-barred. The appellants contended that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to examine the question of limitation once the Collector had made a reference, and that limitation issues could only be decided by the Collector. The core legal question is whether a reference court (District Judge or Additional District Judge) is competent to examine and determine whether a reference application made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is barred by time. The Peshawar High Court held that the reference court has the inherent power and duty to satisfy itself that all statutory conditions, including the requirement of limitation prescribed under section 18(2), have been strictly complied with, and that a reference made upon a time-barred application is invalid. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the reference court is fully competent to go into the question of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reference court has jurisdiction to determine if an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is barred by time?
  • Can a reference court entertain a reference made by the Collector based on a time-barred application?
  • Is the question of limitation under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 exclusively within the domain of the Collector, or can it be examined by the District Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BEGAN vs Mst. BAI1971 PLD Lahore 567 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-10
  colonization of government landsproprietary rightslife estatecustomary lawshariat application actmutationalienation restrictionssuccession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from a suit for a declaration regarding ownership of land initially granted for livestock breeding under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The original tenant died issueless, and his widow succeeded to the tenancy, later acquiring proprietary rights. Following the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, a mutation was sanctioned giving a share to the appellant (husband's sister), which the widow challenged, claiming her estate was not hit by section 3 of the 1962 Act since she was not a limited estate-holder under Customary Law. The lower courts decreed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent. The core legal question was whether proprietary rights acquired by a female tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, constitute a limited estate under Customary Law and are thus terminated under section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The High Court held that the estate held by a female who acquired proprietary rights under sections 30 and 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, is distinct from a customary life estate and is not terminated by section 3 of the 1962 Act. The key principle laid down is that restrictions on alienation placed by section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, do not reduce a female's absolute ownership status into a customary life estate for the purposes of termination under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquisition of proprietary rights by a female tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 convert her holding into a limited estate under Customary Law?
  • Are estates held by Muslim females under sections 30 and 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 hit by section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
  • What is the legal effect of restrictions on alienations imposed by section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 on the status of a female acquiring proprietary rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. BANAKH AND ANOTHER vs KHAN MUHAMMAD1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 31 · Board of Revenue · 1971-04-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. AZIZ FATIMA vs Syed MOHAMMAD KAZIM HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-12
  maintenancejurisdictionfamily courtspending proceedingsprocedural lawnullity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal challenging an order of the High Court which set aside a magistrate's notice for the recovery of arrears of maintenance. The core legal question is whether the enforcement of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, deprived magistrates of jurisdiction over pending maintenance applications under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, rendering subsequent orders null and void. The Supreme Court held that the Family Courts Act, being procedural in nature, altered the forum and stripped the magistrate of jurisdiction in scheduled matters upon its enforcement, making any subsequent orders passed without jurisdiction a nullity in the eye of the law. The key principle laid down is that procedural changes affecting forums apply to pending proceedings, and orders passed by a court lacking jurisdiction are nullities that cannot be executed, leaving the aggrieved party to seek remedies before the proper Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, affect pending proceedings under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does a magistrate lose jurisdiction to entertain or execute maintenance applications under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, once the Family Courts Act becomes applicable to an area?
  • Can an order for arrears of maintenance passed by a magistrate without jurisdiction be challenged as a nullity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ANWAR KHATUN vs THE CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE, UMAR BAKHSH, THE BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND THE COURT OF WARDS1971 PLD Lahore 698 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. AMEENABAI AND Others vs KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND Other1971 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitionlocus standimunicipal corporationallotment of landeasement rightsquorum
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal by the High Court of a constitutional petition challenging a municipal resolution and an appellate order regarding the allotment of a plot of land by the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had an enforceable legal right to maintain a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution against the municipal grant of land to a third party and the subsequent administrative dismissal of their appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioners possessed no legal right to the grant of the land that could be asserted through such proceedings, noting that any alleged infringement of easement rights must be pursued via a regular civil suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition and laid down the principle that a party lacking a direct legal right to the grant of municipal property cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 to challenge its disposal, and must resort to civil litigation for the protection of easementary rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person have an enforceable legal right to the grant of municipal land so as to maintain a constitutional petition against its allotment?
  • Can the High Court interfere under Article 98 of the Constitution with the discretionary power of an appellate authority regarding the condonation of delay?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party claiming an infringement of light and air easement rights resulting from the disposal of adjacent municipal property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. AHMEDI BEGUM., MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ ALI KHAN vs MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Supreme Court 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-07
  wakf-alal-auladland reformsmutwallinon-heir beneficiariesmartial law regulationinheritance shareswakf abolition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This litigation involves cross-appeals concerning the distribution of agricultural lands released from a wakf-alal-aulad following the promulgation of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation No. 64 of 1959. The core legal question centered on the proper interpretation of the wakf deed and Paragraph 10(2)(c) of the Regulation regarding the shares to which the wakif's daughter (sole heir) and maternal grandson (mutwalli and descendant) were entitled upon the abolition of the wakf. The Supreme Court held that the high court rightly determined that the mutwalli was not entitled to a two-third share of the entire property, but rather a double share as a non-heir beneficiary in lieu of services, which ceased upon the abolition of the wakf. The Court laid down that upon the cessation of a wakf under the Regulation, succession opens on the date of the Regulation, with the sole heir taking her share under inheritance law and the remaining lands devolving equally among non-heir beneficiaries per capita. Additionally, unclaimed shares of non-heir beneficiaries do not remain in medio but are distributed pro rata among the remaining beneficiaries.

  Questions settled

  • How are agricultural lands released from a wakf under Paragraph 10 of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation No. 64 of 1959 to be distributed between heirs and non-heir beneficiaries?
  • Whether a mutwalli entitled to a double share for services under a wakf deed retains that enhanced share after the wakf is abolished under the Land Reforms Regulation?
  • What is the governing rule for the distribution of shares among non-heir beneficiaries whose interests are not explicitly defined in the wakf deed?
  • How should unclaimed shares of non-heir beneficiaries be handled upon the distribution of erstwhile wakf lands?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. SHAMSUN NEHAR MANSUR vs CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, WEST1971 PTD 550 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-04-03Read full judgment →
• MRS. SHAMSUDDIN AND 5 Others vs RIASAT ALI AND Another1971 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-10
  land allotmentsitting allotteerefugee claimsmartial law regulationjurisdiction of high courtletters patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition directed against an order of a Division Bench of the High Court at Lahore passed in a Letters Patent Appeal concerning the land allotment rights of refugees. The core legal question is whether an original land allotment made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, can be challenged through appeal and revision despite the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, and whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts is barred by paragraphs 12 and 15 of the said Regulation regarding such allotments. The Supreme Court held that the bar to jurisdiction under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 applies only to orders or schemes made thereunder, and does not extinguish accrued rights or prevent challenges to the legality of original allotments made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, where such rights accrued prior to the Regulation. The key principle laid down is that rights already accrued before the promulgation of a Martial Law Regulation are not affected by it in the absence of a clear provision to that effect, and original allotments forming the basis of modified orders remain open to statutory challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an original order of allotment made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, is open to challenge by way of appeal and revision notwithstanding the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 89?
  • Does the bar to the jurisdiction of courts under paragraphs 12 and 15 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89 apply to pre-existing rights and original allotments made prior to the Regulation?
  • Is a sitting allottee entitled to preference in the allotment of available land in a village over refugees transferred from other districts whose initial allotment is found to be illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. SAROJINI RAJAH vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 1094 · Madras High Court · 1971-02-07Read full judgment →
• MRS. SAFIA RASHID MALIK vs THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST1971 PLC 113 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-01-20Read full judgment →
• MRS. RAZIA ABBAS AHMED vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 21971 PLD Karachi 234 · Sindh High Court · 1970-06-09Read full judgment →
• MRS. I. BUTT (NEE ISABELLA HOUGHTON) vs KHALID B1LAL BUTT1971 PLD Lahore 286 · Lahore High Court · 1968-01-12Read full judgment →
• MRS. DAPHNE JOSEPH vs Malik ERIC ROSHAN KHAN1971 PLD Karachi 887 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-19
  Divorce Act 1869West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964Christian marriage and divorcejurisdictionprovincial and central law inconsistencyfamily court rulesdissolution of marriage
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal is directed against an order of the District Judge, Karachi, dismissing a divorce petition filed by a Christian wife under section 10 of the Divorce Act of 1869 on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The appellant contended that under the proviso to rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, the court within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides has jurisdiction, arguing that the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, is a procedural statute applicable to all citizens regardless of religion. The core legal question is whether the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, overrides or applies to Christian marriages governed by the Divorce Act of 1869. The court held that while the Family Courts Act is not exclusively restricted to Muslims, it is a provincial enactment and cannot override or impliedly repeal the Divorce Act of 1869, which is a comprehensive central code exclusively governing Christian matrimonial matters, given that any inconsistency must be resolved in favor of the central law under Article 134 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 apply exclusively to Muslims?
  • Can a provincial law override or amend a central enactment like the Divorce Act of 1869?
  • Which court has jurisdiction to entertain a divorce petition filed by a Christian wife under the Divorce Act of 1869?
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• MR. RAHIM BUX P. MUNSHI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY1971 PLD Karachi 833 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• MR. MANZUR QADIR vs Mst. AMTUL HUSSAIN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 537 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-28
  Letters Patent Appealevacuee propertytransfer of propertycompensation poollocus standilimitationcondonation of delaydiscretionary powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court that declared respondent No. 1 entitled to the transfer of an evacuee bungalow and directed the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner to give effect to the declaration. The core legal questions involved the competency of a non-party to file an appeal, the condonation of delay in filing, the interpretation of 'any property' under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the finality of an order of transfer passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The court held, firstly, that although a stranger to the suit may obtain leave to appeal if prejudicially affected, the appellant failed to show sufficient cause for condoning the substantial delay in filing the appeal, rendering it time-barred. On merits, the court held that the Central Government's power under section 10(2) is not restricted to specific properties and that the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order of transfer was final upon fulfillment of the condition of availability. The appeal was accordingly dismissed both on limitation and on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who was not a party to the original writ petition file an appeal against the judgment with leave of the court?
  • Does the admission of an appeal and ex parte condonation of delay by an admitting Bench preclude a subsequent Bench from re-examining the question of limitation?
  • What is the true scope and meaning of the expression 'any property' under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Whether an order of transfer made subject to a condition of availability can be regarded as a final and conclusive order upon the fulfillment of that condition?
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• MOZAMMEL HAQUE vs MESSRS AEG ENGINEERING PAKISTAN LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 86 · Labour Court · 1970-07-04Read full judgment →
• MOZAHARUL HOSAIN Alias MAJU DARBESH Alias PIRPAGLA DARBESH vs The STATE1971 SCMR 735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of processprima facie casecriminal revisionwrongful confinementcriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant under Sections 344 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that the proceedings were an abuse of process, citing previous dismissals of complaints and alleging harassment for blackmail. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the pending criminal inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court was justified in its decision. The Court observed that the existence of a child born to the alleged victim and the contested validity of the marriage required a formal judicial investigation. The Court affirmed the principle that where a prima facie case is disclosed, justice requires that the trial proceed to determine the truth. The mere fact that previous complaints were dismissed or that time has elapsed does not automatically warrant the quashing of criminal proceedings, as the accused has a right to be honourably acquitted if innocent, while the law must address potential offences if evidence exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere passage of time or the existence of previous dismissed complaints automatically constitute an abuse of process justifying the quashing of criminal proceedings?
  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed when a prima facie case exists regarding the commission of an offence?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to quash criminal proceedings when the evidence regarding the marriage of the accused and the victim is disputed and requires investigation?
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• MOULA BUX AND 3 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-02
  post-arrest baildelay in trialprosecution lachesextended detentionmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal involving petitioners who had been detained in jail for eight years without a single prosecution witness being examined following a murder incident on January 15, 1963. The core legal question concerns whether extended and inordinate delay in holding an inquiry and trial, coupled with prosecution laches, constitutes sufficient ground for granting post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the delay and callous disregard by the prosecution in procuring the presence of accused persons warranted release on bail, noting that drawing a distinction against petitioners for failing to appeal an earlier refusal on merits was legally untenable. The Court ultimately refused leave to appeal to avoid causing further inordinate delay, instead directing the petitioners to renew their bail application before the Sessions Judge to be dealt with at par with a co-accused who was already granted bail under similar circumstances. The key principle laid down is that prolonged pre-trial detention resulting from prosecution laches and delay in inquiry/trial provides a valid ground for granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does prolonged pre-trial delay and prosecution laches constitute sufficient ground for releasing an accused on bail?
  • Can a Sessions Judge refuse bail to petitioners on the ground that they failed to appeal an earlier refusal on merits when the fresh petition is based on extended delay?
  • How should a court handle bail applications for accused persons similarly situated when co-accused have already been granted bail?
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• MOTABAR AND 14 Others vs MESSRS S. M. REHMAN & Co., QUETTA AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 321 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-01-27Read full judgment →
• MOJIBOR RAHMAN MULLICK Arts 2 Others vs TOBARAK MAJHI-Opposite-1971 P Cr. L J 732 · Dhaka High CourtRead full judgment →
• MOHIB AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1144 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-26Read full judgment →
• MOHAN SINGH AND OTHERS--Plaintiffs vs TARI MIA AND OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 75 · Dacca · 1969-12-16Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMED MIAH vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1971 P Cr. L J 598 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-11-11Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMED ABDUL JALIL vs DAWOOD SHIPPING CORPORATION LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 550 · Labour Court · 1970-08-15Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD URIS AND 5 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-17
  murderprivate defencecommon objecteyewitness testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidencewater dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of six petitioners for murder and causing injuries during a violent altercation over water rights. The petitioners were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge, Larkana, for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, with sentences upheld by the West Pakistan High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the right of private defence of person and property, and whether the prosecution evidence, involving interested witnesses, required further corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were the aggressors, as evidenced by the physical circumstances of the crime scene and the testimony of injured eye-witnesses. The Court rejected the defence's claim of private defence, finding the prosecution's case sufficiently proved. Furthermore, the Court held that minor discrepancies between medical evidence and witness testimony regarding specific weapons used do not necessarily invalidate eyewitness accounts, particularly in the confusion of an attack. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings that the petitioners had made a common cause to commit the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy between medical evidence and witness testimony regarding the weapon used necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can the right of private defence be claimed by an aggressor party in a criminal altercation?
  • Is the testimony of injured eyewitnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction without further corroboration?
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• MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 3 Others vs THE STATE Respondent,1971 P Cr. L J 92 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-21Read full judgment →